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(part I of several)

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MILITARY SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST

HEARINGS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES AND THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS UNITED STATES SENATE EIGHTY-SECOND CONGRESS FIRST SESSION

TO
CONDUCT AN INQUIRY INTO THE MILITARY
SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST AND THE FACTS
SURROUNDING THE RELIEF OF GENERAL OF
THE ARMY DOUGLAS MACARTHUR FROM HIS
ASSIGNMENTS IN THAT AREA

PART 1

MAY 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, AND 14, 1951

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
and the Committee on Foreign Relations



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MILITARY SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST

THURSDAY, MAY 3, 1951

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES AND THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
UNITED STATES SENATE,
Washington, D. C.

The committees met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10:30 a. m. in the caucus room, Senate Office Building, Senator Richard B. Russell (chairman, Committee on Armed Services) presiding.

Present: Senators Russell, Connally (chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations), George, Green, McMahon, Fulbright, Sparkman, Gillette, Wiley, Smith (New Jersey), Hickenlooper, Lodge, Toby, Byrd, Johnson (Texas), Kefauver, Stennis, Long, Bridges, Saltonstall, Morse, Knowland, Cain, and Flanders.

Also present: Mark H. Galusha and Verne D. Mudge, of the staff of the Committee on Armed Services; Francis O. Wilcox, chief of staff; Thorsten V. Kalijarvi, staff associate, Committee on Foreign Relations; C. C. O'Day, clerk; and Pat M. Holt, associate clerk.

(Subheadings within the text have been inserted by committee staff in order to make hearings more readable and easier to follow.)

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen of the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations, today we are opening hearings on momentous questions. These questions affect not only the lives of every citizen, but they are vital to the security of our country and the maintenance of our institutions of free Government.

We shall attempt to obtain the facts which are necessary to permit the Congress to discharge its proper functions and make correct decisions on the problem of war and peace in the Far East and indeed throughout the world.

General of the Army Douglas MacArthur has consented to be the first witness at these hearings. I am sure it is unnecessary for me to attempt to recount in detail the deeds and services which have endeared General MacArthur to the American people.

On the permanent pages of our history are inscribed his achievements as one of the great captains of history through three armed conflicts; but he is not only a great military leader, his broad understanding and knowledge of the science of politics has enabled him to restore and stabilize a conquered country and to win for himself and for his country the respect and affection of a people who were once our bitterest enemies.

The general is here today to counsel with our committees and to help us in the fulfillment of our legislative responsibilities.

SPIRIT OF THE HEARINGS

In his address to the Congress on April 19 the general said:

I do not stand here as an advocate for any partisan cause, for the issues are fundamental and reach quite beyond the realm of partisan consideration. They must be resolved on the highest plane of national interest if our course is to prove sound and our future protected.

I wholeheartedly associate myself with that sentiment. I hope these hearings may be conducted from beginning to end in that spirit. If they are not conducted with the single purpose of serving the national interest in this hour of crisis, we will fail those who have given us their confidence and depend upon us for leadership and guidance.

The guiding light here today, and in the days to follow, must be the national interest, for the national interest transcends, in importance, the fortunes of any individual, or group of individuals.

If we are to exercise one of the highest legislative functions, we must see that the American people are brought the truth, and the whole truth, without the color of prejudice or partisanship, and with no thought as to personalities.

If we do less, we will thwart the proper working of the processes upon which the success of our form of government depends.

MILITARY SECURITY ASPECTS OF HEARINGS

General MacArthur, I am sure you are aware of the controversy as to whether or not these hearings should be in open, or executive session.

Those of us who have supported the executive sessions are anxious to see that the facts reach the American people as rapidly as they are developed.

We have, however, been apprehensive lest, in the heat of controversy, questions of some committee members, or an unguarded statement of some unskilled witness might endanger the lives of our fighting men, or endanger the national security.

Your vast experience makes you one of the best qualified men in this country, on the question of what might effect the safety of our soldiers, and the security of our Nation. It is my desire that the transcripts of these hearings should be full and complete, except for material which would be helpful to our enemies.

You can render a great service to the members of this committee, and to the American people, if you would indicate, as the hearings proceed, any material which, in your judgment, might have a damaging effect.

I do not like to be put in the position of constantly admonishing, some Senators might call it lecturing, Members of the Senate, on the importance of taking extreme care to maintain all reasonable security precautions.

I think we all know how difficult that problem is, and how skillful many outsiders, particularly gentlemen of the fourth estate, are in piecing together a series of separate and apparently unrelated comments that they get from different Members of Congress, into stories that could be very damaging.

Of course, as chairman of this committee, I feel a particular responsibility in respect to classified information.

I am perfectly willing to bear my full share of that responsibility; but I hope that all of the Members of the Senate will cooperate to the utmost in discharging their responsibility and obligation, which is equally mine.

Now, General MacArthur, I do not know whether or not you have a prepared statement. The Senators present would appreciate any remarks you may care to offer as a basis for opening these hearings.

Keep your seat, General, if you choose, if you find it more comfortable.

General MACARTHUR. Thank you. I associate myself—

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, are you going to swear the witness?

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you for reminding me of that.

General MacArthur, the committee took the extraordinary action, in view of the fact that we did not know what the scope of these hearings would be, and the large number of witnesses that might be brought in, of directing me as chairman to administer the oath to all of the witnesses who might appear.

The evidence which you are about to present the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations bearing upon the matters under inquiry shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God.

(General MacArthur and General Whitney nodded affirmatively.)

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, General.

TESTIMONY OF GENERAL OF THE ARMY DOUGLAS MacARTHUR, ACCOMPANIED BY MAJ. GEN. COURTNEY WHITNEY

General MACARTHUR. I would associate myself entirely, Senator, with your preliminary remarks. I have no prepared statement.

My comments were made fully when I was so signally honored by the Congress in inviting me to appear before them. I appear today not as a voluntary witness at all, but in response to the request of the committee, and I am entirely in the hands of the committee.

EFFECTIVENESS OF INTEGRATION OF ARMED SERVICES

The CHAIRMAN. General, I shall ask a few questions, then, bearing upon particularly the matters within the purview of the Committee on Armed Services. This is the first opportunity that the committee has had to have with us a commanding officer from the field who has been in close day-to-day contact with operations in Korea.

You, of course, are aware of the long efforts that have been made in the Congress to coordinate the activities of the several branches of the service, to eliminate duplication, and to weld them into an effective fighting machine.

I should like to ask you if, as a result of your experiences in Korea during this struggle, you feel that we have accomplished the complete integration as a fighting machine of the various services.

General MACARTHUR. I can only speak for what has occurred within what was my theater of responsibility, Senator. You would know more about the integration here or in continental America probably than I would, but in the Far East the integration of the three fighting services has been as complete as I could possibly imagine.

They have worked as a team. The responsiveness of each service to the desires and wishes of the other has been almost perfection. The integration there has been much more than the integration of the three services. It has been the integration of the forces of a number of nations, all of which had various components there. I would rate it as 100 percent, and the only reason I do not rate it higher is because I believe the mathematicians say 100 percent is all there is.

The CHAIRMAN. That includes the cooperation between the air in support of ground forces as well as all of the other phases of activity, tactical activity?

General MACARTHUR. Yes, sir. What I am referring to is the coordination. I am not referring to the efficiencies; I am referring to basic amalgamation of the services and their efforts in support of each other.

QUALITY OF SOUTH KOREAN SOLDIERS

The CHAIRMAN. General, we have received conflicting reports as to the battle efficiency of the South Korean forces. Some of the fragmentary reports we have received and some of the reports we have received from those in the lower echelons has been that they are very fine soldiers, and others that have been there have spoken of them somewhat disparagingly. The committee would like to have your viewpoint on the South Korean soldiers.

General MACARTHUR. In courage and in determination, and in resolution, they are very fine troops. They lack the background of long tradition. They lack an officer corps, which takes years to build up. They lack in the efficacy of long periods of training. The lack in certain instances of matériel and other deficiencies is apparent. But within the physical limitations that exist, I regard them as very fine, indeed.

Their casualties, compared with the forces that were committed, reflect an indomitable spirit for victory. They are lightly armed and are at their best in what you might call the reconnaissance and exploitive features of campaigns.

They do not have the depth of matériel to resist, as well as some other of our forces there, the attack of well-equipped, experienced modern armies.

In certain of their efforts, such as the exploitive pursuit they are unequalled. They can go further on less than any troops I have ever commanded. As all troops have, they have many excellent points and they have some weak points.

The CHAIRMAN. You refer to their——

General MACARTHUR. The difference in reporting is perfectly natural. You will find that that exists on all battlefields in all areas. The instances that fall under one man's observation may be good; another group may be bad. The sum total of the Korean, as I say, within his limitations, is high.

The CHAIRMAN. You refer to their lack of matériel. We are supplying them. Is that because we do not have the supplies for them or because they are not capable of using larger quantities of matériel and equipment?

General MACARTHUR. The supplies that were available to me were not entirely adequate to arm them in the same ratio as our own troops.

In supplying heavy weapons, such as artillery, tanks, and things of that sort, it takes a high degree of training, it takes time. They have a great pool of manpower but it is untrained. To train it takes considerable time, and the supplies to equip them on the same basis as our troops have not been available.

INTEGRATION OF UNITED NATIONS FORCES IN KOREA

The CHAIRMAN. You referred, General, to what had been accomplished in handling troops of different nations, of various tongues. Do you think that the experience we have had there might stand us in good stead in the event of an all-out war where we would undertake to have armies that would be composed of soldiers from many nations? Has it been on a large enough scale to assist us and other members of the United Nations—have they transported enough troops there to where that experience would really be of any benefit to us in the case of an all-out war between communism and the free world?

General MACARTHUR. I would doubt it very much, Senator. The forces of all of the nations except the South Koreans and ours are token forces at best.

The CHAIRMAN. Were any difficulties encountered in integrating the efforts of those token forces?

General MACARTHUR. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have American officers who could speak Turkish, for example, to serve as liaison with the Turkish commanding officer?

General MACARTHUR. We managed to make ourselves reciprocally understood.

The CHAIRMAN. The reason I asked the question—I have been concerned about our training of our commissioned personnel, particularly, in the different languages to enable us to have a coordinated force in the event, which God forbid is necessary, to assemble one to resist communism.

General MACARTHUR. I will say that the Turkish Brigade is one of the finest I have ever been associated with.

The CHAIRMAN. Elite troops, I suppose, and picked for that purpose, were they not, General?

General MACARTHUR. I could not tell you that, Senator.

CHINESE COMMUNIST AIR STRENGTH

The CHAIRMAN. What was the estimate of the Chinese air strength at the time you left the theater, the best estimate that our intelligence had been able to gather of the strength of air that was available by Chinese Communists or others?

We read from time to time where there are brushes between our jet planes and enemy planes of some character and description. Do you have any estimate you could give us as to the total strength of that Chinese Air Force?

General MACARTHUR. The estimates varied. They varied as low as 300 planes and as high as 800 planes. I saw one estimate that went up to above a thousand. The actual strength is conjectural.

The CHAIRMAN. Have they yet attacked our Ground Forces in Korea, the Chinese?

General MACARTHUR. Not in any serious way. There has been an occasional, sporadic strike of one or two planes, but nothing of any serious nature whatsoever?

The CHAIRMAN. Has that been bombing, strafing, or both?

General MACARTHUR. I could not tell you, Senator. The instances were of such minor importance that the details I would not attempt to recall.

SOVIET STRENGTH IN THE FAR EAST

The CHAIRMAN. I was impressed, General, in your tribute to the Japanese people in your address to the Congress. You stated about the hazard of removing all of the troops that we had, garrison troops, from Japan to the field in Korea. If Russia had seen fit to have moved at that time, I assume that they could have captured Japan, could they not?

General MACARTHUR. I would doubt it very seriously, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. You would doubt it?

General MACARTHUR. Yes, sir. I don't believe that Japan could have been taken except by an amphibious effort. And as long as we held control of the sea and of the air over that sea, I would doubt that the Soviet would have been able to overrun Japan in any coup de main.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, it is always difficult for us to have any real estimate of Russian strength in that area. Some sources contend that it is very substantial; they have great airborne armies that they can transport by air from place to place as well as considerable air strength. What did your intelligence reveal as to that?

General MACARTHUR. I will give you my own estimate, if you will permit me.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

General MACARTHUR. The Soviet in the Far East deploys possibly between [deleted].

[Deleted] of armed men in the various three services. He is dependent for their support almost entirely from European Russia.

This side of the Bicol region, there is no industrial set-up of major proportion, so that all of the munition equipment, all the strategic war weapons, all of the sustenance that goes in in such major quantity to support armed forces, must pass over that railway line which runs from European Russia across Siberia.

That line is strained to the very utmost now to maintain on a normal peace basis the forces which the Soviet maintains in Siberia.

I do not believe that it would be within the capacity of the Soviet to mass any great additional increment of force to launch any predatory attack from the Asiatic continent.

I believe that the dispositions of the Soviet forces are largely defensive. I believe that the Soviet has so often repeated the incorrect statement that we are planning to attack him, that he has finally begun to believe himself.

I believe that the weakness of Red China, a weakness which is very noticeable in the air and on the sea, is a corollary of the inability of the Soviet logistical system to send out those munitions to assist its ally.

I believe that the Soviet has the capacity to launch a punishing attack upon Japan, but I do not believe the Soviet has the capacity to overrun Japan until she gets command of the sea and of the air.

That she could get the command of the sea in the face of our magnificent Navy, I would be very doubtful of under any circumstances.

SOVIET AIR STRENGTH IN FAR EAST

Their air is not to be discounted. The estimates of the air strength in the Far East vary. I have seen it put as high as [out] planes, including the naval planes of their fifth and seventh fleets, which are out there.

My own belief is that they could initially launch, perhaps [deleted] planes.

Of those planes, the majority are fighters. Of those fighters, the majority are jets, and are excellent.

The Soviet probably suffers greatly from a lack of maintenance facilities, gasoline, petroleum supplies, and other things.

How long she would be able to maintain an air effort in an all-out war out there is, of course, speculative.

My own opinion is that it would not be too long. I believe that their efforts would deteriorate from the beginning of hostilities.

She has over there now in counted planes, of course [deleted], but they are scattered; their use, their logistical position, gives no indication of any immediate preparation for assault.

Now, when you speculate along that line you are truly speculating. This is the estimate that I had at the time I left.

The very fact that when I poured all our troops from Japan into Korea, and there was no slightest evidence on the part of the Soviet to take any advantage as far as Japan was concerned of that situation, they tend to bear out my estimate.

The CHAIRMAN. How about the submarine strength of the Soviet in that area?

General MACARTHUR. The Soviet, the Russian over the centuries has never been able to develop a navy. It has been of course the political basis of Russian foreign policy to obtain a commercial naval force with a combat force to protect it.

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RUSSIAN INTEREST IN ACCESS TO THE SEA AND SEAPOWER

The Russian has always believed that he could not take his rightful place in the international sphere of commerce and industry unless he shared the commerce of the seas. For centuries he has been seeking warm waters. For centuries the fundamental political policy of the British Empire, no matter what party grew up in place of the Prime Minister, has been to prevent that, and always they have been successful.

The objective of Russia for many decades was the Mediterranean. It not only would have given her warm water, given her a chance to develop her transportation, her water transportation facilities, but would have cut the lifeline of her great rival.

Whether you believe in the British or whether you do not, they were amazingly successful either on the field of battle in the utilization of the principle of the balance of power, or in combinations and leagues of various nations to prevent that tremendous expansion. Without that, Russia could not dominate and control the world.

Now recently the Russian has probably had a new vision opened. That vision is no longer confined to the warm water of the Mediterranean or Europe. It is the possibility of reaching the warm waters of the Pacific and the Indian Ocean.

If by any combination she could extend down to the Indian Ocean, she would not only outflank the Mediterranean, of course, but it would place her fair and flush upon the continent of Africa, which for the next hundred years, with its enormous industrial potential, is something that attracts all commerce and all industry, whatever its nationality might be.

It is a vision which perhaps transcends anything that the old Czarist regimes ever had.

Now as to the possibilities of what may accrue after you reach warm water, you have reached a different phase. As I said to start with, the Russian has never been a seagoing man. It has been his enormous weakness. His great strength has always been on the ground.

It takes decades, some of us believe it takes centuries, to develop a merchant marine and combat vessels to protect them. The Russians have never shown that capacity in the slightest degree.

STRENGTH OF THE SOVIET NAVY IN THE FAR EAST

Over in the Far East their fleets, the Fifth and the Seventh Fleet, are light elements, cruiser, destroyer. They would not be a match either in quantity and certainly not in quality with our own forces.

Along the lines of submarines, the estimates vary. Probably the superior methods of gathering intelligence here in the Central Intelligence Agency gives a great deal more information than I could give you. I am very limited, and what I could gather was on my immediate front and under inhibitions that have probably never been equaled.

SOVIET SUBMARINES

My own belief is that she might have, in the neighborhood of Vladivostok, and in that area, probably [deleted] submarines.

The CHAIRMAN. Any snorkels, General?

General MACARTHUR. I should say that she would have, perhaps, [deleted] modern submarines—German.

Now, whether she has the German crews to man them, I do not know. If they have, they are first class. No better submarine service was ever developed than the German.

Now, the boats, themselves, are unquestionably German. Whether they are manned by efficient crews, I could not tell you. I would have doubts about it.

The majority of their submarines are of low radius, and are largely for defensive purposes. Their training is largely to prevent an amphibious thrust by us into their harbors.

Now, a submarine attack is a serious thing to any logistical line of supply overseas. The mere threat of it means that you cannot dispatch transports and supply ships without the enormous effort of convoying them.

So, the mere threat of submarining would have a very potential effect upon the operations in the Far East.

RUSSIA'S MESHING OF ACTION TO OURS

The CHAIRMAN. General, you stated, in your address to the Congress, that Russia would not necessarily mesh their actions to ours.

Could that be construed as a statement of your belief that they would not mesh their actions with ours?

General MACARTHUR. Everything I say, Senator, of course, is on my own personal authority, and represents nothing but my own views.

The CHAIRMAN. A great many people are interested in your views.

SOVIET CHOICES OF ACTION

General MACARTHUR. My own belief is that the Soviet has two great choices—this perhaps oversimplifies, but it will illustrate my thought.

Those two great choices are: First, whether he, at some time or other, is going to attack or not.

The second choice is the reverse of that: Whether he is not going to attack.

He knows, just as well as you and I know, that we are not going to attack him.

If he has determined that he is not going to attack, that he is doing well enough in the present atmosphere, that he is acquiring and expanding as rapidly as he can digest it; and that he is not going to attack, and that is his basic policy—I do not believe that anything that happens in Korea, or Asia, for that matter, would affect his basic decision.

If he has determined that he is going to use force, sooner or later, what occurs in Korea, or in Asia, might affect his timetable.

I believe that he will make his decisions on a higher basis than the incidents that are occurring in Asia at the present time.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you have any opinion as to whether their strategy is to move in Asia, or Europe, first; or do you think that they have any hard and fast plans in either direction, but are awaiting events that might make one or the other area more propitious?

General MACARTHUR. I would say that it would be highly speculative to attempt to guess; that it would be quite ridiculous.

I believe that the Soviet high command, from the military standpoint, represents a high degree of efficiency. I do not believe that they would put themselves into any strait-jacket of inelasticity, any program of A, B, C, or June, July, or August, which would determine it.

I believe that, like all good commanders, they would be flexible enough to adjust their movements to the conditions that exist.

GROUND TROOPS NEEDED TO ACCOMPLISH UN MISSION IN KOREA

The CHAIRMAN. General, did you ever submit any estimate as to the number of troops that would be necessary to accomplish the mission of the United Nations in Korea, under the conditions which attach themselves to the command in that area?

General MACARTHUR. I have constantly asked for more troops than I was able to obtain, Senator, from the beginning of hostilities.

The numbers that were available to me were limited, and I was informed to that effect; and, with what I had, I did the best I could.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be an estimate that you would not care to make, but do you have any estimate of the number of troops that it would take?

General MACARTHUR. You go into a field that cannot be answered categorically, in that way, Senator.

The number of troops that you speak of are the ground troops, I suppose?

The CHAIRMAN. Well, and their supporting elements.

General MACARTHUR. The supporting elements are acting in such a limited way that it is impossible, for me, at least, to make a categorical reply to your question.

The air and naval forces that were at my disposal out there were only operating at a fraction of their efficiency. They are in effect—by being confined to the narrow area of the battleground of Korea—they are in effect merely performing that function which would be regarded as tactical support of the infantry line.

The great strategic concept of stopping the supplies to troops, of preventing the build-up of troops to be thrown against them, to the disorganization of transportation lines—all of the uses which over the years and centuries the Navy and Air are supposed to do are not permitted over there.

If you would take off and permit them their full capacity, I do not believe it would take a very great additional component of ground troops to wind this thing up.

Now, actually if you do not permit the use of our forces in their normal capacity, you would not be able to supply enough ground troops in Korea to be able to safely clear North Korea.

You would go up to the Yalu and you would be in a position where the enemy could jump you immediately. I don't know how many troops it would take you to do that—ground troops—but they are quite beyond the capacity of this country to supply and maintain with our base 10,000 miles away—and do anything else.

RELATIONSHIP OF COMMANDER TO UNITED NATIONS

The CHAIRMAN. General, will you clarify for the benefit of the committee your position as Commander in Chief of the United Nations there as well as of the United States forces? When you submitted your request for troops, did you submit it to the Government of the United States or did you submit it to the United Nations or both?

General MACARTHUR. Senator, my connection with the United Nations was largely nominal. There were provisions made that the entire control of my command and everything I did came from our own Chiefs of Staff and my channel of communication was defined as was the Army Chief of Staff.

Even the reports which were normally made by me to the United Nations were subject to censorship by our State and Defense Departments. I had no direct connection with the United Nations whatsoever.

The controls over me were exactly the same as though the forces under me were all American. All of my communications were to the American high command here.

CENSORING OF REPORTS TO THE UNITED NATIONS

The CHAIRMAN. Were any of your communications to the United Nations that went through that chain of command actually censored?

General MACARTHUR. Yes, sir. The reports that I made, comments and suggestions—suggestions came back to me as to whether I would accept the changes. Many of those changes I accepted. There were at least in one case changes which I would not accept, changes which seemed to me to place a political slant upon a military officer's report, which were not warrantable.

In that it created a degree of discussion between the State and Defense Departments.

The Defense Department supported my point of view, and maintained that nothing should go in over my signature that I did not approve.

I might say that I would not have permitted anything to go in over my name that I did not approve.

The CHAIRMAN. What was that change to which you refer, General, that you refused to make on the request of the Defense Establishment? You said there were—

General MACARTHUR. I don't know whether the requests were from the State or the Defense Establishment.

The reports that I submitted were passed through both of them, but they made a number of changes in practically every report. I have not got the files here, and I couldn't tell you.

The CHAIRMAN. I, of course, realize the impossibility of remembering everything that was in them. You stated there were some of them that you agreed to, but there was one occasion that you did not agree to a change. I thought, perhaps, that would stand out in your mind as much as would some, if not argument, discussion, at least, on this subject.

General MACARTHUR. No, sir. I couldn't reconstitute this without going into the records. It is entirely available. All you have to do is call on the Department for it.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir; but I have not had an opportunity to do so; I have had quite a few details to read all these records, and I, of course, knowing your memory, thought, perhaps, you would recall just what that incident was.

General MACARTHUR. The general gist of it was, as I said, that it seemed to introduce a political slant which the State Department believed would be advantageous in its handling of the various nations of the United Nations at Lake Success.

It did not agree with my own military concepts, and the reports I put in were intended to be entirely factual—the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, as far as I saw it.

Is there any objection to my smoking?

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, no; it is perfectly agreeable. The members of the committee have been smoking, and we certainly would not extend to them any right that would not be extended to you, General.

/ TIME OF PROPOSAL TO BOMB MANCHURIA AND BLOCKADE CHINA

Prior to the time that the Chinese Communists intervened in the war, had any question arisen as to the blockade of China or of the bombing of bases in Manchuria in the event that they did intervene?

General McARTHUR. I don't entirely recall, Senator, except the question of the "hot pursuit," I know that the Air wished from the very beginning to pursue an attacking enemy plane to the death, whether it was over the border line or not.

The directives forbade that. The question of the blockade of China, the Chinese coasts, as far as I can recall, when the war was confined to the North Koreans, hadn't agitated our headquarters anyway.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, the North Koreans did not have enough air to make that really a vital question; did it, pursuit?

General MACARTHUR. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. It did not really become an issue until after the Chinese intervened.

General MACARTHUR. Correct; but the question was raised at the very beginning, whether we could pursue an attacking plane to a conclusion in the air fight.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you recall at what period during the operations that you first formally suggested to the Defense Establishment that you be permitted to carry on air operations over Manchuria or to blockade the China coast? I do not mean the exact date, General; I mean relative to events. Was it just after the Chinese intervened or about the time that you issued your statement that it was an entirely new war?

General MACARTHUR. It was after the Chinese intervened, and it was definitely established that they were making war on our forces in Korea.

There were various recommendations put in immediately thereafter—after it was determined that China was warring against us, Red China, I put in the application for the use of—that the wraps be taken off the forces in Formosa. There were other recommendations that went in at various times, but I would not—I could not at this stage—I will say that there were a number of visits by the Army Chief of Staff, General Collins, at which those points were discussed in detail, and our position was set forth. However, the decisions were made in Washington, and were complied with completely and absolutely.

The CHAIRMAN. So after the Chinese Communists came in and immediately after it was evident that they were in large numbers attacking your forces, you did recommend that the naval blockade be enforced and that what you have very graphically described as a sanctuary in Manchuria be subject to air attack, and that the Chinese Nationalist troops be employed?

General MACARTHUR. I very definitely recommended that the Chinese Nationalist troops be employed. Whether there was any definite written form in the other things, I do not recall.

In my discussions with General Collins I pointed out how extraordinarily necessary it was to lift those inhibitions.

FORM OF THE PROPOSALS

The CHAIRMAN. But you did not formally request that through channels, that those interdictions be removed?

General MACARTHUR. The requests were made of course to the Army Chief of Staff, General Collins, in the references. You understand that from the beginning these inhibitions were listed, Senator, and

they were never lifted, and when General Collins came out there on these various things, I pointed out the grave effects of not listing them.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, I understood that. Of course that is the point; the very vital question about this whole tragic controversy is the employment of the Nationalist troops, the position of a naval blockade and the bombing of the bases and lines of supply and communications of the Communist Chinese.

Now every member of the committee wishes to develop just how the controversy arose, whether it was through a formal request or through discussion with General Collins and likewise as to your best estimate as to the time.

RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE JOINT CHIEF OF STAFF (JCS) OF
JANUARY 12, 1951

General MACARTHUR. The position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and my own so far as I know were practically identical. On January 12 the Joint Chiefs of Staff presented a study to the Secretary of Defense embodying these conditions:

That we were to continue and intensify now an economic blockade of trade with China.

That we were to prepare now to impose a naval blockade of China and place it into effect as soon as our position in Korea is stabilized or when we have evacuated Korea, and depending upon circumstances then obtaining.

Remove now the restrictions on air reconnaissance of China coastal areas and of Manchuria.

Remove now the restrictions on operations of the Chinese Nationalist forces and give such logistical support to those forces as will contribute to effective operations against the Communists.

Those views which were put in on January 12 by the Joint Chiefs of Staff were unquestionably the result largely of the conferences which were going on constantly between my headquarters and Washington. I was in full agreement with them and am now.

As far as I know, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have never changed those recommendations. If they have, I have never been informed of it.

I want to say that the relationships between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and myself have been admirable. All members are personal friends of mine. I hold them individually and collectively in the greatest esteem. If there has been any friction between us, I am not aware of it.

The CHAIRMAN. Was that message transmitted to you as the commander of those forces by the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

General MACARTHUR. I beg your pardon, Senator?

The CHAIRMAN. Was that message, that document from which you have just read, transmitted to you as part of your instructions?

General MACARTHUR. No, sir. This was the recommendation, the study made by the Joint Chiefs of Staff which was submitted to the Secretary of Defense. A copy of it was furnished me.

NO ACTION ON RECOMMENDATIONS

The CHAIRMAN. But it was furnished to you as a recommendation to the Secretary of Defense and you of course awaited a decision from that source before proceeding along—

General MACARTHUR. A decision putting this into effect never arrived.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you get any instructions it was not to be put into effect?

General MACARTHUR. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You of course being in Korea and Japan do not know, or do you know, what happened to those recommendations?

General MACARTHUR. No, sir; I do not.

The CHAIRMAN. They were submitted to you as a recommendation of the Joint Chiefs dependent upon the approval of the Secretary of Defense or the Commander in Chief, is that a fair statement?

General MACARTHUR. A copy was furnished me of this military study which the Joint Chiefs of Staff made to the Secretary. A copy was sent to me for my information only.

The CHAIRMAN. So if that was a recommendation of the Joint Chiefs, it encountered a veto somewhere along the line, either from the Secretary of Defense or the Commander in Chief, the President of the United States?

General MACARTHUR. I would assume so, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Did the Joint Chiefs ever advise you formally or informally as to what happened to their recommendations?

General MACARTHUR. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You did not discuss it with them on subsequent visits to your command?

General MACARTHUR. I discussed, every time any of them ever came out there, I discussed all these subjects.

The CHAIRMAN. And they did not tell you what had happened to their recommendations?

General MACARTHUR. Nothing. I have no knowledge of what happened to this study after it reached the Secretary of Defense.

RELATIONSHIP OF UNITED STATES TO UN IN KOREAN CONFLICT

The CHAIRMAN. Did the original prohibition against taking this action that you received, did that purport to be an order to you from the American Government or a finding of the United Nations?

General MACARTHUR. The agreement that was apparently made between the United Nations and the United States Government was that the United States Government should be the agent for the United Nations in the campaign in Korea.

The orders that came to me were from the American Government, but they had under that basis the validity of both the United States Government and the United Nations, I would assume.

The entire control of the campaign in Korea was in the hands of the American Government as the agent for the United Nations. That is my understanding of it.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you ever advised by any of the Joint Chiefs or through official or unofficial communication or by the Commander in Chief on the occasion of your meeting with him at Wake Island, of any steps that were taken to get the approval of the United Nations of any of the military plans that were formulated on behalf of the United States Government?

General MACARTHUR. None whatsoever. I think the very agreement was that the United States Government would run the campaign as they had the great mass of responsibility and the forces.

It was a perfectly logical thing that they should exercise the authority.

The CHAIRMAN. I have a great many more questions, but I have already asked too many because the members of my committee are all anxious. They have questions of their own that have been raised in their minds.

Senator Connally?

Senator CONNALLY. I will defer.

General MACARTHUR. If you can get 3 or 4 days off, go over to Korea. You will learn more in 48 hours in that atmosphere than you will learn in 48 weeks at this distance. They would give you the heartiest of welcome, and you would have an indelible impression. You have been playing with soldiers long enough to be something of a soldier yourself. won't

The CHAIRMAN. Even though I was only an apprentice seaman in the United States Navy in World War I, one of the highlights of my experience was the week I spent with you in Port Moresby in your headquarters in 1943 when cleaning up New Guinea.

I do not want to go to Korea right now, General, because I am trying to be objective in this matter, and I know that any man that gets over there with troops and under fire would immediately go to shouting for airplanes, more troops, blockade the coast, bomb the Chinese. Because when a man is under fire in the Pacific area, that is the most important thing in the world.

CONDITIONS ON THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Was there any condition on this order from the Joint Chiefs, General?

General MACARTHUR. Was there any what?

The CHAIRMAN. Was there any condition on this order from the Joint Chiefs?

General MACARTHUR. Any condition?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir. Was the blockade not to be enforced unless you evacuated Korea?

General MACARTHUR. What I read is the extract from that report, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And there is no limitation on the time that it was to be put into effect, or conditions rather? Was there any limitation that it was not to be effective unless you were compelled to evacuate Korea?

General MACARTHUR. The only conditions were those I read, sir. Do you wish me to read it again?

The CHAIRMAN. If you would be good enough, General.

General MACARTHUR (reading):

Continue and intensify now an economic blockade of trade with China.

Prepare now to impose a naval blockade of China and place it into effect as soon as our position in Korea is stabilized or when we have evacuated Korea, and depending upon circumstances then obtaining.

Remove now any restrictions on air reconnaissance of China coastal areas and of Manchuria.

Remove now the restrictions on operations of the Chinese Nationalists forces and give such logistic support to those forces as will contribute to effective operations against the Communists.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, the one that said, "depending upon the circumstances"—if I understand the reading of it—I wish to assure you I have not seen that document—

General MACARTHUR. That reads, Senator:

Prepare now to impose a naval blockade of China and place it into effect as soon as our position in Korea is stabilized.

That was January 12, when we were regrouping our forces after the attack by the Chinese Red Army—

Or when we have evacuated Korea and depending upon circumstances then obtaining.

That is the wording.

The CHAIRMAN. That, I suppose, was designed to give you the fullest freedom of action when it says "depending upon the circumstances then obtaining." I don't know what other purpose those words could have. Well, that, of course, relates to a construction.

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF RECOMMENDED ONLY RECONNAISSANCE—NOT
BOMBING

There has been considerable—I won't say considerable—but there has been some confusion about some parts of your address, General. In one of them you referred to reconnaissance over China and in the other to bombing in Manchuria.

As I recall your address, in your four points you had reconnaissance and then later on you referred to attacking these bases in Manchuria.

Did you understand the order of the Joint Chiefs or the proposal of the Joint Chiefs, I might say, to relate to reconnaissance or to an attack on bases?

General MACARTHUR. This paper, they had, that I just read from?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.

General MACARTHUR. It says:

Remove now restrictions on air reconnaissance of China coastal areas and of Manchuria.

The CHAIRMAN. There is quite a difference between reconnaissance and attack, is there not?

General MACARTHUR. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Did the Joint Chiefs ever suggest in addition to the reconnaissance that these bases be attacked?

General MACARTHUR. Not that I know of, Senator; the only order I had was not to attack.

[Deleted.]

The CHAIRMAN. Did you construe your original orders to prohibit you from retaliating against Soviet air forces or the Soviets in any manner favorable to you in the event the Soviets intervened in Korea?

General MACARTHUR. Most explicitly I was prohibited from bombing any place beyond the area of Korea.

(The following matter was originally deleted, but Secretary Marshall later informed the committee that General MacArthur's statement on this subject could be released, and it follows hereunder.)

PROHIBITION ON BOMBING RACIN

I might say in that connection that additional restrictions were placed upon it. For instance, I was very anxious to bomb Racin. That is in northeast Korea. It is the great central distributing point from Manchuria down the east coast of Korea. It is perhaps 35 miles within North Korea.

I was very anxious to destroy that. Its usefulness to the enemy was self-evident. Great accumulations, depot accumulations, were made there. It was a great distributing center. That could run—the Soviets could run stuff from Vladivostok right down there.

We asked to bomb that, and we were forbidden.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean that was within North Korea?

General MACARTHUR. That is in North Korea, sir, 35 miles this side of the Soviet border. I made the last request along that line—General Stratemeyer, a very magnificent air commander, insisted that that place should be taken out. It was vital. It was forbidden in some original directives. Other things were forbidden, which were within Korea.

The CHAIRMAN. Will it disturb you if when I have something I wanted to ask if I interrupt?

That was forbidden specifically in one of your original directives?

General MACARTHUR. One of the original directives that I recall.

The CHAIRMAN. Was any reason given as to why this town in North Korea should not be bombed?

General MACARTHUR. I don't recall, Senator, but the reason seemed to me to be self-evident. They wished to avoid friction with the Soviets.

Now, to go back to Racin, under the insistence of the Air, I submitted that recently, shortly before my recall, and it was preemptorily refused and no reasons given.

The CHAIRMAN. That is within 35 miles of the Soviet frontier, rather than—

General MACARTHUR. That is up in the northeast, sir, opposite the Soviet border there, and my guess is about 35 miles this side of the border.

Senator LODGE. Could we get the name of that place for the record?

The CHAIRMAN. How do you spell that town?

General WHITNEY. R-a-c-i-n. That is the closest I can come to it.

General MACARTHUR. If you have a map of Korea, I can point it out to you.

Of course, the hydroelectric plants were also—we were forbidden to bomb. Now, the ones in the northeast there were of little efficacy. When we overran them, they had been, many of the generators had been removed and it looked as though the plants hadn't been in operation for several months. The destruction of them—much of the machinery had been removed from the plants, but our operations had been so rapid the Soviets had been unable to get it across the border.

Up in the northwest, along the Yalu itself, the Air on a number of occasions wished to bomb it, but we never had authority to do so. Just how much those plants contribute to the Manchurian industry would be speculative.

The CHAIRMAN. Going back to this place of Racin, General, was it possible to bomb that objective without crossing the Soviet frontier?

General MACARTHUR. Oh, yes, sir. No one would have been more opposed to doing any bombing in Siberia than I would.

The CHAIRMAN. I didn't mean bombing—I mean on your approach and after delivery of the bombs.

General MACARTHUR. No, sir; there was no possibility of crossing the border. It was well within the area, and had we bombed, we would have been solicitous to do so in clear weather so there could have been no mistake.

I had the most definite assurances from the Air that there could be no possibility of error.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you ever formally submitted a request to bomb that objective until this request just prior to your return to the States?

General MACARTHUR. Yes, sir; that was formally submitted. I submitted in a radio the entire recommendation of General Stratemeyer and asked, in view of changed conditions, if we could not proceed to bomb.

There was no explanation given and whether that decision was made in the Defense Department or the State Department is a matter of conjecture on my part.

The CHAIRMAN. About when was that request first submitted, General?

General MACARTHUR. I should say that that request was probably submitted some time in February, perhaps in March. I haven't my files with me, so I couldn't tell you.

[Deleted.]

INTELLIGENCE ON CHINESE COMMUNIST ATTACK

The CHAIRMAN. General, did your intelligence have any previous knowledge of the fact that the Chinese were crossing the boundaries in any considerable force, prior to the attack, and our reversals in North Korea, last December?

General MACARTHUR. We had knowledge that the Chinese Communists had collected large forces along the Yalu River. My own reconnaissance, you understand, was limited entirely to Korea; but the general information which was available, from China and other places, indicated large accumulations of troops.

The Red Chinese, at that time, were putting out, almost daily, statements that they were not intervening, that these were volunteers only.

About the middle of September our Secretary of State announced that he thought there was little chance, and no logic, in Chinese intervention.

In November, our Central Intelligence Agency, here, had said that they felt there was little chance of any major intervention on the part of the Chinese forces.

Now, we, ourselves, on the front, realized that the North Korean forces were being stiffened, and our intelligence, made just before General Walker launched his attacks, indicated they thought from 40,000 to 60,000 men might be down there.

Now, you must understand that the intelligence that a nation is going to launch war, is not an intelligence that is available to a commander, limited to a small area of combat.

That intelligence should have been given to me.

The agencies that the controlling powers had, which received reports from all over the world, from all the nations of the world, which had it—the British Secret Service had every secret service of any of the Allies at his disposal, which were not at mine, gave a much wider and a much broader basis upon which to make those concepts.

DISPOSITION OF OUR TROOPS AT TIME OF CHINESE COMMUNIST ATTACK

The CHAIRMAN. So, the disposition of the forces in the field, then, were based upon the assumption that there would be no intervention by a considerable number of Chinese?

General MACARTHUR. No, sir.

You are not correct in that statement.

The CHAIRMAN. I asked a question; I did not make a statement.

General MACARTHUR. The disposition of the forces was made upon the basis of the enemy that existed, and the orders that I had to defeat them.

That enemy was the North Korean group, and our forces had practically destroyed them. We would have completely destroyed them, if the Chinese had not intervened.

We were limited, as I say, by the two conditions: The size of the force I had; and the mission that was given me.

My mission was to clear out all North Korea, to unify it and to liberalize it.

The number of troops I had was limited, and those conditions indicated the disposition of the troops I had.

As a matter of fact, the disposition of those troops, in my opinion, could not have been improved upon, had I known the Chinese were going to attack.

The difficulty that arose was not the disposition of the troops, but the overwhelming number of the enemy forces, and the extraordinary limitations that were placed upon me in the use of my air.

LIMITATIONS ON USE OF AIR POWER IN KOREA

Had I been permitted to use my air, when those Chinese forces came in there, I haven't the faintest doubt we would have thrown them back.

That opinion is shared not only by every air officer I have commented to, but by General Stratemeyer, and General O'Donnell, who had my bombers, and everybody else—but we were not permitted to use our air against those troops; thousands and hundreds of thousands of troops were permitted to concentrate on the Yalu at that time, only two nights' march down to the front lines.

Probably the great mass of those Chinese troops moved down after we had started our reconnaissance in force, north.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course, I do not know anything about the military part of it, but it does not seem to me that we would have bombed them before they came in. That is the thing I did not understand about it.

General MACARTHUR. What is that, Senator?

The CHAIRMAN. You said if you had been permitted to bomb them before they crossed the Yalu; but the Chinese Army——

General MACARTHUR. If I had been permitted to bomb them before they crossed the Yalu, Senator, they would never have crossed.

The CHAIRMAN. I can understand that.

General MACARTHUR. Correct. If I had been permitted to bomb back of their bases, when they crossed the Yalu, they would have been—their logistical supply would have been cut off so rapidly that they would not have been able to advance with any degree of force or strength against the Eighth Army.

The CHAIRMAN. I see. Of course, I can see the handicap you were under in not bombing them before they crossed; but it would have been——

General MACARTHUR. As a matter of fact——

The CHAIRMAN (continuing). A rather dangerous thing to bomb them before they crossed.

General MACARTHUR. As soon as we realized that the Chinese were moving across the Yalu in force as a national—as national entities, I ordered the bridge across the Yalu bombed from the Korean side, half-way to the stream. That order was countermanded from Washington, and it was only when I protested violently that I was allowed to continue my original directive.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, are the forces in Korea at the present time permitted to bomb half of the bridge from the center of the river over to North Korea?

General MACARTHUR. When I left they were; yes, sir; and I was bombing them.

The CHAIRMAN. Those people have had some good experience in pinpoint bombing, I assume.

General MACARTHUR. The original order, General Whitney, just recalled to me, directed me to confine the bombing along the Yalu river to 5 miles within North Korea, from the Yalu border—from the border of North Korea 5 miles inland, I was not permitted to bomb. That was changed, as I say, when, on my recommendation——

The CHAIRMAN. Did I understand you correctly, General, when you said you, had you known the Red Chinese were coming in in great force, that you would have had exactly the same disposition of troops that you did have?

General MACARTHUR. I don't see how I could have done anything else, Senator.

You understand, it was a calculated risk from the day we landed in Korea whether China or the Soviet would intervene.

In the face of that risk, which I had nothing to do with, you understand, I was ordered with these forces I had to clear North Korea.

I understood the dangers every day as nobody else, perhaps, understood them, but I had my directives, and I was implementing, to the best of my ability; this was a calculated risk. Every step that was taken, every tactical movement, and disposition of those troops was reported to Washington, and approved by Washington. There was no other way, when we had to clear the Pyongyang-Wonsan line, to clear North Korea, but to go north.

NOVEMBER OFFENSIVE TO ASCERTAIN ENEMY'S STRENGTH

Now, when the doubt arose as to whether the enemy was concentrating great forces there, we had three alternatives: One was to ascertain the truth of the strength of what he had; the other was to sit where we were. Had we done that he would have built up his forces, and undoubtedly destroyed us.

The third was to go in precipitate retreat, which would not have been countenanced, I am quite sure.

Now, what we actually did was to move forward to ascertain the strength of the enemy's forces.

When we moved forward, I had already prepared, and the troops had in their hands the order for retreat if we found the enemy in force. What we did was really a reconnaissance in force. It was the only way we had to find out what the enemy had and what his intentions were.

STRATEGIC WITHDRAWAL

When we moved forward we struck him in tremendous force—or he struck us, and we withdrew. The concept that our forces withdrew in disorder or were badly defeated is one of the most violent prevarications of truth that ever was made. Those forces withdrew in magnificent order and shape. It was a planned withdrawal from the beginning. The forces in the northeast, the Tenth Corps, were withdrawn in the same way. John!

The losses that we had in that withdrawal were less than the losses we had in our victorious attack at Inchon.

The whole reversal of the movement was a strategic one. As I have said frequently, that, with the inhibitions that are made there, the narrowness of that terrain in that campaign, all you can do is to go up and down like an accordion to an indecisive campaign and to an approximation of a stalemate. That was inherent from the beginning.

If I had known the Chinese troops were there I couldn't have done any differently. If I had started the withdrawal—it is exactly what I did, just as soon as we ascertained the truth and the plans were all made.

ISSUANCE OF WARNING TO COMMUNIST CHINA AGAINST INTERVENTION IN KOREA

The CHAIRMAN. Well, now going back to the concentration on the other side of the Yalu—of course, you would not have advised that they be bombed until they had disclosed their hand, that they were coming into the war and thereby precipitate a contest between Red China and ourselves, would you, General?

General MACARTHUR. Senator, you ask me what I would do; I will tell you.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.

General MACARTHUR. When that formation of troops, that extraordinary groupment of troops—those are the troops that threatened Formosa. When they were withdrawn up there, I would have warned China that, if she intervened, we would have regarded it as war and we would have bombed her and taken every possible step to prevent it. That is what I would have done, and it seems to me that is what common sense would have dictated should have been done.

The CHAIRMAN. I have considerable sympathy with that statement, although I am trying to be objective.

Do you know whether or not any such warning was given to the Red Chinese?

General MACARTHUR. None that I know of.

POSITION OF FORMOSA

The CHAIRMAN. I did not understand exactly what you would have done about the Nationalist troops. You made some statement about what you would have done with the Chinese Nationalists at that juncture. You meant the way you would warn the Chinese Reds, I assume.

General MACARTHUR. When I received orders that I was to prevent, with the Seventh Fleet and my air, any invasion of Formosa, and reciprocally prevent the Nationalist Chinese troops from leaving Formosa to attack the mainland, there was a concentration of Red Chinese troops on the mainland which threatened Formosa seriously. Those troops were the Fourth and the Third Field Armies which afterward showed up in North Korea.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, you think the inhibition imposed on the Nationalists by the President, of the Seventh Fleet, and the order to prevent any movement either way in between Formosa and China was responsible for unleashing, or at least making available these Third and Fourth Armies?

General MACARTHUR. No, Senator, I didn't say any such thing. If you will let me finish—

The CHAIRMAN. Pardon me, General, I thought you had completed.

REMOVING RESTRICTIONS ON CHINESE NATIONALIST TROOPS

General MACARTHUR. I said that these troops down there threatened Formosa at that time. At that time Formosa—it was necessary for the generalissimo's troops to be held in Formosa for its defense. As these troops were moved north and the threat to Formosa disappeared, it became quite evident there was no necessity to keep the generalissimo's troops tied up on Formosa. As soon as it became known these troops had moved up north and were attacking me—the Third and Fourth Field Armies—I recommended to Washington that the wraps be taken off the generalissimo, that he be furnished such logistical support as would put those troops in fighting trim, and that he be permitted to use his own judgment as to their use. The slightest use that was made of those troops would have taken the pressure off my troops. It would have saved me thousands of lives up there—even a threat of that.

We were at that time with the Seventh Fleet supporting my fighting line and doing everything else in Korea that was possible, bombarding and everything else, at the same time with the other hand they were holding back these troops, which, if they had been used, or even threatened to be used, would have taken the pressure off my front.

It was at that time that I made the recommendation that the generalissimo's troops be brought into play against the common enemy.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you get any reply to that request, or was it vetoed?

General MACARTHUR. I don't think I received any reply, as far as I know.

The CHAIRMAN. There was never any expression of approval or disapproval from the Defense Establishment, even though your forces were under terrific pressure?

General MACARTHUR. As far as I recall, there was nothing, no reply. I certainly didn't receive any affirmative reply. It was after

that, on or about the same time, that the Joint Chiefs of Staff made this similar, made exactly the same recommendation, on January 12.

STRENGTH OF NATIONALIST TROOPS

The CHAIRMAN. General, would you mind advising the committee and the Senate what you think is the real strength of the generalissimo's forces on Formosa? We have received a great many conflicting statements on that.

General MACARTHUR. I can tell you with considerable responsibility, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. We will be happy to have you.

General MACARTHUR. I went down to Formosa. When I visited Formosa, the week before that, I had been receiving reports from the Joint Chiefs of Staff expressing trepidation for the safety of Formosa, and I reported back that under those conditions, hard pressed as I was in Korea at that time, that I would go down there and make a personal reconnaissance. I went down there, and within the limit of time I spent there, I got very definite impressions. The generalissimo has probably in the neighborhood of a half million troops. The personnel is excellent. They are just exactly the same as these Red troops I am fighting. They have a good morale. Their material equipment is spotty. They lack artillery. They lack trucks. They lack a great many of the modern refinements. They are capable of being made into a very excellent force. And their air—I should say they probably have between 200 and 250 planes. Their pilots are rather good. And for such a jerk-water group, they make a pretty brave showing.

Their navy is not a navy. It is a conglomeration of small ships. I went aboard one or two of them. They looked rather smart, but they are only capable of small coastal work, but the force represents a potential of a half million first-class fighting men.

The CHAIRMAN. How would you say that their equipment compared with that of the Chinese Communists who struck us in North Korea.

General MACARTHUR. I would say when I saw them it was inferior to it.

EQUIPMENT NEEDED FOR NATIONALIST TROOPS

The CHAIRMAN. Did they furnish you any estimate as to the amount of equipment that would be necessary?

General MACARTHUR. No, sir. I furnished them.

The CHAIRMAN. You furnished them?

General MACARTHUR. When I went down there I recommended at once to the Joint Chiefs that a professional mission be permitted to go down there to make a study, and I sent a group of officers under General Fox.

The CHAIRMAN. General who?

General MACARTHUR. General Fox. He was one of the deputy chiefs of staff of the Far East Command, and they made a comprehensive study of what would be essential to put those forces in fighting trim.

That report was a very compendious one, was submitted to Washington. In general it was approved and it is my understanding that it is being carried out now, being implemented.

The CHAIRMAN. Did General Fox's report have any estimate as to the time that would be required to teach these men to use their weapons.

General MACARTHUR. We recommended on that mission that a military mission should go with these supplies to insure their proper distribution and to insure the proper training in them. I think it went down to the battalion strength.

My own estimate would be, after the material was there, that those troops would be in very good shape, probably as good as they ever could be made outside of combat, within 4 months.

USE OF NATIONALIST TROOPS ON CHINA MAINLAND

The CHAIRMAN. Is it your opinion that if we had in the past, or during the future seen fit to carry out this recommendation and equip these troops and supply them the means of reaching the mainland of China, they could maintain themselves there?

General MACARTHUR. As to their use, Senator, there is no question that such a decision should be left to their commander. The possibility of a huge amphibious force landing all that crowd on the mainland might not be feasible. They could be used in various ways. They could infiltrate into Indochina. They could go in small forays and come back or they could go to the mainland just exactly as they came to Formosa, in their own junks and so on.

At that time when they crossed the straights there into Formosa, the Red enemy was not able to stop them. He did not have enough air, he did not have enough navy to stop them, and with the protection that naturally comes from our aid and our navy, if he moved from the mainland to Formosa, I fancy he could move back from Formosa to the mainland, but whether that would be the most efficient use of those troops, I would hesitate to say.

The Chinese are peculiar in their own methods. They have their own ideas. They know their terrain. They know their potentialities.

That is a subject that should be left up to the commander in chief of the Chinese forces. I would not attempt to speculate how those troops should be used, but this I do know: They should be used.

Even as a threat they would have relieved the pressure on my command. It would have been a 100-percent different picture if they had not been held in leash.

AREA WHERE CHINESE NATIONALIST TROOPS COULD BEST BE USED

The CHAIRMAN. General, I had considerable sympathy with the original rejection of the use of the Chinese Nationalist troops in Korea at the outset until the Chinese Reds intervened. I thought that that would be very provocative. I do not know what your views were on that.

General MACARTHUR. At that time, Senator?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

General MACARTHUR. When Formosa was threatened by the Chinese Communists, the best use that could have been made of those troops was to leave them right in Formosa, but the minute that threat was relieved, those troops should have been utilized in such ways as might have seemed best.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, would it be possible to augment the forces in Korea by some of the Chinese troops or is that feasible, or should they be left in Formosa? Would they have a greater value in Formosa now that Red China has intervened in the war?

General MACARTHUR. I think that we could use some of them to great advantage in Korea.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you ever make any recommendation after the Chinese Communists intervened in the war, that we accept the offer of the generalissimo of the original 35,000?

General MACARTHUR. I did. I recommended that we should utilize those troops.

The CHAIRMAN. In Korea?

General MACARTHUR. I have forgotten whether I said in Korea.

Senator McMAHON. Mr. Chairman, while General MacArthur is consulting the memorandum, what is going to be your policy? I notice that we have practically a quorum of the Senate here.

The CHAIRMAN. I have sent a message to the majority leader and requested the members of the committee be excused, Senator McMahon. I have not heard from them. I do not know whether there will be anyone there to excuse them or not, but I have sent that request over.

[Deleted.]

General MACARTHUR (continuing). [Deleted.]

That is the only communication I ever received on it.

The CHAIRMAN. Was that received from the Defense Establishment or from the State Department?

General MACARTHUR. Who originated it I do not know, sir. It came through the Department of the Army, but the State Department does not deal directly, did not deal directly, with the theater commander.

The channel of communication, as I said before, was the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Chief of Staff of the Army is the immediate agent thereof. Where this originated, what happened here I haven't the faintest idea.

The CHAIRMAN. I want to apologize to all of my colleagues on the committee for having taken so much time in this examination. Senator Connally?

Senator CONNALLY. I just have two brief questions and I will reserve the other questions.

DATE OF JCS RECOMMENDATIONS

General, what is the date of that Joint Chiefs of Staff statement there that you read a little while ago?

General MACARTHUR. The one with the four conditions? That was January 12, sir.

Senator CONNALLY. Of what year?

General MACARTHUR. 1951.

Senator CONNALLY. In which they pointed out their recommendations? I am speaking about the Joint Chiefs. You read a statement earlier in your testimony.

General MACARTHUR. Yes, sir. It was January 12, 1951.

Senator CONNALLY. Is that the one that you had reference to in your address to the Congress in which you said the Joint Chiefs had approved your plans and so on?

General MACARTHUR. Yes, sir, and many other things in which we were in entire agreement.

Senator CONNALLY. I know, but that particular——

General MACARTHUR. That is what I had reference to; yes, sir.

Senator CONNALLY. That is what you had reference to?

General MACARTHUR. That is correct.

Senator CONNALLY. I want to defer my other question, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Bridges.

CIRCUMSTANCES OF DISMISSAL

Senator BRIDGES. General MacArthur, do you question the right of the President of the United States to dismiss you? Did you or do you now?

General MACARTHUR. You mean to recall me?

Senator BRIDGES. Yes.

General MACARTHUR. Not in the slightest. The authority of the President to assign officers or to reassign them is complete and absolute. He does not have to give any reasons therefor or anything else. That is inherent in our system.

Senator BRIDGES. How did you first receive word of your recall?

General MACARTHUR. I received it from my wife. One of my aides had heard the broadcast and instantly told her, and she informed me.

Senator BRIDGES. You received it via the radio before you had any official notice?

General MACARTHUR. Yes, sir.

Senator BRIDGES. How long after your aide had told Mrs. MacArthur that he had heard it on the radio did you receive your official communication?

General MACARTHUR. Oh, I should say within 30 minutes, perhaps, or an hour. I couldn't tell you.

Senator BRIDGES. Were you recalled with the action to take effect summarily, immediately?

General MACARTHUR. The order relieved me of the command upon receipt.

Senator BRIDGES. Is that a customary procedure?

General MACARTHUR. I have never known it in the American Army, and I know of no precedence any place. Being summarily relieved in that way made it impossible to carry out directives that I was working on at that moment. I had to turn them over to my successor, an admirable officer in every respect, General Ridgway, who was 350 miles away on the Korean front.

I don't think there is any question that the interest of the United States was jeopardized in such a summary mode of turning over great responsibilities which involve the security of the country.

Senator BRIDGES. And is it customary in the recall or relief of a commander, to do it in such a manner that he will be able to turn over his command over to his successor and brief him upon the current status of the operation?

General MACARTHUR. Unquestionably.

RECORD OF WAKE ISLAND CONFERENCE

Senator BRIDGES. General, you were present on Wake Island, were you not, at a conference with the President and certain other high officials in this country?

General MACARTHUR. Yes, sir.

Senator BRIDGES. Was there a stenographic report made of that conference?

General MACARTHUR. There was no official stenographic report. I asked Mr. Ross, who was in charge of public relations, whether there should be stenographic notes taken, because I wished to take them myself, but he told me that no notes would be taken, and there was no stenographer present.

I have heard within the last 48 hours that apparently a stenographer in an adjacent room took down some notes, but I have no knowledge of it.

Senator BRIDGES. And you were not aware that a stenographer was secreted in another room?

General MACARTHUR. No, sir. On the contrary, after the conference, Mr. Jessup, Mr. Murphy, Mr. Ross, perhaps others, worked up a communique which was to be issued covering the reports as to what took place. That communique was submitted to the President and approved, and submitted to me, and I initialed it.

Senator BRIDGES. When the conference was held in the room, were the voices normal voices, or were you engaged in discussion that reached a high level, a high pitch at the time?

General MACARTHUR. No, sir. I think it was a small table and a dozen men were around it—the ordinary conversational tone of voice. There would have to have been a lot of eavesdropping to get any report by anyone that wasn't in that room.

Senator BRIDGES. Did you get rumors over there, or reports that there was sentiment among certain of our Allies in the United Nations favoring your recall?

General MACARTHUR. I was not aware of any movement, either internationally or nationally, that involved my recall. No information whatsoever had reached me. I understand since that there were—there was a considerable amount of talk in the papers, but I had received nothing that I recall. I had not received the slightest information that the matter was under discussion in Washington.

I was not even aware that there was any divergence of basic thought between myself militarily and Washington.

CARRYING OUT MILITARY ORDERS

Senator BRIDGES. Have you ever, to your knowledge, refused to carry out a military order given you?

General MACARTHUR. Senator, I have been a soldier for 52 years. I have in that time, to the best of my ability, carried out every order that was ever given me. No more subordinate soldier has ever worn the American uniform.

I would repudiate any concept that I wouldn't carry out any order that was given me. If you mean to say that the orders I have carried out I was in agreement with, that is a different matter.

Many of the orders that I have received, I have disagreed with them, both their wisdom and their judgment; but that did not affect in the slightest degree my implementing them to the very best and maximum of my ability.

Any insinuation by anyone, however high his office, that I have ever in any way failed, to the level of my ability, to carry out my instructions, is completely unworthy and unwarranted.

Senator BRIDGES. I do not want to take any more time, Mr. Chairman, because others want to ask questions. I will have other questions later.

NOTES OF THE WAKE ISLAND CONFERENCE

The CHAIRMAN. If the committee does not object, in order to preserve a little continuity here, I would like to ask the General if he ever received from General Bradley five copies of these, what purported to be, notes of the Wake Island meeting.

General MACARTHUR. I received from General Bradley, I don't know whether there were five copies, I think some time in December, what were purported to be the recollection of the Washington group of what took place at Wake Island. I didn't—if I remember correctly—I filed the copies; I didn't even check them.

The CHAIRMAN. I beg pardon?

General MACARTHUR. I said I did not read the copies—the copy that was sent me. I merely put it in the file. I have no idea of whether it was authentic or whether it represented it or not. By that time, Senator, that incident was about as dead as the dodo bird. They had no bearing on what was taking place in Korea then.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean the documents in the Wake Island, the purported documents of the Wake Island hearing?

General MACARTHUR. That is what I am referring to, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. General Bradley's letter, as I recall, stated that it was forwarded to you in October 1950, and was receipted for by some member of your staff a few days later, well within October.

Senator SPARKMAN. October 27.

The CHAIRMAN. October 27.

Do you know whether or not those documents that General Bradley forwarded to you, were received?

General MACARTHUR. It could have been in October. I have no doubt they are the documents that are referred to.

The CHAIRMAN. At the time the committee first received the expurgated edition of those notes, or whatever they were, I did not know that they had ever been brought to your attention, so I mailed you a copy.

I hope you received that.

General MACARTHUR. Thank you very much, Senator.

I got the copy just as I was stepping into the plane, so have not had a chance to read it.

The CHAIRMAN. So you are not in position to advise the committee as to whether the purported notes of the meeting are accurate or inaccurate.

General MACARTHUR. I don't know, sir. I had no stenographic notes myself, and I have explained the circumstances under which they were composed.

The CHAIRMAN. So you are not in position to state whether or not there are inaccuracies in that report or whether it is a reasonably accurate statement of what transpired on Wake Island?

General MACARTHUR. No, sir; I have no way of telling you that. I have no doubt that in general they are an accurate report of what took place.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator George.

Senator GEORGE. I will waive at this time.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Wiley.

Senator WILEY. General, I just want to ask a few questions and I hope to have the privilege of asking a few later on.

At the Wake Island conference the papers reported that you and the President walked apart. Is that right? You had a conference just between yourselves?

General MACARTHUR. When I met the President, we were taken to one of the small homes there. The President wanted to see me alone and we talked there possibly three quarters of an hour with no one else present.

Senator WILEY. Then——

General MACARTHUR. We then went later on to the conference room where there was this formal conference.

Senator WILEY. The reason I asked is that I think the memorandum you spoke about mentioned here the recollection of the President and others, too; so that we have got this straight.

INHIBITIONS ON CONDUCT OF WAR IN KOREA

Now, too, you mentioned in your testimony that the inhibitions that were given you were without precedent. Do you want to amplify that?

General MACARTHUR. I think, Senator, they are so well known that unless somebody wishes me to, I have no desire to amplify them.

Senator WILEY. They were in the beginning, these inhibitions?

General MACARTHUR. They were and still exist.

[Deleted.]

Senator WILEY. Have you ever advocated the invasion of the Chinese mainland by United States ground forces?

General MACARTHUR. Senator, you know that is ridiculous. No man in his proper senses would advocate throwing our troops in on the Chinese mainland. I have never heard that advocated by anybody at any time. That is, any military man.

POLITICAL DECISIONS IN KOREA

Senator WILEY. You have indicated in your public addresses that there has been a failure to take certain needed political decisions in the Korean matter. Can you tell us what you think those decisions might well have been?

General MACARTHUR. I can tell you what I would have done.

Senator WILEY. Yes.

General MACARTHUR. I would have served—as soon as it became apparent that Red China was throwing the full might of its military force against our troops in Korea, I would have served warning on her that if she did not within a reasonable time discuss a cease-fire

order, that the entire force of the United Nations would be utilized to bring to an end the predatory attack of her forces on ours.

In other words, I would have supplied her with an ultimatum that she would either come and talk terms of a cease fire within a reasonable period of time or her actions in Korea would be regarded as a declaration of war against the nations engaged there and that those nations would take such steps as they felt necessary to bring the thing to a conclusion. That is what I would have done, and I would still do it, Senator.

Senator WILEY. Have you ever been embarrassed as commanding general in Korea by the actions or policies of any of your UN partners in Korea?

General MACARTHUR. None whatsoever. The United Nations, the various nations who have contributed there, the troops, the actual commands there, have been splendid in every respect.

✓ REASONS FOR RECALL

Senator WILEY. General, when you were recalled when the message came through, were there any reasons assigned to your recall?

General MACARTHUR. The only reasons were contained in the order that I received and the reason that was given was that it was felt that I could not give my complete support to the policies of the United States and of the United Nations.

That reason seems to be to me—there was no necessity to give any reason.

Senator WILEY. I understand.

General MACARTHUR. But it seems to me to be completely invalid. I have not carried out every directive that I have ever received, but what I was trying to do was to find out what the directives were to be for the future.

✓✓ OBJECTIVES IN KOREA

I was operating in what I call a vacuum. I could hardly have been said to be in opposition to policies which I was not aware of even. I don't know what the policy is now. You have various potentials:

First is that you can go on and complete this war in the normal way and bring about just and honorable peace at the soonest time possible with the least loss of life by utilizing all of your potential.

The second is that you bring this thing to an end in Korea by yielding to the enemy's terms and on his terms.

The third is that you go on indecisively, fighting, with no mission for the troops except to resist and fight in this accordion fashion—up and down—which means that your cumulative losses are going to be staggering. It isn't just dust that is settling in Korea, Senator; it is American blood.

Now, my whole effort has been since Red China came in there to get some definition, military definition, of what I should do. There has been no change from the directions that I had—to clear North Korea.

As far as the United Nations are concerned, as far as the Joint Chiefs of Staff are concerned, my directives have been changed and I have been informed that my main objective, which takes precedence

over everything else, was the security of my forces and the protection of Japan. And I have been operating on that.

Now, that is not a mission.

Now, when you say that I have enunciated my recommendations, they are plain and clear. The only reason that you can logically say that I would disagree was the concept that something else than what I recommended was going to be done.

Now, I don't know what is going to be done, but I can assure you had I stayed in command, whatever was ordered to be done I would have done it to the best of my ability.

Senator WILEY. General, when were you appointed to take over Japan, so to speak? What was the date you went to Japan?

General MACARTHUR. My appointment as the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in Japan, as I recall, was made either on August 14 or August 15.

Senator WILEY. How many years previously thereto had you lived in the Far East?

General MACARTHUR. My professional career has extended over a half-century, and more. I think that my foreign service, Senator, amounts to about 24 years on foreign service, nearly half.

CONSULTATION ON CHINA POLICY

Senator WILEY. Now, after you were appointed to the position in Japan, there began a systematic utilization of folks in America to try to formulate some kind of a Chinese policy.

Were you ever consulted?

General MACARTHUR. The Congress of the United States did me the very signal and high honor of asking my views; and while the pressure of my duties in Japan did not permit my coming here, I did make a report to the Congress in 1947, to the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

As far as any consultation on the future of China, by Washington authorities, outside of the legislative branch, the answer is in the negative.

My views have never been required.

Senator WILEY. Has the State Department ever consulted with you when they were sending General Marshall or General Hurley or sending the others over there?

General MACARTHUR. None whatsoever.

Senator WILEY. Did you ever receive any requests from anybody in Government, outside of the legislative branch, that were mentioned, for your views on, or as to how to handle the far eastern situation?

General MACARTHUR. No official request.

A great many personal friends of mine have written me and discussed it with me, but no official request, so far as I recall.

Senator WILEY. What I am getting at, there, is this:

Do you know of any man in America that has had the vast experience that you have had in the Orient, getting acquainted with various nations in the Orient? Do you know of any other man that has lived there so long, or known the various factors and various backgrounds of the peoples, and their philosophy, as yourself?

General MACARTHUR. That is a very flattering estimate you make, Senator.

I think that I have probably lived in the Far East as long as anybody that I know of, in an official position in the United States.

Whether I have profited by it, by the wisdom that you imply, is something else again.

Senator WILEY. Well, let me put it to you another way:

When you were in Japan, were you cognizant of the internal affairs that were going on in Russia, China—the fight between the Commies and the Nationalists?

General MACARTHUR. Naturally.

Senator WILEY. And, you were——

General MACARTHUR. For 5½ years, Senator, I have had to govern Japan. I was provided, by the nations concerned—I, as the sole executive authority for Japan; so naturally the scope of my duties were complete and enveloping, as far as the Far East was concerned and, to some extent, involved the entire world.

STOPPING COMMUNISM IN CHINA

Senator WILEY. Did you have any idea at that time how the situation in China might have been solved, instead of running into the mess that we are in now?

General MACARTHUR. It is my own personal opinion that the greatest political mistake we made in a hundred years in the Pacific was in allowing the Communists to grow in power in China.

I think, at one stroke, we undid everything, starting from John Hay, through Taft, Leonard Wood, Woodrow Wilson, Henry Stimson, and all those great architects of our Pacific policy.

I believe it was fundamental, and I believe we will pay for it, for a century.

Senator WILEY. Well, let us ask the direct question:

What would you have done—what would you have advised, under the circumstances that existed back there in 1945—what would you have done?

General MACARTHUR. I would have given such assistance to the conservative Government of China as to have checked the growing tide of communism.

A very little help and assistance, in my belief, at that time, would have accomplished that purpose.

Senator WILEY. For a good many years you have been acquainted, I take it, with the Russians and with the Communist infiltration.

Would you have sought to have gotten those two forces together?

General MACARTHUR. I did not catch the question.

AMALGAMATION OF COMMUNISTS AND NATIONALISTS IN CHINA

Senator WILEY. Would you have sought to have amalgamated the Commies and Nationalists—have gotten them together?

General MACARTHUR. Just about as much chance of getting them together as that oil and water will mix.

Senator WILEY. That was your idea at that time, too; was it not?

General MACARTHUR. It would have been then, and always. The whole history of the world shows that.

Senator WILEY. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, gentlemen, there are two reasons, I think, which make it appropriate for us to take a recess at this time. One of them is that we have had a rather late session; and the other is that there is an alleged demand for the presence of the Senators over in the Senate. I understand that a vote is about to be taken over there on some motion by Senator Wherry to bring up the Watkins' resolution.

I shall set the time of 2:30 for the reconvening of the committee this afternoon.

Just one moment, please. Some of you gentlemen came in after the initial statement was made. I wish—not because of what has been testified to here this morning—for the future, to remind you that you are especially charged in using good judgment in discussing matters that might affect the national security. I do not think there has been anything in particular here this morning, but there will be before these hearings are concluded.

We will reconvene at 2:30 this afternoon.

(Whereupon, at 12:55 p. m., the committees recessed to reconvene at 2:30 p. m., the same afternoon.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

Present: Senators Russell (chairman), Connally, Wiley, Smith, Green, Hickenlooper, McMahon, Lodge, Fulbright, Gillette, Bridges, Byrd, Saltonstall, Johnson, Morse, Knowland, Cain, Stennis, Flanders.

PROCEEDINGS

The CHAIRMAN. The meeting will come to order.

Senator Byrd, I believe that you are the next in order.

Senator BYRD. Mr. Chairman, I had some questions that I wanted to ask, but all of them have been so thoroughly discussed and knowing that the general wants to get through this evening and go away because of an engagement he has, I will restrain myself and not ask any questions.

General MACARTHUR. Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I am afraid that will be very sad news to some of the other members of the committee, General. We hoped we would have the pleasure of your company here perhaps after today. I know a number of the members of the committee—

General MACARTHUR. I would appreciate it very much if you could finish with me today, Senator. I have a lot of obligations. I am willing to sit until all hours.

The CHAIRMAN. I realize that, but I am sure you will understand how we are groping here to get all of the information that we possibly can on all aspects of this matter.

PROCEDURE FOR HEARINGS

Senator MORSE. May I raise a procedural point with the Chair. No one is more desirous than I am that we arrange our schedules to the utmost convenience of the committee and the general, but I think we ought to face the reality that it is just going to be physically impossible to finish with the general today.

We haven't even gone into a discussion of the exhibits that have been placed on file with this committee by the Defense Establishment, containing the paraphrasing of all the communications that have passed between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense and the general; and I think if these hearings are to accomplish the purpose of getting the information that the American people are entitled to, we ought to realize it is going to take a considerable length of time to complete the examination of the general.

I would prefer that we work out some schedule with the general so that the examination may be completed in the days ahead, but I don't see how you can complete a cross-examination on the one exhibit that I studied last night, for example, in the office of the Armed Services Committee, in regard to the exchange of radiograms and cablegrams with the general—I don't see how you could complete an examination of that in less than a day.

Unless we go into this thoroughly, it is not going to be fair to the general, nor to the American people or any other party concerned.

I think we ought to settle right now whether we are going to try to put the pressure on here for a short examination by the members of the committee—I don't mean that the chairman would do that—but I mean whether or not any of us are to feel bound to conduct a short examination or whether we shall be able to go into this in detail. I don't think I can complete my examination of the general in less than 3 hours.

Senator CONNALLY. How long?

Senator MORSE. Less than 3 hours.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course, I have made every effort possible to accommodate the wishes of all parties at interest here—members of the committee and General MacArthur. I don't think, of course, it would be possible to conclude the hearings today. I think that would be manifestly impossible, because even if each Senator only took 5 minutes, we couldn't conclude it today.

We want to respect your wishes just as far as we possibly can, General, but we feel we have here a very vital matter that may mean life or death to the American people. You are not only probably the best informed man on some aspects of this matter who is available to us, but just now the American people respect your views, I think, more than they do perhaps any other living American.

As much as we dislike to inconvenience you in any way, I know that you will give this committee time to really develop this matter. I want to close the entire hearings as rapidly as possible as far as I am concerned, but I wish to do a thorough job while we are at it.

Since the question of open or closed hearings has arisen, we may have a vote this afternoon that would put us in open hearings. If it does, I anticipate that would take even more time.

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, may I add one other point because I want the record to be perfectly clear as to the position of the junior Senator from Oregon.

SCHEDULE OF HEARINGS

I am very interested in working out a schedule with the general to meet his convenience to the maximum extent possible for the future convenience of the general and the committee, but there are many

other witnesses to be called, and I see no reason why we have to proceed in continuity until we complete our examination of the general.

If it is necessary for him to leave today, I see no reason why General Marshall could not be called tomorrow or on Monday. We could call General Collins or anybody else we want to call.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I would not like to do that except as a last resort, Senator.

I think that while the committee can take that course and I would not be opposed to it if it is necessary to do it, if we can preserve the continuity of these hearings, I think it would be very helpful to us in arriving at the facts.

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, permit me to express my opinion that I think the general ought also to be advised that undoubtedly he is going to have to be recalled after we hear some of these other witnesses, for rebuttal testimony. I imagine that there is going to be some conflict in the testimony among these witnesses.

I think he is entitled to know just what the plans of the committee will be concerning the examination.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, that may be; but I do not think that we can take the position at this time that that is to be the case.

I am certainly not prepared to say he will be recalled. He may be. I do not know what turn the testimony is going to take.

Unfortunately, I have not even had an opportunity to read these various documents. I have not read all of the Wedemeyer report. I have run through it.

I have not read all of the Wake Island document, and I have not been able to read all of the matters submitted by the Department of Defense, though I stayed up until nearly 12 o'clock last night after a very strenuous day undertaking to familiarize myself with the various documents.

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, if you will permit one more word from me, I think what you have just said is a very important observation. That is why I feel it would be well that we taken an interim period here to study these documents. We are sitting here examining the general today on the broad question, as he should be examined upon it, but when you get into these detailed documents, then your examination is going to have to be in terms of specific exhibits.

I think we have to study those before we are in a position to examine the general.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, suppose we proceed in order now, and if any Senator wishes to make a motion that an interruption of the hearings or any matter of that kind be done, we are prepared to continue with the hearings this afternoon and I do not think the committee ought to take any action on that question.

DEFINITION OF THE ISSUES

Senator WILEY. Mr. Chairman, after listening to this exchange of ideas, would it not be a very simple process for us to ask the chairman and others to set down what the real issues here involved are?

To me we can clear away a lot of the maze and fog if we know just what the issues are. We have no resolution to base the issues. We come here, as it were, demanding open session, seeking the sky as the limit. Now, if we haven't the issue clearly in front of us, why I can

see where Senator Morse's explanation is clearly pertinent, but if we had some issues, do as they do in the practice of the courts now. The judge calls them up and says, "Agree on what you can agree and then define the issue." We can sort of litigate, as it were.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair does not want to prescribe the limitations of this hearing. If the Senator wishes to make a motion and does so this afternoon, I will appoint a committee and give equal representation to the majority and the minority, four members; let them get together and define the issues. I am not prepared to undertake any such chore at this time myself.

Senator CONNALLY. Mr. Chairman, will not every Senator have his own ideas about what the issues are?

The CHAIRMAN. We will settle that. Now may we get along with the hearing.

Senator Smith?

Senator SMITH. General, I have a few questions I would like to ask, if I may. I first want to take this opportunity to thank you for the courtesies you presented to me when I went to Japan in the fall of 1949 and asked for some help and guidance in getting around the area, and your advice as to where to go in order to get the feel of the area. I want to say here before I begin that in no way, shape, or manner did you try to influence any judgment I came to, and you gave me the opportunity and answered my questions. So whatever I say is simply in line with trying to bring out some of the things I am still not quite clear about.

COMMANDS HELD BY GENERAL MACARTHUR

In order to start, I would like to ask you, if I may, what are the different commands that you had in the Far East up to the time of this change that has just been made?

As I have it you had four or five different commands there. I would like to get for the record what those commands were. Will you give us that briefly?

General MACARTHUR. Fundamentally I was the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in Japan.

Senator SMITH. That is known as SCAP?

General MACARTHUR. That is SCAP. That was an international office. I also held an international office as the United Nations commander in Korea. I was also the commander in chief of our forces in the Far East. I also commanded, this being a technical command, our ground forces in the Far East. I was also military governor of the Ryukyus Islands.

Senator SMITH. As I recall it in my conversation with you when I was there, there were different jurisdictions in the area. I mean Korea was one jurisdiction, the mainland of China, and you had certain responsibilities in the islands and so on. Could you define those jurisdictions?

General MACARTHUR. The supreme commander was limited entirely to Japan. He was the sole executive authority for the administration of Japan. He had no authorities whatsoever outside of the command of that area.

The commander in chief of the United Nations forces was in command in Korea. He had nothing to do except with the forces in

Korea, and those attributes which came from other sections, such as Japan.

The commander in chief in the Far East has the strategic control of the theater which embraces Japan, the Philippines, and the Ryukyus.

Senator SMITH. The island area?

General MACARTHUR. Yes, sir.

Senator SMITH. Did you have any jurisdiction at all or responsibility over the mainland of China?

General MACARTHUR. When you were there I did not.

Senator SMITH. That is what I want to bring out.

General MACARTHUR. Since then it come under my general jurisdiction strategically.

Senator SMITH. Since the war started in Korea.

General MACARTHUR. That is correct.

Senator SMITH. But prior to the starting of the war in Korea, where was the jurisdiction over the mainland?

General MACARTHUR. I had no jurisdiction whatsoever over China.

Senator SMITH. Am I correct in my recollection that it is in the hands of the Navy so far as the United States is concerned?

General MACARTHUR. It was in the hands of the Navy operating directly under the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

JURISDICTION OVER KOREA PRIOR TO OUTBREAK OF WAR

Senator SMITH. Now, moving over to Korea, if I recollect, prior to the outbreak of the war in Korea, you did not have general jurisdiction over Korea in any way.

General MACARTHUR. No, sir; I had no jurisdiction whatsoever over Korea.

Senator SMITH. What was the jurisdiction there? Am I correct that was from the State Department?

General MACARTHUR. The jurisdiction there was under the general control of the State Department, operating through the Ambassador.

We had, in the military, a mission over there of about 500 officers and men, and they functioned, however, under the Ambassador, under the State Department.

My responsibilities were merely to feed them and clothe them in a domiciliary way. I had nothing whatsoever to do with the policies, the administration, or the command responsibilities in Korea until the war broke out.

Senator SMITH. Did you have anything to do with the policy that withdrew your troops or our troops from Korea prior to the outbreak of the war?

General MACARTHUR. That decision was made in Washington.

Senator SMITH. That decision was made in Washington; it had nothing to do with you or your command there?

General MACARTHUR. The troops were a part of my command at that time; they were the Twenty-fourth Corps.

Senator SMITH. Well, I was left with the impression that there were three different, you might say, jurisdictions there, such as your own on the islands; the Navy on the mainland of China, Formosa, and the State Department in Korea.

General MACARTHUR. That is correct.

Senator SMITH. That there was no one finger, politically speaking, you might say, on the pulse of the whole area?

General MACARTHUR. That is correct.

Senator SMITH. Most of those decisions were cleared in Washington?

General MACARTHUR. That is correct.

Senator SMITH. They might or might not be in line with each other.

General MACARTHUR. Any coordination was in Washington; it was not out in the local theaters.

Senator SMITH. Well now, let me ask you this further question then, General: Assuming there were differences of opinion between you and the Chiefs of Staff as to the strategy in Korea, what possible bearing did that have on your job as SCAP in Japan?

General MACARTHUR. It would have no direct bearing. It would only be indirect. As a matter of fact, I am not aware of having had any differences with the Joint Chiefs of Staff on military questions at all.

REASONS FOR DISMISSAL FROM ALL COMMANDS

Senator SMITH. What I am trying to get at was what was the possible justification, assuming there was a difference of opinion, as you said this morning? The Commander in Chief, the President, could, of course, have the power to remove you as chief of the operations in Korea; but what relation did that have to your job in Japan, as the military government there, you might say, and as the man in charge of Japan?

General MACARTHUR. No direct relationship. They did dovetail into each other.

Senator SMITH. Dovetailed; but I am just trying to get, in my mind, the reason for your being removed from the job in Japan, especially when the Japanese peace treaty was on the fire, and when Mr. Dulles had just been out there, with you, discussing the Japanese peace treaty.

I want to relate that Japanese peace treaty to the picture.

What light can we get from you on that?

General MACARTHUR. I could not give you any light on that, Senator. I do not know.

The two commands were independent.

If your question is—whether I could have been relieved from the Korean command, without being relieved from the Japanese command, the answer, of course, is in the affirmative.

Senator SMITH. That was the purpose of my question, because I have been very much troubled on the SCAP situation. I am on the subcommittee of the Foreign Relations Committee on the Far East, and we have been discussing the Japanese peace treaty, and concerned with Mr. Dulles, and we thought that Mr. Dulles was dealing with you directly on the Japanese peace-treaty negotiations.

That is the reason I raised the question.

CONSULTATION ON JAPANESE PEACE TREATY

I am wondering why you were removed from Japan—if you had any disagreement on the Japanese peace treaty, or anything of that sort?

General MACARTHUR. None whatsoever.

The basis that Mr. Dulles is working on now is 100 percent in coordination with my own ideas.

Senator SMITH. I am very glad indeed to hear that.

General MACARTHUR. I think that many of the concepts and bases for that treaty are my own.

Senator SMITH. I am very glad to hear that.

I wanted to get that straight with you. We still have the Japanese treaty before us, yet.

General MACARTHUR. There was no slightest friction whatsoever that I know of.

Senator SMITH. That is all I have for the present, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator George not now being present, I will call on Senator Saltonstall.

POLICY IN KOREA

Senator SALTONSTALL. General MacArthur, might I ask you about three or four questions that appear to me as important?

Now, what it seems to me that we are trying to do is to get security for our country, our own country, and to get a peace, and a policy in the Far East.

I have been very much worried to try to find out what is our policy in the Far East, particularly with relation to Korea; and I read your speech in Chicago where, I think, you asked that same question twice.

Now, on April 15, the Assistant Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, in a television and press broadcast, stated, in part—and this is the pertinent part of his speech, as I read it:

What we are trying to do is to maintain peace and security without a general war. We are saying to the aggressors, "You will not be allowed to get away with your crime. You must stop it."

At the same time, we are trying to prevent a general conflagration which would consume the very things we are now trying to defend.

I would appreciate it very much, with your knowledge of the Far East, if you will give me your opinion of that statement, and if that is a practical policy.

MILITARY APPEASEMENT OR VICTORY

General MACARTHUR. That policy, as you have read it, seems to me to introduce a new concept into military operations—the concept of appeasement, the concept that when you use force, you can limit that force.

The concept that I have is that when you go into war, you have exhausted all other potentialities of bringing the disagreements to an end.

As I understand what you read, that we would apply to the military situation in Korea certain military appeasements—that is, that we would not use our Air Forces to their maximum extent, only to the limited area of that Korea; that we would not use our Navy, except along the border lines of Korea.

To me, that would mean that you would have a continued and indefinite extension of bloodshed, which would have limitless—a limitless end.

You would not have the potentialities of destroying the enemy's military power, and bringing the conflict to a decisive close in the minimum of time, and with a minimum of loss.

It seems to me the worst possible concept, militarily, that we would simply stay there, resisting aggression, so-called, although I do not know what you mean by "resisting aggression."

The very term of "resisting aggression," it seems to me that you destroy the potentialities of the aggressor to continually hit you.

If that is the concept of a continued and indefinite campaign in Korea, with no definite purpose of stopping it until the enemy gets tired or you yield to his terms, I think that introduces into the military sphere a political control such as I have never known in my life or have ever studied.

Senator SALTONSTALL. In other words, you feel that the Korean situation, having gone into an armed conflict, it should be brought to an end in the quickest possible way through a military victory.

General MACARTHUR. I do, Senator, exactly; and I believe if you do not do that, if you hit soft, if you practice appeasement in the use of force, you are doomed to disaster.

I believe that if you continue that way, you are inviting the very thing that you desire to stop—the spread of the conflict.

RESULT OF GENERAL MACARTHUR'S RECOMMENDATIONS

Senator SALTONSTALL. Then assuming that your four recommendations, as made in your address to Congress, were all adopted, what do you visualize as the result?

General MACARTHUR. I believe that if you carry that out, you stand the best chance that is possible of ending this war in the quickest time and with the least cost in blood.

In fact, I haven't seen any other proposal as to how you would expect to bring it to an end except by agreeing to the enemy's terms.

Senator SALTONSTALL. And you think that if your four recommendations were carried into effect, it would not necessarily spread the war into Manchuria and China, but by quick and effective action of our power, it would be sufficiently limited to Korea as to be brought to an end in that general vicinity?

General MACARTHUR. I don't think that if you apply the measures that I advocate, which were the measures that the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend on January 12, that you will necessarily confine the area of the conflict to Korea; but I believe it will give you an opportunity to hit the enemy where he is assembling to hit you.

DISCUSSION OF FORMOSA AT WAKE ISLAND CONFERENCE

Senator SALTONSTALL. Now, may I ask this question on a slightly different subject. In this so-called Wake Island conference statement on page 8, on the printed copy, the President is quoted as saying this:

General MacArthur and I have talked fully about Formosa. There is no need to cover that subject again. The general and I are in complete agreement.

I believe that was also the purport of a communiqué issued at that time. Is that a fair statement of the President's and your position when you conferred on Formosa, if you care to say? That was a private communication, of course.

General MACARTHUR. I don't think the communiqué had any reference to Formosa, Senator, and I think that when the President said that he and I were in agreement about Formosa, that he meant the agreement was that both of us had dropped the question of discussing it there at Wake Island, at any other time.

The strategic situation of Formosa, its value, and its general relativity to security in the Far East was not discussed by me with the President.

Now, I would not feel at liberty to reveal what was discussed by the President with me in our conference before the main conference.

Senator SALTONSTALL. I respect that.

General MACARTHUR. But I do offer that explanation of what I am sure the President had in mind when he made that statement.

Senator SALTONSTALL. I respect your position with relation to your conference with the President.

I would say, most respectfully, that I would think that that statement, the interpretation of an ordinary person, particularly in Congress, would give that statement, "We are in complete accord," would lead to a different inference.

General MACARTHUR. I agree with you 100 percent, Senator; and the same concept hit me in Tokyo, and the next day I issued a statement through the spokesman in Tokyo stating that there had been absolutely no change on my part in any views I held as to the strategic value of Formosa.

LOGISTICAL SUPPORT FOR USE OF NATIONALIST TROOPS IN FAR EAST

Senator SALTONSTALL. May I ask you, sir, one more question. In your address to the Congress you stated that you felt that military necessity and the conduct of the war—and I think I quote you accurately from here on—"removal of restrictions on the forces of the Republic of China on Formosa with logistical support to contribute to their effective operation against the Chinese mainland."

My question is: Just what do you visualize this logistical support would amount to in the way of men, material, and ships, as well as air support?

General MACARTHUR. The quotation from my statement is incorrect, Senator. What I said was not with reference to the Chinese mainland, but what I said was against the common enemy. As I explained this morning—or tried to—the use of the troops, the Chinese Nationalist troops—should be left to the judgment of the Chinese commander in chief; and I tried to explain the various ways in which he might use those troops.

It is an absolutely incorrect statement, which I have great difficulty in comprehending why it was made, because I gave a copy of my statement to the Clerk of the Senate or the House, whoever was there, and it was recorded and you will find that there was a misquotation on it.

What I said was against the common enemy. I did not attempt to limit the use of the Chinese troops on the mainland.

Senator SALTONSTALL. The misquotation on my part—

General MACARTHUR. What we have recommended there, as I said this morning, I appointed a commission that went down there with the approval of Washington, who made a full report after 2 months

of study of what matériel was necessary to place the troops, the Nationalist troops on Formosa, in a condition of general preparedness for fighting.

That report has been in general approved, and as I understand, is being carried out now.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Mr. Chairman, I thank the General. I have no more questions now. I would like to reserve the right to perhaps ask questions at a future time.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Green.

Senator GREEN. General, in the first place I would like to join with Senator Smith in thanking you for your kind hospitality in Tokyo in 1949.

General MACARTHUR. We still remember that visit with great pleasure out there, Senator.

Senator GREEN. What I would like to ask is a question which seems to me to go to the basis of the whole difference that has been developed. It is this:

VICTORY WITHOUT SUPPORT OF UN ALLIES

The theory that we could win a quick victory in China simply by lending logistic support to the Chinese troops now in Formosa and in bombarding the coast cities and in establishing blockage would, in the first place, would it not, indicate we would proceed alone and not with any help from the other United Nations?

General MACARTHUR. I can give you no testimony about the United Nations, Senator.

Senator GREEN. What would be your expectation?

General MACARTHUR. My hope would be of course that the United Nations would see the wisdom and utility of that course, but if they did not, I still believe that the interest of the United States being the predominant one in Korea, would require our action.

Senator GREEN. Alone?

General MACARTHUR. Alone, if necessary. If the other nations of the world haven't got enough sense to see where appeasement leads after the appeasement which led to the Second World War in Europe, if they can't see exactly the road that they are following in Asia, why then we had better protect ourselves and go it alone.

Senator GREEN. Then why do you think that the Chinese now in Formosa, even with that help and without our ground forces in China, could achieve a victory when Chian Kai-shek suffered such a severe defeat previously?

CHINESE COMMUNIST STRENGTH AND WEAKNESSES

General MACARTHUR. I don't believe that the Chinese Nationalist forces alone, Senator, could achieve any such victory, but using them in conjunction with our own forces in accordance with the recommendations the Joint Chiefs of Staff made January 12, I believe that we would achieve a victory within a reasonable period of time.

I believe that the Chinese, the potential of China to wage modern war, is limited. She lacks the industrial base upon which modern war is based.

She is unable herself to turn out an air force or to turn out a navy. She is unable to supply herself with some of the heavier munitions.

I believe that the minute the pressure was placed upon her distributive system, the minute you stop the flow of strategic materials which has been going on so extensively since the Korean War started, that she would be unable to maintain in the field even the armies that she has now.

What I mean to say is if she has now an army of four or five million men, after the blockade, after the breaking up of her distributive systems due to her enormous poverty, due to the fact that she is only a couple of jumps ahead of starvation at any time at all, that that pressure of blockade and of concentrated attack upon her supply lines would make it impossible for her to maintain anything like four million men in the field. Perhaps a million men, perhaps half that.

She, I believe, has the inherent weaknesses for modern war of relying entirely upon ground forces and not having the industrial system to even supply them.

I believe that against the modern scientific methods of the United Nations, the potential of the United Nations, of the United States, if you would have it so, is sufficient to force the Chinese to stop their aggression in Korea.

We have no desire to destroy China, quite the contrary. You know from your own erudite and long experience of the innate friendship between the two countries. But we do have a great desire to make her stop her aggressive attacking in Korea.

I believe when you hit her base potential that way she would be forced to stop her aggression in Korea. I believe under those conditions she would talk a reasonable cease-fire procedure.

WHAT WOULD BE NEEDED FOR VICTORY OVER CHINA?

Senator GREEN. You do not think then that she would further call upon America for ground forces as well as air and sea forces?

General MACARTHUR. I don't know whether anybody would call on the United States for ground forces, but I do know it would be utterly reckless and foolish for the United States to even consider it. I do not believe it would be necessary.

Senator GREEN. The last experience they had in China when the Japanese attacked with air, sea, and land forces, was that China successfully resisted, although not so well equipped then as the Nationalist troops would be now.

General MACARTHUR. The objective of Japan and our objective, Senator, is different as day and night. The objective of Japan was to conquer, occupy, control and exploit all of China. Our only objective is to force the Chinese to stop their attacks in Korea on our troops. The two things are entirely different.

Senator GREEN. Well, are not masses of China now, the population of China, as much opposed to Chiang Kai-shek's forces as they were then to the Japanese invasion?

General MACARTHUR. I couldn't tell you, Senator.

Senator GREEN. If that were true, then why would not the result be the same?

General MACARTHUR. The general reports from China, of course, are growing restlessness under the slavery of totalitarian rule. Just

how far that may have gone, I don't know. The Chinese on Formosa will tell you it has gone a long way. The reports that come in indicate that. But without the intimate knowledge that would come from personal presence, I wouldn't attempt to act as a seer and answer such basic questions as that.

I do say unhesitatingly that with the power that we could bring against her with our air and Navy, with the assistance of the ground forces that the Nationalists might summon, that I believe we can force her to stop her aggression in Korea, which is the only objective as far as I see it, that we would have in such a conflict.

REDUCING AMERICAN LOSSES IN KOREA

Now you speak of American forces being sucked into China, ground forces. I invite your attention to the fact that hundreds of thousands of American Ground Forces have already been committed in Korea, and if you keep on this indecisive fighting, hundreds of thousands of more of them will go there.

Our losses already, the battle casualties, are approaching 65,000. This conflict in Korea has already lasted almost as long as General Eisenhower's decisive campaign which brought the European War to an end. And yet the only program that I have been able to hear is that we shall indecisively go on resisting aggression, whatever that may mean. And if you do, you are going to have thousands and thousands and thousands of American lives that will fall, and in my own opinion events finally will catch up with you, so that you will have to stop it in some way; and then the great question is—Where does the responsibility of that blood rest?

This I am quite sure—It is not going to rest on my shoulders.

Senator GREEN. As I understand it, the pressure that could be brought in the south, you count upon to reduce the pressure in Korea to such an extent that it would be a quick victory in Korea?

General MACARTHUR. What I said, Senator, was that if you use the Chinese forces on Formosa for a diversionary effect, and force the enemy to operate on another front, you will unquestionably diminish the pressure upon our forces in Korea, and thereby you will save American blood and American efforts.

EFFECT OF MILITARY VICTORY IN KOREA ON POLITICAL VICTORY IN CHINA

Senator GREEN. I understand how it might save that in Korea, but would it not increase it in China by more than what you save in Korea? If you get or you could get thereby a quick victory in Korea, it does not assure, or does it assure, you of a quick victory in China? Have we not substituted a greater problem for a lesser one? That is the thing that bothers me, and that is the reason I am asking these questions.

General MACARTHUR. I believe that if you will hit the Chinese and stop their potentials for war, you will bring peace not only to Korea but you will bring peace to China—that is as far as you can bring it.

Senator GREEN. Well, there is one other—

General MACARTHUR. The great problem, as I see it, in Korea, the great problem is to stop this sacrifice of American blood that has not got any definite end to it, as I see it.

Senator GREEN. There is one other phase to the question which applies to both Korea and China, which you touched upon, and that is this: You have dealt with these questions in both countries on a purely military basis. But isn't our Government required to give consideration and decide upon it on both a military and a political basis? Can you separate them so distinctly and say that a military victory is a political victory?

General MACARTHUR. I think that it is quite impossible to draw a line of differentiation and say this is a political and this is a military situation.

The American Government should have such coordination so that the political and military are in coordination.

WAR AS THE ULTIMATE PROCESS OF POLITICS

The general definition which for many decades has been accepted was that war was the ultimate process of politics; that when all other political means failed, you then go to force; and when you do that, the balance of control, the balance of concept, the main interest involved, the minute you reach the killing stage, is the control of the military. A theater commander, in any campaign, is not merely limited to the handling of his troops; he commands that whole area politically, economically, and militarily. You have got to trust at that stage of the game when politics fails, and the military takes over, you must trust the military, or otherwise you will have the system that the Soviet once employed of the political commissar, who would run the military as well as the politics of the country.

Now, the differentiation that exists between the political features and the military features, I am not able to discuss because I have not been here in Washington. Others will be able to tell you more about that than I, but I do unquestionably state that when men become locked in battle, that there should be no artifice under the name of politics, which should handicap your own men, decrease their chances for winning, and increase their losses.

RELATIONSHIP OF CAMPAIGN IN KOREA TO COMMUNISM IN CHINA

Senator GREEN. Well, but the point is a little different from that. A military victory, a quick military victory, does not necessarily mean anything but the defeat and disintegration of the armies, but it does not affect the population. If you would defeat the Communist armies, it does not necessarily mean that you can defeat communism in China.

General MACARTHUR. Senator, as far as the United Nations in Korea is concerned, it is limited to Korea. They are trying to clear Korea. I don't understand that in any decisions or discussions that have arisen we are trying to do more than stop the Chinese from aggression in Korea. I believe when we do that that we have to put sufficient military forces upon them to do it.

I do not believe we can put that sufficient military force upon them if we limit ourselves to the inhibitions we do now, just in the area of Korea. I believe the minute that we put those pressures on them that the Red Chinese, if they have any sensibilities of discretion at all, would enter into a cease-fire parley.

When we get them to stop their aggression in Korea, I think we have accomplished everything that the United Nations resolution and that the United States desires, as far as I know.

Now, the questions that you have raised are questions that deal with other matters than that. They deal with the future of China.

I have not discussed that or addressed myself to it in any way. I won't attempt to. What I am dealing with is the situation in Korea in all my comments and statements.

Senator GREEN. Suppose the United Nations should withdraw these inhibitions under which you have been acting in Korea. Then, would that change your point of view as to the policy?

General MACARTHUR. I believe that they should withdraw their inhibitions; they should apply the economic, military sanctions that are necessary, and that we would force the Chinese to stop their aggression in Korea. I do; and that is the very essence and point that I have tried to make here.

Senator GREEN. But also you stated in that connection, did you not, that you had received no instructions from the United Nations since your original appointment?

General MACARTHUR. The general objectives of the United Nations, as evidenced by their resolutions, have not varied or changed.

My instructions from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, acting as the agency for the United Nations, have modified the military conditions under which I operate.

As I said this morning, they have made the paramount purpose and mission the security of our forces, and the security of Japan, and in handling the forces, those were the two basic concepts upon which I was operating.

Senator GREEN. Well, in your opinion, would the action of the Chinese in joining in this aggression justify the United Nations, acting through the Chiefs of Staff in modifying those inhibitions?

General MACARTHUR. I certainly do.

Senator GREEN. Well, why would not that be a feasible method of bringing about this quick victory?

General MACARTHUR. I don't quite understand what you mean.

Senator GREEN. Well, is not that another method—

General MACARTHUR. As I understand your questioning, the entrance of Red China in the war against us warranted the United Nations in changing their basic directives. I have asked for that frequently.

CORRESPONDENCE WITH MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Senator GREEN. There is just one other question, which is not related—not directly—in this discussion, precipitated by an exchange of letters between Representative Martin and yourself which, I think, has been made public, was that the whole of the correspondence?

General MACARTHUR. What was that?

Senator GREEN. Was that the whole of your correspondence on that subject?

General MACARTHUR. It was.

Senator GREEN. There were two letters?

General MACARTHUR. I have always felt, Senator, that any Member of Congress, is entitled, within security provisions, to any information that he asked for.

When Representative Martin wrote and asked my opinion, I immediately replied. It made so little impression upon me, I will say, that later on when somebody said a great deal of commotion had been raised by that letter, I had to consult my files to see what the letter was.

I repeat, when any Senator or Congressman of the Government of the United States asks my opinion on a public question that is not security-classified, I shall give him freely and frankly my opinion. That is what I visualize is the proper courtesy and respect that is due to the legislative leaders of the country.

Senator GREEN. Well, then, you had other similar correspondence with other Representatives—

General MACARTHUR. I don't recall, sir.

Senator GREEN (continuing). And Senators? I did not hear you.

General MACARTHUR. The Congress itself; I made a report to it several years ago.

Senator GREEN. Yes.

General MACARTHUR. There have been many Congressmen and Senators through Japan, and always have I answered to the best of my ability the questions and queries they propounded. You were one of them, Senator.

Senator GREEN. Well, thank you very much. [Laughter.] With that exchange of courtesies, I conclude my questioning.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Johnson.

Senator JOHNSON. General MacArthur, I believe you said this morning that you—you read a letter you had in your statement this morning, the date of which was January 12, and you said that was a statement that supported the position which you took in your meeting where—

Senator FULBRIGHT. Will you speak up a little bit?

Senator JOHNSON. I beg the Senator's pardon.

AGREEMENT OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF WITH MACARTHUR RECOMMENDATIONS

This morning you said or you read from a document to support the position you took at the joint meeting of the Congress to the effect that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were in agreement with your position.

Were there any conditions attached to that statement other than the one you pointed out?

General MACARTHUR. On those points none except those that I pointed out, as far as I recall.

Senator JOHNSON. Do you have any other information from the Joint Chiefs collectively or the Chiefs individually that would indicate that they support the position you took?

General MACARTHUR. I know nothing except the January 12 statement. That is the last—

Senator JOHNSON. In your conversations with General Collins from time to time he may have expressed himself on the wisdom of the course you outlined. Did he?

General MACARTHUR. General Collins visited the command after that. At that time the great question that he raised was whether we could stay in Korea at all or whether we would evacuate. The Joint

Chiefs of Staff were not sure we could stick in Korea. It was my opinion that we could.

That was the great question at that time, whether we should evacuate Korea or whether we should not.

Senator JOHNSON. Was it your impression that the recommendations that the Joint Chiefs made in the January 12 letter to the Secretary of Defense was based on the possibility of our evacuating Korea or merely stabilizing it over there?

General MACARTHUR. The statement itself referred to that possibility. I know no more than what was in that study. I wouldn't attempt to interpret what was more than placed in that paper.

I wouldn't attempt to say what the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff may be today, but I do say that was what they recommended on January 12.

Senator JOHNSON. And there were no conditions attached to those recommendations other than the ones you read?

General MACARTHUR. Nothing that I can recall, and that their opinion that was made in that coincided almost identically with my own beliefs in the matter.

And I may say that every responsible military authority that I have talked with, not only in my own command but in the foreign commanders who are there, have agreed with that. I don't know a single exception.

Senator JOHNSON. Has there been any other indication other than the document of January the 12th to the effect that the Joint Chiefs support the program you advocate?

General MACARTHUR. Nothing in writing that I know of.

Senator JOHNSON. Anything orally?

General MACARTHUR. Nothing that I know of.

Senator JOHNSON. General, you said this morning that you constantly asked for more than you were able to obtain.

General MACARTHUR. I want to say, Senator, if I can interrupt you rather rudely, that they have never taken any position as far as I know which is in contradiction to the position of January 12. If they have, it was never furnished me.

DEMAND FOR REINFORCEMENTS

Senator JOHNSON. I believe this morning you said that you had asked for more than you were able to obtain.

General MACARTHUR. That's right.

Senator JOHNSON. I recall quite well that was your position the last time I saw you back in 1942. Would you care to elaborate on that statement by indicating some of the requests you made and the size of the force that you felt you needed and the size of the force you got?

General MACARTHUR. I don't recall all the details, Senator, but the first recommendation I made after I put in the army in Japan was that I should get an entire new army of at least four divisions with all its complements.

The state of preparedness of the country and other obligations seemed to make that impossible, and definite limitations on the number of ground troops were made.

Senator JOHNSON. You would say it would be inaccurate, however, to state that you had been given all the men you requested?

General MACARTHUR. Inaccurate. I have never been given all the men that I requested. The organizations that I have have never been brought up to full war strength.

When I left 3 weeks ago, they were still several thousands short of riflemen in the various combat divisions.

INCREASE NEEDED TO ACCOMPLISH MISSION IN KOREA

Senator JOHNSON. General, could you give the committee some indication of the increase in forces that will be required in your judgment to carry out the program that you think this Nation should carry out in Korea, the Far East?

General MACARTHUR. I believe that the start of that program should be the lifting of the inhibitions against our present Navy and Air Force.

Senator JOHNSON. That would not materially increase the requirements for men for those two services?

General MACARTHUR. Of the ground forces—I do not believe that the settlement of the Korean conflict would require any great increase in our ground forces. There is a definite limitation logistically as to what we can supply in the way of ground forces.

Our great strength would be to attack basically the Chinese forces from our strength. You are a bridge player. You know that the first rule in bridge is to lead from your strength.

Our strength is the air and the Navy, as compared to the Chinese. That is where we should apply the pressure. They cannot, they have nothing to resist it with. They are wide open. And by using those scientific methods which are at our disposal you will obviate the necessity of putting in ground troops and losing them by the thousands as we are doing now.

MILITARY PREPAREDNESS

Senator JOHNSON. General, in the light of this program that you have recommended, would you favor increasing the limitation on the ceiling now on our Armed Forces, the ceiling of 3,462,000 men?

General MACARTHUR. Oh, Senator, you are far afield from me. I have had no part in the policy discussions or the studies of the over-all strength of the United States. I have been a theater commander, confined myself entirely to that.

I wouldn't know. I would have to go into the matter and make studies, which I have never attempted.

Senator JOHNSON. As I remember, in your very fine statement to the joint meeting of the House and Senate you stated that there were some who had expressed the thought that our strength was inadequate to protect us on both fronts and that, as I remember it, you felt that was an expression of defeatism.

I assume you were talking about our potential strength and not our present strength.

General MACARTHUR. When was this statement made?

Senator JOHNSON. In your speech to the House and the Senate.

General MACARTHUR. Oh, yes. Yes, it does.

Senator JOHNSON. General, in the light of world conditions and the demands that are made upon this Nation for trained manpower, do you favor universal military training?

General MACARTHUR. I have never given the subject the slightest thought, Senator. I am a believer in preparedness. If the best way to get preparedness would be the universal military force, I would certainly be for it. Whether that is the best way, after we look it all over, the experts seem to think that it is so. I have never given the matter any study in the last 14 years.

ADDITIONAL FORCES NEEDED TO CARRY OUT MAC ARTHUR RECOMMENDATIONS

Senator JOHNSON. So far as you are informed, however, you do not believe that the execution of the program you recommend would materially increase the need for additional manpower?

General MACARTHUR. I wouldn't know, Senator, until I made a study of it. The over-all strength that is necessary to be kept as a standing force is flexible, of course, and depends upon the relative preparedness of the various nations of the world.

Senator JOHNSON. But you recommend a specific program in the Far East. Now, will that program, in your judgment, require additional manpower and, if so, what is your estimate of how much would be required?

General MACARTHUR. It does not require a great ground force in the Far East.

It does require a certain amount of Navy and Air. It does require garrisons, such as we would have in the various places—Japan, the Philippines, Okinawa. It would be a small fraction, indeed, of the total forces of the United States.

I think the forces that we have out there now, including the Korean forces, represent something less than 10 percent of our potential.

I am sure that that would not have to be raised to any material strength to accomplish the purpose of defense that I spoke of.

AGREEMENT WITH MAC ARTHUR RECOMMENDATIONS

Senator JOHNSON. Did I understand you to say that the foreign commanders in Korea shared your views about the kind of program that should be put into effect there?

General MACARTHUR. Every officer that I have talked with there is in general agreement.

Senator JOHNSON. And by that statement, of course, you include General Ridgway?

General MACARTHUR. General who?

Senator JOHNSON. Ridgway.

General MACARTHUR. I would, of course, prefer to let General Ridgway speak for himself; but I will say "Yes."

Senator JOHNSON. Thank you, General.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General MACARTHUR. I think you will find, if you will go into the reports that he made, that is quite in agreement.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Hickenlooper.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

BRITISH VIEWS ON MAC ARTHUR PROGRAM

General MacArthur, I would like to get into a little different phase of the matter there, in the Orient, in Korea and China, than has been discussed heretofore.

I would like to ask you about the British attitude.

General MACARTHUR. About what?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. About the British attitude, not only in Korea, but in connection with any activities by the Chinese Nationalists on the mainland of China; and to try to tell you what is in my mind, by way of this question, I will just say:

Have the British been vigorous in resisting the idea of bombing, strategically, in Manchuria, or of taking the wraps off of Chiang Kai-shek for the purpose of letting him use his troops in the best method possible against the Reds?

General MACARTHUR. I know nothing directly; but from what has been carried in the press, and other accounts, I should say they resisted it about as strongly as was possible.

That is the general impression that we have, over in the Far East.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Do you believe that Hong Kong, the British foothold there, has anything to do with that? In other words, is it believed, over there, that if they support any such action by Chiang Kai-shek, or support strategic bombing in Manchuria, they will lose Hong Kong to the Reds?

General MACARTHUR. I could not tell you, Senator, except by speculative comment.

I have had no direct dealings with the British, except the small token forces that operated under my command.

You know much more about that than I do.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. May I ask your opinion on another matter, then? That is, if you care to express it, or if you have an opinion on it.

Assuming that the Chinese Reds would be able to consolidate China, that is, win a complete victory—

General MACARTHUR. That is, continental China?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Continental China.

General MACARTHUR. Yes?

VALUE OF HONG KONG

Senator HICKENLOOPER. And assuming that some sort of a cease-fire or appeasement or something of that kind, that would give them the ultimate political victory they want, which is the consolidation of Red China, occurred—do you believe that the Red Chinese would permit the British to stay in Hong Kong very long after that consolidation?

General MACARTHUR (laughing). If you ask my personal opinion, no.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Sir?

General MACARTHUR. My own personal opinion would be "No."

Senator HICKENLOOPER. They would not permit them to stay there very long?

General MACARTHUR. That would be my belief. I think that the port of Hong Kong is now a means by which great quantities of materials, strategic and otherwise, pour through into Red China.

If Red China took that away from the British, it would react against them. I think it is beneficial for the Chinese under present conditions to allow that port to remain in the hands of the British, and to receive the constant flow of strategic materials that goes through there.

I happened to see one of the last papers before I relinquished my command in the Far East, a report from the American consul general, as to the strategic materials which had gone through Hong Kong and reached the Red Chinese. All these materials were on our proscribed strategic list. And, as I recall the figure, it was for 3 weeks; it was for the 2 weeks in February and a week in March, wasn't it? About 3 weeks at that time, and it consisted of these strategic materials alone—of \$210 million, Hong Kong dollars, worth of goods, as I recall. These figures are not accurate but they are approximately so. I think the Hong Kong dollar is now probably about 5 to 1. So that would be about \$40 million worth of strategic materials—railroads, steel products, ties, petroleums, various matters of that sort—which cleared through Hong Kong alone. Now I am not talking about what might be cleared from Singapore up to Tientsin or Tsingtao or those places. This was through the port of Hong Kong alone.

I correct myself, that the total that passed through there of strategic materials which were proscribed and those which were not proscribed was \$40 million.

That report—have you got that report here?

General WHITNEY. I have.

General MACARTHUR. We have it here. That is the report of the American consul made under—what date?

General WHITNEY. March 29, 1951.

General MACARTHUR. March of this year. That shows the great value to the Chinese of having that gateway of supply.

Now, if you place an economic blockade, of course, that would close it down, and the advantages to the Chinese of having it in British hands, and therefore open, would tend to disappear. And following the logic of your statement, it would increase the dangers and jeopardies of Hong Kong passing into Chinese hands.

COMMUNIST CHINA'S OBJECTIVES IN FORMOSA

Senator HICKENLOOPER. In the event the Chinese Reds are able to consolidate their control over the mainland of China and be victorious in that effort, would they rest until they had taken over Formosa also? In other words, is there any chance in your view of any settlement with the Chinese Reds without Formosa being given to them?

General MACARTHUR. My views on Formosa are pretty well known. I believe if you lose Formosa, you lose the key to our littoral line of defense and encompass Truk. I believe the Philippines and Japan both would be untenable from our military point of view. Formosa cannot be taken by Red China as long as the United States maintains control of the seas and of the air. There isn't the capacity, in my opinion, of Red China to storm the gates of Formosa.

Now, whether the Chinese would make any settlement which didn't involve the future of Formosa is entirely speculative. But the concept I have as far as Korea is concerned, is to put such pressure of force upon them that they would have to stop the aggression in Korea.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes. Well, I have gained the impression one way or another that Formosa is the very key commodity in any

dealings with the Red Chinese; that is, that they avidly want Formosa, and that is one of their great objectives, along with the consolidation of the mainland of China; that the Red Chinese want Formosa and they will not give up their efforts to get it.

[IMPORTANCE OF FORMOSA *enough*]

General MACARTHUR. I believe that from our standpoint we practically lose the Pacific Ocean if we give up or lose Formosa. I don't want you to misunderstand me. We haven't the faintest aggressive intent against Formosa. We do not need Formosa for our bases or anything else. But Formosa should not be allowed to fall into Red hands.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes. That would make our position in the Pacific, at least in the Far East, untenable eventually?

General MACARTHUR. If it fell into enemy hands, it would make our position untenable in my opinion.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes.

General, this is a speculative question, but it is one that is in the minds of a great many people. If a settlement should be made of the situation over there, if it should be resolved so that Red China consolidated her position and became the recognized government there, do you think that we could look thereafter to increased dangers and threats in the region of Alaska from Communist forces of whatever combination they might be—Russia or Red China, or a combination of both? Do you think that would increase our danger there?

General MACARTHUR. If the enemy secured Formosa and secured thereby the Pacific Ocean, that would immeasurably increase the dangers of that ocean being used as an avenue of advance by any potential enemy. And Alaska is on that ocean; it would unquestionably increase the dangers to Alaska as well as it would be to the State of California, the State of Washington, and Oregon, Central and South America.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Do you have any information that you could give us as to the strength of the Russian forces—air forces or other forces—across the Bering Strait and the vicinity of that strength?

General MACARTHUR. Alaska? That is not my theater, Senator. I couldn't tell you.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. General, as you are well aware, there have been certain statements and claims made by people publicly that you were recalled because of what they termed insubordination. You perhaps have seen statements in the press made by certain people to that effect.

I would like to ask you whether or not at any time you received any communication from any official superior either suggesting that you might be guilty of insubordination or suggesting that any course of action of yours might be considered insubordination.

In other words, did anybody warn you that you might be guilty of insubordination?

General MACARTHUR. I hadn't the faintest idea of it. I am not conscious of having trod even close to any such thing.

WIDE DISCRETION OF THEATER COMMANDERS

Senator HICKENLOOPER. General, is it not historically true throughout military history that commanding officers, as their rank increases, including their command and their responsibility in the theater increases, that by the same token the breadth of their discretion is also recognized?

In other words, a theater commander is more than purely a disciplined officer taking and carrying out meticulously strict orders within certain narrow limitations. A theater commander, and especially a commander in charge of a great area of operation such as the European invasion under General Eisenhower, and your own activities in the South Pacific and then in the Far East, those commands and those positions carry with it the necessity for broader policy activities and policy statements on the part of a commanding officer than the commander of a garrison, for instance, in some restricted locality would have.

Hasn't that been historically true about commanders?

General MACARTHUR. Completely.

POWERS AS SCAP IN JAPAN

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Now, General, you were the Governor of Japan; were you not?

General MACARTHUR. I was——

Senator HICKENLOOPER (interposing). And a political and administrative officer there?

General MACARTHUR. I was more than the Governor of Japan. I was the sole executive authority for administration and execution in Japan.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. And as such you were charged and authorized in a broad way to make policy decisions; were you not?

General MACARTHUR. I was. I had not only the normal executive authorities such as our own President has in this country, but I had legislative authority.

I could by fiat issue directives. That I did not was a matter of judgment, not of authority.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. And therefore the authority that you had carried with it the broadest discretion; did it not?

General MACARTHUR. There is no question, a discretion which I have exercised frequently. The various proclamations, the various statements, the various manifestoes which I issued to the Japanese people were under the authority delegated to me. They were not subject to the controls of any higher authority.

I was required to carry out and implement the policies of the Far Eastern Commission, but in the gaps that existed where those policies did not apply, my own authority was complete.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. So that you operated not only as a military commander in military operations, but you operated in a political capacity?

General MACARTHUR. I did.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. With the broadest powers and discretions both in the military field within the limits of your command and in the political field within the broad directives of your assignment?

General MACARTHUR. With reference to Japan, completely.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes. Now, didn't you issue directives and orders of a political nature in Japan from time to time without having first had them okayed in every instance by Washington?

General MACARTHUR. I issued them on my own authority.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Were you ever charged with insubordination or noncooperation because you issued—

General MACARTHUR. Never. That was my duty and responsibility.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Those things from time to time?

EFFECT OF AMERICAN PRESTIGE IN THE FAR EAST OF FAILURE TO WIN VICTORY IN KOREA

This is another question that goes to the matter of opinion, General. The longer this situation in Korea remains indecisive, would you give us your opinion on the effect of the confidence and the trust which other nations in the Orient may have in the United States.

In other words, are they getting shaky toward us the longer the indecisiveness in Korea occurs, or—

General MACARTHUR. If the United States doesn't bring the Korean War to a decisive and victorious end, she will have to accept all of the consequences of a disastrous defeat.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. General, this is going back just a little way, but you were the commander in the Far East and I believe the Supreme Commander in the Pacific in the closing days of the last war, at least against the Japanese; were you not?

General MACARTHUR. I was Supreme Commander in the Southwest Pacific area.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Which included Japan, did it not, and it included action against Japan?

General MACARTHUR. Japan was included in my command when I became the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in Japan.

DROPPING OF THE ATOM BOMB ON JAPAN

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, the question I want to ask you is this: How long before the first atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima were you told it was going to be dropped?

General MACARTHUR. As far as I recall, it was a short time. As far as I recall, General Spaatz came out there and informed me that the bomb was to be dropped. I should say that was 10 days or 2 weeks before the bomb was actually dropped.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. How many?

General MACARTHUR. Ten days or two weeks would be my guess now.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. General, I have some questions that have been submitted to me by some other members of the Senate who are not members of this committee, and under the rule I shall adopt these questions as my own, although they are questions which I have been requested to ask.

CHANCES OF VICTORY OVER CHINA

The first one is: You have been quoted as saying China is without the essentials of modern industrial warfare—oil, rubber, food—and

we need only "smash their tenuous railway system to reduce them quickly to impotence."

What are the possibilities of reconquering part or all of the Chinese mainland if the UN troops are properly supported and the Chinese forces of Chiang freed to attack the Communists?

I personally feel that you answered most of that question a while ago.

General MACARTHUR. That has run through the discussion entirely. I think my testimony would answer it.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I feel that you did answer it. I am going through these because I feel obligated to ask the questions of any member.

Well, the answer is that the possibilities are good that the Chinese forces could be defeated.

General MACARTHUR. Senator, what I have said is if you put that pressure on China she will be forced to stop her aggression in Korea.

EFFECT OF PRESIDENT'S ORDER ON FORMOSA

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes. The second question is: What is the military effect of the President's order to the Navy to guard Red China against sea or air attack by the forces of free China?

General MACARTHUR. What do you mean? His order about Formosa?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I take it that the questioner means the use of our Navy to prevent Nationalist Chinese from going on the mainland and to prevent Red China from going to Formosa. That is, the blockade order to our Navy.

General MACARTHUR. The result is to lose the potential against the common enemy of the forces on Formosa, the Chinese forces on Formosa.

TROOPS' OPINION ON BOMBING MANCHURIA

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Question No. three: What is the state of the morale of our ground and Navy forces when the American Navy guards the Red China coast while we are forbidden to bomb their troop concentrations?

General MACARTHUR. That is a question and an argument rolled into one, isn't it? The morale of our forces over in Korea when I left them was tops. They were splendid in every way.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, just supplementing this question, may I ask whether or not they are happy about not being able to bomb the arsenal back in Manchuria?

General MACARTHUR. I think the vote would be 100 to nothing in favor of bombing.

STRENGTH OF CHINESE NATIONALIST ARMIES

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Question No. 4: I understand that American-trained Chinese form the core of the free Chinese Navy, that 4,360 men trained in this country form the core of the free Chinese Air Force, and that the Chinese armies now on Formosa are being trained by General Sun li jen, a graduate of VMI.

Would these forces of free China be able to inflict military damage on the Communist armies in South China?

General MACARTHUR. Unquestionably. General Sun I know very well. He is a VMI graduate. I think he is a graduate also of our school at Fort Leavenworth. He is an able commander.

Properly equipped, as I explained this morning, with several months' training in the new equipment that we might supply them, the Chinese on Formosa would be a formidable force.

The general efficacy as against the Chinese Communists would depend somewhat upon the skill with which they were handled, the support they received, and many other things. It is impossible to answer the question categorically.

STRATEGY AGAINST JAPAN IN WORLD WAR II

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Question No. 5: Isn't your proposal for sea and air blockade of Red China the same strategy by which Americans achieved victory over the Japanese in the Pacific?

General MACARTHUR. Yes, sir. In the Pacific we by-passed them. We closed in. You must understand that Japan had an enormous population of nearly 80 million people, crowded into 4 islands. It was about half a farm population. The other half was engaged in industry.

Potentially the labor pool in Japan, both in quantity and quality, is as good as anything that I have ever known. Some place down the line they have discovered what you might call the dignity of labor, that men are happier when they are working and constructing than when they are idling.

This enormous capacity for work meant that they had to have something to work on. They built the factories, they had the labor, but they didn't have the basic materials.

There is practically nothing indigenous to Japan except the silk worm. They lack cotton, they lack wool, they lack petroleum products, they lack tin, they lack rubber, they lack a great many other things, all of which was in the Asiatic basin.

They feared that if those supplies were cut off, there would be 10 to 12 million people unoccupied in Japan. Their purpose, therefore, in going to war was largely dictated by security.

The raw materials—those countries which furnished raw materials for their manufacture—such countries as Malaya, Indonesia, the Philippines, and so on—they, with the advantage of preparedness and surprise, seized all those bases, and their general strategic concept was to hold those outlying bastions, the islands of the Pacific, so that we would bleed ourselves white in trying to reconquer them, and that the losses would be so tremendous that we would ultimately acquiesce in a treaty which would allow them to control the basic products of the places they had captured.

In meeting that, we evolved an entirely new strategy. They held certain bastion points, and what we did was to evade those points, and go around them.

We came in behind them, and we crept up and crept up, and crept up, always approaching the lanes of communication which led from those countries, conquered countries, to Japan. *

By the time we had seized the Philippines, and Okinawa, we were enabled to lay down a sea and Navy blockade so that the supplies for

the maintenance of the Japanese armed forces ceased to reach Japan.

The minute we applied that blockade, the defeat of Japan was a certainty.

The ultimate result was that when Japan surrendered, they had at least 3,000,000 of as fine ground troops as I have ever known, that laid down their arms because they didn't have the materials to fight with, and they didn't have the potential to gather them at the points of importance where we would attack. We hit them where they weren't; and, as a result, that magnificent army of theirs, very wisely surrendered.

The ground forces that were available in the Pacific were probably at no time more than one-third of the ground forces that Japan had available; but, as I say, when we blockaded that way, when we disrupted their entire economic system, they could not supply the sinews to their troops that were necessary to keep them in active combat and, therefore, they surrendered.

SIMILARITY OF JAPANESE SITUATION IN WORLD WAR II TO CHINESE SITUATION TODAY

Now, the problem with China is quite similar, only China has not got anything like the resource the Japanese Empire had.

It would be easier to blockade them. A blockade along their coasts would be a very simple problem if all the nations of the United Nations joined in.

The only other way in which China can get logistical support is from the Soviet. As I explained this morning, that railroad that runs from the great industrial centers of Russia, which are in European Russia, is already strained to the utmost to maintain the garrisons they have there now; to place them in a position—the increase of traffic that would be necessary to place them as a predatory expeditionary army would be too great.

There is a very definite limit to what they can give to Communist China. That, in my opinion, is why Communist China does not turn up with an adequate air force and an adequate navy. She can't build it herself, and the Soviet can't get it out to her.

It is for that reason that, in my own professional opinion, Communist China, its power to wage modern war, has been tremendously exaggerated; and I believe when we place the pressure, the blockade pressure, and the disruptive pressure of the air, on its distributive systems, that she would be forced to yield within a reasonable period of time.

You must understand that in China itself, they have the greatest difficulty in merely supplying their present civil population. I don't suppose there is a year in China that from 5 to 10 million people don't die either of starvation or of the results of malnutrition. It is an economy of poverty, and the minute you disrupt it, you will turn great segments of its population into disorder and discontent, and the internal strains would help to blow up her potential for war.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I have a few more questions here. As I say, these questions I am reading to you are questions I have been requested to ask.

EFFECT OF UN ON WAR IN KOREA

Question No. 6: The legal authority by which President Truman acts in Korea seems to give him total power to act in the name of the UN, above the law-making powers of Congress.

Would it delay victory in Korea if Congress were to insist that the President act as President of the United States only, and not as agent of any other power, national or international; and if, instead of working through the network of UN, we prosecuted the war on a national basis only, with our actual fighting allies?

General MACARTHUR. I will have to pass that one up, Senator.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Question No. 7:

TRAINING THE SOUTH KOREAN RESERVES

Would it relieve the pressure on American troops in Korea if we began at once to feed, clothe, and arm some of the South Korean reserves with some of the supplies we are sending to Europe?

General MACARTHUR. There is a large potential of manpower in South Korea; but to train it, and to supply it is a matter of gravest difficulty.

The men are there, but because the men are there does not mean that they are soldiers. It takes months to train those men.

What the relativity of supply would be, I do not know; but it would take some time to do more than we are doing now, in the enlistment of the South Koreans.

One of the last orders I gave was to increase, by 25 percent, the normal strength of the Korean divisions.

We have now under arms, 10 Korean divisions.

We have, in addition, their police and constabulary forces; but the Korean division—I gave the order to General Ridgway, permitting him to increase by 25 percent, the combat strength, the rifleman strength of each of those divisions.

That had not been accomplished when I left. There were large gaps still there.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Then, it is——

General MACARTHUR. I think it is the desire of everyone to utilize, as far as possible, the native population.

FAILURE TO USE ALL OUR WEAPONS

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Then I understand your position to be, General, so far as the Korean campaign is concerned, and our objectives to clear Korea of the Reds that we are simply not using the strength and the weapons which we have, to produce that victory; in other words, our weapons are not potential, they are actual weapons; a strategic air, and navy; and Allied Nationalist troops, for instance, on Formosa, which, from a military standpoint, would contribute to, in your opinion, a speedy termination of this thing, with victory against aggression in Korea?

General MACARTHUR. It would be the very best chance we would have to get it to a speedy end, a successful end. You have stated my position almost exactly correctly.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Now is it your opinion that the inhibitions against the use of those weapons which we have has been a military decision or a political decision?

General MACARTHUR. If you mean that it's been my decision in any way, it has not. Who issued, what influence issued the directives I couldn't tell you, whether it was the political decision made or whether it was a military decision or a combination, but the decisions are there.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Do you know of any military commander in history who had at his disposal weapons which probably could be decisive in his favor in a war and failed to use them if he was authorized to use them?

General MACARTHUR. Never.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. It is the object of war, is it—and I think you said a moment ago, but I want to emphasize it again—to win victory and defeat the enemy at the earliest possible moment with the least losses to our own armies?

General MACARTHUR. I don't see how any other conception could be made.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. And your position is that we are fighting indecisively in Korea today, that is so far as the basic objective of cleaning Korea of aggression is concerned?

General MACARTHUR. Correct.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Would you say it would be something like, we are somewhat in the position of a football team that is allowed to advance the ball up somewhere near the opponent's goal line, but they can't call any plays that will go over the goal line and make a touchdown?

General MACARTHUR. Something like that.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I thank you, General. I may have at a later date some more questions to ask. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Morse.

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, I want to say I have a rather lengthy list of questions, but I think it is only fair and courteous to my colleagues of the committee that I ask only a few of those questions at this time because I think every member of the committee ought to be allowed to ask some questions this first day of the hearing. I will ask a few questions now with the request that when all other members of the committee have asked whatever questions they care to, I might be permitted to ask further questions, subject of course to the right of those on the committee higher in seniority to ask their second round of questions first.

REQUEST FOR MAC ARTHUR'S REPORT TO THE UN

Before I ask any questions, Mr. Chairman, I wish to make a request of you to request of the Pentagon Building that we be provided with all records and documents showing any changes in General MacArthur's reports which either Defense or State Departments asked him to approve, with special identification of those particular documents which he was asked to approve but which he refused to approve and in regard to which he testified this morning.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me respectfully suggest, Senator, that he follow the rule and place a written request. I am afraid I might not be

able to carry it out completely. If the Senator will dictate to me a note this afternoon when he returns to his office, I shall immediately transmit it along with my request that the documents be submitted.

Senator MORSE. I wanted to make that request in the presence of the general because I think it is only fair to him that he know that such a request is being made. I think he must subsequently be placed in the position where he can check the information that the Pentagon Building may give us in their response to testimony of the general this morning, concerning the messages that he refused to approve.

As to material that may be coming in this hearing, I do not think any of us are in a position to say at the present time, but I will make that written request of the chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I shall follow what I have done heretofore and immediately transmit it to the Pentagon.

REQUEST FOR JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF RECOMMENDATIONS OF JANUARY 12,
1951

Senator MORSE. I shall also in writing, Mr. Chairman, ask you to obtain for the committee the full statement of the study of the Joint Chiefs of Staff referred to by the general this morning, if the document the general read from is but an excerpt of the full study. I will make that request to check on the exhibit.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I might say that I requested at the outset, on the suggestion of Senator Bridges I believe, that the directive of January 12, 1951, be furnished to the committee.

I understand that it has been furnished in paraphrased form to the committee, but it was not furnished as a verbatim transcript.

The reason assigned by the Pentagon for the refusal to give the verbatim transcript was the fact that those messages involved the safety of our cryptographic code. It had been transmitted by code, and therefore in order that the committee and General MacArthur may have all the facts that I have, I might state at this juncture that General Bradley had called the committee and was very much concerned because this [deleted] report of this message was in the records of the committee.

[Deleted.]

Senator MORSE. Is my understanding correct, general, that you read from the paraphrase this morning and not from the original?

General MACARTHUR. These were notes that were made from an original study, Senator, which was made by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I fancy there are 50 or 60 copies of those sent out to various military people.

Senator MORSE. Is that not what we understand by a paraphrase?

General MACARTHUR. This was in a mimeographed or printed form.

Senator MORSE. Is not that what we understand by a paraphrase of the original message? You did not read from the original message this morning but from a paraphrase?

[Deleted.]

General MACARTHUR. From the copy I received, yes, sir.

Senator MORSE. On my request, Mr. Chairman, I simply only ask to have furnished for the record what can be furnished within the security policies of the Pentagon.

The CHAIRMAN. I shall submit that request.

I might say further that if the Senator desires it, some of those documents are supposed to be for "eyes only." I do not know whether that particular one comes within that category. I think it can be arranged for the Senator to read but not make a verbatim copy of the document.

Senator MORSE. I will ask to read it only in case it becomes material.

PROCEDURE FOR THE HEARING

Senator CAIN. For planning purposes, Mr. Chairman, what are your plans for recess? What hours, if any, have you selected for recess.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I had not selected any specific hour to recess. One witness becomes much more weary than 15 or 20 people interrogating him.

Senator CAIN. Indeed, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. There cannot be any question about that, like one football team playing 10 or 12, they have a great many reserves.

General MACARTHUR. I would be very glad to stay indefinitely, Senator. I have commitments that I have made—I thought this would just be a 1-day session—that I am very anxious to carry out. So I would appreciate it if the committee could keep in session until they get through with me in a general way. As Senator Morse said, I would be available at some future date if you wished to clear up something of that sort.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well, if that meets with the ideas of the committee and their commitments and responsibilities, why, we will proceed in that fashion.

Senator MORSE. General, in your speech before the joint session, you said—

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Chairman, Senator Morse has a very fine voice. I am sure if he put out a little more power we could hear him a little better. He is lowering it a little bit.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Mr. Chairman, before he starts, I did not understand the decision, whether you are going on or recess to some hour tonight and go over.

The CHAIRMAN. If I understood—I would like to have the general state again his suggestion that we continue here indefinitely, as I understood it.

General MACARTHUR. Yes, sir; I would like to. I have commitments in New York tomorrow. I expect to fly back tonight, if it is possible to do so.

The CHAIRMAN. What dates next week would be convenient to you, General?

General MACARTHUR. Well, sir, I would try to meet the committee's wishes. I must say I have been away from here for 14 years, Senator; I am hard pressed, and I would solicit the consideration of the committee to expedite it as much as possible.

The CHAIRMAN. I believe we can well understand that you are hard pressed. If you were to even contemplate accepting the invitations that the people in my own State have urged me to press upon you, that would take you for several weeks within itself. There cannot be any question about your being hard pressed. And I have understood that you have been out of the country, and for that reason, despite

some criticism, I, as you know, let you fix the date of your hearing, although I was constantly prodded here to bring the hearings about. I explained that you had been away for 14 years, and that you naturally were entitled to at least a respite from work here in this committee.

This whole question, though, is probably as much in the public eye at present as any issue of my time. The people are interested and these committees have responsibilities.

I wish to meet with your convenience just as much as we possibly can, and I am sure that is the purpose of the entire committee. If you feel that you cannot be here tomorrow, why, we will arrange for some other witness or postpone the hearings until next week. I shall try to get another witness.

General MACARTHUR. If you would let it proceed for a while, perhaps we could come to some natural conclusion, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, may I most respectfully make a suggestion on procedure. I do not think it possible to finish tonight. I do not think it is fair to either the general or to the members of this committee.

We have our other duties to perform, too, and I do not think it would be proper to go into a long night session and, therefore, I respectfully suggest—and I am not sure we should not vote upon it—that we proceed for a reasonable time, and then have a reasonable recess, and that the chairman be authorized to make arrangements with the general as to when he can be called back next week to finish his testimony. I think there are a great many documents needing study by this committee before we finish the examination of the general.

There are other witnesses who ought to be called before the committee to discuss even at this date some of the testimony that the general has already given today. I repeat to the chairman what I said earlier today. I think we would make a great mistake if we try to rush through the hearing without each man who, after all, represents his State, being free to ask such questions as he thinks appropriate. I think it would be a mistake to try to get through with this hearing-in-chief today.

I think we ought to proceed until around 5 o'clock, then recess, and then call the general back next week at a time convenient to him.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, the Chair undertakes to be the instrumentality of the committee. He does not know exactly what tune is attempted to be played, but if the committee wishes to express itself on this matter, they should do so.

Senator MORSE. I move you, Mr. Chairman, that we proceed until 5 o'clock, and then recess, and that the chairman be authorized to work out a calendar with the general for his reappearance before the committee sometime next week.

Senator KNOWLAND. Mr. Chairman, speaking with respect to that, might we not follow the general's suggestion of carrying on here for a while? I think it would be helpful if each of the members, at least, had a chance to ask a few questions. I have cut mine down, and a number of questions I had intended to ask have already been asked of the general.

Perhaps, if we can fully agree to Senator Morse's suggestion, we can do so, and it may be necessary for the general to come back at a later time to be worked out by the chairman. But might we not proceed and see if we cannot make more headway than is now expected, rather than now set a fixed hour of adjournment, because I understand the general is willing to stay, as he has just stated, a little later if we can at least get around to the other committee members?

The CHAIRMAN. Well, does the Senator desire to vote on his motion now or does he desire to proceed, and see where we can go and what we can accomplish?

Senator MORSE. I will be exceedingly cooperative. I will hold my motion for the time being, and renew it later tonight, but I am trying to be fair with the committee. I am not going to be rushed through my examination, and it is going to take me some time to complete my examination. I would like to ask a few questions.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I would like to second that motion, with a little change; but I say it is, frankly, different to follow these things, after too long a time. I think we have had enough for today.

I would like to second the motion, although I would not object to it carrying on to 5:30.

Senator WILEY. Make it 6 o'clock.

Senator MORSE. I am perfectly willing to substitute the hour of 6 for the hour of 5.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, gentlemen, the Senator from Oregon has modified his motion. We will proceed to 5 o'clock—

Senator WILEY. Six.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, he modified his motion that we proceed until 5 o'clock to 6 o'clock, make the hour 6 o'clock, and that is the motion now before the committee.

Senator MORSE. With the authorization of instructions to the chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. With instructions to the Chair, that he will undertake to work out a convenient date with General MacArthur to resume these hearings.

Senator McMAHON. Next week.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand that the general said he could be here next week.

Those of you who favor that motion will say "Aye."

(There was a chorus of "Ayes.")

The CHAIRMAN. Those opposed?

(There was no response.)

The CHAIRMAN. The "Ayes," gentlemen, have it.

EFFECT OF FAILURE OF UNITED STATES TO HAVE ACTED IN KOREA ON SOUTHEAST ASIA

Senator MORSE. General, in your very able speech before the joint session of Congress, you said—at least the copy I have quotes you as saying:

While I was not consulted prior to the President's decision to intervene in support of the Republic of Korea, that decision from a military standpoint proved a sound one.

My question is What is your speculation and judgment as to what most likely would have happened in southeastern Asia if we had not gone back into Korea?

General MACARTHUR. If we had not intervened in Korea, I do not believe the South Korean forces would have been able to resist the advance of the North Koreans; and within a short time, I think, the North Koreans would have overrun the entire country.

Senator MORSE. Do you think then, General, that the North Koreans or other Communist forces would have proceeded to attempt to take over other territory in southeastern Asia?

General MACARTHUR. That, of course, is an entirely speculative question. But it is the norm of conduct of an expanding imperialistic country to do so.

Senator MORSE. I quite agree with you that it is a speculative question. Yet we are dealing in this whole subject matter with the whole question of our policy in Asia, and one of the justifications given by some spokesmen for the administration for going back into Korea was that if we didn't, not only would we lose Korea but other parts of southeastern Asia.

I was interested only if you shared that point of view.

General MACARTHUR. If we had not gone into Korea, the military potential of China would have been available for other areas; whether they would have used it or not, I wouldn't attempt to speculate.

BUYING TIME FOR PREPAREDNESS

Senator MORSE. Now, it is said, in answer to the question frequently asked, what is our policy in Korea, that the dominant phase of it is to buy time long enough to get our own defenses to the point where we could meet an all-out war with Russia, if it should come.

Is it your opinion that our operation in Korea can be justified on the ground that it is buying time necessary to get our own defenses in order to meet an all-out war with Russia?

General MACARTHUR. The great trouble, Senator, is when you try to buy time in Korea, you are doing it at the tremendous expense of American blood. That does not seem to me to be buying time. It seems to me to be sacrificing our youth.

Senator MORSE. Is it your opinion that we would lose more American blood if we went into an all-out war with Russia now in our present state of defenses than would be the case if we held off for 12 months, taking the losses that we are taking in Korea, in the hope that at the end of 12 months we would be in a stronger position to defeat Russia, if she started an aggressive attack against us?

General MACARTHUR. The answer to that question, Senator, cannot be categoric. It is basically dependent upon what the Soviet intend to do, whether they intend to attack us or not. I couldn't tell you.

The relativity of our preparedness now and our preparedness 12 months from now, will depend largely upon them. As we build up, will they build up? I couldn't tell you. Those subjects have been considered by other agencies than my own. What I devoted myself to in my report to Congress were those problems which belonged to my own territory.

The question you ask is one that goes far afield from that. As I have not been a part of the policies that have been evolved by our military and our Government in the over-all program, I wouldn't

attempt to discuss them. I wouldn't attempt to assume the authority or the authoritative voice that would answer—

Senator MORSE. I think your answer is a perfectly proper one for you to make. But it is true, is it not, that my question does outline one of the differences that is claimed to exist between the policy that you advocate in Asia, compared with the policy that has been represented by various spokesmen in the administration they think should be followed, namely, the policy of buying time until we can get into a better position to fight Russia, if we have to fight Russia?

General MACARTHUR. I have never accepted the theory that underlies your question—that the bringing of the Korean problem to a close would necessitate bringing the Soviet into war against us.

I believe that there is an excellent chance that if you apply the power against the Chinese, that that would necessarily involve the Soviet into taking action against us?

I tried to explain that this morning—my point of view.

DANGER OF SOVIET INTERVENTION

Senator MORSE. I understand that, and I want to relate that testimony of yours this morning to this question which, in my opinion, sets out one of the differences in representations that are made by the two sides of this controversy; and I will follow it, then, with this question:

I am to understand, from your testimony, that you discount the danger of Russia coming into the war, either with a bombing operation, or on a full-scale basis, including manpower, if we should bomb bases in Manchuria?

General MACARTHUR. That is stating it in a little different way than the way I stated it, Senator.

I stated that under the present conditions, the losses we are sustaining, of Americans in Korea, cannot go on indefinitely, without bleeding this country white.

Senator MORSE. I agree.

General MACARTHUR. I say that if you are trying to buy time, you are doing it the worst way you can. You are buying time at the expense of American blood. I think that is too expensive.

There is no certainty that Russia will come in.

There is no certainty that she will not come in.

There is no certainty that anything that happens in Korea will influence her.

That is speculative.

You have to take a certain degree of risk on these things, one way or another.

All I know is that our men are going by the thousands over there, every month, and if you keep this thing on indefinitely, nothing could happen that would be worse than that.

Therefore, I suggest that some plan be carried out that will bring this dreadful slaughter to a definite end; that we shall not continue to buy time, as you put it, sacrificing thousands of American boys every month.

It is too expensive, from my point of view.

Senator MORSE. I do not quarrel with you on that.

RELATIONSHIP OF TIME ELEMENT TO UNITED STATES PREPAREDNESS

General MACARTHUR. Now, as far as buying time is concerned, you make the assumption that we increase our strength as compared with the enemy's.

That is too speculative.

If we add 50 divisions to our forces, he might add 60. He can do it just as quickly as we can.

The relativity of the forces that are involved—these basic questions are too complicated to be answered in the categorical way that you present the questions. Your questions are really argument, and I cannot meet them except what I have said before—that we do face an actual condition in Korea in which we are losing thousands and thousands and thousands of men in an indecisive way.

I do not believe that that is warranted by any concept that relatively we might increase our strength as compared with a foe who has not as yet indicated that he really intends to strike.

We do not know.

This is speculative; but I do know, when we have got a war on our hands, and when we are suffering the way we do, we should try to bring it to an end.

I do say that the worst thing that we can do is go on indecisively sacrificing these men, with no definite end in sight.

RECOMMENDATIONS ON STOPPING AGGRESSION IN KOREA

Now, my proposition is, in my opinion, the best way, and as far as I know, the only way in which a solution has been offered, and on January 12, the Joint Chiefs of Staff apparently thought so, too.

Now, if there is any way in which—if there is any proposition that has been made, any place, here or any other place, to bring this thing to a conclusion, without abject appeasement and surrender on the enemy's terms, I would be the first one to want to try it.

The only way I know, when a nation wars on you, is to beat her by force. I do not know of any argument that will bring an end to this thing.

War, in itself, is the application of superior force, and as we chose that path, and have entered upon that path, it seems to me that we must end it in some way.

Now, there are only three ways that I can see, as I said this morning: Either to pursue it to victory; to surrender to an enemy and end it on his terms; or, what I think is the worst of all choices, to go on indefinitely and indefinitely, neither to win nor lose, in that stalemate; because what we are doing is sacrificing thousands of men while we are doing it.

If you could just say that this line stops aggression, and we didn't lose the men, that would be a different thing; but every day over there you have this terrific and savage conflict, the most savage I ever fought in; and you are losing the very flower of our youth, and if you keep on month after month, and month after month, why, these losses are going to mount up to figures which would stagger the imagination.

Now, in that third process of merely continuing, as has been projected in some circles, that leads to an indefinite sacrifice of lives.

Senator MORSE. Will the general let me say that—

General MACARTHUR. Now, war never before in the history of the world has been applied in a piecemeal way, that you make half war, and not whole war.

Now, that China is using the maximum of her force against us is quite evident; and we are not using the maximum of ours against her, in reply.

The result is—we do not even use, to the maximum, the forces at our disposal, the scientific methods, and the result is that for every percentage you take away in the use of the Air and the Navy, you add a percentage to the dead American infantrymen.

It may seem emotional for me to say that, but I happen to be the man that had to send them into it. The blood, to some extent, would rest on me; and with the objectives, I believe I could stop them—it seems terrific to me that we should not attempt something.

✓ALLEGED LACK OF POLICY IN KOREA

The inertia that exists. There is no policy—there is nothing, I tell you, no plan, or anything.

When you say, merely, “we are going to continue to fight aggression,” that is not what the enemy is fighting for.

The enemy is fighting for a very definite purpose—to destroy our forces in Korea.

We constantly, every day, run that risk, without the potential of defeating him, and stopping him—to come again.

He attacks today. We resist it. We fall back. We form a new line, and we surge back.

Then, he is right back, within a week, maybe, up to the battle front with his inexhaustible supply of manpower. He brings in another hundred thousand, or another half-million men, and tosses them at these troops constantly.

That is a new concept in war.

That is not war—that is appeasement.

Senator MORSE. General, let me say that I haven't any doubt about the fact that my questions are argumentative. I do not see any way of avoiding it when we are confronted here with analyzing the two sides in a great argument, namely your proposals or program in Asia, and the proposals of those in the administration who have differed from you.

All I am seeking to do is to bring out into this record with crystal clearness—and you certainly are making it crystal clear—the basis for your point of view that we ought to follow the suggestions that you made in your speech.

I want you to understand as I ask you my questions, that is the only motivation behind those questions.

RESULT OF BOMBING MANCHURIA

Now my next question is if following the bombing in China of the Manchurian bases Russia should carry out her aid and assistance agreement with Red China and proceed to help Red China with an all-out bombing attack of her own, would we then in our present state of defense lose more men than we would lose if we buy time, as is alleged, for some little time in the future until we get our own defenses in a stronger position?

In other words my question is what is your judgment as to the effect in terms of American losses that an all out war with Russia and Asia at the present time would cost?

General MACARTHUR. My own belief is that what will happen in Korea and Asia will not be the deciding factor in whether the Soviet attacks us or not. If he is determined to attack us, sooner or later he will, and there is nothing that I can see that would prevent it, but I do say that the constant sacrifice of blood, of American blood in Korea today, is of so serious a nature that we must face that problem irrespective of what the future, the speculative future may have in store.

WAR WITH COMMUNIST CHINA

Senator MORSE. Do you consider, General, that we are in fact today at war with Communist China?

General MACARTHUR. I don't see how it's possible that Communist China could be more at war with us than she is today.

Senator MORSE. That seems to me to be——

General MACARTHUR. Now we are not at war with her. We are very limited in our repulse of her efforts, and all I say is that after due warning to China that she cannot continue in this almost fantastic favoritism of war to her, that if she continues, if she will not sit around a peace table and discuss this matter rationally, that we should take all the necessary economic and military sanctions that are necessary to force her to stop.

Senator MORSE. Which would include a declaration of war against her?

General MACARTHUR. That is beyond my technical province. That we would use the necessary force to require her, to force her to stop her predatory actions in Korea, I would say "Yes."

If that meant that you would have to acknowledge the state of war that she has declared on us, and admit it, of course the answer is "Yes."

Senator MORSE. If we gave her an opportunity——

General MACARTHUR. I think that we should say explicitly, Senator, that if this thing was not brought to an end within a reasonable time, that this would mean the culmination of the all-out forceful effort to knock her out.

MAC ARTHUR OFFER TO MEET ENEMY COMMANDER IN FIELD

✱ Senator MORSE. To a degree isn't that exactly what you had in mind when you issued a notice to the Communist military leaders prior to your recall that you would meet with them on terms of surrender, and failing in that, you wanted them to understand that you would resort to other means to protect American interests? Is that in essence what your notice to them meant?

General MACARTHUR. Well, the notice I put out was merely that which every commander at any time can put out; that he would confer with the opposing commander in chief in an endeavor to bring hostilities to an end.

I would have had no authority to discuss peace terms, but I would have had the authority to consult with the commander in chief of the enemy's forces in an endeavor to bring an armistice which might result in peace terms.

Senator MORSE. Is it your understanding, General, that the language that you used in that notice to the Communist military leaders was part of the cause of your recall?

I repeat my question. Is it your understanding that the language you used in your message to the Chinese Communist military leaders—that you stood ready to meet with them in regard to surrender terms, and their failure to do that would endanger them to other forms of attack—was part of the cause of your recall?

General MACARTHUR. I know nothing about the reasons for my recall except the order the President issued.

Senator MORSE. I do not either, but I have read, as I assume you have—

General MACARTHUR. I can't believe that the traditional authority that a commander in the field has to negotiate with his vis-à-vis, the opposite commander, on an armistice would be the subject of criticism from any source whatsoever in the world.

Senator MORSE. Is it true, General—

General MACARTHUR. An effort to bring about peace and end bloodshed, I can't believe that that would influence in any way, shape, or manner my recall.

MAC ARTHUR'S OFFER AND PRESIDENT'S PLANNED ANNOUNCEMENT

Senator MORSE. Is it true, General, that some short time before you issued that notice—and I prefer to call it a notice, because if my understanding of the language is correct, it was a notice rather than an ultimatum, as it has been referred to in the press—is it true that prior to your issuing that notice to the Communist military leaders, you received a message, I believe from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or through whatever Army channels sent notice to you, that the President of the United States was at work on a notice or a message that he sought to publicize sometime in the near future?

General MACARTHUR. Yes; I received such a message. It had nothing to do with my statement whatsoever, though.

The President is constantly, as I understand it, engaged in methods to try to bring the thing to an end, and the message I received hadn't the slightest bearing upon the statement I put out, which was a military appraisal, my military appraisal of the situation, and my offer to meet the commander in chief to discuss peace terms.

I had twice before put out similar statements with the North Koreans, once to the Prime Minister and the other to the commander in chief, in which I suggested meeting him and discussing peace terms.

There is nothing unusual or unorthodox or improper that I can possibly read into the statement I made on September 24.

Senator MORSE. Please understand I am seeking only to make a record here—

General MACARTHUR. I mean March 24.

Senator MORSE. Please understand that I am seeking here to make a record only of my understandings of some of the allegations that are made against you, which have become involved in this controversy; and, therefore, I ask you this question:

Is it your understanding that the administration considered that the notice which you served on the Communist Chinese military leaders embarrassed the President in connection with the paper or document

that he was working on in that your notice could not be reconciled with what he proposed to make public?

General MACARTHUR. I was not aware of it. It was the last thing in the world that I would have wished to have done, to embarrass the President or anyone else who is working to bring about peace.

Senator MORSE. You had not been advised by anyone, including the President or any subordinate to the President, that your notice to the Chinese leaders embarrassed the completion of the plans that the President was working upon in respect to the notice that he was preparing to serve on the Chinese Communists?

RESULTS OF MAC ARTHUR'S OFFER

General MACARTHUR. I received from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, after I put out my statement, a message which called my attention to the fact that any statements involving politics had to be cleared with the State and Defense Departments, and that if any contacts were made by the enemy commander in chief with me, I was to immediately report them, which, of course, I would have anyway.

Senator MORSE. You have really answered my next question, but I want to state my next question in the interest of continuity of analysis.

It is true, then, that following the notice that you served on the Communist military leaders, you received a notice from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that in effect in the future you should get clearance?

General MACARTHUR. I did not regard it as a rebuke. I received nothing from Washington at any time that directly referred to my military analysis of the 24th.

Senator MORSE. You did not interpret, then, the message that you received from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which I read last night in the Document Room, following your notice to the Communist leaders, you did not consider that notice as referring even indirectly to the incident of your serving a notice on the Communist military leader?

General MACARTHUR. It only had the general reference that if the Communist military leaders contacted me, I should report it at once, and recalling the so-called gag rule that states political statements should be cleared.

I may say that when that policy was enunciated in December that I immediately sent my first communiqué after that to the Department of Defense for clearance and the Department of Defense came back and said that my communiqués dealing with the battle situation need not be submitted.

I may say that the President himself, under pressure from the press, confirmed that and said I could make any remarks I wished about the Korean situation.

CLEARANCE OF POLITICAL NOTICES WITH WASHINGTON

Senator MORSE. Is it not true, General, that the message that you received from the Joint Chiefs of Staff prior to the notice that you served on the Communist military leaders stated, in effect, that the administration was in the process of carrying on negotiations with the representatives of allies in the United Nations concerning proposals for a settlement of the Korean struggle with the Chinese?

General MACARTHUR. It did. But it had no reference to any particular terms or any particular situation. It was merely normal. And the purpose of that message to me was to find out what modifications might be necessary in limitation of our advances north, whether I thought we should limit our advances north to some particular line, and they wanted to get my views on it.

Senator MORSE. You would be surprised then if any witness for the administration in this hearing should take the position in his testimony that it is the view of the administration that the message you received from the Joint Chiefs of Staff prior to your serving the notice on the Communist military leaders gave you what they considered to be adequate notice that you should have cleared with the administration before you issued the notice to the Communist leaders? You would be surprised if they took that position?

General MACARTHUR. I would be surprised; yes. It didn't make the slightest impression of that sort upon me.

Senator MORSE. I do not know, General, whether they are going to so testify. But, as a lawyer, I went through these documents last night looking for theories. In a law case you have got to find the theories, and I was trying to figure out what the theory is going to be.

General MACARTHUR. You understand, Senator, if there is a commander commanding as I did in Korea, he has certain obligations. One of those obligations is the protection of his troops, to bring the battle to an end whenever he can. He operates accordingly.

Now, what I did, I can't conceive of in any way embarrassing, harassing, or influencing anything which the President or the United Nations were doing along that line. It might be that it might have helped, but it certainly was not traversing anything of that sort.

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman—

General MACARTHUR. Of course, if I thought it had, I wouldn't have issued it; that is self-evident.

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, I did not realize 30 minutes had already slipped away. I apologize to my colleagues.

General MACARTHUR. As a matter of fact, Senator, the statement I made on March 24 had been prepared several days before I received any message about the preparation that was going on by the President or Lake Success, whatever it might have been. It was largely prepared as a part of psychological warfare. The only question was the issuance—when it should be issued. It was sent out and dropped by the millions into the enemy territory. That is one of the methods by which we fight modern warfare, the psychological efforts we make to destroy the morale of the combatants' forces that are against us. This was—most of this message was intended along that line and was devised and gotten up with the aid and assistance of psychological experts that were doing that. It had no more reference to the high command's position than any normal order that I would have issued to the command there in Korea.

SOVIET SUPPLIES TO CHINESE COMMUNISTS

Senator MORSE. I want to hastily ask one more question. It is true, is it not, General, that there are bases in Russia as well as bases in Manchuria which are supplying the Communist forces with matériel at the present time, constituting part of these supply lines?

General MACARTHUR. I couldn't tell you. But I believe that the supplies that are being furnished by the Soviet are diminishing. I do not believe the Soviet is supplying the Chinese Communist troops in the same way that they supplied the original North Korean army.

I believe that these forces from China now are much more on their own resources than the North Korean forces that originally attacked. Those forces were supplied with Russian matériel, but much of the matériel the Chinese Communists now have is not Russian. There is no indication that there has been a step-up, quite the contrary, in the supplies that the Soviet has been furnishing to the battle front in Korea.

Senator MORSE. You do not place much reliance upon reports that we are reading in the press and periodicals that this recent conference between the Chinese Communist leaders and Russian leaders has resulted in a pact for the speed-up of war matériel by Russia to China?

General MACARTHUR. That I couldn't tell you. But when I left, by the time I left, there was no indication of it.

Senator MORSE. We do know that to the extent that they are using heavy equipment, to the extent any of it is replaced, it must necessarily be replaced in Russia because the Chinese Communists do not manufacture it.

General MACARTHUR. The Chinese Communist troops are lacking in heavy equipment; they are lacking in artillery; they are lacking in trucks; they are lacking in a good many things. It is my own belief that everything China gets now from the Soviet she pays for.

It is quite possible that the North Koreans may have done the same, but I would doubt it.

Senator MORSE. I want to waive now my further questions, Mr. Chairman, feeling, as you suggest, that it is very important to have the General back, that we have before us the documents containing the exchanges of messages between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the General, because in fairness to everybody concerned, I think we need, in relation to a good many other messages, just the kind of explanation that he has given us here regarding the particular message to which I referred. I do not think you can get to the bottom until we do.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair can only reiterate I will be very happy to ask for those documents.

Senator McMahan?

Senator McMAHON. Mr. Chairman, I want to start by saying that I have many questions, and I will make no apology for the time that I take because we are here discussing the survival of our Nation, which means the future of civilization itself.

GLOBAL PROBLEM OF COMMUNISM AND GLOBAL DEFENSES

General, we are faced, are we not, with a global problem in the ambitions of Communist Russia?

General MACARTHUR. Faced with what, Senator?

Senator McMAHON. A global problem.

General MACARTHUR. Unquestionably.

Senator McMAHON. You have given that problem a great deal of thought, I assume? Don't you hear me, General?

General MACARTHUR. Yes. Yes; I have, sir.

Senator McMAHON. And, therefore—

General MACARTHUR. With particular attention, of course, to my own theater.

Senator McMAHON. Pardon me?

General MACARTHUR. With particular attention, of course, to my own theater. My responsibilities are in my own theater.

Senator McMAHON. That is correct. As you have said on three or four occasions today, you are a theater commander.

General MACARTHUR. I was.

Senator McMAHON. I accept the amendment.

I believe you said to Senator Johnson that as a theater commander you had made no determination in your own mind on either universal military service or concerning the amount of troops or number of troops that we should have for our global defense.

General MACARTHUR. That is correct. That problem did not fall within my responsibilities or authorities.

Senator McMAHON. I take it, therefore, General, that you have not clearly formulated in your own mind—I do not say this critically because you were a theater commander—but you have not formulated in your own mind how we are going to put on a global defense if Russia decides to make global war upon us.

General MACARTHUR. I have my own views, Senator, but they are not authoritative views, and I would not care to discuss them. Because I understand I am here to discuss my own theater. There are other authorities that have all those responsibilities and authority. They are not mine, and I therefore would not superficially inject myself into those discussions.

QUORUM CALL

The CHAIRMAN. It is necessary for the Chair to make an announcement. I have just been advised a quorum call is in progress in the Senate preceding a vote on a motion to recess. I wish to make that announcement for those here who might be interested in voting on the motion to recess.

Senator KNOWLAND. Maybe we could pair up here.

Senator FULBRIGHT. What does the Chair wish to do?

Senator SPARKMAN. Maybe we can all pair.

The CHAIRMAN. It might be we can work out pairs. We may have the Sergeant at Arms over after us.

Senator WILEY. If they do not get a quorum, they can recess.

Senator LONG. Would it not be possible for members to put on that quorum and simply pair these? That has been done occasionally.

The CHAIRMAN. That has been done on occasion but no debate follows this quorum call. A motion to recess is, of course, not debatable. I assume that they will proceed until they get a quorum.

Senator WILEY. Wait until the Sergeant at Arms comes.

The CHAIRMAN. I am perfectly willing to proceed. I do not want to rush anyone. I do not desire to interrupt these hearings. I want everyone to have a full opportunity to express themselves by questions.

I may decide it is necessary to go over if the vote comes on the motion to recess, and will turn the hearings over to the Senator from Texas.

Senator CONNALLY. We got permission to sit during the Senate meetings.

The CHAIRMAN. Everyone seems to be in mind to proceed.

Senator McMAHON. General, we are not operating under any resolution here, we are here inquiring as to the effects it will have on our country and our defense if we follow the recommendations which you made in your speech to Congress and have repeated here today.

CHANCES OF SOVIETS ENTERING WAR

I take it, General, that you believe that what we do in following out your recommendations will not necessarily bring the Soviets into the war. Is that your position?

General MACARTHUR. That is my belief.

Senator McMAHON. Suppose, General, you are wrong about that. You could be wrong about it, couldn't you?

General MACARTHUR. Most assuredly.

Senator McMAHON. You did not believe at one time that the Communists of China, Red China, would come into the conflict in Korea.

General MACARTHUR. I doubted it.

Senator McMAHON. They did. You now doubt that the Soviets——

General MACARTHUR. In that I was, however, supported by practically everybody. The American Government through its Secretary of State, through, its Central Intelligence Agency, who were the best-informed authorities, presented that fact.

Senator McMAHON. In other words, everybody that had to do with it turned out to be wrong.

General MACARTHUR. Practically, although, Senator, I think everybody realized that that risk was involved. When we first entered Korea that was inherent to it and it was a calculated risk that was taken.

Senator McMAHON. And now, of course, we can't all agree that there is a possibility that the Soviets will come in if we adopt the recommendations that you propose to carry out.

General MACARTHUR. There is that possibility, but there is the certainty as against that, Senator, that if you don't carry out those recommendations, you are going to lose Americans by the thousands every month.

SITUATION IN KOREA NOW

You are going to lose such a basis that it may endanger the entire preparedness program.

If you keep on losing men at the rate you do now for indefinite time, you may find the entire preparedness program will come up against such obstacles as might endanger it.

I believe that what you argue are possibilities. They are possibilities. Everyone will admit that, but what I am arguing against is a certainty.

There is no question about the war being in Korea. There is a great question whether the war would extend some place else.

You have got a war on your hands, and you can't just say, "Let that war go on indefinitely while I prepare for some other war," unless you pay for it by the thousands and thousands and thousands of American boys.

Now that is the responsibility of those who make this decision, and it is a responsibility, as far as I am concerned, I repeat I wouldn't want it on my shoulders.

Your policy as you enunciated there, Senator, means——

DEFENSE OF UNITED STATES IN CASE OF WAR

Senator McMAHON. I haven't enunciated it yet. I am simply asking for information as to your views. You see, General, what I want to find out from you is this—that if you happen to be wrong this time and we go into all-out war, I want to find out how you propose in your own mind to defend the American Nation against that war.

General MACARTHUR. That doesn't happen to be my responsibility, Senator. My responsibilities were in the Pacific, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the various agencies of this Government are working day and night for an over-all solution to the global problem.

Now I am not familiar with their studies. I haven't gone into it. I have been desperately occupied over on the other side of the world, and to discuss in detail things that I haven't ever superficially touched doesn't contribute in any way, shape, or manner to the information of this committee or anybody else.

GLOBAL ASPECTS OF UNITED STATES DEFENSES

Senator McMAHON. General, I think you make the point very well that I want to make; that the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the President of the United States, the Commander in Chief, has to look at this thing on a global basis and a global defense.

You as a theater commander by your own statement have not made that kind of a study, and yet you advise us to push forward with a course of action that may involve us in that global conflict.

General MACARTHUR. Everything that is involved in international relationships, Senator, amount to a gamble, risk. You have to take risks.

Senator McMAHON. I couldn't agree with you more.

General MACARTHUR. What I faced in the Pacific wasn't something that was speculative in the future. It's right now. What are you going to do to stop the slaughter in Korea? Are you going to let it go on? Does your global plan for defense of this United States against war consist of permitting war indefinitely to go on in the Pacific? What is your plan or what is the other plan to stop the war there in the Pacific?

It is there. There is no sophistry of talk when you see thousands of battle casualties every month; you can't talk those off that there is no war. There is a savage war there.

If you are not going to bring the war to a decisive conclusion, what does the preparedness mean? You are faced with a fact in Asia.

You are speculating about what takes place in the rest of the global parts of the world. I assume that the plans that are being made are to meet the contingences that may arise.

Otherwise the whole force of the United States would be poured into Korea.

Senator McMAHON. General, the purpose of this hearing certainly is not for any Senator and certainly not one who is ill-equipped as I am, to argue this question with you this time.

My purpose is to try to develop information that will be helpful to me in reaching my final conclusions on the matter. General, are you aware of what our atomic preparedness situation is today?

General MACARTHUR. Only in a very general way, sir.

USE OF THE ATOMIC BOMB

Senator McMAHON. I am not asking you for numbers, but do you know the numbers in our stockpile?

General MACARTHUR. I do not. I have no more information on that than the average officer would have. It's confined to a very select circle, you know.

Senator McMAHON. Have you ever asked about that? Have you ever asked for information on it, General?

General MACARTHUR. On the atomic thing?

Senator McMAHON. Yes.

General MACARTHUR. I have discussed it, but I have never attempted to pry into matters which I regarded as beyond my own authority.

Senator McMAHON. In the course of your conduct of your duties in the Far East, as a theater commander, did you ever make inquiry of the Joint Chiefs of Staff about our atomic situation?

General MACARTHUR. I have made inquiries as to what might be the potentialities and possibilities of the use of the atomic bomb in my own theater. I know what that is.

Senator McMAHON. Have you at any time advocated the use of the atomic bomb in your theater?

General MACARTHUR. Of the atomic bomb?

Senator McMAHON. Yes.

General MACARTHUR. The limit of—

Senator McMAHON. Pardon me?

General MACARTHUR. The limit of what I did was to ask for information as to whether there were any plans to use the atomic bomb in the Far East.

Senator McMAHON. Did you recommend its use?

General MACARTHUR. I did not. As I understand it, the use of the atomic bomb has, by fiat and order, been limited to the decision of the President of the United States.

Senator McMAHON. That is true. Of course, I wondered whether you made any recommendations.

General MACARTHUR. Why should I, Senator?

Senator McMAHON. I am not asking you why; I am just asking whether you did, and you answered that you did not.

General, are you familiar with the fact that we held some tests out in Nevada a few months ago which were known as the Nevada tests?

General MACARTHUR. I am aware of that.

Senator McMAHON. Are you familiar with the results of those tests?

General MACARTHUR. Only in a very general way.

[Deleted.]

ATOMIC BOMB STOCKPILE OF RUSSIA

Senator McMAHON. Do you think or have you any intelligence, any access to intelligence reports about Russian potentialities in the building of atomic weapons?

General MACARTHUR. Very little.

Senator McMAHON. Does that little give you an estimate as to how many they possess today?

General MACARTHUR. No, sir.

Senator McMAHON. Have you sought to get that information?

General MACARTHUR. Not at all.

Senator McMAHON. If, by following your recommendations, a conflict is precipitated with Soviet Russia, be it in the European theater or the United States itself, or in the Far East, you have made no study as to the kind of damage that they could do to our forces in Korea and our general situation in the Far East with their atomic weapons; is that correct?

General MACARTHUR. I don't believe for a minute from my general knowledge of the situation that the enemy has the potential or the inclination to use his limited atomic weapons in such an area as Korea or China.

Senator McMAHON. You said this morning, General, that you did not believe that the Russians could land in Japan if we kept control of the sea around Japan, and in the air. Was I correct?

General MACARTHUR. Not quite, Senator. I said that they couldn't overrun Japan; that they would be limited to isolated efforts.

Senator McMAHON. Well, when I said take Japan, I meant take it effectively into their control, as I understood it, and you said it would be impossible.

UNITED STATES PREPAREDNESS FOR ALL-OUT WAR IN THE FAR EAST

General McARTHUR. With that explanation, I agree. As long as we hold command of the sea and of the air, no potential enemy can launch an amphibious force against us with any hope of success.

As long as we maintain sea and air control of the ports of Asia, from Vladivostok all the way down to Singapore, they can't successfully launch an effort against us. As long as we maintain that, the enemy would have grave difficulty in overrunning anything in our littoral island line of defense.

Senator McMAHON. Have we sufficient planes and ships, in your opinion, in the Far East today to maintain that kind of a defense, if the Russians should precipitate themselves into this battle?

General MACARTHUR. I believe they are available.

Senator McMAHON. Are they in the Far East today?

General MACARTHUR. I couldn't tell you, Senator, what the enemy would launch against us. It is speculative. I gave my best estimate of that this morning. We have certain reserves, and I am sure that if the enemy attacked in overwhelming force we could get our reserves there in time to combat them. I believe sincerely that we have the air resource to beat off such an attack, and the Navy resource is unquestioned.

Senator McMAHON. If they should precipitate that attack in the Far East, would the Russians—I take it, with the forces that they have in the Far East at this time, we would have to take some of our reserves from the continental United States and send them over?

General MACARTHUR. It would depend upon the force with which the enemy attacked.

RUSSIAN STRENGTH IN THE FAR EAST

Senator McMAHON. You said this morning that they had [deleted] thousand planes there, I believe.

General MACARTHUR. Some estimates were made. My own estimate was that they could maintain about half that at the start, and that their strength would diminish rapidly from wear and tear; but I believe that they are too far from their bases in continental Russia to keep up a magnified pressure. They have not got the potential to bring the gasoline; they have not got the potential to bring a great many things over.

I also said I thought from the disposition of the Russian forces in Siberia that they were defensive positions.

Senator McMAHON. Has your intelligence advised you of any message from the Russians as to what they intend to do if we bomb in Manchuria?

General MACARTHUR. None whatsoever. If such information exists, it has never come to me. If such information exists, I am sure it would have been sent to me.

Senator McMAHON. General, are you aware of the kind of civilian defense we have in the United States today?

General MACARTHUR. Only in a general way, Senator.

Senator McMAHON. You know it is very sketchy.

General MACARTHUR. I would assume so.

Senator McMAHON. Have you thought about the possibility—

General MACARTHUR. For that matter, I am quite sure it is sketchy in every country in the world.

POSSIBILITY OF ATTACK ON UNITED STATES

Senator McMAHON. Have you thought about the possibility of the Russians launching a surreptitious attack on the United States and its vital production centers through atomic sabotage?

General MACARTHUR. In a general way only. Once again that isn't my theater of responsibility, Senator.

Senator McMAHON. I understand that, General. I am just trying to introduce a few of the considerations that the Joint Chiefs of Staff and their Commander in Chief, I presume, must have in mind in determining what kind of action should be taken in any specific theater.

General MACARTHUR. That is quite correct, Senator; I have no doubt they do. But I have just read what the opinion was of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on January 12, which was to follow in general the same concepts that I have.

If they have changed, that is something else again. I wasn't informed of it, but at that time they agreed with my concepts.

Senator McMAHON. And, of course, General, that recommendation of January 12—and I do not assert it as a fact at this time, the Joint Chiefs will have to explain that themselves—but there is certainly the possibility that that concurrence, if you wish to call it that, was based upon the contingency of a forced evacuation of Korea.

That possibility existed; didn't it, General?

RISKS IN THE FAR EASTERN SITUATION

General MACARTHUR. That possibility exists; yes, sir. What you are driving at, as I get it, Senator, is our enunciating the risks that come if the Soviets should attack. All I can say is that those risks should have been discounted when we entered the war in Korea.

Nothing new has developed to change it. Those responsibilities of those who sent our troops into Korea were just as great at that time as they are now. The risks were just as great then as they are now.

That was a considered action taken by the Government of the United States. I didn't have a thing to do with it. This was a policy that was given me.

Now, those risks that you are enunciating now are the risks that were involved in the original decision. They were taken by the United States.

Now, the United States has committed itself there. All I am advocating is how we can accomplish our purpose or extricate ourselves from the difficulties that have been involved.

Senator McMAHON. And now, General, before it is too late, I want to examine the risks of the course which you wish to pursue because if the risks are so great as to prejudice the existence of this Nation, then it is time we stopped and weighed those risks, until we get into a position to rebut them and to meet them.

General MACARTHUR. You assume, of course, that relatively your strength is going up much more than the enemy's. That is a doubtful assumption, Senator.

STATE OF UNITED STATES PREPAREDNESS FOR GLOBAL WAR

Senator McMAHON. Well, General, if that is not true on the short-term basis, then it will come, I am sure, as news to everybody in the United States Senate. We have been proceeding on the assumption, as our mobilizer-in-chief said the other day, of no attack until 1953. By then, we will be so strong that they can't attack us, because by that time we will have the planes, we will have the bombs—amounts that we haven't got today—we will have the men in uniform, and we may be in shape to meet this attack, which we are not in shape to meet today.

General MACARTHUR. And in 2 years what will be your casualty rate of American boys in Korea?

Senator McMAHON. And, General, I ask you what our casualty rate will be in Washington, D. C., if they put on an attack, an atomic attack—and I had better change it from Washington lest I be thinking about myself, to New York or the other cities of the United States, to say nothing of the American boys who are going to die in the air and sea in this logistical sort of support of the forces into China?

General MACARTHUR. All those risks, I repeat, were inherent in the decision of the United States to go into Korea.

Senator McMAHON. General, I am not saying that they were not. What I am trying to say is that now is the time, it would seem to me, to stop, look, and listen and see where we are before we plunge into a course that may take us over the precipice before we are ready.

General MACARTHUR. What is your plan, then, to end Korea?

EFFECT OF DECISION TO DEFEND KOREA ON AMERICAN PRESTIGE IN FAR EAST

Senator McMAHON. I would like to quote to you your language on going into Korea, which was very beautifully written, and I think it ought to be in the record:

The decision of President Truman on June 27 lighted into flame a lamp of hope throughout Asia that was burning dimly toward extinction. It marked for the Far East the focal and turning point in this area struggling for freedom. It swept aside in one great monumental stroke all of the hypocrisy and the sophistry which has confused and deluded so many people distant from the actual scene.

General, do you regard the threat to us and to our national survival—

General MACARTHUR. The quotation that you read, Senator, is quite true. It did restore at one stroke the enormous prestige of the United States. It confirmed the people of the Far East that we were not going to let them slide into slavery, that we were determined we were going to meet aggression on every front that it showed itself, that we were not going to confine ourselves and say we will defend in this sector but all the other sectors globally we will let go.

It was the enunciation which was the very antithesis of defeatism, which has been so pronounced that we could not meet aggression except in one area of the world. It meant that we, if the enemy was going to encroach in two areas, we would meet him on two areas; in three areas, we would meet him on three areas; that he was just as divided as we were; that if we could not defend wherever he aggressed or started to attack, you admit before the conflict that you are going to be defeated.

This is global, as you said yourself this is a global proposition, and you can't let one-half of the world slide into slavery and just confine yourself to defending the other. You have got to hold every place.

Now, in the Far East there was a tremendous belief that we were not going to defend the Far East, and when we moved in to defend Korea, it gave an enormous uplift throughout that entire section of the world.

If there is anything that I have said that lead you to believe that I was critical of the decision to defend Korea, I would correct it immediately.

Senator McMAHON. No, General; I just thought that was such a fine statement.

ENDING THE KOREAN WAR

General MACARTHUR. The only thing I am trying to do, Senator, is to settle the thing in Korea to bring it to a decisive end. I believe it can be brought to a decisive end without the calamity of a third world war. I believe if you let it go on indefinitely in Korea, you invite a third world war. I believe the chances of the terrible conflict that you so rightly dread—and all the rest of us dread with you—would be much more probable if we practice appeasement in one area even though we resist to our capacity all along the line.

That is all I am saying. I am saying it with the acute consciousness of the dreadful slaughter that is going on in Korea today. If

it is possible to bring it to a successful and an honorable end, I believe we should take the chance of doing so.

Now, in all the discussions today there has been no proposal that has been made here as to how to end the Korean problem satisfactorily and honorably. I believe in the method, as I have enunciated, and on January 12, the Chiefs of Staff believed so, too.

Now, they may have changed, and shifted. I do not know.

Senator McMAHON. We will find out.

General MACARTHUR. They will speak for themselves.

Senator McMAHON. We will find out.

CASUALTIES IN KOREA

General MACARTHUR. But still I am of that opinion; and I shrink—I shrink with a horror that I cannot express in words—at this continuous slaughter of men in Korea.

The battle casualties in Korea today probably have passed the million-man mark. Our own casualties, American casualties, have passed 65,000. The Koreans have lost about 140,000. Our losses, on our side, are a quarter of a million men. I am not talking of the civilian populations, who must have lost many, many, many times that.

The enemy probably has lost 750,000 casualties. There are 145,000 of them that are now in our prison bull pens, prisoners, so they might be excepted from that figure because they live; but a million men in less than 11 months of fighting, in less than 11 months of this conflict, have already gone and it grows more savage every day.

I just cannot brush that off as a Korean skirmish. I believe that is something of such tremendous importance that it must be solved, and it cannot be solved by the nebulous process of saying "Give us time, and we will be prepared; or we will be in a better shape 2 years from now"—which is argumentative.

I don't know whether we will, or not; and neither do you, because you do not know, and none of us know the capacity of the enemy.

He may build faster than we do. I couldn't tell you.

I don't know that, you are gambling on chances; but I say there is no chance in Korea, because it is a fact—you have lost a million men now. You will lose more than a million if you go on another year; if you go on until 1953, you will lose another million.

What are you trying to protect?

The war in Korea has already almost destroyed that nation of 20,000,000 people.

I have never seen such devastation.

I have seen, I guess, as much blood and disaster as any living man, and it just curdled my stomach, the last time I was there. After I looked at that wreckage and those thousands of women and children and everything, I vomited.

Now, are you going to let that go on, by any sophistry of reasoning, or possibilities? They may be there, but this is a certainty.

What are you going to do? Once more, I repeat the question, What is the policy in Korea?

If you go on indefinitely, you are perpetuating a slaughter such as I have never heard of in the history of mankind.

Now, what I am trying to do is to find some reasonable and honorable way to stop that slaughter. It is not to conquer this country, or China, or anything else.

It is to bring this thing to an honorable end.

If you go on, you are going to destroy not only the casualties that I speak of, which are military, but you are going to destroy that people.

Now, I just cannot bring myself to analyze it with that shrewdness of legal capacity that you enunciate in your argument, which is an argument, to let it by.

Your entire drift has been not to do anything, just keep on fighting, losing and bleeding there; and I think we should make some extraordinary effort to bring it to an end.

Senator MAHON. I am not going to characterize your proposition. I do not expect that you are going to characterize my position.

I will take care of that, myself.

ATOMIC PRODUCTION CAPACITIES OF VARIOUS AREAS

Now, I would like to know this, General: Is there any atomic or plane-building capacity in the Chinese mainland, that you know of?

General MACARTHUR. None that I know of. The backwardness of industrial development in China precludes even the concept of such an intricate potential.

Senator McMAHON. Then, General—

General MACARTHUR. They may have some of the natural resources that go into the manufacture of them, of the bombs, I couldn't tell you about that; but, it will never be done in our day. Never, in our day, will atomic weapons be turned out of China.

They cannot turn out the ordinary weapons. They do not have the instrumentalities to turn out airplanes, big ships, big guns, many of the other attributes of modern warfare.

Senator McMAHON. Western Europe, however, has that capacity, has it not, General?

General MACARTHUR. Senator, as I said, I have not made a study of this matter.

I suppose it has, but I don't know.

Senator McMAHON. You would not deny that the capacity, both atomic and the production of planes, of Western Europe, combined with Soviet Russia, would out-produce the United States of America—you would not deny that, would you?

DEFENSE OF EUROPE

General MACARTHUR. Not at all, and any inference from your question that I don't advocate the fullest protection and assistance to Western Europe is quite fallacious, Senator. What I advocate is that we defend every place, and I say that we have the capacity to do it.

If you say that we haven't, you admit defeat. If the enemy has that capacity and is divided on all these fronts, we should be able to meet it.

Senator McMAHON. General, I do not admit defeat. I am thinking if this war has to be fought, about the total and complete victory. I do not want to blind myself, and speaking for myself, General, with

a devotion for my country that I will match against yours or any man's, I am only speaking about a proposition which I believe is sound, and I know that you will give me credit for believing in that which I think, the same as I certainly give you that credit.

Now, General, do you think that we are ready to withstand the Russian attack in Western Europe today?

General MACARTHUR. Senator, I have asked you several times not to involve me in anything except my own area. My concepts on global defense are not what I am here to testify on. I don't pretend to be the authority now on those things.

When I was the Chief of Staff 20 years ago, that was my problem, and I would have answered it. The Chiefs of Staff or others here are the ones to answer that query, not me.

Senator McMAHON. And so, General, you concede it seems to me by that statement, that the Joint Chiefs of Staff, having access to global intelligence, having made global plans for our defense, may have in that information, and because of that information made decisions contrary to your recommendations which could be sound.

General MACARTHUR. They didn't on January 12, Senator. They had all the information available at that time, and they made the study and their recommendations were as I read you this morning, which coincided with my own, that if you apply that type of sanction in the Far East, you will bring this conflict to an end, that there is a strong possibility that that would be the result.

INTELLIGENCE ON CHINESE COMMUNIST ATTACK

Senator McMAHON. General, in September of 1950 did you have any intelligence that the Chinese were going to come in if we went to the Yalu?

General MACARTHUR. I had no concrete information, no, sir.

Senator McMAHON. Had you been advised by any of your intelligence officers to that effect?

General MACARTHUR. On September 15?

Senator McMAHON. In September, any time in September?

General MACARTHUR. I don't recall it, Senator. That the enemy was shifting his forces northward, I knew thoroughly. That he was massing forces along the Yalu I understood, but he was at that time advertising to the world that such Chinese as went in were individuals and volunteers. He specifically proclaimed that Nationalist China was not involved in that struggle.

EFFECTIVE STRENGTH AND USE OF NATIONALIST TROOPS

Senator McMAHON. General, when you went down to Formosa, you made an estimate of the effective troops that they could supply, did you not?

General MACARTHUR. I beg your pardon, Senator?

Senator McMAHON. When you went down to Formosa you made an estimate of the number of effective troops that Chiang could supply?

General MACARTHUR. That the Nationalist Chinese had on Formosa?

Senator McMAHON. That's right.

General MACARTHUR. They had about a half million; yes, sir.

Senator McMAHON. How many at that time did you think were effective?

General MACARTHUR. I think that the caliber of the personnel was good. Their equipment, as I explained this morning, was spotty. I think they're the same caliber of troops that we are fighting now in North Korea. I believe they could be brought to the same degree of efficiency, and I think those troops are good troops.

Senator McMAHON. In the report that you made on your visit to Formosa, did you state how many effective troops Chiang Kai-shek had, in your opinion?

General MACARTHUR. I couldn't tell you, Senator. The report that we made was made by a mission that I sent down there under General Fox.

Senator McMAHON. How many did General Fox report could be effectively mounted and used?

General MACARTHUR. They all could be if they were properly equipped and trained. How many were available at that time I really couldn't tell you.

Senator McMAHON. When the suggestion was made, General, that Chiang's troops be brought up to Korea soon after the outbreak of the hostilities in Korea, you made a finding as to their effectiveness at that time, did you not?

General MACARTHUR. I recommended that they should not be brought up to Korea at that time, that Formosa itself was threatened.

Senator McMAHON. You went so far as to say that they would be an Albatros around our neck for months.

General MACARTHUR. That is correct. They were lacking in artillery, they were lacking in many of the necessities. We were at that time fighting in the Pusan beachhead, and untrained troops, only partially equipped, would have been of little effectiveness.

However, the main reason that I wished those troops held on Formosa was to defend Formosa, and when the Chinese troops that were threatening Formosa moved north to attack us in Korea, I recommended that the wraps be taken off of the Nationalist troops.

Senator McMAHON. That was based upon the fact that the Chinese Communist effectives had been moved north on the Yalu and they did not have anything on the mainland of China with which to carry on the attack on Formosa?

General MACARTHUR. Nothing that would seriously threaten Formosa, correct.

Senator McMAHON. Now who reported that to you, General, your own intelligence or CIA?

General MACARTHUR. I couldn't tell you. It came from various sources, largely from the Chinese Nationalists themselves who reported the movement of the Communist troops.

Senator McMAHON. And did they report to you that there were not sufficient effectives left in the south to carry on the raid on Formosa which you feared at the time that the Yalu troops were down in south China?

General MACARTHUR. There was no such report to me. That was my own estimate of the situation on the strengths and relative positions of the various forces.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Senator McMAHON. When did the CIA leave Korea, General?

General MACARTHUR. When did the what?

Senator McMAHON. The CIA, the Central Intelligence Agency operatives leave Korea?

General MACARTHUR. I couldn't tell you. The Central Intelligence Agency doesn't operate under me at all.

Senator McMAHON. Were they directed to leave Korea after the Inchon landing by your command?

General MACARTHUR. I don't know what you are talking about, Senator.

Senator McMAHON. General, I understood that the Central Intelligence agents disappeared from Korea after the Inchon operation, that very brilliant operation which you directed.

General MACARTHUR. The Central Intelligence agents, Senator, are not under me. As far as I know they never were in Korea. They may have been, but it is not an agency that functions under me. It functions under the Central Intelligence controls here.

AVAILABLE INTELLIGENCE ON CHINA

Senator McMAHON. You regard your information on China as today being much more extensive than it was two or three years ago, do you not?

General MACARTHUR. I don't know what you mean by that.

Senator McMAHON. General, do you think today that you are better informed about the internal situation in China, the general situation in China, than you were 3 years ago?

General MACARTHUR. I thought I was pretty well informed at both times, Senator.

Senator McMAHON. You think you were?

General MACARTHUR. Yes.

MAC ARTHUR LETTER TO EATON, 1948

Senator McMAHON. Well, I quote from the March 3, 1948 report to the Honorable Charles A. Eaton, chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs in the House of Representatives, in answer to the request that was made by the House committee to you for your opinion on things in the Far East, and you said, if I have a correct copy of it:

China, as you perhaps know, is a theater of the United States Navy, controlled outside the scope of my existing authority. I have no representatives there, and apart from general background knowledge, such detailed information as has been made available to me has been derived largely by indirection. Exhaustive investigations of the Chinese situation have been made by responsible United States officials, but these studies are not within my channel of information or command, and in consequence I am not adequately familiar therewith. I have furthermore not had the opportunity to visit China for many years.

You have not, of course, had an opportunity to go there since this time, General?

General MACARTHUR. No, sir.

Senator McMAHON (reading):

With this background, you will readily perceive I am not in a position to render authoritative advice with reference to the myriad of details on which a definitive policy for this particular must necessarily rest.

General MACARTHUR. That is all correct.

Senator McMAHON (continuing):

The Chinese problem is part of a global situation which should be considered in its entirety in the orientation of American policy. Fragmentary decisions in disconnected sectors of the world will not bring an integrated solution.

Senator WILEY. What is the date of that?

Senator McMAHON. I quote from the letter of the general's, dated March 3, 1948.

You also said, General:

In the determination of our global policy care must, of course, be exercised to avoid commitment of our resources beyond what we can safely spare; the sapping of our national strength to the point of jeopardy to our own security and the overburdening of our people beyond their capacity to maintain a standard of life consistent with the energies with which they are naturally endowed.

I will be glad to submit for the record the whole letter.

You remember that letter, of course, General? You referred to it earlier today.

General MACARTHUR. The basic conditions have completely changed since that letter was written, Senator. The war has been precipitated in Korea, and to attempt to apply the rationale of what existed at that time and what exists today is quite fantastic.

COLLECTIVE SECURITY

Senator McMAHON. General, do you believe in the concept of collective security?

General MACARTHUR. What do you mean by "collective security," Senator?

Senator McMAHON. Do you believe in the concept of collective security upon which our foreign policy is based?

General MACARTHUR. What do you mean by "collective security?"

Senator McMAHON. I mean the attempt to weld together a military alliance to keep the peace such as we have attempted to do in the North Atlantic Pact.

General MACARTHUR. I have only a superficial knowledge of the North Atlantic Pact, Senator. I am not prepared to discuss it in any way, shape, or manner.

Senator McMAHON. Neither its provisions nor its implementation?

General MACARTHUR. I have only the ordinary knowledge that any officer would have on it. You have experts on that. General Eisenhower and others have appeared before you very recently with all the intimate knowledge that comes from the authority and responsibility he has.

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen.

Senator McMAHON. Mr. Chairman, I have one more question.

The CHAIRMAN. Under the order heretofore, on motion, and in addition, under the information conferred by the Sergeant at Arms, he has been instructed to bring the Senators to the floor.

PROCEDURE FOR HEARINGS

Senator KNOWLAND. Mr. Chairman, might I ask this question before we leave; Is it understood that when we resume, whenever it may be, next week or otherwise, that we will start where we left off here, so

that those of us who came in at the tail end of this committee table, will not get on the tail end again.

The CHAIRMAN. I might say to the Senator from California that I have not forgotten the time when I was in that position on the committees.

General MACARTHUR. Senator, do you think you could clear me in another day? If you do, I will try to get down from New York tomorrow.

The CHAIRMAN. General, that is a matter wholly beyond my control. I do not know. I have no idea on earth what course the questions will take. I should be very happy if you could testify tomorrow. I will endeavor to do so, but I have no control over it.

Rather than make such assurance, I would prefer that you come back next week.

Senator WILEY. Let us try; at least we can get that out of the way tomorrow, and then come back for rebuttal, the rebuttal that Senator Morse has in mind.

Senator McMAHON. Mr. Chairman, I did not hear what the last proposal was.

The CHAIRMAN. The general inquired of me as to whether or not I thought that the committee could finish with him if he came back tomorrow. I have stated that I could not answer that question. I have no idea as to what might develop in the course of this testimony.

Senator McMAHON. Mr. Chairman, as I have told you, I looked at the clock, and I saw it was past 6 o'clock, but I have a great many more questions which I propose to address to the general, and I might add I have no apology for it at all, for the length of time that I take on this hearing.

The CHAIRMAN. I did not ask the Senator to apologize.

Senator McMAHON. I realize that, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, I was not directing that remark to the chairman. I was putting it in the record.

I certainly want to apologize to the chairman if he thinks I was directing it to him.

The CHAIRMAN. I just want to have the record show that the chairman is not rushing you.

Senator SPARKMAN. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question, please?

Assuming we go over to next week, will a transcript of today's proceedings be available to us?

The CHAIRMAN. It will.

Senator SPARKMAN. It seems to me if we get that and look it over, we might easily shorten this whole thing because many of the questions that many of us had in mind undoubtedly have been sufficiently thrashed out.

We might shorten it by reviewing the transcript.

The CHAIRMAN. What the Senator says is correct.

I have gone over so many things two and three times here that he testified to exactly the same.

Senator SPARKMAN. And it is hard for us to keep them in mind, but we can easily check them if we have a transcript to go through.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course.

Unfortunately, Senators are repetitious.

Senator CAIN. Mr. Chairman, would it be in order, sir, to bring the question before us, to move because of the general's consideration, in part, at least, that we meet tomorrow?

The CHAIRMAN. I will be delighted to meet tomorrow. That is not the question. I earnestly hope we can.

The question was whether we could conclude tomorrow.

That is a question I cannot answer.

Senator CAIN. I think that is a calculated risk.

Senator SPARKMAN. I earnestly believe we will save time by going over.

Senator CAIN. I move you, sir, if I am so permitted, that we begin tomorrow morning at 9:30.

Senator LONG. Mr. Chairman, might I direct this question to the general?

If it would make any difference to him, considering the fact that there may be some divergence of opinion between his opinions, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he would have to come back tomorrow anyway, if he would still like to come tomorrow, or would he like to reserve that until later?

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I hope that we can conduct this hearing in an orderly manner. I, of course, will do that; if the general wishes not to return tomorrow, I will endeavor to get another witness here.

Senator LONG. I was under the impression, Mr. Chairman, that the general might have felt that by coming back tomorrow we might not have to call him back later, and it is my guess that the probabilities are that after we hear the Joint Chiefs of Staff we might want to call him back anyway.

The CHAIRMAN. We cannot give those assurances that he will not be called back again.

I would like to, if we can, finish the testimony in chief at the very earliest possible date. That is what I desire to do.

Senator STENNIS. Well, let us come back tomorrow and try, if the general wishes to.

General MACARTHUR. I will come back tomorrow.

The CHAIRMAN. Then the committee stands in recess until tomorrow morning at 10:30.

(Whereupon, at 6:10 p. m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene Friday, May 4, 1951, at 10:30 a. m.)

MILITARY SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST

FRIDAY, MAY 4, 1951

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES AND THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
UNITED STATES SENATE,
Washington, D. C.

The committees met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10:35 a. m., in the caucus room, Senate Office Building, Senator Richard B. Russell (chairman, Committee on Armed Services) presiding.

Present: Senators Russell (chairman, Committee on Armed Services), Connally (chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations), Wiley, Smith (New Jersey), Green, Hickenlooper, McMahon, Lodge, Fulbright, Tobey, Sparkman, Gillette, Bridges, Byrd, Saltonstall, Johnson (Texas), Morse, Kefauver, Knowland, Cain, Stennis, Flanders, and Long.

Also present: Mark H. Galusha and Verne D. Mudge, of the committee staff, Committee on Armed Services; Francis O. Wilcox, chief of staff; Thorsten V. Kalijarvi, staff associate, Committee on Foreign Relations; C. C. O'Day, clerk; and Pat M. Holt, associate clerk.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Gentlemen, the representatives of the press, the photographers of various press associations, have been most insistent that they be permitted to take pictures this morning. The committee was quiet lenient with them yesterday. They asked for 5 minutes and we gave them nearer 12.

I wish to bring that matter to the attention of the committee. If the majority of the committee desires to allow a brief interlude for these pictures, we may be able to do so.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Could we do it at the end of the meeting instead of the beginning? It would be much less disruption.

Senator KNOWLAND. Mr. Chairman, before we proceed on that there is one question I would like to raise. I have gone over the original text of the hearings yesterday and the deletions.

The CHAIRMAN. I intend to make a statement on that, Senator. Is there any objection, then, to advising the photographers that they will be permitted a 5-minute period to take their pictures at the recess today?

I think I should tell you before action is taken that General MacArthur has been most cooperative with the committee in expediting these hearings. It was suggested either by him or General Whitney of his staff that we take a very brief recess today, that sandwiches and coffee be served here in the room and that we proceed in the hope that we might be able to conclude this phase of the inquiry today.

It has been my purpose, unless I am overridden by the committee or the committee expresses a contrary view, I should say, to take a very brief recess, say for some 30 minutes where we can have this coffee and sandwiches served here, and then resume the hearing. That should be considered in connection with any action taken with respect to the pictures.

We could, of course, permit the photographers in here then.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Chairman, if you want comment, I think that is a very good idea.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean including letting the photographers in for 5 minutes?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I have no objection to that.

The CHAIRMAN. If there is no objection, that course will be followed and Colonel Galusha, will you please notify the people out there with their cameras that when we take a recess it will probably be around 12:30 or between 12:30 and 1; that they will be permitted 5 minutes to come in and take pictures. The committee will remain in their seats and the general will be here, but that we are expecting them to clear this room immediately after they have had an opportunity to take a couple of shots.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Pardon me one moment.

(Discussion off the record.)

CORRECTIONS IN PERMANENT RECORD

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Chairman, on the record, on page 147 of yesterday's transcript, included in a question of mine to General MacArthur is a misstatement. I may have used the word. I had no intention of using the word. It is in the last paragraph containing my question on page 147 in the words as follows: "which are to clear Korea of the Russians."

It is possible I used the word "Russians" in the question and I intended to use the word "Reds," and I would like the permission of the committee to have the record show that the word is "Reds" instead of "Russians."

The CHAIRMAN. I noticed a couple of errors, one of which I am sure—

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I would like General MacArthur's consent to make that change because it was in a question directed to him.

The CHAIRMAN. I noticed some typographical errors, one or two in my remarks that were not made that do not affect the context in any way.

I think in the interests of that kind, that members of the committee should have an opportunity to correct the record before the permanent record is printed; if it in any way, shape, form or fashion changes the context of what was said, permission of the committee should be sought.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. That is why I asked the committee permission on this.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, Senator Hickenlooper will be permitted to make that correction in the record.

Now, gentlemen, General MacArthur has returned this morning for further questioning on the momentous issue that is before this committee.

It is my hope that we will be able to conclude this phase of the interrogation today, bearing in mind, of course, that it may be necessary to recall the general after we have heard the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and the general may desire to return, after we have heard from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Before we start this morning, I wish to congratulate the committee, and all participants in this inquiry, and General MacArthur in particular, for the spirit in which this hearing has been conducted thus far.

I think the discussion has been held on a plane of the highest national interest, and that is the only plane that can serve the people of the United States at this critical juncture.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Chairman, as one member of the committee, I would like to compliment the chairman on the fine way he opened the hearing, and has conducted the debate.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you for that observation.

COMMITTEE REPRESENTATION

Senator BYRD. Mr. Chairman, Senator Brewster has been designated by the Republican steering committee to ask if he could not sit in on this committee, at this time——

The CHAIRMAN. Senator, that is a question that has caused me considerable anxiety and trouble; but until the Democratic steering committee takes action to decide which committee shall have a change in ratio, I do not see how we can do it.

Senator BYRD. I wanted to suggest that Senator Brewster have the privilege of asking questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, the Democratic steering committee will meet and decide whether to change the ratio on the Foreign Relations Committee to 8 to 5; and that places me in an embarrassing position.

I am very anxious for the Senator from Maine to participate, as soon as action can be had by the Democratic steering committee; and I hope that it will be taken today.

Just as soon as it is taken, Senator Brewster will be cordially invited to full participation in this hearing, without regard to whether the Senate has taken formal action on the matter, or not.

Until we know which committee will be affected, I think that would be premature.

I hope that we may continue these hearings in that spirit. That is the only way we can get it back to the American people, the only way we can arrive at the objective of the investigation, which is the truth, and make a proper finding in this matter.

PROCEDURE FOR EDITING TRANSCRIPTS

Now, General, as you know, the committee is releasing to the press and the radio the public version of the transcript as rapidly as it can be transcribed and reproduced.

This procedure imposes on the committee an obligation to comb the original text of the transcript so as to delete material, the release of which might be harmful to the national security, and helpful to the enemy.

Now, as a layman, I must confess that the decisions that have been made by the persons who are supposed to be highly specialized in

this field are somewhat baffling to me. I realize that some procedure must be adopted to protect the security of this testimony, and we can't guard it piece by piece. It must conform to a broad pattern.

It is impossible to say conclusively and on the spur of the moment that a specific item or specific series of data are or are not subject to classification. They must be considered, of course, and evaluated in relation to the whole security picture.

The problem as I understand it can be summed up in a single sentence. No one can say whether a particular word or phrase or that that sentence is a security item; the entire sentence itself and perhaps its relation to other sentences in the paragraph are what count.

Now, the committee did not have the aid of a staff that was sufficient in numbers or experience—we have in experience but not in numbers—to make a proper security analysis of the original record so as to facilitate our efforts to make copies available to the press and radio at the earliest practicable moment.

We, therefore, asked for the best assistance and advice that was available to us in this field—that is, a representative from the Department of Defense—to pass upon those matters within the Department.

EVALUATION OF TESTIMONY FOR SECURITY REASONS

I communicated with the Department and as a result the Director of the Joint Staff, Vice Admiral Davis, is evaluating the testimony as it is transcribed and is indicating items which in his best professional military judgment should be deleted for security reasons.

There has also been assigned to express the views of the Department of State, Mr. Fisher, but I am advised that on yesterday he had no occasion to question any of the evidence. It was all handled by the expert assigned by the Defense Establishment.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Which Mr. Fisher is that?

The CHAIRMAN. I don't know.

Senator LODGE. Adrian Fisher.

The CHAIRMAN. I inquired particularly if he had raised any question whatever on any testimony, and I was told on yesterday he did not. The entire matter was handled by Admiral Davis.

The committee wishes to make it perfectly clear to you, General MacArthur, and to the public and to the witnesses that will follow you here on the stand, that the Department of Defense is not being asked to censor your testimony in the ordinary sense of that word.

I did call upon them for advice to the committee because I knew of no other source to which to go to get advice, with the understanding, of course, that the witness, whoever he might be, was entitled to have a representative of his own in the room with the person that was dealing with the record. I think I addressed a letter to you advising you of that decision.

Now, to be sure that the committee gets your own views to the deletions that were made yesterday, I shall furnish you with a copy of the original record, and in case you feel that the material that has been deleted should be placed back in the published record because it is essential to the presentation of your views, why, we will consider the problem of having the pages rerun, and issued to the press and radio.

SUBCOMMITTEE TO PROCESS RECORD

I have been processing this record through Senator Knowland, who happens to be a member of a subcommittee that I shall now appoint to examine the record, with respect to whether there is a question of whether or not the Department has furnished an accurate paraphrase of documents that have been typographically cleared—I appoint as the other member of that subcommittee Senator McMahon, of Connecticut.

Now, it would be of help to us if, after you have examined the record, you would transmit it to Senator Knowland, and then the committee can, in the last analysis, decide as to whether these portions of the testimony that have been deleted should be made public.

Senator, you were going to address yourself to something.

Senator KNOWLAND. The only point I want to raise is that, Mr. Chairman, I did not get the final part of the hearing until just a few moments ago. I had no objections to apparent deletions that were made that mentioned the number of submarines, and so forth.

The CHAIRMAN. If you will pardon me, personally, as a layman, I could not see where it was important.

Senator KNOWLAND. I could not either, because it has been published in many places, but at least I am not raising an issue to that. However, I do raise the issue on several pages of the testimony that were deleted. I would be glad to discuss with the Defense Department the reasons for the deletions that are not known to me. I would like to know why they should not come out, for instance, in one of the TWX's that the general had quoted from, where they might not want to take the verbatim TWX and release that? It seems to me that that information might be paraphrased, and then released. I would like to explore that subject with the Department, because it deals with this question of the limitations upon bombing within Korea.

Now, that, to me, was the first time I knew that our Air Force was under some restrictions in going north of the Yalu, but I had no understanding, and I did not understand that there were restrictions within Korea itself, which was under aggression from the Chinese Communists. Assuming we did not use the exact language of the TWX, it seems to me that that material is pertinent, and I would like to explore that matter with the Department of Defense.

The CHAIRMAN. After you have explored it with the Department of Defense, if you do not arrive at a satisfactory understanding, the committee will hear reasons assigned by the Department for the deletion. If they do not appear to us to be valid, we can then vote to release the matter. I know of no other way that we can handle this whole question with safety.

When the committee recessed on yesterday I believed that Senator McMahon was questioning.

Senator McMAHON. Since yesterday I have been giving this thing some thought and—

POLICY IN COMBING SECRET DATA

The CHAIRMAN. Will the Senator spare me one moment? I would like to read into the record for the benefit of the committee a letter I wrote to the Defense Establishment with respect to their method of combing the testimony for secret data. I addressed it to the general

counsel of the Department of Defense because he had been sent up to confer with me when I requested that some representative discuss some proper procedure for handling secret documents and evidence of a classified nature.

DEAR MR. LARKIN: This letter will furnish guidance for the personnel charged with examining the transcript of testimony taken before the Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees for the purpose of indicating material which, for security reasons, should not be made public.

The sole criterion for making a deletion from the original stenographic transcript will be whether the publication of the material would be harmful to the national interest because of security considerations. It is recognized that in addition to strictly military security, the corollary consideration of policy security insofar as our relationships and negotiations with other nations are concerned may be a factor in some instances.

For this reason it may be desirable that the officer acting for the Department of Defense consult with an appropriate representative from the Department of State or other departments or agencies with a view toward having a qualified individual available to assist in passing upon questions where other than strictly military security is involved.

It is requested that personnel examining the transcript be particularly diligent in their efforts to confine themselves to strictly security matters, and to refrain from deleting from the transcript to be made public matters which have no significance from the point of view of national security. Specifically, the fact that portions of the testimony might be critical of, or embarrassing to, individuals or their staffs is not a consideration in this instance.

I wanted the committee to be advised of the directions that were given.

Senator McMahan?

Senator McMAHON. Mr. Chairman, as I said yesterday, I have a long series of questions, but I want to reserve them after I ask 10 or 12 more for some future time. I want the committee to know I did not want to monopolize the time of the committee, but we have a very important task here and the general is peculiarly equipped to give us his views at this time.

The CHAIRMAN. I know the other gentlemen of the committee will appreciate that statement.

TESTIMONY OF GENERAL OF THE ARMY DOUGLAS MacARTHUR, ACCOMPANIED BY MAJ. GEN. COURTNEY WHITNEY—Resumed

THE NOVEMBER DRIVE AS A RECONNAISSANCE IN FORCE

Senator McMAHON. General, yesterday you said that the drive in November was a reconnaissance in force; is that correct? Do you remember your testimony of yesterday?

General MACARTHUR. That is correct; yes, sir.

Senator McMAHON. As I recollect it, General, last November you issued a communique in which you said that this was the end-of-the-war offensive which would bring the boys home by Christmas.

General MACARTHUR. That was my hope.

Senator McMAHON. Did you anticipate that you could get them home by Christmas with a reconnaissance in force?

General MACARTHUR. The reconnaissance would have developed the strength of the enemy. If it was not sufficient to resist us, it would have been an all-out assault and, as I explained in my communique, it would have undoubtedly destroyed the last remnants of the North Korean forces.

Where a reconnaissance in force—the line between a reconnaissance in force and an assault attack is a rather nebulous one and depends upon circumstances. What starts out as a reconnaissance in force might well result in a full-scale assault so far as your forces are concerned.

PROPOSED LIMITATIONS ON NOVEMBER ADVANCE TO THE YALU

Senator McMAHON. Was there any difference in opinion between you and the Joint Chiefs relative to how far you would go toward the Yalu in that advance?

General MACARTHUR. The movements, all tactical and strategic movements that I made, had the prior knowledge and approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Senator McMAHON. Was there any recommendation by the Joint Chiefs that it would have been wise in their opinion to stop about 5 miles this side of the Yalu on a defensible ridge?

General MACARTHUR. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believed that it would be probably advisable, based upon the considerations at that time, to occupy the north of Korea with South Korean forces. They were adverse to having other nationals there. But the tactical conditions were such that South Koreans were not able to do so.

POSITION OF THEATER COMMANDER IN GLOBAL PICTURE

Senator McMAHON. Yesterday, General, I pursued a line of questioning concerning the global implications of your proposals, and you informed me that being a theater commander you have not taken those into consideration. Now——

General MACARTHUR. One minute, Senator. That is not exactly what I said, if you will let me interrupt you. I said—I intended to convey the idea that the theater commander was only concerned in global studies insofar as his own theater was concerned to coordinate the demands of his own theater with the global problem; a general knowledge of the global problem, of course, is necessary by all theater commanders.

Senator McMAHON. General, on page 207 of the testimony you stated in answer to my question as to whether or not we were ready to withstand the Russian attack in Western Europe today:

General MACARTHUR. Senator, I have asked you several times not to involve me in anything except my own area. My concepts on global defense are not what I am here to testify on. I don't pretend to be the authority now on those things. When I was the Chief of Staff 20 years ago, that was my problem and I would have answered it. The Chiefs of Staff or others here are the ones to answer that query, not me.

Now, General, I went into that question for two reasons.

First, this committee, of course, has a very grave duty of weighing all factors in the defense of this country. We are not confined to a theater of operations. We are called upon to implement an over-all strategy.

I asked you about it, General, because in your speech to the Congress you stated as follows:

The issues are global and so interlocked that to consider the problems of one sector oblivious to those of another is to court disaster for the whole.

General MACARTHUR. Correct.

THEATER COMMANDER'S POSITION RELATIVE TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Senator McMAHON. Now, General, you are aware I am sure of the mechanics that this Government has set up for carrying out this business of weighing these interlocking factors, in other words, our global defense as a whole.

You are aware of that. You are aware that in 1949 the Congress of the United States passed what is known as the National Security Act. In this act, and although I will not take the time of the committee to read it, I think perhaps, Mr. Chairman, that at least the pertinent portions should be inserted at this point in the record—

The CHAIRMAN. Is that the act of 1947?

Senator McMAHON. This is the act, as it is entitled, "Coordination for National Security." I haven't got the date of the act, Mr. Chairman, but it is the act setting up the National Security Agency which provides that the membership of the National Security Council should be the President, the Vice President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the NSRB.

That is the body that has been set up by this Congress to coordinate our total global strategy.

General, I take it from what you said yesterday that you have a high opinion of the members, the present members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

General MACARTHUR. I have.

Senator McMAHON. And the present Secretary of Defense.

General MACARTHUR. I have.

Senator McMAHON. You recognize them as patriotic gentlemen of capability in their fields.

General MACARTHUR. Unquestionably.

Senator McMAHON. Now General, assuming for the sake of discussion that subsequent testimony brings out real differences between you and the Joint Chiefs on how far our far eastern strategy can best promote our global strategy, and assuming this difference of viewpoint, would you then be prepared to admit that the Joint Chiefs' judgment is better than yours and that the American people would be well advised to follow the judgment of the Joint Chiefs?

General MACARTHUR. The authorities and the responsibilities of the Joint Chiefs are laid down and prescribed by law. Their position in the niche of American governmental procedure is entirely in accordance with the statutes.

Whether I should agree with it or should not agree with it is not pertinent to the actions of the Government of the United States.

As a theater commander I had my own responsibilities and I made my own recommendations, and would again. If they disagreed with those of higher authority, the question of the judgment of that higher authority is not within my hands, and I would not attempt to pass judgment upon it.

That is a matter for public opinion. I therefore would not attempt to answer such a hypothetical question as you put up, that if I were a theater commander and the Joint Chiefs of Staff in their superior

authority gave me a directive which I disagreed with, I still would implement it to the very best of my ability.

A THEATER COMMANDER'S PUBLIC EXPRESSION OF OPINIONS

Senator McMAHON. General, there are some fundamental basic differences between the Government and yourself as to the wisdom of the best course to pursue in the east; that is true?

General MACARTHUR. Naturally.

Senator McMAHON. Do you consider, General, that it comes within the province of a theater commander to register publicly with persons in political life, or out of it for that matter, his differences of opinion while he is still in active charge of the theater?

General MACARTHUR. I believe the theater commander has the responsibility of registering his views as he might see fit, if they are honest views and not in contradiction to any implementing directives that he may have received.

I do not believe the implications of your question, that any segment of American society shall be so gagged that the truth and the full truth shall not be brought out.

I believe it is in the interest, the public interest, that diverse opinions on any controversial issue shall be fully aired.

I understand completely that the totalitarian and the Soviet method is entirely in contradiction to that, that they do muzzle certain segments of society. I do not believe that is the American way.

And if your question is intended to mean that I would be subservient to and not register within the proper processes my opinions, I would refute it at once.

Otherwise you do not get what is the foundation of the very liberty that we breathe, that the people are entitled to have the facts, that the judgment of the Government itself is subject to their opinion and to their control; and in order to exercise that, they are entitled to the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, Senator.

EXPRESSION OF VIEWS BY SUBORDINATES

Senator McMAHON. Now, let's assume, General, that one of your subordinate generals in the theater of your command had felt as you feel. He, too, is a military man and he, too, is subordinate to his higher command.

Do I take it that you would defend the right of a brigadier general on your staff to give his opinions as to the policy that was proceeding or that was being proceeded with by the Government of the United States?

General MACARTHUR. I wouldn't have a brigadier general or anyone else on my staff that didn't freely and frankly give me his opinions in contradiction to my own. The very value of a subordinate is the freedom with which he expresses his initiative.

I have frequently had officers under my command, not only in my staff, but in my command, that disagreed with me completely and I listened to them and on occasions they have convinced me that I was wrong and they were right. That, I believe, is fundamental.

Senator McMAHON. Now, General, we are not talking about the same thing, I don't think. I fully agree with you that it would be a

poor commander, a poor executive of any kind, who insisted on having "yes men" around him and wouldn't listen to what they had to say.

However, General, that isn't quite what I am talking about. I assume that you had the right and exercised it at any and all times to bring any views that you might have to the attention of your superior officers.

Do you wish the question read?

General MACARTHUR. I didn't get your—

Senator McMAHON. Read the question, Mr. Reporter.

(The pending question was read by the reporter.)

General MACARTHUR. Naturally.

Senator McMAHON. And you were never restricted in any way in bringing those recommendations or thoughts that you might have on any matter to the attention of your superiors, the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

General MACARTHUR. No restrictions whatsoever.

Senator McMAHON. You see, General, what I was raising was the question of the advisability, if not the propriety, of any subordinate military officer to take his differences of opinion, on a governmental policy, when he is in the military command, and chain of command, to people in political life.

General MACARTHUR. I do not know what you mean by "people in political life," Senator.

Senator McMAHON. We have your answer, General, in the letter to Mr. Martin.

General MACARTHUR. It seems to me that the American people are entitled to certain basic facts, when it involves the lives of their sons, and, perhaps, the future of our country.

I do not believe in the gag rule, if that is what you are talking about.

I am free to confess I do not quite follow what you are driving at, or how it appertains to this particular investigation.

Senator McMAHON. General, you are not going to, by that statement, without a mild dissent from me, place in this record that I am in favor of what you choose to denominate as "the gag rule."

I am not an expert on military affairs. I was merely of the opinion, and always have been, from what I did know, that every officer and every man in the United States Army reported to his superiors, and fought out his differences with his superiors.

COMMUNISM AS OUR MAIN ENEMY

Now, General, you have stated that the issue that faces this Nation is global in nature.

As I see it, there are three questions, fundamentally, in global strategy.

Who is overwhelmingly the main enemy, in your opinion?

Senator SALTONSTALL. What was that question?

Senator McMAHON. Who is overwhelmingly the main enemy—that we have to take into cognizance—take into consideration?

General MACARTHUR. Communism, in my opinion.

Senator McMAHON. When you talk about communism, do you mean as evidenced in Red China, or the Kremlin?

General MACARTHUR. I mean all over the world, including the interior of many of the fine democratic countries of the world.

Senator McMAHON. General, where is the source and brains of this conspiracy?

General MACARTHUR. How would I know?

Senator McMAHON. Would you think that the Kremlin was the place that might be the loci?

General MACARTHUR. I might say that it is one of the loci.

Senator McMAHON. Would you say it was one of the main loci, the main place?

General MACARTHUR. I think the world public opinion would so locate it.

Senator McMAHON. Pardon me?

General MACARTHUR. I say, I should think that the world public opinion would so locate it.

Senator McMAHON. You would not differ from that opinion, General?

EFFECT OF A CHINESE WAR ON RUSSIAN ARMED STRENGTH

General, if we were to fight a victorious war with China, will you tell this committee how the strength of the Soviet Union, the armed strength of the Soviet Union, would be impaired, assuming she does not come into the war?

General MACARTHUR. Will you repeat the question, please?

Senator WILEY. Why haven't we this loud-speaking system turned on, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Because of the fact that the change was made from the Armed Services' room here without time for the committee or the chairman of the committee to get the operators of this system who had been cleared in security matters.

(The question pending was read to the witness by the reporter.)

General MACARTHUR. As I have said so frequently, Senator, our purpose, as I see it in the Korean War, is to force China to stop her aggression in North Korea. It does not necessarily mean the overwhelming in China, it simply means that sufficient pressure be brought upon her to make her stop killing our boys by the thousands in Korea.

Just how that might impinge with reference to the Soviet forces, is purely speculative.

Senator McMAHON. Well, General, you make a pretty good speculation if Russia does not come in, and we do go into China in a limited way for the further extension of a now limited war. Is it not true that it wouldn't impair the 175 divisions that the Soviets are reputed to have, or the 16,000 operational aircraft, nor her stockpile and growing stockpile of atomic weapons?

General MACARTHUR. If you mean to say, as you yourself said yesterday, calling attention to the alliance between the Soviet and China, that the diminution of China's potential power doesn't diminish the total power of communism throughout the world, why, that would be fallacious, Senator.

Senator McMAHON. I asked, General, about its diminution of their military striking power, and I listed their aircraft, their atomic weapons, and their 175 divisions. It is obvious that we agree they are our main enemy—that the Soviet Union is.

General MACARTHUR. I didn't agree to it.

Senator McMAHON. You do not agree?

General MACARTHUR. I said that communism throughout the world was our main enemy.

Senator McMAHON. I see.

General MACARTHUR. It is your argument to confine it to one section of the world.

Senator McMAHON. I see.

And you have the feeling that if we take over China, that we will have made——

General MACARTHUR. I didn't say we would ever take over China, Senator. I said to the contrary yesterday, that we had no objectives in China proper, except to put sufficient force on China so that she would stop her depredation in North Korea.

FACTORS AFFECTING GLOBAL POLICY

Senator McMAHON. General, as I take it, you have no opinion to give us as to when we will be best prepared for a war that would include the Soviet Union, if one had to come?

General MACARTHUR. Such studies, as that, Senator, are made higher authority than my own. They are available, I am sure, to you.

Senator McMAHON. And, as a former Chief of Staff of the Army, you realize that those higher authorities have to take into account many factors which a theater commander cannot take into account?

General MACARTHUR. Unquestionably.

Senator McMAHON. What are some of those factors, General?

General MACARTHUR. Some of those factors are the general resources that would be available to us and our allies; the strengths that would be available to the enemy, the disposition of the forces; the general political atmosphere that prevails; the controversial questions that might arise between the governments, and many other things which, of course would be much beyond any sector commander's responsibility.

Senator McMAHON. That is very helpful, General; and those are the factors which you assumed that these men whom you believe to be competent have weighed, and must weigh, in relation to our global policy and our global defense.

General MACARTHUR. That is not only their responsibility, Senator, but it is their authority.

Senator McMAHON. And, General——

General MACARTHUR. It is inherent in their command position.

Senator McMAHON (continuing). If they show up here and say that they have weighed all of those factors, and they believe that the policy which we are pursuing in the east is the correct one, I assume that you would agree with them inasmuch as you have not studied those factors which will influence the opinion of these competent men?

PUBLIC OPINION AND DEFENSE DECISIONS

General MACARTHUR. Any decisions they'd make, Senator, are like all other human decisions. They have to pass before the high court of public opinion.

The fact that any group in authority, in carrying out its responsibilities makes decisions, that when they make that decision every man accepts it as an infallibly correct one is absurd.

Senator McMAHON. General, I hope I am a democrat, with a small "d" as well as a large one. I say I hope I am a democrat, with a small "d" as well as a large one, but I wonder if the logical extension of your last observation does not mean that we should take a national poll or referendum on how we should conduct the strategy of defending America. You do not wish to be put in that position, General, do you?

General MACARTHUR. Not at all, Senator. Every military man is subject to assignment. If he doesn't perform his duties satisfactorily, he is subject to removal. If an administration doesn't conduct its processes satisfactorily, every 4 years we have a referendum.

Our system of government is based upon that. If you mean that I would in contradiction to that purely democratic method would accept a Soviet method of placing every issue that comes up before a vote of every member of the citizenship, I would of course not agree.

There is a great difference between pure democracy and a republican form of representative government. The latter is what we're operating under.

Senator McMAHON. Mr. Chairman, I still have my juncture in mind, if the chairman will just indulge me for a couple of minutes more.

LIMITED WAR IN CHINA

General, your recommendations for our operations in China would still be a limited war. We would not commit American ground forces to the operation in China under any circumstances, as I understand it.

General MACARTHUR. I would not advise it; no, sir. That is, of course, with the general limitation of the contingencies of campaign.

I believe it would be a master folly to contemplate the use of United States ground troops in China. I do not believe it would be necessary.

I believe, as I explained several times yesterday, that the application of the, if you want to call it, limited pressures would be quite sufficient to bring Red China to a reasonable attitude to gather around a peace conference table to end this savage slaughter.

Senator McMAHON. General, of course we have had undisputed command of the air in Korea, and those northern Chinese troops keep pouring down into North Korea.

General MACARTHUR. The reason, Senator, that the Air has not been more successful in stopping that pouring down is because they don't have the latitude of operation to hit deeper than the Yalu.

You understand the Yalu is only 2 or 3 days' march from the front line, and it gives the Air a very limited opportunity, especially when you would have a couple of days of obscure weather where the Air couldn't hit, you could get troops down from the Yalu to the front line without being subjected to any air attack, but if the Air could go where they are assembling, could go to the foundation roots where these armies are being assembled to be thrown at us, they could destroy them.

At least they could so decimate them that their efficacy when they reached the front lines would be most materially decreased.

The Air has done a magnificent job in Korea. Under the limitations placed upon it, it has been far in excess of any anticipation that I had.

THE IMPORTANCE OF OUR ALLIES

Senator McMAHON. General, I haven't had an opportunity to review the testimony of yesterday except very hastily, but I saw one of the newspapers had a headline that you said yesterday that we would go it alone if necessary. I am sure, General, that you do not underrate the importance of having our allies with us.

General MACARTHUR. Senator, I am not responsible for what the papers say, but in answer to your question I would say indubitably it is advantageous for us to have all of the allies that we can get and procure.

The great difficulty in the contributions that are being made, they're not in commensurate strength with what we put in. The forces we have in Korea are only token forces from everybody except the South Koreans and ourselves.

We have plenty of allies, but the numbers of them do not contribute in the same generous and noble way in which we do.

Senator McMAHON. Thank you, General. And they should put up more. These allies do have many assets which we must think about in any global struggle.

General MACARTHUR. Unquestionably, Senator, and no one is more fixed in that hope that we can protect them.

UNITED STATES EFFORTS TO COMBAT COMMUNISM

Senator McMAHON. General, you said one thing in your speech—and I will now come to an end—which interested me very much. You said many things that interested me, but this in particular I thought was interesting. You said, and I quote you:

What the people strive for is the opportunity for a little more food in their stomachs, a little better clothing on their backs and a little firmer roofs over their heads and the realization of the normal nationalist urge for political freedom.

I thought, General, that that was a very cogent analysis of the yearnings of the people of the world.

Although I will try to later, I will not take the time now, except to suggest this question: Have you thought out, and could you give us the benefit of your wisdom as to a program that we can adopt in this country in taking the initiative against the Communist menace which is built up on the existence of the conditions which you described?

General MACARTHUR. I think, Senator, that the United States has already contributed with a degree of generosity, nobility, and the breadth of character which is unique in the annals of the world, along just the lines that you are suggesting.

Senator McMAHON. I am very happy to hear you say that. That means of course, that you see some sense in the point 4 program.

General MACARTHUR. Senator, I am not going to discuss any details that I am not familiar with.

Senator McMAHON. I see.

General MACARTHUR. I know no more about the point 4 program than what I have read in the papers. My observations were based upon my own experiences in the Far East.

Senator McMAHON. Those experiences in the Far East have brought you to the opinion that it is this kind of physical condition of the people which has made the inroads of this world-wide conspiracy possible?

General MACARTHUR. It has helped it enormously, beyond doubt.

MAC ARTHUR SPEECH AS CHIEF OF STAFF IN 1932

Senator McMAHON. General, and this is my closing observation, I would like now to read into the record a statement that was made by you when you were Chief of Staff in the year 1932, and I quote:

The national strategy of any war, that is, the selection of national objectives and the determination of the general means and methods to be applied in obtaining them, as well as the development of the broad policies applicable to the prosecution of war, are decisions that must be made by the head of state, acting in conformity with the expressed will of the Government. No single departmental head, no matter what his particular function or title, could or should be responsible for the formulaion of such decisions.

For example, in every war the United States has waged, the national objective to be obtained has involved the Army in land attacks against areas held by the enemy. In every instance missions have been prescribed for the Navy that had in view the assisting and facilitating of the Army efforts. Yet in no case could these missions and objectives have been properly described by the Secretaries of War and Navy acting in unison, or by a single supersecretary acting for both. The issues involved are so far-reaching in their effect and so vital in the life of the Nation that this phase of coordinating Army and Navy efforts should not be delegated by the Commander in Chief to any subordinate authority. Any such attempt would not constitute delegation but rather abdication.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General MACARTHUR. As I look back, Senator, upon my rather youthful days then, I am surprised and amazed how wise I was.

Senator McMAHON. Thank you.

DISTRIBUTION OF TRANSCRIPTS

The CHAIRMAN. All right. I want to make an announcement. All Senators who are here have seen a copy of yesterday's transcript, which is the same material that was furnished yesterday page by page to the press. Copies before you are your personal copies. Please handle them as such, because we have only a limited number.

The other Senators, however, were sent a copy of this by mail early this morning, due to the unusual interest attached to this testimony. I don't know that we will be able to follow that course throughout the entire hearing.

I have run into a somewhat embarrassing position. The staff seated the members of the Committee on Armed Services on my right and the Committee on Foreign Relations on my left, by seniority, one Democrat and one Republican.

Due to some absentees yesterday, I got in the position of calling on two Republicans and two Democrats. I trust it didn't make too much difference.

It may have been a violation of seniority, but we will continue around the table from left to right and I will now call on Mr. Kefauver.

Senator KEFAUVER. Thank you.

THE STUDY OF JANUARY 12, AS SENT TO THE THEATER COMMANDER

General MacArthur, I have a few questions and will not take very much time, I hope.

Mr. Chairman, has it been made clear just how General MacArthur got the study of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on January 12? Is that in the record?

General MacArthur, may I ask you—

The CHAIRMAN. I am not clear, Senator. I would prefer to have the general state it.

Senator KEFAUVER. I believe that you say the study of January 12 by the Joint Chiefs of Staff was sent to the various commands and that you got yours just as one of the theater commanders; is that correct?

General MACARTHUR. That is correct, sir.

Senator KEFAUVER. When it was sent to you, was it sent to you with any instructions or suggestions, that you look it over and advise the Joint Chiefs what you thought about it?

General MACARTHUR. No, sir.

Senator KEFAUVER. It was sent to you then—

General MACARTHUR. For information.

Senator KEFAUVER. Just for your information?

General MACARTHUR. Correct.

Senator KEFAUVER. As to what they had recommended to their superiors?

General MACARTHUR. Correct, sir.

Senator KEFAUVER. Did you make any reply—I think that question was asked you—to the study that you received?

General MACARTHUR. This study. No, sir, no direct reply. None was called for.

SUGGESTION OF UNITED STATES TECHNICAL FORCE TO TRAIN
NATIONALIST TROOPS

Senator KEFAUVER. General MacArthur, you said on yesterday that Chiang's troops on Formosa would have to be given considerable equipment, particularly artillery and trucks and other things of that kind; that you recommended that American officers or technicians be placed with them for the purpose of teaching them the use of that equipment. I believe that is correct.

Do you contemplate that in the event that were done and they made a landing on the continent of Asia, in China, that those technicians would remain with Chiang's troops?

General MACARTHUR. I see no reason why they shouldn't, but I think it would probably be offensive to the Chinese troops to have United States personnel supervising in that way in combat.

Now, we are engaged, of course—implicit in your question, I presume, is whether it would be advisable for American soldiers and officers to be engaged in a war with Red China; and we are, Senator, engaged in the war now in Korea.

Senator KEFAUVER. But you said, General MacArthur, you nor no one else had recommended that American troops actually engage in any part of the ground warfare on the continent, in China proper; that it be limited to blockade and bombing by air and reconnaissance by air.

I wondered if any substantial number of technicians actually went along with Chiang's troops, what kind of situation that puts us in.

General MACARTHUR. I see no objection to it at all, Senator. It is common practice. We have had our advisers with them in the past. We have had missions there. We had a mission in Greece. We have got missions in a great many countries. They go and advise, but it does not commit us beyond the technicality of the assistance that the individuals can render.

I don't think it would be material one way or another whether they went in with them or not, as far as the efficacy of the forces is concerned. I can see no reason why if our Air and our Navy are engaged against the Red Chinese and our troops in Korea are engaged against the Red Chinese, why the use of a few hundred technicians would be a matter of any serious import.

My recommendation that ground troops should not be committed to China was not on the basis of avoiding any concept that we were not utilizing our force to the maximum. It was because of the sacrifice that would be involved in our forces because of our inability with our bases 10,000 miles away to maintain large units of ground troops there.

I had nothing to do with anything except a military decision that ground troops should not be committed in force—our ground troops.

Senator KEFAUVER. As I understand, your conception was based upon our inability to get enough troops there, and that you have no feeling that if we had sufficient ground troops, that we shouldn't use them on the continent of Asia, on the mainland of China proper.

General MACARTHUR. I believe that as a strategic conception it is an impossible one, sir. I do not believe—

Senator KEFAUVER. Your conception is based upon the feeling that we do not have sufficient troops to accomplish that purpose; is that correct?

General MACARTHUR. That is one of the reasons. Another reason is that the manpower of those countries is sufficient; if we aid and assist them in their training and in their supply features, they do not need the assistance of our ground forces. They would need assistance probably from the Air and the Navy.

COMMITMENTS INVOLVED IN SUPPORTING AN INVASION OF THE CHINESE MAINLAND

Senator KEFAUVER. Understand, General MacArthur, I am not being critical. We all have quite a question in our minds as to just what we would be committing ourselves to if we supplied Chiang's troops and they made a landing on the mainland of China.

Considering 500,000 troops, which I believe you said Chiang had, how many technicians do you think we would have to have with them in order to teach them to use the equipment we would send them?

General MACARTHUR. I think the recommendations of the board I appointed, Senator, were about 500 officers and men.

Senator KEFAUVER. Now, General MacArthur, suppose we had that number of men with them and we got involved very deeply and things were going bad, do you think that would commit us to sending more people to the mainland of China?

General MACARTHUR. I don't think it would commit an iota, Senator—not an iota.

Senator KEFAUVER. You do not think that, having given Chiang that support, if things went wrong, or went bad with him, that he and his friends would feel that we were under a military or moral obligation to supplement his forces to whatever extent was necessary to secure a victory?

General MACARTHUR. I think he would welcome any help that we would give him; but I do not think that he would feel that we were under any legal or mandatory obligation.

We would not be.

The fundamental reason that would animate me in this is the interest of our own country. If it was to be to our interest to help an ally, we should do it; if it ran contrary to our interest—I believe our own interests are the paramount consideration, not only there, but every place else.

WILL TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE INVOLVE SUPPORT OF GROUND TROOPS

Senator KEFAUVER. General MacArthur, you have had the experience very often, and we have had it to some extent, that if you maybe give a little assistance, and things are going bad, that you are called upon to put in a little bit more in the hope that conditions will improve.

What if we started out with our 500 officers and technicians, and then presented you, as theater commander, the idea that if Chiang could only get one division to bolster up things, and then things might be going our way again?

Do you think you might arrive at a conclusion of that sort?

General MACARTHUR. I can conceive of no strategic or tactical position where I would put in formed units of American ground troops in continental China.

As far as the technicians and others are concerned, we had about a thousand officers and men that were on the Republic's side all during the civil war. That did not involve us in anything that led to ground troops going in.

And, I see no connection between the employment of formed ground units of the United States and the assistance that would be furnished by a few technicians and officers to help train and supply an ally's units.

Senator KEFAUVER. I can only see perhaps one difference, and that is that in the eyes of the world, the men who were there when Chiang was pulled out, were trying to help him hold on to what he had.

In this case, they would be trying to help him get back something; but that is a matter of discussion.

Now, General MacArthur, I assume that you would recommend that the American Navy be used to launch Chiang on an invasion of the mainland of China, that is, to transport his troops and help him get them on the land; and, if you feel so, how much would be necessary?

General MACARTHUR. The employment of the Chinese forces, as I said yesterday, would be a question basically to be decided by the Chinese commander in chief. Whether he would attempt this grandiose amphibious landing with all his forces on continental China would be extraordinarily doubtful; but within the limitations of the naval

forces that we have in the western Pacific I would render him such assistance in his strategic plans as it would be possible for us to do.

EXTENT OF UNITED STATES SUPPORT OF A NATIONALIST INVASION

Senator KEFAUVER. In other words, if he did decide upon a campaign to put an amphibious, or major amphibious landing on the continent of China, you would recommend that we help him to the extent, possible—

General MACARTHUR. To the extent it was possible, with our forces there, unquestionably.

Senator KEFAUVER. And, I suppose, that would also mean we would continue to pour in supplies for whatever amphibious force he was able to get on the continent, is that correct?

General MACARTHUR. Within our capacity, and other demands that we have to meet in other areas, I would say, give him reasonable support. As a matter of fact, we are doing so now.

Senator KEFAUVER. Well, I understand there is support being given now, which is primarily for the defense of Formosa, however, is it not?

General MACARTHUR. The support that is being given him now is to render the troops that he has capable of fighting.

Senator KEFAUVER. But, of course, it is not contemplated at the present time that there would be an amphibious assault upon China proper?

General MACARTHUR. The present directives forbid the utilization of the Chinese Nationalist forces outside of Formosa and, perhaps, some of the outlying islands of Formosa.

PREVIOUS SPECULATIONS CONCERNING RED CHINA'S ENTRANCE IN KOREAN CONFLICT

Senator KEFAUVER. One matter that I heard you testify about yesterday that I thought for the record should be clarified, and that is that you said that neither you nor the State Department, nor most of the governments in the United Nations, I believe, or at least our Government, and Dean Acheson, Secretary of State, none of you felt there was very much likelihood of Red China's coming into the war in the event that fighting was carried on over the Yalu River, I believe you did say that.

General MACARTHUR. Yes.

Senator KEFAUVER. It seems that I recall Mr. Nehru, and probably others, through the British Embassy—did they not protest that even if the fighting were carried beyond the thirty-eighth parallel that would bring Red China into the conflict?

General MACARTHUR. I am not familiar with what he said, Senator. I was furnished no information from him.

Senator KEFAUVER. What the Indian delegate said at the United Nations was not brought to your attention?

General MACARTHUR. The what?

Senator KEFAUVER. What the Indian delegate said at Lake Success was not brought to your attention?

General MACARTHUR. I have nothing of that sort from Lake Success which was furnished me. Any information of that sort was limited to what I saw in the press.

Senator KEFAUVER. Mr. Chairman, so that the record can be complete, I think I can rightly say that the Indian delegate did make some representations at that time to the United Nations at Lake Success.

I wonder if that could be placed in the record?

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes, sir. If you can get the material I will be glad to see it is placed in the record.

Now, in the handling of this record, it will have to appear in the appendix as referred to by Senator Kefauver in his statement; but if you gather any information, either official or unofficial to the press, I shall see that it is in the record. (See appendix.)

Senator KEFAUVER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will get whatever it was.

Chairman RUSSELL. I read some of it and it was to the same general effect.

MATERIAL EFFECT OF CONTRIBUTIONS OF UN PARTNERS IN KOREA

Senator KEFAUVER. General MacArthur, what kind of a situation would we be in in Korea if the United Nations, while not very substantial in force—that is, outside of the force supplied by our own country—if they should not carry on with us in Korea? What situation would we be in there?

General MACARTHUR. As far as the armed forces are concerned, the total contribution of all the other nations, outside of the United States and South Korea, is a very small fraction.

The subtraction of those forces would have no material effect upon the tactical situation.

Senator KEFAUVER. I do not mean to imply by this question that any member of the United Nations is considering withdrawing any troops they have there, but if they abandoned the conflict in the event your suggested program were followed, we certainly would not want to do anything that would even cause those scarce forces to pull out, I take it?

General MACARTHUR. I think it would be tragic. I believe that everything possible should be done to cement the international feature of the United Nations' effort there. I would say not only that the idea should be deprecated of their pulling out, but it should be emphasized extraordinarily that they should send much larger forces, and that those nations which have not contributed anything, should contribute.

On the contrary, one of the great weaknesses of the United Nations' effort as a United Nations' effort there is that it is not well balanced. Almost the entire burden of blood and effort and money is confined to two countries, the native country of the Koreans, and ourselves.

RESPONSIBILITIES OF UN PARTNERS

Senator KEFAUVER. Well, I agree with you certainly that each member of the United Nations ought to carry its share of the responsibility, and on that basis all of the nations ought to come in, and some who are in should send in larger forces. But I take it that it is important to keep those there and also to get in more, not only from the military viewpoint but from the viewpoint of opinion in the Far East and world opinion in this conflict.

General MACARTHUR. I agree with you completely.

Senator KEFAUVER. So that the effect of the operations that you have recommended, or that may be taken in the Far East upon the attitude of those associated with us would be one of the matters that should be considered among the political factors that go to make up the opinion as to what should be done. You would agree with that, I take it?

General MACARTHUR. It is inherent.

Senator KEFAUVER. Yes.

General MACARTHUR. I will say this, though, Senator: that the relativity of authority in making international decisions should be based in some degree upon the responsibilities of the agents that carry it out. And if one nation carries 90 percent of the effort, it's quite inappropriate that nations that only carry a small fraction of the efforts and the responsibility should exercise undue authority upon the decisions that are made.

Senator KEFAUVER. Yes. Well, I will agree with you, general, about that.

IS CHIANG KAI-SHEK CAPABLE OF LEADERSHIP IN THE FAR EAST

General MacArthur, another theory has some circulation in this country, and that is as you stated in your magnificent address to the Congress that Asia has undergone a revolution in the past few weeks not only in China but in other parts of Asia; that they are looking for new kinds of leadership, et cetera.

A great many people in this country believe that in the eyes of other Asiatic peoples besides the Chinese, particularly the Indians, and other people in Asia, that Chiang Kai-shek is not in the high standing that he might be, and that if we joined in helping him invade the mainland of China, that all of the other people of Asia would turn even more against us than they have at the present time; that we would lose the remaining friends we have in Asia if we assisted him actively in a land invasion of China.

General MACARTHUR. The primary purposes—

Senator KEFAUVER. That is a political matter instead of purely a military one, but they are inextricably interwoven, as you have said so clearly.

General MACARTHUR. This is what I believe, Senator: I believe that to the average Asiatic Chiang Kai-shek stands out as the great symbol against communism. I believe that everyone opposed to communism has a sense of respect for the generalissimo in the Far East. Those that are inclined toward communism oppose him, completely and absolutely; but he does stand as a symbol of an invincible determination to resist communism.

The basic reason for the support that might be rendered to him is because of that fact, because the interests of the United States of America coincide with anyone who is opposed to communism. It doesn't necessarily mean that we approve of everything he says or does. But it does mean that he assists us in our resistance to this world menace; and that any choice between him and communism would naturally resolve in his favor.

The reason that these people would support him as a symbol is because of that basic fact, Senator.

Senator KEFAUVER. I think it is very important to have your view on that in the record, and appreciate it.

General MACARTHUR. We, ourselves, Senator, for many, many years completely supported him; all during the war against Japan we fought alongside of him. He was a trusted, respected ally. There was nothing in his Government that was different then than what it was when he passed into defeat. We supported him completely then. We supported him largely because his interests were parallel to our own. And if we support him now, it should be for the same reason—because his interests happen to be parallel to our own. And those interests are to stop the spread of this imperialistic totalitarianism, to stop the concept that Asia shall be dragged down and revert again to slavery.

Senator KEFAUVER. Yes, I know, of course, that we supported him, General MacArthur, but in this country we have had a good deal of debate and some statements to the effect that one reason why he lost in the effort, that it was thought at least some of the other people of Asia did not support him; that while he was against communism, still his own government was not too clean, and they had lost considerable confidence in the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek throughout Asia as evidenced by the fact that he had lost the battle and he did not truly represent the Asiatic people any longer, but as I have stated I think you answered that fairly fully.

General MACARTHUR. In great international decisions, if they are to be based upon the details of corruption in government, Senator, there would be few countries that would pass unscathed.

Senator KEFAUVER. Well, do you think that the Chiang government is better now than it was when he was driven from the mainland?

PRESENT SITUATION IN FORMOSA

General MACARTHUR. I superficially went through Formosa. I was surprised at the contentment I found there.

I found that the people were enjoying a standard of living which was quite comparable to what it was before the war. I found a financial system which at that time was about as sound as anything in the Far East except Japan. I found representative government being practiced.

In one legislative group I went into, I found of the 21 people there were 19 elected Formosans. I went into their courts. I found a judicial system which I though was better than a great many of the other countries in Asia.

I went into their schools. I found that their primary instruction was fully on a standard with what was prevalent in the Far East. I was surprised.

I found many things that I could criticize, too, but I believe sincerely that the standard of government that he is setting in Formosa compares favorably with many of the democracies of the world.

Senator KEFAUVER. Just two other questions, General MacArthur.

General MACARTHUR. I want to call attention too, Senator, to the basic theme that runs through your queries, and it is to this effect: that our own Government still recognizes the Generalissimo. He still has all of the rights and privileges of being a member of the international comity of nations.

Senator KEFAUVER. Then I take it your feeling is while you, of course, were not in touch with the Chiang government directly during the time before he left the mainland of China, that you do feel there probably has been some improvement in at least the spirit of his government?

General MACARTHUR. There isn't any question that he is trying to follow the lines of liberalism in government. Just before I left Tokyo, he requested that the expert we had on land reform, which turned out so splendidly in Japan, that that expert who was responsible for the results in Japan should be loaned to the Formosan people so that they could put the same land reform that we had in Japan into effect.

He was leaving the day before I was relieved.

THE ORDER OF MARCH 20 AND LETTER TO REPRESENTATIVE MARTIN

Senator KEFAUVER. General MacArthur, I want to, if possible, get the record straight as to one thing. I do not believe you have been asked about it.

That is, that when you wrote the letter on March 20 to Congressman Martin, had you received the information from the State Department of the same day that any further statements by you must be coordinated as prescribed in the order of December 6, or do you remember?

General MACARTHUR. I had not.

Senator KEFAUVER. Do you know when you received the information given you the 20th of March 1951?

General MACARTHUR. I think it was the 25th, Senator.

Senator KEFAUVER. But you did not feel that the letter to Congressman Martin would have required coordinating his letter as required by the order of March 20? I mean you did not feel that the order of March 20 affected things like your letter to Congressman Martin?

General MACARTHUR. Not in the slightest.

Senator KEFAUVER. In any event—

General MACARTHUR. I see nothing in reviewing the case with all the information I had, how the letter to Congressman Martin was affected in any degree by any directive that I ever received.

Senator KEFAUVER. So even if the directive of the 20th of March had been received before you wrote the letter, you would have written it in any event?

General MACARTHUR. That I couldn't tell you. It might have had some influence to the extent that—

Senator KEFAUVER. Well, in any event the letter of Congressman Martin apparently was not given to the public until April 13, so that if you had thought the directive of March 20 should have required you not to have written the letter, you could have recalled it or asked him not to release it?

General MACARTHUR. Senator, as I said yesterday, my letter to Congressman Martin was merely a routine communication such as I turn out by the hundreds. It made so little impression upon me, as I said yesterday, that when I heard one of my staff officers saying there had been some criticism of what I had said to him, I had to go into the files. I didn't even recall what the circumstance was.

It was a casual letter in reply to a request from a distinguished Member of this body, and I would have honored it.

Senator KEFAUVER. But from his letter I took it that you knew that it would be released by him in the debate that was going on in this country.

General MACARTHUR. I didn't have the faintest idea of whether he would or whether he wouldn't release it. The concept never entered into my head.

Senator KEFAUVER. General MacArthur, he said in his letter that there was this discussion going on, he had been in debates on the subject, and in the last paragraph he says in part:

I would deem it a great help if I could have your views on this point, either on a confidential basis or otherwise. Your admirers are legion, and the respect you command is enormous.

In your letter you didn't say anything about it being on a confidential basis, so I take it you must have assumed from his letter it would be made public because he discussed the debate and the argument that was going on.

General MACARTHUR. I never gave it the slightest thought, Senator. It was a matter for his discretion entirely.

Senate KEFAUVER. One clause in the letter that strikes me, General MacArthur, is:

Here we fight Europe's war with arms while the diplomats fight it with words. Was that intended to be a slap at the State Department or what did you mean by that?

General MACARTHUR. It wasn't intended to be anything except a statement of actual facts.

THE RIGHT AND DISCRETION OF SUBORDINATES IN PUBLICIZING OPPOSITE VIEWS

Senator KEFAUVER. General MacArthur, following up the question that Senator McMahon asked, I agree fully, not knowing anything about military matters, however, that you were quite right in presenting your side of the controversy or any question to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and arguing it out; that a major general or a lieutenant general under you would be derelict in his duties if he did not present his point of view to you on some matters affecting the command in your theater, but do you think it proper or would you think it proper for a brigadier or major general under you to take issue with your general concept as the theater commander by writing a letter to a Member of the Congress when he knew that it would be used in the debate about the way your campaign was being carried on?

General MACARTHUR. I wouldn't have the slightest objection to any officer in my command stating his views on any subjects in any way he wished, just so he did it in a courteous, polite way following the normal code of a gentleman's conduct.

Senator KEFAUVER. You mean if in the reconquest of the Philippines some major general had a different view about how the whole campaign should have been carried on, had written me a letter, knowing that I was going to publish it and cause a debate about the general strategy of your Pacific campaign, you would have sanctioned what he did?

General MACARTHUR. Senator, I think there is not a week goes by that things of that sort don't occur.

Senator KEFAUVER. I mean would you have sanctioned it?

General MACARTHUR. I would ask you to examine your own files to see if you haven't gotten a great many complaints in from juniors in the service of the seniors that are over them.

Senator KEFAUVER. Yes, but they always say, "Be sure and don't show this to anybody."

General MACARTHUR. Well, once more that is a matter of your discretion. Representative Martin exercised it.

Senator KEFAUVER. But my question is, General MacArthur, when you were conducting the Philippine campaign, if your chief of staff—who was your chief of staff?

General MACARTHUR. General Sutherland was my chief of staff. I think he is a West Virginian.

Senator KEFAUVER. If he had written to me knowing that I was in a big debate in Congress about whether you were right or not in deciding how you were going to make that magnificent reconquest of the Philippines, if he had written to me expressing a different opinion from the one you had, and criticizing even mildly what you had decided to do, knowing that I was going to inject that opinion into a debate, would you have sanctioned him doing so?

General MACARTHUR. Certainly. I can't tell you how many times my staff has disagreed with me not only privately but publicly. The only thing I ever required was complete honesty of their opinions.

Senator KEFAUVER. You do not think an opinion different from the immediate commander for public debate weakens you in the eyes of the enemy and shows a division in the ranks?

General MACARTHUR. I believe there is a certain degree of propriety in those things of course, Senator.

Senator KEFAUVER. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

THE CHAIRMAN. Senator Lodge.

Senator LODGE. General MacArthur, first let me say that I think it is a great service to the American people and to the Congress that an officer of your unique experience should be available for advice and counsel.

I am one of the millions who admire your record, and I believe in particular that your Pacific campaigns were a military masterpiece, and that you accomplished such big results with relatively so little a force. I think great good should come from this inquiry.

BOMBING OR AIR RECONNAISSANCE ON NORTHERN BANK OF YALU

You have been so clear on this whole question of the Far East that there is only one point with regard thereto that I would like to have elucidated: Whether you still advocate bombing or only air reconnaissance of the enemy bases on the northern bank of the Yalu.

General MACARTHUR. I would advocate that the Chinese, the Red Chinese Government, be served notice that if they continued this type of predatory attack in North Korea and refused to consider terms of an armistice and cease fire, that after a reasonable period of time we should exercise such military sanctions and economic sanctions as would be necessary to force him to stop. That would unquestionably involve bombing of the bases on the other side of the Yalu.

Senator LODGE. But that proposition has not been approved or disapproved by the Joint Chiefs, has it?

General MACARTHUR. I have basic directives that we shall not bomb beyond the Yalu.

Senator LODGE. And so when you were listing your four recommendations, in your speech to the Congress, you mentioned air reconnaissance, did you not?

General MACARTHUR. Yes.

Senator LODGE. Because that had been approved by the Joint Chiefs, is that correct?

General MACARTHUR. The Joint Chiefs had approved that; yes, that is in their recommendations of January 12.

Senator LODGE. I am just trying to establish why in your speech you recommended air reconnaissance in those four points, and did not recommend bombing. The quotation in the speech was:

Third. Removal of restrictions on air reconnaissance of Chinese coastal areas and of Manchuria.

General MACARTHUR. What I said was this:

Apart from military needs as I saw it, to neutralize the sanctuary protection given the enemy north of the Yalu, I felt that military necessity—

and then these four points.

Senator LODGE. Yes; and the third of those points was air reconnaissance.

General MACARTHUR. That's right.

Senator LODGE. And not bombing, and I ask you did you not make that recommendation in that way because that was what the Joint Chiefs had agreed to, whereas the Joint Chiefs had not agreed to bombing? Is that correct?

General MACARTHUR. No, sir. It happened that my views coincided with those of the Joint Chiefs as they made them on January 12.

Senator LODGE. Both as regards bombing, and reconnaissance?

General MACARTHUR. No. These four points that I listed here coincided with what the Chiefs recommended.

Senator LODGE. That is right.

General MACARTHUR. I said, in my thinking, in addition.

POTENTIAL OF THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

Senator LODGE. I see.

That is the point I wanted to have cleared up.

Do you think that our Air Force, today, is big enough to undertake bombing missions in the Far East, and at the same time retain enough power to act as a deterrent to the Kremlin, by being able to threaten the Soviet war-making potential?

Do you think it is big enough to do both of those things?

General MACARTHUR. I think that it is big enough to handle the situation in the Far East without serious detriment to any other program we have.

Senator LODGE. Do you believe that effective bombing could be undertaken against Manchuria with the planes that are presently detailed to the Far East theater, and that there were enough planes there to do the job now?

General MACARTHUR. I believe we could be very destructive with what we have. It might be necessary to sweeten it up a little, but we could do a tremendous damage with what we have.

[Deleted.]

Senator LODGE. (continuing). [Deleted.]

If the four steps which you recommended do not bring the action in Korea to a successful conclusion, what do you recommend should be done next?

General MACARTHUR. Senator, I would wait and see.

I believe it would bring it to a successful conclusion, however.

PROPOSED WITHDRAWAL FROM KOREA

Senator LODGE. My recollection is that in the canvassing of the various alternatives which we have in regard to Korea, yesterday, you did not mention withdrawal from Korea.

Would you care to comment on the idea of withdrawing totally from Korea?

General MACARTHUR. In the three possibilities that I outlined, one of those was to close the war on the enemy's terms, which would have meant the abandonment of Korea.

Senator LODGE. You do not favor that?

General MACARTHUR. I certainly do not.

STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF KOREA

Senator LODGE. What would happen with regard to Formosa if Chiang were to land on the mainland, and then be wiped out?

General MACARTHUR. Senator, that is a hypothesis that is very difficult to speculate upon.

The basic concept that this country should have would be that Formosa should not be allowed to fall into Red hands.

Senator LODGE. That is just it.

We have heard it said——

General MACARTHUR. Now, the mechanics of accomplishing that purpose would depend upon the play of circumstance.

I am unable to answer a hypothetical question in which you put up a suggestion that the forces of the Generalissimo would be destroyed. I do not believe that they are going to be destroyed; and, if we gave him the proper support, they would not be destroyed.

So, to put a hypothesis of that sort, is something I would not attempt to speculate upon at this time.

I would, however, under any circumstances whatsoever—I would insure that Formosa shall not fall into Red hands.

I believe if it does, that you have not only lost everything we gained in the Pacific war, but you have rolled our strategic frontier back from the little island groups that defend us now, all the way to the western coast of the United States.

I believe that you might invite a third world war, if you allow that great breach in our lines. I believe the immediate effect of that would be the collapse in the Philippines and Japan, and our withdrawal.

Senator LODGE. I know you are attached to the importance of Formosa, and I attach great importance to it, myself; and so, I wondered what position Formosa might be in, if a landing on the mainland was unsuccessful.

I realize it is a speculative matter.

Do you think that the Kremlin has enough influence to stop the Red aggression in Korea if it wanted to do so?

General MACARTHUR. What was that question?

Senator LODGE. Do you think that the Kremlin has enough influence to stop the Red aggression in Korea if it wanted to stop it?

General MACARTHUR. I wouldn't know, Senator.

Senator LODGE. You would not know whether pressure—if we were in a position to put pressure on the Kremlin which, unfortunately, we are not—you have no idea whether bringing pressure on the Kremlin would end this aggression in Korea?

General MACARTHUR. I have no source of information that enables me to answer such a question.

RUSSIAN PARTICIPATION IN KOREAN CONFLICT

Senator LODGE. Do you think that the Russians are actively aiding the North Koreans and the Chinese Communists?

General MACARTHUR. With supplies, yes. In any other way, I found no evidences of it.

Senator LODGE. No staff officers?

General MACARTHUR. Found nothing of the sort. We have not found a dead Russian or captured a Russian, so far as I know, since the Korean campaign started.

Senator LODGE. And no Russian fliers?

General MACARTHUR. None that I know of.

Senator LODGE. We heard rumors—

General MACARTHUR. There was supposed to be a Russian mission there in the early days, and that was supposed to be common knowledge. I think it was correct.

Senator LODGE. You do think it was correct?

General MACARTHUR. I think it was correct, yes.

Senator LODGE. So, there were at one time—

General MACARTHUR. But I believe as the North Korean Army was destroyed that the mission withdrew within their own boundaries. I have no reason to believe now that there is any Russian mission in Korea. The control there is exercised, in my belief, completely by the Red Chinese, in conjunction with the North Korean forces.

I believe that the Soviet is supplying those North Korean forces. I believe that the Soviet is selling a certain limited amount to the Red Chinese; but I believe that the Red Chinese have to buy it.

DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE RED CHINESE AND THE RUSSIANS

Senator LODGE. Well, if the Russians are supplying the Red Chinese, do you favor regarding the Russians as an enemy, and taking whatever steps are necessary to stop that supply?

General MACARTHUR. Not at this time; no, sir. I think it is not accepted in the international rules of war that merely the supplying of an enemy constitutes inherently a declaration of war.

Senator LODGE. So you draw the distinction between the Soviet Union and Red China on the basis that the Red Chinese actually have troops in combat, is that right?

General MACARTHUR. I believe that Red China is exercising every potentiality of war against the forces in Korea; whereas, as far as the Soviet is concerned, I believe they are doing—supplying munitions, but practically nothing else.

STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF EUROPEAN AIR BASES

Senator LODGE. You said to Senator Russell yesterday—at least I think you did—that the Soviet industrial potential is in European Russia, and for that reason you did not believe that the Soviets could maintain a sustained threatening offensive in eastern Russia.

If that is true, do you not feel it is important from an over-all standpoint for the United States to retain bases for its strategic aviation in Europe from which it could reach that Russian industrial potential in case of trouble?

General MACARTHUR. Yes, sir.

Senator LODGE. And you think in general, do you, that the more effective allies we can have the better; isn't that true?

General MACARTHUR. Correct.

Senator LODGE. And the only trouble is some of them aren't effective; is that right?

Do you think we ought to make the necessary arrangements so that the millions of stateless anti-Communist young men in Europe and in the Orient who have no army of their own can be formed into military organizations so that our men will have their help in combat and not have to carry so much of the load of fighting and foreign duty by themselves?

General MACARTHUR. It is a very interesting suggestion, Senator. I haven't given it any consideration, but it is an interesting possibility.

Senator LODGE. As a matter of general foreign policy, do you favor regaining the initiative which we lost at the end of the war?

General MACARTHUR. Have we lost the initiative?

Senator LODGE. Don't you think we have lost the initiative?

General MACARTHUR. I think there has been a play backward and forward, but I wouldn't attempt to say that we have lost our initiative.

You are getting pretty far afield from my own theater, Senator. These are merely superficial comments that I make on my general knowledge.

RELATION OF EUROPE AND FAR EAST IN GLOBAL STRATEGY

Senator LODGE. Well, of course, I quite agree that it is not fair to question you in detail on matters outside of the far eastern theater, and I don't want to do that; but, of course, the American public regards you not merely as an authority on the military situation in the Far East, but also as a great American citizen, and all American citizens and their representatives here in Congress are generally involved in American foreign policy as a whole—and that, of course, includes you.

It seems clear to me that if we could consider the Far East by itself without any relationship to anything else, that we should in all probability do virtually the things that you recommend.

Judging from the mail that I get, though, there are millions of Americans who are perplexed by the relationship of the defense of America in the Far East with the defense of America in Europe.

Is there anything that you care to say about that in general terms and as an American citizen and not as an expert?

General MACARTHUR. I tried to cover that yesterday, Senator, and in my speech before the Congress. I believe the problem is a global one. I believe we should defend every place from communism. I believe we can. I believe we are able to. I have confidence in us.

I don't believe we should write off anything and accept the defeat that is involved in it. I don't believe we should breach our own line.

Senator LODGE. I am delighted to hear you say that.

General MACARTHUR. The other fellow has the same problems that we do. If we have to work on two fronts or three fronts or four fronts, so does he; and if we can't meet him and defeat him, our ultimate destruction is certain.

I believe we can; but I believe to let him breach us in any one sector, that he will overwhelm us from that sector. I believe it is a principle of war. You may have one area in which you concentrate more, but if you do, you have got to hold in the other areas.

The whole principle of the application of force is that you concentrate in some place so as to be in superior force there, but you must hold in the other places. If you don't, he has already concentrated superior forces in those other places, and the principle will rebound upon you.

I don't admit that we can't hold communism wherever it shows its head.

Senator LODGE. I think that is a very sturdy statement and one that will be very helpful. Certainly then, you do not think we ought to withdraw from Europe, do you?

General MACARTHUR. I certainly do not.

Senator LODGE. And as a corollary to that statement of yours—

General MACARTHUR. The whole essence of some segments has been to say that if you defend in the Far East, you sacrifice Europe, or vice versa. I think each of those concepts would be pernicious. I believe we should hold our own in both places.

Senator LODGE. I agree very thoroughly with you. But the corollary of that is, is it not, that we must have the requisite military strength so that we can be strong in both places? Is that not true?

General MACARTHUR. I am completely for preparedness.

ADEQUACY OF UNITED STATES PREPAREDNESS

Senator LODGE. Do you think that we are increasing our armed services fast enough?

General MACARTHUR. That is a question I wouldn't attempt to pass on, Senator. I haven't seen the studies that have been made. It is a responsibility of the Joint Chiefs and other groups here. I have had all I could do, and perhaps a little more than I could do, to handle the situation out in the Far East.

Senator LODGE. So you wouldn't care to say either one way or the other whether you think our Army, Navy, and Air Force are big enough now and are growing fast enough.

General MACARTHUR. I would not attempt to make any judgment on it until I had made a complete study of the potentialities, the facts, and other things which are not available to me, and which I have not had to pass upon.

RELATIONSHIP OF THE MILITARY TO CONGRESS

Senator LODGE. I have one more question, one more point that I want to cover, and that is on the general question of the relationship of the military to Congress.

As I understand your testimony, you wrote your letter to Congressman Martin and to other Members of Congress in reply to questions from them; is that not true?

General MACARTHUR. That is correct, sir.

Senator LODGE. Yes. Is it not true that when Members of Congress ask questions of the high-ranking military on matters which may come up in Congress for decision, that the high-ranking military must answer those questions in order to give the legislative the information they have to have to base decisions on?

General MACARTHUR. Unquestionably, in my opinion.

Senator LODGE. Is there not a distinction between high-ranking military men answering questions of Congress on the one hand, and seeking to stimulate action of Congress on the other?

General MACARTHUR. Perhaps.

Senator LODGE. You have not thought to stimulate action in Congress, have you?

General MACARTHUR. Never in the slightest degree. I have never initiated a letter, as far as I can recall, to any Senator or Congressman since I have been in the Far East.

Senator LODGE. That is all, Mr. Chairman; thank you.

Chairman RUSSELL. Do you want to question now, Senator Knowland?

Senator KNOWLAND. Or recess now, whichever you wish.

Chairman RUSSELL. You might go ahead for about 15 minutes.

PROPOSED UN ARMS EMBARGO

Senator KNOWLAND. General, before getting to some of the questions I have—I noticed in the morning papers out of Lake Success, United Nations, New York, this article by the United Press: It says:

The United States today proposed an arms embargo against Communist China so that no soldier in Korea would be a target of a bullet manufactured in the free world. The plan was outlined in a private meeting of the United Nations Sanctions Committee, and American Delegate Ernest A. Gross said it would be embodied in a formal resolution early next week.

And then the article goes on.

Now, General, the war in Korea has been going on for about 10 months; the Chinese have been identified as being in Korea for approximately 6 months. Would you care to give your observations as to whether or not the action in taking this matter up to apply an embargo was expeditious under the circumstances?

General MACARTHUR. I am entirely in accord with the action they are taking. I think it is much too late. I think it should have been taken from the very beginning.

SHIPMENTS OF STRATEGIC MATERIALS FROM HONG KONG TO COMMUNIST CHINA

Senator KNOWLAND. General, you mentioned yesterday that there had been forwarded to you and to this Government certain information from the American consul general at Hong Kong which related

to the shipment of strategic materials out of Hong Kong alone to Communist China. I was not certain whether or not you indicated just what type. You have given the over-all figure, but I am not certain whether you indicated the types of strategic material. I wonder if you could supply that for the record at this point.

General MACARTHUR. I have that report here.

Senator KNOWLAND. I think it would be helpful to have it at this point in the record.

Chairman RUSSELL. I think I should tell you, Senator Knowland, that if the record is very voluminous, it cannot go out in the ordinary transcript of today.

Senator KNOWLAND. I understand that. I am not asking him to put it in. I am merely asking him to indicate the type of material.

Chairman RUSSELL. That is quite all right.

Senator KNOWLAND. I am not asking for that.

Chairman RUSSELL. I thought you said incorporated in the record. We can do that but—

Senator KNOWLAND. I understand that any documents would have to go into the appendix.

Chairman RUSSELL. That is right.

General MACARTHUR. This is a very compendious list. I don't believe the committee would want to hear the entire list. It consists of many chemicals: Ammonium chloride, sulfate, arsenic acid, and so on—a whole page of those;

Instruments and accessories: Electric meters, wires, various apparatus of that sort;

Radio parts: Radio sets, telephone sets, transformers, wire recorders;

Under machinery and fuels: Ball and roller bearings, drills, and electric drills, electric motors, hammers, metal tools, spanners, pliers, and so on;

Minerals: Asphalt, asbestos, coal tar;

Medicines of various sorts;

Metals: Aluminum scrap, ingots, bars, brass plates, bars, copper wire, iron plates, iron nails, high-speed steel, lead sheets, ingots, silicon steel sheets, steel bars, welding rods, zinc sheets, and so on;

Miscellaneous: Boiler materials, cameras, cement, fertilizers;

Laboratory equipment: Microscopes, rubber, rubber accelerators;

Petroleum: Diesel oils, fuel oils, gasoline, grease, kerosene, lubricants, paraffins, and so on.

Senator KNOWLAND. General, that I think, would be sufficient at this time. I would like to ask your judgment as a professional soldier for more than 50 years and as the responsible commander in the Far East, whether you consider that such material would have been of substantial assistance to the Communist force opposing our troops and the other United Nations troops in Korea, and to some extent almost as valuable as actual munitions of war?

General MACARTHUR. There is no question about it, especially petroleum, gasoline, and things of that sort. It is the very essence of the movement of an army and armed troops.

OPERATION OF THE CIA IN THE FAR EASTERN COMMAND

Senator KNOWLAND. Now, General, at the same time, in this morning's paper and carried by all the Press associations, was the statement that indicated that General MacArthur did not let the

Central Intelligence Agency come in until after General Walter Bedell Smith, Director of the CIA, went to Tokyo and talked to him about it.

Was there any prohibition against the operation of the CIA, so far as you have knowledge, in your theater while you were theater commander?

General MACARTHUR. That statement is all tommyrot. Every possible assistance has been given by me to the Central Intelligence Agency.

The only thing I insisted upon was that the Central Intelligence Agency, when they came into the theater, would not act surreptitiously so they would coordinate with my own Intelligence. I have given them every possible assistance.

GENERAL MACARTHUR'S VISIT TO FORMOSA IN AUGUST, 1950

Senator KNOWLAND. Now, General, you testified yesterday that in August of 1950, I believe it was August of 1950, you made a visit to the island of Formosa. I would like to ask whether that visit was known to your superiors in Washington.

The reason I ask the question is that newspaper articles emanated out of Lake Success which indicated that even some of the American diplomatic officials had no knowledge and were somewhat embarrassed by your visit.

I would like to clear that up for the record.

General MACARTHUR. My visit was not only known but approved by Washington. It was really caused by Washington. I was charged with the defense of Formosa. At that time I was heavily engaged in Korea. But for 10 days before my visit, I got a series of messages from the Joint Chiefs of Staff expressing the gravest concern about the situation there. And in spite of the pressure of the Korean campaign and other things, I decided to go down and make the reconnaissance myself and reported that fact.

There was a message came after I reported it and it had been approved, that someone, I think it was the State Department, would prefer some officer other than myself to go down there. But as I was the responsible officer and was charged with the defense, I decided to go myself.

STRATEGIC VALUE OF FORMOSA

Senator KNOWLAND. Now, General, on the 23d of December of 1949, the State Department issued a confidential memorandum to their various representatives overseas, which said among other things that Formosa has no special military significance, and that Formosa had no strategic value.

[Deleted.] It says: Largely because of a mistaken popular conception of its strategic importance to United States defenses in the Pacific.

I have asked for the full text of the document on several occasions and it has never been supplied. It is one of the documents, Mr. Chairman, which I requested that you get from the State Department. I would like to ask if you have, to the best of your knowledge, at any time advised the Department of State or the Department of National Defense that you believed that Formosa had no strategic value?

General MACARTHUR. On the contrary, Senator; practically the entire substance of a letter which I afterward wrote to the Veterans of Foreign Wars, was furnished the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman, Mr. Dulles of the State Department, and others.

This document, I believe, had great weight in changing the estimate that was made from Washington of the strategic value of Formosa.

I have always felt that it was the very key to the littoral island line; that is the key in the sense, in the negative sense, that it must not fall into enemy hands.

Senator WILEY. What is the date of that letter?

Senator KNOWLAND. That memo was December 23, 1949.

What was the date of the letter to which you refer, General? Was that what you were asking, Senator Wiley?

Senator WILEY. Yes.

General MACARTHUR. The memorandum I could not tell you, but it preceded this phase.

WAKE ISLAND MEMORANDUM

Senator KNOWLAND. General, you may or may not be familiar with the fact that on the 21st day of April, the so-called Wake Island memo became available to a representative of the New York Times.

Apparently, in writing the article, he had access not only to the censored portion of the Wake Island record, which has now been made available to the public, but he must have had access to the parts which which are still classified.

This committee, in case you are not informed of it, had information from the Department of Defense that the document had been classified up until a few days ago as a top-secret document, so the correspondent must have had it made available to him while it was still in that category.

Along with his release of the material, he apparently was given some background information. I would like to read this paragraph. He is speaking of the differences in viewpoint, as he understood them, between the President and yourself. He said:

Their differences had been over method. General MacArthur wanted occupation of the island—

speaking of Formosa—

and Mr. Truman stood for its neutralization by the United States Seventh Fleet until its status could be settled through the United Nations.

I have read, and just last night reread, your letter to the Veterans of Foreign Wars, and I could find no hint or statement that you desired American occupation of the island.

I interpreted your statement as saying that it should not be allowed to fall into unfriendly hands. Could you clarify the record in that regard?

General MACARTHUR. Entirely; there is not a word of truth in any statement made, from whatever source, that I have ever advocated the occupation by American troops of Formosa. I have always maintained that it should not be permitted to fall into enemy hands.

Chairman RUSSELL. Gentlemen, I have just been advised that a unanimous consent agreement has been entered into in the Senate for

a vote at 1 o'clock on, I believe it is, the Watkins resolution, to open these hearings to the public. The clerk advises me that there may be some question as to the exact content of the resolution, but I had understood from what brief portion of the debate that I was permitted to hear, that that was the purpose of the resolution.

The committee has agreed to give the photographers 5 minutes to take pictures at the conclusion of this meeting. If you will just keep your seats and your respective places, Colonel Galusha, you will notify them that they will only be allowed 5 minutes, and see that we have adequate police here to enforce that time limitation.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Then what happens?

Chairman RUSSELL. The members of the committee will return here.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Chairman, there is definitely an agreement to vote on something at 1 o'clock?

Chairman RUSSELL. I have been so advised by the majority leader of the Senate.

(Whereupon, at 12:45 p. m., the committee recessed to reconvene at 2 p. m.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

Present: Senators Russell (chairman, Committee on Armed Services), Connally (chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations), Wiley, Smith of New Jersey, Green, Hickenlooper, McMahon, Lodge, Fulbright, Tobey, Gillette, Bridges, Byrd, Saltonstall, Johnson of Texas, Morse, Kefauver, Knowland, Cain, Stennis, Flanders, and Long.

Chairman RUSSELL. The committee will come to order.

I believe that Senator Knowland was in the midst of his questioning at the time of the recess.

You may proceed, Senator.

Senator KNOWLAND. I may say, Mr. Chairman, that I am going to have very few questions to ask, and it is doubtful if it will take more than 15 minutes, at the most, because I want to expedite the hearings, as far as possible.

Chairman RUSSELL. I had assured Senator Flanders, who, I think, is not present at the moment, that I would submit to the members of the committee this statement from him:

An engagement made weeks ago requires me to take a plane at 3:45 this afternoon. Would it be agreeable to you and the other members of the committee if I were permitted to question the general very briefly, shortly after resuming this afternoon?

That is not of any great importance, but the members of the committee, from Senator Knowland, on the left, around to Senator Fulbright, on the right—

Senator KNOWLAND. Mr. Chairman, I will say that insofar as I am concerned, I will be perfectly willing to have Senator Flanders pick up his questioning now, if it would conserve time.

Chairman RUSSELL. He is not here now.

STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF FORMOSA

Senator KNOWLAND. At the time of our recess, General, we had started to go into the question of the strategic importance of Formosa.

I would like to ask you whether, since the outbreak of the hostilities in Korea on the 24th or 25th of June, last year, you have ever had any

indication from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that, in their judgment, Formosa was not strategically important to us?

General MACARTHUR. None. Quite the contrary, Senator.

I think the position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff coincides very closely with my own, on Formosa.

Senator KNOWLAND. In other words, I take it, and I have read some of the documents that have been made available to the committee—the Joint Chiefs of Staff, at least in the period of time covered from the outbreak of hostilities, appear to have taken a very definite position that in their judgment Formosa is of strategic importance to the defense of the United States, and a free world.

Am I substantially correct?

General MACARTHUR. That is entirely correct.

FIVE NATION CEASE FIRE PROPOSAL

Senator KNOWLAND. Now, General, on or about the 11th or 12th of January of this year, there was a proposal made at the United Nations by, I think, some of the Far Eastern and Middle European powers, a proposal for a cease-fire, or an armistice.

Included in that proposal of January 11 was the proviso that five nations should sit down together to negotiate the terms.

Those five nations were the Soviet Union, Communist China, Great Britain, the United States and one additional power, I believe.

Among the items which would be subjects for discussion would be United Nations membership for Communist China, as well as the question of the future disposal of Formosa.

I would like to ask, if you would care to, or would be willing to express yourself, whether you believe that under that type of a set-up, with three nations out of the five that had already indicated their willingness to admit Red China into the United Nations, and dispose of Formosa to the China Communists, whether that would be an indication of an act of appeasement?

CEASE-FIRE PROPOSAL RECOMMENDED BY THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

General MACARTHUR. The position that was taken by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in which I was in fullest agreement, late in March as I recall, was that the terms of an armistice or cease-fire should specifically not include the recognition of any seating of Red China in the United Nations or a consideration of turning over Formosa. That was the recommendation made by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

It was I understand in those two particulars, disapproved by the Secretary of Defense who said that he believed that those two items might well be considered at the conference, the peace conference.

Senator KNOWLAND. That was the memo of the 24th or 26th of March. I was trying to go back here first to find out whether on or about the 11th day of January there had been any indications from the Joint Chiefs relative to the discussion of either the turning over of Formosa to the Chinese Communists or of the admission of Communist China into the United Nations. I wanted to fix the date at which any change of policy might have developed. Do you know of any prior statement, prior to the March 24 or 26 document?

General MACARTHUR. No, sir.

Senator KNOWLAND. To which we have referred?

General MACARTHUR. No, sir; I do not.

Senator KNOWLAND. Well, then going now to the document of March 24 or 26, approximately that date, as I understand it the Joint Chiefs indicated that in their judgment as a part of any negotiations which might take place, that there should not be considered on the bargaining table the admission of Communist China into the United Nations or the turning over of Formosa to the Chinese Communists. Am I correct in that?

General MACARTHUR. That is correct, sir.

Senator KNOWLAND. The Joint Chiefs prepared that memo, that in the normal course of events as I understand it goes to the Secretary of State and perhaps to the President or perhaps for consultation between the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State. We can follow that up when we have other witnesses before us.

Do I understand that at a subsequent date there was either by endorsement or by memo or otherwise an indication from a higher echelon that there was general agreement with the Joint Chiefs' position except that it was believed that the turning over of Formosa and the admission of Communist China into the United Nations could properly be considered as a basis for negotiation for a cease-fire?

General MACARTHUR. That is correct, sir. The recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff went to the Secretary of Defense. The Secretary of Defense forwarded their recommendations as I understand it to the Secretary of State, but disagreed with them on those two points.

Senator KNOWLAND. To your own knowledge—and perhaps you would not be the best source; we could inquire at a later date of one or both of the Secretaries—were those two items eliminated? Were the two items eliminated or did the change regarding the two items take place prior to the time the document went from the Defense Establishment to the State Department? Do you have any knowledge of whether consultations had taken place prior to the time the Secretary of Defense made the changes in the Joint Chiefs' recommendations?

General MACARTHUR. My understanding was that the Secretary of State requested of the Secretary of Defense those provisions which would be included in a cease-fire arrangement.

The Secretary of Defense referred the question primarily to the Joint Chiefs of Staff who made these recommendations to him.

Upon receipt of those recommendations by the Secretary of Defense from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he referred the papers back to the Secretary of State, agreeing with the Joint Chiefs of Staff except in these two points that I have brought out. What happened after that I do not know.

Senator KNOWLAND. Well I cannot help but draw a conclusion, pending development of additional testimony, that that would then leave our arrangement for a cease-fire in precisely the same position it was when our United Nations representative voted at Lake Success on January 11 for the cease-fire proposal of India and the Middle East. At that time the proposal stated specifically that they would consider in the negotiations the turning over of Formosa to Com-

munist China and the admission of Communist China into the United Nations.

General MACARTHUR. That is correct.

Senator KNOWLAND. Now, I would like to ask one or two additional questions.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Knowland, are you through with the Formosa question now? Do you mind my asking one question?

Senator KNOWLAND. No.

FORMOSA, VITAL TO UNITED STATES SECURITY

Chairman RUSSELL. General, if I understand your attitude on Formosa, you think it is so vital to the security of the United States that we would be completely justified in using the veto in the United Nations against any plan that might cause it to fall into the hands of any Red power.

General MACARTHUR. I am not familiar enough with the United Nations to answer you directly about the veto power, but I believe explicitly that the steps should be taken by the United States Government that would be necessary to see that Formosa does not fall into Red hands.

EFFECTS OF THE YALTA AGREEMENT ON THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA

Senator KNOWLAND. General, with your wide knowledge of conditions in the Far East—and I suppose there have been few, if any, Americans who have had as broad and as varied experience in the Far East as you have—would you be willing to express your judgment as to whether or not the strategic ability of the Republic of China to maintain itself was jeopardized by the provisions of the Yalta agreement, which gave the Soviet at least a toehold if not more in Manchuria?

General MACARTHUR. I am not very familiar with the Yalta conferences or anything of that sort, but it is the impression in the Far East that one of the gravest mistakes that was ever made was to permit the Soviet to come down into China at Port Arthur, Darien, and other places of that sort.

Senator KNOWLAND. Were you invited to go to the Yalta Conference?

General MACARTHUR. I?

Senator KNOWLAND. Yes, sir.

General MACARTHUR. No, sir.

MISSIONS OF GENERALS MARSHALL AND WEDEMAYER TO CHINA

Senator KNOWLAND. One other question, General. In 1945, late in 1945, General Marshall made a trip out to the Far East as a special Ambassador for the President of the United States to work with the Government of China relative to a number of matters.

Could I ask whether or not on his trip to the Far East he consulted with you on the matters pertaining to the Far East prior to his mission in China?

General MACARTHUR. General Marshall passed through Tokyo on his way to China, and he was my guest there, but he never discussed in any way, shape, or manner his mission or China,

Senator KNOWLAND. In 1947 General Wedemeyer was sent out to the Far East, both to China and Korea, for the purpose of making a report to the President of the United States. Might I ask at the time he made his report was the report submitted to you for comments?

General MACARTHUR. No, sir. I have only seen those portions of the Wedemeyer report which were made public.

Senator KNOWLAND. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Senator FLANDERS. Mr. Chairman?

PRESENT LEGAL STATUS OF FORMOSA

Chairman RUSSELL. One question, General. I am not clear in my own mind as to the exact status of Formosa at the present time. It had been in Japanese hands for many years prior to the defeat of Japan in World War II. Has the status of Formosa ever been finally determined by any formal treaty?

General MACARTHUR. It has not, sir. Legalistically it is still a part of defeated Japan. The disposition of the various segments of the Empire of Japan has not yet been formally determined. There were certain agreements that were entered into, as I understand it, at Yalta and other places, but legalistically Formosa is still a part of the Empire of Japan.

Chairman RUSSELL. Japan has title until such time as the peace treaty might divest them of it?

General MACARTHUR. The Allies turned over what you might call the administration and the trusteeship of Formosa to China, just as Japan was turned over to us, and it is still in that status.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Flanders, before you came in, in accordance with my assurances to you, I submitted your request to the committee. Of course, it was of particular and vital interest only to about five members of the committee, but there seemed to be a general agreement that as long as you kept your questioning brief that they would be glad to waive their position and let you proceed.

Senator FLANDERS. Mr. Chairman, I thank you and thank the committee, and wish to say that I wrote out my questions so as to make sure that they would be brief.

AN INTERPRETATION OF THE BASIC DIFFERENCE OF OPINION

General, I wish to ask some questions on the practical level. Do you think it is a fair statement to say that on this level the difference of opinion between yourself and the administration is that you favor and believe there can be accomplished a victorious conclusion of the Korean campaign, but that, on the other hand, so far as you can see, or so far as the public has been informed, the present policy of the administration is directly toward a costly and bloody stalemate continued indefinitely?

General MACARTHUR. I would say that is a very concise statement.

Senator FLANDERS. Mr. Chairman, you will note that the answers are even briefer than the questions so far.

Chairman RUSSELL. You had phrased your question so it was not very controversial.

SOVIET STRENGTH IN SIBERIA

Senator FLANDERS. Number 2. It seems to be the expressed criticism of your point of view that it will involve our country in either or both of two disasters. It is claimed that it will involve us deeply in war on the mainland of China, and will probably bring on a third world war by the direct intervention of the Soviet Government in Asia or in Europe.

It would seem to me that you have completely answered the question as to whether it would involve us in extensive military operations in the mainland of China. But the question still remains as to whether your proposals would bring the Soviet Government itself into action. That would seem to be largely a matter of information.

Do you have information that the Soviet Government does not have reserves of war matériel stored in Siberia? If so, the question of transportation and production might not deter that government from intervention.

General MACARTHUR. It is my firm belief that the Soviet Government has not stockpiled in Siberia sufficiently to maintain a major aggression campaign in Asia for any real period of time.

I can only give it as my best opinion——

Senator FLANDERS. Yes.

[Deleted.]

Senator FLANDERS. Then that answers my third question.

General MACARTHUR. Such an opinion, of course——

Senator FLANDERS. Have you been furnished information from any other source as to whether these immediately available reserves of matériel exist?

General MACARTHUR. No, sir.

POSSIBILITY OF SOVIET INTERFERENCE IN KOREA CONFLICT

Senator FLANDERS. And the fourth question is as to whether an active prosecution of the Korean campaign by the means you suggest would bring the Soviet Government into action in Europe, would you give us reasons for believing that it would not, if you so believe?

General MACARTHUR. My reasons have run through a good deal of my testimony, Senator, but——

Senator FLANDERS. You might summarize them.

General MACARTHUR. My belief is that the basic plans of the Soviets are pitched upon a much broader basis than an incident which might occur in Korea or even in Asia itself.

As I said before, I believe the Soviet has two fundamental basic choices: either she is going to attack or she is not going to attack; and I do not believe that what happens in Korea will tend to shape the world-wide global policies that they may enter upon.

Senator FLANDERS. Well, I thank the General, I thank the Chairman of the Committee. I thank the members of the Committee, and I thank everybody.

Chairman RUSSELL. I thank you, Senator, for making your questions brief.

Senator Fulbright?

GENERAL MAC ARTHUR'S BIRTHPLACE

Senator FULBRIGHT. General, as you know, I am not a military man, but I do have a great respect for you as a general and as a great American, as I know all Americans have; but I want to make the record clear on another point.

Certain misinformed representatives in the Senate and the Congress have referred to Wisconsin as your native State.

Now, General, for the record, I want you to state here in a positive manner where you were born. [Laughter.]

General MACARTHUR. Senator, I remember one of the early jokes with which I was twitted with the comment that I was born when my parents were away. [Laughter.]

My father was a Wisconsinite, but he had the good sense to surrender to a Virginia girl. It was intended that I should be born in the old homestead at Norfolk, but he was ordered down to Little Rock, Little Rock barracks, as I recall—

Senator FULBRIGHT. In Arkansas.

General MACARTHUR. In Arkansas; and I am very proud to say, sir, I was born in Little Rock barracks on the 26th of January, 1880.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I hope that Senator McCarthy and Senator Wiley are here. The other day on the floor of the Senate, Senator McCarthy referred to you as a native son.

General MACARTHUR. I may say, too, Senator, that is the one item that I have testified to that I have a dead certainty that is right. [Laughter.]

Senator TOBEY. General, I might point out in those days it was called Arkansas. [Laughter.]

Senator FULBRIGHT. Well, only by the illiterate. [Laughter.]

FACTORS AFFECTING SOVIET DECISION TO ATTACK

General, I hesitate really to engage in asking you questions because I feel that I know so little about it, but on the other hand, in view of my abysmal ignorance, I will have to ask you some questions in the hope that I might absorb a little information.

On that last question, which is not in my list, I wondered if you could elaborate a little, because you have mentioned it at another time in these hearings. What do you think might determine the Soviet choice, if it is not anything that might happen in Asia? Can you indicate, and give me some idea of what type of thing you think could happen that could or would influence their choice?

General MACARTHUR. My own belief is that from the strategic military point of view, the relativity of the strengths on the two sides would be of the greatest possible influence in dictating the Soviet action.

Another point would be whether they were succeeding politically and by the present methods in achieving the aggressive intent, the expansion which is so evidently being attempted by them. Those are two of the fundamental reasons that I believe they would take into consideration such judgments as they might render.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Is it fair to say that you feel that if any substantial relative increase in the strength of Russia might take place, that that would be a material influence in determining them to attack?

Would it make them aggressive, if they had a relative increase with regard to our forces? Is that a fair thing to say?

General MACARTHUR. The greater relative strength that they possess and have would probably be an inducement if they decided to go to force instead of their present political force.

ECONOMIC AND PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS OF ADEQUATE DEFENSE PREPARATION

Senator FULBRIGHT. Then is it fair to say that you feel that an expansion of our Armed Forces should take place rather than a reduction at this time?

General MACARTHUR. I most assuredly believe we should place ourselves in a condition of preparedness which means an increase in our armed strength.

Senator FULBRIGHT. One of the most influential men of the Senate made a statement the other day to this effect. I wonder if you would comment on it:

* * * the cost of maintaining an armed force of 3,500,000 men indefinitely could wreck the American economy. He called for a reduction of a half a million in the United States armed forces objective and a \$20,000,000,000 cut in the American mobilization budget.

Do you think that is a safe doctrine to follow?

General MACARTHUR. I wouldn't attempt to discuss the details and I certainly would not attempt superficially to criticize any comment that any Senator may have made on the floor of his house.

Senator FULBRIGHT. This was not made on the floor of the Senate. This was made out in an ordinary statement. I think it is a fair question in that at the moment that very question will be determined, it must be determined by the Senate and the Congress. I would think your opinion, especially on the matter at this time, should be very influential.

It would be with me because it is a very practical matter. Here we are. Should we reduce the size of our over-all army by a half a million men and reduce the over-all budget by \$20,000,000,000? I do not see how that could possibly be consistent with what you have already said.

General MACARTHUR. The actual details of our preparedness plan, what the strength of the forces are, the cost and all those questions I haven't gone into at all, Senator. I am not able to pass judgment on the question that you put to me.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I do not want you to say 20 billions rather than 19 is the right figure. What I mean is a substantial reduction in appropriation—that is not a detail but a general policy. Is a substantial reduction warranted in view of the present world conditions?

General MACARTHUR. I can only repeat, Senator, I believe we should place ourselves in the condition of adequate preparedness.

What the details are of that adequate preparedness in the relative sizes of our forces and the over-all strengths, I would have to gather the facts and study the problem. I haven't got the information to give you a concrete answer. What you are asking me to do is to pass judgment, of course, upon the studies that have have been made after months, perhaps years of effort.

I haven't even seen more than the superficial outline of them. I wouldn't be able to give you any concrete answer.

Senator FULBRIGHT. The thing that bothers me is this. I don't wish to be too personal about it, with the other Senators, but Senator Taft is, of course, an acknowledged leader——

General MACARTHUR. Was this a statement by Senator Taft?

Senator FULBRIGHT. I was reading from a special article to the New York Times, Joseph A. Loftus. He made a speech to the chamber of commerce on April 30, which is just a few days ago, and it is no secret.

Senator Taft, as you know, has been one of your most enthusiastic supporters from the point of view of this proposal for a policy in the Far East.

Now, he is an extremely influential man. I simply am unable to follow his meaning. I will read the other paragraph:

Senator Taft said the United States should at least try the plan of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur; use Chinese Nationalist troops, bomb Chinese Communist bases in Manchuria and blockade Communist China.

The very next paragraph says:

At the same time, the Ohio Senator declared that the cost of maintaining an armed force of 3,500,000 men indefinitely could wreck the American economy. He called for a reduction of a half a million in the United States armed forces objective and a \$20 billion cut in the American mobilization budget.

I know very little about American military matters, but those two statements seem to be absolutely contradictory, that you can't do both.

General MACARTHUR. I said when I addressed this august body that I wasn't going to be drawn into politics, and I am not. I believe that is as much of a political question as it is anything else.

Senator FULBRIGHT. It seems to me this is a little different from the ordinary political controversy. Here is a question that this Congress has to decide and that is the defense of this country. I don't know anyone better qualified to give us advice on that very important matter.

If we proceed to follow your suggestion or any other policy that extends our military obligations and at the same time cut our military forces, it would seem to me that is the best way in the world to court disaster. To undertake a greater obligation with fewer forces simply confuses a nonmilitary man.

But I take it you don't wish to comment on that.

SIZE OF MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT

Chairman RUSSELL. To get the general out of the realm of politics, I might suggest he might answer as to what he might think of the recommendation of the Joint Chiefs based on a detailed study of all factors pertaining to the national defense, as to the size of the Defense Establishment.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Yes; I would be glad if the general would like to comment.

General MACARTHUR. What is the question?

Chairman RUSSELL. You say you have not had an opportunity to study all these details and I believe earlier in your testimony you stated that was primarily the responsibility of the Joint Chiefs.

The question I would like to suggest is as to whether you would accept the recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as to the size of the Military Establishment and the military budget.

General MACARTHUR. Of course I had nothing to do with their studies at all, Senator; not a policy was put up to me, and everything. I have great confidence in the professional opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and if the opinion that they rendered was a strictly professional one, without any currents of obligation, or pressure from anything else, I would be very glad to subscribe to what they did.

Now, how that recommendation came out, I haven't the slightest idea, and I would not commit myself to it until I knew all the facts and circumstances of their recommendation.

I will say—I will repeat what I said yesterday: I have great confidence in the professional skill of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, individually and collectively.

There are many questions, however, that come out and are passed upon by them, that are influenced by various factors of Government.

Chairman RUSSELL. I do not think there is any question about that; but it would seem to me that the size of the Army and the amount of the military budget would be two questions that would be primarily within their jurisdiction, as professional soldiers, and in planning for the defense of their country. There is no doubt in my mind that decisions are made in the Department of Defense that are influenced, if not changed, by the views of the Department of State; but I would be very much surprised if that would relate entirely to the size of the Military Establishment.

Things that the Department of State might do might affect the size of the Military Establishment, but in the last analysis, the size of the Military Establishment is the responsibility of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in the light of foreign commitments and obligations that might be imposed by the Department of State.

General MACARTHUR. I haven't the slightest information as to how those studies were turned out. I was not consulted in any way, shape, or form.

Chairman RUSSELL. Pardon me, Senator Fulbright.

CONFIDENCE IN THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Senator FULBRIGHT. I notice, General, you are careful to say that you have confidence in the professional skill of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Does that mean you do not have confidence in their personal integrity?

General MACARTHUR. Not at all.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Well, do you have confidence in the integrity of General Bradley?

General MACARTHUR. Completely.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Of General Vandenberg?

General MACARTHUR. Completely.

Senator FULBRIGHT. And Admiral Sherman?

General MACARTHUR. Completely.

Senator FULBRIGHT. You are aware of the fact that the same gentlemen I just mentioned, Senator Taft says he has no confidence in General Bradley?

General MACARTHUR. Senator, I guess this is a free country. Every fellow can have his own opinion.

Senator FULBRIGHT. You have confidence in General Collins?

General MACARTHUR. Completely.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Both his personal integrity——

General MACARTHUR. Complete.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Do you think that General Bradley would lend himself to an arrangement by which he states things in public in which he did not believe?

General MACARTHUR. I would not believe it under any consideration.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I would not either; but of course you are an old friend, and you know the code of the military far better than I do. To me it is a shocking thing that a man of the responsibility of those I have mentioned could be suspect of such a thing, of expressing to the country opinions in which they have no belief.

Certainly that is something that no one could ever accuse you of. You would always say what you think, and not what someone has told you. I would assume that was typical of the highest class military man.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Senator Fulbright, would you mind repeating that question that you asked, please? I could not hear it.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Which one—with regard to General Bradley?

Senator SALTONSTALL. There is a question that you asked on which General MacArthur commented, and then you commented.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Well, there was a succession of them. I asked him if he had confidence in the Chiefs of Staff, and then I specifically asked him if he had confidence in the personal integrity of General Bradley. Is that what you had in mind?

Senator SALTONSTALL. Yes.

Senator FULBRIGHT. General, I believe in your speech to the joint session you complimented the Japanese, and you stated in these hearings that they had a magnificent army, and they are a very great people; did you not?

General MACARTHUR. In effect; yes, sir.

COMPARISON OF JAPANESE AGGRESSION IN CHINA TO PRESENT SITUATION

Senator FULBRIGHT. One of the things that seems to be very important to your case and one which has been alluded to but not developed, is why, in view of the difficulties the Japanese had over a period of 13 years in subduing the Chinese, just why you feel that we could with very few additional troops, and additional air power, subdue the Chinese? That is, subdue them to the extent at least that they would give up and come to terms.

I am very interested as to why you think that could be done in view of the fact that the Japanese had a very fine military establishment. I believe it was much greater than the one we have; was it not?

General MACARTHUR. The objective of the Japanese in China was to seize and exploit the entire country—a very large order. Our objective in the Korean campaign is a very limited one, indeed. It merely is to put sufficient pressure on the Chinese that they would withdraw their troops and cease their depredations in the area of North Korea. It is only a small fraction of what the Japanese Empire was attempting to do in China.

INHERENT DIFFICULTIES IN WAGING A WAR WITH CHINA

Senator FULBRIGHT. Well, I can understand that, but the Chinese have proved themselves to be a very stubborn people. I would assume if you undertake such a project that you would have to do whatever it takes to accomplish it. You are not going to undertake the project and not go through with it. It would seem to me, as long as the whole country is not subdued, as long as there is a Communist group somewhere in China that is not subdued, they will still be able to furnish some opposition to you. However small it may be, they can still mount some kind of an offensive.

That point bothers me more than any other one. Being such a large country and having been so difficult for a highly mechanized army to subdue, I do not see how we could do it. As I understand, the Japanese had airplanes, had good airplanes; they had complete freedom and domination of the air, and yet in approximately 13 years, maybe 15, they were not able to subdue it.

I was wondering if the very primitive character of the Chinese is not in this case perhaps of great defensive value to them. You cannot get at them to destroy them as you could if it was highly industrialized. Perhaps it is that while they have no offensive power beyond their immediate periphery, at the same time they are extremely difficult to destroy because their power is not concentrated.

TACTICAL AND TECHNICAL CONSIDERATIONS OF MODERN WAR IN CHINA

General MACARTHUR. You only have to destroy, Senator, their potentiality to maintain an army on foreign soil in North Korea. When you destroy their power to build the guns, the munitions, to supply the food for an aggressive army that way, they will have to cease utilizing that aggressive army.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I understand they do not have that power now, General; these things come from Russia, I understand. They do not have power to make big guns or any kind of guns, other than pistols; do they?

General MACARTHUR. They have the power to make what equipment they are using, Senator.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I understood that came from——

General MACARTHUR. Which we are not able to overcome with our forces in Korea.

Now, the whole process of modern war depends upon the logistical potential of supplying your troops, feeding them, giving them the necessary munitions, all of the intricate paraphernalia that modern armies have to use on the battlefield. The capacity of China along those lines is very limited.

It is a country of poverty. The slightest dislocation in their normal processes of distribution causes the greatest convulsions in various sections of Chinese society.

If you, for instance, disturb or should disturb in the slightest degree the distributive systems of their food, you might well have 50,000,000 men, 50,000,000 people, starving at any one time.

They live only a couple of jumps ahead of starvation. In other materials, they are almost as bad. They have practically no indigenous products that they can manufacture; they have no great manufacturing centers whatsoever.

They are peculiarly vulnerable to the process of blockade, and the process of internal disruption by bombing.

The minute you apply those factors, it becomes logistically more difficult, probably impossible, for them to maintain a foreign army on the march.

It is as different from the problem of Japan as day is from night. The problem of Japan was to occupy that enormous country of China, to administer it, to govern it; to do that they have to put in a million and a half or two million or more troops, merely to carry out the normal administrative processes.

We do not contemplate anything of the sort. All I contemplate and hope for is to disrupt the capacity of that industrially weak nation to supply the sinews of war to their armies in Korea and, therefore, make them stop this savage slaughter of our troops.

Now, the problems are not the same, and there is no analogy whatsoever to Japan and its purposes during the last war, and the United Nations purposes now in Korea.

A very modest effort, military effort, on our part, I believe, will have an excellent chance of bringing to an end the Korean slaughter.

Now, what Japan did was to completely destroy and chew up the military forces of China during the last war; all of the formed armies were destroyed. What was left were the thousands of guerrillas in the hills. They were unable, however, to absorb the government and administer the government of China, one of the reasons being our own intervention into the war. I have tried to explain the difference.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I can see the difference in the ultimate objective.

General MACARTHUR. It wasn't the ultimate objective that is the main thing. It is the mechanics that you are talking about.

STARVATION AS COMPARED TO WAR CASUALTIES IN CHINA

Senator FULBRIGHT. On the mechanics, China was not, I wouldn't think, appreciably better off 20 years ago than she is now. She has been poverty stricken for a long time, except for the ravages of war.

By that I mean she never did have large industrial installations comparable to our own. Japan could bomb her communications and I presume did. I do not recall that that resulted in 50 million or 10 million of any more than the usual number of deaths from starvation.

I have always heard that they have that as a regular thing. Isn't starvation endemic in China, whether they have war or whether they do not have it?

General MACARTHUR. The losses in China during the last war were terrific. They ran into the millions.

Senator FULBRIGHT. And they lose them in peacetime from starvation, too, do they not?

General MACARTHUR. And you must understand in considering the potential of Japanese force, that the Japanese forces were not concentrated entirely on China. They were engaged in the battle with the United States of America, with the British and with all our allies.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Well, during the first 8 years of that period before Pearl Harbor they concentrated solely on China, didn't they?

General MACARTHUR. They were using a part of their force only, Senator. They were largely preparing for what took place in the future. All the forces that we had to overcome in the Pacific in those four bloody years of war were not used by Japan with reference to the China struggle.

It is quite possible that if it had been left alone, China and Japan, that Japan might have made a success of it, that is, conquered it.

RISKS IN EXTENDING THE KOREAN CONFLICT

Senator FULBRIGHT. Well, I think that is possible, but it would seem to me to be a very major undertaking. I think that point is one that bothers some of us—it does me—more than any other single point. If we could be positive that that would succeed, I think it would throw a very different light on some of the other questions. If it does not succeed, then we have a situation which would inevitably be succeeded into a larger and larger commitment.

That is, I see no way to limit it. Certainly if we should accept your basic philosophy of war, and that is to proceed to victory without any dilly-dallying along, without any what you call appeasement, without anything short of a decisive victory, then there is no stopping point once we become committed. Then what happens to us? As to my own thinking, I am a little more worried about Russia not coming in than I am of her coming in in China, because if we become committed there, it seems to me she really is given a free hand in Europe and in the rest of the world. What really bothers us is the situation in the Middle East and Europe, if we really become committed to the point of having to supply very large forces of ground troops, and particularly air power in China.

I think that central question of whether or not this can be done in a relatively quick and definite decisive way is the key point to many other problems. That was why I was hoping you would develop it in a little fuller way, because this precedent of Japan's recent experience in that area makes it rather difficult to accept that it would be an easy sort of undertaking.

MORAL CONCEPT OF INTERVENTION IN KOREA

General MACARTHUR. The alternative, Senator, is to sacrifice thousands and thousands and thousands of American boys month after month after month.

Not only that, but you will have sacrificed, if you keep on indefinitely, the entire Korean Nation and people. The high moral reason for our intervention in Korea was to save Korea. If you do not continue and save her, you are going to destroy her.

She is pretty well destroyed now. This question of stopping half-way, of completely destroying the moral tone which caused us to intervene in Korea, completely ignoring the enormous bloodshed which goes on there month after month, that very concept shocks me, old soldier as I am. If these risks that you speak of were so real and so compelling, why did we intervene in Korea?

There is nothing that has happened that has changed those risks or increased those risks. The whole moral tone of the world resounded when in its nobility the United States and the United Nations following them intervened to save Korea.

At one stroke you would abandon that, at one stroke. You don't pay the slightest conception to that 30,000,000 of people in Korea, and that great nation and our own boys by the thousands and thousands.

ATTEMPT FOR A QUICK CONCLUSION OF KOREAN WAR

I have been here 2 days now, and I have heard no proposition yet, outside of the ones that the Joint Chiefs made and myself, which would offer any hope for a successful conclusion of the Korean struggle.

I believe it would mean that if you don't attempt to bring this thing to a short and honorable conclusion, it means not only the indefinite sacrifice of life, but it means what is almost equally important, the complete degradation and sacrifice of our moral tone.

Senator FULBRIGHT Well, General—

General MACARTHUR. I am not trying to sell my ideas to you, Senator, in any way, shape, or manner. I have expressed them with the greatest fullness, and I don't want you to get the idea that with a fellow Arkansas man, we are trying to jam anything down each other's throats.

Senator WILEY. Don't forget Wisconsin.

POSSIBILITY OF ENDING OUR CASUALTIES

Senator FULBRIGHT. General, I realize that it takes a great deal of patience on your part to listen to a lot of people who are wholly unfamiliar with this type of thing. Certainly I am. I happen to be a member here of the Foreign Relations Committee and not of the Armed Services Committee, and some of these matters, which I am sure seem to you to be crystal clear, seem very, very difficult to understand on our part.

As I said, I hesitate to labor them. But that one point seemed extremely difficult to me. I think you said there had been no change in Korea. I had understood all along the intervention of China changed the situation, changed the risks, and that it came as a surprise to you and to all of us. If it had not changed—in other words, if the Chinese had not intervened, that particular undertaking in Korea might well have been long since wound up, as you so properly thought it would be, I think, at that time, last fall.

So that it has changed to some extent. Now, I think there is room for honest difference of opinion in matters of this kind. I think you could grant to all of us, certainly in the Foreign Relations Committee, even though we do not understand military matters, that our objective is to minimize the loss of American lives as well as the expenditure of treasure.

It seems to me that this loss of life which is going on today is so sad and terrible, that it is perfectly proper to consider that a mistake in the present circumstances might result in a 10 times greater loss within the near future.

That is what we are trying to balance off. I grant to you that if the choice is between the present loss and no loss—if there is any reasonable opportunity for that—we ought to take it.

The point at issue is whether there is a reasonable opportunity to stop our losses rather than to vastly increase them.

Now, there is a school of thought, as you have already seen exhibited here. I don't know that I say it is a school of thought but what we are really doing is examining these things to see if there is any validity in them.

I can't tell you at this minute whether I think it is right or wrong to proceed, but I am trying to develop the reasons which I hope may give us some guidance.

There are very definite cleavages of opinion about Russia and what she may do in Europe. It does seem to me that if we become bogged down in China, if by chance it proved to be a little more difficult than you think, that then the thing would come about that you mentioned earlier in your testimony. One of the major things that might induce Russia to attack all out would be a relative increase in her strength, which would come about if we expended very large resources in Asia, and if perchance at the same time our budget was cut \$20 billion as suggested by the Senator from Ohio. All those things might happen.

A cautious attitude might be justified under your own suggestion that one of the things that might induce an attack would be a rather large increase in the power of Russia relative to our own.

AID TO YUGOSLAVIA

General, during the winter we had a bill before this Congress in my committee. I happened to be delegated to handle it on the floor and it concerned aid to Yugoslavia. We voted some fifty-odd-millions to Yugoslavia in aid, transferring ECA supplies.

Do you approve of that action?

General MACARTHUR. I never read the bill, Senator.

Senator FULBRIGHT. The bill allocated over 50 million dollars' worth of wheat and grain to the aid of Yugoslavia, just this past December. It was a very simple bill. Do you approve of that action?

General MACARTHUR. I have had no chance to even consider it, Senator. I would not attempt to pass any superficial judgment on such questions as that.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Sir?

General MACARTHUR. I would not attempt to answer any question of that sort.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Why not, General? It seems to me to be a very simple question. It was dictated primarily by military considerations. That is, General Bradley appeared before our committee, and I believe General Collins, also, and said this was militarily justified because of the thirty-odd divisions that the Yugoslavs had.

General MACARTHUR. If you have such good assurances, why ask me?

Senator FULBRIGHT. Well, because I would like your opinion. You being, if not the greatest, certainly one of the greatest soldiers in the world today; I would say your opinion would be very valuable to me.

General MACARTHUR. I haven't got the information, Senator, to answer the question with any degree of authority whatsoever.

Senator FULBRIGHT. The information given to us was very simple. It is that the Yugoslavs have some 30 to 32 divisions in being; that they are relatively well equipped, and that—you know where Yugoslavia is on the map, I presume?

General MACARTHUR. Very well, indeed.

Senator FULBRIGHT. That country was threatened with internal difficulties because of a drought that took place last year. In order to sustain the existing regime there, which might be threatened if there were internal difficulties, we were to make up the deficiency in food supply of Yugoslavia.

Now, the reason why it was justified is the continuation of the existence of this military force of some 30 divisions on the flank of the Russians.

Now, that is about the way it was presented. Do you think, assuming that to be correct, that that is a good reason for giving them \$50,000,000?

General MACARTHUR. On such superficial presentation, I have said I would not give a professional opinion. The entire matter of the defense of Europe, the entire economics of Europe, the degree of communism, if you can put it that way, that exists in Serbia and Yugoslavia, the entire atmosphere, a conglomeration of things that you have been studying and the authorities here for months and perhaps years, I would not attempt in 15 minutes to give an authoritative statement.

I must have the facts. It would take time to get those facts. It has never been within the scope of my responsibility to study those matters. Other agencies of the Government do that. Other military leaders do those things. Ask them, Senator, not me.

I am glad to answer any question that falls within the scope of what I have studied, but I am not going to give a professional opinion, an international opinion, on such a major subject as that without being properly acquainted with the basis of fact. I have been 14 years in the Far East, Senator.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Well, I realize that.

General MACARTHUR. Ask something in the Far East, and I will do the best I can to answer it with some degree of respect for my own opinion.

Senator FULBRIGHT. General, you are a very influential man. You have been in the Far East and you have been in the public service far longer than I have; but many of us on this committee feel it is our duty to make up opinions upon things with which we do not have intimate, long personal association. I was only asking for your best opinion as a citizen.

You have offered us a very positive program which is part of a global program of combating communism. Now, it seems to me it is absolutely necessary, at least it is for us, to consider both sides of this question.

You referred to the necessity of combating the Russians and resisting them in Europe as well as in Asia. You expressed great confidence that we can resist them successfully on all fronts.

Now, one of the important elements—at least we were told by the Chiefs of Staff—is this question of Yugoslavia. Now, you mentioned in your observation there that you were not aware of the degree of communism in Yugoslavia. We were given to understand that it is substantially Communist, if not 100 percent. Would that make any difference to you as to whether or not we should aid Yugoslavia?

General MACARTHUR. It certainly would. The question of the political concepts and affiliations of any nation would be an important

factor as to whether you take them into your camp as an ally or not. I have no knowledge of the present situation in Yugoslavia, Senator.

Senator FULBRIGHT. The Congress was told and the committee informed the Senate that they are Communists and that Mr. Tito is a Communist. In spite of that, we voted aid. Do you think the fact they were Communists is sufficient to have prevented our aid to Yugoslavia?

General MACARTHUR. I would not pass any judgment upon it, Senator.

DEFINITION OF COMMUNISM

Senator FULBRIGHT. You made a statement just before lunch that interests me. You said in answer to a question by the Senator from Connecticut that the enemy—and it is important, I think, that we try to identify the enemy—is communism.

General MACARTHUR. That is correct.

Senator FULBRIGHT. What is your concept of communism? I mean is this the communism of Marx and Engels, or is it the communism as practiced by the Kremlin, or just what do you mean by that?

General MACARTHUR. Communism has many various factors. The great threat in what is called present communism is the imperialistic tendency or the lust of power beyond their own geographical confines. It is their effort to enslave the individual to the concepts of the state. It is the establishment of autocracy that squeezes out every one of the freedoms which we value so greatly.

Now, when you help one Communist nation against another Communist nation, you, of course, accept certain definite risks. What those risks are depends upon the facts of the case. I haven't got those facts.

If there was any doubt about it, I should have said that you would have gathered the facts. You have had General Eisenhower; you have had the Joint Chiefs of Staff; you have had others that are charged with that responsibility. You acted apparently. I do not see that my opinions would affect that action in any way, shape, or manner. I have no opinions on it, except the general opinions of a layman.

RUSSIA OR COMMUNISM AS OUR GREATEST ENEMY?

Senator FULBRIGHT. What I am trying to do is to develop this idea more clearly in my own mind and, I hope, also in the minds of some of the other members of the committee. I should not say "hope," as I think they are interested and are perhaps as unenlightened as I am about some of these concepts. I had not myself thought of our enemy as being communism; I thought of it as primarily being an imperialist Russia. That is what interests me.

General MACARTHUR. In that concept, Senator, I disagree with you completely.

Senator FULBRIGHT. That is what I was trying to develop there.

General MACARTHUR. It happens to be that the Soviet is communistic; but, if you think that communism is limited to Russia, I would disagree with you completely and absolutely.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I did not say it was limited to Russia, but I would say this: If the country that has no association whatever with

Russia—in fact, is antagonistic to them—then I do not see why, such as in the case of Yugoslavia, it is not to our benefit to assist them. In other words, it seems to me the present insecurity of the world arises primarily from Russia's imperialism. To you, that is not so at all?

General MACARTHUR. I have expressed my belief, Senator, on that point.

A WAY TO FIGHT COMMUNISM

Senator FULBRIGHT. Well, it seems to me, you do not fight communism with a gun. It is sort of like sin. We are all against sin, but you do not fight sin with anything tangible. Communism is an idea, but what really bothers us is when people start to shoot—

General MACARTHUR. I think you do fight sin with very practical weapons, and I think we are fighting communism with very practical weapons.

Senator FULBRIGHT. You have been very eloquent about the fighting in Korea. Those people come down, and you shoot them and they shoot you. It does not matter whether they are Communists or not. If they are shooting at you, you want to shoot them, and you may have killed some that were not Communists. It is the tangible effect of it that bothers us.

General MACARTHUR. They were Communists.

COMPARISON OF COMMUNISM AND FASCISM

Senator FULBRIGHT. I do not quite follow the idea that it is communism as such. It is only because it is the tool of an aggressive country that has bombs and guns that really bothers us; is it not?

I think there are some important conclusions that follow from whether or not one approaches it as to whether it is communism or whether it is Russia. Do you see, for example, any real difference between communism and fascism?

General MACARTHUR. I see great differences, Senator.

Senator FULBRIGHT. What is the difference?

General MACARTHUR. I am opposed to both of them, but there are great differences. That is a great philosophical question that I would not care to try to discuss here.

The differences between the various types of totalitarianism, the differences between the slaveries that are imposed by autocratic government—they are pernicious whether they are Fascist or whether they are Communist, but there are many differences between a Fascist type of government, as I understand it, and a communistic type of government, as I understand it.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Well, what are some of the differences? I do not see any, frankly, except the name. They seem almost identical; for example, Hitler and the Nazis. It seems to me their problems would be almost the same, almost identical, with very insignificant differences.

For that reason, I think it is important if you find they are just about the same. We find other countries in the world which we call Fascist. Are we to group them in the same category as the Russians and their satellites?

General MACARTHUR. The discussion has gone far afield from my scope, Senator.

POSSIBILITIES OF DISASSOCIATING SATELLITES FROM THE KREMLIN

Senator FULBRIGHT. I am sorry.

Do you think that there is no chance whatever that a country like Poland or China can ever be disassociated from the Kremlin and the control of the Kremlin?

General MACARTHUR. I have never said the Chinese were under the control of the Kremlin.

Senator FULBRIGHT. You don't believe they are?

General MACARTHUR. I believe there is an interlocking of interests between Communist China and the Kremlin. The degree of control and influence that the Kremlin may have in China is quite problematical.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Well, do you think—

General MACARTHUR. I have said that the main issues in Asia are the ones that I put forth in my speech.

I tried, in defining China, to show the imperialistic lusts for expansion that I believe animated them; but to pass from that—

Senator FULBRIGHT. The Chinese—

General MACARTHUR. But to pass from that and have me pass judgment upon the various nations of the world that I have not been closely associated with, to criticize statements that may have been made in the political arena, to pass judgment on studies that my military contemporaries have made, without even amassing the facts, is quite unfair, Senator, in my opinion.

In any event, I cannot give any authoritative report on it.

CHINESE PEACE WITHOUT SOVIET SANCTION

Senator FULBRIGHT. Well, would you consider that the authorities in China could make a peace with you without the approval of the Kremlin?

General MACARTHUR. A peace with me?

Senator FULBRIGHT. Well, with the United Nations, or with the United States.

General MACARTHUR. I believe that there would be great possibilities of it. I don't know what the action or the impulse would be from the Kremlin. I know no more about that than you do.

I believe that the plan that I have put forward offers the only hope that I know of to stop that insensate slaughter in Korea, to give Korea and its nation a chance to survive.

I believe we accepted that moral obligation, and I believe we should go through with it.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Well, General, with all due deference, I think our first and continuing responsibility is to this country, rather than Korea.

I would not jeopardize this country—

General MACARTHUR. I agree with you in that, too, Senator; but I believe that they are parallel.

I believe the interests of this country are involved in saving the lives of its sons, rather than embarking upon an indefinite, indecisive campaign which will sacrifice thousands and thousands of additional American lives.

And there is no sophistry or of philosophy of discussion that would change the view I have on that.

I believe there is an excellent chance to do it. I believe there is no chance, if you decide otherwise, before you give an opportunity to practice, and attempt the only solution that I know of which will bring a hope for a successful conclusion.

Now, no man in the world is more anxious to avoid the expansion of war than I am. I am just 100 percent a believer against war. I believe the enormous sacrifices that have been brought about by the scientific methods of killing have rendered war a fantastic solution of international difficulties.

In war, as it is waged now, with the enormous losses on both sides, both sides will lose. It is a form of mutual suicide; and I believe that the entire effort of modern society should be concentrated on an endeavor to outlaw war as a method of the solution of problems between nations.

Now, you have an actual fact in Korea. You do have war. The great question is how are you going to end it.

Are you going to let it go on indefinitely, destroying the fabric of society, or are you going to make an effort to end it?

Are you going to let it go on indefinitely, on the plea that a still greater calamity might follow?

You certainly have a tremendous calamity on your hands right now.

You may avoid a future calamity.

It is my belief that if you bring the Korean War to a successful conclusion, you will put off the possibility and diminish the possibility of a third world war.

It is my own belief, if you continue this thing indefinitely, it will eventually overtake you. It will spread. I believe that the plan and the policy I have offers the greatest hope for not having a third world war.

Now those are my opinions. I am not trying to force their acceptance.

As I said when I appeared before this committee, I am not a voluntary witness, but those are my views and I repeat, there is no sophistry of argument of philosophical trends that will alter those basic facts, and those basic facts are all that I have tried to offer to this committee or to the Congress.

APPROACHING THE PROBLEM AND THE PROCEDURE IN SOLVING IT

Senator FULBRIGHT. I hope I haven't offended you. I thought you were a voluntary witness and that we were mutually trying to discover what are some of the truths underlying the greatest problem that has ever confronted us.

I certainly am not trying to be critical of your efforts. I have this approach to you. You have been all over the world for a long time and had great experience. I think your views on any subject would be of value certainly to me and the committee.

I hope you do not think that because I asked you about something that is not in the immediate theater of Japan, that I was trying to be officious about it. I really think what you have to say, whether or not you consider yourself the authority, is of value to us.

We are all seeking some light. I thought you were a voluntary witness who was here just trying to give us the benefit of your experience. There are very few people who have had the experience you have had.

General MACARTHUR. I am very glad to accept the invitation of the committee, but I am not trying to force anything, and the last impression that I would want to give is that I pose as an expert on world affairs.

I have a vast experience in the Orient. I have been there in the last 14 years, and I am glad indeed to place my views before you, but to attempt to have me pose here as an expert on things that I have had no direct connection with, places me in a very false position.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Well, I do not think you are posing as one, but most of us regard you as an expert whether you pose as one or not, but you can't help that.

General MACARTHUR. Well, Senator, if you do, you are wrong.

DEFINITION OF APPEASEMENT

Senator FULBRIGHT. We do, I think; certainly most of us do, and not only in this field because you have had such wide experience before you went to the Orient.

Well, I will try to get along. There is one other idea, General, that I think many of us are confused about. That is the idea that anything short of a complete victory in an all-out effort to end it by force of arms in the Orient would be called appeasement.

In other words, the word "appeasement" has come to have a sort of all-inclusive meaning. It does not seem to me that a negotiated peace, for example, is necessarily appeasement. Do you think so?

General MACARTHUR. Senator, I have my own definition of appeasement that might disagree with yours. I believe when you enter into war, you should use sufficient force to impose your will upon the enemy. The only purpose we have in the Korean conflict is to make the enemy stop his depredations. It isn't his conquest. It hasn't got an ounce of imperialism in it at all.

I believe that we do have the power to do so without sacrificing any of our other interests, and I do not believe in doing so that we in the slightest degree prejudice the beginning of another world war. On the contrary, I have said repeatedly I believe that it would have the opposite effect.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Well, I understood at one time that you were willing to have a cease-fire in Korea. Wasn't that short of an all-out victory?

General MACARTHUR. I would be glad to have a cease-fire in Korea on honorable terms at any time. I have had no other thought and hope in the last 10 months than to bring it to an honorable end with the least bloodshed that is possible.

Every recommendation I have made is to that end and to that purpose and none other. The glorification of a so-called over-all victory or conquest, as you put it, has never even entered my thoughts. What I am anxious to do is to bring the enemy to a round-table discussion on an honorable basis which will cause him to stop his depredation.

He is the aggressor without cause or reason. He is the one that sprung that foul blow on us. It's to stop that that we fight, and I say that anything that does not tend to stop that is in my lexicon appeasement.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Well, I think that puts a little different light on it from what I had understood before. I mean that the only way

would be, in effect, unconditional surrender. By the way, did you feel that the policy of—

General MACARTHUR. I don't know what you mean by "unconditional surrender," Senator. The only thing that the United Nations and the United States as its agent has ever demanded is a liberated, unified Korea.

Never by word or deed they indicated that they had any other concept. The enemy, on the other hand, has openly announced its purposes which involve the complete destruction of our forces, the complete occupation of Korea, the forcing upon Korea of a totalitarian system of government.

All of those things have been announced, but the only purpose that we have as I see it, is to stop the depredation of the Chinese Communist forces in North Korea, and their allies, the North Koreans.

I have endeavored to the best of my ability to suggest a discussion of honorable terms to end this war. We have been met at every turn by that, by the introduction of other political efforts, the recognition of Red China, which has nothing to do with the Korean conflict, the turning over of Formosa, which has nothing to do with the Korean conflict. Those are the insistence of the enemy before he sits down.

Those, if they were accepted, would again fit my definition of appeasement.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Well, do you feel our Government has accepted those principles that you have just mentioned?

General MACARTHUR. Do I feel that our Government has accepted them?

Senator FULBRIGHT. Yes.

General MACARTHUR. No, sir. Those are the demands of the enemy, and as I said today, the Joint Chiefs of Staff within the month have recommended that in the discussion of cease-fire terms, that neither of those appeasement policies should be acceptable even for discussion. What the attitude of our Government is, I don't know, but I would doubt very much that it would consider such terms.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Well, that is my impression.

General MACARTHUR. What is that?

Senator FULBRIGHT. That is my impression, sir.

IS WAR WITH RUSSIA INEVITABLE

General, would you care to say whether or not you feel that war with Russia is inevitable? I mean that question comes to all of us here, not only this year, but in this conflict that has grown up with Russia, it must be settled by war. Do you have a feeling or view about that?

General MACARTHUR. No, sir; I do not feel that war is inevitable. I believe that the great masses of the world, what you might call the ordinary men of the world, are invincibly against war.

I believe that is so among the Russian masses, just as it is among our own people.

I believe that the great tragedy of the world today is that we have not been able to establish the mechanics to carry out the will of the common people that war shall be nonexistent.

I believe that the same impulses against the destructiveness of war exist in common by all people.

Now, war, you have got to understand the history of war; you have got to understand that in the beginning it was a sort of gladiatorial contest in which when the opposing parties disagreed, they would agree to abide by the decisions of this gladiatorial contest. I suppose the beginning was the David and Goliath story of the Bible. It progressed from that into small professional armed forces, which would fight in some obscure corner of the world, but the results of that would be accepted in the chancellories of the world, and the peace would be written.

Gradually, with the scientific methods which have made mass destruction reach appalling proportions, war has ceased to be a sort of the roll-of-the-dice to determine what the winner should be—which should be the winner, and dictate the terms.

It has become an all-out effort. It has involved every man, child and woman in the whole world. The integration of the world into this compressed community now which exists has involved everybody.

I tell you it has outlawed the very basic concepts, gentlemen, upon which war was used as a final word when politics failed to settle international disputes. It is inherently a failure now.

The last two wars have shown it. The victor had to carry the defeated on his back. I have been carrying with all the resources possessed, and with the noble help of this country, that defeated country in Japan, trying to save her from destruction, and win her back into decency.

We paid, perhaps, \$2 billion in that effort. We have been doing the same thing with Germany. We did win the war, but we did have to carry the loser.

If you have another world war, you are going to get such destruction and destructiveness, I think it was a philosopher who said—since we are talking about philosophers—under such conditions only those will be happy that are dead.

Now, the masses of the world are far ahead of their leaders, I believe in this subject. I believe it is the massed opposition of the rank and file against war that offers the greatest possible hope that there shall be no war.

I believe it is the confession of defeatism in our civilization to say that war is inevitable. I believe the greatest mistake that was made in the League of Nations was not to tackle that fundamental problem.

It represents the highest hopes and concepts of mankind, and its mission was to keep the peace, but it developed into a body which had all the weaknesses of a legislative group, which could not speak with the authority of elected representatives; it had all the weaknesses of a judicial forum which did not have the moral and spiritual code which gave conviction to the world at large in its decision, and executively, it had all the weakness that it did not have the agencies under its control to carry out its decisions. It still remains a hope.

Senator FULBRIGHT. General, I certainly—

General MACARTHUR. That is a rather long and garrulous statement that I did not intend to load the record up with, but it is the only way in which I could answer your question as to why I believe that war is not inevitable.

Senator FULBRIGHT. General, I am very glad to have that in the record, and I do not think it is loading up the record at all in the

sense that it is superfluous. That is one of the main points. For my own part, I thoroughly subscribe to that, but you know very well there is a great difference of opinion in that very question as to whether or not war is inevitable. Your opinion on it is a very important one because if you accept the principle that it is inevitable, you begin to get into an entirely different approach to these problems, and I thoroughly agree with your position on it.

General MACARTHUR. I understand thoroughly, Senator, that you cannot abolish war unless others do it, and it is done universally.

If you had one great power that keeps armed and threatening, the only way that you can meet force is by force, and I have to, and you have to, prepare for that. But sooner or later, if civilization is to survive, you have got to tackle the main issue, and the solution is inevitable in the final analysis that war must go.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Do you think the United Nations is a reasonable approach to this problem?

Can you think of a better way?

General MACARTHUR. It is the effort we are making.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Can you think of a better way? That is what we have all been trying to do.

General MACARTHUR. I repeat that the mission and the concept and the hopes which underlie the organization of the United Nations is one of the highest and noblest concepts the world has ever had.

NEWSPAPER ACCOUNT OF GENERAL MAC ARTHUR

Senator FULBRIGHT. General, I have taken too much time. I have one other question. It relates to a newspaper account. I realize these are often wrong, but there is no better time to either confirm or deny them than soon after they appear.

In the Washington Daily News of May 2 was an article by the United Press concerning you which caught my eye, and I wondered if you would care to either confirm or deny or not comment—any way you choose.

The first sentence starts out:

Gen. Douglas MacArthur has informed confidants that he holds Secretary of State Dean Acheson primarily responsible for his discharge, it was learned today. However, persons who have talked with the general recently state that he has neither the wish nor the intention of putting the finger on Mr. Acheson when he testifies before the Senate investigators tomorrow.

General, would it surprise you to know that the Secretary of State in fact opposed your recall vigorously in discussions at the highest level?

General MACARTHUR. Senator, I have made it a rule never to try to answer newspaper charges.

Senator FULBRIGHT. It is all right.

General MACARTHUR. In this particular case, I want to say I have never met the Secretary of State. I have never attributed to him in the slightest degree the decision of the President to replace me. I haven't the faintest idea of whether he had any part or whether he did not have any part. As I say, I have no personal acquaintance with him whatsoever. As far as this statement is concerned, it has absolutely no basis of fact.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Thank you very much, General.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Cain.

RECOMMENDATION OF GENERAL RIDGWAY

Senator CAIN. General MacArthur, all of us are deeply concerned about matters of policy here at home, but we are very mindful of the great responsibilities which have been imposed upon your successor, Gen. Matthew Ridgway, in the Far East. We Americans at home wish to help General Ridgway in every possible manner.

Would you care to reflect on General Ridgway's capacity as your successor? And, General MacArthur, I ask this question because I take for granted that General Ridgway was ordered to Korea with your concurrence.

General MACARTHUR. General Ridgway was my selection and recommendation as the commander of the Eighth Army after the unfortunate death of that very magnificent soldier, General Walker.

I have known General Ridgway for 30 years. I don't think you could have made a more admirable selection in the Far East than General Ridgway. I hold him in the highest esteem, not only as a soldier but as a cultured gentleman and one of the most magnificent characters I have ever been acquainted with.

Senator CAIN. General MacArthur, I think I ought to say this off the record.

(A discussion was had off the record.)

Senator CAIN. General MacArthur, some of my colleagues in the Senate appear in days gone by to have been in doubt about your military relationship with General Ridgway, who succeeded General Walker, as you have stated, as Eighth Army commander.

It is my understanding that from the moment General Ridgway reported to Korea until you turned over your several commands to him, General Ridgway took his orders and directives from you as supreme commander and from you alone.

Is that understanding of mine, sir, correct?

General MACARTHUR. That is absolutely correct, and I don't know how there could have been any more complete cooperation, devotion, and loyalty both ways than between General Ridgway and myself.

Senator CAIN. Thank you, sir.

CHANNEL OF COMMAND

General MacArthur, did I understand you correctly on yesterday to have stated that your chain of command was through the Chief of Staff of the Department of the Army to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the Secretary of Defense, to the American Commander in Chief, the President of the United States?

General MACARTHUR. I believe that is entirely correct. I can absolutely state that my channel of command was through the Army Chief of Staff to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Senator CAIN. Yes, sir.

General MACARTHUR. From there up I believe you are correct, but I would not be able to state it of my own knowledge.

Senator CAIN. Permit me to ask you a similar question. I have in mind the reference you made yesterday to the Joint Chiefs of Staff study which was available for reaction last January and to which you addressed yourself on yesterday.

I know, sir, that the Joint Chiefs of Staff are the principal military advisers to the President, to the National Security Council, and to the Secretary of Defense.

Do you happen to know if the JCS reports directly to the President and to the National Security Council or does the JCS only report to those two principals through the Secretary of Defense?

General MACARTHUR. I could not tell you. I do not know.

PRIMARY MISSION IN KOREA

Senator CAIN. If you would not mind, General MacArthur, I would like to clear my own mind on what your mission in Korea was from the day you entered Korea last June—1950.

I notice from some statements offered in the Congressional Record of April 13 that a reference was made to a statement made by the President of the United States on October 10, 1950, in which the President said with reference to your mission in Korea:

His mission—

referring to General MacArthur—

has been to repel aggression and to restore international peace and security in the area as called for by the United Nations. He—

General MacArthur—

is carrying out his mission with the imagination, the courage, and the effectiveness which have marked his entire service as one of our greatest military leaders.

General MacArthur, on October 6 Ambassador Warren R. Austin in addressing the General Assembly of the United Nations said this:

In June and July of this year—

referring to 1950—

the Security Council of the United Nations gave all the necessary military authority to the United Nations commander to repel the aggressor army and restore peace in Korea.

I understood you, sir, on yesterday to have said that your mission in Korea was to clear Korea of the enemy—get that enemy out of Korea—and to make of Korea a free, united, and self-controlled nation.

Did I understand you correctly on yesterday, sir.

General MACARTHUR. That is correct. That is the initial resolution that the Security Council passed and the General Assembly confirmed early in October.

Senator CAIN. General MacArthur, may I ask you, sir, if the mission which was given to you by the United Nations and by the United States and by 53 nations of the United Nations, of which the United States is but a single member of the 53, has ever been changed by higher authority?

General MACARTHUR. No, sir. The only change that has been made was the directive of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that my primary mission involved the preservation of my forces and the security of Japan. That was, of course, determinative on the tactical dispositions I would take with reference to my command.

Senator CAIN. I see, sir. Permit me to ask this. I refer to this stated mission, which you have made very clear, which the Ambassador made clear, which the President of the United States made clear, and

which 53 members of the United Nations made clear. If that stated mission has not been changed by those in higher authority, how, sir, are we to reconcile the purpose of that mission, which was to free, clear Korea of the enemy and to repel the aggressor, with the restrictions which prevented your command and now the command of General Ridgway from carrying out that mission?

This is a question which the American people are in the process of determining for themselves, but I ask you: How do we reconcile these apparent contradictions?

General MACARTHUR. I tried to reconcile them in my recommendations and the recommendations of the Joints Chiefs of Staff of January 12, which I read, would have corrected them.

CONTRIBUTIONS OF UN MEMBERS IN KOREA

Senator CAIN. General, I have understood you to believe very deeply—as, parenthetically, I believe, sir—that the Chinese Reds and the North Koreans must be opposed by the collective power of all of the free nations and not by an inadequate attack by a handful of nations who are presently waging the war on the Allied side in Korea.

My question: Have you any observation to make as to why, without prejudice of any kind, our Allied friends throughout the world have been so very reluctant in the last 10 months to take part in the Korean conflict? Do you know what steps, if any, are being taken to substantially increase the Allied forces and contributions in Korea?

General MACARTHUR. I will say, Senator, I think it was one of the greatest mistakes that the various members of the United Nations have ever made in not fully supporting the effort in Korea.

Why they did not I cannot understand. It was against their own interest, I am sure. As far as I know, no material effort is being made to increase the strength of our forces there.

RELATIVE STRENGTH AS A DETERMINANT IN RUSSIA'S DECISION TO ATTACK

Senator CAIN. General MacArthur, a few minutes ago I understood that you and the Senator from Arkansas, Mr. Fulbright, were in substantial agreement that one of the major factors which will determine whether Russia decides to attack the United States at some time in the future will be Russia's relative strength as compared with that of the United States.

From that premise, unless we want to decrease the chances of Russia deciding to attack us at some future time, should we not bend every immediate effort to conclude successfully the Korean conflict? For as long as it continues, does it not necessarily follow that Russia's strength is increasing while the strength of the United States and some of our free allies is going down on a daily basis?

General MACARTHUR. Yes, sir. You stated much more eloquently than I could the concept I have.

STATEMENTS OF GENERAL MAC ARTHUR AND REPRESENTATIVE GROSS ON MARCH 7

Senator CAIN. On Wednesday, March 7, you made a public statement in Korea on which the Senator from Washington reflected briefly in the Senate. I read only two sentences.

On Wednesday, March 7, General MacArthur was moved again to speak of the future.

I was referring through that word "future" to a comparable comment you had made three and a half months before when you raised questions identical with those you raised on March 7.

General MacArthur said in language we can all understand that this accordion war of our can go on practically forever without reaching a decision.

On the same day, March 7, at Lake Success America's representative on the Sanctions Committee, Mr. Ernest Gross, gave an interview to the New York Times in which he said a good many things. I would like to quote just several sentences and ask your opinion on it, sir. This article said this:

"The plan to contribute new efforts to increase contributions of United Nations members to the International Army in Korea," Mr. Gross declared "was made before General MacArthur's warning today of an indefinite stalemate."

The last paragraph of the interview, sir, says this:

"The United States Delegation"—

referring to Mr. Gross—

"shied away from further comment on General MacArthur's statement, except to say that the United Nations commander was not making recommendations but giving an analysis. Any recommendations from the unified command to the United Nations" he declared, "would be made by the United States Government itself."

My first question against that interview, sir, is this: Do you consider that in months gone by you have submitted analyses of the situation to your superiors at home or have you made recommendations to those at home who were in a position to take affirmative action on them if they decided so to do?

General MACARTHUR. Both.

Senator CAIN. You not only gave an estimate of the situation from time to time, but from time to time you made positive recommendations to those in higher authority?

General MACARTHUR. Absolutely. I was in daily contact with Washington. I made a daily report—when I was in command—not only a radio report, but a telecon every day. There isn't anything that occurred that wasn't only reported but discussed and approved.

The final authorities in all decisions except minor ones that were within the scope of my tactical authority were submitted to Washington.

Senator CAIN. Permit me to ask this question, General MacArthur, against the last sentence credited to Mr. Gross:

"Any recommendations from the unified command to the United Nations," he declared, "would be made by the United States Government itself."

General MACARTHUR. That is correct. The United States Government by the initial agreement was the agent for the United Nations and I operated completely and absolutely under the control of our military high command here.

DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN UNITED NATIONS AND UNITED STATES DECISIONS

Senator CAIN. For a good many long and dreary and very sad weeks some of us in the Congress were of the opinion that we had to look to the United Nations for decisions that would resolve in any firm way the conflict in Korea.

Speaking for myself, it was on March 15 that I read Mr. Gross' comments after which I began to look to my own Government, the United States of America.

I think you have said, sir, in support of what Mr. Gross said, that decisions affecting the progress of the war in Korea are not made by the United Nations but are made completely by the United States of America acting as an authoritative agent for the United Nations.

General MACARTHUR. There is no question as far as the military campaign is concerned, that is correct.

Senator CAIN. Well, I have labored this point a bit, but if as a result every American citizen learns to understand that the problem of decision lies within our own country and not at Lake Success, I think they not only will be properly advised but we may be in a position to reach decisions of some character more rapidly.

General MACARTHUR. The control of the operations, the military operations in Korea, are completely under our own Military Establishment.

Senator CAIN. You would have enjoyed many of the debates in recent months on this subject during which well-intentioned gentlemen of the Congress of both Houses, as I recall, would rise and say: "Such questions as are being raised are being given due consideration by the United Nations and we look to them with great hope and expectation, but the fact in the case is that with reference to the military operation, we must look to our own instruments of Government here in America."

General MACARTHUR. Exactly.

GENERAL MAC ARTHUR'S DEPARTURE FROM JAPAN

Senator CAIN. General MacArthur, it is my impression, sir, that you did not address or bid farewell to your troops or to the Japanese people, your friends, before leaving the Far East. I do not know this to be so, but should you care to tell me that it is so, would you give me your reasons as to why you thought it proper to do something which I as a lay person would think very unusual? Should you provide me with the facts of the case, I will be better qualified to respond to some of my friends in Korea who have written to me in recent weeks and said: "The General must have been busy or preoccupied, but we had no word from a man for whom we had fought and done our best for a good many long months."

Senator GREEN. Will the Senator yield for a question there?

Senator CAIN. No, sir. I am sorry.

Senator GREEN. May I ask the Senator a question?

Senator CAIN. I would prefer, may I say—

Senator GREEN. I believe the question and answer were misleading, and I would like to draw attention that it be corrected if they are not.

Senator CAIN. I will prefer if my colleague will permit me just to let the general answer the question, and then if I have misstated the case, I shall certainly apologize first and submit to any correction.

Senator GREEN. There wasn't any intention of misstatement by anyone.

Senator CAIN. I thank the Senator.

General MACARTHUR. It was a matter of great grief and regret to me that I did not regard it as appropriate to address the command which I no longer possessed. The order of my relief was a summary one.

I do not challenge it in the slightest degree directly or indirectly. It was the judgment of one individual. The final judgment will be made by public opinion and the historical future, but the order actually relieved me of the command upon receipt.

I was no longer in command, and I did not think it was appropriate for me to encroach in any way upon the prerogatives of the commander in chief at that time, who was General Ridgway. It is a matter of the greatest regret that I couldn't express the thanks and the gratitude for the loyalty and bravery and determination with which that command supported me.

Senator CAIN. I think you said on yesterday——

General MACARTHUR. I can say almost the same of the Japanese people. I think both of them realize that it was not a failure on my part, a voluntary failure on my part, but what was forced upon me by the circumstances that existed.

Senator CAIN. I appreciate your answer, sir. I think that those in far places around this world are entitled to know the circumstances which made it, from your point of view, inappropriate to bid them farewell after a close association of blood and friendship over quite a long time.

On yesterday, General MacArthur, if I am not mistaken you said that your successor, General Ridgway, was, as of the time you received the order relieving you from your duties, some three or four hundred miles away.

General MACARTHUR. At that time General Ridgway was at the front. He was superintending personally the projected attack upon the enemy center at Chorwon.

Upon receipt of the message I directed the Chief of Staff to phone him at once that he was in command, and I turned over to the Chief of Staff the functions of my command until General Ridgway could come over.

Senator CAIN. General MacArthur, you felt it was inappropriate to address a message to the Japanese people or to your troops. I am only a layman and I accept your version of its inappropriateness. It seems in terms of logic to me that if you receive an order which was to take effect on receipt of that order by you, that as of the minute you read that order you no longer were in a position, even though you might have strongly desired, as you did, to address any remarks except of an informal character to people over whom you no longer had the power of command. Is that correct, sir?

General MACARTHUR. I would not have thought of doing it without obtaining the permission of General Ridgway.

Senator CAIN. General MacArthur——

General MACARTHUR. I left Japan, Senator, just as rapidly as I could. I left within 4 days.

Senator CAIN. In our effort, sir, to get at the truth of all these considerations we ask questions which might be construed to be prying, but they are only offered to help us.

I do not know that the Secretary of the Army was a guest of yours or at least he was in your command post shortly before you were relieved. May I ask if the Secretary of the Army gave you reason to believe that within the course of the next few hours you were to be relieved of all your commands?

General MACARTHUR. I do not think Secretary Pace knew anything about it. Every impression I had was that it was as great a surprise to him as it was to me.

Senator CAIN. I have but several more questions, with your continued indulgence, General, which I appreciate very much.

General MACARTHUR. Yes, sir.

SHOULD ARMED FORCES BE SENT TO THE MAINLAND OF CHINA

Senator CAIN. A great many of us are uninformed on many subjects and, therefore, in our business we say things that are not always predicated on facts.

One of my colleagues not very long ago offered a statement, I take for granted, in good faith, which I hold to be incorrect. I would like to offer it now to you in order that should you care so to do you would make any comment to it so it coincides with each other in the record.

This gentleman said under date of April 11—which reminds me, sir—what was the date when you addressed the joint session of the Congress?

General MACARTHUR. I think it was the 18th, Senator.

Senator CAIN. If it was the 18th, this comment was made a week before, and you would have had an opportunity to speak for yourself.

The comment is as follows:

Even if we are suffering, as the Senator says, 90 percent of the casualties in Korea, it is still a limited engagement, and we are in a far better position in Korea to meet the added force of Red China—with the Allied Powers who are with us there—than we would be in if we had to continue with what we are doing in Korea, and at the same time commit the monumental folly, which MacArthur has said is necessary, of sending an independent additional armed force from this country to the mainland of China.

General MACARTHUR. I don't know who made it, Senator, but it has not the slightest foundation of fact, and I repudiate it completely.

Senator CAIN. General MacArthur, Morgan Beatty of the National Broadcasting Co. said in a recent hook-up that on the 26th day of last June, General MacArthur himself made the following statement to Ambassador Dulles and to accredited news reporters:

Anybody who commits the land power of the United States on the continent of Asia ought to have his head examined.

May I inquire if you recall having made such a statement to Ambassador Dulles?

General MACARTHUR. I don't know whether I made the statement, but I confirm absolutely the sentiments involved.

Senator CAIN. This reference to Morgan Beatty was made by a colleague of mine, who thought that you, General MacArthur, had made that statement to Beatty on June 26, and at a later date had said something different.

The Senator to whom I refer went on to say that, with reference to the Beatty statement:

I say that I not only agree with that, but I believe that any man in a responsible position in our military forces who would do that, which would amount to committing our land forces against Red China on the mainland of China, not only ought to have his physical head examined, but ought to have his official head cut off.

May I inquire if, in your opinion, there is any legitimate reference to any attitude of yours, or any kind, character or description, in that

comment made on the 11th day of April, on the floor of the United States Senate?

General MACARTHUR. None whatsoever; and the other comments—all I can say as to them—"Amen."

CONDUCT OF KOREAN CAMPAIGN

Senator CAIN. One last reference, sir, to a well-intentioned comment from a colleague of mine, which I personally hold to be not in accordance with the facts, and I seek now to have the American people get the General's best views, in his own words, so they can make up their own minds.

This Senator went on to say this:

I am endeavoring to answer the Senator's question.

I may refer to General MacArthur's lack of coordination of command. I do not pose—

said this Senator friend of mine—

as a military expert. I gained only the rank of a second lieutenant in World War I, and I managed to hold on to it for the duration; but I learned enough to know that any time a general loses contact with his forces, or any time he permits them to become hopelessly split, without liaison, and without intelligence, in an area where he does not know where the enemy is, or what the enemy is going to do, and acts on any such basis, he is liable to have the terrible thing happen to him that happened to magnificent MacArthur.

General MACARTHUR. Senator, that is a lot of poppycock.

Senator CAIN. I thank you, General.

General MACARTHUR. I would agree that any general that did that, should suffer the result; but that is just about the complete antithesis of the campaign in Korea.

Senator CAIN. Well, General MacArthur, these comments were made a week before you came home to say anything on the subject, and I think, and I will agree, that many a man can unintentionally make vast mistakes, when he has not bothered to raise a question concerning facts, with those whom we have a right to presume know what they are talking about.

General MACARTHUR. Senator, it is pretty easy to make comments on things that are 10,000 miles away, and about people who haven't the slightest information of what is going on.

Senator CAIN. I thank the general.

General MACARTHUR. It is more difficult to make mistakes of that sort, about things that are closer to us; but over there, I wasn't even aware that these comments had been made, until you read them.

Senator CAIN. I thought you were entitled to know what was being said by different sources in America.

THE SORJE SPY CASE

I have before me two brief questions which have been submitted by a friend of mine. He asked me to ask them just as he has written them.

General MacArthur, would you care to give us information on any Government employees involved in the Sorje spy case?

General MACARTHUR. I know little about the so-called Sorje spy case. It was a study that was made by my Intelligence Service, and forwarded direct to the Central Intelligence Agency here.

I would not be able to give you any information whatsoever about it. I have not even read the reports, much less authenticated them.

Senator CAIN. If the committee is interested in determining the facts in that case, the report to which you made reference is presumably in the custody of the Central Intelligence Agency?

General MACARTHUR. If you want to know about the Sorje spy case, get it from General Willoughby. He is the Chief of Intelligence, G-2, of the Far East Forces. The entire case was worked up under his control. He knows intimately every detail. I am sure he would be delighted to give you the full facts.

Chairman RUSSELL. I had not heard of that case.

Would you mind making a brief statement as to what it is?

Senator CAIN. No, sir. I am not here to probe into the background of questions, other than my own, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. I was not undertaking to do so; but I thought it might be of interest to the committee, if you or the general would care to make a brief statement on it.

Senator CAIN. I was going to say, that I take it for granted that the Senator who had me ask the question would, as well as any other Senators who are interested, write for the information and have it made available to them, individually, through General Willoughby.

General MACARTHUR. General Willoughby has the complete file, all documented. I have never had time to read it, myself, but he is just full of it.

Senator CAIN. The second question this Senator asked me to offer to you, sir, is this:

General MacArthur, would you care to comment on the influence which Service, Lattimore, Vincent, and other State Department advisers had in shaping our disastrous policies in Asia?

General MACARTHUR. I would have no comment on that matter.

Senator CAIN. General MacArthur, may I express my deep appreciation for the fullness of your answers, and for your indulgence in taking the time to answer them.

Senator GREEN. Would the Senator yield now for one question that I thought might fit in here?

Senator CAIN. If I am permitted to do so, sir.

THE UNITED STATES AS THE UNITED NATIONS AGENT IN COMMAND OF MILITARY OPERATIONS

Senator GREEN. You asked General MacArthur as to the United States being the agent of the United Nations.

Senator CAIN. I did, at one point in my interrogation.

Senator GREEN. And his answer was that the United Nations appointed the United States its agent, and you thereupon drew the deduction that your colleagues of the Senate had no right to refer to discussion in the United Nations about Korean matters, because they had been turned over to the United States; and I would like to ask the general whether the United Nations was thereby prevented from giving instructions or directions as to the actions in Korea? Could not the United Nations give—

General MACARTHUR. What their relationship might be, and what influence they might have with the Washington authorities is something that I have no knowledge of, Governor.

Senator GREEN. But so far as you know, had not the United Nations given instructions to its agent, the United States?

General MACARTHUR. As far as the military operations are concerned, it was my understanding that the United Nations had turned over full and complete authority to direct the military campaign to our military authorities.

Senator GREEN. But my question is: Couldn't it modify those instructions, if it saw fit to, at a later date?

General MACARTHUR. I couldn't tell you that. I assume so.

Senator GREEN. Well, we can't take for granted then that it is a possible credit to it.

Senator CAIN. Senator Green, would you permit me to say, because I raised the question—

Senator GREEN. I am just trying to clear this matter up. I am interested in finding out what the facts are.

Senator CAIN. Well, my purpose in raising the question was to determine where we could look for military decisions in Korea.

We know that no military decisions outside of the basic authority has ever, at least to my knowledge, been made by the United Nations since June or July of 1950.

On the basis of what the general has given as his best opinion, on the basis of what Mr. Gross, our official delegate of the Sanctions Committee in the United Nations has said, I think it is a fair statement of reasonable fact. I will stand to be corrected, that we must look to those witnesses who are coming up here in the next few days for advice on decisions and how they are to be reached with reference to Korea.

General MACARTHUR. It was my understanding that the military operations in Korea were being handled completely and absolutely by our Joint Chiefs of Staff under the controls that exist of the American Government over them.

All of my military orders and directives emanated from the Joint Chiefs of Staff and no other source.

Senator CAIN. Yes, sir. I think the date was the 11th of April 1951 when our Chief Executive in a radio message to the people of the United States and to those of the world who listened to it, told all his listeners what was going to be done in Korea on the sole authority and responsibility of decisions reached by the executive branch of our Government.

Senator GREEN. It is very true that such has been the case and is the case now. The question is whether the United Nations couldn't modify the instructions given its agent.

Senator CAIN. Well, I would be all for that, sir. I would only hope they would make some decisions.

Chairman RUSSELL. Are you through, Senator Cain?

Senator CAIN. I am indeed, and I thank you, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Gillette.

CLARIFICATION OF COMMITTEE'S PURPOSE

Senator GILLETTE. General MacArthur, I was very much interested listening to the colloquy that you just had with Senator Cain in which, if I understood it correctly, you made the statement that you did not question in the slightest degree the right of the President to recall you, the President as Commander in Chief.

General MACARTHUR. That is entirely correct, Senator.

Senator GILLETTE. Also you stated, I believe, that you were not consciously aware of any insubordination or any failure to carry out orders that would justify such an action.

General MACARTHUR. Completely.

Senator GILLETTE. And you further stated, if I understood you correctly, that the decision would be made at the bar of public opinion.

General MACARTHUR. The ultimate decision, I think so.

Senator GILLETTE. Before I comment further on that, may I say, General, that this is not a question of personalities so far as this body here is concerned.

The American people, as you know, are tremendously concerned, tremendously confused, tremendously exercised, tremendously wrought up and tremendously worried over a situation in which we find ourselves involved, a situation in which many of the people feel that we should not have been involved.

They are questioning why there was a reversal of American arms and who is responsible.

You will recall as a culmination of a number of events which has left our people confused, bewildered and agitated. As I understand the purpose of this group, it is to try to develop a basis of fact that we can make available through the proper channels to the American people so that they can make the decision to which you refer.

Then, sir, this statement you made was made a little while ago:

I have been here 2 days and heard no proposal to end the war from anyone here other than the proposal that was made and embodied in the four basic proposals that we had been discussing.

You made that statement?

General MACARTHUR. Correct.

Senator GILLETTE. You were not laboring under the delusion that the purpose of this group is to present a program or policy or that it has any such authority to do it, are you?

General MACARTHUR. Senator, I don't take unto myself to interpret anything that such a distinguished body as this does.

Senator GILLETTE. When I say, General—

General MACARTHUR. You determine what you do yourself.

Senator GILLETTE. When I say our purpose—as one member, and a very junior member and, in fact, the most junior member—as I understand it, is to try to develop a factual picture for presentation to the public, and that that is our function. You are not prepared to disagree with that?

General MACARTHUR. Not at all.

Senator GILLETTE. Now, in that connection, General, you stated yesterday, and again today, "I appear today not as a voluntary witness at all."

For fear that this statement might be misconstrued to your disadvantage and be construed that your appearance here was a compulsory appearance, you did not intend that construction, did you, when you made that statement?

General MACARTHUR. No, Senator. What I meant, not being a voluntary witness, that I had not suggested to the committee that I be permitted to appear to give my preconceived ideas.

Senator GILLETTE. I was sure that was it.

General MACARTHUR. I was invited with the greatest courtesy and consideration by the chairman, and I accepted my appearance here with a sense of the greatest distinction.

Senator GILLETTE. I was sure that was the meaning you intended to convey.

General MACARTHUR. I regarded it as an honor to be permitted to do it.

Senator GILLETTE. I did not want the record to carry the implication that you were here by compulsion; you merely wished to convey that you had not initiated the action by request to come and appear here.

General MACARTHUR. Exactly, Senator.

PROCESSING OF MILITARY REPORTS

Senator GILLETTE. Now, there are a couple of questions I want to ask you and, believe me, General, I do not want to add to the burden of the long strain of the hours that you have been subjected to interrogation here, but there are two or three matters that, I believe, should be clarified, at least for my own thinking.

On page 26 of the hearing yesterday, you used this language—

Even the reports which were normally made by me to the United Nations were subject to censorship by our State and Defense Departments.

Did you mean to convey, General, that they did anything improper in censoring or changing your reports?

General MACARTHUR. I did not attribute any such sinister purpose to them, Senator. I merely tell you the facts, that I was directed to make reports bimonthly, and it was directed that those reports should be submitted to the State and Defense Departments for such suggested changes as they desired to make.

Senator GILLETTE. Yes. You made your reports to them?

General MACARTHUR. A number of those reports; I made the reports, yes.

Senator GILLETTE. And not to the United Nations?

General MACARTHUR. I made the reports; they were to go to the United Nations ultimately, but they were submitted to the Defense and State Departments; numbers of the suggestions they made of change, I accepted. There was the case that I spoke of in which they made suggestions of the introduction of what I thought was political slanting, and I objected, and the State Department, as I understand it, took the matter up with the Defense Department. They objected to my attitude in the thing. The Defense Department supported my attitude, and said that they desired that the integrity of my military reports should be maintained.

Senator GILLETTE. Should be preserved?

General MACARTHUR. Should be preserved.

Senator GILLETTE. The Security Council resolution of the United Nations, July 7, among other things, states as follows: They recommended—

that all members providing military forces and other assistance pursuant to aforesaid Security Council resolution make such forces and other assistance available to a unified command under the United States; request the United States to designate the commander of such forces; authorize the unified commander at his discretion to use the United Nations flag; and request the United

States to provide the Security Council with reports on the course of action taken under the unified command.

That very explicitly provides that the reports to the United Nations must be made by the United States and not by the commander in the field. Is that not true?

General MACARTHUR. I was directed, Senator, to make bimonthly reports. I made them in that way.

Senator GILLETTE. The only thing that I wish——

General MACARTHUR. These reports that went to the United Nations were over my signature, my reports.

Senator GILLETTE. The only point that I have in mind, General, is the criticism, if you intended it as criticism, that your reports had been doctored or changed, when the provision under which we are acting requires that the United States make the reports to the United Nations and not any commander in the field, or the commander of the unified forces.

General MACARTHUR. The United States Government, of course.

Senator GILLETTE. Makes the report.

General MACARTHUR. They could have made any report that it desired.

Senator GILLETTE. And they could base them on your reports.

General MACARTHUR. But directed me to compose the reports.

Senator GILLETTE. They could base it on your report to them. They could delete any of it, or they could make any additions.

General MACARTHUR. They couldn't over my signature, though, sir.

Senator GILLETTE. Oh, no.

General MACARTHUR. And the reports that were submitted to the United Nations were over my signature.

Senator GILLETTE. They were actually made over your signature?

General MACARTHUR. The United States in the fulfillment of this resolution or directive directed me to make these reports. That was the responsibility that was reposed upon me.

Now, the reports that I made had to be submitted to these two departments. They could have submitted my reports with any comments that they did not agree with this part, or did not agree with that part. They could have done anything they wanted. But the thing that I objected to was that they would submit a report over my name which I did not agree to.

Senator GILLETTE. I think——

General MACARTHUR. I accepted most of their recommendations.

Senator GILLETTE. I think you are wholly justified in that position.

General MACARTHUR. But when it reached a stage where it was violative of my conscientious belief as to the integrity of what I said, I insisted that it should be done otherwise.

Now, there was no question that the United States could make any reports they wished, and on any report I made they could have made any comment. They could have said, "This is a foolish report," or "We don't believe in this, that, or the other thing." But the method that they used was to change the report over my signature. Now, when I could agree to that, there was no objection, and I did in a majority of the cases. But when it became a question on which I did not agree, as I understand it, the State Department protested that to the Defense Department, and the Defense Department supported me—that as long as the reports, as I had been charged with

making those reports, that the integrity of the report should be preserved.

THE WAKE ISLAND MEMORANDUM

Senator GILLETTE. I am in full agreement with that statement, and I think it is a very fair one.

Now, I want to refer to this so-called compilation of reports and notes and various other sources that purports to be the substance of statements made at the Wake Island conference on October 15, 1950. And in the letter of submittal to us—to our honorable presiding officer here—

Chairman RUSSELL. I received it as a servant of the committee, so you are correct in stating “to us.”

Senator GILLETTE. I also insist I am correct when saying our honorable presiding officer. I insist on that.

In this letter of submittal the statement was made—

Five copies of this report were forwarded to General MacArthur on the 19th of October, and a receipt for them signed by General MacArthur's aides on October 28.

If I understood you, General, yesterday, you said in effect, if not in words, that you had never read this purported compilation and knew very little about it, excepting the facts that had been called to your attention here. Is that correct?

General MACARTHUR. That is correct, sir.

Senator GILLETTE. Again I am compelled to advert to newspaper reports, which you dislike and which I dislike. But I read with some interest yesterday morning what purported to be a comment made by your aide, General Whitney, with reference to this matter.

He was quoted as saying that these copies had been received but they were probably consigned to the wastebasket; that they were not interested in Tokyo in matters of this kind.

You were also quoted in the same article as saying they would have as little interest as the report on the Battle of Bunker Hill.

Would you care to comment on that?

General MACARTHUR. Senator, the comment that the report had little bearing, and its comparison to the report on Bunker Hill was with reference to the release of the report here, which had taken place in the last 72 hours. It had no reference to the receipt of this report in Tokyo. I did not need to read the report; I was present at the conference. I knew completely what had occurred there.

What happened to the five reports that reached my headquarters, I don't know. I suppose they went into the normal files.

Senator GILLETTE. You know nothing about that?

General MACARTHUR. I am quite sure that if they were receipted for by a member of my staff that they went into the normal files.

Senator GILLETTE. And a reputed report of the conversation and a conference between the President of the United States and you and other high officials would have no interest to you at all?

General MACARTHUR. I didn't say that, Senator.

Senator GILLETTE. Well, it had so little interest—

General MACARTHUR. I said I need not read it in order to be fully acquainted with what had occurred.

Senator GILLETTE. And you don't know what became of it?

General MACARTHUR. I am sure they must be in the files in Tokyo now.

Senator GILLETTE. But you did not read it at that time?

General MACARTHUR. I did not, sir. Moreover, I want to repeat that the report, as I understood it, was merely the compilation of the recollections of certain of the participants at the conference. I was informed by Mr. Ross, who was the publicity man of the White House at that time, that there would be no stenographic reports taken of the conference.

When the conference was concluded there was communique made, which was submitted to the President, and he approved it and I initialed it, after reading it, which purported to give out what had occurred at the conference.

Now, I have understood in the last 72 hours that there was some surreptitious eavesdropping, stenographic eavesdropping, taken of that conference. I don't know who ordered it, and I don't know anything about it. But when I received the reports in Tokyo, I was under the impression that was merely the notes that may have been taken and the recollections of those who were engaged in the conference. My own recollection was all I needed in the matter.

Senator GILLETTE. Well, the fact that you evinced no interest in it at that time when this compilation was received was not in any way based on the knowledge that you since said you learned in the last 72 hours?

General MACARTHUR. Not in the slightest.

Senator GILLETTE. Not in the slightest?

General MACARTHUR. No.

Senator GILLETTE. Now, General MacArthur—

General MACARTHUR. You have quoted General Whitney—

Senator GILLETTE. I quoted what the newspaper said.

General MACARTHUR. What was in the paper; yes.

General Whitney has asked me to state, Senator, that he said nothing whatsoever about any wastebasket. He said distinctly, as he recalls, that these reports had gone to our files in the normal administrative process.

Senator GILLETTE. I thank you.

Now, I want to—

General MACARTHUR. Now, the comment was made about Bunker Hill and the release of this report, supposed to be top secret, 6 months after it occurred, when the issues were no longer in the slightest degree involved in the great questions that are being decided here. That is what caused the comment that they were about as antiquated as a report would have been upon the Battle of Bunker Hill.

Why that report was released at this time, why it was kept secret for 6 months, why it was suddenly sprung, are matters for your judgment, not mine.

Senator GILLETTE. Well, they are matters that we hope to inquire into, on which we can base our judgment.

General MACARTHUR. Right, Senator.

RED CHINESE INTERVENTION AND POLITICAL OBJECTIVES

Senator GILLETTE. I want to ask you about a matter that I feel personally is the crux of this whole discussion.

In your very outstanding speech made to the joint session of Congress you stated, speaking of the time that we had progressed to the highest point in North Korea that—

Our victory was complete and our objectives within reach when Red China intervened with numerically superior ground forces. This created a new war and an entirely new situation, a situation not contemplated when our forces were committed against the North Korean invaders, a situation which called for new decisions in the diplomatic sphere to permit the realistic adjustment of military strategy. Such decisions have not been forthcoming.

Is that correct?

General MACARTHUR. That is what I would say. There has been no change in the normal basic resolution which the United Nations passed which gave as our mission the liberation, unification of all Korea. The United Nations has not acted to change that mission which was dictated entirely when the North Korean was the only enemy. Since a new country, a new great military force, was thrown in against us, there has been no change in the basic diplomatic political decisions that have reached the command in the Far East. Those I have constantly asked for.

The tactical control of the troops has been modified by our Joint Chiefs of Staff by the limitation that the basic concept that the commander in chief should exercise was the security of his forces and the realization that our main objective there was the protection of Japan.

Senator GILLETTE. I believe I made the note yesterday when you made the statement with reference to your implementation of the policy, as you then understood it in your capacity as the commander of the military arm, was threefold (1) Security of our forces, (2) security of Japan, (3) suppression of aggression in Korea.

General MACARTHUR. That is correct.

Senator GILLETTE. That was the mission. And so far as you have been advised in enunciation of policy to you as commander of the military arm, a policy for implementation, there has been no change?

General MACARTHUR. That is correct.

POSITION OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Senator GILLETTE. Up to the time of your recall from command.

Now, you referred to these four propositions. I am not going to take the time to read them, they are in the record a number of times; but I am quoting again from your speech:

While no man in his right mind would advocate sending our Ground Forces into continental China, and such was never given a thought, the new situation did urgently demand a drastic revision of strategic planning if our political aim was to defeat this new enemy as we had defeated the old. Apart from this military need, as I saw it, to neutralize the sanctuary, protection given to the enemy north of the Yalu, I felt that military necessity in the conduct of the war made these four things, and then these four propositions were enunciated—and again I quote:

It is my understanding that from a military standpoint the above views have been fully shared in the past by practically every military leader concerned with the Korean campaign included our Joint Chiefs of Staff.

General MACARTHUR. Correct.

Senator GILLETTE. Now, in referring to these yesterday, you referred to a memorandum and read from a memorandum that I under-

stood had emanated from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to you. It sets forth in almost identical language these four objectives. Is that correct?

General MACARTHUR. The study from which I read was the report of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense, a copy of which was furnished me for my information.

Senator GILLETTE. And what did you understand it to be?

General MACARTHUR. I understood it to be the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense.

Senator GILLETTE. It has never been effectuated by any order?

General MACARTHUR. No, sir.

Senator GILLETTE. Up to the time of your recall.

General MACARTHUR. No, sir.

Senator GILLETTE. In your speech, though, to the Congress you said:

This represented my decision.

Now, was it your decision that you made available to the Joint Chiefs of Staff or was it a memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff of their policy that they made available to you?

General MACARTHUR. I recommended to the Joint Chiefs of Staff about 10 days before they made their recommendations to the Secretary of Defense which embodied all these views. Later the Joint Chiefs of Staff made this recommendation to the Secretary of Defense.

Senator GILLETTE. Using your language substantially.

General MACARTHUR. I wouldn't say "using my language."

Senator GILLETTE. Substantially?

General MACARTHUR. But substantially the same idea embodied those.

Senator GILLETTE. Well, then, it is your contention now as you stated in this speech to the Congress, that:

I felt that military necessity in the conduct of war made necessary these four things—

and that you, as an implementing commander, set them out as your policy and made them available to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

General MACARTHUR. Not the slightest, Senator. You completely misinterpret the facts.

Senator GILLETTE. Oh, I hope I do.

General MACARTHUR. I made certain recommendations to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Joint Chiefs of Staff made a study and embodied that study in their recommendations to the Secretary of Defense.

They furnished me a copy of their recommendations to the Secretary of Defense which were those that I read to you. What I said in my speech to the Congress was the presentation of my own ideas, and I said that those ideas were practically identical with those of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on January 12 when they made this recommendation to the Secretary of Defense.

Senator GILLETTE. Of course, you did not say that in your speech to the Congress, fixing the date. You said, and I quote:

From a military standpoint these views have been fully shared in the past by practically every military leader, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

General MACARTHUR. That is correct.

Senator GILLETTE. You did not connect it with these memoranda that you received on the 12th of January; is that correct?

General MACARTHUR. I certainly had reference to it when I wrote the speech, that and other conferences that I had and other recommendations and studies that were made.

Senator GILLETTE. Well, General——

General MACARTHUR. I didn't go into the categorical details of giving the January 12th. I did under the questioning of the committee here.

DEFINITION OF VICTORY

Senator GILLETTE. I think it has been sufficiently covered. I am going to ask you four questions as rapidly as I can which are general in their nature, so that the comment can be in the record.

In your speech before the joint meeting of Congress April 19, you said:

War's very object is victory, not prolonged indecision. In war there is no substitute for victory.

I should like you to clarify precisely what you mean by "victory" in the conflict now being waged in Korea; and my question, therefore, has three parts.

A. By "victory," do you mean the defeat of the Chinese Communist armies wherever they may be in Korea, in Manchuria, in China proper; or, by "victory," do you mean what we meant in 1945 by victory over Japan and Germany, the total defeat of Chinese Communist power, military and political, throughout east Asia?

General MACARTHUR. I think I have answered that a number of times, Senator, but I will do so again.

The objective that I referred to by victory was to force the Chinese Communists armies to cease their depredations and attacks in North Korea.

Senator GILLETTE. Yes; I understood that you had——

General MACARTHUR. It had no reference to anything——

Senator GILLETTE (interposing). You stated that several times.

General MACARTHUR (continuing). Else except the application of such force as was necessary to stop that bloody conflict in Korea by the Chinese Communist forces being required to cease their attacks and depredations.

Senator GILLETTE. I think you have stated several times, as you have just mentioned, that your thought was that by the pressures exerted, as you suggested, the Reds might be induced to cease their pressure in North Korea.

Was it something comparable, not in the way it was handled, but in its purpose, to the diversionary attack that was made on Washington in the Civil War by Early in order to relieve the pressure on Richmond? Was that in a general way your purpose?

General MACARTHUR. I would not make any comparison with General Early's attack in the Shenandoah Valley on Washington during the Civil War.

Senator GILLETTE. But it was diversionary.

General MACARTHUR. I repeat, Senator, that everything I have recommended and said and done is for the purpose of liberating Korea, stopping that savage conflict there, and forcing the Red Chinese from continuing their depredations.

There is no further purpose that I have in mind or that the United Nations have in mind, or as they have announced as being in mind,

or that the United States has put forward any concepts that might be read into that statement. That we have any desire to invade China or destroy China or to destroy the Communist armies, as they exist in China, as long as they stay within the proper proprieties of their own borders, is not correct.

IDENTITY OF RUSSIAN AND RED CHINESE INTERESTS

Senator GILLETTE. Now, you have said that the Chinese Communists—and I quote—"interest are at present parallel to those of the Soviet."

Do you believe it would be in the interests of the United States to try to turn Communist China against Soviet Russia rather than to encourage their forming a solid front against us?

General MACARTHUR. I have frequently stated that I would welcome any aid and assist, as far as was in my power, anything that would break up any Communist combine that threatened democratic countries.

Senator GILLETTE. In the event that the steps you propose against China did not lead to victory, but to prolonged warfare between us and Communist China, would you say that such a war would tend to cement Russia and China irrevocably together or to separate them and lead to hostilities between them?

General MACARTHUR. I would not attempt to assay what are the strategic, political, industrial, or commercial concepts, actions and plans of the Soviet, and the Communist Red Chinese Government.

THE NEED OF ALLIES

Senator GILLETTE. Right now, my last question is in reference to your April 19 speech in which you uttered the following truism:

The issues are global and so interlocked that to consider the problem of one sector oblivious to those of another is but to court disaster for the whole.

In the light of that truism, would you favor going ahead on our own in China, even if that brought about the loss of all support from our Atlantic allies, even if that led to the break-up of the Atlantic alliance and our defending our eastern shores; and even if that meant the loss of the right we now have to use the territory of those allies in Europe, North Africa, and the Mediterranean for air and sea bases for our strategic Air Force and naval forces?

General MACARTHUR. Senator, the plan that I propose, I believe, would be followed by the great majority of the United Nations—perhaps by all of them.

I believe that we would not be isolated; I believe all they need was the leadership, which was necessary, and which we supplied in the beginning. I believe that, of everything that you picture there, the reverse would be accomplished by the plan that I propose.

Senator GILLETTE. I certainly pray that that is true, and I want to thank you—

General MACARTHUR. That would be my hope and my expectation.

Senator GILLETTE. I want to thank you as one member of this committee for being so considerate, so generous, and so frank, and apologize for taking your time.

May I say in closing that I referred a moment ago to the vast interest of the American people in what we are trying to do here in bringing the facts to them and, as proof of what I have referred to, may I say that last Thursday I had in my own office 5,000 letters of inquiry relative to the MacArthur recall.

I answered in mimeographed form that we were going to try to develop the facts here.

Yesterday I received twelve; today I received four. So, they are anxiously awaiting the results of the work we are trying to do.

Chairman RUSSELL. My attention was diverted momentarily, and I did not exactly catch the full purport of your statement with respect to the untimeliness of the release of the Wake Island report.

I must assume full responsibility for that. I requested the Department, after I read a newspaper article in the New York Times, to supply me with that full report. I thought that, inasmuch as it had been injected into this controversy, it was the duty of this committee to secure that report. I therefore requested it after I had read the article in the New York Times.

It wasn't requested with any idea of embarrassing anyone or influencing the committee, but in my hope of getting all the facts in this case and to enable us to arrive at a decision based on the facts and on the truth.

General MACARTHUR. My reference wasn't made to the release by the committee, your actions—it was the previous release made.

Chairman RUSSELL. There was a news story on it. I don't know how that occurred.

General MACARTHUR. That is what my comment was addressed to. Chairman RUSSELL. Senator STENNIS.

General MACARTHUR. The fairness and the splendid way in which you handled this discussion—I am glad to take this public opportunity to acknowledge with gratitude.

Chairman RUSSELL. Thank you. My only objective is to be fair and get all the facts.

ECONOMIC BLOCKADE OF CHINA

Senator STENNIS. General MacArthur, reverting for a moment back to the first thing that you mentioned here with reference to your recommendations to the Joint Chiefs of Staff was the economic blockade of China.

General MACARTHUR. That is right.

Senator STENNIS. Do you consider that very important and very vital then and now?

General MACARTHUR. I do indeed, Senator. The lack of industrial capacity of China makes her peculiarly dependent upon the imports that she receives.

Senator STENNIS. I don't mean to repeat now the subject matter, but do you understand that the objection to putting in this blockade came primarily from England? If that is a fair question—you read a list of items yesterday or today that you considered very vital and they were all sent in by England, as I understood.

Now, did you understand that the principal objector to this blockade was England?

General MACARTHUR. I really couldn't tell you, Senator. The list that I read this morning of those things didn't come entirely from England. They came from various countries.

Senator STENNIS. The major part of them were from England; were they not?

General MACARTHUR. I really couldn't tell you that.

Senator STENNIS. Well, anyway, on the 16th day of January—

General MACARTHUR. The only point I made was they all came through Hong Kong, which of course is an English colony.

Senator STENNIS. On the 16th day of January, Senate Resolution No. 37 was introduced in the Senate—has not been acted on yet. It is very brief, and I will read it:

Resolved, That it is the sense of the Senate that the United Nations should immediately take such measures against Communist China under chapter 7 of the Charter of the United Nations as will be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security, including the application by members of the United Nations of measures for complete interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, the severance of diplomatic relations, and operations by air, sea, or land forces of members of the United Nations.

Now, your testimony here really coincides with and approves that resolution; doesn't it?

General MACARTHUR. Yes, sir. I think that would have been a very wise resolution.

ROLE OF ENGLAND IN UN POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Senator STENNIS. Now, General, with reference to this command, you say the United States had complete authority to give all military orders in the name of the United Nations; but, at the same time, that didn't apply to military questions that might also involve political considerations. Did it?

In other words, our Government, as you understood, was conferring all the time with the United Nations on these matters.

General MACARTHUR. That is correct. I was referring to the military operations.

Senator STENNIS. Now, I will ask that question—

General MACARTHUR. In order to clarify any misconception that may have arisen, I think it is a very wise thing. You have got to have a centralized control of military operations. Divided controls means disaster.

Senator STENNIS. But for the failure of these four points that the Joint Chiefs of Staff handed to you in January, based upon your recommendations at least in great part, the failure of those to be carried out now, what was England's position on that, if you know?

General MACARTHUR. As the press reported, she was generally in opposition.

Senator STENNIS. Generally in opposition to the ultimatum to China?

General MACARTHUR. That is correct—so reported in the press.

Senator STENNIS. I have never heard that—you say according to the "press reports." I have never heard that there was any other contention about it; have you?

General MACARTHUR. I don't recall.

Senator STENNIS. Anything to refute those press reports?

General MACARTHUR. There were other nations reported in the press that were opposed to it in addition to England.

ALTERNATIVES IN KOREA

Senator STENNIS. Now, I will try to be brief here. It seems to me that we are just facing a decision here between extending our military forces in Korea along your lines or along some affirmative lines and pulling out of Korea. That is a choice between those two.

Isn't that what it will lead to right away—either extend affirmatively the military forces, according to your plan or some plan, or just withdraw from Korea?

General MACARTHUR. You could evacuate Korea, or you could continue the indecisive campaign, or you could pursue it to a victorious conclusion, which was the proposal I made.

Senator STENNIS. But if we pull out of Korea, that more or less abandons the United Nations and almost causes the collapse of it; is that your idea?

General MACARTHUR. It would be the complete abandonment of the moral status of those nations that had gone in there. It would mean probably the annihilation of Korea, and the Korean Nation.

It would mean that the entire Far East would conclude that they had been abandoned to Communist aggression.

Senator STENNIS. That would be an abandonment of the United Nations, in the east, anyway, in the Pacific.

General MACARTHUR. That would be my interpretation beyond any question.

DEGREE OF CHINESE FORCE IN KOREAN WAR

Senator STENNIS. Now, without wanting to repeat at all, but one thing that concerned me that you have said—your opinion is that China is already using all the force and throwing all in on us that she can now.

Would you elaborate on that some?

General MACARTHUR. I believe that China is maintaining the maximum of military force of which she is capable in the progressing of the Korean campaign.

Senator STENNIS. That she couldn't maintain a foreign army to any further extent than she is now? Did I get the idea correctly?

General MACARTHUR. I believe she is pretty well committed in the Korean campaign as it exists at the present time. I believe that practically the maximum effort that she is militarily capable of is being exerted in Korea at the present time.

Senator STENNIS. With little left at home then for further strength?

General MACARTHUR. She has other commitments, of course. She has the commitments of her own defense; she is committed to some extent on her borders in other areas.

I don't mean to say every soldier China has is there. I believe that under the commitments and responsibilities that she has she is putting the maximum of force that she is capable of into the Korean campaign.

It is her major military objective at the present time as I see it.

TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE FOR NATIONALIST TROOPS

Senator STENNIS. General, you have certainly changed my mind some as to the ability of the United States to maintain a naval and air war effectively and bring China to terms perhaps in that way.

Now, you don't recommend the landing of any ground troops on the mainland of China and you do recommend though the support of Chiang and you say that you would give him the proper support to keep him on the Chinese mainland. What did you mean by that? Wouldn't that involve landing troops there of our own if he got in trouble?

General MACARTHUR. I didn't say, Senator, that we should maintain the Republic of China's forces on the mainland. I said that the utilization of those forces should be left to the decision of the Chinese commander in chief and in his decisions we should give him such support as we were capable of without the involvement of ground forces of our own on the Chinese mainland.

I went on to say that the commission that we appointed down there had made complete recommendations as to what was necessary in the way of supply and technical assistance to make his forces on Formosa, to put them in battle trim.

Senator STENNIS. Senator Hickenlooper suggests that while we are on this point, your statement here the other day that it would relieve the pressure on Korea for the troops on Formosa to be now utilized, he observed and wants me to ask if it wouldn't also relieve, help with the situation in Indochina, with the French fighting the Communists there.

General MACARTHUR. To open or to threaten—even to threaten to open another front would relieve the pressures on all existing fronts. It would require the concentration of Chinese troops in a different area from which they can be concentrated now. It would tend to divide and disintegrate the potential military force that Red China possesses.

DEFENSE AGAINST WORLD-WIDE COMMUNISM

Senator STENNIS. General MacArthur, this morning I understood you to say that you believe we can defend—you were talking about the United States—believe that we can defend every place from communism—you are meaning world-wide—anything else is defeatism; if we cannot meet and defeat him, we court our own destruction.

That is the memorandum I made.

Can we defend every place, world-wide, from communism with no better cooperation than we are getting now from the other free nations?

General MACARTHUR. My concept of course, Senator, was that we are opposing communism.

Senator STENNIS. Yes.

General MACARTHUR. That we shall assist wherever we can in that opposition. I did not mean to convey that the United States should defend every mile of the world that was threatened by attack or might be attacked, but that we should assist those that would resist it to the maximum of our capacity without destroying ourselves.

Senator STENNIS. Well, yes, I emphasize this present lack of cooperation. We are faced here with a terrible budget and we have a limitation of manpower, as you know, and we have got to make decisions some way here as to how far we can go.

In other words, I have said we must draw a line somewhere in the Pacific. I wouldn't begin to say where we draw it, but unless we get better cooperation, I do not believe we can go on a world-wide concept.

General MACARTHUR. I don't believe that you can reduce the problem of resisting Communist aggression by the simple process of drawing lines on the map and saying, "You shan't go beyond this line."

I believe where the aggression shows its face, we should attempt to meet it. I believe that it has very definitely shown its face in Korea. That is where the main fighting is going on, and that therefore we should meet it there.

Senator STENNIS. But there is also involved in this—

General MACARTHUR. If it should spring up in some other area, the military possibilities of that area would determine what we could do in the way of assistance, and always, to answer the spirit of your question, we must rely largely upon the determination and purpose of that sector which is threatened to do its utmost to resist. In Korea, the South Koreans have gone to the maximum on that.

Senator STENNIS. And at the same time, though, how far we can go is also going to be determined by the cooperation we get from other major free nations, and it has not been forthcoming this time to your expectation or your desires, I am sure.

General MACARTHUR. I would hope that they would do more than they have, especially in Korea.

Senator STENNIS. Well, they will just have to do more if the United Nations is going to be a success, will they not?

General MACARTHUR. If the United Nations was a success, I believe that is one of the components that would produce that success.

I think, as I said this morning, that one of the great weaknesses that is developing in that organization is the failure of the members to carry out what I regard as their full responsibilities in action which they have taken as a group.

ENEMY CONSPIRACY BEHIND ATTACK ON SOUTH KOREA

Senator STENNIS. Well, now, General MacArthur, did Russia, just putting it briefly, do you think that Russia inspired this attack by North Korea on South Korea? Do you think that it was primarily inspired by Russia, by China, or just who?

General MACARTHUR. I couldn't tell you that, Senator.

Senator STENNIS. I think your idea would be very helpful.

General MACARTHUR. But I am very definitely convinced that all three were in the general conspiracy to make that attack in North Korea.

It could not have been launched by the North Koreans without the supplies which were furnished them by the Soviet. It could not have been kept up without the actual national assistance by the Chinese Red army.

I am quite sure that there must have been some type of agreement between those three before the attack was launched, and I believe it

was conceived months before it was actually launched. It takes time to organize such an army as that North Korean army was.

It should not be discounted. I have either fought with or against practically the soldiers of all countries in the world, and professionally, without reference to the savagery and the brutality practiced by the North Koreans or their ideologies, professionally they were worthy of the highest admiration. They were an excellent force.

Senator STENNIS. General MacArthur, I certainly thank you for the fine enlightenment you have given me during these hearings. It is very helpful indeed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Long.

ADEQUATE PREPARATION DISCOURAGES ENEMY ATTACK

Senator LONG. General MacArthur, permit me also to express my admiration for the record you have made, for you as an individual and also as a witness. You have been a magnificent witness here and extremely helpful to us.

General MACARTHUR. Thank you, Senator. I remember a day in this very room when I saw your brother. I was the Chief of Staff. That is the last time I saw him.

Senator LONG. I believe that was my father, sir.

General MACARTHUR. Your father. I didn't realize you were quite that young.

Senator LONG. General, you have indicated that if Russia intends to attack us, that in your judgment one of the main items would be their ultimate chance for success which as you described would be based largely on the relativity of forces; in other words, that they do not want to start a war unless they could win it.

General MACARTHUR. That is correct.

Senator LONG. And that is why you do not believe that Russia would come in in the event that we carry out the recommendations that you have made.

General MACARTHUR. That is correct.

Senator LONG. Now following that thought, would it not tend to delay war or to persuade Russia that we should not have war if we arm this nation and made it as strong militarily as we could within the limits of our ability to maintain such an establishment?

General MACARTHUR. I am wholeheartedly for preparedness by this Nation in the present condition of world affairs.

Senator LONG. Now you have not attempted to pass on how many troops we should have, but you do believe that we should attempt, as I take it, to maintain a Defense Establishment that could win a war against Russia if we had to fight one against Russia?

General MACARTHUR. That would be adequate; yes, sir.

Senator LONG. And to maintain one less than that or less than sufficient to win a war against Russia, if she attacked us, would be only to invite attack. I believe that you would probably agree with that.

General MACARTHUR. I think the silliest thing in all warfare is to build up an armed force that can't win.

Senator LONG. Sort of like trying to maintain a——

General MACARTHUR. You throw the money away and all you will do is to take the loser's end.

Senator LONG. At one time we had a great football team at my State university, and it cost a lot of money to keep it up, but the foot-

ball team more than paid its expenses because it won games and the crowds came out.

A little while later on we had a losing football team. It did not cost as much to maintain the football team but it cost the university a lot of money to keep it up because the crowds would not come out to see it.

General MACARTHUR. I understand you are going to have a good one this year too.

Senator LONG. I hope we do have a good one.

Nevertheless there is not much point in maintaining an army that can't defend you, is there?

General MACARTHUR. That is correct. That is the one thing you have got to have, a champion.

COMMUNIST AGGRESSION SEEKS AREAS OF LEAST RESISTANCE

Senator LONG. You have indicated that in your opinion it is a good idea to stop Communist aggression wherever it breaks out or at least to resist it, not to simply let it go without resistance.

General MACARTHUR. Correct.

Senator LONG. Our experience has shown that wherever the Communists knew they were not having or going to have resistance, they invariably went.

General MACARTHUR. That is correct.

Senator LONG. Therefore, for us to simply say—

General MACARTHUR. They exploited the weak points.

Senator LONG. That is right. For us to say that we would not defend, and to make clear to the Soviets that we would not defend certain points bordering their nation, is merely to invite them to take those places.

General MACARTHUR. That would be my opinion.

Senator LONG. Now, when you suggest that we should meet this aggression, judging from historical precedents, we might have avoided World War II if we pursued that policy.

For example, when the Italians started on the road to aggression by moving into Ethiopia, a mere squadron of American fighting ships could have prevented that at the time, could they not? In other words, their supplies would never have gotten to Somaliland or to Eritrea, and so the Italian armies could not have advanced into Ethiopia, and the war would not have been on.

VETO POWER IN UN

Here is the question I have in mind at the present time: Where aggression breaks out in the future, we could assume that the United Nations would have a Red member on the Security Council, and veto that action.

What would your recommendation be, for example, if the Russians should move into—well, let us say if any nation, any Communist nation, should attack its neighbor, and that the Russian member of the Security Council would veto the action, what would you suggest that we do in that eventuality?

General MACARTHUR. I have always personally felt, Senator, that the veto power, as exercised in the United Nations, was a very grave mistake. I do not see how it is going to continue to function unless some remedial action along that line were taken.

Senator LONG. Of course, we have found one way——

Senator LODGE. Could I hear that last word? The veto power was a very what?

General MACARTHUR. Unless some remedial action is taken.

Senator LODGE. The veto power was what?

Senator WILEY. As exercised.

Senator BYRD. A grave mistake.

Senator LODGE. A great mistake.

General MACARTHUR. The Senator was asking what would happen, what, in my opinion, should be done if Russia vetoed any action taken by the United Nations to resist aggression, and my reply was that I had never thought that it was a wise measure to have the veto power vested as it is in the United Nations.

Senator LODGE. Thank you.

Senator LONG. Of course we have found one way to at least get around part of that problem, by associating ourselves, and allying ourselves with nations that we would like to help defend, as we did with the North Atlantic Pact.

Would you be in favor of a similar arrangement with regard to Japan, when Japan becomes an independent nation, and we remove our occupying forces?

General MACARTHUR. Senator, I am going to ask you to excuse me from answering that question.

I have been working with Senator Dulles on that, and I believe it would be unwise, at this time, to discuss it, even before this group.

You will have a complete chance, when it comes up, to do it.

Senator LONG. I value your discretion there, and will leave that to you, sir.

General MACARTHUR. I had an engagement this morning at 11:30 to discuss that matter with him, and that is why I was so anxious to finish yesterday; and I hope to get to it tomorrow.

Senator LONG. If you believe it unwise, I will concur with you in that, sir.

PUBLIC REACTION TO MAINTAINING LARGE DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT

General, I have been impressed by what you have said about the casualties that we have been suffering in Korea. I know how it must affect you when you send your men in, to see what is happening, and what has happened to our boys over there.

I completely understand your feeling that way, having been in the Navy myself and operating a ship evacuating wounded off a beach-head, where we simply hauled them out, 500 or 600 at a time; and I know something of that feeling, myself.

That is a feeling that an officer has, when he sees his men, in great numbers, that have been badly shot up.

However, the point has been made here that we are draining ourselves in Korea; we are losing men; and it is costing us a lot of money.

Now, there is one fact that I would like your guess on.

Do you believe that we could have armed this Nation, or be arming this Nation as rapidly as we are today, in all respects, if we were not actually forced to fight an aggression, as we have been made to do?

In other words, when I was in the Congress, in the previous year there was a terrific drive for economy, and I was one who felt that

we ought to try to economize as much as we can, even on the Defense Establishment, and we had it down to about a \$12 billion budget.

Since the aggression in Korea, and because of the fight that you were having to make there, the people have realized the necessity of a large Defense Establishment, and they have been willing to see their Congress make large appropriations. I believe our defense budget must be four times as much as it was before, tremendously expanding our services.

Some of us had the impression that it is almost impossible, unless your men are actually fighting, to get the American people to keep a Army, Navy, and Air Force that could beat a nation like Soviet Russia.

I know that you have been confronted with that problem, having been Chief of Staff on one occasion, and trying to get appropriations from the Congress to have a sufficient Defense Establishment to try to protect this Nation.

What is your judgment on that question?

General MACARTHUR. I believe that this country should throw itself into the maximum posture of defense that our economy can sustain.

Senator LONG. Do you believe that we could have possibly armed this Nation to the degree that we have, and are arming it, if the Communist aggression had not broken out a year ago?

General MACARTHUR. That, I would not be able to answer, except on the general concept that as the danger to your security increased, the vividness of the public in response to preparedness increases.

Senator LONG. In other words, the public does not like to pay taxes, but somewhere along the line we have to make them realize the dangers that they are facing.

One of our native sons, Gen. Claire Chennault, is a subject of much pride in Louisiana. Have you ever had much chance to discuss the China situation with him?

General MACARTHUR. I know him well.

Senator LONG. I assume that you have, on occasion, discussed the general Chinese situation with him?

General MACARTHUR. I haven't seen him for nearly a year—

Senator LONG. It might interest you to know that—

General MACARTHUR. But, I have known him for many, many years.

Senator LONG. It might interest you to know that General Chennault has made recommendations to many members of this committee substantially in line with what you believe should be done under the present circumstances.

I do not say that they are in all respects the same, but they do, in many ways, correspond to your recommendations.

General MACARTHUR. I think that most professional soldiers would agree with them.

Senator LONG. Now, General Chennault, of course, took a volunteer group of Americans, at a time when this Nation was not at war, and made a substantial contribution to the defense of the Chinese, against Japanese aggression.

Do you believe that there are possibilities for pursuing that line with regard to enabling the Chinese Nationalists to give the Chinese Communists more difficulty?

General MACARTHUR. You mean by the voluntary efforts of individual Americans?

Senator LONG. Yes.

General MACARTHUR. I do not believe that such a contribution would suffice to be of any special importance.

MAINTENANCE OF BLOCKADE BY NATIONALISTS

Senator LONG. Now, it occurred to me that if this Nation did not want to maintain a naval blockade, that possibly we might consider the possibility or prospect of doing something like we did for Britain during World War II, before this Nation got into the war.

You may recall that we gave Britain 50 destroyers.

Now, if this Nation gave 50 old destroyers to the Chinese, and if we could let them have about 3 or 4 officers and 8 or 10 enlisted men with each destroyer, to show them how to operate them, do you think there might be any prospect of the Chinese Nationalists maintaining an effective blockade?

The have declared one previously, have they not?

General MACARTHUR. I do not believe that the Chinese Nationalists, and their naval forces, in any reasonable period of time, could maintain an efficient blockade of the Chinese coast, especially if it was opposed by any of the really great nations of the world.

Senator LONG. You spoke, a short time ago, I believe it was yesterday afternoon, of the fact that your release concerning discussing ending the bloodshed in Korea with the enemy general in the field was partially a psychological measure, a part of psychological warfare.

Now, if this Nation should adopt the policy that you recommend, particularly with regard to bombing China, I assume that you would probably favor seeing that the Chinese knew why we were doing that, and that they were well appraised of it, possibly by dropping leaflets over China, over their cities first?

General MACARTHUR. Correct. I think that the weapon of psychological warfare can be used with great potentialities. It has been, in the past; in the war in the Southwest Pacific we used it very successfully.

EXTENT OF UNITED STATES AID TO CHIANG KAI-SHEK

Senator LONG. Now, I hate to labor this point because it has been discussed several times before, but in my own mind, the answer is not exactly clear.

Suppose we assisted Chiang Kai-shek and he felt that he could make a landing of substantial size, successfully, on the Chinese mainland; and if it did appear that there was some prospect of success in that, do you think that it would be a good idea, under those circumstances, to permit the use of our landing craft, with our personnel, to put them ashore?

General MACARTHUR. I believe that we should render every possible assistance to him that is within our power, if he attempts such a strategy.

Senator LONG. Now, if you are going to use our landing craft, you might as well give him the benefit of our naval bombardment, had you not? In other words, if we are going to use our own landing craft, it would seem reasonable, just to protect the lives of our own folks who are operating them, we ought to give them the benefit of our naval bombardment—

General MACARTHUR. Correct.

Senator LONG. Particularly if opposed by forces you could bombard.

General MACARTHUR. That would be inherent in the use of the Navy.

Senator LONG. Of course if the Chinese Communists knew that, they would have to keep ever more forces against the sea, would they not?

General MACARTHUR. They would.

Senator LONG. That would tie more or them down.

You stated that you believed China was making her full military effort against us at the present time; and I had the impression that she should be able to raise an army running to several millions of men.

I understand that she has maybe three or four hundred thousand men in, at the present time—I don't know exactly the number.

I had the impression that possibly she might have thrown another million or two million men in, and I also was informed that there were about 400,000 men in Manchuria, along the line of the Yalu River.

Do you really feel that she cannot make a much greater effort, or contribution in terms of throwing at least more men at us than she is putting in there?

General MACARTHUR. I think the whole center of gravity of the Chinese military effort has moved up toward the northeast.

There is a certain limitation as to the actual number of men that can be used at one time on a limited battle front, but she can supply the reinforcing waves and echelons to leap-frog over her attacking troops. She undoubtedly has a large concentration in south Manchuria, along the Yalu.

EFFECTIVENESS OF A BLOCKADE

Senator LONG. What we could do to her economically with a blockade would be a far greater injury than merely killing the men that we are killing and wounding at the present time, in China.

General MACARTHUR. There is no weapon of war, in my opinion, that is quite as efficacious as a blockade.

If you put on a blockade, and it is successful, you are apt to kill them by the millions. Every other weapon has a certain degree of limitation. A rifle kills a single man; a machine gun kills them by the score; heavy artillery and bombs kill them by the thousands; the atomic bomb may destroy them by the hundred thousands; but when you put your blockade on them and prevent them from getting food, and the ordinary processes that keep life in modern civilization, you threaten the life of the entire group.

A blockade threatens destruction by the millions. That is why it is so effective. That is why the control of the seas, and the control of the air over the seas, are still a matter of the greatest potential in modern strategy.

It is those two things that the Chinese are utterly lacking in. They have practically no navy—I am talking about Red China, now—and a very small air force.

She is therefore vulnerable to the processes of blockade, and the disruptive effect on communications and transportation that exist in our air supremacy.

CALIBER OF UN TROOPS

Senator LONG. General, I will state frankly that I believe that the answer to this question would undoubtedly have to be stricken by the censors for security reasons, and particularly, well, more for political reasons than for security reasons, actually, but I wanted to know something about it because it has puzzled me so.

The censored edition of the Wake Island notes does not have the statement that is in the uncensored report. The uncensored report mentions a remark made by someone, and agreed to by you, I believe, to the effect that the UN troops generally were not very good, and not very useful and it would serve—

General MACARTHUR. The United Nations troops?

Senator LONG. United Nations troops. Not the United States troops, but there seemed to be the impression that they gave a good United Nations color to it, but the troops were not very effective, and didn't seem to be much use in getting many more in.

Now, I had the impression that the troops we have from Britain, and all the British Empire, as well as the Turks, were very excellent troops; and that the French were very excellent troops; is that correct?

General MACARTHUR. Any conceptions that may have been put out from the Wake Island conference, that the United Nations troops were not superior, is incorrect.

All the troops that have been fighting on what was my line in Korea were of high caliber.

The Turks were fine.

The British, splendid.

The French, first class.

They were all good.

The only criticism I would have of them—there are not enough of them.

Senator LONG. Now, what is your judgment of the South and Central American troops, and at the present time we have none in there, but if we get into a global war, we could get some, I feel sure.

What do you think of their efficiency, as a fighting force?

General MACARTHUR. Central and South Americans?

Senator LONG. Central and South American—Brazilians, for example.

General MACARTHUR. I have never commanded troops from those countries. I would not be able to tell you; but I am quite confident that with proper equipment and proper training, they would make excellent soldiers.

In fact, I do not know of any nation in the world, if you give them proper training and equipment, that would not behave most becomingly, with courage, determination, and resolution.

Such things are not bounded by nationalistic lines at all. They are universal.

EFFECTIVENESS OF NATIONALIST TROOPS

Senator LONG. Now, if Chiang Kai-shek were able to make a landing or carry on extensive guerrilla warfare on the Chinese mainland, he could probably use his troops just as effectively in that area as he could assisting us in Korea, could he not?

General MACARTHUR. Yes.

Senator LONG. It occurs to me that the troops could be used in either place, but I was curious to know why we do not attempt to arm even more of the Koreans. Do you think we could make the South Koreans into soldiers of equal fighting quality to what the Chinese Nationalists would be, if we brought them in?

EFFECTIVENESS OF SOUTH KOREAN TROOPS

General MACARTHUR. I think the South Korean, given proper training and equipment, is the equal of practically any troops in the world. The great trouble is that the big pool of South Koreans are not trained. It takes time to train them, and the supplies that are necessary are not immediately available.

Senator LONG. General, I would like for you to help me in my thinking on this matter of Formosa.

General MACARTHUR. One of the——

Senator LONG. Pardon me, go ahead.

General MACARTHUR. One of the main components of any army, of course, is the leadership, the officer corps. It takes time to develop an officer corps.

You cannot train a competent officer to a higher command or general staff work in a short period of time.

To build up an army it takes years, tradition, standards, and there is no way to substitute for that. It takes time.

No; the development of an officer corps is far more difficult than the turning out of the ordinary rank and file.

STRATEGIC VALUE OF FORMOSA

Senator LONG. With regard of Formosa, I agree that it is in our interest that the Red Chinese do not have it, if for no other reason than if they have decided to make themselves our enemy; the weaker your enemy is, the better off you are, and the less potential danger he is to you. A half million troops on Formosa are just that much more of a liability that your enemy has to worry about, and you can use it to your advantage in the event you had to fight him.

However, I have not to this date seen the real strategic importance of Formosa.

It is my understanding that Formosa is about 400 miles from Japan; that, actually, the main islands of Japan are closer to Shanghai than they are to Formosa.

You stated, and also said, that Formosa is about 100 miles from the Philippines. However, the Philippines are almost that close to the Chinese mainland, I believe, or about 150 miles from the Chinese mainland.

Now, you stated that you believed as long as we had our sea and air power in the area of Japan, that you did not think Russia could successfully invade Japan with her land army, even though we had only token forces there of a division.

How do you believe the Chinese could make great use of Formosa in the face of the sea and air power that this Nation has?

General MACARTHUR. He would probably make bases available for the Russian submarine fleets, and the Russian air fleets, and you could

put such a concentration of submarine power and air power there as could take out our airfields in both the Philippines and in Japan.

You could probably, by the introduction of the Russian submarine, based in Formosa, interdict all of the supply lines of the western Pacific, so we couldn't get the supplies to our air fleets, our ground forces, or our Navy.

You have breached our line completely when you take Formosa. You can from Formosa—you are right between the Philippines and Japan. You can hit each flank, and knock each one of them out separately by interdicting the supply lines from Pearl or from Guam, which can be done by their submarine bases in Formosa.

You have completely changed the strategic complexion of the Pacific. The fact that Red China might not immediately have a fleet of submarines or an air fleet, would probably be corrected within a reasonable period of time by permitting her ally to come down there. They already do, I am sure. The Soviet already has access to such air bases as exist on continental China. But you could man on Korea air fleets.

There are 19 air strips there now on Formosa the Japanese used when they took the Philippines, and other bases in the Southwest Pacific.

You would render our whole line of defense untenable. It would be breached at Formosa. Now, it cannot be breached——

Senator LONG. In World War II——

Chairman RUSSELL. Would you mind developing that? That is disturbing a great many people as to why it cannot be breached from continental China, and it is only 90 miles away.

Would you mind, General, telling us about that?

General MACARTHUR. Because the existing fields that would be available in continental China are so distributed that we could mass a superior air force in our own concentrated island littoral chain to overpower them.

If you should put on Formosa the jet plane that the Russian has, its area of operation would be brought so much closer to our bases that our bases in Okinawa and Japan and the Philippines would be made untenable. There is no such condition exists from the Chinese mainland.

Senator KNOWLAND. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if we might have the staff bring over that map which was produced here the other day? I think it would be helpful to us at this point when discussing this situation.

Chairman RUSSELL. That will be done.

ALLEGED USE OF UNITED STATES EQUIPMENT BY CHINESE REDS

Senator LONG. General, I want to go into a completely different line of questioning, and it may not be within your range of experience, but I believe it would be helpful to the committee on this—and certainly we can use as much help as we can obtain.

Did you have occasion to observe the developments that led to the fall of China to the Chinese Reds?

General MACARTHUR. You mean the Japanese campaign?

Senator LONG. The campaign that led to the Communists taking over China, and the defeat of the Chinese Nationalists.

General MACARTHUR. I am not familiar enough with the details of that campaign to discuss it, Senator.

Senator LONG. Well, the reason I asked that is because you made the statement yesterday that in your opinion, at an expense well within our means, we could have prevented the Chinese Communists from taking China. If we had prevented that we would not be fighting them now.

General MACARTHUR. I believe that at that time the forces of the generalissimo were stronger than the forces of the Chinese Communists against him.

I believe that had we furnished a little added assistance to those forces, they would have been able to defeat the Chinese Communist forces.

I believe that the great lull that took place there enabled the Soviet and others that were assisting the Chinese Communists to accelerate and accumulate a sufficient balance of force which gave them victory.

Senator LONG. Now, we have heard it said many times, and I have heard people who said they actually saw motion pictures of the Communists entering certain of the major cities of China, Peiping, for example—that when they entered, they were driving mostly American equipment, American supplies, arms supplied by the United States to the Chinese Nationalists, and that was most of the equipment that the Chinese Communists had.

Do you know whether or not those statements are true or false?

General MACARTHUR. I would not know of my own observation, Senator.

Senator LONG. All right.

General MACARTHUR. At that time that was not in my area. China reverted to me later on.

Senator LONG. Because much of the failure of this Nation to support China, as I understand it—I was not a Member of the Senate at that time, but, as I understand it, most of the basis for this Nation's failure to support the Chinese Nationalist Government—was a complete disgust with what the Chinese did with what we understood was available to them.

For example, there seems to have been the feeling that after supplying billions of dollars of military aid, that armies went into the field, and in some cases even surrendered without firing a shot. Do you know anything about any such rumors as that, or whether any of those facts were true?

General MACARTHUR. Nothing at first hand, sir.

Senator LONG. General, I believe that certain members of this committee are still very anxious for you to elaborate on your views about Formosa. Possibly you might want to use the map that has been moved right behind you there.

General MACARTHUR. I will try to answer any questions.

VITAL IMPORTANCE OF FORMOSA

Chairman RUSSELL. The question was, General—and I have heard it discussed around the cloakrooms ever since this matter of importance of Formosa first arose—why is Formosa, which is only 90 miles from the mainland, so vitally important? Isn't it as vulnerable to Okinawa and the other islands that we hold as they would be from

Formosa, and why does the mere matter of 90 miles make so much difference?

I have heard that discussion ever since this question of the importance of Formosa arose, and I think a statement in the record on that would be very helpful.

General MACARTHUR. Because it gives them another bastion, Senator. The continental line there has a certain capacity, but when you take it out and put it here where it is immediately north of the Philippines, immediately south of Japan, you give them the additional capacity that goes with that.

You take—their submarines will go out here and cut these lines of communication there. You have increased the range by not only the 165 miles but you have this output position here which is an entirely different thing when you have got this coastal area of defense.

You have already made your amphibious movement in here and broken this line of continuity down here.

You can mass here on Formosa, you can probably mass between two and three thousand planes in a highly protected position, which would increase the capacity by just that much.

You could put submarine bases in there on several of their harbors which would introduce them right into the middle of our line.

They are now confined to certain places, here, these great ports. You can't put those bases, those submarine bases, along most of this coast line. There are only various harbors that exist there.

This is a natural haven and bastion for both submarines, naval forces and airplanes, and you place them so close here that in order to defend, you will have to triple, quadruple, or otherwise the forces that we have, and we just can't maintain that much force with a base 10,000 miles away, where this fellow has it right here.

It is just as vital to our defense as any bastion would be in the middle of your line of any sort.

Now the present range of a Russian submarine would not be much below, except their snorkels, this area here. They can't cut with their present bases, they can't cut our supply lines.

You move them down here and put the Soviet in here, you haven't moved them just this little distance across there. You have moved their whole concentrated potential of attack down here.

You have made it practically impossible, as the Second World War shows, to resist it.

That was the Japanese base. It was from here they attacked Malaya, here they attacked the Philippines, here they moved over toward New Guinea. You put exactly the same thing there and it would make it practically impossible for the United States to maintain such forces on these islands here as to snuff this out in addition to what we'd have to snuff out in the bases that they might possess now.

It just gives them the master strategic bastion at a point which would increase their striking capacity many, many times.

FORMOSA'S ECONOMIC AND TACTICAL POTENTIAL

Chairman RUSSELL. I am unalterably opposed to surrendering Formosa under any circumstances. I would even favor the use of the veto in the United Nations, so long as we have a veto, before I would be a party to surrendering it. But I cannot for the life of me,

from the standpoint of its strategic importance, understand why, with those ports along the China mainland just a relatively short distance from there, and airplanes based on airfields on the China mainland just back of there, it would make such a tremendous difference.

General MACARTHUR. Only you have the resources of a great nation of 8,000,000 people that will be used in supporting that air effort and that naval effort. Formosa is an enormously wealthy potential country agriculturally. The force you put down there you would not have to move in any supplies at all for. They could live off Formosa.

You have a great population. You have a country there that in population is stronger than both Australia and the Netherlands put together in that small concentrated area. It could be made one of the strongest bastions I know of. All of that resource would be available if it fell into the enemy's hands.

Chairman RUSSELL. I suppose one reason for my feeling is only because of the fact that you neutralized and bypassed Formosa in World War II, though it was in Japanese hands.

General MACARTHUR. You understand that the objective we had, Senator, in the World War there was to stop and be able to place the blockade on the flow of materials that came from the South Pacific, and that we could do it more readily and easily from the Philippines than we could from Formosa.

Moreover, in landing in the Philippines we had a friendly population supporting us, where in Formosa it would have been a hostile population.

Moreover, we had certain moral reasons for liberating that Christian nation that had been our ally in the Philippines rather than go into the hostile community of Formosa.

We bypassed Formosa because when we took the Philippines and Okinawa we had already established the bases that we could choke off the transportation supply lines which supplied Japan. And the minute we put that pressure on Japan collapsed.

Now, if you put Formosa there, you just reverse it. From Formosa they can supply the same sort of pressure on the Philippines and the same sort of pressure on Japan, and neither the Philippines nor Japan have the pressure in navy or in air that would meet that tremendous potential threat that the Soviet could launch and maintain in Formosa. And we have not got the resource to meet it from America.

If they don't have it, if we keep it in friendly hands, they don't have that great potential power. It saves just that enormous effort.

Now, if they have it, with the Philippines with its small forces, its minimum of an air force, practically no navy, nothing but a naval patrol, you have got to place a great percentage of our Navy and Air in the Philippines to protect from Formosa.

The potential does not exist from continental China. The coast of continental China that borders on the Philippines and on Formosa are rocky coastal areas. They are not more than two or three landing spots from Shanghai all the way down to Hong Kong. There are none of the natural resources or bases that exist in continental China that exist in Formosa.

Chairman RUSSELL. I am glad you made that statement, General, because I have been——

General MACARTHUR. I am sure, Senator, that any estimate that has been made to the contrary is not made by professional military men.

Chairman RUSSELL. I just wanted to make this statement for the record. I have been a member of the Armed Services Committee since it was created, and that is the first comprehensive statement that has been made to this committee as to the strategic importance of Formosa.

General MACARTHUR. I have seen a number of statements in current literature about the weakness of Formosa. One was made by—none was made by professional military men. All were made by men whose ideals were closely linked with the Communist cause. There has been an enormous propaganda put out about it, which is false.

Senator KNOWLAND. Mr. Chairman, at that point on Formosa, may I ask the general if so far as he knows any responsible naval commander from Admiral Radford to those who have served out in the Far East disagree with the strategic importance of Formosa?

General MACARTHUR. I have known every naval commander that has operated in the Pacific for the last 10 years, intimately, and most of those which have operated in the last 30 years, and there isn't a single exception to it. And I can add that there is not a single exception to a military and Army commander, or an Air commander, that I know of.

Senator KNOWLAND. Thank you.

General MACARTHUR. I don't know of anything that would be more universal than the concept of the strategic value of Formosa. As a matter of fact, the Navy wanted to go into Formosa rather than the Philippines, and it was largely a moral question that decided that issue.

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question?

Chairman RUSSELL. If directly on Formosa.

THE CAIRO AGREEMENT

Senator MORSE. I want to say that I agree with Chairman Russell that you have given the members of the Armed Services Committee, I think, the clearest explanation in defense of the retention of Formosa that I have ever heard since I have been a member of the committee.

I certainly think we have to hold Formosa while we are in this present crisis, but my questions go to these problems because they involve the United Nations attitude.

We know that the Cairo agreement, entered into by the heads of the nations present at that conference, gave Formosa to China, and great Communist propaganda is being made over that, of course, now. Is it not a fair question for me to ask you, if you agree with me that that was a great mistake at Cairo?

General MACARTHUR. I think that any decision that was made that would involve the possibility of Formosa falling into Red hands would have been a grave mistake.

Senator MORSE. Subsequent events showed that possibility became a reality.

General MACARTHUR. It did, indeed.

Senator MORSE. It was not given to the Generalissimo to become a mandate of the United Nations immediately upon his defeat, it was given to China, if I understand the Cairo agreement correctly.

Senator KNOWLAND. The Republic of China.

UNITED STATES ATTITUDE REGARDING FORMOSA

Senator MORSE. The Republic of China—whoever in international, whatever form of government succeeded him.

Is it not true that we have this problem in the United Nations—that some of our allies seem to be of the opinion that Formosa ought to be considered a United Nations issue rather than a United States issue, because even today we are in there on unilateral action, not United Nations action? And therefore, it is alleged to be a subject matter for United Nations negotiations. Is that not true?

General MACARTHUR. That is correct, Senator. The only attitude I believe that the United States should take is that it should not fall into Red hands.

We have, of course, no imperialistic designs on Formosa, but I believe that our own self-preservation demands that the proper steps should be taken to see that it does not fall into Red hands.

There are many solutions of the problem. The United Nations may come up with such a solution of the problem.

Senator MORSE. Of course, our unilateral action on Formosa now is justified by us, and I think rightly so, on the basis of the long-existing historic policy of our country that we have the right to make such movements in the Pacific as we deem necessary to protect our security and interests.

General MACARTHUR. That is right.

Senator MORSE. I judge that as far as international law is concerned—

General MACARTHUR. You are going all the way back, Senator, to John Hay.

Senator MORSE. That is the basis for our action there.

General MACARTHUR. Yes.

Senator MORSE. One other question on Formosa. We are confronted with the emergency of our generation but during this period we have to think of the problems of generations to come, too. And I suppose eventually because of the Cairo agreement, our country in X years ahead—I say X years, it may be 10, it may be 100—if we come to a system of international justice through law, we will then be confronted possibly with the Formosa issue before the World Court. We will have to take our chances, it seems to me, then.

I am afraid if it got to the World Court now on just the one issue as to whether or not the Cairo agreement, as a matter of international law, it might obligate us to give it up. That might be pretty difficult for us to win as a legal proposition. But I think the American people ought to understand that we are in there now on unilateral action because we believe it is necessary to protect it from falling into Red hands in order to protect our security and interests.

General MACARTHUR. Right.

Senator LODGE. One question on Formosa, Mr. Chairman?

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes, sir.

EFFECT OF ATOMIC WEAPONS ON FORMOSA'S IMPORTANCE

Senator LODGE. General, do you think that the development of atomic weapons, with the result that they can hit a much larger area, would in any way diminish the value of Formosa?

General MACARTHUR. I think that the entire strategic concepts of the world will unquestionably, from a military standpoint, be subject to modifications as the atomic weapon increases in range, in caliber, and power. At the present time I would say that Formosa is indispensable.

What might happen 50 years from now if war is not outlawed and we go on at the perfectly astounding rate of developing scientific processes of annihilation, you may change the entire basis of all strategy. When you get guided missiles, when you can look ahead to the various uses of atomic warfare, perhaps other methods of warfare that would even be more annihilating, I do not think that you can make any aphorisms that cover immortal time.

I will say that within our generation I am sure there is no development that will change the strategic value of Formosa.

Senator LODGE. Thank you very much.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Chairman, I have been asked by one of my colleagues to ask some questions on Formosa.

Chairman RUSSELL. I apparently made a mistake in getting into this.

SOVIET PROPAGANDA CONCERNING A "RACIAL WAR"

Senator SMITH. This is entirely apart from these other considerations in regard to Formosa. Is not the participation of the Chinese Nationalists in Formosa and the Nationalist forces in the present conflict a thing of considerable psychological value inasmuch as it is a means of refuting the Communist propaganda that this is a white man's war against the Asiatics?

We haven't touched on the "white man's war" question at all; and I am interested in your thought on that point.

General MACARTHUR. I believe, if Formosa should fall into Red hands, that the entire morale of our friends in the Far East would disappear. I believe it would be regarded as the complete scuttling of our assistance in the western Pacific.

Senator SMITH. Do you think they are under attack now in Korea because of this white man's war propaganda? Our purpose there is to release the Koreans from this other menace but there is a lot of talk about the white man's war. Russia, of course, has been playing that propaganda to a fare thee well.

General MACARTHUR. We have on our side, Senator, lots of people that are not white.

Senator SMITH. That is true.

General MACARTHUR. We have Filipinos, we have Thailand troops, we have a good many others of various colors and nationalities.

Chairman RUSSELL. South Koreans.

General MACARTHUR. I had heard no serious concepts of any racial difficulties based upon a difference of color in the Far East. The yellow peril, which was so discussed at the turn of the century, seems to me to have been receding very markedly as time goes on.

The very fact that our own Nation and most of the modern nations of the world stand for the independence of native groups, that we stand against any imperialism, any exploitation, has completely laid at rest any myth that there could be a racial war in Asia.

I count among the best and most devoted friends I have men whose skins are brown and yellow and other colors and, as far as I have

seen in the last few years, there hasn't been the slightest taint of patronage or difference based upon racial characteristics.

The differences are upon independence, character, ability, and all those things that differentiate whites among themselves, just as well as whites against the yellows or the browns.

Senator SMITH. General, I think that is a very important contribution you have made, because I have been asked that question a number of times. I have made a great many friends in the Far East of dark color or the yellow race, and I find they can be as good friends to us as anybody else, if there is not the idea prevalent that we are trying to superimpose the white man's culture upon them. You have demonstrated through your efforts in the Far East that we have given them cooperation of the highest order.

PROPOSED UN TRUSTEESHIP OVER FORMOSA

Senator KNOWLAND. I had a short question on this Formosa point. There has been some suggestion made, General, that perhaps the United Nations by a vote would set up some kind of a trusteeship over Formosa. It is, of course, the home of the Government of the Republic of China and the people on the island feel that they are Chinese and free Chinese.

Now having in mind that all of the United Nations together have only put up as troops to fight aggression in Korea approximately 30,000 men compared with what we have put up and what the South Koreans have put up, wouldn't it be a right smart undertaking for the United Nations to go in against the will of the Republic of China and the people there to disarm the 500,000 troops who are now on Formosa?

General MACARTHUR. I think it would be an impossibility. My comment on the United Nations—I tried to bring out the point that the United Nations lacks as an executive agency the instrumentalities to put such decisions into effect.

It has never been more vividly brought out than in Korea. If you subtract the United States from the Korean effort, you just have pretty nearly zero left.

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, may I raise a procedural question as to what the chairman suggests as to plans for completing the examination of General MacArthur in regard to his testimony?

Chairman RUSSELL. I have no specific plan, Senator Morse. We were proceeding here until we came to an impasse.

Senator MORSE. The reason I asked is I understood the chairman would want to limit the questions at the present time to Formosa.

PROCEDURE OF INTERROGATION

Chairman RUSSELL. I am not trying to limit anyone. I was trying to proceed in order because this Formosan question came up. It was for that reason that I allowed jumping around the table.

Senator MORSE. Now will the chairman hear me for a moment in regard to the problem that I think is presented by my desires for examination?

The chairman will recall that yesterday in about 30 minutes of examination I said I thought it was only fair to let other members

of the committee ask some questions before I completed my examination.

I want to say that the testimony of General MacArthur has deeply impressed, greatly moved, as well as troubled me because I think he has presented a case so specific and clear that it is the duty of the members of this committee to find out in detail from the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other Government officials exactly what they can say in reply.

Chairman RUSSELL. Is there any doubt in your mind that the committee will not undertake to do that?

Senator MORSE. I am not raising any question as to whether the committee is going to undertake it. I am trying to explain to the chairman the problem that I have in regard to my own examination.

I consider that each Member of this Senate, on this committee, has a perfect right to use his own best judgment as to the course of action he thinks he should follow on this committee to get for himself the facts that he wants, and I have questions that I want to ask the general as a basis, a foundation, for certain questions I want to ask the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

I am perfectly aware of the fact that there may be colleagues of mine on the committee that may not think I should ask that many questions, but I intend to do it because I think this situation is so critical that, unless we can make a record here on the part of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Administration that would justify not adopting the program that the general has offered us in these 2 days of testimony, the American people will have the right to hold us as members of the Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committee responsible for what the general has so eloquently described as the stalemate in Korea.

Now I think I would be most unfair if I did not give some estimate of the time that I think it is going to take me to complete my examination.

I have before me some 54 questions. I have never examined a witness yet on the basis of starting out with a designated number of questions without discovering that his testimony in turn raises many other questions that you must necessarily ask him if you are going to have a complete examination.

I want you to know that before I put the question to you as to what your pleasure is, what the general's pleasure is, in regard to completing his examination. I assume that there are other members of this committee that still have questions that they want to ask the general.

He has been on the stand all day. He was on the stand all day yesterday. I think we ought to discuss with him for a few minutes what his pleasure is.

I do think, Mr. Chairman, that you ought to complete the examination of the general before you call in other witnesses. I think we ought to complete his testimony in chief.

We have got it before us so that we feel we have laid all the foundation we want to lay as far as examining the general is concerned before we start examining the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

I think that is only fair to the general and fair to the committee. If you want a suggestion from me, it is—

Chairman RUSSELL. I appreciate the Senator's advice as to the length of time he will probably take. Of course with 58 questions

there is no way to estimate how long it will require. This has been a long day.

I have marveled at a man who has claimed to have seen as many years as General MacArthur says that he has. He undertook to fix definitely the date of his birth along with the place of that happening. He has been able to carry on here. He has been confronted by a succession of questions. He has been like the iron man football team I believe of Brown University many years ago.

General MACARTHUR. That was Brown.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. He has stayed right in there with each one until the questioner has exhausted his questions or else passed them over until another time. I am perfectly willing to leave that to General MacArthur because he has been here all day for better than 8 hours—almost 8 hours of questioning.

Certainly that is as much as should be expected of any witness in one day. I do not know what the General's views are as to whether he would like to carry on this very grueling day of questioning or whether he would prefer to come back Monday or at some subsequent time—or tomorrow, for that matter.

General MACARTHUR. If it was possible, Mr. Chairman, I'd like to go on now and finish. I am available just as long as the committee wants me.

Chairman RUSSELL. General, would you like to take a 5 or 10-minute recess at this period so that we might stretch our legs?

General MACARTHUR. No, sir.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Chairman, may I ask one question that was just called to my attention on the telephone?

Chairman RUSSELL. Does it have to do with Formosa?

Senator SMITH. No. It has nothing to do with Formosa, except remotely.

Chairman RUSSELL. I think we should follow an orderly procedure, Senator Smith, if you will forgive me.

Senator SMITH. I thought Senator Morse was going to start his questioning.

Chairman RUSSELL. Oh indeed not.

Senator SMITH. Oh, I apologize. I didn't know.

Chairman RUSSELL. It so happens that I have some four questions that I was requested to ask the general. I shall do so. I do not think it will take me but just a moment.

COST OF LOGISTICAL SUPPORT

General, when were you last on the mainland of China, not the mainland of Asia but of China?

General MACARTHUR. The mainland of China?

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes, sir.

General MACARTHUR. As I recall now it was in 1937.

Chairman RUSSELL. Do you have first-hand sources of information on the mainland of China, that were transmitted to you through Intelligence, of enemy military activities or plans?

General MACARTHUR. I think I have access to practically all the intelligence that is available on that subject. I did when I was in command.

Chairman RUSSELL. I was asked to ask you, General, to give an estimate of the financial cost of the supplies and logistical support which you propose for Chiang Kai-shek.

General MACARTHUR. What was that question?

Chairman RUSSELL. The financial cost of the supplies and logistical support which you suggest be given the Republic of China—the Chinese Nationalists?

General MACARTHUR. I have forgotten the exact figures, Senator. They were included in that report that I referred to previously made by the commission of General Fox. They are available. Vern Mudge can get them for you very readily.

LIAISON BETWEEN EIGHTH ARMY AND TENTH CORPS

Chairman RUSSELL. Now this is the last question I was asked to ask. General, there have been newspaper reports that there was inadequate liaison between the two United Nations armies. I assume that means the Eighth Army and the Tenth Corps operating in Korea at the time of the Chinese Communist attack. Do you care to comment on that?

General MACARTHUR. That is completely false.

Chairman RUSSELL. There was adequate liaison?

General MACARTHUR. Absolutely. Complete coordination under my own immediate command.

FUTURE OF NORTH KOREAN TROOPS

Chairman RUSSELL. Now here is a question that I desire to ask on my own because I want to get this thing clear in my mind as well as for the record. In your very compelling presentation of your views as to the proper policy in China, I do not think that you have anywhere stated just what the policy should be if the plans succeed and the Chinese Communists withdrew to the line of the Yalu River, but crossed the river and stayed there in force with our people perhaps in force on the other bank or still in Korea?

General MACARTHUR. If the Chinese Communists withdrew from their depredation in North Korea, the disposition of their forces within their own territories in my opinion should be left entirely to them.

There would undoubtedly in the treaty of peace be some stipulation for the protection of North Korea, some agreement that the nationality and sovereignty of Korea should be preserved by the nations signing the treaty of peace; that with such an agreement we should attempt to carry with it any internal control of China would not be within my own contemplation.

PROPOSITION: EVACUATE KOREA AND LAY SIEGE TO RED CHINA

Chairman RUSSELL. General, I have one statement I wish to make and then I would ask your professional opinion on the subject matter of that statement.

You have presented here with compelling eloquence the point of view that will appeal to me and will appeal to all the American people. That is that you have an affirmative policy designed to end the slaughter as you call it in Korea of our sons, to force the Chinese to cease their depredations and to bring to an end the terrible des-

truction that is in progress in Korea, and you state that you have not heard at anytime of any other proposition offering any affirmative hope of bringing this contest to a successful conclusion.

Now from the time that our forces first entered Korea, I realize as you have so well stated, it was a calculated risk as to whether or not Red China, and indeed the Soviet, would come into the struggle.

Some of my colleagues might recall that as far back as August or September of last year I discussed at the luncheon table the terrible dread I had of hordes of Chinese intervening in that war.

I have been desperately concerned about fighting a land war of any kind, whether limited or unlimited, with a power that has an inexhaustible number of men that are available to Red China, and I felt that to hazard the intervention of the Soviet into this war with their airplanes, their manpower, their submarines might compel us to have our Armed Forces in Korea almost as hostages to the Soviet or make it unable for us to supply them, and it so happens that they are the only trained and battle-tried soldiers that are available for the defense of this country if war should break out in any quarter of the globe.

Now what is wrong with a policy or what would have been wrong with a policy that had been adopted as soon as it was evident that Red China was intervening in mass, which would have directed the evacuation of our land forces from Korea and laying siege to Red China by sea and by air until they did withdraw from their predatory attacks upon Korea?

That appealed to me tremendously even before the event, and as I see this matter being drawn out as it is with all the anguish and suffering attendant thereto, it appeals to me more as a rank amateur in the strategy of war.

It seems to me that that conforms to every proposition that you have made. It prevents the accordionlike movements up and down Korea by land forces. It is calculated in my mind to force the Chinese back of the Yalu River. It will certainly stop the slaughter of our men on the ground.

It does not involve the abandonment of our moral obligation to the Korean people. It does remove the battle from their own doorsteps and from their own homes.

You have spoken here of the effect of a naval blockade, and why that was such a magnificent means of waging war, and which has proven successful through all of history; indeed, England, for years, stood off Napoleon, with that weapon alone, and existed; and I have been advised, although I am no expert on the subject, that China has the sketchiest and most tenuous communications, only a couple of railroads running across the country, over great rivers, mountain gorges.

It would seem to me that if a limited bombardment, such as you suggested, could be successful, that we could have by extending the bombardment, and withdrawing the ground forces, arrived at every objective that you have announced, without the necessity of losing the lives of infantrymen fighting in Korea.

I, as one who has had no experience whatever in the handling of troops, have spent some little time in studying the history of military operations, and of waging war, and I would like to have you point out the defect in that plan.

CONSEQUENCES OF PROPOSED EVACUATION OF KOREA

General MACARTHUR. The great difficulty in accepting that formula, Senator, for Korea itself, is that you would abandon Korea to the enemy.

It would result probably in the destruction of the Korean people. The ruthlessness of the enemy, if we withdrew our protection from South Korea, would probably result in thousands, perhaps even millions, of those people being exterminated.

It would be the collapse, it seems to me, of the moral obligation we took to protect Korea.

It seems to me that the psychological effect of withdrawing from Korea would collapse the confidence, not only of the Far East, in our strength to carry out an obligation which we have announced, but throughout the world.

I am sure that if we should withdraw from Korea, that it would be regarded in the Communist world not only as the greatest victory of modern time, but would invite them to aggression everywhere.

I believe that we committed ourselves on that thing when we went in in June. I believe that we cannot turn back. I believe, in the words, I think it was, of David Lloyd George, when the British were faced with just that same question of whether they would withdraw from the Continent, and one of the great speeches was made in the Commons by Lloyd George, when he said, "You must go on or you will go under."

I believe that is what faces us in Korea. If we don't go on, I believe we will go under.

Chairman RUSSELL. You place it then on political considerations rather than military grounds?

General MACARTHUR. I believe also—place it on what, sir?

Chairman RUSSELL. Place it on political considerations rather than purely military grounds.

General MACARTHUR. I would go higher than the term "political consideration." I would say they were moral.

Chairman RUSSELL. Moral.

General MACARTHUR. And spiritual considerations. I would say they were the very essence of what we did when we entered Korea. I would say that they are the very essence of what we are trying to do all over the world; I would say that it was the very essence of the concept of the United Nations.

I do not believe that we should withdraw now. I believe we have gone too far. I believe the million Koreans that have died, one way or another, should not be sacrificed to a halfway effort.

I believe we should try the plan that I have. If we do apply that plan, the attack on our troops, I am convinced the day we announced the ultimatum, if you wish to use that term, to Communist China, the day we announce that, that the attack of their ground troops will slack off.

I believe it will have the effect of their retrograding their effort. It would be a wise, strategic concept on their part under those conditions to tend to draw back rather than try to exploit forward.

I believe that the mere pronouncement of what we were going to do will go a long way toward effectuating the end of the ground fighting in Korea.

If we are going to apply these military sanctions to China, I don't believe that we decrease the risk of the extension of the combat by withdrawing our ground troops from Korea.

I believe it would increase the risks of that. I believe that if we apply the full effect of our naval and air potential that we should not accompany it by what would amount to the inhibition of not applying the force of the ground troops that we have now deployed in Korea.

I don't see that there would be any real advantage in the withdrawing of our troops under those conditions. I believe, on the contrary, it would materially compromise the results if we withdrew the pressure and the threat of our Ground Forces, and tried to do it solely by blockade and air attack.

I believe that for success in modern war, you have got to use to the full capacity the potential of all three of the forces; that is what I believe must have anticipated the Congress in its very wise decision of unification.

I believe that you violate that, I believe that you swing in reverse almost to the present inhibitions that we place upon the sea and air arm, if we place inhibitions of withdrawal upon our Ground Forces.

Chairman RUSSELL. I appreciate your criticism. I had listened with a great deal of interest to your testimony and I tried to catch every word of it.

Your argument as to the effectiveness of a naval blockade, your argument and your belief that any announcement of the plan to bomb would probably cause the Chinese to withdraw, and, over all, your very eloquent statement of sadness over the loss of our men there; I listened to all of that.

I tied that with your statement that China had no air, and that I knew that Russia, if they intervened, would be fighting on our own terms, because your statement that they had no navy there, and so far as air is concerned, you convinced me we could supply ours better than they could theirs.

I could not, of course, comment on your statement with respect to the fact that it would cost more lives, Korean lives, but I thought perhaps, some of that grew out of the inflamed minds of those who have been stirred by the savagery of the battle that you described, and if there was no land fighting on Korea, it might result in the saving of Korean lives.

I propose that, along with it, we drop leaflets with bombs, wherever they fell, and where they did not bomb, in order that they might know that attacks would cease upon their ceasing their depredations against Korea.

I cannot see that it involves any breach of a moral obligation if we—that is, before the world—announce that those attacks would continue until Korea was evacuated.

It could result, as you state, in the loss of the lives of millions of Koreans, if the Chinese decided to exterminate the Korean people.

General MACARTHUR. I believe the presence of the troops there, Senator, is the anvil which enables the Air and the Navy to make such conclusive blows; without the anvil they would be almost hitting into loose air.

Chairman RUSSELL. Very well.

Senator Connally, did you have any questions?

Senator CONNALLY. No, I have no questions.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Bridges?

Senator BRIDGES. No questions.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Wiley?

PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE RELIEVING MAC ARTHUR

Senator WILEY. I have just a few questions, General, if you please. I believe I only asked a few in the beginning. I won't trespass upon your time very much.

I have listened now for 2 days and the first issue, I think, was very quickly resolved when you said there was no question about the constitutional power of the President to recall you.

The next issue, as I see it, is more or less an issue between you and the President, it is whether or not in the opinion of the American people there were justifiable grounds.

I have listened to the evidence so far and there appears to have been no justifiable grounds. What the evidence will develop hereafter I do not know; but I am going to ask you again what I asked you in the beginning. Have there been any grounds of any kind assigned other than that which appeared in the letter or in the directive that came to you after your wife had gotten the information over the radio?

General MACARTHUR. I have no other information, sir.

BACKGROUND OF A RUSSIAN ATTACK

Senator WILEY. No other reasons. Now, the third issue, it seems to me as I have listened here, is the program or campaign that you have advised, and to which the Joint Chiefs of Staff have apparently agreed. According to the opinion of the American people, should it have been followed?

Apparently it wasn't. Now in rebuttal it seems to me it is claimed that there are other reasons arising out of our connection with the other nations, the chief reason being a fear that if your program were carried out, it would precipitate Russia into the battle.

Now, I think your answer has been quite clear on that. In your judgment there is no reason to believe that would actually precipitate Russia into the battle. In other words, she will choose her own time irrespective of what we do.

Do I understand that to be your conclusion.

General MACARTHUR. That is correct. That estimate is speculative, of course.

Senator WILEY. Yes. Let me say there is prevalent the notion that Russia has a treaty with China which obligates her to come to the assistance of China in case of an attack. Have you any information on that subject?

General MACARTHUR. None, sir.

Senator WILEY. Then, General, the general concept that we had on this whole global picture was that Russia was using her stooges wherever she could to wear us down.

Thus, she used the North Koreans and when they didn't do the job, she shoved in China and when they couldn't do the job, or so we hope, she may come in herself, or she may start in her drive toward Iran. That brings me up to these questions now.

RESPONSIBILITIES OF A THEATER COMMANDER

How far does the theater commander take the over-all global strategy into account in meeting his responsibility?

General MACARTHUR. The responsibility for the over-all global strategy, of course, is fixed by the highest authorities in Washington. The theater commander has the responsibility not only of implementing such action as takes place in his theater, but of coordinating his activities with those of the adjacent theater commanders.

Senator WILEY. And I get from your former testimony that you feel you have complied with every directive or order that has come from your superiors and have not disobeyed in letter or in spirit any such directive or order; is that right?

General MACARTHUR. Not to the slightest. I have to the best of my ability implemented every order or directive that I have ever received.

Senator WILEY. Since international communism is world-wide, and organized—I think you called it in a global conspiracy—can the far eastern commander escape assessing the capabilities of all Communist powers that can be interjected into the theater of his responsibility?

General MACARTHUR. That is his responsibility.

PLANS OF CHIANG KAI-SHEK

Senator WILEY. That is. Now, you remember that Chiang has announced that he will return to the mainland by the end of this year.

Is there any chance that the Nationalists could or might initiate a campaign which might ultimately rescue China from the hold of communism?

General MACARTHUR. I wouldn't attempt to answer that question, Senator. There is always a possibility—I should say, that the probability of the Generalissimo's forces, as a whole, returning to the mainland by the end of this year would be quite limited.

Senator WILEY. Would be what?

General MACARTHUR. Would be quite limited—the possibility would be quite limited.

He might well infiltrate; he might well do a great many things; but I do not believe he will be supplied, his troops trained by that time, to make such an effort.

BLOCKADE OF CHINA

Senator WILEY. If Britain forbade further imports into China through Hing Kong of war materials, would not the same objectives be achieved as those sought by the blockage?

General MACARTHUR. That would be a part of a blockade. It would close the main entrance. Of course there are other ports, the traffic from Singapore up to Tientsin to Tsingtao, but that is probably the main point where the influx of materials takes place.

POSSIBILITY OF SOVIET INTERVENTION

Senator WILEY. I think the most serious question, and probably the most speculative one, and the one that most concerns our associates in the United Nations—regards your policy in Korea. If we were

to follow your plan, would Russia come into the war? That is where there is a great division of opinion, and it is that fear that we might do something that would bring Russia into the war that I think must have caused the Chiefs of Staff to hesitate to put into operation your recommendations, with which they agreed in January.

Have you any thought on that?

General MACARTHUR. I feel sure, Senator, that if Russia should intervene because of any incidents in Korea, it would only be a matter of time before she would have struck someplace, anyway.

I do not believe that, in itself, as I have said so frequently, would be a cause for intervention by Russia.

Senator WILEY. That is all.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Byrd?

Senator BYRD. No questions.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Smith?

Senator SMITH. One question.

My office called me a few moments ago and said some press members were there who quoted your statement this morning that you favored the United States going on to war with Communist China alone, even if the United Nations people wouldn't go along with us.

I thought that was such an outrageous statement that I would ask you to repeat just what you did say about our action in case the United Nations didn't go along with the kind of action you had advocated in your report.

General MACARTHUR. I believe, if the United States takes the action that I have advocated, that it will be supported by the United Nations.

Senator SMITH. Well, it would be proper to deny, would it not, any statement that suggests you advocate the United States would go along and take on Communist China in a war by itself?

You didn't make any statement, as I recall, of that kind.

The record will show exactly what you did say.

General MACARTHUR. I don't recall exactly, Senator, but I believe that the United Nations would follow. If they did not, I still would advocate the action by the United States.

Senator SMITH. To save our boys in Korea, the same thesis you have had all along?

General MACARTHUR. Exactly.

Senator SMITH. But not take on a full-scale war on the mainland of China?

General MACARTHUR. I have never advocated the use of our troops on the mainland of China.

Senator SMITH. I just wanted to get that clarified for your benefit because that report is going around.

Chairman RUSSELL. I am a little confused as to the procedure here, inasmuch as I have been switching from committee to committee. Senator Johnson is out. I will call on Senator Morse.

MOTION TO RECESS

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, I am going to make a motion and prior to making it I want to make a very brief statement as to the reason I think the motion should be passed on the part of the committee.

The motion is going to be that we recess until Monday and that the general be recalled to complete the testimony in chief on Monday, and I want the committee to know my reasons for making the motion.

First, irrespective of what the general's own feelings may be—I do not think it is fair to any witness to hold him on the witness stand the many hours that we have held the general today. Second, I think it isn't fair to the committee, because following that procedure I am certain would subject the committee to serious public criticism.

The question would be raised as to why we do not hold briefer sessions rather than to take any witness, whether the witness himself is willing or not, and proceed as long as I think we would have to proceed tonight to complete this testimony.

In the third place, although it isn't particularly material as far as I am concerned, it certainly is not fair to me to be placed in the position where I have to assume responsibility for holding this committee in session tonight in order to complete my examination because yesterday I did what I thought was the fair and courteous thing, namely, waived the completion of my full cross examination until the other members of this committee had asked their first round of questions.

I have put in a great deal of work in the preparation of study for this hearing as my colleagues have done. I have come out with more questions because I have very definite plans as far as my own participation in this hearing is concerned, in respect to future witnesses.

If the questions that I ask will lay the foundations for my questioning of other witnesses to come—they are entirely impersonal questions and seek to summarize, however, what I think are the points in producing the great confusion in this country that has resulted from the incidents of the recall of General MacArthur from his command.

Now, Mr. Chairman, I think in the interest of orderly handling of business of a committee we should follow a procedure of recessing at this time until 10:30 on Monday morning. I want to say that I know of no greater service that General MacArthur can perform for the American people at this time than to follow a course of action that will make it possible for him to complete his testimony before this committee in an orderly fashion.

I think he is performing a tremendous service for the American people by this testimony before this committee, but I do not think we ought to carry on a procedure here that will cast reflection on anyone, including the Senate itself, and it is the conviction of mine that if he will go through further hearings here tonight, it can't be reconciled with orderly procedure.

Mr. Chairman, I make my motion.

Senator KNOWLAND. Mr. Chairman, the general has now been here for two full days. He had a number of engagements which he had to put off that he had today, which he has for next week, I understand.

Now it seems to me that this committee in all fairness and as a matter of courtesy to the general should pay some attention to his own wishes in the matter.

I did have some additional questions which I also cut short. As far as I am concerned—and this is certainly no guide to any other individual member of the committee—I am prepared to waive the

additional questions because I think if we closely examine the record we will find that many of the questions which might be asked at this time have in one degree or the other been answered.

I don't say that is true in all cases, but the general has expressed his own wishes in the matter. He does have commitments. He has been away for 14 years. He does have a family he would also like to give some attention to, and I would think that we should try insofar as it is possible to do, after 2 days of devoting to this committee, giving time to work out our schedule to comply with the general's desires.

Senator CAIN. Mr. Chairman, I would like to offer as a substitute motion that we recess now, subject to being called back into session, as far as General MacArthur is concerned, at a time which is mutually convenient between General MacArthur and the chairman of the committee.

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, may I speak to that motion? Entirely impersonally, I want to say that I think the implications involved in the issues that are presented by this controversy before the committee is of such vital importance to the welfare of our country that as much as I would like to accommodate the convenience of the general, I think we should follow the same course that we would follow in other hearings before our committees when we have high military officials before us, and we have in those instances, although we have tried to accommodate them, we haven't broken up the continuity of our hearings; we have insisted that they come to our hearings, and testify in the interests of an orderly presentation of the problem before the committee.

I think it is very important that now that we started with the general we should finish with his case in chief before we call in other witnesses.

I do not like to be even placed in the position where it looks as though I do not want to accommodate the personal convenience of General MacArthur. As an individual, I would like to do that, but here we are in the midst of this hearing, and I think we have got to go through with it. I think our witnesses are going to have to accommodate themselves to us. Therefore, I think it is, personally, reasonable to take the position that General MacArthur be recalled on Monday to complete his testimony, and be ready to proceed with the testimony of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and others.

Chairman RUSSELL. Any other discussion?

Senator FULBRIGHT. Mr. Chairman, might I ask if tomorrow might not be more convenient rather than Monday?

Senator MORSE. I have no objection to tomorrow. I said Monday because I heard the general say that he had postponed one meeting with Senator Dulles in regard to the Japanese peace treaty, and he was contemplating meeting with him tomorrow, and I felt under those circumstances I certainly should not select tomorrow.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I want to say I do think we ought to complete the hearing. I am afraid that the public and people outside the committee will not understand if we go on indefinitely this evening.

General MACARTHUR. Mr. Chairman, I am entirely at the convenience of the committee. If they wish me back tomorrow I will be back here tomorrow at the hour you say.

Chairman RUSSELL. General, you have been most cooperative with this committee.

Senator BYRD. General, would you prefer Saturday or Monday? What would be your preference?

General MACARTHUR. I would prefer tomorrow to go right on if that is the wish of the committee.

Chairman RUSSELL. Let us have a restatement of the motions that have been made. Senator Cain, will you please restate your substitute motion?

Senator CAIN. I move you, sir, that we recess now, subject to being recalled at a time of mutual convenience agreed to between the chairman of the Armed Services Committee and our witness, General MacArthur.

Chairman RUSSELL. In view of the general's statement, do you not think 10:30 tomorrow would be satisfactory?

Senator CAIN. Indeed, sir; that seemingly has been agreed between the two gentlemen.

Chairman RUSSELL. The substitute motion will be put first.

Senator MORSE. I will accept the substitute.

Chairman RUSSELL. The question is on the motion that the committee now stand in recess until 10:30 tomorrow morning. Those who favor the motion, say "Aye."

(There was a chorus of "Aye's.")

Chairman RUSSELL. Opposed, "No's."

(There was no response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. The "Aye's have it, and the motion is carried.

UNEXPURGATED COPIES OF THE HEARINGS

Just one moment, gentlemen. I want this in the record today. I have instructed the staff of the committee to place in Senator Knowland's hands the top secret unexpurgated copies of these hearings in order that he might consult with General MacArthur, and let him say if matters that have been expunged that he thinks should be in the hearings, if he will initial the pages of the proceedings, I have announced that the committee will determine the disposition of the testimony.

Senator KNOWLAND. What I had in mind doing was consulting with General Whitney, and seeing how they wanted to handle it. I would not want it to be understood that we were making a requirement on the general that he initial the pages because he may desire to handle it in some other way, but I will consult General Whitney and General MacArthur.

Chairman RUSSELL. I understood this morning that the Senator from California was first going to consult with those who had been in charge of this matter in the committee room, that if no agreement could be arrived at, then the matter would be submitted to General MacArthur, and he would indicate those matters that he thought should appear in the record.

Senator KNOWLAND. That is correct.

Chairman RUSSELL. I insist upon that procedure. I think that is the only way we can justify going into a hearing here as to whether—

Senator KNOWLAND. I agree with that; I misunderstood.

Chairman RUSSELL. The committee will now stand in recess until 10:30 o'clock tomorrow morning.

(Whereupon, at 7:00 p.m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene at 10:30 a.m., Saturday, May 5, 1951.)

MILITARY SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST

SATURDAY, MAY 5, 1951

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES AND THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
UNITED STATES SENATE,
Washington, D. C.

The committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10:35 a. m. in the caucus room, Senate Office Building, Senator Richard B. Russell (chairman, Committee on Armed Services) presiding.

Present: Senators Russell (chairman, Committee on Armed Services), Connally (chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations), George, Green, McMahon, Fulbright, Gillette, Wiley, Smith of New Jersey, Hickenlooper, Lodge, Tobey, Byrd, Johnson of Texas, Kefauver, Stennis, Long, Bridges, Saltonstall, Morse, Knowland, and Cain.

Also present: Mark H. Galusha and Verne D. Mudge, of the staff of the Committee on Armed Services; Francis O. Wilcox, chief of Staff; Thorsten V. Kalijarvi, staff associate, Committee on Foreign relations; C. C. O'Day, clerk; and Pat M. Holt, associate clerk.

Chairman RUSSELL. The committee will come to order.

Gentlemen, today marks the third day of what has almost become, or threatened to become, a marathon session.

I do not believe that I recall any previous time in my legislative career where any one witness has submitted to such lengthy and continuous questioning as General MacArthur has, in this hearing.

It is a tribute to the general, not only to his physical stamina, but it is a tribute to him and every member of the committee that these exhaustive interrogations have been conducted in complete courtesy and in the highest dignity.

It is a tribute to every participant in this hearing, I think, that it has been so free from petty bickering.

Some of the questions might have been slightly repetitious, but they have been fair questions, designed to elicit information, rather than to provoke debate.

The general, of course, as befits his distinguished record, has answered all questions fully and frankly.

It seems that, where differences have arisen, they have been discussed in the spirit of mutual respect for opposing opinions.

The basic strength of our Government depends upon discussions of public questions being conducted in that manner.

My hope that these hearings would produce something of genuine benefit to our people and to the future of our nation has been strengthened.

We have accumulated a large body of data, and the record contains a rather thorough exposition of the views of General MacArthur.

I hope that we will be able to conclude our questioning of the general today.

Of course, with General MacArthur, the hearing is only beginning. We will hear next from other officials of the Government, beginning with Secretary George C. Marshall, of Defense.

I have a procedural matter here that was raised in private conversation this morning.

In calling upon the Senators for questioning last evening before we recessed, I called upon the Senators in the order of their seniority, but that was affected by the presence, or rather the absence, of Senators who had not had an opportunity to ask questions in their places at the table.

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Morse.

Senator MORSE. I suggest that you return to the order of seniority this morning and start with whoever would be senior to myself, who was allowed to start questioning last night.

Chairman RUSSELL. Thank you, Senator.

SECURITY PROTECTION OF HEARINGS

Senator KNOWLAND. Mr. Chairman, before you proceed, I have a matter on the subcommittee. Senator McMahon is not here yet, but I would like some guidance.

As I previously mentioned yesterday, in the hearings of May 3, volume 1, there was mention made of certain restrictions on bombing within Korea itself. I personally do not see why that information should not be made available.

I wondered what you had in mind—whether the Senator from Connecticut and the Senator from California, who are the subcommittee, should first discuss it, then to take it up with the military censor. If we could get his agreement, there is no problem. If there is still disagreement, the matter would then be submitted to the full committee.

There is another area where the general had requested the troops of the Republic of China from Formosa might be used. On that, I fully agree that the exact language of the TWX should not be used, but it seems to me that again that could be paraphrased; and I wondered just what your instructions were as to procedure.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, I shall again undertake to express my own views, as I did yesterday, when I stated some of the decisions had been quite baffling to me. As I believe I stated on yesterday, it was my intention that the Senator from California and the Senator from Connecticut would confer where either of them raised any questions as to the security value of any matter that has been deleted from the record under the proceeding we have adopted, which, while not perfect, is the very best that the Chair could possibly devise. If either of them thinks that a matter should appear or be printed, that should be discussed with the officials of the Department of Defense who have undertaken this job of protecting the security in the release of these hearings. If no agreement is reached with the officials of the Department of Defense, it is my suggestion that that fact be reported to the committee; that the committee at that time could, either through a subcommittee of larger size or by action of the whole committee, hear briefly from the Senator who had raised the question, get the views

of the Department of Defense very briefly as to their reasons for assigning a classified designation to the matter; then the committee could vote upon whether or not it should be made public.

Senator KNOWLAND. That is entirely agreeable as far as I am concerned. During the noon hour I shall endeavor with the Senator from Connecticut—I raised a point on certain items where I questioned whether the security was necessary or whether it could not be handled, particularly if there be a paraphrase. If we could get together at noon—

Chairman RUSSELL. If the Senator from California will pardon me, the question of paraphrase of course is involved in the whole situation as to whether it be released, and I assume you can present your view and it will be paraphrased as the Department has done with certain documents.

Senator KNOWLAND. I understand that, but on this particular document I am referring to, if we could meet at noontime and go over this together, then perhaps get the chief censor, Admiral whatever-his-name-is—

Chairman RUSSELL. Davis.

Senator KNOWLAND. Admiral Davis downstairs, and maybe make a report this afternoon.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, I hope the members of the subcommittee will raise that, as it is impossible for our committee to confer on a matter of that nature.

I believe, because of Senator Morse's generous waiver, Senator George will be next. You are a little under the weather, Senator. Do you desire to propound questions?

Senator GEORGE. I would rather pass at this time. I might wish to ask one or two questions, but I have been reading the record.

It seems to me to be full and reasonably complete. I do not care to fill up the record with repetitions and argumentative questions, and I would suggest you call whoever is next in line.

I may wish to ask one or two questions. I am satisfied that any Senators will yield to me before the noon hour when I may have to leave again, to ask one or two questions if I should wish to ask them.

I would like to ask one thing, perhaps of the chairman or General MacArthur. It possibly relates to some of the matter deleted from the Thursday's hearing. The general had given testimony regarding a particular junction point, concentration point within Korea, but near the Soviet border. Was that point or town definitely identified, and is it identified in the record?

Chairman RUSSELL. I shall ask the Senator from California to please follow me closely in this statement in order that I might be corrected if I am in error. I think I have knowledge of the fact, but he has given more careful attention to it.

In my opinion the matter was covered very fully in the hearings. The town was identified. The inhibitions were explained and the value of an attack upon that particular position was clearly stated by General MacArthur. All of that matter was deleted.

Senator GEORGE. I heard that testimony and I was surprised at the deletion.

Senator KNOWLAND. That is one of the points that I raised.

Chairman RUSSELL. That is one of the issues referred to by the Senator from Connecticut. If an agreement cannot be reached with the

staff of the Defense Establishment, the committee will then pass upon the propriety of the release of that portion of the testimony.

Senator GEORGE. I thank the chairman. I merely wished to know if a particular concentration point, distribution center had been properly identified so we would have no difficulty in locating it.

Chairman RUSSELL. I do not think there is any question as to that. Senator Saltonstall?

Senator SALTONSTALL. I have only one additional question that I would like to ask General MacArthur at this time, and that is this: I read the concluding pages of the record last night in which the chairman asked you the question about evacuating Korea, and your answer that it had been a great moral blow and so on.

PLANS FOR POSSIBLE EVACUATION OF KOREA

Where there ever any plans made to evacuate Korea, and if so what in general were they and what were the plans made, if you felt you had to evacuate Korea? What did you then plan to do?

TESTIMONY OF GENERAL OF THE ARMY DOUGLAS MacARTHUR, ACCOMPANIED BY MAJ. GEN. COURTNEY WHITNEY—Resumed

General MACARTHUR. As a military contingency we prepared plans for the evacuation if we were forced to do so. All of the details were never worked out, but the initial plans involved a gradual withdrawal toward the south, if we were forced to do so, into various defensive positions, with a final evacuation in the southern part of Korea.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Were there any plans made for carrying on the undertaking of the United Nations that had been started in Korea if you had had to leave Korea, or in your opinion were the plans to go back—or, rather, would you in that event have gone back to Japan and left the situation as it was before you entered Korea?

General MACARTHUR. The withdrawal contemplated returning the mass of our troops at first to Japan. The details of what might have occurred after that would have depended upon the action itself or the directives that I might have received.

Senator SALTONSTALL. And there were no directives?

General MACARTHUR. There were no directives; no, sir.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Mr. Chairman, the record shows even more clearly than the listening here the fullness of General MacArthur's statement and the impressiveness as a witness. I have no further questions to ask. I appreciate the helpfulness you have given to us.

General MACARTHUR. Thank you.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Hickenlooper.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I think no more at this time.

Chairman RUSSELL. Pardon me, Senator Green. I don't believe Senator Green has been asked.

Senator GREEN. No more questions.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Johnson.

Senator JOHNSON. General, I have just two or three clarifying questions. They have been presented, but I am not clear on the answers.

I have always had great admiration and respect for you as a man, as a military leader, and as one who lives up to his responsibilities.

Your capacity to perform your duty has contributed greatly to your leadership qualities.

Now, I have responsibilities as a Senator and I need your help. I know your suggestions will be valuable to us.

ADDITIONAL FORCES NEEDED IN KOREA

At this moment we have pending in the conference committee of the Congress a very serious question of providing the men to make up our Armed Forces. You could help the Congress and I think the country if you would give us some exact figures, some estimates as to how many additional members of the Armed Forces you think would be desirable in carrying out the specific program that you have recommended for the Far East.

In other words, I know what your problem was in the early days of World War II; you had to attempt to hold almost barehanded. I know what your problem has been throughout the Korean campaign. I am sure that you asked for men that weren't supplied. Now, you presented this program.

Our embracing of that program will be a hollow one unless we provide the men and matériel to back it up and carry it through and reach ultimate victory.

We touched on that briefly in our discussions the other day. If you feel disposed, I should like to have you elaborate on the perhaps inconsequential number that would be necessary to increase, or perhaps the large number that would be required.

General MACARTHUR. It would be difficult to try to reduce to exact figures in advance what you have to have to defeat an enemy. It is not a unilateral proposition.

It depends upon the relativity of the two forces engaged. So, it would be quite ridiculous at any stage of the campaign to try to predict exactly the norm of force that you would need to conclude the campaign.

I will say, in answer to your basic question, that I am sure the overall strength which is being provided now or debated now, would well encompass, without prejudice to any other operations or demands that may be made upon it, the conclusion of what I had in mind in the Far East.

It would only take a relatively small fraction of that force to carry on the campaign that I would have in mind.

Senator JOHNSON. I assume——

General MACARTHUR (interposing). The increases that would be necessary in the Far East would not be great as far as ground troops are concerned.

The greatest thing that would be necessary is to release the power that we now possess so that it can be utilized.

It is quite possible that when we do that there should be added increments of both the Air and the Navy.

I believe those increments would be readily available without prejudice to any other area or operation that is in contemplation.

In that respect, too, Senator, it must be borne in mind that the general objective, as I understand it, of our preparedness program envisions its accomplishment in about 2 years' time or something of that sort.

During that time, those forces can be used in Korea without prejudice to their ultimate use some place else, merely as a basis of training or something of the sort; they would be quite available if the projected program is only going to reach its completion and its fruition at some future date of 2 years or 18 months, whatever it may be.

So, I can't see that there is the slightest prejudice involved to the ultimate over-all global program which is before the Congress now, because of any demands that might be made in the Far East to carry out the program that the Joint Chiefs apparently visualize and hope for on January 12.

TOTAL MANPOWER NEEDED

Senator JOHNSON. And the Joint Chiefs' plan at present assumes that they get the legislation that they need for a total armed force of 3,462,000.

Now, as I understand it, it is your opinion that of that 3,462,000, in order to carry out your program, it would not be necessary to substantially increase your ground forces.

On the other hand, you feel that it would be necessary to make additions to our sea power and to our air power, but in that event that would not involve substantial increases of our armed personnel in that field.

General MACARTHUR. That is exactly correct, Senator.

Senator JOHNSON. Now, General, I realize that you do not want to get into this sphere of specific legislation, but this Armed Services Committee is in it right now, and as a man who has commanded probably more of our armed forces than any other individual, it seems to me that you could comment with propriety upon a broad principle.

Since we are living now, and will continue to live for years to come, in a world of uncertainties, I wonder if you do not think that some system of universal training which would guarantee that all of our young men would be made available for service, and they would be trained young men, should be invoked so that when the Nation was threatened we would be prepared?

General MACARTHUR. As I said, Senator, I am for preparedness, and the maximum preparedness, and the maximum utilization of all of our resource.

Now, whether universal military training accomplishes that fact would have to be pretty carefully considered by me.

There are other demands upon our manpower. Whether the total effort to train these great masses of millions of men, whether in actual combat those men would go into the niches for which they have been trained, I don't know. I have not studied the bill. I have not studied the potentialities of it.

MAXIMUM UTILIZATION OF MANPOWER AND RESOURCES

It is not a question, I think, that can be settled by merely whether you are for or whether you are not for it. I am for the utilization of the total manpower that we have.

But whether the program of universal military training all youths along practically the same line, which I understand is the point considered, whether that will reduce and produce the greatest military

effectiveness, I would not attempt to say until I had studied the problem very, very thoroughly.

I believe there are many complicated considerations. I believe the fitting in of the manpower, of the expert efficiency of the country, is a very intricate problem that can't be settled in such a broad general way as that.

I believe the greatest possible consideration has got to be given to the demands of industry. I believe that if you are going to prepare the youth, that you have got to understand that modern warfare has as its basis industry.

I believe that you have got to understand that the money that is involved is not limitless; that you have got to get the maximum efficiency for every penny you spend.

Now, I would not have the slightest hesitation in completely approving that, if I thought that was the best way to get the effectiveness.

Now, at the present moment, of course, this is a future plan you are working on; at the present moment, as I understand it, it is not applicable. There are other and more acute demands.

I should advise most seriously, if I were considering the problem, that I should wait and get through with the emergency that faces us now, and then on what has resulted and what exists then, I would sum up the facts, and make my decision.

UNIVERSAL MILITARY TRAINING

If universal military training is the best way to do it, I would unhesitatingly advocate it. The question is the survival of the Nation, and I believe it is every citizen's duty to give that need in time of necessity that is required by the Nation.

Senator JOHNSON. General, do you have any recollection of ever having recommended or advocated universal military training of our young men?

General MACARTHUR. Oh, yes. I not only, many years ago when I went to the Philippines, requested the Philippine Government to try to organize it for the blow that was manifestly certain to come, but the first thing I did was to introduce universal military service as far as I was able to accomplish it.

Senator JOHNSON. I mean, as it applied to this Nation.

General MACARTHUR. I am quite sure that 25 years ago had we had universal military service, the whole situation would have been different.

It is my belief that had we been prepared before either of these World Wars, there was a very excellent chance that they would not have taken place.

The only thing I address myself to, any doubts that I would have, is as to the efficiency on the military potential that the country could produce.

Now, over in the Philippines, the situation was entirely different. They didn't produce anything; everything was supplied to them.

What was necessary there was to get the manpower to use what was supplied to them; so there was no question there that universal military service was the proper thing.

Before the First World War—and the Second World War, for that matter—industry hadn't assumed such an important part as it has now.

I believe the thing should be carefully studied, Senator, after we get over this present crisis that exists; and, if the best method at that time is for universal military service, as producing the maximum efficiency like Abou ben Adhem, my name would lead all the rest.

DEFICIENCIES IN MANPOWER AT TIME OF NORTH KOREAN ATTACK

Senator JOHNSON. General, when you requested more men for your command in Korea, were you informed of the manpower that was available to the armed services at that time?

General MACARTHUR. I was very vividly and acutely informed of the deficiencies that existed. The armed services made available, I am sure, everything that was possible under the circumstances. I am sure they scraped the bottom of the barrel to get them over there; but there just didn't seem to be any extant, Senator.

In order to fill up merely the strengths of the units of the Japanese occupation army that I sent over there, I had to utilize Korean manpower.

I issued the directive, in order to have any degree of maximum efficiency in our major combat unit, the division—a directive that for every rifleman and every batteryman that we had, the Americans, there should be a Korean enlisted man placed with him, and that that individual, that American, should be the guide and mentor to teach the Korean.

In order to get the force that was necessary to make the Inchon envelopment, I had to take the Seventh Division, which had been practically emasculated, and send the other three divisions over, and I had about 5 weeks to bring them up.

In order to do so, I placed over 8,000 Koreans in that division. I brought them over to Japan and gave them the 3-week training that I had.

In the Third Division, a very similar condition existed, and in all the divisions I authorized large increments of Korean soldiers to be incorporated.

As the flow of personnel increased from continental United States, those Koreans, those that survived, were made available for transfer back to the Korean divisions to fill up the gaps that were being made there. But even today we have—I wouldn't speak for the present moment, but when I left I think there were many thousands of the Koreans still serving in our combat units. Our combat units have never—after 10 months of war were not up to their combat strength.

In saying that, I wish to repeat that I believe every degree of efficiency that was possible, everything that could be humanly done, had been exerted by the Defense Department to send me those men. The support I received from the staffs here is quite beyond any criticism.

URGENT NEED FOR PREPAREDNESS

Senator JOHNSON. But, General, you have had a rather unique experience, horrible as it has been, in the early days of World War II and the 11 or 10 months of the Korean experience, of having to take on savage enemies almost barehanded. And I know of no man alive who can more touchingly and effectively make the Congress or the country aware of the price we paid for deficiencies in the early stages

of both of these conflicts. I hope as you go about the country talking to our citizens and presenting them with a positive program, that you will do what you can to contribute to their awareness of the deficiencies that now exist that will not permit this Nation to supply its commander with the men and the material they needed in the face of a horrible invasion.

General MACARTHUR. You know the acuteness of modern war is increasing very vividly. It took a long time in the old days before the war machines really began to roll. But with the integration of the world, increase in scientific methods of destruction, the blow falls much quicker; that is, you don't get the time now to prepare that you had in the past. The first blow in the next war may well be the decisive blow. The first blows or the potency of the first blows—and that first blow, you understand, there is no method by which you can avoid the surprise attack of an enemy these days. He hits and then he announces, or he hits and he doesn't announce. And if you are not ready at that time you might well be overwhelmed before many factors, which I won't attempt to go into, gave you a certain period of time in which you could build up to meet the attack. But with every passing year that diminishes. Therefore, the corollary is with every passing year, as long as you have a maverick running loose in the world, it means that your necessity for preparedness increases unless you can find the formula to settle the whole matter.

Senator JOHNSON. General, I hope in the next few weeks that you may have an opportunity to study the reports of this committee and the action taken by the Senate by a rather large vote, 79 to 5, passing the manpower bill that we hope will be sufficient to meet our needs, and if at any time you have any suggestions or criticisms, we would be very delighted to have them.

EFFECTIVENESS OF MAC ARTHUR RECOMMENDATIONS ON CHINESE COMMUNISTS

I want to ask you this question, General. Assume we embrace your program and suppose that the Chinese were chased back across the Yalu River, and suppose they refuse to sign a treaty and to enter into an agreement on what their future actions will be, what course would you recommend at that stage?

General MACARTHUR. Such a contingency is a very hypothetical query. I can't quite see the possibility of the enemy being driven back across the Yalu and still being in a posture of offensive action.

I don't believe that the hypothesis you draw is quite a reasonable and a rational one. If he ceases his depredations across the Yalu, the main purpose that we have is accomplished.

If your question implies that we should cross the Yalu because he did not sign a treaty of peace or stayed in a sullen attitude——

Senator JOHNSON. If I may interrupt, I think I can clear up what I have in mind. Some of the experience we have had—they dash back, we dash up to them, and they come back and so forth, the accordion thing that you are talking about.

Now suppose we inaugurate this program that you have advocated and suppose it has the elements of success that you envisage. They go back across there, they still retain large mass formations there, what course are we going to have to take?

General MACARTHUR. I don't think they could.

Senator JOHNSON. Are we going to have to keep a large number of men there to protect our position?

General MACARTHUR. Of course, my program would prevent his having a great accumulation of force close to the border of Korea. When you have cleared Korea, what the situation would be to secure it for the future I wouldn't attempt to settle at this time. It would depend upon the factors that have been produced by our successful campaign.

I can't visualize an enemy who had been cleared of Korea staying in a state of belligerency. I believe he would fight to hold his line along the Yalu until he was convinced that he could not do so.

Now if he were so convinced, I believe that a rational treaty could be drawn up with him at that time; if we were so successful as that, his entire country would be in jeopardy.

He would be subject to attack which might not only overturn the government in existence but might threaten the very security of segments of China, and that he would so recklessly defy the realisms by not accepting the defeat which would be entailed by his being forced to stop his aggressive action in Korea doesn't seem to me to be reasonable.

RELEASING OF UNITED STATES TROOPS AFTER VICTORY IN KOREA

Senator JOHNSON. You think it is unlikely that if your program was carried into effect and we were victorious, we would be required to retain anything like the manpower that we have in Korea at this time?

General MACARTHUR. I should certainly hope not, sir.

Senator JOHNSON. And you believe that it would not be necessary?

General MACARTHUR. I believe it would not. I believe there should be—there could be some arrangement made then so that the South Koreans, placed in the full posture of defense, with such support as might be necessary from our fleets and air forces stationed in the Far East, that that would be the sufficient security, the reasonable security, that the condition would demand.

Senator JOHNSON. I got that impression of your position from this purported substance of statements made at Wake Island, and here is what gave me that impression, and I would like to ask about it. It appears on page 6 of the committee print:

General BRADLEY. The Eighty Army is returning to Japan soon. We have the problem of getting additional troops to Europe.

Of course, we have that problem in front of us at the moment.

As it now stands it will be April before we can get a division into Europe. Could the Second or the Third Division be made available to be sent over to Europe by January?

General MacArthur—

quoted as saying—

Yes; I will make one available by January. I would recommend that the Second Division be selected, as it is a veteran division, better trained, and would make a better impression.

Do you recall any such exchange, General?

General MACARTHUR. Yes; that is practically my recollection of it. You must understand, Senator, that that was made on the basis

of the North Korean War. We expected to close that war out very definitely and when the war was closed out, we anticipated that the majority of the occupation forces in Japan would be returned to Japan.

The Second and Third Divisions, which had come from continental United States, I was prepared under those conditions to return to the controls of the central authority.

Senator JOHNSON. Now, that is a background for your view that when and if we obtain victory, we can make available to other parts of the world some of the manpower that is now tied down in Korea?

General MACARTHUR. Correct. I would view with the gravest concern the indefinite stationing of American troops to guard that border or any other border in which the nation itself concerned could reasonably be expected to accomplish.

SUPPORT FROM WASHINGTON

Senator JOHNSON. General, while we are on that Wake Island conference I want to read a question on page 3, a statement—Secretary Pace says:

Is there anything in terms of ECA and Army cooperation that we might do to help you?

General MacArthur is reported as saying:

No commander in the history of war has ever had more complete and adequate support from all agencies in Washington than I have.

Is that a correct statement?

General MACARTHUR. I am very glad to have the opportunity to reaffirm that. Up to that time it was certainly so.

USE OF UNITED STATES GROUND FORCES OUTSIDE CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES

Senator JOHNSON. Now, General, there seems to be a school of thought in the United States which believes that we should withdraw our ground forces or confine our ground forces to our continental limits and offer other nations primarily air and sea support in this battle against communism.

I have been under the impression in your statements before the committee that you do not agree entirely with that thesis. Am I correct?

General MACARTHUR. I didn't get the first part of the question.

Senator JOHNSON. There is a school of thought in the United States which believes that we should confine the bulk of all of our ground forces to the continental United States and that we should provide other nations with nothing but sea and air support in the battle against communism.

Now, I gather from your statements that you do not embrace that theory completely and I am just wondering if I am correct in that assumption.

General MACARTHUR. I believe that it is the gravest possible mistake in the use of the armed forces of a nation to try to draw the lines of demarcation between ground troops, air troops, and navy troops. They are an integrated team.

At one place you may need the preponderance of one element or the other, but the force that we apply should be based upon the com-

plete integration of the potential of those three forces. It is impossible to make such a simplification in my opinion.

LIMITATIONS ON USE OF UNITED STATES GROUND FORCES ABROAD

Senator JOHNSON. Then you would not favor legislative strait-jackets that would place a limitation on the number of ground troops that could be supplied?

General MACARTHUR. Senator, I stand upon my answers. I don't want to be drawn into the political discussions that are prevalent upon that point. As I understand from the press, that is a very heated, mooted thing that is being discussed in the Chambers of Congress; but my own belief is that the elasticity that is necessary is not to be measured by academic or strait-jacket formulas at all.

It depends upon the circumstances of the case and common sense and good judgment should be applied to those circumstances when they arise.

Senator JOHNSON. Now, General, I want to assure you, if you need assurance, that this is certainly not a political question so far as I am concerned. My feeling is that we have a Nation to save and not an election to win.

But no one is more aware of my own inadequacy in certain fields than am I.

Now, when I am called upon to say that thou shalt not provide more than one division or two divisions or one air group or eight air groups, I approach that decision with a great concern, and when I have the opportunity to get the judgment and the advice of a man in whom I have great confidence and who I believe has dedicated his life to one primary purpose—and that is the security of this Nation and the principles upon which it is founded—I would like to have your recommendation as to the wisdom of a committee like this saying to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that we are going to limit you to a specific number of groups to a specific type of fleet, to a specific number of divisions to be sent to this theater or that theater.

I am speaking of the broad principle—I am not speaking as a Democrat or a Republican—I am speaking of the wisdom of a legislative body placing those limitations and those prohibitions upon the men that are charged with formulating our plans and carrying us to victory.

And, as one man who has played a very strong part in both the planning, and as former Chief of Staff, and in the victory we attained in World War II, I should like to have your best judgment, without concern for politics, but only concern for the future of the Nation.

General MACARTHUR. I believe, on questions of the utilization of the military power of the country, within the missions which have been established by the Government, that the Congress would do well to pay the closest attention to the professional advice that is rendered by those services.

If, in any condition, they should disagree with it, why, that is a matter that they should go into carefully.

I believe that the professional subjects should be largely influenced by the advice of the professional heads of the services.

Senator McMAHON. What was the last phrase, General?

Chairman RUSSELL. Professional heads of the services.

Senator McMAHON. Thank you,

General MACARTHUR. As I see it, the question of the disposition of our forces, the question of the utilization of our Armed Forces—that is what you have senior professional men to advise you.

Now, their advice is not iconoclastic. It may not always be correct and, in the wisdom of the Congress, you may want to go over it.

It is quite true that you are the last word. You represent the authority of the voice of the people; but, in general, I should say that the advice of the professional experts should be weighed carefully indeed, and without—unless there are specific reasons to the contrary, that can be elucidated, with reasons—that their advice should be accepted.

SECURITY SITUATION IN OTHER COUNTRIES

Senator JOHNSON. General, as Supreme Commander in the Pacific, were you kept informed, through diplomatic channels or intelligence reports, of the internal political situation in Western Germany, Austria, Yugoslavia, and other iron-curtain countries?

General MACARTHUR. In no particular detail.

I didn't have any responsibilities or connection with those theaters. They are not adjacent to mine; and, of course, only the general information that flows through intelligence channels was available.

Senator JOHNSON. But our potential needs and our commitments in other theaters were matters that you were not aware of the details on, but you don't think that your program would materially affect those commitments, whatever they may be?

General MACARTHUR. No, sir; no, sir.

Senator JOHNSON. And that is because you think the program that you recommend would require very little additional trained men?

General MACARTHUR. That is correct.

Senator JOHNSON. Thank you, General.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General MACARTHUR. I wouldn't say very little additional trained men, Senator; very few additional units.

The casualties and flow of trained men resulting from the savage degree of fighting will probably constantly increase.

ADDITIONAL FORCES REQUESTED TO CARRY OUT MAC ARTHUR RECOMMENDATIONS

Senator JOHNSON. General Marshall said when he appeared before the committee on the troops-to-Europe question that he estimated that our requirements and our needs at that time would be approximately 4 divisions, and he made a firm estimate that we would not be required to send in excess of approximately 100,000 men. I had hoped that I could get from you some specific estimate of the number of additional men that you thought your program would require.

General MACARTHUR. It is quite impossible, Senator. It depends upon what the enemy has. You cannot make a unilateral decision. You have got to have enough force to defeat him; and if he brings in more force, if you fixed an inflexible figure, why, you would just be silly.

Senator JOHNSON. So it could mean a hundred thousand or 500,000?

General MACARTHUR. I couldn't tell you. But I do not believe, I repeat, that as far as combat ground divisions are concerned, that it will need any special additional force of that type.

Senator JOHNSON. Well, then it seems—

General MACARTHUR. I believe that the major thing is to take off the inhibitions and let us use the maximum of force we have.

Senator JOHNSON. And if we do that, in your judgment certainly less than, say, 100,000 men would likely be required?

General MACARTHUR. I wouldn't make any estimate on the number of men. The casualties, as I say, are reaching staggering proportions. I am talking about the number of combat units on the ground.

Senator JOHNSON. Well, General, we have to estimate the number of men required if we embrace these programs, and we not only have to estimate them, we have to be able to supply them. And when you present a positive program, such as you have presented, it is going to be our responsibility to be sure that we have the units and the forces required to carry it out.

Now, if that is going to involve—

General MACARTHUR. I am quite sure, Senator—I repeat—I am quite sure that the program you just enunciated, of the approximately 3½ million men in the Armed Forces, can accomplish anything that I would have in mind without prejudice to other operations.

Senator JOHNSON. And that statement is based on a rather general knowledge of our commitments in other parts of the globe?

General MACARTHUR. Correct. And the additional fact that the major part of the commitments of preparedness in the other parts of the world are fixed at about 2 years hence. So that the troops that are being trained in that 2 years could be used in the Far East without the slightest detriment to anything else; so that, in effect, you could get a much greater proportion of the whole in the period of the next 2 years for use in the Far East than perhaps would be actually necessary to accomplish my plans, without prejudice to any program for the defense of Europe or of the Mediterranean, or any place else, or of the continental United States.

Senator JOHNSON. That may necessitate rather radical revision of our plans. Our present strength is 3 million. We hope to reach 3½, roughly, as quickly as we can, and our target date is July 1 of this year. Now, I gather that your Far Eastern program, in your judgment, could be met and all the needs supplied without infringing in any way on any other commitments we have in any other parts of the globe, and I would like for the record to show that if I am correct.

General MACARTHUR. I believe that the program is quite comprehensive enough to meet the needs in the Far East without any prejudice to other areas.

Senator JOHNSON. And without any increase in the present strength set by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, three million four?

General MACARTHUR. Yes; I believe that the three million and a half strength would encompass that.

Senator JOHNSON. Thank you, General. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator McMahon.

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, I think Senator Hickenlooper is next.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Hickenlooper stated a moment ago that he didn't have any questions.

Senator McMAHON. General, you stated yesterday that communism is our enemy all over the world, and by that you mean——

General MACARTHUR. I didn't catch the first part of the question.

THE ENEMY IS COMMUNISM

Senator McMAHON. I said yesterday you stated that communism is our enemy all over the world. Where is most of the military power located that is held by communism?

General MACARTHUR. Unquestionably in Soviet Russia.

Senator McMAHON. General, I was very much interested in your statement in answer to Senator Johnson when you said—and I have had it typed:

You know the acuteness of modern war is increasing very vividly. It took a long time in the old days before the war machines really began to roll. But with the integration of the world, increase in scientific methods of destruction, the blow falls much quicker; that is, you don't get the time now to prepare that you had in the past. The first blow in the next war may well be the decisive blow. The first blows or the potency of the first blows—and that first blow, you understand, there is no method by which you can avoid the surprise attack of an enemy these days. He hits and then he announces, or he hits and he don't announce. And if you are not ready at that time you might well be overwhelmed before many factors, which I won't attempt to go into, gave you a certain period of time in which you could build up to meet the attack. But with every passing year that diminishes. Therefore, the corollary is with every passing year, as long as you have a maverick running loose in the world, it means that your necessity for preparedness increases unless you can find the formula to settle the whole matter.

If we adopted your plan for China, and if that plan resulted in a pacification of China and Korea, the military force that is possessed by communism would still be the maverick that would be running loose in the world, is that not correct, General?

General MACARTHUR. Yes.

UNITED STATES PREPAREDNESS TO WITHSTAND A SURPRISE ATTACK NOW

Senator McMAHON. You recognize in this statement the necessity for a preparedness to withstand a surprise blow.

I ask you, General, are we now prepared to withstand that surprise blow?

General MACARTHUR. I should say from my general knowledge that we are rather inadequately prepared at the present moment. I base that upon the fact that in the fighting in Korea I have never been supplied the sinews that were necessary to bring it to a decisive conclusion, and as that is the only place in the world we are fighting, if we are not able to supply it there, I assume that deficiencies exist.

Senator McMAHON. And, General, of course the worst blow that this maverick, which we agree on is the Soviet Union, could strike at the free world would be at the production centers of the free world which are located in this country.

I should think they would be the most potent military blows that could be struck, would you not agree?

General MACARTHUR. They would certainly be a very potent blow; yes, sir.

Senator McMAHON. And so the state of our defenses, our civil defenses, our military defenses, to protect these production centers is of extreme importance.

General MACARTHUR. I should say so.

Senator McMAHON. And, therefore, any course of action which might precipitate now that kind of a blow must be weighed with the greatest care.

General MACARTHUR. Correct.

INVITING RUSSIA TO AGGRESSION BY NOT SETTLING KOREAN WAR

Senator McMAHON. Have you taken those circumstances into consideration when you now recommend that we proceed on a course which may bring the Soviet Union into this conflict?

General MACARTHUR. Complete. I believe that if you do not settle successfully what you have started, and are committed to, in Korea, you will tend to incite him to increase not only the tempo of his blow but the time of his blow.

I believe that the program I have suggested will tend to not precipitate a world war, but to prevent it.

I don't believe there is anything that you could do that would accelerate the tempo of possible war with the Soviet than to show weakness in the Far East today.

CASUALTIES IN KOREAN WAR

Senator McMAHON. General, how many casualties have we had in Korea?

General MACARTHUR. The casualties in Korea when I left, the American casualties, the battle casualties, I don't count the disease casualties and other things, but the battle casualties of the American troops were approaching 65,000.

The battle casualties of the South Korean troops were approaching 140,000, as I recall. The battle casualties of the other allies were practically negligible, perhaps, two or three thousand.

Our total casualties, therefore, would be in the neighborhood of a quarter of a million men battle casualties.

I should estimate that the enemy's battle casualties, including the 140,000 to 145,000 prisoners that we held, would probably be close to three times that.

Senator McMAHON. That is about—

General MACARTHUR (interposing). I should therefore estimate that the total battle casualties, which does not, of course, include civil casualties, would approximate a million men. The civil casualties were horrible beyond conception. I wouldn't be able to estimate them; but the probabilities are that they were more than the military casualties.

Senator McMAHON. We have had in our own forces 65,000 casualties, and we have had that—by casualties, of course, you mean killed and wounded, and taken prisoner.

General MACARTHUR. I did not get that.

Senator McMAHON. I say, by battle casualties you mean killed, wounded and taken prisoner.

General MACARTHUR. Or missing.

Senator McMAHON. Or missing.

How many dead, General, in our forces?

General MACARTHUR. I have forgotten the exact figures. It would be impossible to give you an exact figure because you cannot determine

the dead among the missing. As I recall the figures—these are approximations now—the actual killed that had been identified by us were, perhaps, 13,000, something like that; and, as I recall, the missing were, perhaps, 15,000.

My own judgment on the missing is that the heaviest percentage of them are dead.

Senator McMAHON. Well, General—

General MACARTHUR (interposing). The usual estimate, the usual ratio, that prevails as to dead and wounded, I should say would be about 1 to 3.

Senator McMAHON. General, certainly the rate of casualties has been, thank God, tremendously disproportionate. We seem to be imposing about what, would you say, six or seven to one?

General MACARTHUR. I should say that the ultimate casualties inflicted on the enemy would be in about the ratio of 3 to 1.

Senator McMAHON. Three to one?

General MACARTHUR. Three to one.

Senator McMAHON. Despite the fact that we have 65,000 over-all, and you say they have three times that many, or approximately 620,000—I am talking now about the United States forces.

General MACARTHUR. You are talking about American casualties, Senator, when you say 65,000.

Senator McMAHON. I am talking about the American casualties.

General MACARTHUR. The total casualties of the Allies were about a quarter of a million.

Senator McMAHON. I understand that, General; but the total casualties of the North Koreans, and the Chinese, are approximately—

General MACARTHUR. The total casualties, I would estimate, were about three-quarters of a million.

Senator McMAHON. Three-quarters of a million. Of those, there were about 140,000 prisoners, you say?

General MACARTHUR. 140,000 prisoners.

DEGREE OF CHINESE PARTICIPATION IN KOREAN WAR

Senator McMAHON. Do you think, General, that we are engaging the military might of the Chinese at this time in Korea?

General MACARTHUR. I believe that the Chinese nation, the Red nation, is bringing to bear upon the campaign in Korea every possible facility it can amass. It has, as I said yesterday, in answer to a similar question, it has other obligations; it has frontiers to maintain; it has internal conditions that it has to meet; it is not possible to take every military man that China has and put it in Korea, as you can well understand; but I believe they are exercising the complete maximum of their potential.

If we believe the reports that circulate from the Chinese press, they have entered upon not only a conscription program but a violent conscription program. They are seizing men every place they can get them to muster into the service.

The complaints that you see, and gather in certain sections of the Chinese press against the violent methods are increasing.

I believe that they are using every ounce of power to achieve victory in Korea, and that their aim in Korea is the complete destruction of the United Nations forces there, and that they intend to occupy

and administer and govern, if they are successful, every inch of Korean territory.

That program has been repeatedly enunciated by their responsible heads; it has never varied.

GEOGRAPHIC SCOPE OF WAR FRONT IN KOREA

Senator McMAHON. Now, general, that is relatively a narrow front; that is relatively a narrow front, as you would agree, in Korea, as modern war goes, and as we can envision it, that is now being carried on on a rather narrow front.

General MACARTHUR. It depends on what your measure is.

Senator McMAHON. I am talking geographically.

General MACARTHUR. If you are talking in geographic miles——

Senator McMAHON. Yes.

General MACARTHUR. Yes. If you mean by the interests that is involved, the principles that are being settled, the various features, it is a war of large magnitude.

Geographically, it is a contracted sector.

CHANCES OF SOVIET INTERVENTION

Senator McMAHON. Do you think there is any risk, General, if we push the Chinese and the North Koreans back that Russia will come into the war if it is confined to Korea?

General MACARTHUR. She has not come into the war yet.

ATOMIC DESTRUCTION IN JAPAN

Senator McMAHON. General, well, I will ask you this next question. Did you ever in the course of your administration of Japan have occasion to go to Hiroshima or Nagasaki?

General MACARTHUR. I have flown over both places numbers of times.

Senator McMAHON. And, no doubt, General, you are familiar with the casualties that were suffered in those two places?

General MACARTHUR. I am quite familiar. The figures are, of course, conflicting, different figures, but the slaughter was horrible at both places.

Senator McMAHON. I thought that the figure of 80,000 at Hiroshima——

General MACARTHUR. How much?

Senator McMAHON. Eighty thousand at Hiroshima——

General MACARTHUR. Eighty thousand.

Senator McMAHON (continuing). Was accurate.

DEFICIENCY IN CIVIL DEFENSE PROGRAM

General, it has been announced that the atomic weapons of today are of much greater potency than those that were exploded at Hiroshima. We can anticipate in the event of an atomic attack on this country, therefore, if General Vandenberg is correct when he says that 30 percent of the attacking forces of the enemy bombers might be shot down or deflected from their targets, meaning that 70 percent

would get through, that we would have terrific casualties and terrible damage.

General, it is not either your fault or my fault that the Civil Defense Administrator said the other day that too many people are still playing ostrich in the face of atomic warfare. He said:

No matter what they are told, they are unwilling to accept the facts that confront us. They would rather think about something more pleasant. Unless the people of this country, whoever they are and wherever they live, take their heads out of the sand, no civil defense program can be successful. If we don't have a home front thoroughly protected clear across the Nation by an adequate civil defense program, we can lose the next war.

General, we have not that program in existence at the present time; by your own statement, which I have read to you you have stated that if the enemy hits by surprise that that may well be the decisive blow.

You have stated, in answer to my questions, that you cannot, because you have no intelligence on the subject, tell us that Soviet Russia will not enter this war if we enlarge it to the mainland of China.

You have stated, General, that if we are not ready, we may be overwhelmed because we would not have the period in which we could build up the attack.

READINESS TO PRECIPITATE WORLD WAR III

Now, in view of all that, General, don't you think it would be the part of wisdom to get ourselves into that kind of a situation where we can avoid this final decision blow before we take the chance of precipitating this struggle?

General MACARTHUR. I believe this, Senator: That the initiatory action of your potential enemy is already under way. I believe if you don't meet it in Korea you are doomed to destruction. I believe it is already started, and if you let it grow and increase by the enemy, you will get engulfed.

As far as the initial stage of an attack is concerned, you must understand that our own preparedness, atomic preparedness, is far in excess of that of the potential enemy at the present time; that within hours after he launched, we could counterattack. Every disastrous and gloomy prophecy that you have made you can multiply against the enemy.

Senator McMAHON. General, I have not made them; I have read from the Civil Defense Administrator's statement.

General MACARTHUR. Or those that you read, then.

There is no possibility of the potential enemy being able to take out our capacity for immediate counterattack, and that capacity at the present time as far as atomic warfare is concerned is infinitely greater than that of the enemy.

Senator McMAHON. Have you received—

General MACARTHUR. I repeat what I have said—that I believe the best way to stop any predatory or surprise attack by the Soviet Union or any other potential enemy is to bring this war in Korea to a successful end, to impress upon the potential enemy that the power we possess is sufficient if he goes to war to overpower him. I believe that the evidences of weakness that we might show if we accept defeat, or this unconscionable continuation of slaughter with no definite mission at the end, will produce the very effect which you would of all others probably be most anxious to avoid.

I have said that, Senator, not once or twice, but I must have said it half a dozen times.

Senator McMAHON. Yes, General, and I don't doubt that you will say it many times more before this thing is finally decided. And upon the wisdom of this decision, I say again, may rest the survival of our people.

You stated yesterday that you did not believe that war was inevitable.

General MACARTHUR. That is correct.

Senator McMAHON. You have just stated that you believe their attack is now under way, if I understood you correctly.

General MACARTHUR. I said, Senator, that that might be the initiatory reason to persuade them that our weakness—we felt our weakness was so great that their military potential was sufficient to warrant their attacking us.

Senator McMAHON. Now, General, both you and I have stated that we do not want this total war which will involve millions of casualties, the destruction, as you so eloquently said yesterday, of everything that we hold near and dear—I do not pretend to quote you, sir, but I think that is what you meant.

You stated to Senator Johnson that it means that our necessity for preparedness increases unless you can find the formula to settle the whole matter.

EFFECT OF SUCCESS OF MACARTHUR RECOMMENDATIONS ON UNITED STATES ARMED PREPAREDNESS

New, General, again in the event of the success of your proposals in the Far East, I again call to your attention the fact that the main military potential of communism is in the Soviet Union. I think it is fair to say that the armaments race in which we are engaged with them would intensify rather than minimize in the event of the success, the total success, of your program in China.

General MACARTHUR. I disagree with you 100 percent. I believe it would act as the greatest possible deterrent upon the enemy if we were successful in stopping this predatory attack in the Far East. I believe if we do not do it, it would be an incitation to him to attack another area.

Senator McMAHON. Do you believe, General, that the armaments level could be reduced in America if we are successful in your program in China?

General MACARTHUR. I have never even hinted it, Senator.

Senator McMAHON. And so the arms race would go on, General; wouldn't it?

General MACARTHUR. I don't know what you mean by an arms race.

Senator McMAHON. Well, I mean by that the business of staying ahead, as we should stay ahead, General. Just let's have it in the record, lest there be any mistake made, I have voted to sustain every single measure to increase our armed strength, without excepting, without voting for any economy cuts, so I say that if your program is successful, General, we will have to keep up our expenditures for armaments just as long as the military potential of the Soviet Union

and the stockpile of atomic weapons grows and grows and grows.

General MACARTHUR. You would in any event, Senator. If you imply in your statement, which I read into it, that if we yield in the Far East we will not be obliged to take preparedness measures, I disagree with you 100 percent.

Senator McMAHON. General, if you will pardon me, sir——

General MACARTHUR. As long as the Soviet Union strengthens.

Senator McMAHON. I would like to get it on the record now that I do not stand for an abandonment of the Far East. I do not stand for that.

General MACARTHUR. We certainly agree on that, Senator.

ABOLITION OF WAR AS THE FINAL SOLUTION

Senator McMAHON. We certainly do. Now, General, have you any hope for us in finding the formula which will settle the whole matter?

General MACARTHUR. I tried to expound it yesterday, Senator.

It is the abolition of war.

It takes long decades, of course, before that could be accomplished; but you have to make a start. There is no halfway substitute. You, of all men, should know that, as the expert in atomic warfare.

Senator McMAHON. Just the legislative representative, General; not too expert.

General MACARTHUR. And, the sooner we tackle that basic problem—it is no more difficult to settle that problem than it is these various problems that come up, that are corollary to it.

I believe that that should be done.

There was great evidence of that in Japan.

You spoke of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

ABOLITION OF WAR IN JAPAN

So the Japanese people, more than any other people in the world, understand what an atomic warfare means. It wasn't academic with them. They counted their dead, and they buried them.

They, of their own volition, wrote into their constitution a provision outlawing war.

When their Prime Minister came to me, Mr. Shidehara, and said: "I have long contemplated and believed," and he was a very wise old man—he died recently—"long contemplated and believed that the only solution to this problem is to do away with war."

He said: "With great reluctance I advance the subject to you, as a military man, because I am convinced that you would not accept it; but," he said, "I would like to endeavor, in the constitution we are drawing up, to put in such a provision."

And I couldn't help getting up and shaking hands with the old man, and telling him that I thought that was one of the greatest constructive steps that could possibly be taken.

I told him that it was quite possible that the world would mock him—this is a debunking age, a cynical age, as you know—that they would not accept it; that it would be an object of derision, which it was; that it would take great moral stamina to go through with it, and in the end they might not be able to hold the line; but I encouraged him and they wrote that provision in.

And, if there was any one provision in that constitution which appealed to the popular sentiment of the people of Japan, it was that provision.

There was a warrior tribe which, for centuries, had pursued war, and successful war; but the great concept, the losses, the great lessons the bomb had taught them, had been understood, and they were trying to apply it.

OUTLAWING WAR IN THE WORLD

Now, the world should have common sense enough, when it surveys the last two wars, to understand what I tried to bring out yesterday, and my own thought—that it had become the method of suicide for modern civilization, if they engaged in this type of combat.

I therefore believe that time is running out on us.

I said, at the end of the world war, the Second World War, that we have had our last chance, and I believe it firmly, and, as I said yesterday, I believe that 99 percent of the people of the world believe that.

It is the establishment of the mechanics that are so difficult.

That, Senator, is my suggested solution: That you try, through the United Nations, or some other forum, to get an agreement with the nations that they will accept that formula and try to have their constitutional bodies, their legislatures, debate it and see who are the people that stand out against it.

I understand thoroughly that no one nation is going to put it into effect, until practically all do—all the great nations do, anyway.

The great nations would set the norm.

If the four or five great nations should do it, it would be impossible for anyone else to violate it.

Discuss that, and if you have to pass such a legislative fiat, do it conditionally, upon the others—take the moral leadership of the world, which is ours, and try something like that.

We are not making great progress along the normal lines of diplomacy.

That, Senator, if I should have the temerity to make a suggestion, and I only do it in response to the questions that have been asked, would be my answer.

Senator TOBEY. May I interrupt a moment for an observation?

Chairman RUSSELL. Does the Senator from Connecticut permit the Senator from New Hampshire to make an observation?

Senator McMAHON. Of course.

Senator TOBEY. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I hope you feel as I do that the committee ought to rule in very clear-cut and definite fashion that this statement that the general just made to us is the most moving statement, going to the real fundamentals of the world's future, that it should be incorporated in the record verbatim, in toto, with no exceptions.

Chairman RUSSELL. No question but that that should be done, Senator.

EFFORTS TO AGREE ON DISARMAMENT

Senator McMAHON. General, I am in complete agreement with what you have said. I, too—and I am sure most of my colleagues—am looking to find a way so that this third and final and complete catastrophe will not come upon the world.

There has been, general—there have been steps taken by this country such as the so-called Baruch plan, which became the United Nations plan for the control of atomic energy, with which you are familiar.

I think it is important in these hearings, general, that we see what areas of agreement we have as well as areas of disagreement. I know you agree to that.

General MACARTHUR. Correct.

Senator McMAHON. And we have also had the President of the United States, particularly in his speech at the dedication of the United Nations, go on record as being in favor of a plan which will beat the swords into plowshares so that the world will not know war any more.

The President on that occasion pointed out that if the armaments expenditures that we were making could be reduced and that problem, that great expense minimized, that we would have the wherewithal to try to bring a little more food, a little better hovels, to these people whom you suggested in China were being moved to action by that condition.

General, I made that suggestion in February of 1950 when we announced that we were going about the building of a hydrogen weapon which the scientists tell us could be built, which if used might kill 10 million people; and I suggested it was high time that we started a moral crusade for peace and that we make an offer in the United Nations to get effective disarmament and at the same time develop a pool for the improving of the living standards of the people of the earth.

Does that come within the concept, General, of what you would call moral leadership?

General MACARTHUR. That is a step in that direction. It is quite short of the program which I have suggested as embracing the abolition of war.

Senator McMAHON. What is your program, General? I thought that it was based upon effective disarmament.

General MACARTHUR. It would be based upon the abolition of war itself.

Senator McMAHON. Do you believe that we can have war abolished and great armaments existing in the world of the kind and character that you and I know about?

General MACARTHUR. I believe if you abolish war, the only armaments you will need will be the police and constabulary armaments to keep good conduct within the confines of your own geographical areas. That would be a problem entirely different from the international war.

Senator McMAHON. I think, General, that we agree that one of the causes of war which would produce that war which you and I want to abolish and all decent men want to abolish, is the armaments that exist in the world today.

General MACARTHUR. That is correct.

Senator McMAHON. Thank you.

Chairman CONNALLY. Who is the next questioner?

Senator WILEY. Senator Morse.

Senator MORSE. I am next.

Chairman CONNALLY. Go ahead.

Senator MORSE. I want to say before asking any questions that I have heard a great many witnesses in my life and I have never heard a more able one, a more frank one, nor one who obviously testified with greater sincerity than you are testifying at this hearing.

If I let my subjective feelings control me, I wouldn't ask any questions at all, because I have such a feeling of humility in asking you questions that I would prefer personally not to ask them.

However, I sit in the Senate with obligations, I feel, to do what I can to find the answers to these questions that have created what is undoubtedly, I think, the greatest division and controversy probably in half a century.

NATURE OF QUESTIONS

Therefore I want you to know, General, that as I ask these questions, I ask them absolutely impersonally. Any question that I ask does not carry with it any implication at all of any judgment of mind.

I have sought to work out—as I have studied this controversy—a set of questions that can be used not only in the examination of you, sir, but can be used also in the examination of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other witnesses. What I want to try to find out is how we can resolve any differences, if they exist, as I believe they do, between the proposals that you offer for the settlement of this controversy and the proposals that other Government spokesmen offer.

Some of my questions may appear to be a bit repetitious, but if they do, I have this comment to make about them: First, I would not ask them if I were perfectly satisfied on the record as it presently stands; and, second, I make no apology for asking anything that might seem to be a little bit repetitious because I have yet to hear comment on a question on the same subject matter that has been asked you on which you have not given further enlightenment to this committee.

When I went home last night I felt a little sad about the fact that I had a little feeling that I was responsible in large measure for making it necessary for you to come back today. In view of some of the great statements you have made here this morning, I do not have that feeling of sadness any more at all. I do not feel that I should apologize to you or anybody else, because I think you have made some great statements here this morning that are going to be of great help to this committee in meeting the obligations that are ours.

TECHNIQUES OF COMMUNISM

So with that as a preliminary statement, adding only this: that I do have this feeling about one of the major points that you have made; namely, that the enemy of the American people and of our Government is the Communist threat world-wide to the preservation of the free way of life. I think it exists on a global basis. It exists not only in connection with the particular armed struggle we are conducting in Asia at the present time, but also within our own country. In fact, I have said many times—I only make this comment so that you will understand at least the basis from which I question as far as my personal philosophy is concerned—I have made the statement many times, and repeat now, that the Russian pattern is never to move

from the outside in until it thinks it is also in a position to move from the inside out.

General MACARTHUR. Yes.

Senator MORSE. That is just part of the Russian pattern. And I think as we see what she has done in the various satellite countries she has swallowed—and I agree with you that communism is our enemy. I would agree also that communism is being implemented primarily, as far as a motivating force in the world today is concerned, by the Kremlin. Therefore, we have to keep our eyes on the Kremlin as the motivating power behind the advance that communism is seeking to make as a threat to freedom.

Now that is all I am going to say by way of a preliminary statement, and now I turn to my questions. I will present them just as a lawyer, with the same impersonality that I would present them in the court room.

Do you agree, General, that we are, in fact and in effect, at war in Korea?

General MACARTHUR. Yes, sir.

FORMAL DECLARATION OF WAR IN KOREA

Senator MORSE. Do you believe that we should have declared war against the North Koreans or against the Communist Chinese?

General MACARTHUR. I believe that we actually practiced war. It is; our actual practice, of course, is limited.

Senator MORSE. That is right.

General MACARTHUR. That is one of the criticisms that I would make.

Senator MORSE. But as far as the operation itself is concerned, we are fighting just as much a war in Korea—

General MACARTHUR. As though it were legally declared.

Senator MORSE. As if there had been a declaration.

General MACARTHUR. Yes, sir.

Senator MORSE. It raises of course the constitutional question as to whether or not our operations in Korea should not be based on a formal declaration of war? Is it your opinion that there should have been a declaration of war?

General MACARTHUR. Of course the forces on our side that are operating in Korea are in accordance with the mandate of the United Nations, and the action of the United Nations might well be regarded as their declaration of war.

The resolution that was passed by the Security Council and afterward confirmed I believe by the General Assembly sometime in October might well be regarded as a declaration of war. It certainly was a declaration of intent of the United Nations.

Now I am not familiar enough with the United Nations to know what their basic provisions are, whether they have to go into the formality of a declaration of war such as international law formerly at least required of an individual nation or not.

I would say that the action of the United Nations amounted to a declaration of war in Korea at that time. At that time of course the only actual enemy was the North Korean force.

Senator MORSE. Is it your view, General, that now that we are a member of the United Nations we can become formally involved in a

war without exercising the constitutional process of a declaration of war by the Congress?

General MACARTHUR. We actually did. Whether that is legal or constitutional would be quite over my head.

Senator MORSE. Please understand I am simply trying to raise the point for the record that we are in war and we are in war without any declaration of war having been made.

I understood from your speech—and it was a great one—before the joint meeting of the Congress, that you recognized that it was sound to go into Korea when we did.

You do not quarrel with the right or power of the President of the United States to make the decision that he made sending us back into Korea?

General MACARTHUR. I wouldn't challenge any action that the President of the United States might take, sir.

Senator MORSE. That is under his power as Commander in Chief you would assume that he had the authority to go back into Korea if he decided that it was necessary to do so to protect American lives, interests and property?

General MACARTHUR. I would unhesitatingly obey his orders, as I did.

DEVELOPMENT OF DIVISION OF KOREA

Senator MORSE. Now General, nothing has been mentioned in this hearing to my recollection about the original steps that were taken that led to involvement between us and the North Koreans and what I have always felt has been their backers behind the scenes, namely, Soviet Russia.

Therefore I ask you would you make a statement for the record as to your understanding of how it came to pass that the thirty-eighth parallel was selected as the division line for jurisdiction between the North Koreans and South Koreans?

General MACARTHUR. Toward the conclusion of the Second World War, I was directed to put troops into Korea. I sent the Twenty-fourth Corps under General Hodge.

Our orders were to land, secure and proceed north. Simultaneously the Soviet forces who were at that time in alliance with us, were pressing down from the north; it was a matter of general coincidence that those two forces approached contact in the neighborhood of the thirty-eighth parallel, and the thirty-eighth parallel as far as I know was merely selected as a convenient means of delimiting the activities of the two forces involved.

Senator MORSE. Was that point of demarkation as to military and civil jurisdiction agreed upon by the military commanders in the field and then subsequently affirmed by their respective governments, or was it agreed upon by their governments in the first place and then made effective by an order to the commanders in the field?

✓ General MACARTHUR. As far as our forces were concerned, my recollection is that we received the directive from our Government. What steps our Government may have taken with other governments along that line I am unacquainted with, but there is no question that as far as the theater troops were concerned, we received the directive.

There was no agreement or contact by us with the local Soviet commander.

Senator MORSE. I have read in various places at various times statements to the effect that the thirty-eighth parallel has a division line in Korea in respect to jurisdiction of the United States and the Soviet Union was a military decision in the first instance.

That is why I am asking this line of questions. I am to understand now—check me if my understanding is not correct—it is my understanding that the commanders in the field were confronted with the military fact that as our troops moved northward and the Soviets moved southward, they were going to meet.

General MACARTHUR. That is correct.

Senator MORSE. And the indication was they were going to meet at about the thirty-eighth parallel.

General MACARTHUR. That is correct.

Senator MORSE. They so informed their superiors, at least our commanders so informed their superiors in our Government and then a directive was issued by the appropriate civilian officials of our Government that that line should be marked out as the partition line for Korea. Is that a fair statement? If not, correct it.

General MACARTHUR. I don't think there was anything emanated from the field on the question. I think that we received the directive.

I assume that it was largely, fundamentally at least upon the military situation which existed, and it would be my guess that the high military authorities probably suggested the line in that vicinity. It was a military factuality that the troops would meet at about that region.

NEED FOR RUSSIAN SUPPORT TO END WAR IN PACIFIC

Senator MORSE. At that stage of the war against the Imperial Japanese Government, General, did you meet very much resistance as you moved north in Korea toward the thirty-eighth parallel?

General MACARTHUR. Negligible.

Senator MORSE. The participation of the Russian forces from the north was the result of their carrying out an agreement or authorization to enter into the war in Asia consummated at Yalta, is that your understanding?

General MACARTHUR. I presume so, sir. Russia declared war.

Senator MORSE. Following the Yalta conference.

General MACARTHUR. And she moved in, following Yalta; yes. I know nothing about the details of Yalta.

Senator MORSE. As the commander in the Pacific after the bomb was dropped, did you need the Russian forces to help you finish the war?

General MACARTHUR. No, sir. Their contribution as far as the decisiveness of ending the war was negligible.

RESPONSIBILITY FOR TRAINING SOUTH KOREAN ARMY

Senator MORSE. General, who was responsible for building and training a South Korean Army after the surrender of Japan?

General MACARTHUR. When it was decided to train a South Korean Army, it was first a military mission was selected. The last period of the training was under the control of our State Department.

When we evacuated the troops from South Korea, the American interests there were locally centered in the American Ambassador. The head of our military mission was under his general control.

The technical details of training and so on of course were his own. My own command was charged with the domiciliary arrangements for that mission. The code of training was that which was prevalent in the American Army. The supplies that were given and the degree of equipment of the South Korean Army was a decision made in Washington.

Senator MORSE. One reads occasionally, at least I have in the past, that the responsibility for training the South Korean Army was your responsibility as commander in the Pacific and as commander of SCAP. That is why I asked the question.

General MACARTHUR. Not in the slightest, Senator. I didn't have an ounce of responsibility in Korea after it became a republic except to make the domiciliary arrangements for the mission and to evacuate in case of emergency the American nationals in South Korea.

The decision as to the time of evacuation was to be made by the American ambassador. He did make that decision and we did evacuate over 2,000 Americans before the intervention in Korea.

RELATIVE STRENGTH OF SOUTH KOREAN AND NORTH KOREAN ARMIES

Senator MORSE. General, what explanation would you give to the fact, if it is a fact, that the South Korean Army was never trained to the high degree of efficiency and strength as was the North Korean Army?

General MACARTHUR. I think that the explanation is quite clear, if you understand the basic conditions that existed in Korea.

There was an occupation by the Russians of North Korea, and an occupation by the Allies of South Korea.

The friction between the two sections grew, and in order to preserve the geographical limitations, both sides organized what might be called light troops. They were of the nature of border patrols, a little stronger than the normal constabulary, but not comparable to troops of the line.

There had been, for over a year before the actual conflict, a growing degree of irritation on that border. It had culminated in isolated small unit attacks, patrol attacks, by both sides, sometimes of battalion size, in which those two forces had pretty carefully matched themselves, and which both forces fundamentally realized that they were pretty safe from the other.

But back of that security force that the North Koreans had along the thirty-eighth parallel, there was organized a new army. There was organized an army of a nucleus of veterans that had been fighting for years in Manchuria or Mongolia; there were many Koreans; there were men of other nationalities, mercenaries, mercenary types of men who made their living by combat.

That force was carefully organized; that force was carefully trained and drilled, quite possibly just north of the Yalu—certainly, in Manchuria. It was completely organized by the Soviets with supplies.

It was a smart, as efficient, and as able a force as I have ever seen in the field. That force could not have been launched on its combat

mission without the full concurrence, not only of the North Korean Government but of Red China and of the Soviet Union.

When it struck, it struck like a cobra. It passed through their own security forces. As I recall, their security forces were organized into what they call four brigades. These brigades, in strength, were about the same as the North Korean division, but of a different type of organization. They passed through those people. The South Koreans were no match for them at all, and the disposition by the South Koreans of their logistic potential was extraordinarily poor.

LOGISTICAL MISTAKES OF SOUTH KOREANS

They had put their supplies and equipment close to the thirty-eighth parallel. They hadn't developed any positions in depth. Everything between the thirty-eighth parallel and Seoul was their area of depot.

When they lost that immediate line, they lost their supplies. They were not able apparently to destroy them en masse; so that at one initial stroke this North Korean Army had a new supply base in the area between the thirty-eighth parallel and Seoul, which enabled them to press south with the full strength of their base being immediately behind them; they no longer had to rely upon the long distance from the Yalu to get their supplies down.

When we intervened, the circumstances as far as I was concerned were these: I was summoned to a telecom conference from Washington. It was the first time I had ever in person been summoned to such a conference.

EVENTS AT BEGINNING OF KOREAN WAR

At that conference I received the orders initiating our entrance into Korea. I immediately flew over. We still had a field at Suwon and I pushed forward from Suwon to the Han, the outskirts of Seoul; and at that time it was quite apparent to me that the South Korean Army had been so hard hit that it was completely disintegrated and in full flight.

I felt that the line of the Han could not be maintained. I felt that it was entirely problematical whether we could save any remnants of the South Korean Army or establish any position in Korea.

My directives were to establish a beachhead in the neighborhood of Pusan and to take such steps as I felt I could within the means I possessed to support the Korean Government and help maintain the South Koreans.

I was reminded at the time that my resource for the time being was practically limited to what I had and that I must regard the security of Japan as a fundamental and basic policy.

I threw in troops from the Twenty-fourth Division by air in the hope of establishing a loci of resistance around which I could rally the fast retreating South Korean forces.

I also hoped by that arrogant display of strength to fool the enemy into belief that I had a much greater resource at my disposal than I did.

I managed to throw in a part of two battalions of infantry, who put up a magnificent resistance before they were destroyed—a resistance which resulted, perhaps, in one of the most vital successes that we had.

The enemy undoubtedly could not understand that we would make an effort with such a small force.

Instead of rushing rapidly forward to Pusan, which he could have reached within a week, without the slightest difficulty, he stopped to deploy his artillery across the Han River.

We had destroyed the bridges. It took him days to do that.

THE PUSAN BEACHHEAD

We gained 10 days by that process, before he had deployed in line of battle along the 150-mile front with Suwon as the pivotal point.

By that time, I had brought forward the rest of the Twenty-fourth Division, under General Dean. I gave him orders to delay the advance of the enemy until I could bring the First Cavalry Division and the Twenty-fifth Division over from Japan.

He fought a very desperate series of isolated combats in which both he, and a large part of that division, were destroyed.

By that time we had landed the Twenty-fifth Division at Pusan, and it was moving forward by rail. And we landed the First Cavalry Division on the east coast, and they moved over and formed a line of battle. I do not think that the history of the war will show a more magnificent effort against what should have been overwhelming odds as those two divisions displayed.

By that time the Eighth Army command had moved over under a very indomitable leader, General Walker. From that time on I never had the slightest doubt about our ability to hold a beachhead. And on July 19 in the first communiqué that I recall I issued, I predicted that we would not be driven into the sea.

We gradually built up. But the campaign you know, and I will not go into. But those were the initial features.

Ultimately we took out of Jaapn the three of the four divisions we had.

When I conceived the idea of the Inchon envelopment, in order to accumulate the necessary troops, I have explained how I reorganized the Seventh Division, which left Japan without any combat troops. The reaction of the Japanese was magnificent. They not only morally and spiritually supported everything that we did, but all of the incidental friction of democracy, such as labor struggles and everything, without any word from me, ceased at once. The entire nation spiritually placed itself behind the United Nations to do what it could under the restrictions of occupation and policy directives of the Far Eastern Commission.

Senator MORSE. General, I think that is another great statement for the record that you have just made, and leads me on to the next question.

Chairman RUSSELL. Gentlemen, arrangements have been made for us to have a spot of lunch here whenever it meets the convenience of the committee or of our witness, General MacArthur.

Senator MORSE. Whatever meets the wishes of the chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. We might terminate but I have another matter before suspending. The photographers are very anxious that they be permitted to take some photographs during the recess while we are here. I will leave that to General MacArthur and this committee. I told Colonel Galusha to tell them that we will not have any such

stampede that we have had in the past, and if he could work out a system, I would submit it to the committee; otherwise I would tell them they could not come in. They have agreed to limit their numbers to three to come into the committee room. Having been able to get down to that number, I am submitting it to both General MacArthur and to the committee. If it will disturb you in the slightest, General, I hope you will feel perfectly free to say so; and if the committee does not want to have the photographers in now, we can wait until we recess this afternoon.

General MACARTHUR. Any decision you make, Mr. Chairman, is mine.

Chairman RUSSELL. I perhaps have a personal interest in the matter, General. The photographers have advised me through Colonel Galusha they want a picture of me with you. I was squeezed out of the line of fire on Monday when these hearings commenced. Naturally I am quite flattered that they would ask to have a picture of General MacArthur and me.

Senator STENNIS. I move we bring them in.

Senator WILEY. No politics.

Chairman RUSSELL. I have not mentioned politics since this hearing began and I do not intend to mention or be affected by politics at this stage of the proceedings. That is purely a personal matter, and I so said in my prefatory statement.

Senator WILEY. I am willing to admit, Mr. Chairman, if I could have had a picture with him in the last campaign in Wisconsin, it would have helped me a lot.

Chairman RUSSELL. I can well understand.

General MACARTHUR. I expected Senator Fulbright to say "What good would it do for an Arkansas man to go up to Wisconsin election?"

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, gentlemen, we will stand in recess now until 1:20.

All right, Senator Knowland.

CHANGING THE SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF CERTAIN TESTIMONY

Senator KNOWLAND. I just wanted to report that Senator McMahon and I went down to see Admiral Davis, and on one of the points which dealt with the TWX, he agreed that that information could very well be made public, but it should be paraphrased.

I asked him if the Defense Establishment itself would undertake to paraphrase it and furnish that to us, and he said he would immediately take that up with them.

The point, on that—the other point at issue—he still felt that should be excluded. I asked him to rediscuss the matter with General Bradley and let us have a report back. He has promised to do that, and I think we will, at least, have that determination by this afternoon's session.

Senator BRIDGES. May I ask, is that the question of the areas which are not——

Senator KNOWLAND. That is the question dealing with the sanctuary within——

Senator BRIDGES. Korea.

Senator KNOWLAND (continuing). Korea.

Chairman RUSSELL. That is the only issue, as I understand it, that remains unresolved at the present?

Senator KNOWLAND. Of the two points that we took up.

Chairman RUSSELL. That is, as of the first day's hearings. Did you raise any—

Senator KNOWLAND. We have not raised any on the subsequent hearings; and I think, generally, as I have gone over them, I quite agree with him on those matters that he had excluded, but except for these two—

Senator BRIDGES. On the areas within Korea, the Russians know it, the Chinese Reds know it, the North Korean Communists know it, and most of us knew it. I do not see how it can affect security.

Senator KNOWLANDS. And I say in fairness the admiral has some reasons which at least appear to him to be valid. I believe that he is doing a very conscientious job and has cut very little out of this record, and certainly, I think so far as the committee is concerned, we should reserve judgment until he has talked with General Bradley again, and then perhaps we can have a discussion before the committee.

I am personally not convinced by the arguments he made, but he has some valid arguments.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, in accordance with the procedure that was announced heretofore, if the admiral does not get clearance from the Department of Defense, the admiral will present his views to the committee, and the committee will then take action as to whether or not the matter should be released.

The committee will now stand in recess until 1:20.

(Whereupon, the committee recessed at 12:45 to reconvene at 1:20.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

Chairman RUSSELL. The committee will come to order, please.

At the time that the recess was taken, Senator Morse was engaged in interrogating General MacArthur.

Senator, will you proceed?

Senator MORSE. General, is it not true that shortly after the partition of Korea along the thirty-eighth parallel, the Russians dropped an iron curtain of nonaccessibility in northern Korea, as far as Allied people were concerned?

General MACARTHUR. Completely and absolutely.

Senator MORSE. Has it been your observation that the dropping of an iron curtain along the borders of a satellite country is part of the Russian pattern?

General MACARTHUR. Completely.

DISPARITY BETWEEN NORTH KOREANS AND SOUTH KOREAN FORCES

Senator MORSE. Is it not true, as you have already indicated, in your testimony, that following the dropping of that iron curtain along the thirty-eighth parallel, there was trained, in North Korea, or possibly on the other side of the Yalu, Communist forces, making use of North Koreans that had previously served in the Manchurian army, and that when the Russians subsequently made their great worldwide propaganda gesture of removing their forces from North Korea,

this Russian-trained Communist force of North Koreans moved into North Korea?

General MACARTHUR. Shortly afterward; yes, sir.

Senator MORSE. Is it not true that during the entire time that this Communist army was being trained behind the newly established Russian iron curtain along the thirty-eighth parallel, the United States was carrying on a military program in South Korea which consisted, for the most part, of training what might be characterized as a police force for the handling of internal disturbances within South Korea?

General MACARTHUR. Largely so, yes.

Senator MORSE. As a result of the great differences between Russian policy in North Korea, and American policy in South Korea, is it not true that when the break-through that started the Korean War, occurred, the North Koreans were in a much more powerful military position than were the South Koreans?

General MACARTHUR. Very much more so.

Senator MORSE. Is it true, General, as far as supplying military equipment to the South Koreans during the period of so-called American occupation of South Korea, that the decisions as to the supplying of military equipment did not rest with your command, but rested with Washington?

General MACARTHUR. Correct.

REQUEST OF SUPPLIES FOR SOUTH KOREA PRIOR TO OUTBREAK

Senator MORSE. Now, General, do you recall whether or not prior to the Korean outbreak, a request was made by General Lemnitzer, to release military supplies to Japan for immediate shipment to South Korea?

General MACARTHUR. Will you repeat that?

Senator MORSE. I will rephrase the question.

Do you recall, General, whether or not prior to the Korean outbreak, a request was made of you, for the release of military supplies and equipment from Japan, for immediate shipment to South Korea, by General Lemnitzer?

General MACARTHUR. I have no recollection of it, Senator.

DECISION TO SEND UNITED STATES GROUND FORCES TO KOREA

Senator MORSE. General, at the time of the North Korean aggression, it was necessary for us shortly thereafter to send American troops into Korea.

Am I correct in my understanding that after your personal reconnaissance, based upon a message or directive from Washington, you came to the conclusion that the South Koreans couldn't possibly hold along the line of the break-through, and that it was subsequent to your personal reconnaissance that the President's previous directive was changed to include the sending of ground troops into Korea?

General MACARTHUR. That is my recollection.

Senator MORSE. It is true, is it not, that the President's order in the first instance was to make use of the Air Force and the Navy in support of the South Koreans and the first order did not include ground troops.

General MACARTHUR. The first order, as I recall, Senator, directed that we should use the Air and Navy and also had the directive that we should hold the beachhead at Pusan.

As I recall, I reported back after my reconnaissance that it would be impossible to hold that beachhead without the use of ground troops.

Senator MORSE. Therefore, on the basis of that report, your superiors authorized you to make use of such ground troops as you could spare.

General MACARTHUR. That is my recollection.

Senator MORSE. As I go along, General, I will from time to time indicate, because I want it in the record, the purpose of any particular question, not only because I think the record should show it, but because I think it might be helpful to you to expand any answer you may wish to make.

The purpose of the last question I asked you was to get into this record your answer to comments that we have heard from time to time in this country that the responsibility for sending ground troops into Korea in the first instance was your responsibility in that it was based upon your recommendation.

But your answer is that after your personal reconnaissance you saw the situation there and recognized that you couldn't hold the Pusan beachhead, which order to you was contained in the first directive, unless you used ground forces to do it, and you so recommended to Washington, and that recommendation included authorization to use those ground forces, if you were going to use them, wherever you thought it was best to use them in order to protect a beachhead at Pusan.

General MACARTHUR. That is correct, sir. The estimate that must have been made in Washington, that the South Korean troops, ground troops, with the assistance of our Navy and Air, would be sufficient to accomplish our mission of establishing a beachhead was erroneous. The South Korean troops did not have the power to do it. The Air and the Navy, as auxiliaries to them, did not bring up sufficient power to hold that beachhead.

To carry out that mission we had to use our troops. As a matter of fact, we had to use them in great profusion, as you know, later.

Senator MORSE. General, the troops that were available to you for immediate use in Korea following the authorization to use ground forces necessarily were such troops as you had under your command in Japan?

General MACARTHUR. That is correct, sir.

EXTENT OF TRAINING OF TROOPS FIRST SENT INTO KOREA

Senator MORSE. It has been said that the troops that you had to send in Korea in the early days and weeks of the Korean War were troops that were not seasoned in that they were not battle-trained and many of them had not received a great deal of military training before they had to go into battle.

I think it would be good for the record if you would comment on the problem that confronted you as commander in respect to the previous training of the troops that you had available to send into Korea at that time.

General MACARTHUR. The troops in Japan had been practically relieved of all occupation duties nearly a year previously to their introduction into the campaign in Korea. The Eighth Army had been released from its occupation duties and given the mission of being placed in an excellent state of professional efficiency. That was carried out by General Walker with great ability.

Those troops had had about 10 months of the most intensive training. They were as good as any troops I have ever known in my life short of the troops that have combat experience. The great difficulty with that command wasn't in the training or the efficacy of the troops.

It was in the way they had been skeletonized and emasculated in their organization. The regiments generally speaking, instead of having three battalions, only had two battalions. The batteries, the artillery battalions, instead of having the normal number of batteries, usually had only one battery. The actual strength of the troops as compared with a combat organization was probably not more than 50 percent thereof.

The efforts, the economies that were being practiced had reduced the divisions to what might be almost called cadre strength. They were suddenly, without the slightest warning, picked up and put into combat, and as a result there wasn't a fraction of the efficiency they would have had had they had their full organization and their full strengths.

Under the handicaps that they had, I have looked back with amazement at the success that they achieved.

Senator MORSE. And they were the only troops you had available?

General MACARTHUR. They were the only troops that were available not only to me but practically in the Pacific. There were one or two regiments that we picked up from Pearl Harbor, the Fifth Infantry, for instance.

Now we did have, of course, as rapidly as they could get out there, we got the First Marine Division. One combat team of the First Marine Division went into action as I recall some time in August, and the other two combat divisions reached us just about the time that we were launching the Inchon operation.

Those units—it's a magnificent division—were in good organizational shape. They were at strength with officers, they were as fine as you could expect, but the other troops that I had, all the troops in my command, none of them are up to strength yet.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Will the gentleman yield for a question on that point?

Senator MORSE. I yield.

DIFFICULTY IN TANK WARFARE

Senator SALTONSTALL. I would be very interested, General, right in connection with that, to have you elaborate very briefly on a point that came up many times. Is it true that the tanks and the matériel with which these troops were equipped that were first sent over there was of a very light caliber because of the roads and the bridges, and so forth, in Japan, so that it was difficult for them to compete with the tanks that were coming down against them?

General MACARTHUR. They had the lighter tank in the occupation troops, but the great difficulty in the tank warfare in the start was not the caliber of the tank, it was the fact that we didn't have as many as the other fellow had.

The equipment that we had of those occupational divisions was the normal equipment of the United States Army as it had ended the war 5 years before. I regard the equipment as quite adequate. It was the lack of its completeness that invited criticism.

I would say, going back to the question of the efficiency of these troops, that inspections had been made from Washington and commendatory statements had been made. I recall one by our Chief of Staff, General Collins, in which he spoke very handsomely of the training of the Eighth Army.

Senator KNOWLAND. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if the Senator would yield right at that point, because it is a point that might help complete the record.

Senator MORSE. I yield.

QUALITY OF TRAINING OF UNITED STATES TROOPS IN JAPAN

Senator KNOWLAND. On October 8, 1950, the Honorable Frank Pace, Secretary of the Army, delivered an address over the Mutual Broadcasting System, and in that he said:

Our divisions on occupation duty in Japan were not equipped or manned for this type of action. They were at reduced peacetime strength levels, and because of overseas rotation policies they included, as they always do, a certain percentage of newly arrived recruits. Despite the fact that these units had not completed the requisite cycle of training after having been relieved of their diverse and scattered duties of military government in Japan, they moved without delay into the Korean conflict. We knew that they would face grave difficulties calling for the utmost of courage, skill, and leadership, but we sent them in unhesitatingly in accordance with our solemn obligations to the other nations united with us in the cause of restoring peace.

I thought it would fit in with this record.

Senator MORSE. General, I am sure that many others in the Senate as well as myself received a good many communications in the early weeks of the Korean War that many American boys were in the front lines, particularly those who went over as Reserve Marines, with only a few weeks training prior to their being placed in the front lines. What comments do you wish to make in regard to that criticism that many of us received?

General MACARTHUR. The great mass of the troops had had adequate training. The Eighth Army had had its main mission for at least 11 months to train the troops. The fresh troops, replacements from the United States, I think were required at that time to have between 14 and 18 weeks training. I would say that there may have been here and there an exceptional case where the man had had less than the minimum amount of training, but that in general the criticism would not be valid.

Senator MORSE. I want to revert for a moment, General, to the Russian build-up north of the thirty-eighth parallel prior to the invasion, and prior to the time that Russia started her world-wide propaganda for evacuation of American troops from South Korea.

COMMUNIST BUILD-UP IN KOREA AND MANCHURIA PRIOR TO ATTACK

Is it true that American military officials, including your command, as well as other military officials, knew that there was tremendous Communist power north of the thirty-eighth parallel before the breakthrough?

General MACARTHUR. I would doubt—it was not in my command at that time, so I really couldn't tell you, but the fact that the south part of Manchuria was strongly held by Red troops, I think, was universally recognized.

I don't believe that there was any special indication of the build-up in North Korea of unusual Red echelons. As a matter of fact, they were built up on the other side of the Yalu, and when the North Koreans struck, as I said, they moved down very rapidly.

I would fancy that a very short period of time elapsed between the time that first North Korean Army hit, and the time it left Manchuria.

Senator MORSE. One of the criticisms——

General MACARTHUR (interposing). They could have gotten down very readily in a week or 10 days.

Senator MORSE. One of the criticisms that was somewhat prevalent in our country at the time of the breakthrough was that our intelligence had apparently been caught napping in that it would be presumed that they did not know of the strength of the Communists north of the thirty-eighth parallel. That criticism on the part of people who apparently did not know the facts, went also to your command, with such questions as why didn't MacArthur's command know of the strength of the Communists north of the thirty-eighth parallel. What comment would you like to make on that for the record?

QUALITY OF INTELLIGENCE

General MACARTHUR. Well, to answer the latter part, first, it was not in my command; I didn't have anything to do with it.

But to answer the main part of the query, there is a pretty definite limit to which intelligence can be gathered.

The difficulties of first ascertaining the facts, and then of making conclusions from those facts, I don't think the normal public quite understands.

It is not as though you had captured an enemy order and there it was all laid out there. Even if you know troops are being concentrated in a certain area, it doesn't follow that you make the correct conclusion whether they are there for defensive purposes, aggressive purposes; whether they are put there as a blind or as a bluff or caution or not.

I don't think the criticisms of the Intelligence Service are well taken. I believe that the Intelligence Service collected about as much of the facts as it was possible to collect from an area that is behind the iron curtain.

It is not easy to get in there and find out.

Now, the assessment of all those things does not fundamentally and primarily rest with a local command. About all the local command could do is to tell you what is going on on its immediate front.

There has to be an evaluation made in the highest governmental level of all the information that flows in from the chancellaries of the world to make the predictions.

I don't see how it would have been humanly possible for any men or group of men to predict such an attack as that, any more than you could predict such an attack as took place at Pearl Harbor.

There is nothing, no means or methods, except the accidental spy methods—if you can get somebody to betray the enemy's higher circles, that can get such information as that. It is guarded with a secrecy that you cannot overestimate. Not even, probably, the commanding officers of the units, military units, concerned knew what was going on until they got the order to march.

DISREGARD OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY COMMUNISTS

Those things, the value of surprise in warfare just cannot be overestimated; and when you have an adversary who has none of the spiritual or moral qualifications to abide by the rules of international law, it increases the difficulty of ascertaining what they are going to do.

Now, that attack by the North Koreans was, according to international law standards, an entirely illegal attack. It was not preceded by any declaration. There was nothing that gave the authority to the North Korean troops to kill. Troops don't have that authority except by the declaration of war.

Those people struck without any declaration of war; it was even worse when Red China intervened. There was not the slightest declaration; even today there has been no such declaration.

All of the complex rules of international law which were built up from the early days, which tried to ameliorate the savagery and barbarity of warfare, have been just discarded now, as you know, Senator, peculiarly, and one of the primary things that has been discarded is that troops operate these days under the orders of their governments without any declaration of war, which gives this great surprise factor.

However, if they had had the warning, I don't see that they could have done very much different. It took us, as I told you, nearly 3 weeks to get troops from Japan in any force over there, so if the enemy had sent over a copy of his order within 72 hours of the attack there could have been very little difference in the result.

Senator MORSE. And it came at a time, as far as the weather was concerned, that neither air reconnaissance nor air power would be very effective, did it not?

General MACARTHUR. That is correct.

RESPONSIBILITY FOR KOREAN INTELLIGENCE

Senator MORSE. General, regarding this matter of our intelligence information, as to what was going on north of the thirty-eighth parallel, whose responsibility was it in the military organization to supply whatever intelligence could be made available?

General MACARTHUR. I fancy that it was the South Korean Government. That had been organized, as you know, into a republic. They had their own administrative processes. They had their own army. We were assisting in the training and supply of that army; but the direct obligation unquestionably rested with the South Korean Government.

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Senator MORSE. To the extent that we had any responsibilities in South Korea at that time, by way of military missions or military assistance or supervision, was there any responsibility resting upon our Military Establishment to maintain intelligence communications with North Korea?

General MACARTHUR. I wouldn't say there was any more obligation than the normal obligation of aiding and assisting a friendly government that we were trying to put upon its feet.

Senator MORSE. As far as the threat of a fight that confronts us with communism around the world, is it not true that our military intelligence system would be expected to carry on rather constant vigilance as to communistic activity everywhere, including the area north of the thirty-eighth parallel?

General MACARTHUR. Unquestionably.

Senator MORSE. And if they did and they found any information that would be of importance to the military defense of this country, were they under obligation to make that available to your command?

General MACARTHUR. I would assume they would. It was not in my area, but it was adjacent to my area, and I would have been vitally interested.

COORDINATION BETWEEN CIA AND G-2 IN JAPAN

Senator MORSE. Now, General, I ask a question with no implications on my part at all, but in answer to what I have read. The question is this: Is it true that two CIA men had been sent to Tokyo and were in Tokyo prior to the trip to Tokyo that Gen. Bedell Smith made to confer with you, but that those CIA men were not given access to your intelligence files and they were confronted with an order that they could not have access to the battlefield?

General MACARTHUR. Pure bunkum, Senator.

Senator MORSE. I am glad to get that in the record.

General MACARTHUR. The Central Intelligence Agency—I think any theater commander would be glad to have any assistance he could get in intelligence.

The only questions that ever could arise between a theater commander and the Central Intelligence Agency was that there should be proper coordination between his own intelligence service and the Central Intelligence Agency.

The Central Intelligence Agency out in my command has worked in complete unity with my Chief of Intelligence, General Willoughby, G-2.

Senator WILEY. What was the date of that alleged trip?

Senator MORSE. The conference I referred to was the conference General Smith had with you some months after the outbreak of the Korean War.

General MACARTHUR. General Smith went out to Tokyo 2 or 3 months ago and at that time the purpose of his visit was to perfect and expand the Central Intelligence Agency; it was not to iron out any friction, it was not because of any difficulties. It was largely due to expanding and increasing the effort that was being made to gather intelligence.

Senator MORSE. General, you know of no friction between the Chief of your Intelligence Service, General Willoughby, and the officers of CIA, under the jurisdiction of General Smith?

General MACARTHUR. Nothing that would not be normal and minor, nothing that ever reached me.

Senator MORSE. You know of no instance in which the CIA was denied access to whatever intelligence your intelligence system could supply?

General MACARTHUR. That would be ridiculous.

PREVIOUS WITHDRAWAL OF UNITED STATES AND U. S. S. R. TROOPS FROM KOREA

Senator MORSE. General, reverting now to the situation prior to the outbreak in Korea, after it became pretty well known that there were powerful Communist trained forces north of the thirty-eighth parallel, Russia then announced to the world that she was withdrawing Russian troops, did she not?

General MACARTHUR. At the time she withdrew those Russian troops, it would be my opinion that she was already engaged in constructing this new army and that one of the reasons that she withdraw her troops was to clear the way for this army without directly involving her in the issue.

Senator MORSE. She withdrew them when she no longer needed them because she had her satellite Communist troops to take their place.

General MACARTHUR. Somebody to do the job for her, correct.

Senator MORSE. And that has been another example of the same Russian pattern that she has followed in all satellite countries. Is it not true at that point, General, the Russian propaganda forces by way of radio bombardments proceeded with a line of criticism against the United States because we had not up until that time withdrawn our troops from South Korea?

General MACARTHUR. Incessant, daily broadcast over the Far East.

WISDOM OF WITHDRAWAL OF UNITED STATES TROOPS FROM KOREA

Senator MORSE. Subsequently and finally we did withdraw our troops from South Korea. Did you join in any recommendation to withdraw those troops from South Korea?

General MACARTHUR. I concurred in it.

Senator MORSE. Do you think that was a mistake? I don't mean to give you a hindsight question.

General MACARTHUR. In the aftermath and hindsight, I should say it was a very grave mistake.

Senator MORSE. Let me explain it. I did not mean it as a hindsight question.

General MACARTHUR. At that time, Senator, at the time our troops were withdrawn, it was the strategic concept of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that that was not a proper place for the employment of American ground troops, that is that it involved inherent dangers to place United States ground troops in continental Asia, and it was, as far as the military was concerned, the strategic consideration that our troops should not be left there because they might be trapped, that is if the Soviet and the Communist Red China and everybody had suddenly hit, the position of a small garrison there would have been very

dangerous indeed, and the strategic concept was for the withdrawal of those troops.

There was nothing peculiarly threatening at that time in Korea when the decision was made to get out.

Senator MORSE. When the decision was made to get out, General, had it become your understanding that America's front line of defense in the Pacific was a line which fell on this side of Korea and that therefore it was not contemplated to defend in Korea?

General MACARTHUR. There was no question that our military strategic concept was as you have said.

Senator MORSE. And at the time you concurred—

General MACARTHUR. I will say that there was a very great political pressure from South Korea itself to withdraw our troops.

They were anxious to have them withdrawn, and it paralleled that political impulse of the South Koreans, paralleled the strategic concepts that the military had at that time to withdraw them.

Senator MORSE. I am glad you made that point. When you concurred—and I say “concur” because I understand that is your testimony—you concurred in the decision to withdraw, were you asked for a recommendation?

General MACARTHUR. I don't recall. I think that the thing reached me in the form of a suggested action, and that suggested action was the withdrawal; and I concurred; but I do not recollect, Senator. I would have to look back in the files.

TYPE OF EQUIPMENT TURNED OVER TO SOUTH KOREANS AFTER UNITED STATES TROOP WITHDRAWAL

Senator MORSE. Well, when you concurred in the decision to withdraw our troops and most of our heavy equipment, too—we did not leave much American equipment in South Korea when we withdrew, did we?

General MACARTHUR. When those troops withdrew they left considerable of their equipment that was turned over to the South Korean Army. But there was a definite decision made from Washington with reference to the items concerned. There was a limitation on the size of artillery. I think there was a limitation on the tanks. I can't recall that they received any air equipment. And if they received any Navy equipment, it was of a very minor character. Certain definite limitations were placed as to what should be left back there.

Senator MORSE. Would it be fair to say that those limitations placed on the type of equipment that should be left in South Korea could be generally characterized as calling for the leaving behind of only so-called light equipment, with little heavy equipment, such as heavy artillery, and heavy tanks?

General MACARTHUR. That is right. It was the heavier equipment. What was left was sufficient as a constabulary. It would have been quite sufficient to stop the North Korean security forces if they tried to come down, but it was not sufficient to stop a well-equipped modern army on the attack.

(There was brief discussion off the record.)

ENCOURAGEMENT OF GUERRILLA WARFARE AND RAIDS BEHIND ENEMY LINES

Senator MORSE. General, did you, at any time, take any action to prevent the use of guerrilla warfare or sabotage activity behind the enemy's lines?

General MACARTHUR. No, sir; to the contrary, I encouraged it.

Senator MORSE. Can you tell us, General, about when the American Rangers, guerrilla-trained fighters, were used in the Korean War?

General MACARTHUR. My recollection is not entirely distinct on that, but I think we began to get the Ranger companies shortly, probably, after the Inchon landing.

Senator MORSE. You weren't opposed to their use, were you?

General MACARTHUR. Oh, I am one of the main exponents of Ranger use.

Senator MORSE. Welcomed them with open arms, didn't you?

General MACARTHUR. Oh, yes. Commando type of warfare, if it is used with intelligence, has the greatest possible efficiency, not only in what it actually does, but in the confusion and bewilderment that it creates in the enemy.

As a psychological weapon, as well as an actual one, it has a very large place.

PROPOSAL FOR STATEMENT ON CHINA

Senator MORSE. General, do you recall receiving a request from the State Department last November to issue a statement that the United States had no designs on China?

General MACARTHUR. A request on——

Senator MORSE. Do you recall receiving a request from the State Department that you issue a statement that the United States had no designs on China?

General MACARTHUR. My recollection is indistinct on it, Senator. I don't recall whether I was asked to issue a statement, or not. The files will show it, though.

Senator MORSE. Well, some of these questions, may I repeat again, I am putting into the record so that later I can refer to the files with the foundation in the record.

General MACARTHUR. I understand that, sir.

PROPOSAL FOR A BUFFER ZONE ALONG MANCHURIA

Senator MORSE. General, did you ever receive any advice from Washington, through channels of your superior command, about leaving a buffer zone between North Korea and Manchuria, and if so, what was your reply to that advice?

General MACARTHUR. There was considerable pressure and desire, apparently, from Washington, to have a buffer zone established in North Korea. There were various steps in the general proposals that were made.

The first one was that the United Nations troops, except the South Korean troops, would not go beyond a certain line, and that the intervening territory should be held by the South Korean troops.

It very shortly became evident that the South Korean troops didn't have the power to occupy that; and in the gradual process of the campaign, the concept of a buffer zone disappeared. That concept

was only during the period before the Red Chinese came into the war, and was undoubtedly dictated by the hope of preventing any possible irritation of Red China, so that she would not come in.

The minute Red China came in, all questions of buffer zones disappeared and events overcame that idea.

Senator MORSE. Did you receive, at any time, General, advice from superiors in your line of command, that one reason for suggesting a buffer zone was that it was believed in Washington that such a zone might be helpful in negotiating a cease-fire order, through the committee of the United Nations that was then at work on a cease-fire-order negotiation?

General MACARTHUR. I have no such recollection.

Senator MORSE. And in asking the next question, General, let me make clear to you that my personal belief is that we shouldn't have stopped at the thirty-eighth parallel, but I ask this question:

ADVISABILITY OF CROSSING THE THIRTY-EIGHTH PARALLEL

At any time were you asked for a recommendation, or advice, by your superiors in line of command, as to whether or not we should push beyond the thirty-eighth parallel, and go all the way to the Yalu?

General MACARTHUR. The original mission that was assigned was to clear all of Korea.

That original declaration of policy was supplemented, in October, by the United Nations General Assembly.

The actual crossing of the thirty-eighth parallel was specifically authorized by the Secretary of Defense, to me, in a message, a personal message, which said that he did not—the Defense Department did not wish to in any way embarrass me tactically or strategically in my crossing of the thirty-eighth parallel.

The halt that took place after the Inchon landing, which was something magnificently spearheaded by the marines—the halt in crossing the parallel was due entirely to logistical difficulties. It was with the greatest difficulty that troops could be supplied.

We had to go through the Seoul—had to go from Inchon to Seoul, or by railroad from Pusan up, and, General Walker had the greatest difficulty in getting a sufficient depot of supplies to push the attack north of the Seoul area.

The crossing of the thirty-eighth parallel was not only in complete accord with every directive I received, but all the details of the crossing were daily reported.

As far as I know, it had the most complete and absolute approval of every section of the American Government and, as far as I knew, of every section of the United Nations.

I have seen since reports that the British advanced some idea to the contrary. If they did, it never reached me and I had a liaison officer, an air vice marshal, assigned as the special liaison officer from the British Government to me, who communicated with them daily; and I saw him at frequent intervals and nothing of the sort was ever communicated.

As far as I know, the crossing of that parallel had the most complete agreement by everybody that was concerned with it, except the enemy.

SCOPE OF THEATER COMMANDER'S AUTHORITY

Senator MORSE. For purposes of emphasis in the record, General, you want this committee to understand that in keeping with the original directive as to your responsibility to clear Korea of the invading Communists, you were given full and complete authorization by your superior command to follow those tactical actions in the field that in your judgment were necessary to carry out that directive subject to the inhibitions you have already testified to.

General MACARTHUR. Not only that, but if I had not crossed the thirty-eighth parallel, I would have regarded myself in complete defiance of the orders I had received.

Senator MORSE. That is what I wanted to get in the record.

General MACARTHUR. If I had believed I could not successfully cross the parallel and carry out the mission that had been assigned to me, I would have reported back that fact and asked for some change, but I felt I could successfully cross the parallel, and I felt I could successfully destroy the North Korean Army; and if there hadn't been the intervention by the Chinese Communists, I am quite certain we would have liberated, pacified, and unified all Korea.

Senator MORSE. Now, another subject matter, general. You have commented on it in part, but I think here is the place to pin it down in the record.

COORDINATION BETWEEN EIGHTH ARMY AND TENTH CORPS

It is alleged in some writings that we have read that at the time of the operation last November and December General Walker of the Eighth Army and General Almond of the Tenth Corps did not maintain communications between each other, but had to communicate through Tokyo, and orders were sent out to them from Tokyo in regard to the tactical operations that they were or should carry out in that operation.

Is that true or false?

General MACARTHUR. That is false. The coordination of these two forces was in my own hands. The Tenth Corps was an enveloping movement that was moving in to outflank the supply line of the remnants of the North Korean Army. But the liaison between the Eighth Army and the Tenth Corps was carried on by the normal processes and means, not only by planes, couriers, but by other means.

Senator MORSE. By that you mean—

General MACARTHUR. There was as complete coordination as I have ever known between enveloping movements—much more coordination was there than I was able to get between the Pusan beachhead, the Eighth Army, and the Tenth Corps when I put the Tenth Corps in at Inchon.

Senator MORSE. My next question is surplus, general, except for emphasis purposes.

It is true then that during the operation engaged in by the Eighth Army and the Tenth Corps there was direct communication between General Walker and General Almond, as well as with you as the over-all commanding officer?

General MACARTHUR. Of course. Both of those officers would coordinate along many lines.

Senator MORSE. And there is no basis of fact for what I think is the unfortunate allegation, if it is not in accordance with fact—and I am satisfied from the testimony it could not be in accordance with the fact—there is no basis in fact then for the charge that General Walker and General Almond were not on speaking terms, as some of the articles said?

General MACARTHUR. Ridiculous.

Senator MORSE. I am glad to have that.

General MACARTHUR. And the officers were good friends. General Almond has been my chief of staff; General Walker commanded the Eighth Army for several years right out there. And their acquaintanceship lasted over, oh, 25 years.

Senator MORSE. Now, General, a question or two on the exhibit in the record—

General MACARTHUR. The last time I saw Walker alive I recall that he spoke of a fine letter that he had just written General Almond. When we withdrew the Tenth Corps from that enveloping movement caused by the entrance of Red China into the war, I moved the Tenth Corps around to Pusan and placed them as a component part of the Eighth Army; and General Walker expressed to me the great pleasure that he had that he was getting Almond under his immediate command, and of the fine letter that he had just sent him.

Senator MORSE. Now, General, I would like to ask a question or two in regard—

General MACARTHUR. All that sort of stuff, Senator, is scuttlebutt written 10,000 miles away from the scene by these skillful propagandists who were trying to destroy the confidence of the American people in their own institutions. Nothing is viler than the effort that was made to destroy the belief by the American people that their troops were not of the highest quality and did not have adequate and efficient leadership.

Senator MORSE. Well, General, I want to say that I think you are performing a great service in taking the opportunity of this hearing to answer those charges, and I hope you will give me credit for the sincere feeling on my part that I am performing a little service in putting the questions to you so you can answer them.

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF JANUARY 12, 1951, RECOMMENDATIONS

Now, General, I want to ask a question or two in regard to the exhibit in this record, which I think is of the most vital importance, namely, the so-called study of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of January 12, with regard to which you testified so frequently in the hearings. And I ask you this question: Was the study and recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff based upon a plan for evacuation and/or retreat to the Pusan beachhead, and that it was not contemplated that their recommendations should be implemented except in case of evacuation or retreat to Pusan?

General MACARTHUR. That is not the way it read. It said distinctly that these things should be put into operation as soon as our position in Korea was stabilized, or that we evacuated Korea.

The first of the contingencies was the one of stabilization, and then, at that time, it was quite apparent that we were under normal conditions going to stabilize that situation.

I would like to read the exact wording of that.

Senator MORSE. I will be glad to have you.

General MACARTHUR. The pertinent phrase is this: "Prepare now to impose"—

Senator MORSE. General, may I interrupt just a moment to address a question to the chairman?

PROTECTION OF CODE

We are dealing again, I think, Mr. Chairman, with a document which I understand—and you clear me up—which I understand is considered one that has not been paraphrased, and that therefore the colloquy now taking place, the examination now taking place between the general and myself, it ought to be understood, will be deleted from the record when released to the public. Am I right or wrong?

General MACARTHUR. May I intervene, Mr. Chairman?

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes.

General MACARTHUR. This does not need to be paraphrased. This is a mimeographed copy of a study which was sent to me through the mails.

Senator MORSE. Fine. I just wanted to get that cleared.

General MACARTHUR. There is nothing cryptographic involved in it.

Senator MORSE. You may proceed.

General MACARTHUR. The only question would be on the basis of what is there. There is no cryptographic involved in this.

You may rest assured if there had been, I would not have introduced it.

Senator SMITH. I may say this statement that the general is reading appeared in David Lawrence's column in the New York Herald Tribune on May 3.

General MACARTHUR. It is in my own testimony, I think, that was given to the public.

Chairman RUSSELL. I am quite sure of that. I do not think this particular message was ever in crypt. If it has been of course, the representatives of the Defense Department will see it is eliminated.

As I recall, I think it is the third time it has been read. I said that I thought it had already been probably cleared once or twice—

General MACARTHUR. It has.

Chairman RUSSELL. And this is the third time it has been read.

Senator MORSE. I think it is important to read it again, General.

General MACARTHUR. As a matter of minor importance, Mr. Chairman, I think it is the fourth time.

Chairman RUSSELL. Perhaps, your recollection is better than mine.

General MACARTHUR (reading):

Prepare now to impose a naval blockade of China and place it into effect as soon as our position in Korea is stabilized or when we have evacuated Korea.

Senator MORSE. General MacArthur, did General Collins at any time in a conversation with you in Japan or elsewhere advise you that it was the plan of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to put those recommendations into effect only in case of a program for evacuation or a retreat to the Pusan beachhead?

General MACARTHUR. No, sir.

SCOPE OF SOVIET-CHINESE MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY OF 1950

Senator MORSE. Now, General, I want to ask a line of questions—I hope not too repetitious—dealing with another phase of this controversy connected with the Russian-Chinese Communist pact for mutual defense, because, before I get through with the examination, you will see that what I am trying to do is to lay a skeleton outline here of what I understand, rightly or wrongly, to be the position of those who do not agree that we should follow the course of action that you recommend in Asia.

My first question is this: Would it not appear from the terms of the Russian-Chinese alliance of 1950 that bombing in China would be the line beyond which the U. S. S. R. could not remain passive under that alliance?

General MACARTHUR. Well, that I couldn't tell you, Senator.

Senator MORSE. Would you expect the Russian Communists—I mean the Chinese Communist leaders, in case your program was carried out, to call upon the Soviet Union to come to their assistance under this alliance?

General MACARTHUR. That, again, I wouldn't speculate upon. There are many things that they might do. They might call upon the Soviet for air assistance; they might call for other types of supplies that would enable them to meet the conditions. Whether they would wish to have the Soviet troops and forces injected into the very heart of China, I don't know, sir.

There are many possibilities as to the shade of help that they might desire, and the risks that they would themselves run if they placed themselves completely within the military dominion and power of the Soviet.

It is quite possible that they would regard that with a degree of fear and dismay which would tend to prevent them from considering it seriously.

The Russian already is now in certain sections, as you know, at Port Arthur and Dairen, and I, myself, have the belief that the Red Chinese are anxious indeed to get the Russians out of Port Arthur and Dairen, and that they would voluntarily invite the Soviet to move into their interior areas, to my mind, would be quite doubtful from a logical standpoint.

Now my recollection of the Chinese-Soviet agreement of mutual help was largely predicated and based in the actual wording of the document upon a threat from Japan.

The primary reading of that treaty was as I recall based upon the assumption that Japan might again become a military and imperialist power, and that the other references were to such countries as might be in support of those imperialistic designs.

Senator MORSE. Of Japan.

General MACARTHUR. But that the nation which was mentioned in that treaty as the primary one in which it was intended to work against was Japan.

I may be subject to correction in that, Senator, but that is my recollection.

Senator MORSE. Therefore generally you do not think that the language of the mutual aid treaty between Red China and Red Russia is broad enough to encompass a right to expect assistance by Red

China from Red Russia in case Red China was attacked by any country other than Japan?

General MACARTHUR. I think that the terms of the treaty as far as I recall them were so elastic that it was subject to interpretation along those lines.

Senator MORSE. Do you know of any other secret protocols or treaties between Red China and Red Russia which Red China might feel justified in invoking in case of any air attack upon her by the United Nations?

General MACARTHUR. I do not.

RECENT CHINESE-SOVIET AGREEMENT ON ASSISTANCE

Senator MORSE. Have you been informed as to any agreement that may have been reached by the Chinese Communist leaders and the Russians that met in recent weeks in regard to which you might be able to advise this committee? There has been a recent meeting as you know.

General MACARTHUR. There has been I recall certain intelligence reports which advance the concept that an agreement had been reached to supply certain materials of war by the Soviet to China. I have forgotten the figures. They were not too small.

For that area I recall that it struck me they were rather large as I visualize the capacity of the Soviet to supply them, but they dealt entirely, the report did, with what was promised in the way of supplies.

I remember the report because I commented on it and discussed it with my chief of staff, that for allies it seemed to me that was pretty weak support if China was becoming hard pressed.

Senator MORSE. It seems to have carried out the Russian pattern of at least letting the satellites exhaust themselves first.

IMPORTANCE OF RED CHINA TO SOVIET RUSSIA

General, there is one line of argument in this country that is to this effect: That irrespective of a treaty of mutual aid, Russia couldn't stand by and permit China to be attacked in view of the importance of independence Red China to Red Russia's security. What comment would you make on that argument?

General MACARTHUR. I don't believe that the Soviet has sufficiently associated itself with the war in Korea to believe that the defeat of Red China to the extent of her being forced to evacuate Korea would necessarily produce great prejudice to the Soviet cause in other parts of the world.

It has been quite apparent to me, Senator, that the linking of the Soviet to this Korean War has paled out as the events have progressed.

SCOPE OF SOVIET ROLE IN KOREAN CONFLICT

When this was first started, there wasn't any special thought of Red China intervening. The entire thought of the world and anxiety of the world was that the Soviet might intervene, but as time has progressed, the conjunction of the Soviet to this campaign has receded rather than increased.

At that time we were all looking for a big Russian mission there. We were looking for various Soviet indications of engaging in the combat.

On the contrary, the Soviet even when we accidentally bombed one of her fields and admitted it and apologized and disciplined the officers involved and offered the Soviet compensation, they didn't even take the trouble as far as I know to collect any compensation. They dropped the issue.

We have gone close to their border there without, as far as I can ascertain, or my intelligence, the slightest increase of their troops on the sector between North Korea and Siberia.

I have seen no indication of the Soviet's desire to identify themselves increasingly with this Korean campaign. They have at Lake Success and the chancellories of the world, they have been the spokesmen, but out on the battlefield it has been quite the contrary.

Senator MORSE. You have pretty much answered the next question.

IDENTITY OF SOVIET AND RED CHINA INTERESTS

General MACARTHUR. There is another point that might be brought up. It is just what would be the Soviet attitude, just what would be beneficial to the Soviet from their point of view, in the increasing strength of this new Frankenstein that is being gradually congealed and coalesced in China?

Would the Soviet desire to have China become so powerful that it might even challenge the Soviet? Would it be the desire, would it be possible for the Soviet to retain a maximum degree of control if China became too powerful?

The general relationship between China and the Soviet has never been clearly defined. Nobody knows it except those that are intimately connected therewith, either from China or the Soviet.

But by the logic of general strategy of the general international philosophy of the forces of the world, there is a point that might well be reached where the interests of Red China and the interests of the Red Soviet did not run parallel, that they started to traverse and become antagonistic.

That is a factor which I am sure would be taken into consideration by both of those countries in an endeavor to apply for their own benefit any of these very elastic provisions that are written into this so-called treaty of alliance between them.

Senator MORSE. One of the arguments you hear in this country is that we should play for just such a split between Russia and China as is implied, I think, in your last few comments, and not follow a course of action within China that might cause a cementing of Red China and Red Russia together and that, therefore, we should try to avoid. If it is possible to win in Korea without it, we should try to avoid bombing in Manchuria which might bring in Russia.

SOVIET SENSITIVITY ABOUT MANCHURIA

That goes to my next question, which is: Isn't it true that Russia now for some long period of time has been exceedingly sensitive about Manchuria, and that an attack upon Manchuria might cause her to make use of, or respond to a call to provide assistance to Red China under, the alliance?

The argument, as you know, is how would we feel if some foreign country started to bomb in Mexico? I have my idea as to the source of that kind of argument, but let's get it in the record, that is part of the argument, that Manchuria to Russia stands pretty much in the relationship of Mexico to the United States, and that she is very sensitive about who controls Manchuria.

General MACARTHUR. To answer the first part of your query, Senator, I don't think there is any question that our own interest would be enhanced by splitting the relationship as wide as possible between China and the Soviet. The great question is the mechanics of it, how to bring it about.

I think that everyone will agree when a man and his wife have a quarrel, if you attempt to interfere, the results are quite doubtful.

I do not see how our interference with it would do more than complicate it and might actually react upon ourselves. The great factors involved are quite beyond our control, I think, along that line.

Now, as to the sensitivity of the Soviet to Manchuria, history shows how complete it is, but I don't think—if there is any one question that all Chinese—whether they are Red or Nationalist—would agree upon, it is that Manchuria is going to stay Chinese.

I do not believe that any bombing effort we might make in Manchuria would alter the fact that Russia knows just as well as we know that we haven't got an iota of imperialistic design against Manchuria or any other part of China, that it would merely be in an effort to make the Red Chinese withdraw their predatory attacks in North Korea.

Senator MORSE. General, if we issued the ultimatum that you recommend and Red China didn't respond by stopping its aggression in North Korea, it is my understanding that the resulting bombing might include a bombing of the limited railroad facilities in Manchuria. Am I correct about that?

General MACARTHUR. It would unquestionably involve the interdiction of such supply and logistic lines of support as are utilized in maintaining the Red troops in North Korea.

SOVIET DEPENDENCE ON MANCHURIAN RAILROADS AND RESULTS OF BOMBING SAME

Senator MORSE. It is my understanding that the major trunk lines in Manchuria are jointly administered by Russia and Red China, because those railroad lines also are of such vital transportation service to Russia.

With that Russian interest in those railroad lines, might that enhance, in your opinion, the danger of Russian participation in the war?

General MACARTHUR. I believe it is a very minor question when it is related to the great problem of whether a third world war is about to be launched.

Senator MORSE. I think the record is perfectly clear as to your point on that, so I am going to hastily go over those questions, and refer briefly to your previous answers to them.

In view, General, of the technical importance of the trunk line through Manchuria to Vladivostok, the main Soviet base in the Far East, would not the Soviet Union probably consider an attack on this line a threat to its basic interest in the Far East and, therefore, increase

the danger of war with Red China; because without that trunk line, Vladivostok would be in a rather precarious position?

General MACARTHUR. My own opinion is in the negative, Senator.

Senator MORSE. In view, General, of the dependence of the Soviet base at Port Arthur on the rail line south from Mukden for over-length support, could not the Soviet Union probably consider disruption of this rail line a threat to its position in Port Arthur and thereby increase the danger of war?

General MACARTHUR. In my opinion, it is a minor point.

Senator MORSE. Is it your opinion, however, that if we carried out your recommendation or the issuance of the type of ultimatum you previously testified to, to be followed by bombing if they did not desist in their aggression in North Korea, it would be necessary to bomb these trunk lines that are of such transportation importance to Vladivostok and to Mukden and to access into Russia proper?

General MACARTHUR. It is quite possible that it would be necessary, Senator; but the probabilities are that the main use of those lines now is to transport stuff from the Soviet to China rather than the reverse, so that the interest of the Soviet would not be too violently interrupted.

Senator MORSE. Only to the extent of the Soviet world-wide plan, at least, I think it is, of using other Reds to do her fighting for her, if she can, and those trunk lines are of vital importance to get the material to the Red Chinese so that they can do the dying rather than the Russians.

In that sense, it might very well create serious complications. But, as you say, it is up to her to determine.

General MACARTHUR. The treaty, as I understand it, of peace between China and the Soviet, provided that at a certain period of time, Port Arthur, Dairen, and all those lines which are within China proper, pass entirely over to China.

It is already provided in writing in that treaty, as I recall it, that those things will revert to China.

Senator MORSE. I do not state it as a fact, General, and it will have to be determined—can very easily be determined—but it is my understanding, that that treaty is not so broad as to relieve Russia from all rights in joint administration of those lines.

I think the treaty—I say I do not swear to it, but I think the treaty—retained in Russia a considerable amount of administrative authority jointly with Red China over the transportation facilities, because of Port Arthur and Vladivostok.

Well, assuming with me for a moment—and it is not my personal belief, but assuming, unless other witnesses can convince me to the contrary—assuming, for a moment that the bombing of these lines of communication might increase the danger of Russia's entering into the war, it then becomes necessary for us to look at the ability of Russia to deliver, if she gets into the war.

WAR-MAKING POWER OF RUSSIA IN ASIA

So, I have a few brief questions in regard to the war-making power of Russia in Asia, as contrasted with her war-making power in Western Europe.

My own personal belief on what I know to date, at least, is that she has greater war-making power in Western Europe than in Asia, if for

no other reason than for the location of her own industrial war-making strength as well as the differences in transportation problems.

But irrespective of that, what, in your opinion, is the combat strength of Russia in the Far East, if she should decide to come to the assistance of the Red Chinese, keeping in mind the fact that she wouldn't let her other front become unduly weakened.

General MACARTHUR. The assistance is definitely limited. I should say that the main help that Russia could supply would be in the air.

Senator MORSE. In the air.

General MACARTHUR. In the air. Just how great that would be would be speculative, but as compared with the potential strength that she could exert in Europe, it would be a very small percentage in fraction thereof.

Senator MORSE. And you think she could use either paratroopers or amphibious landings without warning attack on the airfields of Japan, and thereby weaken us in that bastion?

General MACARTHUR. I don't think there is any question that she could put in punishing attacks on Japan. Whether she could make a definite landing, would be very doubtful as long as we retained control of the sea and the air. It would only be of a predatory character.

IF RUSSIA ATTACKED JAPAN

Senator MORSE. And you think, General, that she has the present power, as far as armed ground forces are concerned, to take rather easily the island of Hokkaido?

General MACARTHUR. She might be able to make a landing on Hokkaido. She might be able to establish a bridgehead there, but I don't think she would even make the attempt. On that score it leads no place unless her objective would be on the Kanoya Field in the main island of Honshu; I don't believe it would be more than a predatory attack at best.

Senator MORSE. You do not consider the island of Hokkaido to be an important stepping-stone base if she had designs on our island chain?

General MACARTHUR. I would consider it an important thing, but making the landing on Hokkaido that could not be developed farther south and be exploited would probably end in ultimate failure.

Senator MORSE. Would Hokkaido be of benefit to her with respect to both submarine and air bases?

General MACARTHUR. Would it be what, Senator?

Senator MORSE. Would Hokkaido be of strategic benefit to her, both as submarine and air bases?

General MACARTHUR. I am quite sure she could not maintain either until she had cleared the rest of Japan. From other air bases in Japan, it would be quite untenable.

Senator MORSE. Do you think that she would have—strike the question. Do you think, General, she would have the ability, in case my assumption should come to pass, that she went into the war with Red China, to conduct either an amphibious landing or drop paratroopers on Honshu and take over that area?

General MACARTHUR. I do not.

Senator MORSE. You think we would be able to prevent her from doing that?

General MACARTHUR. I do.

POSSIBLE THREAT TO OUR SUPPLY LINE TO KOREA

Senator MORSE. General, could a sudden attack so disrupt our air bases and naval facilities in Japan that the Eighth Army in Korea might be cut off from an evacuation of Korea in case Russia should come down from the north along the line that I have indicated in my previous questions?

General MACARTHUR. Do I think they could cut our supply lines? I think they could increase the difficulty of supply very markedly by submarine attack, but that they could cut off our troops there and have a debacle, I don't believe for a minute.

Senator MORSE. You do not think—

General MACARTHUR. I don't believe they have the naval power to successfully consummate such an attack.

Senator MORSE. You do not think they have enough power to prevent evacuation of our Eighth Army if it was decided that that was necessary in order to protect—

General MACARTHUR. I do not.

Senator MORSE (continuing). Other areas in Asia?

Do you think, General, that the Soviet Union possesses the capability of mounting an immediate air and submarine blockade of Korea to the extent that the position of the Eighth Army in Korea would be seriously jeopardized, and evacuation made impossible?

General MACARTHUR. Will you read that question again, sir?

Senator MORSE. Yes. Do you think that the Soviet Union possesses the capability of mounting an immediate air and submarine blockade to the extent—in Korea—that the position of the Eighth Army in Korea would be seriously jeopardized and prevent its evacuation, if necessary?

General MACARTHUR. No, sir.

Senator MORSE. You do not accept, then, the point of view that one reads sometimes that at the present time the Russian air power is so great in Asia that if it made a frontal attack on our Navy and our Air Forces, it would do such great damage to both our Navy and Air Force as to make it necessary for us to withdraw from Korea.

General MACARTHUR. I believe they would have great difficulty in handling, and I know they couldn't handle our Navy as it is presently constituted, as we have under such a global condition as that.

Just how much force the Soviet would be willing to pour into that area is quite problematical. If the Soviet launches global war, there are other sectors I am sure that would be more sensitive and of more immediate attack than anything out in the Far East.

Senator MORSE. That goes to my next question. In case of a sudden Russian attack, if they used the bombing of Manchuria as an excuse, and I do not think they ever need an excuse, that is I hold the point of view that whenever they think we are weak enough to lick us, the chances are they will try it, but that is beside the point for a moment.

EFFECT OF A RUSSIAN ATTACK IN THE FAR EAST ON HOLDING EUROPE

To go back to my question, you do not think that if they should use Manchurian bombing, if we follow your suggestion, as an excuse for starting an all-out attack on us at least in Asia, that they could be successful in so weakening and damaging our Air Force and Navy located there as to then make it very easy for them to take Europe?

The question is based on the assumption that we need our Air Force and Navy to protect Europe.

General MACARTHUR. I don't believe that any attack that the Soviet can make in the Far East would overcome our forces there. I don't quite understand the correlation between that and Europe.

Senator MORSE. I do not see why you should from the way I put the question, General. I do not think I stated it very well. Let me explain the question.

Do you think that there is any great danger that if Russia should use our bombing in Manchuria as an excuse for starting an attack upon our forces in Asia, not only our land forces but our Navy and our Air Forces, that she might be successful in so damaging those forces that we then would not be in a strong enough position with the use of our Air Force and Navy to protect Europe from an attack by Russia on the western front?

General MACARTHUR. I don't believe that the losses that we might sustain under such a condition in the western Pacific would have any appreciable effect upon the steps that we are taking to defend western Europe.

In other words, they could not deliver such a crippling blow as Pearl Harbor for instance, to put our Navy out of commission or our Air Force out of commission.

Senator MORSE. That is exactly what I have in mind.

General MACARTHUR. I answer in the negative completely.

Senator MORSE. Have you heard it said that one of the reasons for the lack of enthusiasm on the part of some of our allies in the United Nations for a greater effort in Asia at this time is their fear that it might bring Russia in and jeopardize America's air and naval power with the result that European defenses would be greatly weakened thereby?

General MACARTHUR. I had never heard that advanced. I have heard other reasons for that, but never that one.

Senator MORSE. I have heard others, too, including that one, from those who very much worried about the possibilities of a Pearl Harbor on both our Navy and our Air Force, because of the alleged tremendous air power that Russia can put in the air, and because of the alleged superiority of Russia in submarines over the United States, at the present time, in the Pacific waters.

General MACARTHUR. If that was really a valid fear, it could have been corrected very easily by the nations involved by sending a little more of their forces over there to help us.

It would balance up.

Senator MORSE. Please understand, General, I think they should have done it, but I also understand that one of the reasons some of their spokesmen give for not doing it is: they think they have to keep themselves in as strong a position as possible to meet an attack on the Western Front.

EFFECT OF MAINTAINING OUR FAR EASTERN BASES ON DEFENSE OF
CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES

General, do you see any great danger if Russia comes into the war on any basis, limited or otherwise, to help Red China, that our occupation in those Asiatic areas weakens our position to defend an attack, if Russia should decide not to go into Japan, or into Korea or the Philippines, but make her first attack along the Aleutians and Alaska and the west coast of the United States?

General MACARTHUR. Will you state that again, sir?

Senator MORSE. Will the reporter read it?

(The pending question was read by the reporter.)

General MACARTHUR. No, sir.

I believe the presence of our forces, in their present positions there, in case of an all-out global war, would require the use of sufficient Russian force to counterbalance it.

I believe, if, for instance, we evacuated, that the Russians would have just that additional number of troops and forces to use in the predatory attack he might launch some place else.

Military forces have an inherent attraction for each other. Where you put an enemy force, invariably it acts like a magnet that draws your own forces there. They are bound to balance. So, if you should withdraw our forces there, it would simply mean that the maneuver potential of the Soviet would be correspondingly increased. Our own defensive potential might be increased, too, by our own combination, but the relativity would not be altered.

Senator MORSE. General, have you ever expressed to Washington a fear that the Russian-Chinese mutual aid pact might result in Russia entering into the war in case we broadened our operations in Asia?

General MACARTHUR. I have never communicated with Washington on the subject.

RELATIONSHIP OF DEFENSE OF THE PACIFIC TO DEFENSE OF EUROPE

Senator MORSE. General, still on my assumption that Russia might come in, if we engage in such a broadened conflict in Asia, do you think we are presently in a position to be of such aid to our allies in Europe to prevent Russia from proceeding to take over Europe?

General MACARTHUR. As I understand the European program, it envisions the maintenance of a garrison in the western Pacific to hold under any circumstance or conditions. We have an obligation in both of the areas. And I do not believe that any increment or increase that we put into the western Pacific to carry out these recommendations would seriously interfere with the program for Western Europe. That program is to be completed in 2 years, and the use of any increment in that time would not detract from the final consummation of the European program. On the contrary, if we bring the Pacific situation to stability, it will release a great many of the components of armed force in the Pacific now that could be used in Europe in case of necessity.

If we allow it to go on, you subtract that force which, as long as you allow it to go on, is not a potential for the Western European or any other area's defense.

If we can bring this to an end, it tends to reduce rather than increase the demands on our forces for other areas than the critical area of Western Europe.

Senator MORSE. In your speech before the Congress, General, you said in effect, if I interpreted it correctly, that taking the position that we cannot defend on two fronts at the same time is a position of defeatism.

General MACARTHUR. Complete in my opinion.

TIME NEEDED FOR PREPAREDNESS AND RISK OF WAR NOW

Senator MORSE. In the statement that you made a moment ago you pointed out that the plan as far as European defense is concerned contemplates a 2-year period to get ready for adequate defense of Europe. There are some who seem to think that that is a very vital 2-year period, and that, therefore, we should not follow a course of action in Asia at the present time that might get us involved in a two-front war prior to the lapse of that 2-year period when it is presumed we can build up our defenses to meet Russia on as many fronts as she may want to start.

What comment do you have to make about that argument?

General MACARTHUR. I think I have covered that pretty well in my previous testimony, Senator.

Senator MORSE. I think you have, and I am going to accept your previous testimony, and we will incorporate it by reference at this point. And in essence you think that we are in about as good a position now to meet Russia on two or more fronts as she is to meet us. Is that a fair summary of your general attitude about that?

General MACARTHUR. Yes, sir.

Senator MORSE. And that therefore—I am not asking you this. I will put the statement in, though, by way of conclusion to your observation on the question. And therefore it becomes now the burden of those who take the position that we cannot afford to risk for some time, within that 2-year period at least, a war on both fronts, to answer the position that you have taken in this record.

RISK OF NOT ENDING KOREAN CONFLICT

General MACARTHUR. I think, Senator, that the greatest risk we would run is not ending the war in the Pacific. I think that is infinitely greater in its potential of destructiveness to Western Europe than if we let it run indefinitely, to say nothing of the other questions—of the enormous loss in manpower that would be involved in an indefinite extension of this war, of the enormous loss of moral values that we would have, the psychological effect, which would result from our losing our controls in the western Pacific.

I believe the great danger and jeopardy to the Western European program is to allow the western Pacific to go on indefinitely.

I believe that it is advisable and helpful for our defense in Europe, or any other area, to bring this western Pacific issue to as rapid a conclusion as possible.

I believe we gain in every respect by doing that. I believe the great danger is to let it run on.

LIMITED WAR IN CHINA

Senator MORSE. You say, General, that you are opposed to a limited war in Korea, but some are saying that, in effect, what you are really proposing is a limited war in China. Do you think that is a fair evaluation of your proposal?

General MACARTHUR. I do not, sir. I do not call it a fair evaluation of my concept in any way, shape, or manner. I said that we should put such pressure on Red China as would force her to stop her war in North Korea.

Senator MORSE. That is my next question.

General MACARTHUR. It has nothing to do with geographical limitations of introducing war into China, except to put such pressure on her as would bring her Korean adventure to a cessation.

Senator MORSE. That goes to my next question, in part in repetition, but I think it needs to be clarified.

EFFECTIVENESS OF MAC ARTHUR RECOMMENDATIONS

If the program which you have outlined to us, which in essence, as I understand it, is first an ultimatum and then a deliverance on that ultimatum—bombing of the sources of supply—does not in fact stop the aggression in Korea, how much further do you think we ought to go with the war in China?

General MACARTHUR. I believe that the methods I have proposed will be completely effective. I believe that we can bring a sufficient blockade and air attack to unquestionably force China to diminish her effort in North Korea.

I believe—I wouldn't attempt to predict the exact time that that would be accomplished but, applied long enough, I believe its results would be a certainty.

I do not believe you need to go any further than those provisions. The length of time that you have to apply those provisions is problematical, but apply them. Sooner or later they will bring the results in my opinion.

Senator MORSE. Is it fair to say, General, if—I am sorry I have to talk in terms of so many "if's"—if, after whatever you considered to be a reasonable time for applying those pressure, the Chinese aggression continued, either because they are supplied with more and more material from Soviet Russia or with other assistance from Soviet Russia, or for whatever cause, would you then, in carrying out the principle that we must meet this resistance until we have a victory over it, say we would have to then enlarge our military operations against China?

General MACARTHUR. No, sir. I say and repeat that I believe the application of that force, continued long enough, would accomplish completely the purpose I have in mind. If the Chinese continued to resist, we would continue to apply those forces until the time would come when those forces would force her to cease her campaign in North Korea.

In my belief that time would come as a certainty. It would be the continuation of that pressure until it produced the results.

Now, if the implications that the question impliss—do I believe that we should introduce ground troops to support that movement in continental China—the answer is conclusively in the negative.

Senator MORSE. I didn't have that in mind, because I think you made perfectly clear time and time again in the record that you are opposed to the introduction of ground forces——

General MACARTHUR. Completely.

Senator MORSE. In China, and on the basis of my understanding of the military problems that would be involved in a ground war in China, I certainly agree because I doubt if you can win that kind of war, but I will tell you what I had in mind. I was going to ask it in the next question.

USING THE ATOMIC BOMB ON CHINA IF SHE DOESN'T NEGOTIATE

Although I realize you think it is a matter of certainty that you would win that way, I would like to find out what we might then have to do if you might be proven wrong about that and we didn't win that way. Would we then be justified in issuing an ultimatum to China that we would use the atomic bomb unless she stopped her aggression in Korea?

General MACARTHUR. Of course, when you get on the atomic bomb, you have gotten on territory that I can't comment on. The President of the United States has reserved the control or, so far as I know, the discussion of the use of the bomb within his own hands. It would be a matter at his own discretion, whether he wished to supplement the bombing attacks on China by the use of the atomic bomb.

I have never, of course, discussed the use of the bomb with him in any way, shape, or manner; so I wouldn't be able to give you any information whatsoever on that subject.

Senator MORSE. As I understand your position, I respectfully point out that, however, as a people, in the event of the possibility that I referred to coming to pass, that we couldn't win an ultimate victory in the Korean War along the lines that you recommend, we as a people then have the right to make clear what we think ought to be done to end it; and on the basis of that assumption, I raise my question.

I meant to imply would it not be better to resort to stronger bombing methods, including atomic warfare, than to risk the lives of millions of American soldiers on the soil of China?

General MACARTHUR. The use of the atomic weapon would certainly represent a great reserve potential which we could exercise at the discretion of the Commander in Chief.

ADDITIONAL FORCE NEEDED FOR CARRYING OUT MAC ARTHUR RECOMMENDATIONS

Senator MORSE. Now, General, in carrying out your proposals for a war against the Chinese Communists, just how much additional American force do you think would be required to carry it out, both air, navy, and land, with the understanding that the land forces wouldn't be going into China but would be used in Korea.

General MACARTHUR. As far as our ground forces are concerned, I don't believe there would be any appreciable increase necessary.

As far as the air, it might be advisable to start with an increment of two additional B-29 or B-36 groups [deleted].

It might become advisable to increase that bombing capacity. As far as the Navy is concerned, small additions at best I think would be able to accomplish the purpose.

SCOPE OF PROPOSED BOMBING

Senator MORSE. General, in discussing the proposal for bombing north of the Yalu if the Red Chinese would not capitulate to the ultimatum, you at several times referred to destroying Chinese bases, supply routes, and manufacturing centers.

Now do you mean just in Manchuria or all over China progressively, depending upon the effect of your early bombing?

General MACARTHUR. In the beginning I certainly would apply it merely to the supply routes and bases that contribute to the actual battle front. It might become necessary later to go deeper if the enemy deploys his forces deeper.

Senator MORSE. That is consistent with the statement that you have made that you would have to see it through to whatever extent it became necessary to get the victory in ending hostilities in Korea.

General MACARTHUR. Exactly.

EFFECT OF BLOCKADING PORT ARTHUR

Senator MORSE. General, in blockading the China coast what measures do you propose to employ in the case of the naval bases of the Soviet at Port Arthur?

General MACARTHUR. I'd maintain a blockade.

Senator MORSE. Of Port Arthur?

General MACARTHUR. Yes, sir; I'd maintain the blockade entirely along the Chinese coast.

Senator MORSE. Would a blockade of Port Arthur, in your opinion, increase the danger of open hostilities with Russia?

General MACARTHUR. It would certainly cut off the supply lines from Russia into China. I do not believe the small incident involved would materially affect in any way the great decisions that would be involved in bringing the Soviet into a global war.

I said that I doubted that anything that took place in the Korean War or in Asia would be of such influence as to alter the basic decision that Russia may make as to whether she is going to attack or whether she is not going to attack.

Senator MORSE. I understand that, General, and you and I, if we were just carrying on a conversation between ourselves, that is all the information that I would need would be your broad conclusion that you do not think anything we might do in connection with our trying to defeat the Chinese and stopping the war in Korea would bring Russia into the war now, but I am asking these specific questions because I want—

General MACARTHUR. Unless she was ready to come in anyway.

Senator MORSE. Unless she is ready to come in anyway. I am asking these specific questions because I want them in the record when other witnesses testify and may point out—I do not know what they are going to say, but may point out—this Port Arthur situation and

argue that a blockade of Port Arthur might be a red flag to Red Russia.

EFFECT OF RED CHINA'S MILITARY COMMITMENT IN KOREA ON HER ABILITY
TO ASSAULT OTHER AREAS

With respect to your statement, General, that Chinese Communist intervention in Korea now amounts to all-out war in the sense that the Chinese have committed their maximum available military power, does it follow that the Chinese Communists cannot increase the strength of their ground forces in Korea, cannot send in air, cannot attack Hong Kong, invade Indochina, Burma, or Thailand and assault Formosa at the present time?

General MACARTHUR. If she tried to do any or all of those things, why of course it would tend to take the pressure off the potential that she could use in Korea.

I believe that she is at her maximum now of over-all strengths that she can produce, and I believe that she is using of that maximum all that she feels she can in North Korea.

Senator MORSE. If we withdrew our unilateral action in respect to Formosa insofar as bottling up the generalissimo's forces are concerned, and he proceeded with an attack on the mainland, do you think that the Red Chinese would then try to take Formosa?

General MACARTHUR. No, sir. I don't think the Red Chinese are going to try to take Formosa by military assault under present conditions. I think the great effort that Red China is making is to get Formosa by other processes than the military.

Senator MORSE. If we withdrew our Navy at the present time from the protection of Formosa, do you think the Red Chinese would then attack the generalissimo?

General MACARTHUR. I would doubt it. The forces that were deployed formerly for a potential attack on Formosa are thoroughly committed now up in Korea. I believe that the Chinese in spite of the enormous numbers attributed to them, would have difficulty in organizing such a force as to contemplate a successful attack on Formosa within any reasonable period of time.

MILITARY PREPAREDNESS AND MORALE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA COUNTRIES

Senator MORSE. In your opinion, General, are the countries of southeast Asia prepared now for an attack by Red China, or does our holding in Korea at the present time give them the time necessary if they want to make use of it to get themselves prepared to defend themselves against Red China?

General MACARTHUR. The military resources of the countries of the South Pacific and the Southwest Pacific are very limited. It is quite possible that the greatest reliance they have upon security is the belief that the American Navy and the American Air Force will come to their assistance if they are under attack.

Those countries which are surrounded by water can have a reasonable degree of security, and as long as we maintain our hold in the Pacific, as long as we have the control of the seas and the air, they do enjoy a certain degree of relative security.

The enemy's ground troops cannot reach them under those conditions. Of the countries in continental China, the use of our Navy

would not be much, and the use of our air would be somewhat limited by its radius of activity. Those countries, of course, would welcome anything that tends to keep the pressure off of their own border.

The greatest help though I believe all of them could have is our success in stopping this aggression in North Korea. It would be heart and life and blood into their efforts, into their belief that the United Nations has the power to protect and secure them.

If we do not do that, I can assure you that from one end of Asia to the other the belief will prevail that we cannot or will not aid and assist them, and they very probably will make the best bargain they can with the other side so that they can escape the depredations and destructiveness of being overrun.

I believe that the very best help that can be rendered on any front in the western Pacific or in the Far East is the success of our effort in stopping the enemy in his first real military effort in the last few years to make aggression the weapon of the spread of communism.

If we do not stop it, I believe that the resulting disasters will increase in rapidity, increase in scope, that you will simply invite what we had hoped to accomplish.

Senator MORSE. I want to say, General, that that statement as far as I am concerned makes my examination worth while and I want to dwell on it just a moment.

EFFECT ON WORLD SITUATION OF UNITED STATES ABANDONMENT OF KOREA

It is a question I did not expect to ask, but by the statement you just made, is it not true that you have pointed out to the American people one of the reasons why we have to maintain ourselves in Korea, because if we failed in Korea the countries in southeastern Asia then will lose hope and feel that they must work out the best possible appeasement program with the Red Chinese and the Red Russians?

General MACARTHUR. Undoubtedly and unquestionably.

Senator MORSE. And if they have to follow that course of action, the only appeasement that history shows they can make to the Red Russians would be to yield to their occupation and control.

And, is it not true that the loss of southeastern Asia to communism would jeopardize the security of the United States for years to come?

General MACARTHUR. Correct.

Senator MORSE. I yield to the Senator from Massachusetts.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Thank you.

General MACARTHUR. I would like to add to that, Senator, that such a loss would, in my opinion, insure the ultimate conquest of Europe by the Soviet.

I believe the first line of defense now, for Europe, is right where we are fighting over there, in Korea. It is a global effort, and if you breach that, it will roll around to Europe as sure as the sun rolls around.

Senator MORSE. One of the reasons that it would increase the possibility of Russian conquest of Europe is that it would then, for a much longer period of time, force us to expend a great deal of our defenses in the Pacific and Southern Pacific waters in order to maintain our own security?

General MACARTHUR. That is correct.

Senator MORSE. I yield to the Senator from Massachusetts.

RELIANCE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA ON UNITED STATES NAVY AND AIR FORCE
FOR SECURITY

Senator SALTONSTALL. General, I would just like to ask, in that connection—I was not quite clear as to what you intended to say, or what you did say, regarding the use of our Navy, particularly with relation to southeast Asia.

Now, as I understand, at the present time our Navy is responsible for maintaining neutrality in the Straits of Formosa. It has no further responsibility, has no responsibility further south.

Did you intend to imply that possibly that responsibility should be stretched, or just the fact that it was in the Straits of Formosa gave encouragement farther south?

General MACARTHUR. No. I was talking about the general belief among those countries of southern Asia, and the South Pacific, that if they were attacked by a predatory force that they could rely upon the United States giving the assistance of the Navy and its Air Force.

I was not talking about any of the present legalities or conditions that existed.

I was talking about the conditions that would exist, as I understood the Senator meant to imply if aggression was at their door, and they were being threatened.

His query was: Were they in a condition of security; and my answer was that their main reliance for security must be the potential help that would be furnished by the United States, in the Navy and Air Force.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Thank you.

ARMIES OF RED CHINA BOMBING JAPAN AND SOUTH KOREA

Senator MORSE. You testified yesterday, or the day before, General, in regard to what you believed to be the air strength of the Red Chinese; and you testified, as I recall, that to date they have not carried on any air attacks, to any great degree, on our own ground forces in South Korea, nor any attacks at all on our Navy, or on Japan.

Do you think that the moment we started bombing in Manchuria, that that would bring an end to the freedom from bombing of what has been referred to as the United States sanctuaries in South Korea and Japan, and in the form of the United States Navy?

General MACARTHUR. I don't believe that Red China has the potential to bomb any of those places. I don't believe she has got the air or the navy to make any threat.

The Soviets, as I have said, would be a much more formidable adversary along those lines.

Senator MORSE. Therefore, if any such bombing of these so-called United Nations sanctuaries that haven't been bombed to date, should take place, it would have to take place by a Russian attack?

General MACARTHUR. Unquestionably.

Senator MORSE. Do you believe, General, that air power and a naval blockade would force the Chinese Communists to capitulate, or at least effectively prevent Chinese reinforcements from reaching Korea in volume, within the next few months, so as to end the Korean campaign within the next few months?

General MACARTHUR. I wouldn't attempt, as I said, Senator, to speculate upon the time that would be necessary.

Senator MORSE. Do you think, General, that the—and I am coming now—

General MACARTHUR. There are too many imponderables involved.

Senator MORSE. I am coming now to a few questions in regard to the Nationalist Chinese troops.

EFFECT OF BOMBING AND BLOCKADING CHINA ON CHINESE SENTIMENT TOWARD UNITED STATES

Do you think, General, that air attacks on China and a blockade, plus the use of the Nationalist troops, the generalissimo's troops, would develop or provoke a hostility of the Chinese people on the mainland to the United States, and tend to have them give greater support to the Peiping regime than they presently are giving?

General MACARTHUR. I do not.

Senator MORSE. It is my understanding that in China, as in Red Russia, the number of Communists is rather small, in proportion to the total population; is that your understanding?

General MACARTHUR. Yes, sir.

Senator MORSE. That is, ardent advocates of the Communist regime—that they are the victims of it, under the police state method, but not advocates?

General MACARTHUR. I believe that such intervention as I have suggested would bring to life an enormous number of Chinese who would take heart, and attempt to resist the present regime of Red China.

I would think it would have the opposite effect to the one that was suggested by your question.

Senator MORSE. That goes to my next question. We will cover it very quickly, then.

SENTIMENTS OF CHINESE POPULATION TOWARDS NATIONALISTS

Is it your opinion that the use of the Nationalist troops, now, might result in greater support for the Nationalist troops than they received when the Generalissimo was driven off the mainland, because of the experience of the Chinese population with the tactics and methods of the Red Chinese?

General MACARTHUR. I do, most sincerely.

Senator MORSE. Would the development, General, of hostilities caused by the bombing in Manchuria, as you propose, be met, you think, by the generalissimo, in a demonstration that he is ready to put into practice democratic processes which it was alleged he did not put into practice at the time he was driven off the mainland?

General MACARTHUR. I think he is doing that in Formosa now, sir, to the best of his capacity and ability.

USEFULNESS OF NATIONALIST TROOPS

Senator MORSE. Do you believe, General, that the military forces on Formosa are now capable of defending that island, of providing effective reinforcements for Korea, and conducting effective operations against the mainland, or just defend Formosa?

General MACARTHUR. Your question includes so much it is hard to answer.

I'll say that I do not believe, at the present time, Formosa is seriously threatened with military attack.

I believe, therefore, that the 500,000 troops the generalissimo has, could be used to excellent advantage in other and extended fields.

I believe that the mere releasing of them from inhibitions, the threat of their use, would require an enemy concentration to meet the probable points of their infiltrative efforts.

I would not attempt to speculate as to what the plans of campaign of the Chinese commander in chief were, until I had conferred with him.

There are many possible uses that could be made of those troops, which, however, would be of annoyance and threat to the enemy, which would require his concentrations of troops and forces to meet.

Senator MORSE. Then, do I understand, General, that you have no specific proposal as to how this joint operation with the generalissimo is to work, and that you would first leave that up to him to decide or to recommend, and at that point, you would decide how much cooperation we could give him to carry out his plans?

General MACARTHUR. That is correct, sir.

As a matter of fact, my basic orders that I am operating on, forbade the use of those troops and confined them to Formosa, so I, of course, never have discussed with the Chinese the possibility of doing anything except carrying out my directives and my orders.

RED CHINESE CAPABILITIES OF MEETING A NATIONALIST ATTACK

Senator MORSE. Do you know whether or not it is true that at the present time the Red Chinese have massed on the mainland of China across from Formosa sufficient troops and military force to meet the generalissimo if he should make a landing?

General MACARTHUR. I am not aware of that. I do not know how they would or could tell where the generalissimo was going to land to begin with. I don't believe they have got such excessive number of troops that they could afford to use them in that rather blind way.

The reports that my intelligence had was that the Chinese, the Red Chinese Government was making frantic efforts to raise new forces down in the south and central China. Their forces had been so completely committed up north in Korea that there was a fear that their lines were thinly held, and that they were conscripting and making frantic efforts to rehabilitate military forces down in those areas.

Senator MORSE. Well, my understanding is that one of your reasons for advocating the use of Nationalist troops on the mainland, if the generalissimo should decide to do it, is that it would divert troops away from Korea.

General MACARTHUR. That is correct.

Senator MORSE. That are presently there. So my question is two-pronged.

First, do you have any military intelligence that shows that they do not presently have on the mainland of China across from Formosa enough military force to meet him if he should land on the mainland?

General MACARTHUR. I believe that the minute you took off the

inhibitions from the generalissimo's forces that it would result in relieving the pressure on our front in Korea. I believe that they would have to tend to shift the center of gravity of their military mobilization down further south than they are at the present time.

USE OF UNITED STATES TROOPS TO SUPPORT NATIONALISTS

Senator MORSE. Well, if the generalissimo should decide to land on the mainland of China, and at that point the United States decided to assist him, as I think you would give favorable consideration to doing, you would have to cover him with air support, and you would have to back him with naval support, would you not?

General MACARTHUR. Within the powers that we had over there I would do my utmost.

Senator MORSE. And if he was repulsed, would you back him up by coming to his assistance on land or do your best to evacuate him and let him take his chances?

General MACARTHUR. No, sir. I have said that I can conceive of no condition in which I would attempt to land United States ground forces in continental China.

TYPE OF CHINESE NATIONALIST OPERATION

Now, I will say this: I do not want to prejudice any Chinese commander in chief or the generalissimo, or embarrass them in any way, but I do not believe that the generalissimo would make the initial use of his forces in that type of grand amphibious effort. I believe it would be an infiltrative effort at various points and would involve a degree of maneuver and of strategy that would be quite different from trying to take this great massive force and land it in an amphibious effort in the ways that we are accustomed to.

Senator MORSE. Would it be fair to say that the type of operation you have just defined might be characterized as guerrilla warfare operations rather than—

General MACARTHUR. I think it is more than guerrilla warfare operation. I think, Senator, that in conjunction with the movement of his regular troops from Formosa and their utilization, that he would organize and coordinate and endeavor to control the guerrillas in China.

POTENTIALITIES OF CHINESE GUERRILLAS

There are various reports as to what the potential strength of those guerrillas is. I think the last report I saw was there were a million and a half of them that were ready to go when they received any degree of encouragement or any hope of success.

I believe there would be a type of coordination between that type of guerrilla force and the regular troops that the Generalissimo has. The troops he has are regulars. They are capable of line of battle action. They are much more than guerrillas.

Senator MORSE. I was going to ask about the other guerrillas on the mainland. Do you know whether or not it is true that a large number of those guerrillas on the mainland are under Chinese war lords that are not friendly to the Generalissimo, but are very much opposed to the Red Chinese?

General MACARTHUR. I wouldn't be able to give you any authoritative statement on that, but I believe that all those people that are opposed to Red China would combine and unite their efforts in resistance to Red China.

Senator MORSE. One word for clarification in regard to the number of effective troops he has now ready to fight, wherever it shall be decided to use them.

PREPAREDNESS OF CHINESE NATIONALISTS

Am I correct in my understanding that at the time of the Fox study the figure was estimated that there were about 35,000 troops effective and ready for immediate combat?

General MACARTHUR. I don't think there is any special segment of the Generalissimo's army that is in a condition of complete preparedness. I think that any statement of that sort that might have been made from any source meant that you could take from the entire force of 500,000, you could collect the weapons that might be sufficient to completely arm and equip 35,000, or whatever the figure was, but if you did that, you would subtract from the efficiency of the rest of the command.

The entire command is more or less homogeneous, and the entire command is lacking in the full supply of military weapons to make them really efficient on the battlefield.

Senator MORSE. Is it your understanding from the Fox report that if we proceed as rapidly as we can to fully equip the Generalissimo's troops, that you would, with the equipment, have a number up to approximately a half million?

General MACARTHUR. I believe all those troops would be good troops with a little more supply, a little more training, a little more confidence that they are going to be supported, a little more hope that they may ultimately be successful.

Senator MORSE. You think the morale of those troops is sufficiently high to make a good account of themselves against Red Chinese?

General MACARTHUR. I do under the conditions I have enumerated.

NEGOTIATION AND APPEASEMENT

Senator MORSE. Now, General, on another subject, it has been charged by some that your use of the word "appeasement" is synonymous with the word "negotiation."

Will you please restate for the record just what you have in mind when you warn us against the danger of appeasement in settling the Korean dispute?

General MACARTHUR. What I meant by such a reference would be the inclusion in the discussion of a Korean settlement extraneous issues under the demand of Red China of such things as the recognition of Red China by the United Nations or the turning over of Formosa to Red China—things which did not appertain directly in any way, shape, or manner to a correct settlement, an honorable and just settlement of the Korean campaign.

Senator MORSE. General, you have just in that statement really provided an answer here to a series of questions I was about to ask. I will state the questions. You need not answer them, because I think your statement just made answers them. I have this question.

If a cease-fire order would result from the ultimatum that you recommend we should serve on the Chinese Communists, to the effect that if they do not stop their aggression in Korea we will bomb their bases, what main principles would you lay down as terms for the peace? Would you agree that all of Korea should be placed under a United Nations mandate until successful recovery from the effects of the Korean War had been attained and until a free election could be held?

I think I will ask you that question. Would that be one of your recommendations?

General MACARTHUR. That would be a possible solution.

Senator MORSE. That is something that would not be appeasement; that could not be classified as appeasement.

General MACARTHUR. No. What I had in mind, when we thought we were about to close that situation out was to hold at the earliest possible time, elections throughout all of Korea, and when those elections were held, and the government was established, to get out, and let the Koreans handle their own problems. Give them such help and assistance as we felt they could use, but not try to dictate to them.

Senator KNOWLAND. Senator Morse, may I interrupt?

CENSORING CERTAIN MATTER IN HEARINGS

Mr. Chairman, I wonder if the Senator would permit an interruption while I make an inquiry of the chairman.

I have just again consulted with Admiral—Vice Admiral Davis, who is handling this in a very able manner, I might say, this tough job of going over this copy, to determine if anything should be deleted.

The fact of the matter is, and I think it is only fair to this committee and to the admiral to say, that relatively little has been deleted from our record.

He appears to be moving on a common-sense basis, and I understand that in today's testimony, nothing up to now has been deleted, and in the record that I have examined heretofore, the last 2 days' hearings, very little has been deleted.

Now, on one of the two points that Senator McMahon and I took up with him, relative to the possibility of the information being made available through a paraphrase, he has now worked out with the Defense Establishment a paraphrase which I think adequately covers the information which might be included, and in discussing the matter with the admiral, we both agreed that the best way of handling it, since it is of relatively brief form, would be to read it into the record at this point so that it could get into the processing.

I was wondering if that was agreeable to the chairman, and to the Senator from Oregon, whether, at least, that one subject might be gotten out of the way so that people won't think information is being needlessly withheld.

Chairman RUSSELL. I have no objection, if the Senator does not.

Senator MORSE. I have no objection.

Chairman RUSSELL. At the risk of appearing to be repetitious, I wish to make a brief statement again about this subject.

There has been a tendency in some quarters to criticize the Department of Defense for the matters that were eliminated from this record.

I must assume the responsibility, and I do assume it, for the method by which this record has been handled.

The Department of Defense did not invite themselves into this position that they occupy. I requested the Department to furnish someone to go over this record, because I did not know where else to turn.

In requesting them to assign a man for that purpose, I presented in writing my ideas as to how the record should be handled. Just as I requested Secretary Marshall to downgrade in classification all the documents that he possibly could for the benefit of the public, the people, and this committee, I likewise requested them to use the most liberal rules in indicating classified matter that was presented in these hearings.

So, when censorship is referred to, let it be distinctly understood that the representatives of the Defense Establishment are carrying on a very difficult job at the express request of the chairman of this joint committee, and the responsibility is mine, and mine alone, in behalf of the committee; and, as I understand it, if no members of the committee wish to share it, the chairman will assume it all.

I did it in a conscientious attempt to protect the national interest, to protect the secrets of our Government from falling into the hands of unfriendly powers.

It was done with ample machinery provided so that the committee, in the last analysis, could express itself on its responsibilities as Senators, and under our oaths as to what was and was not matter that should go into the record or be deleted.

Senator KNOWLAND. Mr. Chairman, I want to say that I fully endorse and support the statement that has just been made by the Senator.

It should be obvious to all of us that there will be material produced at the meeting that should not, for the security of our forces overseas, be given to the public, and I think that he has set up one of the most efficient operations that I have ever seen, and I speak as a newspaperman, in handling the copy to the press; and there have been relatively few deletions that have been made in the hearings to date, and I think that the Defense Department could have furnished no better man to do this job than Vice Admiral Davis, who is now doing and has undertaken the job. They did not send someone here who would have to constantly check with headquarters. They sent a vice admiral, who is a man of wide discretion, and whom I had the opportunity of meeting some time ago, I believe, out in the Pacific, and who, apparently, is using a rule of common sense in following out the desires of the chairman that every bit of the information should be released which could possibly be released, without a violation of security.

I feel, in justice to our chairman, who has very fairly presided over these meetings that I would like to both endorse his statement and fully support it.

Chairman RUSSELL. Thank you.

Senator WILEY. I think, Mr. Chairman, that the remarks of Senator Knowland express the consensus of all of us on this joint committee.

Chairman RUSSELL. I appreciate that.

Senator KNOWLAND. If it is agreeable, I will now read—if you will turn to your hearings on page——

Senator McMAHON. Mr. Chairman, will the Senator yield to me?

Senator KNOWLAND. Oh, yes. I looked for you when I came in here, Senator.

Senator McMAHON. Mr. Chairman, at this point, I think the record should show that in the *Evening Star*, there is a cartoon on the front page showing the President of the United States holding a transcript of the MacArthur hearing, and another figure representing John Q. Public, I suppose, looking at the hearing, and it shows about half of the transcript blacked out. I cannot believe that whoever drew this cartoon looked at the record, because the press knows, and anybody could know by looking at it, that less than one-tenth of 1 percent of this record has been deleted, and this is an unintentional effort, I am sure, to—it is not an unintentional effort; it is simply misleading.

CONDUCT OF THE HEARINGS

Chairman RUSSELL. I would like to observe in that connection that so far as my part in these hearings is concerned I have no desire nor purpose nor shall I undertake to conduct these hearings for the benefit of the President of the United States, for General MacArthur, or any other individual.

I am undertaking to conduct them in the interest of truth and in order that the American people may be informed. Public opinion, of course, is in the last analysis a power which motivates our Government, and I have sought to operate them in this manner in order that the public opinion might be informed and intelligent decisions may be taken.

Without any effort to defend the President, I might say that it was a bit unfair to have him in the position of censoring or deleting matter from the record, because I have never discussed with the President the manner in which these hearings were to be conducted. He is not to be a witness before this committee, insofar as I am advised. I do not think that a President of the United States has appeared before a congressional committee, except in the first administration of George Washington.

I realize, of course, when I decided upon what I thought was the proper manner of handling these hearings that I would be subjected to criticism. I have undertaken to conduct myself to where I am impervious to it; and if there is any criticism that is attached to the manner in which the record has been conducted, I am willing to carry on the burden in the days to come.

REINSERTION OF MATTER PREVIOUSLY DELETED FROM MAY 3 TRANSCRIPT

Senator Knowland, will you proceed.

Senator KNOWLAND. If you will turn to the record of yesterday's hearing, page 62—that is the May 3 hearing, rather, page 62——

Chairman RUSSELL. That is the first volume of the testimony that is before you.

Senator KNOWLAND. It will read as follows:

Insert beginning page 62:

On the 29th of November I sent this message to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (the substance of this message appears hereunder):

"Thirty-three thousand seasoned troops from Formosa were offered in accordance with the United Nations Security Council Resolution on June 27 for opera-

tions in Korea. The United States declined this offer from the Chinese Embassy in Washington because Formosa was threatened with imminent attack and preservation of the full defensive strength of the Chinese Government was necessary. The belief that use of Chinese Nationalist troops in Korea would be an excuse for formal intervention on behalf of the North Koreans by the Chinese Communists probably influenced the declination. No longer valid are either of these reasons for declination. As I reported yesterday, Chinese Communist intervention in Korea is already most full and complete, and Formosa was relatively freed from danger of potential attack with the movement northward in China of the center of gravity of the Chinese forces following the landing at Inchon.

"The only potential source of reinforcement available for early commitment are the Chinese armies on Formosa. In approximately 14 days troops from this force could be landed in Korea. If desired, there would undoubtedly be made available a much larger force than originally offered.

"I strongly recommend: That you authorize my direct negotiations with the authorities of the Chinese Government on Formosa. In order to reinforce our position in Korea, I would arrange for the movement north of such Chinese units as may be needed and desirable. These units would be incorporated in the UN command."

Then quoting General MacArthur:

I call attention to the date of that, November 29. That was the highest crisis that existed at that time in Korea. At that time it was not certain just what losses I would sustain in my strategic withdrawal. On the following day, 30th of November, I received this reply (the substance of the reply appears hereunder):

"Consideration being given your proposal. World-wide consequences may be involved. Possibility that we would be isolated because of disruption of the united position in the UN of the other nations associated with us will have to be considered. Employment of their forces in concert with Chinese Nationalists may be completely unacceptable to countries of the Commonwealth. Extension of hostilities to other areas, including Formosa, might be involved."

Now, at this point it was suggested that one sentence be eliminated. I have examined the sentence. I do not believe it materially affects the request. It was the first request which has been made by the State Department for a deletion.

Personally at this time I agree with the admiral and the State Department it should be deleted, but I wanted to mention there was a one-sentence deletion at that point.

Then—"Disruption of the essential Allied line-up in the UN can be avoided only with utmost care."

Now that is the paraphrase and that covers the TWX problem. I took up again the matter——

Chairman RUSSELL. Just one moment.

Senator McMahon, do you agree with the competency of this matter which Senator Knowland just read?

Senator McMAHON. If Admiral Davis gave it to Senator Knowland, and he says he did, as he read it, I think it is quite satisfactory, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Without objection then, the committee will approve this reinstatement of the deleted matter.

DISCUSSION OF OTHER DELETIONS IN RECORD

Senator KNOWLAND. Now I merely wanted to bring the committee up to date on the other matter which Senator McMahon and I discussed with Admiral Davis.

He said that pursuant to our request he had communicated with General Bradley. Both he and General Bradley are still of the opinion

that that information should be not included. I told him that on the presentation he had made I was still not convinced, but that I would report back to the committee and suggest that at the proper time in our proceedings this afternoon, after General MacArthur, perhaps, has finished his testimony, that he might come up for a few minutes and make his explanation to the committee. Because I would rather have the admiral do it himself. And he can do it very briefly, and I think lay the situation before us.

At the request of Senator Lodge I took up the matter of one additional deletion which had taken place in yesterday morning's session. The admiral can perhaps discuss that when he comes up also.

I will say I was not able to locate Senator McMahon at the time I went downstairs, so he was not in on this second conversation regarding the matter that Senator Lodge had mentioned to me.

I will say, personally, that Admiral Davis, as of this time, has convinced me that the deletion of that material was justified from a security point of view. But, again, there may be others who would differ, and perhaps Senator Lodge might feel better if the admiral when he came up on the other matter would also make the presentation in that regard.

Chairman RUSSELL. It would greatly expedite the work of the committee, Senator Lodge, if you could find time——

Senator LODGE. I made no complaint.

Senator KNOWLAND. He made no complaint. He merely mentioned it and asked me to discuss it with the admiral.

Senator LODGE. If the Senator from California is satisfied, that is enough for me.

Chairman RUSSELL. After all, General, this was in your testimony. Do you object to the paraphrase of this document in the manner suggested by Senator Knowland?

General MACARTHUR. Not in the slightest, sir.

Senator KEFAUVER. Mr. Chairman, if the Senator from Oregon will yield for just one matter that I wanted to suggest for the record.

Senator MORSE. I yield.

TEXT OF SOVIET-CHINESE TREATY OF 1950

Senator KEFAUVER. Mr. Chairman, the matter of the military treaty between Soviet Russia and Red China of February 14, 1950, has been referred to in questions by Senator Morse and by others; also the expression of mutual friendship and the agreement with reference to the Chinese Shantung Railway.

I wonder if it would not be appropriate so that would be in the record that we make an exhibit of the official release by the U. S. S. R. Information Bulletin with reference to those treaties, so that they would be a part of the record.

Chairman RUSSELL. I would be very happy to have that done, Senator. You, of course, understand this cannot go out in the record being furnished to the press but would appear in the appendix of today's procedure.

Senator KEFAUVER. Mr. Chairman, in that connection, I think it would be pertinent for the discussion this afternoon if one paragraph in the preamble of the principal treaty, and also article 1, were read

into the record at this time. They are very brief, and I will read them if I may.

Chairman RUSSELL. Are there any objections?

Senator KNOWLAND. No; but, Mr. Chairman, may I make an inquiry at that point?

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes.

Senator KNOWLAND. So far as I know the treaty itself has not been filed with either the UN or with our own State Department, and I think it should be clearly indicated in the appendix that this comes from whatever you have there—the U. S. S. R. magazine, and does not necessarily imply that the committee considers it the official text of the treaty. Because they might for some reasons of their own desire to give us a little different picture than the actual treaty itself. I would like the record to be clear in that regard.

Chairman RUSSELL. All right, go ahead, Senator Kefauver.

Senator KEFAUVER. Yes, I know we all appreciate that they have just given us what they want us to see.

Senator KNOWLAND. What is the date of the treaty?

Senator KEFAUVER. This is the treaty of February 14, 1950. It is two treaties, one the principal treaty, the treaty of friendship and alliance, the other having to do with a railroad—

Senator KNOWLAND. What is the date of the magazine, what month?

PREAMBLE OF SOVIET-CHINESE TREATY OF 1950

Senator KEFAUVER. I do not have the date of it. This is put out of course by the U. S. S. R. Information Bulletin, and it has been partly described, these sections, by General MacArthur I think, but I thought they should be in the record and the whole thing as put out by the Soviet Government should be an exhibit to the record. In the preamble there is this part:

Filled with determination jointly to prevent, by the consolidation of friendship and cooperation between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the People's Republic of China, the rebirth of Japanese imperialism and a repetition of aggression on the part of Japan or any other state which should unite in any form with Japan in acts of aggression.

That is in the preamble. Article I is as follows:

Both high contracting parties undertake jointly to take all the necessary measures at their disposal for the purpose of preventing a repetition of aggression and violation of peace on the part of Japan or any other State which should unite with Japan, directly or indirectly, in acts of aggression. In the event of one of the high contracting parties being attacked by Japan or states allied with it, and thus being involved in a state of war, the other high contracting party will immediately render military and other assistance with all the means at its disposal.

WITNESS' FAMILIARITY WITH TREATY

And, Mr. Chairman, in reading over the record I think General MacArthur either did not understand the question or did not respond to it as he undoubtedly would like to, one question with reference to that treaty. On page 483 of the record of yesterday in a colloquy between General MacArthur and Senator Wiley, question by Senator Wiley:

Yes. In other words, if Russia comes in—well, let me say there is prevalent the notion that Russia has a treaty with China which obligates her in case of an

attack, obligates Russia to come to the assistance of China. Have you any information on that subject?

General MACARTHUR. None, sir.

Of course, manifestly General MacArthur probably knows as much about it as anyone else, and he has discussed it at great length, so I thought that should be clarified for the record.

General MACARTHUR. My answer was devoted to any special knowledge.

Senator KEFAUVER. I just thought that might be interpreted by somebody picking it out of context that you did not have any knowledge about this treaty. I am anxious that the record be kept clear. Thank you, Senator Morse.

(The document submitted by Senator Kefauver will be found in the appendix of this record.)

Senator LODGE. Mr. Chairman, I just would like to say to the able Senator from Oregon that it is almost 3 hours now that he has been questioning. His questions have been very good, but I was wondering how much longer you were going to go on because as I estimate it, 18 members of the joint committee have had a chance to ask their second round and 8 members have not, and I wondered if you would be willing to suspend and let the eight remaining members of the joint committee get their second round of questions in.

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, I will do what I can to shorten my questions, but I think I should be allowed to complete my examination. I have tried to be exceedingly fair about this. I announced in advance I was going to have considerable examination.

Chairman RUSSELL. I don't think anybody would charge the Senator with—

Senator MORSE. I would like to proceed. I will assure the Senator from Massachusetts I will do the best I can to shorten this. While this interruption has been going on, I eliminated several pages from my examination. I am sure the Senator from Massachusetts is pleased to hear that.

Senator LODGE. I don't want to cut the Senator short, but I was thinking of the other eight who would like to get a chance to ask a few more questions.

Senator MORSE. I have on two occasions waived my rights here, but I do want to finish this.

Chairman RUSSELL. Go ahead. We will make better time.

EFFECT ON RUSSIAN PRESTIGE FOR FAILURE TO HELP CHINA IF ATTACKED

Senator MORSE. In view of the fact that the Senator from Tennessee has raised the Russian-Chinese treaty again, I will digress from the line of question I was asking the General to ask one I overlooked when we were on that subject before.

Knowing the oriental mind as you do, knowing also the representations that Russian propaganda has made to the effect that the United States can never be counted upon to stand by her allies, when the going gets real tough, do you think there is any danger that Russia might lose face with her satellite countries, both in Europe and Asia, if she did not respond to the request of Red China to come to Red China's aid in case we should bomb Manchuria?

General MACARTHUR. Of course, it is possible, Senator; but as I said before, just what demands China might make and what response the Soviet might make in my mind are quite speculative.

Senator MORSE. Before I yielded to the Senator from California, General, I was examining you on the principles that you might think to be fair and reasonable within the realm of negotiation rather than appeasement for the settlement of the conflict in Korea.

PRINCIPLES FOR NEGOTIATION IN KOREA

I had asked you if you would agree it would be reasonable to stand for the principle that all of Korea should be placed under United Nations mandate until a successful recovery from the effects of the war had been obtained in Korea and then holding of a free election over all of Korea and I understand you thought that would be reasonable, although you are making no commitment, let it be clear, as to what offers you think we ought to make.

General MACARTHUR. Yes, sir.

Senator MORSE. Next do you think it would be reasonable to negotiate an agreement for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea save and except the necessary United Nations police force to maintain order and carry out directives of such a United Nations mandate?

General MACARTHUR. I do.

RELATIONSHIP OF CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN UN TO KOREAN SETTLEMENT

Senator MORSE. Would you favor, General, an understanding that the issue of whether or not the Chinese Communists should be seated in the United Nations should be allowed to go to the United Nations for determination and vote?

General MACARTHUR. I don't believe that question has anything properly to do with the settlement of the Korean problem.

Senator MORSE. Is it your understanding, however, that some of our United Nations allies seem to be, shall I say, in disagreement with us because we have objected to letting that issue go to the United Nations for a vote heretofore?

General MACARTHUR. Those are the reports that the press carries.

Senator MORSE. Is it your understanding and belief that one of the positions that we can expect some of our United Nations allies to take in the final settlement of the Korean conflict, once hostilities cease, is that this issue should go to the United Nations for determination?

General MACARTHUR. It is quite possible.

RELATIONSHIP OF FORMOSA TO KOREAN SETTLEMENT

Senator MORSE. Would you favor—and here is where we get to the distinction between appeasement and negotiation, General—would you favor allowing the Formosa issue to be placed on the agenda of either the United Nations or the World Court for determination as part of the negotiations for a peace treaty over the Korean conflict?

General MACARTHUR. I would not. I believe the question has no direct relation to the settlement of the Korean conflict.

Senator MORSE. It is your position that we should enter into a peace treaty, insist upon entering into a peace treaty short of considering

the Formosa issue, and thereafter let the Formosa issue run the course that it will take in the field of international negotiations and diplomacy.

General MACARTHUR. The disposition of Formosa is an integral part of the treaty of peace to be made with Japan.

Senator MORSE. It ought to be handled at that time?

General MACARTHUR. That time.

NEED FOR REINFORCEMENTS IN JAPAN BECAUSE OF RED CHINESE THREAT

Senator MORSE. With reference to your belief that Russia will not necessarily come to the aid of China, did you at any time request reinforcements to the number of, I think, four divisions for the defense of Japan, a defense which you said you would not be responsible for unless you received such reinforcements, because of the constant danger of intervention by the Chinese Communists?

General MACARTHUR. I have asked on repeated occasions the replacement of the four divisions for the occupation of Japan.

Senator MORSE. Would it be fair to say that one of the reasons that you asked for those reinforcements is because you were cognizant of the danger that either Red China might come into the conflict or Red Russia might come into the conflict? I am talking about your request prior to the time the Red Chinese got in.

General MACARTHUR. Completely.

Senator MORSE. Therefore, if the record that may be submitted by other witnesses shows messages that you sent to Washington asking for reinforcements and saying in effect that you couldn't be held responsible for the defense of Japan unless you got them, the reason for such messages was that you were always cognizant of the possibility that both Red China and Red Russia might get into the conflict.

General MACARTHUR. Correct.

AREAS OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN MACARTHUR AND ADMINISTRATION

Senator MORSE. Now, General, in my study of this controversy I have asked myself on many occasions—well, now, what is the area of agreement between the general and the administration?

I have found in trying controversies that it is always helpful at least to know on what points the parties are agreed. That is very helpful in resolving their differences sometimes.

So I have set down here what I understand to be at least the position of the administration in regard to Asiatic policy and I am going to ask you if I am correct in the statement I will make after each enunciation of a principle or policy, if I am mistaken in my assumption that you agree with it.

RESISTING AGGRESSION IN KOREA

The first is it is my understanding that you agree with the administration and have from the very beginning that we should resist aggression in Korea and you were not in disagreement over the decision to go back into Korea.

General MACARTHUR. Correct.

IMPORTANCE OF FORMOSA

Senator MORSE. Second, it is my understanding that at the Wake Island conference you and the President and the others present at that conference were in agreement that we should hold Formosa.

General MACARTHUR. The question of Formosa was not discussed. The strategic value of Formosa was not discussed at any time at Wake Island. In the general conference that was held the subject was not discussed on its merits at all.

It is my belief that at various times, at least, the administration has been in complete agreement with my concept that it should not fall into enemy hands.

There have been shifts and changes in the policies, as I have seen them announced by the administration, but I believe that there is no variation whatsoever between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and myself that Formosa should be held and not permitted to fall into enemy hands.

Senator MORSE. You think I would be right in my conclusion that as between you and the administration there has not been, at least since we went back into Korea, any difference of opinion over holding Formosa for the duration of the Korean War?

General MACARTHUR. I wouldn't wish to limit my opinion in that way, Senator. I do not believe that for the safety of the United States of America Formosa should be allowed to fall into hostile hands.

Senator MORSE. At any time?

General MACARTHUR. Correct. I am not able to speak as to what the policies of the administration are.

Senator MORSE. Let me state this point No. 2 this way, because I still think I am right in the conclusion I have drawn. I am not stating it very well as to your position and the administration's position.

When the President issued his order that our fleet should protect and defend Formosa from an attack from the mainland, you were not in disagreement with that order.

General MACARTHUR. Not to protect it from falling into Red hands; no, sir.

Senator MORSE. That order itself would seem to justify my conclusion that the administration was of the opinion that Formosa ought to be held from Red occupation?

General MACARTHUR. Correct.

Senator MORSE. So I close that point—

General MACARTHUR. It was certainly my interpretation of the order.

Senator MORSE. Certainly, then, as to the policy that has been followed to date in respect to Formosa, since we went back into Korea, there has been no disagreement between you and the administration?

General MACARTHUR. So far as preventing Formosa from falling into Red hands. There has been the disagreement with the use of the generalissimo's troops.

Senator MORSE. I am coming to that. It might be proper to say that there is a question as to whether there is a complete agreement between you and the administration as to the future status of Formosa after the Korean conflict has been ended.

General MACARTHUR. It is quite possible.

RESISTING AGGRESSION ELSEWHERE IN ASIA

Senator MORSE. Third, General, the President on June 27, 1950, promised increased aid to French Indochina and the strengthening of the Philippines in carrying out a principle that he announced that we would resist any further aggression by the Communist Asia and with that program of the President you have not been in disagreement, but have ardently supported it; is that not true?

General MACARTHUR. Indochina, of course, is not in my area. That part that relates to the Philippines I am in complete agreement.

Senator MORSE. But your testimony in this hearing, I think, is subject to the fair interpretation—and you correct me if it isn't—that you believe we should resist an extension of communism in other parts of Asia.

General MACARTHUR. Correct.

Senator MORSE. So that to the extent that the President has enunciated the same principle, you are in agreement?

General MACARTHUR. I would be in agreement; yes, sir.

Senator MORSE. And in the June 27, 1950, statement of the President he did enunciate such a principle. I am not going into the question of the implementation, I am just trying to lay out here what I think are the principles of policy that you are in agreement with the administration on and those on which you may be in disagreement.

General MACARTHUR. I would be in complete agreement with resisting communism in Indochina.

OPPOSITION TO APPEASEMENT

Senator MORSE. Fourth, the administration spokesmen—I refer to General Bradley's speech of the 17th of April and Acheson's speech of the 18th of April—set forth statements asserting that the administration is opposed to any policy of appeasement in the settlement of the conflict.

So if you are in agreement on the definition of appeasement, which is another matter, but if you are in agreement with the definition of appeasement, both the administration and you have warned and advised the American people that we should not settle our conflict with communism on any ground of appeasement; is that right?

General MACARTHUR. Correct.

MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO WESTERN EUROPE

Senator MORSE. Fifth, on the matter of military aid to Europe and the implementation of the North Atlantic Pact, I assume from the report of the Wake Island Conference, which states in effect that you thought you would be in a position to send at least the Second Division to Europe shortly after January 1, that you are in agreement with the administration that we should implement the North Atlantic Pact.

General MACARTHUR. I believe we should make every possible effort to assist Western Europe in her defense.

Senator MORSE. Within, as you said so many times in this hearing, within the ability of us to deliver.

General MACARTHUR. Correct.

USING NATIONALIST TROOPS IN KOREA

Senator MORSE. Seventh, in regard to the use of Nationalist troops in Korea, is it true that at one time you thought it was inadvisable to use Nationalist troops in Korea, but as conditions changed, you subsequently recommended that some Nationalist troops should be used in Korea to an amount of about 30,000?

General MACARTHUR. Correct.

Senator MORSE. At that time were you in agreement or disagreement with your superiors in the line of command on that recommendation?

General MACARTHUR. I made that recommendation, and the reply was that it was being taken under consideration. I think I read the reply into the record.

Senator MORSE. So in the history of your relationship with the administration in recent months that has been one of the points of disagreement?

General MACARTHUR. I don't know what the administration decision is on that, Senator. I recommended it, General Ridgway recommended it, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended it, but, as far as I know, no definite decision has been reached.

Senator MORSE. At least, you didn't get any instructions to implement such a recommendation?

General MACARTHUR. No, sir.

MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO FORMOSA AND USE OF NATIONALIST TROOPS ON CHINESE MAINLAND

Senator MORSE. Eighth, in regard to the use of the Generalissimo's troops on the mainland of China, you are not in a position to say whether the administration disagrees with you or not although it is to be noted that it is sending a mission to Formosa at the present time in accordance with the recommendation you previously made; is that correct?

General MACARTHUR. The situation is that the directive is still in effect that the Generalissimo's troops shall not be used outside of Formosa or its immediate vicinity.

I have recommended that that decision be changed. The Chiefs of Staff have recommended that it be changed, but whether a final decision has been made upon the matter I don't know.

It has never been changed.

Senator MORSE. But the most recent move for the sending of a mission of some 500 men to Formosa with some announcements coming out of the Pentagon Building to the press that that may be increased in the near future is some indication, at least, that the administration has gone this far with you; namely, that they think they had better get these troops trained in the use of equipment and possibly get equipment to them.

General MACARTHUR. That is certainly part of it. As I say, as far as I know the administration has not made its final decision on the matter.

USE OF AMERICAN TROOPS ON CHINESE MAINLAND

Senator MORSE. Ninth, as to any difference between you and the administration on the use of American troops on the mainland of China, you know of no difference because you are opposed to it and

it is your understanding that the administration is opposed to it; is that correct?

General MACARTHUR. That is correct.

EARLY CONCLUSION OF JAPANESE PEACE TREATY

Senator MORSE. Tenth, in regard to an early conclusion of the Japanese Peace Treaty, the Wake Island conference shows rather clearly that you and the administration are in agreement that that is an early must.

General MACARTHUR. Complete.

NEGOTIATION OF PACIFIC PACT

Senator MORSE. Eleventh, in regard to the possibility of working out a Pacific Pact somewhat similar in principle to the North Atlantic Pact, it is true, is it not, that at the Wake Island conference you approved a proposal for the implementing of what might be called a Truman Doctrine of the Pacific?

General MACARTHUR. That is right.

CHAIN OF ISLAND BASES IN PACIFIC

Senator MORSE. Twelfth, as to the general strategic concept that we protect ourselves in the Pacific by holding a chain of island bases, an arch from the Aleutians to the Marianas, I judge that you hold to that policy based upon both your speech before the Congress and also your letter to the Veterans of Foreign Wars, and it is my understanding that that is also the policy of the administration.

General MACARTHUR. It was my original policy.

Senator MORSE. It still is?

General MACARTHUR. It still is. I think the administration is in complete agreement with that policy.

ECONOMIC BLOCKADE OF CHINA

Senator MORSE. That was my question. Next as to economic blockade of China, there is no doubt that you advocate that. Is it your understanding that the administration is in any way opposed to an economic blockade of China?

General MACARTHUR. The recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of January 12 proposed it. So far as I know I don't know what the administration thinks on it.

Senator MORSE. That certainly is an area in which there might be disagreement.

General MACARTHUR. It might be.

Senator MORSE. And it is certainly important that the committee find out whether or not they go as far as you recommend in regard to the blockade of China?

General MACARTHUR. I am for an economic blockade.

Senator MORSE. And a complete one?

General MACARTHUR. A complete one after due warning and giving an opportunity to the enemy to gather around the peace table and discuss a just and honorable peace.

RUSSIA GUIDED BY SELF-INTEREST

Senator MORSE. Thirteenth, in regard to the possibility of an extension of war with Russia as a result of broadening the scope of the Korean War, do you think it is a fair statement of the respective positions of yourself and the administration that there is agreement to the extent of common belief that Russia will be guided by her own interests and will proceed whenever she thinks it is in her best interests irrespective of what we do?

General MACARTHUR. That is certainly my belief.

DISAGREEMENT ON RISK OF WAR NOW

Senator MORSE. Do you think it would be a fair statement that the disagreement if any which arises between you and the administration is that apparently some in the administration feel that we cannot take a chance now that Russia will not become involved in the war until more time has elapsed for the strengthening of our defenses both in Asia and in Europe? Is it your understanding that that is the attitude of some in the administration?

General MACARTHUR. I really couldn't speak for the administration, Senator.

Senator MORSE. Let me put the question this way. Is it your understanding that one of the reasons why you did not get authorization to broaden the Korean War was because it was felt that such action at this time might bring Russia into the war?

General MACARTHUR. It is quite possible.

REASONS FOR MAC ARTHUR'S RECALL

Senator MORSE. Have you heard it said, General, that that was one of the reasons for your recall?

General MACARTHUR. Senator, I do not know why I was recalled. The only statement that I have seen on it is the order for my recall.

Senator MORSE. Well, what I said is, Was it your understanding that that was one of the reasons?

General MACARTHUR. That statement was of a nature which expressed the President's belief that I could not give wholehearted support to the policies of the United States and of the United Nations in the Far East.

So far as I know, I have completely implemented, to the best of my ability, every directive, every policy that was given to me, but there is no possible charge that I have failed to carry out and implement or even to take exception to any announced policy that the United States or the United Nations has made.

I can only interpret that order that the administration, knowing the views I held, was going to act in a very contrary way, and believed it was advisable not to place any strain upon my loyalty, if you might put it that way, and relieved me of the command.

Senator MORSE. As I said the other day—

General MACARTHUR. It must have been based upon what they had in mind for the future. It could not possibly have been based upon anything in the past.

I had made certain recommendations, most of which—in fact, practically all, as far as I know—were in complete accord with the military recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and all other commanders.

Now, I have no knowledge whatsoever, today, as to why I was relieved, except the orders of the President.

I have said before that the President is under no obligation to explain his actions. He acted within his complete authority, and his responsibility, and I don't challenge either, in any way, shape, or manner.

Senator MORSE. I think you have made an——

General MACARTHUR. But, as to the reasons of my recall, I am still completely uninformed, because the reasons contained in the order are not valid.

If the President had given a decision which was exactly contrary to the recommendations I had made, I would, to the best of my ability, have carried them out completely and absolutely.

CHARGE OF INSUBORDINATION

My recommendations were seeking decisions, seeking policy directives. I felt that the position I was in, the military position, was untenable without having some directive, some mission which was more realistic than that which existed at the time; and I felt, in all conscience, I could not go on ordering men to their deaths by the thousands, in such a complete vacuum of policy decision.

There is nothing that I am aware of, of the slightest tinge of insubordination, or of dictation or anything that conflicted with any decision that has been made.

I merely first asked for decisions, and when they were not forthcoming, I gave my own recommendations.

Now, many of those, as I said, are completely in accord with the military and professional opinions that at that time were given by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Now, the opinion that the President expressed, as I read the order, and try to interpret it, is that something was in mind, that the administration had in mind, that was so violative of the concept that I had that it was thought best to relieve me, rather than charge me with their execution.

There has no charge ever been made to me, or publicly, that I know of, that I failed in any respect to try to carry out the directives I received; or any charge that I had disagreed with what had been decided upon.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Chairman, would the Senator yield for a question there, to clarify a point along the line the Senator was asking?

Senator MORSE. Yes; I will yield.

Senator SMITH. General MacArthur, prior to your abrupt dismissal, had you been called to Washington to confer with your superiors, or had the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or either of them, gone to Tokyo to discuss any possible disagreement with you, would it have been necessary to dismiss you summarily, or would you, on request, have turned your command over to General Ridgway?

General MACARTHUR. There isn't any possibility of my disagreeing with any order I might have received, whether I regarded it as good, bad, or indifferent.

What I was requesting was some directive. The lack of directives was what I was trying to bring to their attention and ask them for a decision.

Had any decision whatsoever been reached, I would have, to the very best of my ability, carried it out.

I resent, with every fiber in my body, any inference that can be drawn that I have been, in any degree, insubordinate or disrespectful of the President of the United States, or the policies of this country, or even of the policies and directives of the United Nations.

Senator SMITH. Then had you been requested to turn over your command, by the request of the United States, you would have done so, without it being necessary to dismiss you summarily, wouldn't you?

General MACARTHUR. Of course I would. The slightest indication from higher authorities that they believed I should withdraw, I would have complied with.

Senator SMITH. In that case then, you could have been left your responsibilities in Japan as the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers to continue the negotiations with Senator Dulles, or Ambassador Dulles, on the Japanese peace treaty.

In other words, there was no connection between the SCAP job you had and other personal differences on Korean strategy?

General MACARTHUR. There is no connection whatsoever, as far as I know.

Senator SMITH. I thank you.

General MACARTHUR. The two offices are entirely separate and distinct.

Senator SMITH. Thank you, General.

DISAGREEMENT OF EXTENDING THE WAR IN KOREA

Senator MORSE. General, the statement you just made bears on the next point, I think it is 14, in my attempt here to enumerate the areas of agreement and disagreement; namely, it is my understanding that one of the areas of disagreement is over the question as to whether or not the war in Korea should be limited or extended, as you have recommended, to operations in China by way of bombing.

Would you say that is a fair statement of what appears to be at least a disagreement between you and the administration?

General MACARTHUR. As I say, I can't speak for the administration.

Senator MORSE. No.

General MACARTHUR. But my own recommendations and the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were never put into effect by the administration. To that effect your inference there was disagreement would be perfectly logical.

Senator MORSE. And please let me assure you again, General, that these particular questions express no belief on my part.

General MACARTHUR. I understand.

Senator MORSE. But they do express inferences in trying to get out what I think are the representations that are being made as to what the disagreements are.

General MACARTHUR. I understand thoroughly.

MACARTHUR'S OFFER TO MEET ENEMY COMMANDER TO END WAR

Senator MORSE. That leads me to say this, as I mentioned to you the other day, that it is my understanding, from what I have read as to what is reported to have been statements that administration leaders have made about your recall, that it was considered that your statement to the Chinese military leaders, which I called "the notice" the other day, which others have called "an ultimatum," had the effect of extending the war in Korea from a war of limited operations to one of a broader operation in China; and that it was considered that that was in violation of known administration policies and served as a part of the basis for the recall. I am going to do what I can to find out whether or not that is their position.

General MACARTHUR. I don't believe there is the slightest validity in that comment. As I have explained, my statement was a cold military appraisal of the military situation that existed in Korea, and a suggestion to the enemy commander in chief that under such conditions it would be advisable to bring the matter to an end conclusively.

What I said seemed to me to be in complete support with everything that the administration was desirous of doing, with every directive outlining the missions that we had to consummate.

SUPPORT OF WORLD ORGANIZATION

Senator MORSE. The only other statement of general policy that I have enumerated here is with regard to a world organization. And it is my understanding, both from your testimony here and from other public observations you have made in times past, that you have always strongly supported the idea of an international organization such as the United Nations, and have expressed a desire to do what can be done to make it effective in bringing about a time when we can have an international system of justice through law rather than a settlement of disputes by war.

That is correct, is it not, General?

General MACARTHUR. That is correct, sir.

Senator MORSE. I have just two questions remaining.

SCOPE OF FILES OF WITNESS

One question goes to a critical comment I read in the paper the other day, yesterday I think it was, that you had in the Waldorf Astoria Hotel a great many secret documents; and the question was whether or not they were being properly protected, and whether or not they should not be down here in the Pentagon Building. And I thought you ought to be given an opportunity to answer that question.

General MACARTHUR. That is perfectly absurd, Senator. I haven't got any documents in the Waldorf Astoria, and all of the files of my headquarters were left intact. My own personal files were being

packed and are probably being shipped to me. But I haven't got any files. All I have you see right here [indicating].

MAC ARTHUR'S POSSIBLE INTENT TO RESIGN

Senator MORSE. Lastly, General, it has received wide circulation in this country that you contemplated resigning your command and that the President beat you to it by a recall. I thought you ought to have an opportunity to make a statement on that allegation.

General MACARTHUR. What was that?

Senator MORSE. I will repeat it. I say, I thought you ought to have an opportunity to make a comment on an allegation that has received very wide circulation, as you probably know, that you were planning to resign within a few hours anyway, and that the President beat you to it with a recall. I thought you ought to be given a chance to make a statement on that.

General MACARTHUR. Ridiculous.

Senator MORSE. You had no intention of resigning?

General MACARTHUR. None whatsoever. It has been my hope that I would be able to see my missions through. Those missions were the signing of the Japanese peace treaty and the conclusion of the Korean War. At that time I intended to withdraw from active military service, but not before, unless I was recalled by higher authority.

Senator MORSE. Now, Mr. Chairman, may I say in closing my examination, first to my colleagues on the committee, that I appreciate very much the courtesies that have extended to me. We will have to wait until the future as to whether or not the course I have followed in asking these questions has been wise. But in preparing to try a case—unfortunately I think that is involved here—each counsel has to decide for himself the foundation he wants to lay for it.

And to the general I want to say that you have my very, very deep appreciation for the very courteous, cooperative, kindly way in which you have taken my examination. And I trust that you know that I carried out what I said in the beginning was going to be the motivation of my examination; namely, one of complete impersonal questioning, motivated only by a desire to get what I think, mistaken though I may be in some of it, ought to be put into the record for adequate examination of other witnesses.

I want to thank you very much.

General MACARTHUR. Senator, I don't see how anyone could criticize your interrogation.

Senator MORSE. Thank you very much.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Lodge.

Senator LODGE. General MacArthur, I have two or three points I would like to clear up. In particular you made two statements today which I do not think are at all contradictory, but which might lead to some confusion by people who do not read it very carefully.

I think we ought to elucidate it.

STATEMENTS ON PREPAREDNESS

You stated to Senator McMahon—I have sent for the record so as to get it just exactly right—as follows:

Senator McMAHON. You recognize by that statement the necessity for a preparedness to withstand a surprise blow. I ask you, General, are we now prepared to withstand that surprise blow?

General MACARTHUR. I should say from my general knowledge that we are rather inadequately prepared at the present moment.

I want to put that alongside of your statement to Senator Johnson of Texas that you did not consider that the measures which you proposed in the Far East would require a higher ceiling than the 3½ million manpower ceiling fixed by the military leaders of this country.

Actually there is no conflict between those positions, is there?

General MACARTHUR. I don't see any.

Senator LODGE. No; and the fact that you think that your recommendations could be carried out in the Far East, without requiring a raising of our manpower ceiling does not mean, does it, that you think that our Air Force is large enough today to provide air defense for America?

General MACARTHUR. No.

Senator LODGE. It does not mean, does it, that you consider that we have enough tactical aviation to support our troops from Europe, does it?

General MACARTHUR. No.

Senator LODGE. It does not mean that you consider that the present goal of 18 divisions and 18 regimental combat teams for the Army is big enough, does it?

General MACARTHUR. Not necessarily.

Senator LODGE. Not necessarily.

The statement has often been made, and we have referred to it here, that our troops in Korea are buying time for us to get ready.

If that is true, do you not think that we owe it to the heroic sacrifice to our troops in Korea to use the time that we are buying in order to get ready as quickly as possible?

General MACARTHUR. I believe we should make all possible preparations in the shortest possible time.

Senator LODGE. And in your statement to Senator Long yesterday, you said, and I quote:

I believe that this country should throw itself into the maximum posture of defense that our economy can sustain.

That does not mean, does it, that you consider that we must have the guns-and-butter program whereby we try to have armaments without any diminution whatever of the luxuries of life?

General MACARTHUR. The economic problems I wouldn't be prepared to discuss, Senator, in such detail as you have asked.

I believe within the economic potentials of the country, as determined by the Congress, we should do the maximum of preparedness.

Senator LODGE. Some people have said that we ought not to prepare any more than we can do without at the same time curtailing on luxuries, and all of the normal frills of our governmental spending; other people say that we ought to cut out all the nonessential spending and all the nonessential activities of life, and concentrate on the military.

Now we can do either one of those two things and still maintain our economic system. Would you care to say whether, in your judgment, the challenge to us is sufficiently binding so that we ought to follow either one of those two courses?

General MACARTHUR. I wouldn't be prepared to discuss the question without much greater study than I have given to it.

Senator LODGE. Thank you.

KOREA AND THE FUTURE OF THE UNITED NATIONS

There is one more point. Yesterday, you said, in connection with the United Nations, and I quote:

I repeat that the mission and the concept and the hopes which underly the organization of the United Nations in one of the highest and noblest concepts the world has ever had.

Then, you said that one of the obvious defects in the United Nations was the abuse of the veto power, is that correct?

General MACARTHUR. That is correct.

Senator LODGE. Would you say that the success of our operation in Korea had a direct bearing on the future usefulness and vitality of the United Nations?

General MACARTHUR. I would say it has the greatest—will have the greatest possible effect.

Senator LODGE. Would you say that if the United Nations is to succeed and prosper in the future that it is necessary that in cases of aggression all the member nations put up manpower in proportion to their population and not let just a few carry the whole load?

General MACARTHUR. I think that is not only reasonable but just.

Senator LODGE. Would you say that another weakness in the United Nation's set-up today is the impossibility of expelling any member which is actively seeking to destroy the organization?

General MACARTHUR. If there were such a member, I should think he would be subject to the usual rules of expulsion.

Senator LODGE. Of course, unfortunately, in my opinion, the Soviet Union is constantly trying to sabotage the United Nations, and there is very little than can be done about it.

Would you say that the fear of the Red Army in Europe is one of the greatest single factors which prevents the United Nations from working as it should?

General MACARTHUR. I wouldn't discuss the subject from the point of Europe. I have been away in the Far East for 14 years, and I don't pose as—not only as an expert, but having anything more than the ordinary run-of-the-hopper knowledge of the special conditions that exist there.

Senator LODGE. Thank you.

Would you think that, in contemplating the general challenge of building and organizing peace, we should seek to amend and improve the United Nations or that we should follow the course outlined in the Vandenberg resolution of calling a conference and setting up a new organization?

General MACARTHUR. I would not know, Senator.

Senator LODGE. You would not know.

ADVISABILITY OF CONSENT OF CONGRESS TO SENDING TROOPS TO KOREA

Do you think that the consent of Congress should have been obtained at the time that we went into Korea?

General MACARTHUR. I haven't given such a question the faintest consideration.

I would believe it would be most inappropriate for a theater commander to delve into the propriety of the orders that he receives.

Senator LODGE. Thank you, General; thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Knowland?

CIVIL SUPREMACY IN PEACE OR WAR

Senator KNOWLAND. General, directing your attention to the New York Times of this morning, Saturday, May 5, there is an editorial, a lead editorial, which appears under the heading "The Basic Disagreement," and paragraph 2 thereof reads as follows, and I quote:

General MacArthur advances the thesis that once war has broken out the balance of control must be put in the hands of the military; and that no political considerations should handicap the latter in winning such a war; while the administration holds that in peace or war, the civil government remains supreme.

Now, my interpretation, and I want to check with you on your testimony, was that you made the observation that wars break out when diplomatic means fail. You did not question the supremacy of the civil authority, either in peace or war, but you did make the point that once the military were given the job of making war, that in that particular field they should not be interfered with in bringing the war to a successful conclusion.

Now, am I substantially correct in my interpretation?

General MACARTHUR. The statement—the interpretation of the New York Times is completely slanted.

At no time in our system of government is there any question of the civil administration being in complete control.

What I said was meant to convey the idea that there should be no non-professional interference in the handling of troops in a campaign.

You have professionals to do that job, and they should be permitted to do it; and that there should not be a political commissar system—if I could use those words—which would dictate professional subjects which involve the lives of men when war has been engaged in.

Any idea that a military commander in any position would possess authority over the civil functions of this Government is a treasonable concept in my mind.

Senator KNOWLAND. That was my——

General MACARTHUR (interposing). And I don't know of any reasonable man in the whole history of our country who has advanced any such silly idea. Whoever wrote that article was either completely biased or he ought to have his head examined.

Senator KNOWLAND. That was my interpretation of your testimony, and I thought in fairness to you and to the country that it should be clarified because these things are oftentimes picked up and repeated and then misconceptions get abroad which I was quite sure did not represent your testimony as I listened to it here the other day.

PRACTICE OF THEATER COMMANDERS TO ISSUE STATEMENTS TO ENEMY

Now in the New York Times of today on the front page is an article with a heading: "Ridgway tells foe to end futile war. Warns enemy soldiers they face further mass slaughter and ruination of of Korea."

The article is by Mr. Murray Schumach. It has a date line of "Eighth Army Headquarters in Korea, May 4," and reads as follows:

Lt. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway urged the Chinese Communist and North Korean troops today to give up their fruitless attempt to drive the United Nations forces out of Korea and realize they were being led to mass slaughter by "empty Communist promises."

"From their most recent offensive they suffered tremendous losses," he said, and he promised that any other major enemy assault would be paid for with the same "bloody price they had been paying."

I won't read the entire article but on the next page it goes on to say:

The general's suggestion that the enemy troops revolt against their Communist leaders was contained in a statement he made at a brief press conference after flying visits with Lt. Gen. James A. Van Fleet to nearly every sector of the front. Shortly after the conference he took off for Tokyo.

Now my question is this: I recall not long ago that as the then theater commander you made the statement to the Communist forces that were opposing you, calling on them to surrender, to sit down and discuss at least the cease-fire arrangement.

My general understanding has been that that has been the customary practice of theater commanders for ages past, and I frankly as a layman could not see a great deal of difference between the statement that your very able successor made than the one that you made a short time ago. Would you care to comment?

General MACARTHUR. The two statements in general purport seem to be just like two peas out of the same pod.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Chairman, will the Senator yield at that point?

Senator KNOWLAND. Yes; I will yield.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. It runs in my mind that there was a considerable segment of a certain type of writer in the newspapers that not only criticized General MacArthur severely for making that statement but said that that was a part of the reason why he was recalled. That was one of the culminations of the event. Does the Senator have the same opinion?

Senator KNOWLAND. I have some such recollection.

RIDGWAY STATEMENT TO LOOK MAGAZINE

Now I might say at this point, and I might mention it in the record that will go to the press, it is not classified information but at the same time if General MacArthur is going to be back here it would be different, but since this may be the last time we will have the opportunity of meeting with him at least for some time, I do want to call attention to the fact that this release is from the Look magazine of next week and it will not be released until Tuesday, May 8, and from the point of view of any quotation it should not be used by the Press until the release date, but it is an article by General Ridgway on the subject, A Soldier's Faith, which will appear in that issue of this national magazine. In it I only want to quote two paragraphs. General Ridgway has this to say:

There is no finer military team than the United Nations command which was organized by the brilliant inspired leadership of its former commander in chief, General of the Army Douglas MacArthur.

Then toward the end of the article General Ridgway has this to say, and I quote:

The deadly purpose of communism is unchanging. Nowhere is its menace more manifestly alive and potent than in Korea. Here its intent is implacable so that all can see. It has announced its intention and every action supports that intention of either driving United Nations forces from the peninsula or destroying them in place. The Eighth Army is fully aware of this menace. It trusts that the peoples from whom it comes are likewise aware.

I might say that I think that General MacArthur has helped in a very great way to make the American people more aware of this living menace of communism which we face today in Korea.

QUESTION WHETHER TIME ELEMENT IS ON OUR SIDE

Now earlier in the testimony during the questioning by the Senator from Connecticut—and I have a very high regard for him. We served on the Joint Atomic Energy Committee together and have served on these combined committees on numerous pieces of legislation that the combined committees have handed, but I had understood him to point out the great problem that we face in the event of the type of attack which he pointed out might very well take place.

It seemed to me that if carried to the extreme, that might develop such a feeling of fear that people would finally come to the conclusion they had little else to do but to surrender. I am satisfied that that was not the intent of the Senator from Connecticut, because he belongs to the party of a great leader who mentioned that the people have nothing to fear but fear itself, but I do think that it is important that we keep in mind that time is not necessarily on our side.

That if you build up 50 divisions, the enemy during the same period of time may be adding 75 divisions. If you are building X number of atomic weapons, he conceivably at some time in the future might be building up 2X atomic or other weapons.

I would like to ask, General, whether you feel that this question of time without necessarily being bound to it, has two sides and that you have no positive assurance that the element of time is necessarily going to work with you?

General MACARTHUR. I think that is unquestionable.

Senator McMAHON. Will the Senator yield at that point?

Senator KNOWLAND. Yes; I will yield, since I mentioned the Senator.

SUPPORT OF DEFENSE MEASURES

Senator McMAHON. I would like to say for the record at this point that the Senator from Connecticut has no doubt about the stamina of the American people and their determination to resist with all of the forces at their command any attempt to destroy them. Any attempt that will be made I believe will be successfully met.

The Senator from Connecticut's position is that we should try to get our defenses into such shape, the best shape that we can get them and immediately get them in order to meet any surprise attack.

The Senator from Connecticut also says that he agrees with General MacArthur that war is not inevitable, and the Senator from Connecticut would like to take the time that we now have and may get for the purpose of trying to see that this thing does not happen, and

I do not understand that the Senator from California wants to go on record as believing that a third global war is inevitable.

Senator KNOWLAND. I will say to the Senator—and I have no desire to carry on the debate here because that is not our purpose—that inasmuch as he has mentioned the subject, I felt that at least we should get a little clarity.

The Senator has mentioned quite properly that he has supported defense measures. I might say the Senator is not the only Senator around the table that has done so. I happen to have supported the 72-group air program recommended by the President's Commission when the administration itself cut it to 45 groups, so that there are others around the table who have been vitally interested in national defense.

DEFINITION OF APPEASEMENT

Now a little later on, I think during the questioning of the Senator from Oregon, the question was asked about the definition of "appeasement."

I think at the time when he was trying to find an area of agreement in saying that both you and the administration had declared they did not favor appeasement, that question was asked.

It seems to me that what we need is a definition of appeasement, because my recollection is that in the Yalta agreement and in some of the other agreements we spoke of democracy, but the Soviet put a different interpretation on democracy than we did, and as a result, though Poland and a number of the satellite countries now find themselves in the absolute tyranny of the Kremlin and its satellites, they are presumably there by virtue of a definition of democracy which our President and Mr. Churchill and Mr. Stalin had agreed upon, so before we compound the same errors, it seems to me that we should have a clear definition of just what constitutes appeasement.

SOVIET STATEMENTS ON YIELDING TO THE PROVOCATIONS OF AN ENEMY

Now the final question I want to raise—two questions, Mr. Chairman—is this: I want to take a very brief time of reading into the record from the Operational Code of the Politburo, "A systematic analysis of the political strategy of Communism and the rules by which it operates," by Nathan Leites, which is a Rand Corp. research study, the following which appears on page 42, and I direct the general's attention to it:

Nor must the party "yield" to the "provocations" of an enemy.

In 1918, Lenin stated that certain parts of the foreign bourgeoisie were attempting to "provoke the Russian Soviet Republic into a clearly disadvantageous war," and called the "Left Communists" who were in favor of such a war: " * * * tools of imperialist provocation."

In 1928, Stalin wrote:

"The opposition makes a lot of noise protesting that they * * * invented the slogan of self-criticism, that the party stole the slogan from them and thereby capitulated to the opposition. By acting in this way, the opposition is trying * * * to catch certain simpletons and to induce them to dissociate themselves from the party slogan of self-criticism. And how do some of our comrades react to this? Instead of tearing the mask from the opposition's fraud and fighting for the slogan of Bolshevik self-criticism, they fall into the trap, dissociate themselves from the slogan of self-criticism, dance to the tune of the opposition and capitulate to it, mistakingly believing that they are dissociating themselves from the opposition * * *. But in our work we cannot

dance to anybody's tune. Still less can we allow ourselves to be guided in our work by what the members of the opposition say about us. We must pursue our own path, brushing aside both the fraudulent attempts of the opposition and the errors of certain of our Bolsheviks who have fallen victims to the provocation of the opposition."

And then further on on page 43 it says :

According to the rule against yielding to the provocations of an enemy (par. 7), the Politburo would not necessarily retaliate to a political offensive against the Soviet Union with war, unless it was convinced that the offensive carried a certain indication of imminent attack.

I would like to ask the general if that perhaps is one of the bases upon which he feels that the Soviet Union will not go to war until it suits their purpose and until the calculated chance of their winning is greater than their chance of losing regardless of what may happen in the Far East.

General MACARTHUR. That would completely support my thesis.

Senator KNOWLAND. Now finally, Mr. Chairman—and I would like to say for the benefit of Admiral Davis who is going to have to read this record, that this should be treated as secret and not released to the press [deleted].

That is all, Mr. Chairman, of my questions.

COMPILATION OF SECRET DOCUMENTS RELATING TO INQUIRY

Chairman RUSSELL. Under the procedure that I have adopted, the Senator from California and the Senator from Connecticut have been designated to deal with these top secret documents which have been cryptographically handled as well as with those documents that are marked "Eyes only," to report to this committee as to whether or not the Department of Defense has made a reasonably fair presentation of the contents of those documents.

The staff of the committee will therefore prepare a request to be submitted to the Department of Defense to permit these two Senators designated to examine the documents and make a report to the committee as to whether the statement referred to in the compilation is correct.

Now, while we are on the subject of that compilation, I desire to make a brief statement.

Now, General, in the preparation for these hearings, the Senators requested me, as chairman of the Armed Services Committee, at that time, to request a number of documents, highly classified, from the Department of Defense.

On my own behalf, and as chairman of the committee, in order to obtain the fullest possible evidence on this hearing, I likewise requested that a number of documents that were related to the matters I anticipated would be involved.

This involved a tremendous mass of highly secret matter, if it had all been submitted, just as requested; and obviously this committee has no facilities for handling, processing, briefing, or even protecting the security of those documents.

The Department of Defense, in an effort, that I think was quite comprehensive, to comply with the committee's request for this information, had prepared under the direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff a secret compilation of extracts from all these pertinent documents.

It consists of something over 100 mimeographed pages of material. The material is arranged in chronological order, and purports to contain all of the various exchanges between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and your command in the East.

Now, during the progress of these hearings, the Joint Chiefs will undoubtedly appear before the committee, as well as the Secretary of Defense.

Now, it would be most helpful to us, and only fair to you, to place in your hands a copy of this secret compilation. It would assist us if you, or somebody, some member of your staff in whom you have confidence, were to go through this compilation and let us know whether, in your best judgment, it is an accurate and reasonably comprehensive extract from these reports.

I will ask General Mudge to hand you copy No. 1 of this compilation.

It is, of course, a registered secret document. I will be glad to put it in your custody, in the hope that you may find it possible either to examine it yourself, or have it examined and give this committee an opinion as to whether or not it is a reasonably accurate and complete document.

General MACARTHUR. I have no files whatsoever, Senator. I have no means of checking what has been omitted; and I have only my own recollections as to the contents of these documents.

It would be quite impossible for me to go over them, to make any comprehensive check.

I am entirely willing to trust to the judgment and discretion of the Department of Defense in anything they wish to submit, or anything they wish to omit.

Senator McMAHON. Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator McMAHON.

TASKS OF SUBCOMMITTEE ON CONSULTATION WITH CENSORS

Senator McMAHON. I was under the impression that the subcommittee had been appointed to consult with the censors on any matter that was disputed, as to whether or not it should be included in the transcript, or left out.

If the duty of the subcommittee is to go further than that, and to examine documents in the possession of the Joint Chiefs, on their working papers, I would like to have the chairman relieve me of that responsibility.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator, you understand that this is merely to see whether or not, in this compilation, in the case of any specific document—and I am sure it will not arise with respect to more than two or three documents—that it was my purpose that you and Senator Knowland represent the committee in reading the documents and comparing them with the compilation and report to the committee whether or not it was reasonably comprehensive and accurate.

I don't think it would involve any great amount of time or effort on your part. You have had a great deal of experience in dealing with secret documents, as chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, and I would like to express the hope that you accept this assignment.

I don't think it would involve any terrific amount of work.

Senator McMAHON. I wanted it clear, it wasn't on the basis of the amount of work involved. I wanted it clearly understood, then, that my assignment, among others, is to examine the documents which have been paraphrased, and which have been furnished——

Chairman RUSSELL. Exactly.

Senator McMAHON. And we are not being delegated, in any way, to go over and examine any documents——

Chairman RUSSELL. No, no.

Senator McMAHON. That have not been furnished.

Chairman RUSSELL. Now, there may be some other documents that will be mentioned in the course of the hearing, there may be some documents they did not paraphrase, because there are documents of that nature; but I do not anticipate that the Senator will be requested to read more than five or six documents before the hearings will be concluded.

Senator McMAHON. Mr. Chairman, my comment was not made because of the work involved. That wasn't the point.

I want it clearly understood I would not take any responsibility to go over and try to look into the working forms which had not been furnished.

Chairman RUSSELL. No, no; this merely involves, I might say to the Senator, that out of the innumerable discussions which I have had in undertaking to prepare for this, I have met with the Defense Establishment members, and we know that it is not feasible for the 26 members, or even 5 or 6, to read all of those documents, and it should be in the hands of a subcommittee to handle documents of that nature.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. There was some questioning, and I passed at that time, but I do have one question I would like to ask, when my time comes.

Chairman RUSSELL. I understood that you, Senator, waived the second round.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I had waived the second round.

Chairman RUSSELL. I have no desire to cut anybody off, I want them to have full opportunity——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I have one question that came to me this afternoon that I would like to ask, if I may.

COMPILATION OF SECRET DOCUMENTS

Chairman RUSSELL. The general said, in order to conclude this, that you have no desire to have this document?

General MACARTHUR. I have a copy, sir; but I cannot possibly go over it and give you any assurances that it is absolutely correct and conclusive of the facts of all the documents.

Chairman RUSSELL. I didn't intend that.

General MACARTHUR. I have no method of checking this at all, except my own general recollection; and as I have said, I have complete confidence in this being done by the Department of Defense in an entirely satisfactory way, as far as I am concerned.

Chairman RUSSELL. Of course, if you do not desire to have the responsibility for the document, I shall not undertake to force it on you.

General MACARTHUR. It is quite entirely agreeable to me to leave it to the Department of Defense, and the subcommittee that has been appointed, to determine what should be printed and what should not.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, this is not printed, this is still secret matter but involves the paraphrase of documents that were transmitted cryptographically.

General MACARTHUR. I understand thoroughly.

Chairman RUSSELL. Now, Senator Knowland, before we proceed with the questioning, was it your idea we ought to have the hearing this afternoon with respect to that testimony or defer it until Monday morning?

Senator KNOWLAND. I think, since we will have the Defense Establishment up on Monday morning, and it is getting late, and we have not finished with the questions, it might be a little late for the committee to have the admiral come up. I do hope we will take it up Monday morning with the Defense Establishment.

Chairman RUSSELL. I will call the meeting at least a few minutes before the time scheduled to hear the witnesses in order that we may settle the question with respect to that particular testimony.

Senator Fulbright?

EFFECT OF DISAGREEMENT OF ALLIES ON SUPPORT FOR MAC ARTHUR
RECOMMENDATIONS ON KOREA

Senator FULBRIGHT. General, I have no new matter, I think, but there are one or two questions that have arisen in the course of the examination today I would like to clarify, and I hope it will take a very few minutes.

This question—and I am sure it may appear repetitious but nevertheless I am not quite clear on the facts—I believe you stated yesterday you believed our allies would support your program in China and the Far East, and stated again today you believed that is what would happen. Senator Morse asked about this. But I was wondering if you would care to give us your views, that if they did not and we would carry it out alone—I believe you said yesterday we should?

General MACARTHUR. That is right.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Even though they refused to go along.

Now it seems to me it may be an important consideration that if we should go it alone in the Far East, that it is likely that we would have to go it alone elsewhere, that is, in the European theater. In other words, I can hardly imagine if we come to such great differences with the British, for example, or the French, that they would not support us in that endeavor, that they would continue to do so in other areas.

I would assume that is a fairly deep difference to cause them to draw apart.

Now if that should happen, we would lose, I assume, the use of the air bases that are now on land belonging to England and France, which would handicap very severely any possible struggle with Russia.

Of course, that question has been brought up in the press and is one I think we have to face. Would you care to comment on that?

General MACARTHUR. I think the great loser if such a deplorable break would come would be the nations who split off from the United States. In the subject of western defense, for instance, those nations who are involved are much more dependent upon our helpfulness than we would lose if they split and became independent.

What you prophesy, or the possibility that you have raised, Senator——

Senator FULBRIGHT. I do not prophesy it.

RESOLVING CONFLICTS AMONG ALLIES MUTUALLY

General MACARTHUR. I corrected myself. Pardon—is a most deplorable situation. But if in your question there is the inference that the threat, almost the blackmailing threat, that we had to agree in spite of what we thought was our own just interests to every demand that was made upon us in order to continue that unity, it is my belief the unity is valueless.

I believe there must be some agreement on these things, but I believe that loyalty is a two-way thing. I believe it has got to be practiced by both sides. I do not believe that one partner can say to the other, "You will have to accept my dictum or we will break the partnership." Such a partnership, in my opinion, Senator, would be quite worthless.

Senator FULBRIGHT. General, I agree with you. But we do know there is a great difference of opinion in the press, which reveals that many people in this country, many of our influential newspaper people complain that we are dominated by the British foreign policy. Recent accounts from Great Britain and the resignation of some of the leading members of their Cabinet indicate that the British feel that they are too much dominated by our foreign policy; and there we have a very definite difference of views.

I am not capable of telling you which of those views is the absolutely true one, but there is that difference.

Now I think it is the duty of statesmanship to try to reconcile these differences and work together. That is about all I know that we should try to do.

General MACARTHUR. I believe that the international differences of the Allies should be settled upon a just basis for all concerned. I do not believe that the special influence of any one group animated by its own selfish interest should be predominant in those things.

I believe that if we cannot come to such a just solution with our allies, that it practically means we are not allies.

I believe that the questions involved in the defense of the western Pacific should be settled on their merits; they should not be settled on what the differences of political opinions are in the Cabinet of Great Britain or in our own administration, for that matter. They should be adjudged by sensible sound minds that carry the responsibilities of these Governments upon the basic interests of the people concerned. It should rise far above any of the inferences that were carried in the quotations that you have made.

If we cannot arrive at such just decisions with our best friends, why, we have reached a very deplorable state of intercourse.

BRITISH POLICY IN THE FAR EAST

General MACARTHUR. Now I believe sincerely that the fundamental interest of the British, which is the nation you have invoked, is involved in this question of the Western Pacific, and I believe most sincerely that they are cutting their own throats in following the

plans they have of such complete support of Red China, and the complete support of the giving of Formosa into the hands of a potential Red enemy.

Senator FULBRIGHT. General, I agree——

General MACARTHUR (interposing). I cannot believe——

Senator FULBRIGHT (continuing). With that position.

General MACARTHUR (continuing). That the sound common sense of Britain would make such a decision—I cannot believe it. And I believe that the question that we have enough brains and sense and integrity in both of those two great countries to reach a proper, sound, sane decision—that question is one which would not involve a definite breach of our friendship.

It, perhaps, would be one of the most tragic things in modern civilization to see the Anglo-Saxon peoples split. But that does not mean that either should be so inflexible, so obdurate that they take a fixed position and will not listen to any reason.

Now, the position that the British look upon this question of the recognition of Red China and of the disposition of Formosa, was taken long, long ago. Many conditions have changed since then. The inflexibility of their position has been obdurate and unyielding. It runs counter not only to our best interests, indeed, to what I think involves the very life of this Nation, but I think it runs counter to the British own best interest.

I think it threatens them, as I have said here; I believe that if you do not carry this thing to a success in the Western Pacific, that it is the beginning of the downfall of Europe; that is one of the most serious arguments I make.

I am just as concerned about the future of Western Europe as any Western European is insofar as protecting it from falling into the hands of the Soviet or of communism.

COMMUNISM OR RUSSIA AS THE ENEMY

Senator FULBRIGHT. General, there is one other point. In yesterday's very short exchange with regard to communism, what is the idea, what is our enemy, is it a country or is it an idea, I am not quite satisfied with the record that I made.

I want to make a very short statement, and ask your comment on it. It is only a paragraph or two.

It seems to me that communism, as a method of organizing society, is antagonistic to the democratic system. The two are completely antithetical, and as ideas they are opposed to each other, but it does seem to me it is only when the idea of communism is embodied in a people, that is, a nation, such as Russia, that it becomes really dangerous to our security.

If we admit that communism, as an idea without regard to its being the weapon of a powerful, aggressive people like the Russians is dangerous to our system, it seems to me to be admitting that it has real merit; that it may have appeal to people as a way of organizing their society. Now, I do not think it has, any more than you do.

Without the use of force I don't think people will adopt communism, I don't think we have any examples of where they have voluntarily accepted the domination of communism.

In other words, in peaceful competition, without the use of arms, communism will not prevail.

Therefore, I believe that it is the combination of communism with the great military strength of Russia that really concerns us. I note that in practically every case in Europe the leaders of the domestic native Communist movements are all people who have been trained in Moscow, and seem to be agents of Moscow in those respective countries.

I don't know whether that differs as much as we appear to differ yesterday from your views or not. My thought is what concerns us now is this extension of the physical power of Russia over so many satellites, making an imbalance in the power potential among nations.

METHODS OF COMMUNISM

General MACARTHUR. That would be one of the threats of communism, but I don't believe for a minute that you should discount the enormous attempts at internal sabotage, the fact that the various cells that they feed out don't practice military force, but they practice the tremendous psychological factors of propaganda, of creating confusion, of bewilderment, of belittling and assassinating characters of the people that are opposed to them, of all the methods of the fifth column, which have so undermined the confidence of free peoples in their own institutions—those things are raging every day in almost every country of the world.

They have nothing to do with military force, but they are allied with it.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I don't make myself clear yet. I agree that is one of their methods, but aren't all of those in this country and Canada in practically every case—are they not supported by Russia? Don't they draw their strength, their money, the brains—especially the brains—the men who are sent to organize them, from Russia?

What I was trying to do is simply develop the primacy of Russia in the development and use of communism as a weapon in this international struggle.

General MACARTHUR. I don't think there is any question that the strongest member of and the strongest supporter of the Communist doctrine is the Soviet Union, both in numbers, in power, in brains—it was the almost original home of the Communist doctrine.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Now, even today, at least my information we get with regard to Europe, which is much more voluminous than it has been in the Far East certainly, in the committees I have been on, is that there is a very definite relationship today between the leaders of communism in France and Italy with Moscow, that they are in constant communication and take their orders. Isn't that your impression from what you know?

General MACARTHUR. I don't know, sir.

RELATIONSHIP OF COMMUNIST LEADERS IN OTHER COUNTRIES TO MOSCOW

Senator FULBRIGHT. Well, is it true in the Far East? I believe mention was made here the other day of a case that arose and was studied in Japan itself. I don't recall the name. It was a Communist spy, a quite famous one, in Japan. Was he not under the direction of Moscow?

General MACARTHUR. I couldn't tell you. I don't know who you are referring to. You will have to be more specific.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Sorge, I believe, the case was mentioned here. Sorge was mentioned in the hearings yesterday.

General MACARTHUR. That was a case that took place many years before we occupied Japan.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I thought it was after you were in the Far East.

General MACARTHUR. As I recall, he was an accused Soviet spy that was arrested and executed in Japan, but that was, I think, in 1942 or 1943. It has no connection and relation that I can see to what has occurred in Japan since the surrender.

Now, as to the statement that you said that I had inferred that communism throughout the Asiatic countries was controlled and dictated by the Soviets, my speech to the Congress shows very clearly a divergence from any such thought.

Senator FULBRIGHT. We have been told that Mao Tse-tung was trained in Moscow and had close personal relations in Moscow. Is that not true?

General MACARTHUR. How would I know, Senator?

Senator FULBRIGHT. You don't know. You know that that is commonly reported?

General MACARTHUR. That is what has been reported, but I can give you no testimony on Mao.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Have you any reason to believe it is not so?

General MACARTHUR. I have no reason to believe either way, sir. I am not a competent authority to discuss it.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I certainly don't pretend to be. What I am relating are impressions gathered from the press. I have no other knowledge, but that is commonly believed.

General MACARTHUR. My advice to you, Senator, is—if you listen to advice from a fellow Arkansas man—not to believe everything you see in the press.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Yes; I think that is very good advice, and not some of the things we hear in committee meetings do we always believe.

You take in the case of France, these men Thorez and Duclos—the information with regard to them is a little more precise than in the press. That is, our own diplomatic people tell us in no uncertain terms that they are agents of Moscow and there is a very definite influence flowing from Moscow into those countries at all times.

Well, I thought—I wanted to make the point that it seemed to me that Russia is the primary threat to our physical security. Now, whether or not the idea of communism, disassociated from Russia, is a great threat is another matter.

It isn't connected with that very powerful physical force—if it isn't, I don't feel there is any great danger that it can compete in a peaceful society with the idea of democracy. It doesn't seem to me that it has the basic merit that would prevail.

There was one other question that is a matter of mechanics, General, that you came right up to the point, but I believe you stopped just short.

EXTENT OF SUPPORT WE SHOULD GIVE NATIONALISTS

I won't repeat all of the background, but in the course of questions by Senator Morse was the mechanics of what would happen if Chiang's troops were utilized and the generalissimo's troops did go on to the mainland, what would happen if after that happened the Chinese did withdraw from Korea?

What would be our obligations to the generalissimo? I ask that purely as a matter of information. I would assume that the generalissimo, if they were at all successful, would wish to continue.

Do you think we could honorably disengage ourselves from any obligation to pursue it?

General MACARTHUR. I don't exactly know how comprehensive your question is. But he happens to be a friendly ally, and I would regard him and help him and aid and assist him in due proportion, just as we do to our other friends and allies.

That depends largely upon our own interests, upon our own potentialities, upon the general alignments and policies that exist at the time.

I would not attempt to answer such hypothetical questions so far in the future. I make no pretense to be a seer or a prophet.

Senator FULBRIGHT. What suggested the question was the conversation in some detail with Senator Morse about whether or not they would be used as guerrilla troops or how well trained they were. You got up to that point and left it dangling. I didn't understand how we closed up such an undertaking, assuming it took place. That is what would follow from the adoption of your plan. I wonder if you have any ideas about that.

BASIC CAUSES OF WAR

There is one other last question, General. You must have contemplated it in the course of your long career. Could you give any thoughts about what you think are the basic causes of war?

General MACARTHUR. Senator, I remember once when I was a young boy my father was an Army officer and was ordered to Fort Leavenworth. It was the start of our school system. Every week they had a lyceum discussion, and an officer was assigned to make a discussion on the topic that was given him.

My father was a man of great equanimity and of modesty of character, rarely aroused, placid, congenial. He came home one night in the greatest possible anger. My mother said, "Arthur, what is the matter with you?"

He said, "Well, I have just been assigned to make the discussion at next week's lyceum." And my mother said, "Why, you should be very proud to get an opportunity." She said, "What is the subject?" And my father said, "That is the trouble. The subject that was assigned to me was this: The Spirit of the Age—What Is it?" [Laughter.]

Now, when you ask me to analyze the causes of war, I could go and show you hundreds of books that would discuss that from various angles. The remaining twilight years of my life wouldn't be long enough to put the full thesis out.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I wouldn't expect the full thesis.

General MACARTHUR. I do revert to the fact, though, that what I have suggested, that you do get the complete answer and the absolute analysis of everything that is involved in that if you would abolish war.

If you will admit that whatever the causes are, it is a curse and a scourge and no longer a possible method of settling disputes between nations, you will save all of the discussions about the causes by its abolition.

Senator FULBRIGHT. That is the reason I asked the question—your very eloquent statement a little earlier today about abolishing war. I wondered if, feeling so strongly as you do about abolishing war, if you hadn't considered what are the causes and how you go about abolishing it.

Do you think some edict will abolish it? I would be very interested in how to abolish it, and that is why I asked the question.

General MACARTHUR. Senator, I wouldn't attempt to burden the record with any voluminous answer to that question.

EFFORTS TOWARD ABOLITION OF WAR

Senator FULBRIGHT. Finally, what I was leading up to is: Do you feel that the approach that this Government has taken, beginning I would say in 1943 with action by the Congress directed toward abolishing it, is in the right direction or not?

General MACARTHUR. Sir?

Senator FULBRIGHT. In the right direction. Are we pursuing a futile policy in our effort to abolish war? I consider everything we have done under the United Nations as being motivated by the purpose of abolishing war. Is that a wrong, futile, and naive approach, or is it not?

General MACARTHUR. I think every effort that is made to abolish war or the causes of war, which are well known to every rational, reasonable man, is a noble and proper purpose.

Senator FULBRIGHT. General, that is not responsive to my question. I asked you: Is the effort we have made—

General MACARTHUR. I haven't any idea of trying to answer directly your question. I don't think it falls within the scope of my knowledge or that I am qualified to discuss such a subject before this distinguished group.

Senator FULBRIGHT. You mean you don't feel qualified to say whether or not the United Nations and what we have done in that direction is a step toward the abolition of war, in your opinion? You don't feel qualified to make any expression about that?

General MACARTHUR. I have only the barest knowledge of what has transpired in the United Nations. I have never been connected directly with their sessions.

There are many, many things that have occurred that I have no knowledge of at all. I wouldn't attempt in the slightest degree to pass judgment on that distinguished body. I don't know enough about what they have done.

I am sure—and I have said here—that their ultimate purpose, the mission that they are working for, is one of the highest and noblest that the Christian world has ever known.

Now to discuss in detail things that I don't know anything about would just be foolish and foolhardy on my part.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Well, I would like to point out I did not ask you to discuss it.

General MACARTHUR. I am sure you know infinitely more about it than I do. I am sure I cannot contribute an iota to your knowledge.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I am not sure of that at all. You are the first and most important agent the United Nations has ever had. Is it for that reason that you did not mention the United Nations in any way in your speech to the Congress—is the reason because you do not have a view as to whether or not it is a step in the right direction?

General MACARTHUR. Of course it is a step in the right direction, Senator. I devoted 10 minutes here yesterday to try to give you my concepts. I tried to point out what I thought were its mechanical defects.

I tried to say how high I regarded its purposes, and the hopes that I had, with all other sane men, that something of that sort should be evolved.

I discussed it to the limit of my ability. I frankly don't know what you are trying to ask me.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Well, General, I apologize. I seem not to be able to make myself clear. That is not what I am asking at all.

I believe you said, and I agree, that the difficulty is one of mechanics. We are all agreed about abolishing war, I mean there is nothing controversial about that. There is no one in this room or any other room that does not want to abolish war.

The question is the mechanics. I thought it was a very simple question.

EFFECTIVENESS OF UNITED NATIONS MACHINERY

Do you believe that the mechanics, the machinery which we have adopted are reasonably well designed to accomplish that purpose or do you think it is a lot of poppycock?

General MACARTHUR. I would like to ask you that question. You know more about it.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Well, General, I am very free to say it is the best I can think of. I merely want to know what you think. I cannot think of a better approach.

General MACARTHUR. I am not sufficiently acquainted with it to pass any judgment.

It is very interesting to know that you approve its methods and its projects, and what it is doing.

Senator FULBRIGHT. It is not interesting, nor is it news as to what I think about it.

General MACARTHUR. I must say this—

Senator FULBRIGHT. It would be news as to what you think about it, because I have not yet seen whether you have said anywhere whether you thought it was reasonably well designed to accomplish the purpose or not. That is the only question I was seeking an answer to.

General MACARTHUR. I have had no direct contact with the United Nations, except to be the commander of the United Nations forces in Korea.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I thought that was quite a lot of contact.

General MACARTHUR. If you judge the United Nations by the present situation in Korea, you would see that there must be some lack in the mechanics, because it has not made a complete success there, yet.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Well, I agree to that, and I was hoping that you might give us a suggestion as to how we could improve it as a matter of mechanics, not its objective, but what could be done as a practical matter in its organization; and I hoped you might have a suggestion, but if you don't care to discuss it, I accept that.

General MACARTHUR. Senator, if I ever have an opportunity to make the study, and I evolve anything that is worth while, I shall certainly communicate to you.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I thank you very much.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Cain?

Senator CAIN. Thank you, sir.

General MacArthur, for the reason that, perhaps, you will not visit with the committee again, I merely want say as one individual that I have been extraordinarily privileged during the past 3 days to be able to listen and drink up your loyalty to country, your patriotism, your convictions, and the boldness and aggressiveness, and I think reasonableness of the positive program which you have advanced for the consideration of these joint committees.

General MacArthur, I have seven questions, sir.

EFFECT OF LOSS ON FORMOSA ON SECURITY OF WEST COAST

No. 1, I have understood you to believe that our first line of defense would probably become the West Coast States of Washington, Oregon, and California, were Formosa to pass into the exclusive hands of an enemy. Have I gathered you completely?

General MACARTHUR. That is correct.

Senator CAIN. That is your determination, sir?

General MACARTHUR. That is correct.

STRENGTH OF UNITED STATES COMBAT DIVISIONS IN KOREA

Senator CAIN. My second question, General MacArthur: Would you care to comment on the present understrength of the combat divisions in Korea?

The question is asked in hope that this committee, if there is a way to do it, might be of greater service to the troops in Korea.

General MACARTHUR. I think the Defense Department is doing everything that is possible to fill those ranks. They may be filled by this time.

The program that was outlined provided that with the increase in the strength that is now going on that within a reasonable time we would not only have the ranks filled, but they were going to provide a system of rotation so that the men that had had the longest service might have a reasonable chance of getting back.

Senator CAIN. The end strength then that we have had in Korea up to this time is merely evidence of the fact that we simply have not had men sufficient to the undertaking which was involved in Korea.

General MACARTHUR. That is correct.

IMPORTANCE OF ROTATION SYSTEM

Senator CAIN. You have answered, I think, my third question, which I would state as being this: Because we understand and know that many of our troops have been in Korea for months, it would

appear that some sort of a rotation system has been and will continue to be a pressing need.

General MACARTHUR. No question about it. There is nothing that raises the morale of those troops more than to have some definite hope that they are not committed indefinitely and will get a chance to get back.

Senator CAIN. That is to say that many fine young Americans have been retained in Korea during past months for a longer period of time than would have been your choice had a rotation system been available to you?

General MACARTHUR. That is correct.

Senator CAIN. My fourth question, and I think many an American has an interest in it, is, and it has two parts, sir:

The first I ask because I disagreed with the statement when it was first made many months ago.

POLICE ACTION OR WAR

What is a police action? The second part of that same question is how long did that police action, if there was a police action, continue until war in Korea began?

General MacArthur, without prejudice to anyone, I merely want to draw your attention to the fact that for months and months the American people was advised that it was a police action, which was going on in Korea. I was one among many who did not understand it.

I ask for clarification from you, if you please, sir.

General MACARTHUR. To me, it was war from the day I got there. The term of police action may have been evolved in the concepts that it was an endeavor to clear and police all of Korea. I don't think the term could have been evolved with reference to the actual type of fighting and battle that was going on. That was unadulterated war of the most savage character.

Now, in referring to a police action, it may be that it meant that they were using the mechanics of war to police Korea. That I wouldn't be able to tell.

Senator CAIN. Well, I can understand——

General MACARTHUR. I have never used the term myself.

Senator CAIN. Yes, sir.

General MACARTHUR. I have seen it in some dispatches, some papers, but I never regarded it as an attempt to say that that was a minor skirmish or something of that sort.

Senator CAIN. Against the background of what you were doing in Korea, presumably you did not quite understand what the phrase "police action" meant when you read it in various publications.

General MACARTHUR. I did not believe that it conflicted with the concept that we were fighting a very, very savage war.

PROPOSED ULTIMATUM TO RED CHINA AND DECLARATION OF WAR

Senator CAIN. My fourth question, sir: You have vividly on a number of occasions in the past 3 days described the conflict in Korea, and called it a war in every full sense of that word.

My understanding is that you feel that we ought now, even at this late date, 10 month after the conflict began, serve an ultimatum

on Red China, and if that ultimatum is not agreed to and does not result in a conference, that you believe that then it is up to the Congress and the administration to determine whether a formal declaration of war shall be declared against our enemies or whether the war shall be continued against those who seek to destroy the Allied forces without a formal declaration of war?

Have I reasonably well understood your position, sir?

General MACARTHUR. I never have given special consideration to the technical question of whether a declaration of war should be made or not.

What my recommendations were, were that we would be permitted to use the full mechanics of our instrumentalities, that by doing so, we not only save lives, but we decrease the possibility of the conflict becoming a third world war.

Whether it is necessary, a technicality of international law, which 25 years ago your questions could have been answered beyond the shadow of a doubt, that the declaration of war should have to be made—the international code has been so violated, and been accepted in its violation so generally, that whether it is necessary to go through that process, I wouldn't be able to tell you.

Senator CAIN. Well, we need not, sir, go back as far as 25 years, I think. As I recall, there were formal declarations of war against America's enemies beginning in 1941.

MAJOR OR LIMITED WAR

My sixth question, sir. We refer to the Korean conflict many times these days as being a limited war. The use of the word limited implies that a minor war is being waged in Korea. You have said and restated that Red China is committing or intends to commit its full military potential and capacity against the allied forces and against American troops.

This means to me, General MacArthur, that we are engaged in a major war in Korea, and that our people ought to be very conscious of what we are involved in across the sea.

You have told us so that I, as one, will never forget it, that the Korean War being waged today is as vicious and brutal and relentless and bloody as any war you have ever known anything about in your many years of experience.

Am I then right in believing that we are engaged in Korea in a major war, and that bold and aggressive steps must be taken soon if that conflict is to be concluded successfully?

General MACARTHUR. I agree entirely with what you say.

SIZE OF UNITED NATIONS CONTRIBUTION TO KOREAN CONFLICT

Senator CAIN. General MacArthur, my last observation, and I ask your response to it in the briefest possible form. As a member of this Senate, as just an American citizen, I understand our national purpose and that of the free nations within the United Nations to be a determination to stop and conquer aggression wherever it breaks out. It was in support of this declaration and determination, as I understand it, that the United Nations forces entered Korea.

After 10 months of war, only 14 of 53 nations, free nations, have contributed troops to that conflict. To me it seems most unlikely and

very unreasonable to assume that the United Nations can successfully stamp out any future aggression if it fails now to defeat and drive the aggressor out of Korea.

My own conviction, purely as an individual, is that the first great challenge to the right of free men and free institutions to live and to be preserved in the future is going on today in Korea.

General MACARTHUR. I agree with you entirely.

Senator CAIN. From your point of view then, sir, the challenge to the future lies not in future potentials in other areas of this world but in that peninsula known as Korea?

General MACARTHUR. It does.

Senator CAIN. I thank you, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Tobey.

Senator TOBEY. General MacArthur, when you paid that fine tribute to your late father a few minutes ago—equanimity and poise, slow to anger, plentiful of mercy—I thought of saying, "Like father, like son." I pay you that tribute.

General MACARTHUR. Thank you, sir. There is no tribute you could pay me that I would appreciate quite as much.

Senator TOBEY. With reference to Senator Cain's remarks about the war in Korea being called a police affair, that to me is about anomalous to calling Red China Communists "agrarian reformers."

CONFERENCES BETWEEN MAO AND STALIN

Now the question I want to ask you is only one, and that is—we have read in the press about conferences being held from time to time between the Soviet leaders and General Mao. How many, and to what extent have they been held, can you tell us?

General MACARTHUR. The reports that we have received would indicate there have been several such conferences. Whether that is correct or not, Senator, I have never been able to find out. Our best source of information on things of that sort, of course, is from Peiping, and I have made many efforts to find out where those conferences were held, their scope, and so on. I have always gotten conflicting reports back. My own belief is that one or two conferences were held.

Senator TOBEY. That question is particularly of interest to me because I noted this afternoon in your comments you spoke of your feeling, I think, if I am correct, that relationships between Red China and the Soviet were not as close as many have suggested.

CONDUCT OF THE HEARINGS

My last comment is this—this is not in the form of a question, although I will ask a question, but it is not a question on the evidence. You have sat here 3 days, giving a truly remarkable exhibition of a witness on the stand, maintaining your poise and temper, and giving answers to different questions compounded by the committee.

We have a chairman, Dick Russell, for whom we have a deep affection and high regard. I say that in all sincerity.

What I want to bring to your attention is this. After this ordeal, not of battle but of parliamentary procedure, do you feel the manner in which the hearings have been conducted, the questions and general

attitude only confirms your faith in the democratic processes and parliamentary procedure?

General MACARTHUR. I have never had a higher sense of distinction than being invited to confer with this body. I feel it is one of the most signal honors that has ever been given me.

I don't think that any man could criticize in the slightest degree either the conduct of the hearings, the scope, the methods. I never was so confident that the Congress of the United States is truly representative of the people of the United States and the sole interest they, whatever their political affiliation, is to see that our country prospers and is secure.

I value every minute of the time I have spent here in the company of these distinguished gentlemen. I claim each and every one a friend, whatever their feelings may be toward me.

I do believe that this system is the best in the world, the best that has ever been evolved, perhaps the best that will ever be evolved, and I do believe that it is reaching its highest point in the legislative halls of the Congress of the United States of America.

MANNER OF MACARTHUR RECALL

Senator TOBEY. General, in closing, there is not any man who knows his Constitution but realizes that the Commander in Chief, the President, has the constitutional right to remove you or any other officer in a subordinate position. But the thing that bothers a great many people across the country and bothers me—and I speak very frankly; I am noted for that—is, as I put it, the cruel and summary and unkind way in which you were relieved from your command—not having first-hand notice from the Commander in Chief, but having to learn of that tragic thing in your life through the medium of your wife who happened to hear it over the radio. That is not my idea of standards of government.

I am making that statement after listening to the questions of Senator Smith from New Jersey that he propounded to you about the procedure that might have happened, that it might have been approached in a more decent, orderly, and more humane and kindly way.

That is all, Mr. Chairman.

General MACARTHUR. I do not question in any way the action that has been taken by the President of the United States.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Stennis.

EFFECTIVENESS OF OUR AIR POWER IN KOREA

Senator STENNIS. General MacArthur, I just have one question. There has been a great deal of speculation and talk about the air forces in Korea, our own Air Forces. This is not critical of them.

For instance, this morning the radio broadcast at 8 o'clock, broadcasted from Tokyo, quoted a prisoner, an American soldier that had just been released as a prisoner. He said while he was with the enemy soldiers, whenever our artillery would open up, they would run for cover, but when our planes would come over strafing they would just laugh.

Now that is the news that came in this morning.

Now is there some explanation? I ask this as a member of the Armed Services Committee, and we have these matters here—this

commentator suggested it might be because the plane was too fast. Now is there some light you could give us on this matter that is argued about here frequently?

General MACARTHUR. I believe that the service that has been rendered by our Air Force in Korea, whether Ground, Navy or Marine, has been magnificent.

I believe that perhaps too much was expected of the air. The air alone has certain limitations as compared with ground troops.

As far as the casualties that result from the action of air and artillery, they are quite different. The air covers an enormous area of ground. The casualties that it imposes upon an enemy are heavy and accumulative, but they are scattered. An airplane hits here [indicating], another airplane would hit over here, another airplane would hit over here. So the accumulative casualties are heavy, but they do not hit in any concentrated spot. But with artillery it is entirely different. You got a battery, and when it puts its fire down, it puts it in a very small concentrated area. As a matter of fact, the artillery is spotted by the air. We use the little puddle jumpers to train our fire on their targets.

But the artillery fire with its concentrated areas is quite a different thing from the dispersed fire that enemy planes put down upon you.

It is quite possible that this prisoner may have been an artilleryman. There is a great deal of pride of service, you understand.

The effectiveness of both of the weapons are tremendous, but their range, their usefulness are very different, indeed. Both are deadly when they hit you.

I would say that the support that our tactical air has given to our ground troops in Korea has perhaps never been equaled in the history of modern war.

It is quite evident to anybody that is acquainted with war that determined ground troops cannot be stopped alone by air. I think it is well understood now, certainly by the Congress that passed the unification law, that modern war must have all the components working together in unison, and that it's quite silly for anyone to say that the artillery fire is more effective or less effective or equally effective with the fire from a plane. The two things are quite different. Both are important; both are absolutely necessary for victory in modern war.

Have I thrown any light upon your question?

Senator STENNIS. Yes, thank you.

That is all, Mr. Chairman; thank you.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Long.

Senator LONG. I have just a few more questions, and I will be as brief as possible.

EFFECTIVENESS OF MILITARY OCCUPATIONS

Your occupation command has been pointed out as the most successful of any occupation force in history.

That is the evaluation that has been placed on it by many people, and it therefore was somewhat of a surprise to me to read from a document a statement attributed to you, that no military occupation has ever been a success.

I wonder if you could explain to us what you had in mind in that connection?

General MACARTHUR. I would not accept any such quotation.

I do believe, however, that the general concept of the occupation of a defeated nation, by the conquering nation, is rarely productive of good results.

I believe there have been some exceptions.

I would say that probably one of the most successful occupations in all history were those carried on by Caesar. The results have well justified his temporary occupation, and his endeavors to instill administrative order with the degree of liberalism that dignified the age in which he lived.

But I will say, as a general rule, that I do not believe in military occupations.

I believe that the termination of hostilities should be a definite and definitive thing, and it should not carry with it the punitive potentialities, the mortifications, the indelible wounds that go to some people in the occupied country that did nothing but display patriotism for their own country and its cause, good or bad.

I do not believe that the system is a wise one.

I do not say that all occupations in history, however, have not been successful.

Senator LONG. You made the statement——

General MACARTHUR. And, I do believe that in Japan, many good results have flowed from its occupation.

Senator LONG. You made the statement that the Japanese liked the Americans, I believe, at least in the Wake Island——

General MACARTHUR. Yes, sir.

IMPACT OF AMERICAN TROOPS ON JAPAN

Senator LONG. You were quoted as saying the Japanese liked your troops.

General MACARTHUR. Yes, sir.

I believe that the Japanese admire and respect not only the American way of life, but the American personality.

You must understand that Japan suffered all of the disastrous effects of perhaps the greatest isolation in modern history.

Tucked away there in the North Pacific, they had little or no realization of how the rest of the world lived. They had evolved a feudalistic system of totalitarianism which had produced results which were almost like reading the pages of mythology.

When we landed in Japan, there were millions and millions of Japanese people that had never even seen a white face. They had been propagandized to the point that they believed that the most brutal of all nations was the United States of America; that when we occupied them, we were going to ravish them and exploit them in the most savage fashion.

When the contrary proved to be the case, when we tried to administer a decent and just form of government, they were so astonished and so grateful that their inclinations were to follow us, and to copy what we did.

They are like all orientals. They have a tendency to adulate a winner, and to have the most supreme contempt for a loser.

They lost at the height of their power. Only a fraction of our military force was utilized in overcoming them. They felt that we must have something that they could well copy.

They despised themselves. Their defeat was not only the destruction of their armed forces, it was not only the occupation of their country by foreign forces; it was their complete realization and distrust of their own basic concepts and methods of life.

There was an enormous vacuum created there, in which the Anglo-Saxon system of decency, fair play, and justice came into play.

They probably would have followed us and adopted many of our policies and criteria, merely because of what I have explained; but the more accustomed they became to our system of life—they watched us carefully, they were struck enormously by the spirituality of the American home.

When our men, these magnificent men that brought me all the way back from Australia—when they came in with their self-reliance, their assurance, their reasonable self-restraint, when they saw those men the first thing they did was to build their chapels, even before were built our hospitals, and it made an enormous impression on them.

The more they became acquainted with the American way of life, the more that they understood what that way of life meant to them—they got more fun out of life, they got more return for what they put into life.

They began to realize that the liberty of an individual, the dignity of man, were not merely flamboyant expressions of rhetoric, but were real methods by which we tried, at least, to regulate our methods of living.

SOCIAL REVOLUTION IN JAPAN

They have absorbed them to an astounding degree. A great social revolution has taken place there, a revolution which, in effect, could only be compared to the great revolutions of our own types, such as the Magna Carta that brought liberty to the English people; or the French Revolution, that brought international freedom to France; our own Revolution, which brought the concept of local sovereignty.

Those things are thoroughly known and understood by every school-boy in the world, because they were back-dropped by such sensational things—war, bloodshed, kings were guillotined; the whole drama of tragedy managed to emphasize these great charters of liberty so that they are fully understood; but there was no such drama in this evolution that has taken place in Japan.

There was no drop of blood that was spilled. It proceeded in a completely orderly fashion, by the processes of daily assimilation.

The result is that the world at large, public opinion, does not realize the enormous change that has taken place.

It does not mean that the Japanese character has undergone a great moral reformation. It means that a very isolated and backward nation has had a chance to taste of, and enjoy, and practice, the freedoms which you and I learned at our mothers' breasts when we were born.

We miss them if we lose them, but we are not acutely conscious of what they exactly mean—what they mean to people who, in general effect, were living in a type of exploitative slavery—willing slaves, I admit, because they believed in that system, but the freedom that has come to Japan has been quite similar to the freedoms that have been evolved in various peoples.

Being from Louisiana, you know the gradual evolution that has taken place over the past 75 years.

It is something of that nature, concentrative, not over a long period of years, but into a short period of time.

For those reasons the admiration that they have felt for the type of life that we introduced; the very evident attempts that we made at being just, in giving them another chance; the fact that we did not exploit them and do not intend to exploit them; the fact that we have resisted the efforts of other nations to exploit them; the fact that we have gone out of our way, like the Good Samaritan, after having fought them, and poured our dollars and our efforts to give them another chance, has appealed to them tremendously.

There is no sham about it. They respond to the good deeds that we have given them.

They have another reason for being in our camp, and they are in our camp strategically, economically, financially, and to some extent spiritually. It is the fact that they would probably be inclined to be there because if there is any one thing that I believe all Japanese except a very, very minor fraction would unite upon, is their fear and their hatred of the Russian.

As communism emanates from Russia they recoil from it. That naturally helps to put them on our side. There are a great many other reasons that I won't attempt to go into.

RELATIVE MATURITY OF JAPANESE AND OTHER NATIONS

Senator LONG. You believe that having enjoyed the freedoms that we enjoy in this Nation and having acquired some understanding of them, that the Japanese people would not willingly part with those freedoms.

General MACARTHUR. I think, Senator, that you can read the pages of history in vain to find incidence of a people, of a race or a nation which has enjoyed those freedoms who have willingly given them up.

There are many that have had them choked out of them by foreign banners, but I don't know of a single instance of any nation that practiced liberty and freedom that has willingly given it up.

Senator LONG. Germany might be cited as an exception to that, however. Have you considered the fact that Germany at one time had a democratic government after World War I and later followed Hitler, and enthusiastically apparently at one time.

General MACARTHUR. Well, the German problem is a completely and entirely different one from the Japanese problem. The German people were a mature race.

If the Anglo-Saxon was say 45 years of age in his development, in the sciences, the arts, divinity, culture, the Germans were quite as mature. The Japanese, however, in spite of their antiquity measured by time, were in a very tuitionary condition. Measured by the standards of modern civilization, they would be like a boy of 12 as compared with our development of 45 years.

Like any tuitionary period, they were susceptible to following new models, new ideas. You can implant basic concepts there. They were still close enough to origin to be elastic and acceptable to new concepts.

The German was quite as mature as we were. Whatever the German did in dereliction of the standards of modern morality, the international standards, he did deliberately. He didn't do it because of a lack of knowledge of the world. He didn't do it because he stumbled into it to some extent as the Japanese did. He did it as a considered policy in which he believed in his own military might, in which he believed that its application would be a short cut to the power and economic domination that he desired.

Now you are not going to change the German nature. He will come back to the path that he believes is correct by the pressure of public opinion, by the pressure of world philosophies, by his own interests and many other reasons, and he, in my belief, will develop his own Germanic tribe along the lines that he himself believes in which do not in many basic ways differ from our own.

But the Japanese were entirely different. There is no similarity. One of the great mistakes that was made was to try to apply the same policies which were so successful in Japan to Germany, where they were not quite so successful, to say the least.

They were working on a different level.

EFFECTIVENESS OF LAND REFORM IN JAPAN

Senator LONG. General, in your speech to Congress you spoke of general areas of Asia. I believe you had in mind China, but this might have also applied to Japan when you said:

What the peoples strive for is the opportunity for a little more food in their stomachs, a little better clothing on their backs, a little firmer roof over their heads and the realization of the normal nationalist's urge for political freedom.

It was significant to me that you noticed the actual physical aspects first, the food, clothing, shelter. Now you carried out reforms in Japan that dealt with the physical as well as the spiritual. Your land reforms for example was a system, as I understand it, of giving all these Japanese farmers a chance to own the land that they were working.

Could you give us some idea of how you put that into effect? Did you attempt to remunerate the large landowners who had previously owned the land or just how were these land reforms put into effect?

General MACARTHUR. In the consideration of the question of land distribution in Japan, you must understand that practically half of the Japanese population are farmers. You must understand that the population of Japan, over 80,000,000, is crowded into a small area of about the geographical size of the State of California or the State of Montana. That of that land not more than 16 or 17 percent of the area is profitably agriculturally tillable.

They are perhaps the best agriculturalists in the world. They probably can get more out of the land than any other peoples certainly that I have ever known, but in spite of that fact, they have never in the last 30 years been able to grow enough food to feed their population.

The norm over those 30 years would range from 12 percent to 30 percent of the food consumption had to be imported. They are a very thrifty people and the food consumption is of the most modest character.

The average consumption in calories per capita per day in Japan is about 2,500 calories. That is about half of what is either eaten or wasted in the United States. A more favorable comparison perhaps would be with our ration to the troops—we don't waste too much—which is 3,500 calories, so that you will understand that even with their thrift, that they were living upon a very narrow margin as far as food was concerned.

I give this background to show you how important the farmer was to the life of Japan. When we went in there, there were very large landholdings by landholders who in various degrees we thought exploited the farmer himself. We passed the necessary laws to make it possible for the farmer to buy that land. We issued certificates which amounted to bonds which would become due over the course of 25 years.

We tried to arrive at a fair appraisal of the land, and we confiscated nothing, but we forced the absentee landholder to sell his land to the farmer who tilled it.

That process was extraordinarily successful. I don't think that since the Gracchi effort at land reform in the days of the Roman Empire there has been anything quite as successful of that nature that has been brought about.

The result has been not only to improve the food production but it has been to establish a political segment of society which before was nervous, irritable, exploitable, into one of the most sound conservative elements of the political life of Japan, and as I say, its great importance lies in the fact that 50 percent of Japan are farmers, that is every farmer only has to feed his counterpart, so he is a very important segment.

EFFECT OF REFORMS ON COMMUNISM IN JAPAN

We have been trying to do the same thing in the fishery. It was dominated by industrial tycoons who did not give the fair meat to the laborer that was involved in it. That is in process of evolution now.

We have made considerable strides but it doesn't compare with the successes we have had in the land reform.

Senator LONG. In other words, you put into effect the concept that Americans have been working on for at least 70 years of breaking up monopoly and of giving the individual the opportunity to own a stake in his country and his Government by owning property for example. In other words, the idea of the private ownership of property is meaningful to at least half the Japanese who own their own farms.

Now that type of thing is an impediment to any Communist organizers attempting to interest people in a different form of Government, is it not?

General MACARTHUR. Correct.

Senator LONG. If the Communists want to go to the Japanese and convince them that they should be members of the Communist group, they are going to have to talk about something beside land reform or something different from the exploitation of the workingman because those factors have been reduced in Japan insofar as you could work them out, I take it.

General MACARTHUR. Japan had great monopolies. The reforms that were put into effect were designed after the American pattern to abolish monopoly and introduce fair competitive systems along the capitalistic concepts that we practice ourselves.

The actual laws that were passed were perhaps a little more rigid than our own so-called antitrust laws and antimonopoly provisions. The application of those laws as yet does not approach in efficiency our own American system.

We have, however, inculcated the basic concept in Japan of free competitive enterprise, in its development and in all the so-called democratic policies and reforms that we have introduced.

As soon as we lift the occupation they will be modified, they will become more indigenous to the Japanese culture and civilization, but I believe sincerely that the soundness of the ideas will prevent their ever being discarded or uprooted unless it is by foreign occupation.

CONTROL OF AGRICULTURE BY LARGE LANDOWNERS IN JAPAN

Senator LONG. Did you attempt to make any provision to keep the land from once again falling into the hands of large landowners? Did you attempt to pass any provisions to restrict the amount of property, particularly farm land any one individual could own?

General MACARTHUR. That is one of the provisions. Japanese farming is the complete antithesis of American farming. We do things in a great scientific way. As compared with our methods, they might be called a sort of a pick and shovel, as compared with our great bulldozer methods.

In our agricultural development when I was a boy, I think that it is quite possible that 35 percent of our people were farmers.

I have been away a long time and I am not quite familiar yet, but it is my belief that not more 12 or 15 percent of our people are farmers. We have consolidated it. We have put in the great master methods of scientific development. But in Japan it is quite the other way. They run to the little individual farms. So in the distribution we have limited their farm lands to what one family could exercise its full labor potential on.

Unless there is a radical change in the laws that the Diet passed, I do not believe it would be possible for the landlord system to gain a toehold in Japan.

I believe that practically all of Japan agrees in the merit of the reformation that has taken place in that regard.

JAPANESE POLICE SYSTEM

Senator LONG. General, what is your estimate of the Japanese police reserve that you organized during the latter part of your regime prior to your relief?

[Deleted.]

General MACARTHUR. The Japanese police system when we entered Japan represented a complete national localization of the military power of the constabulary under the police. We completely uprooted that and established a police system which was to some extent modeled upon our own police systems, in that the local centers, the municipal centers, would maintain their own police forces, and that there should

be a national police reserve which would handle the areas which did not fall under municipal control, and that the two could be amalgamated in case of emergency.

The size of those police forces, of the municipal force in accumulated strength, was about 90,000, and of the centralized police force was about 30,000.

Back of all that when the occupation troops remained in Japan, of course, were our own forces. When I took those forces out I felt it necessary for the internal security of Japan to organize an auxiliary police force, which we called the National Police Reserve, which would be in the nature of constabulary rather than police.

We organized them very much on the same form as our own Army divisions. They constitute about 75,000 men, organized into 4 divisions. Their training has progressed favorably. I regard them as quite comparable to any similar force I have ever seen.

They have not been armed with anything that could be called military weapons [deleted].

Senator LONG. I believe that former Senator Dulles, the present American Ambassador to Japan, I believe, or the special American Ambassador, stated that it might be necessary for Japan to make some contribution to the collective security of the free world in the future. If that should be the case, I assume that that police reserve could be converted into a very efficient although small element of an international security force.

POSSIBLE CONTRIBUTION OF JAPAN TO INTERNATIONAL SECURITY FORCES

General MACARTHUR. Unquestionably you would expand that force and you could very readily convert the present force into excellent ground troops. I believe that it is inherent that Japan would have to contribute to its own security.

I think it is also inherent in the situation that she could not ever support economically all of the modern elements of warfare such as the expense of arms, of a large navy or a comprehensive air force.

She could contribute, however, sufficient ground troops which would obviate the necessity of any other country having ground troops in Japan, and I presume that that would be the logical outcome of the provisions of a treaty, and the immediate aftermath.

It is impossible to conceive that the United States would indefinitely accept the responsibility for policing the Japanese islands.

We would contribute, I assume, to their defense, the same type of components that we would contribute to the other nations of the Pacific—in large measure our naval and air components. But the ground forces should be supplied from the native contingents, and in doing so, such a procedure would not involve in the slightest degree any possibility of the resurrection of any military threat to any other society in the Pacific Ocean.

It would constitute nothing that even resembled the old military machine of Japan, but what is more, I believe that the old concept that the Japanese have that they could advantage themselves by processes of war, have been thoroughly and completely knocked out of them by the results of the last war.

At the height of their military power, they were easily overcome. I believe the Japanese people, as a whole, have lost any concept that

they would advantage themselves by military adventure far afield. I believe that is even a greater security, perhaps, than their not being able economically to sustain and maintain the elements of naval and air forces that would be necessary if they intend to embark upon any predatory effort.

NEED FOR MORAL LEADERSHIP

Senator LONG. General MacArthur, I know that you have stated several times in your testimony that this Nation should assume moral leadership, and you have certainly given every indication that you have sound ideas of how that moral leadership can be asserted.

The President of the United States has said, I believe, that you are free to express your opinion on matters that you would care to discuss; and I certainly do hope that as basic issues do arise, and particularly involving fundamental questions on which this Nation must pass, particularly in our field of foreign affairs, that you will express that opinion from time to time, because undoubtedly it will be an influence for the good of this country, and for the moral leadership that we need.

We need moral leadership not only in us as a nation, but we need moral leadership within the Nation.

General MACARTHUR. Senator, as I said to the Congress, old soldiers fade away.

Senator LONG. General MacArthur, it has been a great privilege to have been here with you and to have had the opportunity to ask these questions, and again let me thank you for the many years of faithful service you have rendered this Nation.

General MACARTHUR. Thank you, sir.

Senator LONG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator BRIDGES. Mr. Chairman, in assigning your program for the first of the week with respect to witnesses—

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I wonder if I could ask this one question before you get into procedure?

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, Senator, of course, you have that right. I can only express the hope that it will not prove—

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I hope I am not offending, but I passed up my opportunity a while ago so that other members can have their chance, and this question has come to me recently. I think I am entitled to ask one question.

Chairman RUSSELL. I stated you were entitled to 100 of them if you wished to ask them. I am not trying to cut you off. You can question just as long as you choose.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. This information has come to me this afternoon, General: I have been asked if I would direct this question to you for whatever comment you might have to make on it.

WARNING JAPAN AGAINST DANGERS OF COMMUNISM

I am told in a book by one Frieda Uttley, which is forthcoming shortly, entitled, "China Story," it is stated that in September, 1946, in this book, she states, I am told that when you issued a warning against the dangers of communism in Japan, John Carter Vincent was quoted in the New York Herald Tribune as having charged you

were launching an anti-Soviet campaign in violation of State Department directives to you to use Japan for building a bridge of friendship to the Soviet Union.

Now, that is alleged to be a statement in this forthcoming book. The question is, Did you receive directives or instructions or suggestions that you should so use Japan as to make it, in effect, building a bridge of friendship to the Soviet Union?

General MACARTHUR. None whatsoever.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Thank you.

Senator BRIDGES. Thank you.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I thank the chairman.

FUTURE PROCEDURE FOR HEARINGS

Senator BRIDGES. Mr. Chairman, I have a question on procedure. We have had three very full days. The general has been most generous to us. We provided for continuity in the hearings.

I wondered if it would meet with the approval of the chairman and the members here if next week we could meet just forenoons so that we could give some attention to the Senate and to our other business, and to other hearings which might be scheduled.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator, these hearings, of course, are on an extraordinary subject and we have not formally been using the pattern of congressional hearings.

I am perfectly willing to leave that to the discretion of the committee. I hope that we may follow this matter through to its conclusion as rapidly, as expeditiously as it can be done so that we can provide every member of this committee, and consistent with the right of every member of this committee, to exercise his constitutional prerogative of examining witnesses fully.

What we are seeking are facts. The hearing will be a failure if anything should occur in the course of our investigation that would obscure one single fact casting any light on the very vital questions that we have under consideration.

I am perfectly willing to leave it to the committee as to whether or not we should have morning and afternoon sessions or confine them to mornings only.

I think that we might settle that matter better on Monday when we see the course that the hearings will take.

Senator STENNIS. There is a vote scheduled for Monday.

GRATIFICATION FOR WITNESS' APPEARANCE

Chairman RUSSELL. It would be absolutely impossible to have any meeting on Monday afternoon.

General MacArthur, I wish to state to you that the 3 days that you have been here with us are without parallel in my legislative experience.

I have never seen a man subjected to such a barrage of questions in so many fields and on so many varied subjects.

I marvel at your physical endurance. More than that, I have been profoundly impressed by the vastness of your patience and the thoroughness and the frankness with which you have answered all of the questions that have been propounded.

We have certainly drawn freely on your vast reservoir of knowledge and experience, not only as a great military captain, but as a civilian administrator of 80 million people.

I want to thank the members of this committee for their very fine attitude throughout these hearings. There are undoubtedly differences of opinion here as to some of the details on the matters that are involved, but we are closing now, I think, with a fine understanding and grasp of the American concept of the right to differ in opinions without giving offense. We hope that we will be able to arrive at the truth when we conclude our deliberations and our labors.

I agree, indeed, that these hearings have until now been a fine illustration of democracy at work. I hope that they may be conducted to their conclusion in such a manner as will strengthen the faith of the American people in our institutions of government and in our form of government.

We have only commenced the hearings. We will have next week other great and distinguished military leaders, as well as civilian witnesses.

We will continue to delve into this matter with the objective of discovering the facts and the truth in order that we may contribute to the workings of democracy, and to enable America to emerge from the very critical situation in which we find ourselves today, safe and secure, and supplying the world the leadership that is necessary to enable us to have the best place on earth to live.

Senator CONNALLY. Mr. Chairman, I would like to say a word. As cochairman, I have not "cochairmanned," although I have been here all the time.

I want to say to General MacArthur—that is no fault of anybody but myself—I can say that. The chairman has been very kind and courteous.

Chairman RUSSELL. Thank you.

Chairman CONNALLY. I want to say to General MacArthur that I have very greatly enjoyed his appearance before this committee—three hard, gruelling days that he has suffered without any apparent evidence of suffering—but I know he must have in these tedious sessions that we have had.

I think that this committee has demonstrated before the whole world that democracy is something more than a piece of paper with the word "democratic" written on it. This shows the operations of free government under constitutional processes—that we can handle a question that has aroused a great deal of controversy and a great deal of passion, and a great deal of feeling in a placid, calm manner in order to ascertain the truth, and to determine the policies and the questions involved.

I want to thank the General again for his broad knowledge. He has got so much knowledge about so many different things that have been developed, and no doubt these questions have revived some of the knowledge that he has not been conscious of until called for by these piercing questions that have been leveled at him.

I hope the General has a pleasant journey wherever he may go throughout the country, and I am sure he will be welcome wherever he goes.

I want to express my gratification at his appearance. I have known him for a good many years, but I have not had many contacts with him for a long while, but I am delighted to see him here and glad to have revived our friendship and acquaintance, and I wish him well.

Chairman RUSSELL. General, of course, it is wholly likely that after we have proceeded further with these hearings, we may like for you to be with us again.

For the present, why, we stand in recess until 10 o'clock on Monday morning.

(Whereupon, at 7:10 p. m. the committee recessed to reconvene at 10 o'clock Monday morning, May 7, 1951.)

MILITARY SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST

MONDAY, MAY 7, 1951

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES AND THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
UNITED STATES SENATE,
Washington, D. C.

The committees met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10:30 a.m., in the caucus room, Senate Office Building, Senator Richard B. Russell (chairman, Committee on Armed Services) presiding.

Present: Senators Russell, Connally (chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations), George, Green, McMahon, Fulbright, Sparkman, Gillette, Wiley, Smith (New Jersey), Hickenlooper, Lodge, Tobey, Byrd, Johnson (Texas), Kefauver, Stennis, Long, Bridges, Saltonstall, Morse, Knowland, Cain, and Flanders.

Also present: Verne D. Mudge and Mark H. Galusha of the Armed Services Committee staff; Francis O. Wilcox, chief of staff; Thorsten V. Kalijarvi, staff associate, Committee on Foreign Relations; and Pat M. Holt, associate clerk.

DISTINGUISHED CAREER OF WITNESS

Chairman RUSSELL. Gentlemen, the witness before the committee today is Gen. George C. Marshall, Secretary of Defense.

General Marshall's eminent career as a military leader and as an able administrator is known to all American citizens.

He rendered outstanding and noteworthy service as the Army's great Chief of Staff during World War II. He then answered the call for further services, and came from a well-earned retirement to assume the most important posts in the civilian branch of our Government.

His name has become synonymous with integrity and devotion, throughout the land, to duty.

I trust the General will allow me a personal note which I would like to indulge in, for I have known him for many years.

When I think of him, I like to recall some words I read a few years ago. They went something like this: "Most men are the slaves of their ambitions. General Marshall is the slave of his duties."

General, I know you do not come here this morning to be praised but to advise and counsel with us on the pressing problems that confront this nation.

REFERENCE TO PREVIOUS TESTIMONY

For 3 days we have listened to the testimony of another great American, Gen. Douglas MacArthur. General MacArthur has brought to us the point of view of a policy which he strongly believes

can be adopted by this country. He has argued his position ably and has supported it with the factual data.

In that process he has raised challenging issues—issues which must be faced and resolved calmly but decisively. They go to the very heart of this country's survival as a Republic of free men.

Some of the questions which he has raised appear to challenge the basic concepts—or at least some of the basic concepts—of our nation's foreign policy. Since General MacArthur has until recently been a theater commander bearing the burden of directing an armed conflict, considerable weight must be attached to his views.

You, General Marshall, are the official that directs the Defense Department—that agency upon which this Nation must rely for protection when its existence is threatened by an aggressor. The decisions which it is your duty to make are heavy and burdensome and involve the delicate balancing of America's armed might to put it in the best posture for defense.

We are asking you today, General, to tell us about those decisions in relation to the far eastern theater and the Korean War, as well as the effect it might have upon our entire world position. We recognize it to be a difficult task. We have seen fit to conduct these hearings in closed session and to arrange that any matter that might affect the national security adversely be eliminated from the record.

NEED FOR WHOLE TRUTH

As I told General MacArthur, one of the highest legislative functions is to assure the people that they know the truth, the whole truth insofar as we have the ability to ascertain that truth. I am therefore asking you, General Marshall, to speak fully and freely and to rely upon the methods that we have devised for the protection of this record to delete from the transcript any information that might aid our enemies. I can assure you that no other statement that you make will be taken from this transcript. I must express again the earnest hope a calm, judicious approach to this vital question which has been maintained thus far through these hearings be carried on until they are brought to a conclusion.

General Marshall, in view of the extraordinary circumstances of these hearings, the fact that we do not know their full scope, the committee has directed me to administer the oath to all the witnesses. You will therefore please rise and raise your right hand.

The evidence which you are about to present to this committee upon the matters now under inquiry shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God.

General MARSHALL. I do.

Chairman RUSSELL. You may be seated, General. General, do you have a prepared statement?

TESTIMONY OF SECRETARY OF DEFENSE GEORGE C. MARSHALL, ACCOMPANIED BY FELIX LARKIN, GENERAL COUNSEL

Secretary MARSHALL. I have a brief statement to make, but first I would like to observe that it is a very distressing necessity, a very distressing occasion, that compels me to appear here this morning and in effect in almost direct opposition to a great many of the views and actions of General MacArthur.

He is a brother Army officer, a man for whom I have tremendous respect as to his military capabilities and military performances and from all I can learn, as to his administration of Japan.

I am here primarily to answer whatever questions you and the members of the committees may care to ask me.

However, I think it may be helpful if, at the outset, I make a brief preliminary statement which I think will clarify some of the issues raised in the course of your hearings last week.

BASIC DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN ADMINISTRATION AND MACARTHUR

From the very beginning of the Korean conflict, down to the present moment, there has been no disagreement between the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff that I am aware of.

There have been, however, and continue to be basic differences of judgment between General MacArthur, on the one hand, and the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on the other hand.

In his testimony last week, General MacArthur indicated that, in his understanding, there had been at least two instances in which the Joint Chiefs of Staff had been overruled by the Secretary of Defense or by higher authority.

One of these instances related to the views expressed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff with respect to the disposition of Formosa and the seating of the Communist Chinese Government in the United Nations.

RELATIONSHIP OF FORMOSA AND THE SEATING OF COMMUNIST CHINA IN THE UN TO KOREAN SETTLEMENT

In his testimony of May 4, General MacArthur suggested that I, as Secretary of Defense, had overruled the Joint Chiefs of Staff in their opposition to turning Formosa over to Communist China and to seating Communist China in the United Nations.

At the time I became Secretary of Defense last September, the established policy of the United States was to deny Formosa to Communist China and to oppose the seating of the Communist Chinese in the United Nations.

There has been no deviation from that policy whatsoever. At no time have I entertained the opinion that there should be any deviation. These two issues were to be excluded from any armistice terms.

When the time comes for the negotiation of a settlement of the conflict in Korea, the questions of Formosa and the seating of the Chinese Communists in the United Nations will undoubtedly be raised by other parties to the discussion.

The position which the United States has taken in the United Nations in connection with such negotiations is that this Government will not oppose discussion of these questions. In such discussions, however, I am confident that the United States will continue to adhere to its present position, namely, that it will oppose any settlement of the Korean conflict which would reward the aggressor in any manner whatever, and it will oppose the attempt of any nation or regime to shoot its way into the United Nations.

JCS MEMORANDUM OF JANUARY 12, 1951

The second instance referred to by General MacArthur, of a supposed overruling or veto of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, relates to the courses of action proposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in a memorandum addressed by them to the Secretary of Defense under date of January 12, 1951. Of 16 courses of action enumerated in the memorandum, the following 4 were quoted by General MacArthur in his testimony of May 3:

Continue and intensify now an economic blockade of trade with China.

Prepare now to impose a naval blockade of China and place it into effect as soon as our position in Korea is stabilized, or when we have evacuated Korea, and depending upon circumstances then obtaining.

Remove now restrictions on air reconnaissance of China coastal areas and of Manchuria.

Remove now the restrictions on operations of the Chinese Nationalist forces and give such logistic support to those forces as will contribute to effective operations against the Communists.

At the time this memorandum was prepared, we were faced with the very real possibility of having to evacuate our forces from Korea. The proposals advanced by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which I have just quoted, were put forward as tentative courses of action to be pursued if and when this possibility came closer to reality.

I transmitted this memorandum to the National Security Council for its consideration. At about this time, however, the situation in Korea began to show signs of improvement.

General Collins who, with General Vandenberg, had left for Korea to obtain a first-hand view of the situation, reported back from Tokyo on January 17, stating that he had just returned from Korea where he had found that the Eighth Army was in good shape and was improving daily.

Thereafter, the situation of our forces in Korea continued to improve and during the latter half of January the enemy forces remained on the defensive. Throughout February and March our forces maintained the initiative against the enemy.

As the result of this change in the military situation from that which prevailed during the early part of January, it became unnecessary to put into effect all of the courses of action outlined in the Joint Chiefs' memorandum of January 12.

None of these proposed courses of action were vetoed or disapproved by me or by any higher authority. Action with respect to most of them was considered inadvisable in view of the radical change in the situation which originally had given rise to them.

BASIC DIFFERENCES ON EXTENSION OF CONFLICT

Now, as to the basic differences of judgment which exist between General MacArthur on the one hand, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense, and the President, on the other hand.

Our objective in Korea continues to be the defeat of the aggression and the restoration of peace. We have persistently sought to confine the conflict to Korea and to prevent its spreading into a third world war. In this effort, we stand allied with the great majority of our fellow-members of the United Nations. Our efforts have succeeded in thwarting the aggressors, in Korea, and in stemming

General MacArthur's testimony

the tide of aggression in southeast Asia and elsewhere throughout the world. Our efforts in Korea have given us some sorely needed time and impetus to accelerate the building of our defenses and those of our allies against the threatened onslaught of Soviet imperialism.

General MacArthur, on the other hand, would have us, on our own initiative, carry the conflict beyond Korea against the mainland of Communist China, both from the sea and from the air. He would have us accept the risk involvement not only in an extension of the war with Red China, but in an all-out war with the Soviet Union. He would have us do this even at the expense of losing our allies and wrecking the coalition of free peoples throughout the world. He would have us do this even though the effect of such action might expose Western Europe to attack by the millions of Soviet troops poised in Middle and Eastern Europe.

This fundamental divergence is one of judgment as to the proper course of action to be followed by the United States. This divergence arises from the inherent difference between the position of a field commander, whose mission is limited to a particular area and a particular antagonist, and the position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense, and the President, who are responsible for the total security of the United States, and who, to achieve and maintain this security, must weigh our interests and objectives in one part of the globe with those in other areas of the world so as to attain the best over-all balance.

PUBLIC VOICING OF THE DISAGREEMENT

It is their responsibility to determine where the main threat to our security lies, where we must fight holding actions, and where and how we must gain time to grow stronger. On the other hand, the responsibilities and the courses of action assigned to a theater commander necessarily apply to his own immediate area of responsibility. It is completely understandable and, in fact, at times commendable that a theater commander should become so wholly wrapped up in his own aims and responsibilities that some of the directives received by him from higher authority are not those that he would have written for himself. There is nothing new about this sort of thing in our military history. What is new, and what has brought about the necessity for General MacArthur's removal, is the wholly unprecedented situation of a local theater commander publicly expressing his displeasure at and his disagreement with the foreign and military policy of the United States.

It became apparent that General MacArthur had grown so far out of sympathy with the established policies of the United States that there was grave doubt as to whether he could any longer be permitted to exercise the authority in making decisions that normal command functions would assign to a theater commander. In this situation, there was no other recourse but to relieve him.

IMPORTANCE OF CASUALTIES IN KOREA

As to the question of the specific campaign in Korea, as to the casualties that are daily occurring there, with our troops, and those of our allies, no one, I believe, is more conscious of them than I am.

I realize, though, that the commander on the spot, who actually witnesses the casualties, is even more impressed by what is going on.

However, during some very painful years, I had a daily question of casualties from all over the world, and it is an agonizing procedure, so I can fully understand the reaction of a commander in General MacArthur's position, to the struggle in Korea, unless he could clearly see an early and victorious way out.

But there are many other considerations that this Government has to take into account; and it becomes the hard duty of those responsible to consider what is the wisest course to follow in such matters.

What our troops have done has really been magnificent. Thank goodness, a few of them are now coming back and they will return in much larger numbers beginning the end of this month; but we have small choice at the moment in the matter; and what we can do is appreciate to the full the heroism, the endurance, and the skillful fighting that those men are doing for us.

Now, gentlemen, I am ready to answer any questions you may wish to ask.

ROLE OF UNITED NATIONS IN PREPARING DIRECTIVES FOR MAC ARTHUR

Chairman RUSSELL. Mr. Secretary, this committee went at some length into the manner of preparing the directives which apply to the Korean theater.

General MacArthur testified that he received his orders directly from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I should like to have you explain to this committee the part played by the United Nations organization or any subdivision thereof in preparing the directives which apply in the Korean theater, particularly those that have been called the inhibitions upon the use of the force that was available in that theater.

Is that too long a question?

Secretary MARSHALL. I think I understand what you are trying to get at, Mr. Chairman.

The United Nations Security Council passed certain resolutions which related to our course of action in Korea, why we should go in, why we should fight there, and then the general statements as to what we were to do—what we were to accomplish.

From that over-all resolution, the Chiefs of Staff had the business of preparing a precise directive, taking into consideration all the military involvements and implications. That directive was, as a matter of routine, forwarded to the Secretary of Defense, to the National Security Council, and to the President.

MANNER OF PREPARING DIRECTIVES

If it involved precise political consideration, it was discussed as a rule with the members of the State Department or sent to them and their reaction awaited.

In a major decision of that nature the final action would be taken in the Security Council, for which the terms are here in your own basic law creating that agency.

If the directive pertained to rather minor matters, which would come up from day to day—

Senator SMITH. Might I ask a question there? The general just said Security Council. You meant our Security Council, not the Security Council of the UN?

Secretary MARSHALL. Our own National Security Council.

Senator SMITH. Yes.

Secretary MARSHALL. If they pertained to directives which are issued from week to week, or sometimes almost day to day, that proposal from the Chiefs of Staff goes to the Secretary of Defense, and by him to the President.

Normally the Secretary of Defense would concur or state his disagreements. It would go to the President, and then he would indicate whether or not he approved of dispatching that particular directive.

There are a number of minor directives, but they may be brief, but they may have very important effects or implications. In all those dispatches to the theater commander of that nature, the President expresses his final approval, but not all of them go to the National Security Council unless they are basic directives where the matter is studied by a senior staff of that Council, on which is a representative of the Defense Department, a representative of the State Department, and a representative of the Council itself.

In the normal procedure as to the minor directives, it was customary during my period as Secretary of Defense for me to give the paper to General Bradley, who came in every morning about 9:15 and who had an appointment with the President regularly at about 10. And he would take the paper to the President and get his approval before its dispatch.

In the actual dispatch General Collins acts as the agent, the executive agent, of the Chiefs of Staff, because it is largely an Army involvement, just as the President acts as the executive agent of the United Nations in regard to their resolution as to Korea.

COMPOSITION OF NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Chairman RUSSELL. For the record, Mr. Secretary, would you state who composes the Security Council? I assume that the names of the members of that body, while of great importance, are not as familiar as those of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. So will you state who composes the Security Council?

Secretary MARSHALL. The Security Council is composed of the President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the NSRB, at times the Secretary of the Treasury, when the matters lead into economic things. I forgot to mention, and I should have stated at the very beginning, the Vice President of the United States.

General Bradley, as a rule, accompanies me. General Smith, the head of the Central Intelligence Agency, usually sits in on the meeting.

Chairman RUSSELL. What is the point of contact between the Security Council and the United Nations? Would that be the Secretary of State?

Secretary MARSHALL. That would be the Secretary of State.

UNITED NATIONS ROLE IN DIRECTIVES

Chairman RUSSELL. Do you know whether or not the United Nations Organization made any specific recommendation as to the imposition of a naval blockade on China and the bombing of Manchurian bases, or did that originate within the Security Council in attempting to comply with the original directive of the United Nations?

Secretary MARSHALL. If I understand your question correctly, Mr. Chairman, there was initiated in the Joint Chiefs of Staff a proposal about December 7 or 8 to authorize General MacArthur to institute a procedure in the air called "hot pursuit," which meant that our planes could follow theirs for a stated distance over the Yalu River into Manchuria.

That was considered, concurred in by me—as a matter of fact I had urgently recommended it—and was concurred in by the Secretary of State, and approved by the President, and the Secretary of State was directed to take that up with the 13 nations involved with us in fighting in Manchuria. They voted solidly against it, so for the time being we had to drop that.

[Deleted.]

DISCUSSION ABOUT ECONOMIC BLOCKADE

Chairman RUSSELL. Do you know whether or not any program for the blockade of the China coast has been submitted to the other representatives—the representatives of the other powers?

Secretary MARSHALL. My recollection as to that, Mr. Chairman, is that we have been discussing it with them informally, and we have not brought the issue up as a formal proposition for them to refuse.

I might say that we have been intensely concerned—the Chiefs of Staff—by formal document, which I concurred in and put a vigorous endorsement on in doing so, that the economic blockade be intensified specifically by cutting off the matériel that was going into China via Hong Kong.

Chairman RUSSELL. Do you know whether, as a matter of fact, representations have been made seeking to make agreement as to strengthening and tightening the blockade—the economic blockade?

Secretary MARSHALL. They have been, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. Have they been attended by any success?

Secretary MARSHALL. I beg pardon?

Chairman RUSSELL. Have they met with any success?

Secretary MARSHALL. Not complete success. Our own Government is engaged in a complete economic blockade, but we have not been able to bring that about with the other nations, except to a limited extent.

Chairman RUSSELL. Have the Joint Chiefs of Staff or you, as Secretary of Defense, taken up with the Security Council the question of a complete economic blockade to be enforced by United States Naval Forces on China?

Secretary MARSHALL. That has been discussed before the Security Council.

Chairman RUSSELL. Any formal action—

Secretary MARSHALL. Particularly, it was discussed in regard to that proposal of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of January 12, which Gen-

eral Marshall had specifically referred to; that was one of the items in that which were to be taken if we found ourselves forced into a withdrawal from Korea.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL DISCUSSION OF JCS MEMO OF
JANUARY 12, 1951

Chairman RUSSELL. Now, that document then of January 12 to which you refer was discussed in the Security Council?

Secretary MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. Was it approved by the Security Council?

Secretary MARSHALL. The document went to the Security Council at the same time that General Collins and General Vandenberg went to Korea to report back to us what they thought the situation was with regard to the morale of our forces, and the possibility of our having to evacuate Korea.

We were at our lowest point, I might say, about January 9 to 10; and the message from General MacArthur at that time was very—was, in his message, he was very seriously concerned with the question of the troops and their battle fatigue, the length of time they had been held in, and the prospects that faced them with these enormous hordes of Chinese Communist troops

Therefore, this memorandum of January 12 was drawn up, which included some 16 points of possible action, they termed it—tentative proposals.

Then these two officers went over to Korea, and made a very complete investigation. Incidentally, General Collins went to, I think, each corps, at least one division in each corps, and some regiments; General Vandenberg not only went over the air situation generally, but actually landed from a helicopter 12 miles in front of our lines and joined a ground patrol in order to get the reaction of just what the situation was—really a remarkable reconnaissance—and they came back convinced that the morale was high and was increasingly building up every day under General Ridgway's leadership and that the situation was in the way of changing very radically, which it did, because we ceased to be on the defensive by the end of the month, and in February and March we had the initiative.

Under those conditions, when this memorandum was referred to the Security Council by me, the discussions took the line of what action now was considered wise under the changing conditions.

Some of the measures were carried out and quite a number were held in abeyance under the changed conditions as being unwise measures to take in view of the fact that we had greatly improved our situation in Korea.

That was joined with a general study from the National Security Council, which had been under way for about 2 weeks prior to that in connection with the policy we were to follow in Korea and made a part of that.

The decision as to where the action was no longer felt wise was taken on the recommendation of the Chiefs of Staff.

Chairman RUSSELL. In other words, the memorandum of January 12, 1951, was never approved in toto by the National Security Council?

Secretary MARSHALL. It was not.

COPY OF JCS MEMO FURNISHED TO MACARTHUR

Chairman RUSSELL. Now, a copy of that memorandum was forwarded to General MacArthur. Was that sent to him for his information or was it in the nature of an order or authorization?

Secretary MARSHALL. It was sent to him for his information and was talked over with him by General Collins in person.

Chairman RUSSELL. Was a complete copy embracing all of the 16 points which you referred to this morning forwarded to General MacArthur?

Secretary MARSHALL. I didn't quite get that.

Chairman RUSSELL. Was a complete copy embracing all of the 16 points to which you referred this morning sent to General MacArthur?

Secretary MARSHALL. Yes, sir; I think that was handed to him by General Collins on his personal visit. Anyway, he received the entire document.

MAC ARTHUR MESSAGE ON KOREA SITUATION IN JANUARY 1951

Chairman RUSSELL. I am going to get into that in a moment, as to the other points. You referred to a message that you had from General MacArthur which related to the morale of the men and in which they were—there was the matter of battle fatigue and other disabilities.

Did he suggest the withdrawal from Korea in that message?

Secretary MARSHALL. He stated in one of his messages about that time that if he was not to be reinforced, if he was not to be permitted to bomb into China, if he were not permitted to establish a naval blockade of the China coast, and if he was not permitted to use the Chinese Nationalist troops from Formosa, that under those conditions he thought that we would be probably forced to evacuate Korea.

Chairman RUSSELL. Was that message encrypted?

Secretary MARSHALL. Message what?

Chairman RUSSELL. Was that message codified? Is there any reason why that message could not be made available to this committee?

Secretary MARSHALL. I will have to take a look at it before I can answer. I don't know the full involvement of the message.

I will read you the message and slightly paraphrase it, but it is very important that it be not declassified in your information.

[Deleted.]

Now, gentlemen, I read that actually the way it is, and I wouldn't have it become public in any way because it would be ruinous to us in our security arrangements.

I have here in my hand now, which I didn't at the time you asked the question, the exact notes in relation to the handling of the message of January 12, and with your permission I will read it.

Chairman RUSSELL. You mean the notes with reference to—

Secretary MARSHALL. As to the actual moves between the Chiefs of Staff and Security Council in relation to the handling, the preparation and the handling of the document of January 12, which was referred to by General MacArthur in part in his statement before the Congress.

Chairman RUSSELL. All right, sir.

Secretary MARSHALL. I have covered it in outline, but if you would like me to read the exact notes on it, I will do so.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, I think it would be well to do that, General.

Secretary MARSHALL. Beg pardon?

Chairman RUSSELL. I think it would be well to do that. How do they relate to national security?

Secretary MARSHALL. Well, they do and they don't both ways. Part of it does and part not. But this isn't giving away the cryptographic phase of the thing.

SITUATION IN KOREA AT TIME OF JCS JANUARY 12 RECOMMENDATIONS

References have been made in General MacArthur's testimony to certain courses of action which were proposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in a memorandum addressed by them to the Secretary of Defense under date of January 12, 1951. Of the several courses of action enumerated in the memorandum, the following four were quoted by General MacArthur in his testimony of May 3.

I have read those here.

Because all of these courses of action were not put into effect General MacArthur apparently has concluded that they were overruled or vetoed by some higher authority.

In order properly to understand the Joint Chiefs' memorandum of January 12, it is necessary that it be considered in the light of the situation prevailing in Korea at the time the memorandum was prepared.

Late in December and early in January it appeared altogether possible that we might have to evacuate our forces from Korea. On December 29 the Joint Chiefs of Staff requested General MacArthur's views as to the conditions which might determine a decision to evacuate Korea.

He suggested the following four courses of action:

Blockade of the coast of China.

Destroy through naval gunfire and air bombardment China's industrial capacity to wage war.

Secure appropriate reinforcements from the Nationalist garrison on Formosa.

Release existing restrictions upon the Formosan garrison for diversionary action against the vulnerable areas of China's mainland.

Under these courses of action, unless they were adopted, and in the absence of reinforcements, General MacArthur stated that it would be necessary to contract our defense lines to the Pusan beachhead for final evacuation.

On January 9, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with the approval of the Secretary of Defense and the President, informed General MacArthur that the retaliatory measures suggested by him could not be permitted; and he was therefore directed to defend in successive positions, inflicting maximum damage to hostile forces in Korea, subject to the primary consideration of the safety of his troops and his basic mission of protecting Japan. Should it become evident in his judgment that evacuation was essential to avoid severe losses of men and material, he was at that time to withdraw from Korea to Japan.

It was in the face of this situation, when it appeared that we might be forced out of Korea, that the Joint Chiefs of Staff prepared their memorandum of January 12.

SUBSEQUENT CHANGES IN KOREAN SITUATION

At my request—that is, the Secretary of Defense—this memorandum was transmitted to the National Security Council for its consideration. At about this time, however, the situation in Korea began to show signs of improving. General Collins who, with General Vandenberg, had left for Korea to obtain a first-hand view of the situation, reported back from Tokyo on January 17, stating that he had just returned from Korea where he had found that the Eighth Army was in good shape and was improving daily. He added that the Communist Chinese had not made any move to push south from the Han River. Thereafter, the situation of our forces in Korea continued to improve and during the latter half of January the enemy forces remained on the defensive.

Throughout February and March our forces maintained the initiative against the enemy.

As a result of this radical change in the military situation from that which prevailed in the early part of January, it was not considered wise to put into immediate effect all of the courses of action outlined in the Joint Chief's memorandum of January 12.

None of these proposed courses of action was vetoed or disapproved by me or by any higher authority. The ultimate decision with respect to them was simply rendered unnecessary at that time—or unwise, to put it better—in the view of the Chiefs of Staff.

JCS DIRECTIVE OF JANUARY 9 TO MAC ARTHUR ON HOLDING KOREA

Chairman RUSSELL. Now, General, going back to the instruction of January 9, when you stated, I believe, that you advised General MacArthur that it would be unwise to evacuate Korea—did I understand that correctly?

Secretary MARSHALL. There was one message outlining the advantages we would gain if we did not evacuate Korea, but he was given the directive that the security of his command would be the first consideration.

Chairman RUSSELL. That was on January 9?

Secretary MARSHALL. I don't know whether that was January 9.

Chairman RUSSELL. I recall you mentioning January 9, and I want to identify that memorandum and document, whatever it was.

Secretary MARSHALL. That is classified material. [Reading:]

From the Chiefs of Staff to General MacArthur on January 9.

(The substance of the message follows hereunder:)

This replies to your recommendations:

Careful consideration still being given to measures of retaliation you suggested. Contribution to general situation resulting from drawing of Chinese Communists into Korea is fully appreciated.

The following points must be accepted on the basis of consideration of the over-all situation:

(a) Strengthening of our effort in Korea does not appear justified on the basis of any change in policy or other eventuality outside of Korea.

(b) United Nations concurrence would be necessary and, in particular, negotiations with the British would be required on the question of blockade. Hong Kong position and extent of Chinese Communist trade with British would be involved. Evacuation from Korea by our forces, or stabilization of our position in Korea, would be required before naval blockade of China coast could be undertaken.

(c) Decision of attack objectives in Communist China with naval and air forces must await attack outside of Korea on UN forces by Chinese Communists, since only in that eventuality could authorization be obtained.

(d) In view of probable greater usefulness elsewhere and unlikelihood of effect on Korean outcome which would be decisive, use in Korea of Chinese Nationalists from Formosa not favored.

(e) In event stabilization in Korea not feasible, security of Japan must be served by portion of the forces which may be evacuated from Korea. If stabilization in Korea without commitment of additional forces can be accomplished, deployment of two National Guard divisions partly trained may be expected.

(f) Intensification of economic blockade of Chinese trade being pressed.

Chairman RUSSELL. Were those instructions from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or from you, General; or, did they originate with the Joint—

Secretary MARSHALL. That originated from the Joint Chiefs, and was passed through my hands, and I concurred, and it went to the President, and he approved.

Chairman RUSSELL. Do you know whether or not the National Security Council ever approved that memorandum?

Secretary MARSHALL. They didn't get that one; no, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. Did not get that one?

Secretary MARSHALL. No, sir.

THE 16 RECOMMENDATIONS OF JCS, JANUARY 12, 1951

Chairman RUSSELL. Now let's turn now to this January 12 document to which you referred.

You stated it had some 16 points in it.

Can you give the committee all those points?

Secretary MARSHALL. It covers pretty much all of Asia.

Do you think that it is necessary for me to take that up, Mr. Chairman?

Chairman RUSSELL. Well we want to protect the National security, but we kind of run a considerable hazard to national security in undertaking these hearings; but I think they might be pertinent.

I will be glad to hear you, if you think they should not be given.

Secretary MARSHALL. Just let me glance at the points a moment.

Chairman RUSSELL. If you desire now to have Mr. Larkin read them, if they can be read, I will be perfectly willing to have him do it.

Secretary MARSHALL. The Joint Chiefs of Staff tentatively agreed upon the following objectives relative to Communist China and Korea, together with the actions to be taken to attain them, with some indication as to the time.

I don't think it will be at all wise for me to talk about the objectives, because that is war plans; but as to the actions to be taken, in part, I will try to touch on those, with the understanding that they are classified.

Chairman RUSSELL. Did that word "tentative" apply to all 16?

Secretary MARSHALL. Pardon?

Chairman RUSSELL. Did the word "tentative" apply to all 16?

Secretary MARSHALL. Yes.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have tentatively agreed upon the following objectives—

These are the actions to be taken in connection with those objectives:

A. With the preservation of the combat effectiveness of our forces as an overriding consideration, stabilize the situation in Korea, or evacuate to Japan, if forced out of Korea.

[Deleted.]

E. Continue and intensify now an economic blockade of trade with China.

Chairman RUSSELL. Those are the points referred to by—
Secretary MARSHALL (continuing to read) :

F. Prepare now to impose a naval blockade of China and place it into effect as soon as our position in Korea is stabilized, or when we have evacuated Korea, and depending upon the circumstances then obtaining.

G. Remove now restrictions on air reconnaissance of China coastal areas and of Manchuria.

H. Remove now the restrictions on operations of the Chinese Nationalist forces and give such logistic support to those forces as will contribute to effective operations against the Communists.

I. Continue to bomb military targets in Korea.

J. Press now for United Nations action branding Communist China as an aggressor.

Send a military training mission and increase MDAP to Chinese Nationalists in Formosa.

Now here is one I cannot mention. I will have to skip it.

Initiate damaging naval and air attacks on objectives in Communist China at such time as the Chinese Communists attack any of our forces outside of Korea.

[Deleted.]

I omitted one.

Chairman RUSSELL. All of those items were embraced in the same document that contained the four which General MacArthur presented to the Congress and to this committee?

Secretary MARSHALL. That is correct, sir.

CONDITIONS ON THOSE 16 RECOMMENDATIONS

Chairman RUSSELL. Now was there any qualification as to the time that those measures were to be applied or as to relate to the time or events?

Secretary MARSHALL. I was informed that the enclosure—that is, the document I have just read to you—

is being referred to the senior National Security Council staff for their use in connection with the report on the possible United States action to counter Chinese Communist aggression currently under preparation by the senior National Security Council staff at the direction of the President for consideration at the next Council meeting on January 17.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well. I should like to ask you this question then, Mr. Secretary: Was the inauguration or the implementation of these four suggestions dependent upon the evacuation from Korea or the stabilization of the line in Korea? That is one matter that has caused concern.

Secretary MARSHALL. Both were involved in one way or the other. The evacuation of Korea brought them to a head very definitely. The stabilization affected, in their opinion, the possible implementation by some of these means, but in the discussions at the time the point was made that it dependent upon the state of morale of our forces at the time of stabilization.

I might add that most of the 16 points have since been all or partly put into effect.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, did the memorandum show on its face that this was a suggestion from the Chiefs of Staff to the National

Security Council or that it appeared to be a final finding by the Joint Chiefs?

Secretary MARSHALL. It was, as I read the statement, that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had tentatively agreed upon the following objectives relative to Communist China and Korea, together with the actions to be taken to attain them, some indication as to timing. That was sent to me and I had it sent over to the Security Council for immediate attention.

[Deleted.]

SECURITY ELEMENT TO THE HEARINGS

Chairman RUSSELL. General, I am afraid that this record is not going to be very large that we will be able to release. You have put the classification to practically all of your statements.

Secretary MARSHALL. Well, Mr. Chairman, I will probably be taken to task very severely for going into so many details here, so I will get it from you and more particularly from the other end of the line; because, if I may say so, I have felt through a good deal of this as though I were sort of acting as an intelligence agent for the Soviet Government and the Chinese Communist Government, but they don't provide one for me. I get nothing of their conclusions, their recommendations, their proposed actions, but the world gets a good bit of the other side from the United States of America and it is not an easy way to handle things when you are at war.

Senator WILEY. Better make that classified.

Secretary MARSHALL. Let me add another thing. I have tried to be very frank with you, and I am sorry that my frankness has led at length to matters that I thought had to be restricted from the public, and I might say that I gave directions to the Chiefs of Staff and to the others concerned a week before these hearings began that they were to apply their energies to trying to find out how much could be given to the committee rather than what we were not going to give to the committee; and I think, considering that particular volume you have, they made a very complete effort to do so.

Chairman RUSSELL. I thought it was a splendid compilation, I wish to say further, General, I am not urging you to have released in this record that goes to the public any matter involving public security—I mean national security.

If anything, I am too conscientious along that line. I have always been exceedingly careful about any matter I discussed that was even brought to the attention of the Armed Services Committee in hearing; but we are here undertaking in a very comprehensive way to get to all of the facts that will enable us to discover the truth with respect to this matter and, naturally, without endangering the national security or any of our secret information, we want to get as much of it to the people as we can.

MARSHALL ACTION ON JCS MEMORANDUM OF JANUARY 12, 1951

Senator KNOWLAND. Might I ask you if you would inquire of him as to whether or not, when this went to the Security Council on or about January 12 or 17, whenever it finally went over, whether it went with an endorsement from him, approving the Joint Chiefs' request, or whether he made any change in the number of recommendations.

Chairman RUSSELL. I think that is a very pertinent question. General, did you approve this memorandum of January 12 prepared by the Joint Chiefs?

Secretary MARSHALL. No, sir. I neither approved or disapproved. I transmitted it to a meeting of the Security Council for general consideration, in which I would be involved.

Chairman RUSSELL. You are a member of that Council?

Secretary MARSHALL. I am a member of that Council.

Chairman RUSSELL. And were present when it was discussed?

Secretary MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION ON JCS MEMO

Chairman RUSSELL. You at that time, I believe from your conversation, said that the Council felt that the change in events since it was prepared made it inadvisable to put all of them into effect.

Secretary MARSHALL. That was the general consensus of the opinion of the Council, but we were still combining that with the other recommendations that were being worked up on the same general subject.

That was on January 17.

Chairman RUSSELL. Did you concur in that finding of the National Security Council?

Secretary MARSHALL. Yes, sir; and, as I say, the actions taken were concurred in by the Chiefs of Staff. In fact, we took their advice in relation to some of them that were held up for the time being.

Chairman RUSSELL. You mean then that the final disposition of this document prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, these recommendations in the National Security Council, was based in the last analysis on the recommendation of the Joint Chiefs?

Secretary MARSHALL. Yes, sir. In general that was the case. General Bradley sat with me in those meetings also and interpreted their views. However, you are getting into details which I think General Bradley and some of his own people can answer more specifically than to have me speak for them.

Chairman RUSSELL. I don't like to go too much into detail.

Secretary MARSHALL. They are intimately familiar with the details rather than have my interpretation of what I feel would be the correct statement.

Chairman RUSSELL. You were present in the Council meeting of the National Security Council?

Secretary MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. So I want to get your views.

USE OF CHINESE NATIONALISTS IN KOREA

Now, General, what was the course of procedure which finally determined as to whether or not the Chinese Nationalist troops were to be used in Korea?

Was that final determination made by the Chiefs of Staff or by you or by the National Security Council, and explain the procedure which were followed in arriving at the decision.

Secretary MARSHALL. There were several stages to that. But again I think the actual detailed procedure can best be given you by the Chiefs of Staff, because they took the leading part in all of it and made the analysis of the pros and cons in the matter.

But there was an original consideration that took place I think in August or thereabouts, or maybe July. In July General MacArthur advised against acceptance of an offer of 33,000 troops, Chinese Nationalist troops, because of their ineffectiveness and lack of logistic support. That is when it first came up. That is, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's offer and General MacArthur's recommendation in relation to that.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I didn't understand that. I wonder if you would repeat that. What was General MacArthur's recommendation?

Chairman RUSSELL. Very well.

Secretary MARSHALL (reading) :

In July 1950 the Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek offered 33,000 Chinese Nationalist troops for the battle in Korea. General MacArthur advised against acceptance of the offer because of their ineffectiveness and lack of logistic support.

That is the initial appearance of the question of Nationalist China's troops. I haven't got the data right here on the various steps, but, as I say, the Chief of Staff can give you that specifically because it was almost entirely their recommendations, their analyses in the matter.

Chairman RUSSELL. If I understand General MacArthur's testimony, he stated that he did in the first instance advise against the use of Chinese Nationalist troops, but as the operations in Korea proceeded and particularly as our position there worsened, that he very strongly advised that Chinese Nationalist troops be employed.

JCS RECOMMENDATIONS ON USE OF CHINESE NATIONALISTS

Secretary MARSHALL. I find I have the note here :

In late November General MacArthur recommended the Eighth Army be reinforced as rapidly as possible with fifty to sixty thousand Chinese Nationalist forces from Formosa. It was his view that this number of Chinese Nationalist troops were sufficiently well-trained and equipped to be committed to combat; that the Korean War had sufficiently drained the Chinese Communists' potential to negate the possibility of an early invasion of Formosa; that, since the Chinese Communists already had intervened, no widening of hostilities by the Chinese Communists would result, and that the needs for reinforcements in Korea and the inability to obtain them from elsewhere justified the use of Chinese Nationalist troops.

The Joint Chiefs felt that based on the past performances of these same troops on the Chinese mainland and the reports of the survey party, which was sent by General MacArthur to Formosa as to the adequacy of training and the equipment of the Chinese Nationalist forces there, the Joint Chiefs were convinced that these forces would not be effective in Korea.

[Deleted.]

Furthermore, their departure from Formosa would leave that island with inadequate defensive forces to meet a possible Communist attack.

Chairman RUSSELL. I do not suppose that is classified matter, is it, General?

Secretary MARSHALL. I will have to find out about that.

Chairman RUSSELL. If it is, I will ask it this way: Later, then, in November General MacArthur did request the use of Chinese Nationalist troops?

Secretary MARSHALL. That is correct, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. In considerable numbers?

Secretary MARSHALL. Yes, sir; in increased numbers.

Chairman RUSSELL. And that recommendation by him was disapproved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

Secretary MARSHALL. That is correct, sir.

[Deleted.]

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, couldn't we insert and say for the record, then, that it was disapproved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff due to the state of training and the nature of the equipment of these troops and for other reasons which appealed to the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

Secretary MARSHALL. That is all right. I see no objection to that whatever.

Chairman RUSSELL. You see no objection.

Senator KNOWLAND. Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Knowland.

Senator KNOWLAND. Mr. Chairman, I wish you would ask the general, for the record, since General MacArthur had been in Formosa in August, whether any of the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff had visited Formosa.

Chairman RUSSELL. I will be glad to ask that question.

Had any members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff visited Formosa?

Secretary MARSHALL. Not that I know of.

Chairman RUSSELL. You referred to some report which had been submitted—

REPORT OF FOX MISSION TO FORMOSA

Secretary MARSHALL. When General MacArthur's trip there was authorized, there was also with it, I think on the suggestion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a group to make a general inspection of these troops and their equipment, their state of training, and that is what is referred to here as the report of the survey party, headed by General Fox, sent by General MacArthur to Formosa, and which came to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Chairman RUSSELL. Do you know whether or not this mission, headed by General Fox, made specific recommendations as to the use of Chinese Nationalist troops in Korea?

Secretary MARSHALL. I couldn't answer that offhand, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. You could not answer it offhand?

Secretary MARSHALL. But that can be answered very specifically by the Chiefs of Staff.

Chairman RUSSELL. Can you state for the record as to whether or not the decisions of the Joint Chiefs to advise against the use of these troops was in part based upon a report that was made by the Fox mission?

Secretary MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. They were.

DISCUSSION WITH UN ON USE OF NATIONALIST TROOPS

Now I want to ask you this: Do you know whether or not the question of the use of the Chinese Nationalist troops in Korea was ever submitted by any authorized representative of the United States Government to the United Nations or any subdivision of the United Nations?

Secretary MARSHALL. I recall no formal representation. I think there have been discussions of that. There have been discussions, but Mr. Acheson, if he is a witness, can give more direct information.

Chairman RUSSELL. You do not know of your own knowledge then whether or not any of our allies in Korea objected to the use of—
 Secretary MARSHALL. I don't recall, sir; I don't recall that.

INITIATION OF JCS MEMO OF JANUARY 12, 1951

Chairman RUSSELL. Now, returning to that memorandum of January 12, 1951, Mr. Secretary, was that prepared as the result of recommendations that were made in the first instance by General MacArthur or was that prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on their own initiative?

Secretary MARSHALL. It was prepared by them on their own initiative, but it was, in part, related to General MacArthur's recommendations and his estimate of the situation. Again, they can give you more direct answers to that question.

Chairman RUSSELL. Was there, as between the three members of the Joint Chiefs, was there and dissent as to that memorandum, or do you know?

Secretary MARSHALL. I couldn't answer that, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. You could not answer that?

Secretary MARSHALL. No, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. Do you know whether any person other than—

Secretary MARSHALL. What I received was this memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, signed by General Bradley. The presumption is, of course, that it is unanimous.

Chairman RUSSELL. You would not know of your own knowledge as to whether any other person was consulted with respect to the preparation of that memorandum?

Secretary MARSHALL. No, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. Were you consulted before it was prepared?

DISCUSSIONS WITH STATE DEPARTMENT AT THAT TIME

Secretary MARSHALL. I do not recall that I was consulted specifically. We were having discussions then in the office of the Chiefs of Staff, with them, Mr. Lovett, myself, Mr. Acheson, and Dean Rusk, and other—and another member of the State Department. There were a whole series of such discussions there over a period of 3 or 4 weeks in view of this very dangerous situation, and I suppose all that has a bearing on this matter.

I don't remember the exact date of the discussions before this, but I do know there were a number of discussions, and I think they are labeled in that large text the Chiefs of Staff prepared for you.

INSTRUCTIONS TO MAC ARTHUR ON CROSSING OF THIRTY-EIGHTH PARALLEL

Chairman RUSSELL. I think General MacArthur cleared this up, but I want to ask you: Were any instructions ever issued General MacArthur as to whether he should stop at the thirty-eighth parallel or Pyongyang or any other point short of the international boundary or boundaries?

Secretary MARSHALL. He received instructions regarding the thirty-eighth parallel shortly after landing at Inchon, and then again the question of the thirty-eighth parallel came into focus when the situa-

tion was restored by General Ridgway in a successful operation of the troops along about the latter part of January and, if we can find those, I can read them to you.

We regarded that there was no, you might say, legal prohibition against passing the thirty-eighth parallel, but he was specifically informed that the dominant consideration would be the security of his command and, if it was necessary to go past the thirty-eighth parallel, for that purpose, he would go ahead and do it; but a major advance beyond the thirty-eighth parallel at this particular time when the situation had been restored was not to be undertaken without the approval, specific approval, of the Government.

In the fall, when he started his advance, following the landing at Inchon, he was authorized to pass the parallel in connection with his own efforts to destroy the North Korean troops, and finally given authority by the United Nations.

Chairman RUSSELL. So that it was supported not only by this Government but by the United Nations?

Secretary MARSHALL. By the United Nations. I might add that where the foreign governments became very active in the matter, seemingly to disapprove or be fearful of what was to be done, was after there were indications of the Chinese Communists' entry into the fight.

As I recall, that occurred about the last few days of October when the first Chinese Communist prisoners were taken.

Chairman RUSSELL. You have testified, General, and some Senators think the record is not quite clear, and I am inclined to agree, that the January 12 document contained 16 recommendations.

Secretary MARSHALL. Yes, sir; 16 proposed courses of action.

PUTTING INTO EFFECT OF THE 16 RECOMMENDATIONS

Chairman RUSSELL. Sixteen proposed courses of action.

Can you state how many of them have been put into effect?

Secretary MARSHALL. Offhand, from a glance at the document, I would say 12 or 13 out of the 16 have been put into effect.

The first one has been put into effect.

[Deleted.]

To continue and intensify the economic blockade of China has been put into effect.

To prepare now to impose a blockade, naval blockade, of China: That has not—the preparation have been made, but it has not been put into effect.

[Deleted.]

Continue to bomb military targets in Korea: That has been put into effect.

Press now for United Nations branding Communist China as an aggressor: That has been put into effect.

Send a training mission and increase MDAP to Chinese Nationalists in Formosa: That has been put into effect; and then the next one I cannot read, but it has been put into effect.

Initiate damaging naval and air attacks on objectives in Communist China at such time as the Chinese Communists attack any of our forces outside of Korea: That order stands.

[Deleted.]

ROLE OF STATE DEPARTMENT IN PREPAREDNESS OF JCS MEMO

Chairman RUSSELL. Now, recurring briefly, General, to the preparation of that memorandum, was it prepared in the first instance altogether by the Joint Chiefs of Staff? I mean, do you know whether or not the advice or counsel of the State Department was sought in any way in the preparation of that memorandum?

Secretary MARSHALL. Not that I know of, sir. They may have discussed it because I have authorized on the lower levels intimate back and forth with the State Department; but it is specifically a Chiefs of Staff document.

Chairman RUSSELL. What representatives of the State Department attend the meeting of the National Security Council?

Secretary MARSHALL. Mr. Acheson is the only one, I believe. He generally comes alone.

Chairman RUSSELL. You do not recall that Mr. Rusk or any other members ever attend there?

Secretary MARSHALL. I don't recall their being there, sir.

MAC ARTHUR VIOLATION OF DIRECTIVES ON PUBLIC STATEMENTS

Chairman RUSSELL. Now, Mr. Secretary, one of the issues here is as to whether or not General MacArthur directly or indirectly violated any orders or directives issued to him by you, as a representative of the Department of Defense or by the President of the United States?

I would like to have you discuss that.

Secretary MARSHALL. In relation to the conduct of the campaign, no, he has not, not that I can recall. In relation to public statements, he has.

Chairman RUSSELL. Now, do you know what instructions were given him with respect to public statements?

Secretary MARSHALL. A general instruction was issued to all Government activities, and specifically to all military commanders, that they would refrain from any public statements regarding foreign relations that were not formerly cleared.

Chairman RUSSELL. Do you have a copy of that order? Has it been made public?

Secretary MARSHALL. We can get it for you, but we have not got it here. That was——

Chairman RUSSELL. Can you give us about the date of that order?

Secretary MARSHALL. It was a directive of December 6 which was sent out to General MacArthur, along with all of these other officials concerned. It had its genesis in these events.

MAC ARTHUR'S PUBLIC STATEMENTS ON NOVEMBER OFFENSIVE

This directive had been preceded by a series of public statements and releases by General MacArthur concerning the failure of the offensive launched on November 24 and on November 30.

In reply to an inquiry from Mr. Arthur Krock of the New York Times, General MacArthur had stated that he had received no suggestions from any authoritative source that his command should stop at any line short of the international boundary, and that the strategic course of the campaign in Korea was not responsible to any degree for the massive attack of the Chinese Communists.

On December 1 in response to the inquires of the United States News and World Report, General MacArthur stated that the limits imposed on his pursuit of the Chinese forces and attacks on their bases constituted an enormous handicap without precedent in military history.

Also on December 1 General MacArthur sent a message to the president of the United Press in which he stated that his command was faced with an entirely new war resulting largely from expansion of military odds unprecedented in history. The statement went on to criticize the imposition of limitations on effective retaliation by his command against the Communist Chinese.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, now what if any—

DIRECTIVE OF DECEMBER 6, 1950, ON PUBLIC STATEMENTS

Secretary MARSHALL. Now the directive of December 6 was put into general terms in order to avoid making it specifically personal to General MacArthur.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, was it considered by you or any of General MacArthur's supervisors that those statements were in violation of any order or regulation?

Secretary MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. What specific regulation or order do you think they violated?

Secretary MARSHALL. I beg your pardon?

Chairman RUSSELL. What order or regulation did they violate, these statements?

Secretary MARSHALL. Comments in relation to matters that pertain to our foreign relations, our relations with our allies and the general Government decisions as to policy to be followed in the campaign.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, had he been notified of that policy or was that a standing policy of the Defense Establishment?

Secretary MARSHALL. You mean as to public statements?

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes.

Secretary MARSHALL. He had received no specific instructions or any instructions so far as I know on that subject until this message of December 6.

Chairman RUSSELL. So he had not received up until that time any specific orders calling attention to what you regarded as either the inadvisability or inappropriateness of his issuing these statements to these representatives of the press?

Secretary MARSHALL. I think that is correct, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. Now can you give us the text or paraphrase of that order of December 6?

Secretary MARSHALL. I will have to obtain it for you; I haven't got it here.

Chairman RUSSELL. Sir?

Secretary MARSHALL. I will have to obtain it for you; I haven't got it here.

Chairman RUSSELL. I see.

Now what specific instances after the receipt of this directive, do you have where General MacArthur violated that directive?

Secretary MARSHALL. I didn't hear the first part of the question, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. As I understand it, General MacArthur was removed from his several commands because of the finding of his superiors that he had violated directives that had been issued, and

the question was as to what instances, if any, arose after the receipt of this order of December 6, wherein General MacArthur violated those instructions?

Secretary MARSHALL. Yes, sir; there was another occasion. But General MacArthur's relief was not entirely based on that factor.

Senator WILEY. A little louder, please.

Secretary MARSHALL. Yes, sir; there was another occasion, which I will refer to in a moment, but his relief was not based solely on those factors.

PROPOSED PRESIDENTIAL DECLARATION OF MARCH 1951

During the early part of March, when it appeared likely that the forward movement of the United Nations' forces would soon bring them back to the vicinity of the thirty-eighth parallel, it was decided that consideration should be given to the preparation of a statement to be issued by the President as the executive agent of the United Nations, relating to the possibility of obtaining a negotiated settlement for the Korean conflict.

After a series of discussions between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and representatives of the Department of State, a draft of a proposed Presidential declaration on the Korean situation was prepared by the State Department. This draft was made the subject of discussion at a meeting on the 19th of March between the Secretary of State and several of his assistants, the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, at which general agreement was reached concerning the substance of the proposed Presidential declaration.

On March 20 the Joint Chiefs of Staff dispatched the following message to General MacArthur:

State planning a Presidential announcement shortly that with clearing of bulk of South Korea of aggressors, United Nations now prepared to discuss conditions of settlement in Korea. United Nations feeling exists that further diplomatic efforts toward settlement should be made before any advance with major forces north of the thirty-eighth parallel. Time will be required to determine diplomatic reactions and permit new negotiations that may develop.

Recognizing that the parallel has no military significance, State has asked Joint Chiefs of Staff what authority you should have to permit sufficient freedom of action for next few weeks to provide security for United Nations forces and maintain contact with the enemy. Your recommendation desired.

In his reply on the 21st of March, General MacArthur stated that his present directive establishing security of command was adequate for his needs.

He also requested that no further limitations be imposed upon him.

EFFECT OF MAC ARTHUR STATEMENT OF MARCH 24 ON PROPOSED PRESIDENTIAL DECLARATION

On the 24th of March, General MacArthur issued a public statement with respect to the Korean conflict. In this statement, General MacArthur discussed the comparative military situations of the Chinese Communists and the United Nations forces in Korea, particularly pointing out the military weakness of Red China.

He stated that should the United Nations depart from its effort to confine the war to the area of Korea and expand military opera-

tions to Red China, Red China would be doomed to the risk of imminent military collapse.

He further pointed out that if these basic facts were established, there should be no difficulty in arriving at decisions on the Korean problem, provided the issues were resolved on their own merits without being burdened by such matters as Formosa and Red China's seat in the United Nations.

He stated further that the fundamental questions continued to be political in nature and must find their answers in the political sphere.

He added that within his authority as military commander he stood ready to confer in the field with the commander in chief of the enemy forces in an effort to find any military means whereby the realization of the political objectives of the United Nations might be accomplished.

At the time the foregoing statement was issued, the clearance of the proposed Presidential declaration with the other 13 nations having forces in Korea had very nearly been completed. In view of the serious impact of General MacArthur's statement on the negotiations with these nations, it became necessary to abandon the effort, thus losing whatever chance there may have been at that time to negotiate a settlement of the Korean conflict.

A meeting was held at once by the Secretary of State and members of his staff, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Mr. Lovett, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, at which the matter was fully discussed.

MAC ARTHUR'S ATTENTION CALLED TO DECEMBER 6 DIRECTIVE ON PUBLIC STATEMENTS

Later in the same afternoon this group met with the President. As a result of this discussion the Joint Chiefs of Staff were directed by the President to call General MacArthur's attention to the President's order of December 6, 1950, which, in effect, required that all officials of the United States Government, military as well as civilian, should not release any speech, press, or other public statement concerning foreign policy without prior clearance by the Department of State, or if concerning military policy, with the Department of Defense.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Mr. Chairman, right there—

Secretary MARSHALL. Shortly after General MacArthur's statement on March 24—do you want me to go ahead with the statement?

THE MARTIN LETTER

Chairman RUSSELL. I want you to clear it up; yes, sir.

Secretary MARSHALL. Shortly after General MacArthur's statement of March 24, Congressman Joseph Martin of Massachusetts released for publication a letter addressed to him by General MacArthur, dated March 20, 1951. In this letter, which like the March 24 release had not been cleared in accordance with the President's directive of December 6, General MacArthur dealt further with the questions of whether to carry the war to China, whether to use the Nationalist Chinese forces on Formosa, and whether to apply our maximum strength in Asia or in Europe.

DISCUSSIONS ON RELIEF OF MAC ARTHUR

This letter was brought to the attention of the President on April 5. Thereafter the President called a meeting of his special assistant, Mr. Averell Harriman, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and General Bradley. No decision was taken at this meeting, but after full discussion the President requested that all records bearing on the subject be brought to his attention.

On the following day, Saturday, this same group again met with the President at 8:50 in the morning for a further discussion of the subject. It was suggested that the matter be considered individually over the week end. The President directed me as Secretary of Defense to secure the views of the Chiefs of Staffs from a purely military point of view. Because two of the Chiefs were out of the city, they did not meet until the afternoon of the following day, Sunday, April 8. Later that afternoon the three Chiefs of Staff met with me and General Bradley and stated their recommendations in the matter based on purely military considerations. These recommendations were reported to the President by General Bradley at a meeting the next morning, Monday, April 9, which was also attended by Mr. Harriman, the Secretary of State, and myself. With the unanimous concurrence of all those present, the President at that time took his decision to relieve General MacArthur.

On Tuesday, the 10th, at 3 p. m. there was another meeting of the President with the same group to pass on the form of the message from the President to General MacArthur, the form of the orders to General Ridgway notifying him of his succession to command, and the form of the release advising the public of the action taken and the reasons therefor.

Originally it was decided to transmit the notification to General MacArthur at 8 p. m. Washington time on Wednesday, April the 11th, that is 10 a. m. Tokyo time. Secretary of the Army Frank Pace, then in Korea, was directed to make the delivery of the messages to General MacArthur at his residence, the Embassy, at the time indicated. However, late on Tuesday, April the 10th, there were indications that the action to be taken had become known publicly, and it was then decided by the President to accelerate the transmission of the official notification to General MacArthur by approximately 20 hours. The exact timing of the public release was made so as to coincide with the arrival of the communication in Tokyo in midafternoon.

Mr. Pace in Korea incidentally did not receive his instructions due to a breakdown in a power unit in Pusan.

INVESTIGATION OF LEAK ABOUT MAC ARTHUR REMOVAL

Chairman RUSSELL. General, it seems to me that it is rather shocking that a matter of that tremendous importance to this Nation, the people and its future, could have become public. Had any investigation been conducted to see how it did become public?

Secretary MARSHALL. I didn't get that.

Chairman RUSSELL. That precipitated the announcement because it had already become public.

Secretary MARSHALL. I don't know about that, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. Do you know whether or not any investigation has been had to know how it came about?

Secretary MARSHALL. I don't know about that, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. I must observe I think that is one of the most startling instances I have ever heard of, that a matter of this tremendous importance should have become public before it was intended that it should.

Secretary MARSHALL. I believe this was a rumor which they thought had pretty solid foundation, but I was not involved in that.

IMPORT OF MAC ARTHUR STATEMENT OF MARCH 24 ON NEGOTIATIONS WITH OUR ALLIES

Senator SALTONSTALL. Would you permit General Marshall to read again that paragraph concerning the negotiations that were stopped because of General MacArthur's message?

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes.

General MARSHALL. Do you want me to read the succession of events in connection with that?

Chairman RUSSELL. I don't think it is necessary to read them all, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary MARSHALL. On the 20th of March, the Joint Chiefs of Staff dispatched the following message to General MacArthur—Do you wish me to read that message?

Senator SALTONSTALL. Just as to the negotiations that were being considered, and that had to be given up, as I listened to the statement, because of the public message of General MacArthur, on the 26th.

Secretary MARSHALL. Well, the message, if this is what you want, is:

State is planning a Presidential announcement shortly that with the clearing of the bulk of South Korea of aggressors. The United Nations now preparing to discuss conditions of settlement in Korea. The United Nations feeling is that further diplomatic efforts toward the settlement should be made before any advance with major forces north of the thirty-eighth parallel. Time will be required to determine diplomatic reactions and permit new negotiations that may develop. Reasoning is that parallel has no military significance. State has asked Joint Chiefs what authority you should have (General MacArthur) to permit sufficient freedom of action for next few weeks to provide security for United Nations forces and maintain contact with the enemy. Your recommendations are desired.

And, in his reply on March 21 General MacArthur stated that his present directive establishing security of command was adequate for his needs, and requested that no further limitations be imposed upon him in the conduct of his operations in Korea.

On the 24th of March, General MacArthur issued a public statement with respect to the Korean conflict.

Do you wish me to read that?

Senator SALTONSTALL. I don't care about that, but what follows right after that.

Secretary MARSHALL. At the time the foregoing statement was issued, the clearance of the proposed Presidential declarations with the other 13 nations having forces in Korea had very nearly been completed.

In view of the serious impact of General MacArthur's statement on the negotiations with these nations, it became necessary to abandon

the effort, thus losing whatever chance there may have been at that time to negotiate a settlement of the Korean conflict.

RECOMMENDATION OF JCS ON RELIEF OF MAC ARTHUR

Chairman RUSSELL. You stated, Mr. Secretary, that all of the Joint Chiefs and the chairman were consulted with respect to this action of the relief of General MacArthur, and that they passed on it from a purely military standpoint—that was the Joint Chiefs?

Secretary MARSHALL. That was the Joint Chiefs.

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes, sir.

Now, do you know whether they passed on it as a body, or was it taken up with them individually?

Secretary MARSHALL. They discussed it together, and General Bradley brought up what was their unanimous conclusion on the various points involved, and he can testify to that specifically, here.

Chairman RUSSELL. General Bradley was present when their final decision was reached?

Secretary MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. Were you there?

Secretary MARSHALL. No, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. You were not there?

Secretary MARSHALL. Are you talking of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

Chairman RUSSELL. No. I am talking about when the final decision of the——

Secretary MARSHALL. General Bradley was present, but the Chiefs of Staff——

Chairman RUSSELL. You were?

Secretary MARSHALL. I was present, Mr. Acheson was present, and Mr. Harriman was present.

Chairman RUSSELL. Did General Bradley report that all of the Joint Chiefs had approved the relief of General MacArthur from a military standpoint?

Secretary MARSHALL. Yes, sir; but I would prefer that you let him give you the exact reasons that they reached that conclusion.

Chairman RUSSELL. Now, I wish to make this record perfectly clear, and will you state again the names of those who were present, with the President, when this decision was taken?

Secretary MARSHALL. His Special Assistant, Ambassador Harriman; Secretary of State, Mr. Acheson; Secretary of Defense, myself; and General Bradley.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Chairman, might I ask one question in further clarification?

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Smith.

Senator SMITH. Did that decision include the relief of General MacArthur of all his commands, or just the change in the Korean command?

Secretary MARSHALL. His relief from his responsibilities in the Far East.

Senator SMITH. Entirely?

Senator KNOWLAND. Mr. Chairman, right at that point, would you be willing to clarify as to whether the recommendations of both the civilian and military people went into the matter of the summary removal of General MacArthur?

Chairman RUSSELL. I was coming to that, Senator, if you will just give me a little time.

REASONS FOR SUMMARY FASHION OF DISMISSAL

Mr. Secretary, this was a rather unusual procedure, for the relief of a military commander, as well as one who was a civilian director in Japan; and, in such a summary fashion.

Was there any reason expressed in this conference as to why this summary action was taken to relieve the general, without an opportunity, as he states, to give a farewell message to his troops?

Secretary MARSHALL. Let me answer it in this way, Mr. Chairman: There was considerable discussion as to the procedure for his relief, and for that—and in that, the decision was reached that it should be carried out by an official of the Government, of some stature; and Mr. Pace, being in Korea, he was designated to do this, and he was specifically instructed to make the appointment to see General MacArthur at the Embassy, his home, and not at his office; and at a time before he went to his office for his daily business.

Now, as to the immediacy of the situation in regard to his feelings as being expressed in the press releases by him, it seemed to give indication this would be a cumulative affairs and might be still more serious.

I don't recall discussions of that by me and I do not feel that I should endeavor to interpret for other men who will be before you.

The question of his opportunity for the farewell to his command was not discussed, as I recall. The necessity for his immediate relief, I think, was felt by all concerned. The issue was getting too complicated to go on, considering the tremendous importance of the events then in progress.

Chairman RUSSELL. Do you mind elaborating on that just a bit, as to why it was becoming so complicated that a day or two could not have intervened for the regular procedure of the relief of a high-ranking officer from his command might be followed?

Secretary MARSHALL. The situation was going to be exceedingly difficult for General Ridgway, and our thoughts had to go to General Ridgway and the tremendous problems he was going to have on his hands both in Korea and in Japan particularly there in relation to the treaty discussions that were then under way.

Just what would have developed in connection with the procedure of relief, which was named for some date ahead, we will say specifically for General MacArthur to take formal leave of his command would also involve the reactions that would be set up that might be decidedly to the disadvantage of General Ridgway, whom we have to look to to carry out the campaign in Korea and the responsibilities in Japan.

I don't know that that thought went through the minds of the others, and I don't know that I analyzed it in my own mind at the time.

My reaction was that it was necessary to relieve General MacArthur immediately.

Senator SMITH. Could I just ask one question and thereafter I will await my turn?

Senator McMAHON. Mr. Chairman, could I be heard on the process of interrupting? I think one of the things that contributed most to the running account of General MacArthur was the fact that each Senator had his own questions to ask without being interrupted. Any question arising in the mind of any Senator he will have his chance to ask. That is the way I feel and that is up to the committee, of course.

Senator SMITH. I withdraw the question.

Chairman RUSSELL. I have taken quite a bit of time myself here and could be subject to criticism on that, but I thought perhaps these questions might clear up a great many more questions and might eventually result in saving some time of this committee.

So you as the Secretary of Defense did advise the President to relieve General MacArthur of his command and approved of the manner in which it was handled?

Secretary MARSHALL. My approval of the manner in which it was handled went to the arrangement with Mr. Pace and that, of course, was terminated as I have explained to you.

Chairman RUSSELL. He could not be reached?

Secretary MARSHALL. We didn't know that at the time. He didn't get into it at all unless it was sent to him, and the question of the leak came up after the last conference that I had with the people I have named.

NATURE AND EFFECT OF MAC ARTHUR'S MARCH 24 STATEMENT

Chairman RUSSELL. Now, Mr. Secretary, General MacArthur in his appearance before this committee stated that he regarded this statement of his dated March 24, 1951, as an instrument of psychological warfare as well as being issued in the hope that it would result in a temporary cease-fire order at least to slow down the loss of life attendant on military operations in Korea.

I assume from your position you don't think that has any validity, or do you?

Secretary MARSHALL. You might consider such a statement as having a place in psychological warfare provided it did not do harm otherwise; and in that case I would say that it did because it was increasing our troubles with our allies and making it the more difficult for us to work to a more harmonious and intimate accord with them.

They were emphatically opposed to these specific propositions and to have that stated by the commander out there aroused their fears, their uncertainties, and made it all the more difficult for us to deal with them.

WARNING ON CHINESE COMMUNIST INTERVENTION

Chairman RUSSELL. Mr. Secretary, did you or the Joint Chiefs of Staff through you ever inform General MacArthur that intervention by the Chinese would not occur or was unlikely or that there was a likelihood of the intervention by Communist China?

Secretary MARSHALL. I did not send him such information, and I think it would be better for you to question the Chiefs of Staff in regard to that.

Chairman RUSSELL. I thought most of the messages went through you.

Secretary MARSHALL. Well, that might have but I just don't recall immediately.

Chairman RUSSELL. Do you have any knowledge—

Secretary MARSHALL. I have checked up on the information sent to him by General Smith's CIA group to find out, and I found that his information was all sent out.

COOPERATION BETWEEN CIA AND G-2 IN JAPAN

Chairman RUSSELL. The next question I intend to ask you is as to your knowledge as to whether or not there was coordination between Central Intelligence and General MacArthur's staff.

Secretary MARSHALL. I don't know in regard to that, sir, just what happened.

Chairman RUSSELL. Was it ever brought to your attention by CIA that there was any failure of cooperation between Central Intelligence and General MacArthur's staff?

Secretary MARSHALL. I have not a very distinct recollection of that. I do, I think, recall some discussion, informal entirely, with General Smith regarding, I will say, the attitude of General Willoughby.

Chairman RUSSELL. I don't understand you. You say you had no formal complaint?

Secretary MARSHALL. I do recall in a hazy sort of way a consideration with General Smith of the CIA referring to some difficulty in relation to General Willoughby, General MacArthur's G-2.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, General Smith paid a visit to Japan. Did you know the purposes of his mission? Were you instructed on that or did you request him to go to Japan?

Secretary MARSHALL. You are talking about General Smith's mission?

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes, General Bedell Smith, Director of the CIA.

Secretary MARSHALL. Yes, I knew he was going out there, director of all relationships, and he reported to, I think, the National Security Council on his return.

Chairman RUSSELL. Did he go on his own initiative or under your orders?

Secretary MARSHALL. He is not under my orders, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. Did he go under the orders of the National Security Council of which you are a member?

Secretary MARSHALL. No, I don't think he did, sir.

QUESTION OF FORMOSA

Chairman RUSSELL. I believe you have covered in your opening statement your views on whether or not Formosa should be given to the Chinese Communists.

Secretary MARSHALL. Yes, sir, I touched on that and I think further details on that you should obtain from the Chiefs of Staff.

Chairman RUSSELL. I was asking your view now, not those of the Joint Chiefs.

Secretary MARSHALL. I concurred with the views of the Chiefs of Staff.

Chairman RUSSELL. Does that also apply as to the representation by Red China in the United Nations?

Secretary MARSHALL. Very specifically; yes, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. You are opposed to both?

Secretary MARSHALL. Yes, sir, and I so stated in my statement. Just 1 minute, let me get that straight.

Chairman RUSSELL. I think you covered it in your statement.

Secretary MARSHALL. I referred to the policy which was in existence when I became Secretary of Defense, which was to deny Formosa to Communist China, and to oppose the seating of Communist Chinese in the United Nations.

At no time have I entertained the opinion that there should be any deviation from that policy, that these two issues were to be excluded from the armistice terms.

Chairman RUSSELL. That covers the question.

Secretary MARSHALL. And I added at the end that I was opposed, with the Chiefs of Staff, to any attempt of a nation or regime to shoot its way into the United Nations.

CHANCES OF SUCCESS OF MAC ARTHUR'S RECOMMENDATIONS

Chairman RUSSELL. Now, General, as a military man with distinguished service to your country over a long period of years, I would like to get your professional opinion as well as your views as Secretary of Defense as to whether or not the Chinese Reds can be driven out of Korea and Korea pacified without the implementing General MacArthur recommends?

Secretary MARSHALL. When you use the expression "driven out of Korea" I assume you mean all of Korea, both north and south.

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes, sir, I mean to carry out the original directive of the United Nations.

Secretary MARSHALL. I should say that if the Chinese Communists continue in force in North Korea with the potential of additional reinforcements that might be made available, and with our situation where we visualize no considerable reinforcement of the United Nations army, that they could not be driven out of North Korea, and I have my own doubts as to whether the actions recommended by General MacArthur would bring the conflict to a victorious end.

I am afraid, in my own opinion, it might result in a great increase in casualties without a decisive finish, but that is his view to the contrary as the theater commander.

[Deleted.]

Chairman RUSSELL. Wait a minute, do you mean to say in your opinion there is doubt even if we do bomb them whether they could be driven from there?

Secretary MARSHALL. I didn't hear the end of your question.

Chairman RUSSELL. Did you say in your statement that you doubted whether they could be driven out even if we adopted these recommendations?

Secretary MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. Is that what you wanted to state?

Secretary MARSHALL. That is what I wanted to state. You can get into the details of this with the Chiefs of Staff, [deleted].

Senator LODGE. But you have no objection to having your belief stated that in your judgment the bombing of the Chinese bases would not bring victory?

Secretary MARSHALL. That is correct, sir.

WAYS OF ENDING KOREAN WAR

Chairman RUSSELL. General, that brings me to the question that I think is plaguing the American people and is causing great indecision in the country, uncertainty and a certain depth of feeling. How will we ever bring the Korea episode to a conclusion?

Secretary MARSHALL. Now what I am going to say now must not all be released because I can't advertise my conclusions as to that to the enemy.

[Deleted.]

They have had tremendous losses. We speak of their very large forces, but when you take the percentage of the losses that they have suffered, they are tremendous.

Now the question is how long can that go on unless they are assisted by the Soviet Government. If they renew the attack and they meet the same result that came from their attack of the last 2 weeks, we will have almost destroyed again or ruined the fighting power of some, I think it is, 34 new divisions. There were that number concentrated on what was the left of our line on the First Corps, and I know after the fourth day the report was that we had disposed of 26 of them up to that time.

Now on their part that cannot continue without wrecking them very seriously because they have troubles in China themselves. They had this threat they were carrying out against Indochina. That I am quite certain has been decidedly delayed by the effect of what is going on in Korea, and the same thing applies to any threats to Thailand or Siam.

[Deleted.]

When we turn to this country, I think we must keep in mind throughout that we had almost nothing in the summer of 1950 in the way of available troops in this country other than one airborne division, the eighty-second, and a part of a Marine division.

Everything else has been built up since that time [deleted].

You have the choice of employing all the means General MarArthur recommends, which would certainly enlarge the fighting—and whether it would bring victory is a matter of opinion. The Chiefs of Staff can give you their own views in regard to it, and in which I concur that it would not.

We have the choice then of what I have just described to you or we have the choice of withdrawing from Korea and leaving those people to assassination and virtual destruction. Those are your choices, and with our rather conspicuous successes recently as the command built up, as replacements are immediately available, and as the rotation starts, we will vitalize the command to a very considerable extent, and the efficiency of our Air Corps is increasing all the time.

Chairman RUSSELL. Do I understand you to believe that that entire statement should be off the record, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary MARSHALL. The first part of that should be off the record [deleted]. The next part where I spoke of what we were now struggling for should not be on the record. The generalization, I don't mind that being on the record.

Chairman RUSSELL. I understand, then, that you recommend a continuation of the present policy in Korea rather than adopting General MacArthur's proposal?

General MARSHALL. That is correct, sir. I must add to that, of course, that if the Chinese Communists with at least equipment support from the Soviets and maybe more support carry the war to us outside of Korea. [Deleted] then we have to retaliate.

[Deleted.]

We have no choice then. The security of that command is our first consideration.

MANNER OF CENSORING THE HEARINGS

Senator SALTONSTALL. Mr. Chairman, would you yield for a question on procedure, to yourself? I have been very much disturbed as I listened to General Marshall as to his statements as to what would be on and off the record, particularly with relation to our method that you so ably worked out with relation to General MacArthur's testimony.

I wondered if General Marshall knew of the method by which you were censoring this testimony, and if he did, what becomes of our subcommittee and the committee's responsibility under the method that you worked out?

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, of course I think that the committee is responsible, but for my part if I may be too security conscious, I want to be very careful and not release anything that is going to be of help to the enemy.

Senator SALTONSTALL. How does that function if General Marshall tells the Senator through the record up here that the testimony is off the record?

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, I understand that Admiral Davis has been instructed to use his own judgment; though I would be less than frank if I did not say that I thought General Marshall's views would be very persuasive as a witness.

Secretary MARSHALL. I might say, Mr. Chairman, that Mr. Larkin is sitting here with me, and I believe he has been sitting with Admiral Davis quite a bit, and he has heard my comments here, which he can interpret somewhat to Admiral Davis. And he also has been jogging my elbow to say, "Don't say that because that is classified."

Senator LONG. Mr. Chairman, may I interrupt to suggest that at least some of this information might be stated in other terms, that possibly the general might be consulted about that after his testimony to see the part that has been deleted.

The response that was made to me—it was suggested by Senator Flanders, if I may quote him—he does feel that this answer to General MacArthur's position should be made a part of the record insofar as possible to give the public at least a chance to understand what is involved here.

Secretary MARSHALL. Mr. Larkin can do just what you are speaking about, particularly paraphrasing messages.

Chairman RUSSELL. I assumed the general counsel was here for that purpose. Is that correct?

Mr. LARKIN. Yes, Senator.

MILITARY CONSEQUENCES OF MAC ARTHUR RECOMMENDATIONS

Chairman RUSSELL. Now, Mr. Secretary, what is your opinion with respect to the probable military consequences if the program, so ably presented by General MacArthur, is adopted by the Government of the United States? You have already cleared it up with respect to the operations against China. I ask you as to your opinion as to whether or not it will likely promote intervention by the Soviet power—or do you believe it would?

Secretary MARSHALL. My own view was—and I think it is similar to that of the Chiefs of Staff—that we were risking a hazard that had such terrible possible consequences that what we would gain was not comparable to what we were risking; and further than that, that certain of those actions would almost inevitably lose us the cooperation of our allies and would precipitate a situation where the troops on the ground would become involved as to whether or not they could continue in the action. That was a most serious consideration.

I always felt that General MacArthur, because of his distance from here, and because of his preoccupation, naturally, with the operations that were going on in Korea, as well as his responsibilities in Japan, did not fully realize the state of mind of these associates of our, our allies, and the extraordinary difficulty we had in lining up, having them all line up with us where we had to have them before the United Nations' Security Council.

The possibilities of the loss of our allies, the loss of continuation and development of collective action, collective defense, and the hazard of entering into a general war appealed to us as being so serious that the other possibilities which would flow in his opinion, from carrying out his proposals, were not considered advisable.

EFFECT OF DEFENSE OF EUROPE

Chairman RUSSELL. What effect do you think it might have upon the implementation of the North Atlantic Treaty and the military and political situation in western Europe?

Secretary MARSHALL. Well, it directly affected that, directly affected that.

As you know, from the press and otherwise, we were in a considerable discussion, argument, with the British Government in relation to actions that ought to be taken. We still have the basis there of argument and discussion relating to Hong Kong and imports into China. But we are intimately associated with them, with France, the other western European countries, in the effort to build up a defense in western Europe that will have some body to it, some assurance of deterrent action against a possible Russian action. And all of those matters would be jeopardized very, very seriously. And we never must forget that aspect of the matter.

PROGRESS ON ECONOMIC BLOCKADE ON CHINA

Chairman RUSSELL. Mr. Secretary, can you tell this committee what progress is being made in the imposition of an economic blockade on Red China?

Secretary MARSHALL. Beyond our own, which is complete?

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes. I mean a complete, total one.

Secretary MARSHALL. I can't tell you the status of that at the present time because I have not heard Mr. Acheson detail the results of his more recent pressure. I referred some time back to the fact that the Chiefs of Staff had strongly urged that he make a renewed effort, and that I had endorsed, concurred in their proposal, their suggestion, and had tried vigorously to carry it to him. He has been endeavoring, I know, to bring about an accord in that matter, which means the termination of the imports to China through Hong Kong.

Chairman RUSSELL. Do you think that if an economic blockade can be imposed that it would have any material military consequences?

Secretary MARSHALL. Oh, it will have certainly in my opinion, it will affect the military situation. I don't think it will affect them seriously because their real supply line as to war matériel, and so forth, is largely coming from the Soviet Government.

Chairman RUSSELL. You think the bulk of their supplies are coming from the Soviet rather than through the Chinese ports?

Secretary MARSHALL. Yes, sir; that would not apply to food and would not necessarily apply, we will say, to medicines of certain kinds, but it certainly applies to weapons, to ammunition, tanks, planes, and war matériel of that sort.

EFFECTIVENESS OF A NAVAL BLOCKADE

Chairman RUSSELL. What do you think would be the effect of a complete naval blockade of the China coast?

Secretary MARSHALL. I think it would inconvenience them and in time might have a very serious effect on the stability of the Chinese Communist Government.

Chairman RUSSELL. What effect would it be likely to have if we unilaterally imposed a complete naval blockade?

Secretary MARSHALL. I am advised by the naval authorities that you cannot very successfully impose a naval blockade under those conditions, because we would be involved with Russian ships, with those of other nations, and it would "leak like a sieve" is the expression they used to me.

Senator BRIDGES. I don't want to interrupt, but it is 1 o'clock, and there was an agreement for the Senate to vote, and so on.

Secretary MARSHALL. It would also tie up large—

Chairman RUSSELL. I have one or two questions yet to ask.

DIRECTIVES ON BOMBING CHINESE COMMUNISTS

General, will you state briefly the directives of our Government to General MacArthur with respect to use of bombing as a weapon against the Chinese Communists, the limitations that are involved?

Secretary MARSHALL. A number of the messages involve that in which he was cautioned time after time against bombing beyond the borders of Korea, and he was given one message, which I recited to you, wherein he was notified that if attacks were made against us outside of the boundaries of Korea, he could retaliate by bombing under those conditions.

There were several messages back and forth concerning the bombing of the bridges over the Yalu River and the communities right on that river on the Korean side when he was reporting large move-

ments of Communist Chinese troops moving southeast through Manchuria and crossing the Yalu into Korea.

Chairman RUSSELL. General——

Secretary MARSHALL. And he was finally given the authority to bomb those localities.

BOMBING OF RACIN IN NORTH KOREA

Chairman RUSSELL. General MacArthur stated that there was a certain road juncture and supply center, which I believe, was pronounced "Rashin," and spelled "R-a-c-i-n"——

Secretary MARSHALL. Racin.

Chairman RUSSELL. That was of tremendous importance to our enemies in North Korea; that it lay 35 miles from the Soviet border; that all of the air officers stated that it was possible to bomb that juncture without any violation of the Soviet frontier, and that he was convinced that it was of great importance that the center be bombed to stop or slow down the movement of supplies through that juncture; that he had specifically, and I think he said, repeatedly requested to bomb that center, but that his requests had been denied.

Can you give any just or logical reason why that town should be bombed within North Korea?

Secretary MARSHALL. It was a question of the risk involved in an operation so close to the Soviet frontier, and as to the question of ships in the harbor, and other mishaps that might occur.

The Chiefs of Staff had several interchanges with General MacArthur, seeking to get certain facts in relation to the locality, its distance, the actual distance of these dumps or storages from the frontier, which seems to me, were not in the distance just mentioned, and also the question of whether or not the same result could be obtained by establishing them just over the Soviet frontier—that is, within their frontier, if this other bombing took place.

Now, I think it would be much better if you had the Chiefs of Staff give you the exact details on that. I concurred in their decision.

RELEASE OF PREVIOUS TESTIMONY

Chairman RUSSELL. We are confronted, Mr. Secretary, here with an issue as to whether or not that specific testimony delivered by General MacArthur should be released. The committee has not yet taken action with respect to that, and I should like to have your views as to the effect that it might have upon the security of our troops in Korea and the operations, the operations there, to have that fact made public, he had made these recommendations.

Secretary MARSHALL. I would want to look over the various papers connected with that.

Chairman RUSSELL. No papers are involved. It was just a statement from General MacArthur that he was denied permission to bomb that locality.

Secretary MARSHALL. Well, I am prepared to say that that is correct; he was denied.

Chairman RUSSELL. I understand, but I am talking about the release of it. I am not talking about, and there is no issue involved, as to whether or not he received instructions.

Secretary MARSHALL. I did not understand what you were getting at there. I think that can be released, and I will find out and let the committee know right away.

Chairman RUSSELL. You will let us know during the afternoon?

Secretary MARSHALL. Yes.

Chairman RUSSELL. Thank you very much.

Gentlemen, what is your pleasure here? Do you want to recess at this time? We have been here now until a little past 1 o'clock. We agreed Saturday not to have an afternoon session today. If no one expresses any objection, and if you will accept the apologies of the chairman for consuming the entire morning in his questioning—

Senator KNOWLAND. I think it has been very helpful, Mr. Chairman, an excellent job.

Chairman RUSSELL. I thank you. We will stand in recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning; General Marshall will return tomorrow morning.

(Whereupon, at 1:10 p. m. the committee adjourned to reconvene Tuesday, May 8, 1951, at 10 a. m.)

MILITARY SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST

TUESDAY, MAY 8, 1951

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES AND THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
UNITED STATES SENATE,
Washington, D. C.

The committees met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in the caucus room, Senate Office Building, Senator Richard B. Russell (chairman, Committee on Armed Services), presiding.

Present: Senators Russell, Connally (chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations), Byrd, Johnson of Texas, Kefauver, Stennis, Long, Bridges, Saltonstall, Morse, Knowland, Cain, Flanders, George, Green, McMahon, Fulbright, Sparkman, Gillette, Wiley, Smith, Hickenlooper, Lodge, and Tobey.

Also present: Mark H. Galusha and Verne D. Mudge, of the staff of the Armed Services Committee; Francis O. Wilcox, chief of staff; Thorsten V. Kalijarvi, staff associate, Committee on Foreign Relations; and C. C. O'Day, clerk.

Chairman RUSSELL. The committee will come to order.

General Marshall will return to the stand today for further questioning by members of the committee.

TESTIMONY OF SECRETARY OF DEFENSE GEORGE C. MARSHALL, ACCOMPANIED BY FELIX LARKIN, GENERAL COUNSEL—Resumed

Chairman RUSSELL. I have a very few questions that I desire to ask. Before asking them I wanted to inquire of General Marshall as to whether or not you desire to make any further statement with reference to any question that was asked you yesterday, and particularly those that were excluded from the record for security reasons.

Secretary MARSHALL. I don't think of any at the moment, sir.

RESTRICTIONS ON KOREAN MILITARY OPERATIONS

Chairman RUSSELL. General, did you—I want you to tell us for the record just what restrictions were placed upon the scope of military operations in Korea and where those restrictions originated.

Secretary MARSHALL. The restrictions imposed on General MacArthur in the conduct of the campaign in Korea were in general to confine the operations to Korea, and under no circumstances to carry out operations beyond the border of Korea into Manchuria.

He was also cautioned against having units within, I think it was, about 15 miles of the border in northeast Korea where it touched the perimeter of Siberia, the Soviet Government.

The restrictions did not apply to operations by the Navy on the water along off the coast of Korea, but those were restricted, in other words, forbidden, in relation to the Manchurian coast, the China coast, and most specifically the northeastern tip of Korea in close proximity to the Soviet border.

There was a modification in those restrictions in the event that our forces were attacked outside of Korea, to the effect that he was authorized to retaliate in bombing against such operations.

[Deleted.]

ORIGIN OF KOREAN RESTRICTIONS

Chairman RUSSELL. Did those restrictions originate with the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a part of the military program for the conduct of the war or did they originate in the United Nations?

Secretary MARSHALL. Those restrictions directly related to views of the Chiefs of Staff as expressed and discussed in the National Security Council with the representation, with the presence of the President, the Vice President, myself, the Secretary of State and the head of NSRB. There was an intermingling there of political necessities along with military directions. There was an agreement that not only were these restrictions necessary in order to avoid a break with our allies and a complete confusion in our relations to the United Nations and specifically the Security Council, but they also felt it would be necessary in regard to the retaliation that could be carried out by a heavy force if they developed on the Communist side.

[Deleted.]

RUSSIA'S RETALIATION POWER

Chairman RUSSELL. What is your opinion, Mr. Secretary, as to the potential power of retaliation available to the Soviet in the Korean War?

Secretary MARSHALL. You are asking, as I understand it, the retaliation or the action of the Soviet military planes—

Chairman RUSSELL. If the Soviet wanted to see fit to enter the Korean War?

Secretary MARSHALL. From the information estimates that I have seen, it would be a very serious matter, because they have, according to estimates that I have seen, a considerable force—I have forgotten exactly how many thousands in the vicinity of Vladivostok, Dairen-Port Arthur, Harbin. I don't know whether there are any plane concentrations in relation to Sakhalin, but there have been reports of troop concentrations and particularly Japanese prisoner, former prisoner, organizations, presumably of indoctrinated Japanese on the Sakhalin point, which is not very far off northwest Hokkaido.

You made a reference a moment ago, to the United Nations, and yesterday—

BASIS OF MILITARY DIRECTIVES

Chairman RUSSELL. If you will just pardon me, Mr. Secretary, I have been somewhat confused all through this testimony as to the source or origin of these restrictions as to whether or not they originated with the United Nations at the time they decided by resolution

to resist aggression in Korea, or whether they were the suggestion or the orders of our own Government that were invoked for military or political reasons by the United States or whether they were directed by the United Nations.

Secretary MARSHALL. I believe it will be best for me to take the successive resolutions of the United Nations relating to this matter which form the basis for the military directions from their executive agent, the President of the United States to our military commander in the Far East.

I think you will see, as I read these, that positive directives are not included; policies, permissions, you might say, are included.

Then, it goes beyond that in the reactions of the delegates to the United Nations toward our conduct of operations in which their troops were involved, and which involved the possibility of the development of a world war.

Now, with your permission, I will read what those resolutions are.

Chairman RUSSELL. We will be glad to have them.

Secretary MARSHALL. I gave you a very incomplete statement yesterday.

On June 25 last the Security Council of the United Nations adopted a resolution:

(a) Determining that the armed attack upon the Republic of Korea by forces from North Korea constitutes a breach of peace;

(b) Calling for the immediate cessation of hostilities;

(c) Calling upon the authorities of North Korea to withdraw forthwith their armed forces to the thirty-eighth parallel; and

(d) Calling upon all members to render every assistance to the United Nations and to refrain from assisting the North Koreans.

That was June 25. On June 27 last the Security Council of the United Nations adopted a second resolution:

That the members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area.

On July 7 last the Security Council of the United Nations adopted a third resolution recommending that all members providing military forces and other assistance pursuant to the aforesaid Security Council resolutions make such forces and other assistance available to a unified command under the United States, and requesting the United States to designate the commander of such forces.

From July 8 last and onward, therefore, General MacArthur served as commanding general of the United Nations forces, with his mission defined by the directive of June 27. That is, to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area.

Late in September the advance being made by the United Nations forces was bringing them back to the vicinity of the thirty-eighth parallel.

On October 7 last the General Assembly—not the Security Council—adopted a resolution restating the essential objectives of the United Nations as the establishment of a unified and democratic government of Korea and recommending that all appropriate steps be taken to insure conditions of stability throughout Korea.

I will read that again:

The General Assembly adopted a resolution restating the essential objectives of the United Nations as the establishment of a unified and democratic gov-

ernment of Korea, and recommending that all appropriate steps be taken to assure conditions of stability throughout Korea.

This resolution then went on to provide that the United Nations forces should not remain in any one part of Korea—should not remain in any one part of Korea, except so far as necessary to achieve the two foregoing objectives.

U. N. POLITICAL OBJECTIVES

Thus, in this somewhat oblique fashion, the United Nations authorized its forces in Korea to advance beyond the thirty-eighth parallel. This authority, however, has always been considered as permissive, rather than mandatory; and at no time have the United Nations forces been given the task of unifying all of Korea by military action.

In other words, the unification of North and South Korea has been set up as a political, rather than a military objective of the United Nations.

Following the intervention of the Chinese Communists early in November, the United Nations became gravely concerned about the possible extension of the area of conflict beyond Korea. On November 13, 1950, our Department of State advised several of the member nations having forces in Korea as follows:

That it may be necessary at an early date to permit United Nations aircraft to defend themselves in the air space over the Yalu River to the extent of permitting hot pursuit of attacking enemy aircraft up to two or three minutes flying time into Manchurian air space * * *

Serious concern was registered by several nations that action in the way of hot pursuit might precipitate an extension of the hostilities. In response to this concern our Department of State advised that the United States would continue to give other governments having forces in Korea information in advance of taking such decisions in order that they may express their views, to which full consideration will be given.

Thereafter, enemy air action in Korea did not develop to such an extent that it was deemed necessary to take a decision with respect to hot pursuit.

Now I think that covers pretty generally the outline of our direct connection with the United Nations in the matter of the military operations specifically. And I repeat again the fact that no directive from the United Nations in explicit military terms has been forthcoming, but these policies have been established under which the President as executive agent acts for the other nations in directions for the campaign in Korea.

Chairman RUSSELL. General, can you supply for the record the directives and orders and memoranda sent to General MacArthur by the Department of Defense containing these restrictions or any restrictions that were imposed on him in the conduct of the campaign?

Secretary MARSHALL. Yes, sir; that can be done. I suppose it will be acceptable in paraphrase form.

Chairman RUSSELL. They will be, if there is no objection, or is there any objection to the release of those?

General MARSHALL. Some, yes, and some, no. I will answer that way.

Chairman RUSSELL. Will you please designate which can be printed in the record and which you think not?

General MARSHALL. Yes.

Chairman RUSSELL. We want just as many as we can possibly have, with due regard to security.

REASONS FOR SECURITY

Yesterday, General, I asked you as to when there was a foreseeable end to the Korean war under the present policies of the Defense Department. In my opinion that is one of the most important matters that is involved in these hearings.

General MacArthur believes that his program will bring to an early end the loss of life that is resulting in Korea today. He presented that viewpoint very forcefully and eloquently to this committee, and he has argued that the Defense Department does not have a program that will bring this war to an end.

Now that is a very vital question. Yesterday you went into some detail in answering that question. Unfortunately the greater part of your answer was chopped out of the record on the ground that it contained material that would be vital to our country's security and would adversely affect the operations that are now in progress in Korea.

I do not question that decision as to security, General. That is a technical matter and I do not propose to fix my judgment against the judgment of men who are expert in that field, but I do think that a statement should appear in this record from you as to whether or not you think that the methods now being employed in Korea, the operations being conducted under the limitations and restrictions that exist, can bring that war to a successful conclusion in the foreseeable future.

Secretary MARSHALL. Mr. Chairman, it is exceedingly hard to decide what may be said in answer to your question because it really amounts to disclosing a war plan. May I project this a little bit beyond that factor?

In the matter of security we all easily recognize that matters must not be brought out here in a way to break down our codes, for example, or to suggest other action by our opponents that would be very harmful to our interests, and I think everybody is in agreement that we must not disclose plans of campaign. I think there is general agreement on that, understanding on that, but I am rather uncertain as to the extent of the understanding in regard to security as to our Armed Forces.

We have to do always all in our power not only to maintain but to build up the fighting morale of our forces. That is sometimes very difficult.

During the last war it was difficult in certain areas. It is equally difficult here. They have made a magnificent response and I was told only this morning the last reports indicated a very high morale, which is the most important factor, however you approach it, in bringing the operation to a successful conclusion, but I am disturbed and I should think you would be disturbed at the effect that will sweep through that force of a situation in which their commander has stated his views which accentuate the casualties that they are suffering and in effect that it is without justified purpose.

That is not only one time, but a number of times; and the effect of the fact that their commander has been in complete disagreement with the constituted authorities of this Government, that is a most serious matter, and we should find some way of proceeding with this investigation that does not destroy us in the field by serious reaction in the way of morale.

Now I don't approach this in the purely abstract manner because I have gone through some very grueling experiences in connection with it.

MORALE OF TROOPS

A soldier can be very easily made to feel sorry for himself, particularly when he is in most disagreeable, unattractive, and dangerous localities, and particularly when he has been called upon to make a tremendous effort over a long period of time.

There were certain statements made in the press during the last war in relation to our "forgotten" soldiers in Italy. I don't recall at the moment how many divisions we had there, but it was in excess of 20—not all of ours but others—and it was a very critical operation, because the force had been reduced and yet they had to play a decided part in making possible the landing in Normandy.

The effect of those statements was a tremendous mail from wives, mothers, and others to these soldiers, until I was told by at least one corps commander—and I think two—that the effect on morale had been so serious they didn't know whether they could carry out successfully the next planned operations.

I went to Korea from Yalta on the request of the authorities there, and had to talk—I remember one day—25 times, in the Apennines, in the mountains, to various groups to try to bring them into an understanding of the general situation.

Chairman RUSSELL. Did you mean you went to Korea or to Italy?

Secretary MARSHALL. Did I say Korea? Italy. That has been somewhat on my mind. This was Yalta—Italy; but I was occupied 3 or 4 days there doing nothing but talking to groups of troops all thorough the mountains because they thought it was urgently necessary that I do so because of the serious—they felt, almost calamitous—effect of this tremendous mail from home resulting from these statements.

Now translate this investigation to the soldiers in Korea, who are doing a very wonderful job, but under very difficult circumstances, and hearing and reading that no reinforcements are coming and that these casualties probably, possibly, are not being sacrificed to an advantageous result.

Now that to me is the most important part of our security considerations. The other two are important, by by comparison they are almost trivial.

I make this comment so that you may have in mind what our difficulties are. I said yesterday that it was tremendously important that we give General Ridgway what support we could in his extraordinarily difficult situation—coming into command as he has.

That is all involved with this. That is the reason it is so difficult to give the answers or release for publication to the public the answers that you think would be desirable.

I have tried to be very frank. I have read from secret documents to you, I have tried to go right down to the nubbin of this thing, so far as I could, but I do think we have to question very carefully whether we advise the public at the expense of our Army or not. I say the Army is the primary consideration of this Government.

ALTERNATIVES IN KOREA

Now that is a war plan that this question leads to. I did state it yesterday, but it was—I said we had three choices, Mr. Chairman, as I saw them. The one was the extension of the campaign along the lines suggested by General MacArthur. The one was to withdraw from Korea and violate our promise to those people and sacrifice them to assassination and probably almost extinction, and the other was to fight where we were, to what advantage we could gain by the method that we followed.

That method was to inflict the greatest number of casualties we could in order to break down not only the morale but the trained fabric of the Chinese Armies.

[Deleted.]

That is, inflict terrific casualties on the Chinese Communist forces. If we break the morale of their armies, but, more particularly, if we destroy their best-trained armies as we have been in the process of doing, there, it seems to me, you develop the best probability of reaching a satisfactory negotiatory basis with those Chinese Communist forces, without getting ourselves into what we think would be a great hazard toward developing a much enlarged struggle with consequently larger casualties or a complete world war.

And also that we will retain our allies, bring them to more satisfactory reactions before the United Nations as their confidence in our leadership in this delicate matter is increased, and generally improve the situation.

You don't object to my talking along at length here, do you?

Chairman RUSSELL. No, sir. I want you to go into this.

GLOBAL-APPROACH TO CONTAIN COMMUNISM

Secretary MARSHALL. I have some notes here relating to this, you might say, the criticism of stalemate which is directed so often at the campaign in Korea.

In the first place, in the last 5 years the United States has been engaged in a unique struggle—unique struggle against Communist imperialism and aggression. This for us is an unprecedented situation and has called for unprecedented measures to deal with it.

I want to recite these because this is part and parcel to them. For the last 5 years our supreme policy has been to curb Communist aggression and, if possible, to avoid another world war in doing so. The execution of this policy has required extraordinary patience, firmness, and determination in meeting and helping our allies to meet, and helping them to meet challenges in Iran, Greece, Turkey, Trieste, Berlin, and Indochina, and finally Korea.

Now many of you will recall discussions of some of these by me in person, notably relation with Greece, appropriations and policies, and things of that sort—and Berlin. And, of course, we have to con-

sider appropriations regarding Indochina. But the results I think speak for themselves.

Year by year the United States has opposed these aggressions with courage and poise, and in each instance the threats were curbed or overcome without involving this Government in a total war.

The struggle between the democracies, as we define the term and the Communist powers is a continuing one. It has already lasted over 5 years, and it may last much longer.

There can be, I think, no quick and decisive solution to this global struggle short of resorting to another world war. The cost of such a conflict is beyond calculation. It is, therefore, our policy to contain Communist aggression in different fashions in different areas without resorting to total war, if that be possible to avoid.

This policy may seem costly, if maintained over a period of years, but those costs would not be comparable at all to what happens if we get involved in what you might call an atomic war.

~~Korea is only the latest challenger in this long, hard, continuing world-wide struggle.~~

We are applying there the same policy that has been successfully applied in the attempted aggressions that preceded it elsewhere in the world.

Each incident has required different military and diplomatic efforts on our part, to cope with the situations as they develop, in one area or another. All of them have been costly, but Korea is the most costly of all, for it has involved the lives of our American troops.

Nevertheless, even though the conditions have been different, ~~four~~ policy has been uniform in the following respects:

We have spurned appeasement.

We have brought to bear whatever has been necessary, in money and manpower, to curb the aggressor; and we have sought in every possible way to avoid a third world war.

KOREA'S PLACE IN GLOBAL STRUGGLE

The application of this policy has not always been easy or popular. Korea is not the first time there have been complaints of a stalemate, and it is not the first time that there have been demands for a quick and decisive solution.

I think these periods are of interest. Korea has lasted for 10 months but the Berlin crisis lasted almost 15 months and was a very daring undertaking, and entirely off the record.

[Deleted.]

It was carried out as you know, and ended up in relieving the blockade without our getting into an actual war, but it lasted 15 months.

There were times when the fight for Berlin also looked like a stalemate, but we kept our head and persevered and in the end won a notable victory.

Incidentally, off the record:

[Deleted.]

Senator KNOWLAND. Mr. Chairman, might I ask a question just on procedure here. I am not sure whether the general is saying off the record for the purpose of advising Admiral Davis or is stopping the stenographer. I think everything that is said here ought to be in the official record of the committee and then cut out for security.

Chairman RUSSELL. Those instructions were given to the reporters. Secretary MARSHALL. I am sorry but I am going pretty far afield here, but I thought I wanted to give you the full complexion as I see it. There were those who wanted to end this situation by smashing through the Russian blockade, even though this might have precipitated a war at that time. We refused to take that risk as long as there were other means of accomplishing our ends, and I at that time was Secretary of State.

It should also be recalled that there were critics who were impatient over our policy in Greece. Some of you sat in the hearings we had in regard to Greece.

The effort to free Greece from Communist aggression took 18 months. There were those who said that this was a hopeless adventure and that we were merely wasting our economic and military assistance to that country.

It is true that our rescue of Greece was costly, but I do not think very costly in comparison to the stakes involved; but it paid off not only by our saving Greece, or enabling Greece to save itself, but, during the course of this fight, the Soviet Government suffered its greatest postwar setback in the defection of Yugoslavia.

I do not believe—I do not know, but I do not believe—that the action in Yugoslavia would have taken the course it did if Communist domination of Greece had occurred.

While our foreign policy has placed a considerable burden upon the United States in recent years, it is likewise true that it has imposed great strains on the Soviet Government, and has created significant tensions within the Soviet orbit, which, in the end, may yield decisive advantages to this country and our allies.

What is going on in Korea is a very difficult campaign. It has been met by very able leadership and very remarkable action by our troops and those of our allies. It is a unified force. It is now a tremendously skillful force, and, in the coordination between the air and the ground and the ships, it has developed to an astonishing degree.

I repeat that I think the course we are following now is virtually the only course you could follow, and I merely am referring to previous struggles we have had of the same basic nature, but the procedure we have taken has been adapted to the particular locality.

POSSIBLE COURSES OF ACTION

Chairman RUSSELL. You have stated, Mr. Secretary, that there were only three possible courses of action open.

Secretary MARSHALL. That I see.

Chairman RUSSELL. That you could see.

Secretary MARSHALL. I repeat again, Mr. Chairman, though, that you can get this much more in technical detail from the Chiefs of Staff, because they discussed it for hours and almost days, whereas I get the results of their discussion because I am administering all the other affairs of the Defense Department.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, we will have the Joint Chiefs before us before we conclude this hearing, Mr. Secretary, but I should like to ask you to summarize, if you will, as you see it, the advantages and the disadvantages of the three possible avenues open to us: First, as to the extension of the war.

Secretary MARSHALL. First as to what?

Chairman RUSSELL. As to the extension of the war; the adoption of the MacArthur plan, in other words.

What do you think would be the advantages or the disadvantages of that plan? You have gone into the defense of our present program in Korea, but I would like for you to deal with the effects—advantages and disadvantages—of the first possibility, I believe you mentioned, which is, I believe you called it, the extension of the war.

Secretary MARSHALL. Mr. Chairman, I want to qualify what I am going to say by reminding you again that I have opinions, naturally, in my position, but the detailed study of all these considerations is taken by others, and I get the reflection of those and the papers of them passing through my hands.

Chairman RUSSELL. I understand that, Mr. Secretary, but there is a responsibility—

Secretary MARSHALL. I am going to make a statement, but I will qualify it before I do. I am a little fearful that you are thinking I was a Chief of Staff and maybe I am a kind of Chief of Staff now.

I am not. There are considerable other matters I have to attend to and I have tremendous confidence in these particular men.

HAZARDS OF MAC ARTHUR PLAN

So what I am saying is largely a reflection of what they bring to me. I think the extension of the conflict would not be profitable. I don't quite see how it could bring us to a quick, and what you might call a victorious, conclusion for a number of reasons.

In the first place, China is a vast country and is a country where human life is not put on the same standard of values that we have, and losses that would occur, we will say, from bombing and things like that they can wipe off the slate very easily where we could not.

But you don't destroy much when you do hit at that. You make it difficult, you interfere, but when you bombard a coastal city, when you bomb a coastal city or an interior city, I don't think you accomplish a great deal.

The Japanese had a long trial of that and had troops all through China, but were not able to take over the country. When you turn to the next factor involved in that, you come to the question of the employment of the troops of the Nationalist Government in Formosa. That is concerned with this very affairs. We are all of the opinion that Formosa itself is of great importance and it is imperative that it be kept out of Communist hands.

Now the problem is: Can we effectively use the troops from Formosa, completely disregarding the hazard that we think might grow out of their use in relation to the development of another world war?

I referred yesterday to a mission whose report exercised influence on the Chiefs of Staff in connection with their decision.

If I can find it in my original statement, I will read it.

I cannot find it.

However, there was a mission of 37 officers sent from General MacArthur's headquarters, by him, at the direction of the Chiefs of Staff, in early August, about the 3d of August, I think, to Formosa, to go over the command there, air, sea, and ground, in connection with the defense of Formosa against any Communist attack on that island.

They returned to Tokyo about the 26th or 27th of August, and submitted their report on the 11th of September; and the substance of that report—this should be off the record——

[Deleted.]

That had a great effect upon the opinion of the Chiefs of Staff, in relation to the utilization of these particular troops; and I came into the record yesterday with the first recommendation of General MacArthur, in August, I think it was, and his later recommendation along a different line, along in November; so that, we think, would have prejudiced the campaign because of the small result we would get from incursions of that force on the mainland, and the hazards we would take in reducing the effective force of those troops that are equipped, and those troops that are reasonably trained, in action on the mainland, not to mention the support that we would have to give them, in addition to what we were actually doing in Korea with our Navy and our Air.

Therefore, the feeling has been that an extension of the present war, under the terms proposed by General MacArthur, would not only hazard the development of a very much enlarged and probably a world war, but would not lead to a quick decision—decisions of a decisive nature which would not only terminate the actual fighting in Korea but relieve us of very heavy troop obligations in the immediate future in that region.

Now the next point I mentioned was whether or not we evacuated Korea.

Chairman RUSSELL. Before you get to that, Mr. Secretary, you said the hazard of Soviet intervention. Do you think that that possibility is remote or that it is very real—that the Soviet might intervene?

Secretary MARSHALL. I think it is a very real possibility, and like all other matters pertaining to the Soviet Government, the decision is of a few men and can be an instant decision whenever they choose to make it. They may make it without any reference to a specific event; and again they may find themselves imperiled as they feel it, in their future development of communism in the world, and therefore take action to reduce that peril.

Chairman RUSSELL. Now, with particular respect to this question—the extension of the war—you stated on yesterday that you thought there was a great likelihood that the adoption of General MacArthur's policy would result in greater losses in Korea than to follow the present policy.

I believe you stated that substantially yesterday.

Secretary MARSHALL. I assumed, and we have assumed, that, if we started on that procedure, particularly the bombing and the naval action, in relation to Manchuria and China, we would immediately have whatever retaliation they were able to effect; [deleted].

I am here dealing with something that the commander on the ground thought quite differently about, and presumably his air chiefs advised him differently about. However, on this side there are a number of officers who have had tremendous experience in the matter and also have had plenty of time, and all the information obtainable, to come to a pretty clear idea of what the possibilities are in the build-up of Communist China air power, which had been very evident for several months.

[Deleted.]

Chairman RUSSELL. That answers, but not directly, what I intended to ask—as to whether or not that statement envisioned the Soviet entering the war, or whether you thought that the losses might be greater if the war were confined solely to Communist China under the program advanced by General MacArthur.

Secretary MARSHALL. Well, if you didn't achieve a decisive result, I would say the losses were bound to be greater because there would be an extension of the effort and presumably heavy air action against us until we crushed all possibility of air retaliation.

Now, to the extent to which we can crush that, the issue is immediately created as to whether or not the Soviets will stand by and see this crushed, they having furnished continuously all these planes in the Chinese Communist build-up.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, if that is your opinion as to its effect if the war were confined to the Chinese Communists, can you state for the record what would be likely to occur if the Soviet intervened?

EFFECT OF SOVIET INTERVENTION

Secretary MARSHALL. The question is what would be the effect if the Soviet intervened?

Chairman RUSSELL. If I understand it, it is your statement that the losses would be greater if the MacArthur plan were adopted and the war was not ended by any other power than Communist China. What would the effect be if it did provoke the Soviet to intervene?

Secretary MARSHALL. Well, of course that would immediately involve the defense of Japan, Hokkaido in particular, attacks on our air all over Japan, all over Korea, at the bases, probably Okinawa, and we couldn't accept that without the maximum retaliation on our part, which inevitably means a world war, which means unlimited losses for a considerable period of time.

Chairman RUSSELL. You do not believe, then, that the war could be limited to the Far East, but would spread to Europe and all other places of the world?

Secretary MARSHALL. That is our view of the matter.

EFFECTS OF KOREAN EVACUATION

Chairman RUSSELL. What would be the effect on our world posture of military strength to oppose communism if we withdraw from the Korean peninsula immediately, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary MARSHALL. I feel that that would have a tragic consequence in relation to Communist efforts in the Far East, the build-up of the Chinese Communist Party, the effect on Indochina, Thailand, Indonesia, the efforts in the Philippines which are directed against that government by Communist-inspired groups of people.

It would be, I feel, a very tragic affair. That is the reason the Chiefs of Staff in this particular document of January 12 were dealing in the light of possibility which seemed at times to be verging on a probability that we would have to evacuate from Korea until the campaign was turned in our favor, because it was felt that we just couldn't merely evacuate and do nothing. We had to do something to try to maintain our position.

Chairman RUSSELL. What, if any, effect would it have in Europe and the Middle East, Iran and India, and other parts of the world?

Secretary MARSHALL. It would, I think, very clearly have a very depressing effect on all of those people who have been looking to us for leadership and as an example, I think it would have a distressing effect.

I think all of us will recall the general effect in Western Europe in particular and all through Germany during that period of July when our very small forces were steadily driven back until they were reduced to a narrow bridgehead around Pusan.

The papers, I think, carried very extensive comments on the reaction in Europe. A myth had been exploded—we were not the powerful country we were thought to be.

Chairman RUSSELL. Do you care to comment any further on your third alternative, the present plan of operations?

Secretary MARSHALL. I certainly wouldn't want to comment on that for publication [deleted.]

General MacArthur destroyed one North Korean Army and portions of the newly constituted army trained in Manchuria have been pretty largely torn to pieces, almost decimated, and now that they have brought in new groups of Chinese Communist troops, a very large percentage of those have been really so torn to pieces that they are not capable of effective action and will not be for some time to come.

There has been a difficulty in arriving at casualties but it appears that the losses have been somewhere between five hundred and eight hundred thousand that have been suffered by the North Koreans and by the Chinese Communist forces.

No people can continue at that rate very long. While we have had heavy losses for us, considering the distance from home, the small forces involved, they have been very, very small in comparison with those suffered by the Chinese Communists, and the North Koreans, and remarkably small during the last 2 to 3 months.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Connally?

Senator CONNALLY. I will defer questions. I want to ask the General some questions later on.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Bridges?

METHOD OF MAC ARTHUR RECALL

Senator BRIDGES. Mr. Secretary, you spoke yesterday of your concurrence in the recall of General MacArthur. Would you approve of the method by which it was done?

Secretary MARSHALL. I tried to explain that yesterday as well as I could. As to the factual part, it was arranged that the relief would be carried to him by the Secretary of the Army, and at his Embassy, his home, and before he went to the office, so that there would be the least embarrassing reaction so far as that specific thing occurring.

The issue seemed to be the immediacy of the relief in relation to his own leave taking of his forces.

I explained that as frankly as I could yesterday. In fact, we had to consider what was going to be the position in which General Ridgway found himself suddenly required to not only direct the campaign in Korea but to take over the responsibilities with the Japanese Government.

I said at the time I answered the question that I couldn't give the views of the others, if I recalled them, which I didn't on that specific

subject, and I tried to analyze what mine would have been as to that specific factor, of the immediacy of his relief, and though I didn't recall analyzing it myself at the time in such detail; however, since the question of my having a chance to recall a little more about it, I do recall that there was a specific discussion as to whether or not it would be desirable to retain General MacArthur in his role in relation to Japan only, particularly his relations to the Japanese treaty, and turn over to Ridgway the conduct of the campaign in Korea.

I recall that that was set aside on the ground that it would put Ridgway in an almost impossible position because Japan was his base, and there would be a divided authority there that might make it very difficult to conduct affairs. They are difficult enough at best. That was discussed.

I recall, after I had talked here yesterday, that it was felt that it must not be on a divided basis.

MAC ARTHUR'S EXPERIENCE

Senator BRIDGES. Do we have, General Marshall, any man in military service in the United States who has a wider experience in the Far East than General MacArthur?

Secretary MARSHALL. I do not think we have, Senator Bridges.

Senator BRIDGES. Do we have any—

Secretary MARSHALL. In fact, I know we have not.

Senator BRIDGES. Do we have anyone in political life who has a wider knowledge and experience in the Far East than General MacArthur?

Secretary MARSHALL. I do not think we have. In political life?

Senator BRIDGES. Yes; in public life.

Secretary MARSHALL. When you say Far East, you mean the whole Far East?

Senator BRIDGES. Yes.

Secretary MARSHALL. Well, there might be some difference about that; I don't think of them at the moment.

Senator BRIDGES. Do you know of any military man on the side of the free world that has a greater experience in the Far East than General MacArthur?

Secretary MARSHALL. Any military man?

Senator BRIDGES. In the service of the free nations, our allies, in other words.

Secretary MARSHALL. Offhand, I do not know of any.

WEDEMEYER REPORT

Senator BRIDGES. We have received the so-called General Wedemeyer Report on Korea, General Marshall. Would you tell us, first, who suppressed that and, second, for what reason it was suppressed for these several years?

Secretary MARSHALL. As to the Wedemeyer Report on Korea, I can't answer that question; I will have to tie it up with the Wedemeyer Report on the whole result of his visit.

I restricted that from publication myself for the reason that he engaged in proposals in connection with putting the China problem before the United Nations, and specifically proposing that Korea—Manchuria—be put under trusteeship with the Soviet Government, the

British Government, and ourselves, and, I believe, the French, to handle the matter. That occurred at the time we were heavily involved in the discussion with the Congress in relation with Greece, or discussion with the United Nations, in relation to the affairs in Greece, when we were attempting to make certain that we had a proper commission to investigate and see what was going on and represent our interests, and it was thought inadvisable to release that for publication.

Now I also might add that that report, that visit, was instigated in order to provide information for me and for the President. I proposed sending General Wedemeyer out, and I had him write his own directive, which brought it into the Presidential set-up.

I thought I would just send him out to look over the ground for me, and come back and tell me what he thought; but his idea, and I think it was right, was—he needed as much prestige as possible in what he was doing, and therefore he needed a Presidential directive; and my recollection is, he drew up most of the directive himself.

Now, when it came to the publicizing of the report, that was quite another matter, but it might have been done. I know they did go through it to see how we could delete, and it seemed to be so woven into the report, that part of the United Nations phase, that it would excite more speculation and more complications than would be desirable.

Now I don't know as to the Korean section, because I did not know it had not been released until this recent matter came up; and I only presume that you can be told directly by the State Department that it was not included in their White China Book, because they felt, I presume, it didn't directly affect the China situation.

As far as I could see, there were only very few deletions necessary in connection with the report.

KOREA'S STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE

Senator BRIDGES. Do you consider Korea as militarily strategic to the United States?

Secretary MARSHALL. What?

Senator BRIDGES. Strategic to the United States.

Secretary MARSHALL. Of strategic importance?

Senator BRIDGES. Yes.

Secretary MARSHALL. If we can afford, and find it possible to maintain it, it is not absolutely vital, but its close relationship to Japan, and, of course, to Manchuria, makes it of very material importance.

The question largely is to what extent we can commit forces continuously, or under special circumstances, for the defense of Korea.

Senator BRIDGES. General Wedemeyer said, and I quote:

The political, social, economic, and military situations in South Korea are mingled. A Soviet-dominated Korea would constitute a serious political and psychological threat to Manchuria, North China, Japan, and hence to the United States' strategic interests in the Far East. It is therefore to the best interest of the United States to insure the permanent military neutralization of Korea. Neutralization can only be assured by its occupation until its future independence as a buffer state is assured.

Do you concur in that?

Secretary MARSHALL. In the rough; yes.

Senator BRIDGES. He further said:

The long-term purpose of military aid to Korea should be to enable South Korea, and later all Korea, to engage in a holding operation against the progressive expansion of militaristic communism.

Now do you think that we would have been better off today, possibly not at war in Korea, had we followed the report rather than suppressing it?

Secretary MARSHALL. Followed the report—What was the end of that?

Senator BRIDGES. Rather than suppressing it?

Secretary MARSHALL. I wouldn't answer that in the direct fashion you apparently would like me to do, because, if we take every advice that we get, we would never arrive anywhere. There have to be modifications in all of these matters.

MAINTAINING SOUTH KOREAN FORCES

I might say that my great concern when I was Secretary of State with regard to Korea was the fact of the difficulty in maintaining our forces there. I know my last recollection is that they wanted to have at least 33,000 of our troops there, and the best they could recruit, enlist, was 18,000.

But what I was more concerned about was the character of the South Korean forces that had been set up—as to command, as to leadership. And I knew at that time that in North Korea those forces had been given preliminary leadership and development by Soviet officers who were replaced as the force was built up by Koreans who had served with the Russian Army as far west as Stalingrad. So my concern at that time was the character of the South Korean forces, having in mind their importance in holding together a stable state.

Senator BRIDGES. The Wedemeyer report also said:

Consideration was given by the mission to the organization, training, and equipping of a strong Korean military force along the lines of the former Philippine Scouts. This force should be under the control of the United States military commander and initially should be officered by Americans, but with a program for replacement and understudy by Korean officers. It should be of sufficient strength to cope with the threat from the north. Such a force will become truly effective only if the United States commander in Korea is given clear-cut authority to establish and control it.

What is your comment on that, General Marshall?

Secretary MARSHALL. Well, part of that is what I was just saying, Senator Bridges, that my worries with regard to the South Korean development of strength, ability of them to support themselves, was related to the question of command, development of leaders, and the immediate installment of competent leaders. And I had reference to the Philippine Scouts; I had reference to the marines in Haiti and other places where the local forces had been built up.

I was concerned with this matter when I was Secretary of State. I found there had been an involvement in which the War Department had been involved, and I presume the State Department with the War Department, and there was the feeling that we could not place commanders of companies and battalions, regiments, and later brigades over South Koreans because, as I understood it, it would have been very strongly opposed by Syngman Rhee and the other Korean leaders.

The Philippines, on the contrary, were under our control all the time up until 1946. That was not the case in Korea, and that was the reason they gave me for not having these leaders doing the build-up of that force.

Senator BRIDGES. You think that, if these recommendations of the Wedemeyer report had been carried out and the forces there had been built up, it might have resulted in the Korean conflict not developing?

Secretary MARSHALL. That is possible, but a great many other factors are involved in it so I can't make a categorical answer to the proposition.

In a general way most of the things he recommended were actually done, but there is a very important difference which you have read there which I have been commenting on in the character of the stability, the discipline, the leadership of that South Korean force.

PLANNING BEHIND KOREAN ATTACK

Senator BRIDGES. Do you think, General Marshall, that there was any ulterior motive or there was any planned procedure by the Soviet in having the Korean attack take place when they were absent from the Security Council?

In other words, what I am getting at, do you think this was a long-range program on the part of the Soviet to start the Korean involvement when they were boycotting the Security Council because, if they had been there, they might have vetoed it or probably would have vetoed it in letting us become involved?

Secretary MARSHALL. I had not thought that true as you state, and the general reaction at the moment was it was rather fortunate they were not present on the Security Council at that time, and as I recall the return to the Security Council when the leadership automatically fell, the chairmanship fell, to them, they did everything in the world to obstruct what we were doing.

Of course, that could be tied up with the same scheme which you have implied there. I hadn't thought about that in that connection.

RUSSIA'S MILITARY STRENGTH

Senator BRIDGES. Do you think Russia has the atomic bomb?

Secretary MARSHALL. Senator, I know little beyond what has largely been in the press in connection with it. I assume they have.

I assume it will be a tedious and difficult development because I think in such matters we go much more rapidly than they would, and it's been a long tedious business with us, particularly because we have a real industrial complex and I illustrate what I mean by that in saying that when we discussed with the engineers, the directors of our operations over here, not the scientists, shortly after the explosion of the bomb, Mr. Stimson and I had them there in the office for about a day and a half, and one of the statements made was tremendously impressive to me. I think it related to the man that ran the Oak Ridge thing.

I am always afraid to talk about this for fear I get off into secret things, but I don't think it's a secret. He said there were 10,000 subcontractors.

Well, I don't think they've got 4,000 subcontractors or 2,000 subcontractors in all of Soviet Russia with the skills that are required

because of the extreme refined tolerances involved, so my own guess is the build-up would be slower than ours until they have developed some entirely new process, but they have the bomb I am quite convinced, and I couldn't even give you an estimate if I had the information as to when it might be available for use against us.

Senator BRIDGES. General Marshall, do you feel the Soviet is improving their military strength from day to day, week to week, month to month, year to year?

Secretary MARSHALL. Those are the evidences that we get and particularly in regard to its deployment. I don't know how much they are improving it in the way of better operative methods; I couldn't answer that.

I do know something about that as to aviation; but what has been going on behind the scenes has seemed to us to be a steady development in deployment in Western Russia and in the Far East, notably in the Vladivostok region and Sakhalin Islands and places of that sort.

Senator BRIDGES. You see our intelligence, of course, and do you gain from our intelligence that the type of weapons, type of planes, and so on, which the Russians are now producing is increasing in efficiency?

Secretary MARSHALL. I think that is correct. I think, however, there has been some exaggeration about some phases of it, particularly not exaggeration so much as depreciation of what we have in the way of tank power and things of that sort, but there has been a constant development; and it shows they are going ahead in every way they can.

DECISION TO ENTER KOREAN WAR

Senator BRIDGES. General, as a former General of the Army and as a former Secretary of State, were you consulted on the decision to enter the Korean war?

Secretary MARSHALL. No, sir.

Senator BRIDGES. Do you know who made the decision?

Secretary MARSHALL. I don't know the details of that, Senator.

Senator BRIDGES. General MacArthur told the Congress that he was not consulted. Do you think that, as head of the command, the man who represented us in the Far East, our commander over there, that he should have been?

Secretary MARSHALL. I have read the messages covering that period, and I would say the messages disclosed what is the approximation of consultation, because they were back and forth several in a day to the various authorities, and his returning comments, and his recommendations for certain actions.

Now as to the actual initial decision, I don't know.

EISENHOWER COMPARED TO MAC ARTHUR

Senator BRIDGES. General Marshall, when we considered the issue of military aid to Europe and troops to Europe it was pointed out by various people including yourself that one had to have faith in the military leaders, one had to have faith in the Supreme Commander in Europe, General Eisenhower.

For instance, you made the statement, and I quote:

As a result of the various steps outlined earlier, these plans are now well advanced. General Eisenhower, as you know, has assumed supreme command. In order for him to succeed in this most difficult and critical of assignments, it is essential that he not be deprived of that freedom of action which is so necessary to a military commander.

That is a straightforward statement about General Eisenhower in Europe and the need for faith in our commanders in a given area and the necessity for them to have freedom of action—that was your thought as far as Europe was concerned.

Don't you think that should apply equally to the Far East?

Secretary MARSHALL. If the circumstances were the same and the men were the same. I have great regard for General MacArthur's military capabilities. In fact, I played a very large part in his various assignments, promotions, and decorations; but when it comes to the point of the commander not recognizing, being unwilling to recognize the decisions of his Government, that is quite another matter.

General Eisenhower has been restricted at times in his operations, particularly during the last war, but there was no repercussion resulting from that. There was discussion and decision and that ended the matter.

I do not think the comparison is quite a fair one, sir.

ESSENCE OF CHINESE COMMUNISM

Senator BRIDGES. In 1945, G-2, of the Army, prepared for publication a report which explained that the Chinese Communists were the same brand of Communists as were the Russian Communists.

Was that report withdrawn, and, if so, why?

Secretary MARSHALL. In 1945?

Senator BRIDGES. Yes, sir.

Secretary MARSHALL. And it was by the Army G-2?

Senator BRIDGES. Yes.

What I am getting at is, the State Department—many of the officials of the State Department at that time were saying that the Chinese Communists were merely agrarian reformers; but apparently the War Department—because we did not have the Department of Defense at that time—took an opposite position; and, as early as 1945, recognized that the Chinese Communists were not agrarian reformers, but real Communists of the same basic background that the Communists of Russia were. We have understood that this report was never published, and that somebody suppressed it; and I wonder if you knew about it?

Secretary MARSHALL. No; I have no knowledge of that particular thing; but I have my own knowledge of when I—I got out to China and looked the ground over, from the very start, and there was no doubt that the leadership of this group were Marxist Communists, and so stated in my presence, and insisted, in my presence, that they were.

And, when I visited Yunan, in that mountain fastness of theirs, in their little theater building which they used for all sorts of purposes, and they had some kind of entertainment prepared for me—over the proscenium arch was a large picture of Lenin and a large picture of Stalin; and I recall Chou en Lai, the Prime Minister of the Chinese Government, came to me protesting, in Chungking, in the late winter

or early spring of 1946, against the dragging of Stalin's portrait through the streets, in the mud.

I have heard him assert not once but a number of times that he was a Marxist Communist. His story always was that they would approach the desired end, which was a Communist form of government, through, first, the democratic processes, as they called them, until there was enough stability and industrial strength and development to permit them to go the whole way to a Marxist Communist state.

The only phase of the agrarian belief would have been, I should suppose, the fact that most of the members of the party were of the agrarian type, as there were almost no industries within the Communist bounds in the early days in China.

There was never any doubt in my mind, and never any thought there was any misunderstanding about it.

SUPPLY OF CHINESE MANPOWER

Senator BRIDGES. General Marshall, at one time this morning you said, in effect, that human life was very cheap or considered very cheap in China; that they do not have the regard for human life that we have, or that is had in many other areas of the world.

Then you made another statement, in answer to Chairman Russell, about the conduct of the war, and in advocating your procedure or fighting within the boundaries of Korea, the limited Korean War, to the effect that we just keep on killing Chinese Communists, and you thought that was the best way of proceeding with the war, and of bringing it to a conclusion.

If what you say is true that they hold human life is cheap while we hold a much higher estimate both as to the dignity and the value of human life—with which I agree—do you not think that these concepts lessen the value of your thought that by staying within the confines of Korea, and just killing Chinese Communists, where a hundred thousand or even, perhaps, millions, wouldn't make any difference to a country with the terrific manpower reserve—

SUPPLY OF TRAINED CHINESE TROOPS

Secretary MARSHALL. Senator, I referred, I think, several times in my statement—and I should have if I didn't—to trained Communist forces.

There is a limit to what they have in trained Communist forces and, presumably, a limit as to equipment, although I imagine the Soviets would supply them, certainly, up to quite an extent.

What we have been doing. So far, as all our reports go, and it has been tearing down the best of their trained forces. We have gotten, I think, four different general army groups—I don't mean these army corps—the general army group that have come in there, and some have been reduced down to about 25 or 30 percent strength, and even that includes reinforcements that have been put into the ranks.

I am talking about the vital effect of destroying their trained Communist armies.

It takes a long time to create such an army; it also presents problems of equipment, and things of that sort; and during the last 3 months, as I remarked, our losses have been very greatly reduced, and that

has been one reason we have been able to cut our calls on Selective Service, because they were so much below what we had anticipated.

On the other hand, the losses of the Communist force have been tremendously increased, and that is the trained force that we are tearing down.

I spoke, I think, yesterday, of on the front of the First Corps, which was on the left of our line Korea, and it was calculated there were 34 divisions, and the last report I heard, which was about a week or maybe a little more ago, where they had a good basis for the statement, 26 of those had been pretty largely chewed up; and I think they said it was 8 to 10 remained to be committed to the action on that part of the front. That is what I meant when I said we were tearing them down.

It has been published before, but as we know, we have filled the hospitals all over China, and what happens with the wounded that are released, and naturally talk, though they may do it secretly, is bound to have its effect on the Chinese people in the end, although it will never have a sudden effect.

But they have tremendous manpower availabilities and they have built them up into very large forces and our very small force in Korea with the air and naval aid has cut them down to a remarkable extent.

DEFENSE DEPARTMENT ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESSES

Senator BRIDGES. General Marshall, was Louis Johnson's removal as Secretary of Defense and your succeeding him as Secretary of Defense, did that have anything to do with the conduct of the Korean War? I mean was the Korean War involved in that, his removal and your succession?

Secretary MARSHALL. Well, I suppose it was involved, but not as a reason for the change that I know of. I was called in there and then I went about the business in the same way I had heretofore, such administrative business.

I think the only major change I made immediately was to authorize, require very general backs and forths informally, discussions with the working staffs which had not been the case prior to my arrival there.

Chairman RUSSELL. What do you mean by the "working staff"? Will you excuse me?

Senator BRIDGES. Certainly.

Chairman RUSSELL. What do you mean by the "working staff"?

Secretary MARSHALL. Well, if the Chiefs of Staff are involved in something that has relationship to the world picture and matters of that sort, this problem is always turned over to the group under the Chiefs of Staff to get all of the facts spread out and to make a proposal for an attitude or decision by the Chiefs of Staff.

The Chiefs of Staff then take that and may be 2 or 3 days on it, but in getting this preparatory paper, it was very important in my opinion that they be free to discuss for instance with the State Department, to go over there or bring the State Department in in the lower echelons to discuss these things so that we didn't get on a basis of trying to handle the thing all in the form of a memorandum over there and then a memorandum from over there back to us on the highest level.

DISCRETION AMONG LEADERS

Senator BRIDGES. General Marshall, you commented yesterday about General MacArthur answering the letter of Congressman Joseph Martin. Don't you believe that if a United States Senator or a Congressman of the United States writes a letter to a military-policy-making man in authority, whether it is here or in some area of the world, that he is entitled to get a frank reply?

General MARSHALL. No, sir; I don't think from the senior commander when he knows he is advocating something to the leader of the opposition party to the administration that he as the commander is in total disagreement with his own people. That sets up a chain of events in this tragic state that we have arrived at here, which is a most unfortunate thing for everybody concerned.

Senator BRIDGES. What is the rule so far as anybody in the Military Establishment answering a letter from a Senator or a Congressman?

Secretary MARSHALL. Well, I think he has to use considerable discretion. I have had to write a good many thousand, and it depends on the back and forth, but I don't think I would ever be involved myself in a criticism of the Commander in Chief to any Congressman of either party concerned.

I don't think—that goes contrary to my precepts and understanding as a soldier. I think on the other hand what we suffer from at times, rather critically at times, is the willingness of the individual to take issue on the confidential basis with his commander in chief. That is pretty hard to get people to do. There is where you state your case and put your own commission or command or position in peril, and there is where we lack and there is the place to state.

That isn't easy to do particularly with the President of the United States. I am not referring to Mr. Truman, I am not referring specifically to Mr. Roosevelt, though I went through 6 years or almost 6 years under Mr. Roosevelt, but I think the chains of events are bound to be set up, and particularly the effect on the troops concerned.

MILITARY TRADITION OF LOYALTY

You preach loyalty all the time. You are dealing with an organization where a man receives an order from even a captain which leads to his death or his wound, and he has to obey that order. He doesn't abate it, he obeys it, and that has to be instinctive. Now, if the example at the top is contrary to that, then you have got a very serious situation.

I am reminded now of a criticism that was brought to me regarding myself shortly after I became Chief of Staff, and the criticism was to this general effect: That I was giving my support to the then Secretary of War, Mr. Woodring, and not giving it to others.

Now, my reply, I remember distinctly, was this. When the Chief of Staff of the Army sets an example to the whole Army by disloyalty to his Chief and superior, who is the Secretary of War, he has just about ruined the Army in my opinion.

Senator McMAHON. Just about what, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary MARSHALL. Ruined it.

I will give you an example of what I am talking about that is much better than that.

I recall General Pershing telling me of his own experience. In the first place, he was suddenly ordered to conduct an operation into Mexico, and I think he went some 600 miles into Mexico in the effort to capture Villa.

In the first place, he was barred from using the railroad. We had no motortruck organizations in that day, and they just had to buy trucks and organize and do the best they could to carry tremendous supplies over these tremendous distances, in many cases there being no trails. He was barred from using the railroads. That was the most severe prohibition that could be placed on him. I don't think he ever made a public comment; he assured me he had not.

It went further than that. Just as he thought he was going to effect the capture of Villa, he received a communication to cease his efforts and retire, which meant he failed in his business. He told me he didn't mention that to any of his staff, and that he walked around his tent, and around the bivouac there most of the night, and gave the order the next morning for the beginning of the withdrawal without any explanation whatever to anybody concerned. That was his reaction from a military basis to Mr. Wilson's prohibition and to Mr. Wilson's orders.

I think it was a very good model to follow in the Army.

Senator BRIDGES. Don't you think there is a little difference between issuing a public statement, General Marshall, and writing a letter to an official of the United States Government like a United States Senator or Congressman?

Secretary MARSHALL. Well, I don't know how to better explain it than I have gone into it, because you have to take the background preceding that letter into consideration—what had happened.

I recited all that yesterday, and it is a disagreeable business. I will go through it again if you would like me to.

Senator BRIDGES. No; that is all right.

CHINESE POLICIES OF STATE AND DEFENSE DEPARTMENTS

Now, General Marshall, isn't it a fact that the Defense Department under Mr. Forrestal, under Mr. Johnson, and I think even under you as Secretary of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff have consistently, have consistently urged a policy toward China and a course of action in the Far East more positive than that of the Department of State?

Secretary MARSHALL. You are referring to my period as Secretary of Defense and you are going back to——

Senator BRIDGES. I am referring——

Secretary MARSHALL. That is all right. I am just getting it in my mind.

The Chiefs of Staff, I know, were concerned as to decision regarding Formosa, and that concern was finally completely washed out by a firm decision of this Government that under no circumstances was Formosa to come under the control of a Communist-dominated or a Communist government.

At the same time, they were just as firm in their conclusions that we must not commit our strength in relation to Formosa and other points in China, in a manner which we could not afford, unless there was a rather complete change in the situation regarding the Armed Forces in this country.

I cannot speak as to Korea. The relationships with the Communist government, I think, were always those of not recognizing that government.

The relationship to the Philippines was one of our poverty in troops available. In Indonesia I don't know what the reactions of the Chiefs of Staff were to that issue.

As to Indochina, their reaction was we should, so far as we could, provide in the light of our own requirements and some other requirements, we should provide equipment, and if they asked for it, training individuals [deleted].

That is as far as I can recall the backs and forths in these various discussions.

I think it is essential also, Senator Bridges, to keep in mind the situation that we were in at these times. Now, while Mr. Forrestal was Secretary of Defense, I was Secretary of State, and there were urgings to do a great many things.

My recollection is at that particular time there were one and a third divisions in the entire United States. I know I was concerned and the Chiefs of Staff were very much concerned over obtaining enough men to guard the air strips at Fairbanks against a possible drop there, which would have been a great hazard to the Northwest.

We had literally almost no military forces outside of our Navy and outside of an effective but not too large Air Force, except the occupation garrisons and, as we know, even in Japan they were only at about 60 percent strength.

There was very little with which to do. When you judge decisions, you have to judge them in the light of what there was available to do it.

That leads you up to your budget, the actions of Congress, and matters of that kind. A great many involvements were there which I was not concerned with after my departure from the State Department until I came into the picture again in September.

FORRESTAL'S POSITION TOWARD CHINA

Senator BRIDGES. Well, General Marshall, aside from the time you have seen Secretary of Defense, it wouldn't be surprising to you, then, to know that under Forrestal and under Johnson, that the Defense Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff took a much stronger position for positive help and action toward China, and the Far East, than the State Department was taking?

Secretary MARSHALL. Wouldn't surprise me to learn——

Senator BRIDGES. Yes.

You have explained, somewhat, your own position, but when, in other words, Mr. Forrestal, who was a very distinguished American, and unfortunately is not with us any more, but Mr. Johnson certainly could be produced here—and I have heard, directly and indirectly from them, that they favored a much stronger position toward the Chinese, and the Far East, than the State Department did, during the period of their service; and I wondered if you recognized that as being true?

Secretary MARSHALL. I don't know enough of the facts at the time. I was just thinking of Mr. Forrestal, and my own contacts, in relation to China.

Now, Mr. Forrestal visited me in Nanking. I recall, at the time he visited me, I was in the middle of a conference at the Executive Yuan, endeavoring to work out that impossible situation, and he came up and got someone to come in and have me leave the conference so that he could talk to me.

Now, his concern at that time was this: Urging me to get the marines out of their job at that time, of keeping the railroad open from Tientsin, north of Chin Wan Tao, and also over to Peiping. He was very much concerned by the continuation of the marines in the situation.

I had been trying for some time to lessen that tension, but the fact remained that we could not continue the supplies of coal which were essential to central China, if the railroad was cut off from Chin Wan Tao on down to Tientsin.

He wished to get the marines out of there, and I was holding them longer than he thought advisable.

Now, that is the one contact in connection with China that I recall in connection with Mr. Forrestal.

There were more reactions of a naval nature than any others, because the Navy, very naturally, found it of tremendous value to them to have a port, a safe anchorage, you might say, and possible repair point on the China coast; and they had gotten that fairly well established at Tsingtao, and they felt very deeply in regard to any matter that didn't strongly support that installation.

Incidentally, I had arranged through the surplus property deals that the repair set-up of a naval nature would be covered as to costs through a period, I think it was, of 15 years; that when we turned over certain equipment to them from our surplus property, in connection with the naval repair shops in Shanghai, that was to give the Navy something closer than Guam.

I recall very distinctly they had very strong feelings on this subject. Insofar as I am concerned, in my knowledge of the matter, I thoroughly sympathized with the naval point of view.

On the other hand, I was not only skeptical, but alarmed at the possibilities of the ground involvements in connection with China. Now, beyond that, I cannot answer your question.

Chairman RUSSELL. You turned over surplus property to them, you said. Who do you refer to?

Secretary MARSHALL. The Chinese.

Chairman RUSSELL. What Chinese?

Secretary MARSHALL. The Kuomintang government; Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's government.

RECORD OF PRESIDENT'S CONCURRENCE WITH JCS

Senator BRIDGES. General Marshall, is it not a fact that when there has been, generally speaking, a division between the Defense Department and the Chiefs of Staff, whether it has been Forrestal, Johnson, or you in command of the situation, and the State Department, which advocated or stood for more pacifying methods, if that is a fair word to use, towards the far eastern situation, has not the President generally sided with the State Department views?

Secretary MARSHALL. Well, I can answer that pretty accurately out of my own knowledge and my own experience.

I know of no occasion where—I can recall no occasion where—Mr. Truman has acted adversely to the Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense, in relation to the State Department.

What has happened is this: I spoke of enabling the lower echelons, the working echelons to work back and forth without restriction; that had been previously forbidden.

We had a great many discussions. It has been a rather common procedure for the Secretary of State and one or two of his principal men, Mr. Lovett and myself, and the Chiefs of Staff, to meet in the Chiefs of Staff room and hold discussions of 2 and 3 hours over these various matters, generally with some specific document that we were concerned with; one which had probably been furnished us, in the first place, by the State Department.

Then, we would investigate it, or the Chiefs of Staff had, through their lower working levels, and then their reply had gone back informally, and then this meeting would occur. Now, that occurred time after time.

We always reached agreement and it was an agreement where the Chiefs of Staff sat on one side of the table, and Secretary of State Acheson, with his people, and Lovett and myself, sat on the other; in other words, the civil discussing it from our point of view, as nearly as I was civil, and the military across from us.

Now, those were carried either to the Security Council or directly to the President and, I think I am being very accurate when I say, I think I do not recall a case where the President overrode the Secretary of Defense and the Chiefs of Staff in preference to the advantage of the State Department.

As a matter of fact, we practically didn't take anything to him that we could not resolve, and I found that with discussion we could resolve practically everything that came up.

IMPORTANCE OF EUROPEAN DEFENSE

Senator BRIDGES. General, is it, in your opinion, the aim of Soviet Russia, or the Kremlin, to destroy or take over the free world?

Secretary MARSHALL. I think their purpose is to dominate the whole free world.

Senator BRIDGES. You have said before that we should build up our allied forces in Europe, and if we do that we could successfully defend ourselves, certainly, by 1953.

The military assumptions on which these statements are based I suppose are full European cooperation and ample American assistance in troops and air power; is that correct?

Secretary MARSHALL. That is roughly correct, but what I was talking about there is a set-up which would be successful in deterring full war, deterring the Soviet military aggression.

Now, there is also involved, of course, Soviet political aggression such as occurred in Hungary, Czechoslovakia and at a much earlier date in Poland, and that is where the European recovery program came into play to work against such a matter as that.

That phase of the matter was one of the great failures in connection with China in their battle with the Communist forces there. We start with the development of deterrents and thereafter it is a question of good government.

Senator BRIDGES. Now, General, supposing that the worst should happen and that Russia would override Europe and the skills and resources of Europe were at Russia's disposal. Would this, in your judgement, enable Russia to threaten the security of the United States?

Secretary MARSHALL. I think very clearly they could do so. That would be a terrific loss to us.

Senator BRIDGES. At the present time do we have enough strength in Europe to prevent that?

Secretary MARSHALL. Not at the present time. We have enough to start them to think before they leap, and of course we have an atomic advantage that they are aware of.

COMPARING EAST AND WEST POLICIES

Senator BRIDGES. To summarize what I was getting at, if Russia needs the skills and resources and industry of Europe, and we are not going to be fully prepared there until 1953, is Russia therefore going to permit us to arm Europe, and in light of the facts isn't our present program for Europe much more provocative than, for instance, the bombing of the bases in Red China?

If they can get possession of the skills, the industries, the resources of Europe and they see those resources, skills, drifting away as a result of allied preparation with American cooperation, and perhaps we will be so prepared in a period of 2 years if all our hopes materialize there—and I believe we should do it. I fully concur in that—

Secretary MARSHALL. I understand you are making a comparison.

Senator BRIDGES. Isn't that more likely to provoke the world war than a far-off incident in China where you bomb some Chinese bases?

Secretary MARSHALL. I agree with you as to hazards we have accepted in Western Europe. The hazards were inescapable there unless we just abandoned Germany and let the other part go. We had to take them.

We had no choice, literally no choice whatever there. I don't think the same is true in Korea, but as to the Soviet determinations, there is a great similarity because of the feeling on the part of many, that are well advised, is the Soviets are determined that we be chased out of Korea.

Whether that determination will carry them to the overt act that provokes a war remains to be seen.

There is also the Soviet concern as to the situation in Western Europe, but I don't think for a minute their advisers consider that we are preparing for an offensive campaign against them other than the political reactions which will result from a prosperous and clean Europe, free people in comparison to what goes on in the satellite estates and in that part of Germany that is dominated by the Soviet Government.

The situation, rather, in those respects is somewhat different in Korea, because there it is not Soviet ground that is occupied, but territory to which they attach undoubtedly great importance.

I think that if you want to get at what goes on behind the scenes, I think they had to assume that this force they had carefully trained, equipped, developed its leadership and its numbers—which far outnumbered those of the smaller Korean force—was in expectation that

they would very quickly solve the situation in Korea and we would not involve ourselves in it, that we would hold back. I think they suffered a great surprise in that respect.

Now, there is also undoubtedly the question, aside from hazards, of the extent to which we become involved in that part of the world. That can be a very serious matter to us and one, we will say, of some satisfaction to the Soviets if we become engaged in a full-out war with China.

But you are questioning me regarding comparison of hazards. I will sum up again what I think of that. There were those hazards and are those hazards in Western Europe, and there has been no choice in taking them other than just surrendering the situation to the Soviet Government.

That is not entirely the case in Korea. The conditions are quite different.

OBJECTIVE IN KOREA

Senator BRIDGES. Now, another question, General. You referred earlier in your testimony this morning, in telling us why you are opposed to the proposals of General MacArthur, that the Japanese spent 8 or 10 years on the mainland of China and they couldn't conquer China. You don't propose—certainly General MacArthur hasn't proposed, or anyone I have heard, that our problem is to conquer China?

It is to rid Korea of the Chinese Communists or all enemy Communists; isn't that true?

Secretary MARSHALL. I think that is a good point.

I was referring, though, to the fact that, when I spoke of the loss of life, of the cheapness of life, that the effect of blows like that would be rather remote as to the immediate situation, in my opinion, in regarding China proper and Korea as to reaction to the Communist forces in Korea. The same things as a blockade or an economic blockade, that eventually wears them down, that eventually threatens the endurance of their Government. But it doesn't have any immediate effect except to the extent of inconvenience.

INTERNATIONAL EMBARGO

Incidentally, Senator, if I may inject, if you don't mind, into what we have just been talking about—do you mind my making a comment about that blockade?

Senator BRIDGES. Certainly not.

Secretary MARSHALL. I looked up very carefully what were the factors and found that in December, that is, following the entrance of the Chinese Communists into the Korean action, that this country placed a complete embargo on all exports to Communist China, Manchuria, and North Korea. But in order to support this embargo, this Government applied stringent controls over exports from or through the United States to Hong Kong and Macao.

These controls cover all items except those having no strategic significance and are designed to prevent goods of United States' origin, either in original or processed form, from contributing directly or indirectly to the military potential of Communist China.

The United States has also prohibited all United States shipping and aircraft from calling at Chinese Communist ports or transporting cargo from non-United States sources destined for Communist China. It has also brought all Chinese Communist assets within the jurisdiction of the United States under control by a blocking order.

In further support of the foregoing measures which have been taken unilaterally, the United States has been pressing for the application of such international control measures as will be effective in diminishing the Chinese Communist potential for aggression. A resolution adopted by the United Nations General Assembly, February 1, last, provides the basis for sanctions to be invoked against the Chinese Communists. Under this resolution the United States is currently pressing in the United Nations for the imposition by as many of the member nations as possible of an embargo on the shipment to the Chinese Communists of arms, ammunitions, and other implements of war, as well as petroleum, rubber, and other materials useful to the Communist war effort.

Finally, on May 7, last, the United Kingdom and France indicated that they were now prepared to support a resolution introduced by the United States for an international embargo against Communist China.

Now, that is quite a change there of the British Government and the French Government. The support of the United Kingdom and France practically assures the adoption of the United States' proposal imposition of such an international embargo will, of course, make the question of a naval blockade of far less importance, almost academic.

PRESIDENT'S AGREEMENT WITH STATE DEPARTMENT

Senator BRIDGES. I asked you earlier if you were aware of whether the President had ever overridden the Department of Defense in favor of the State Department's position, and I would like to reverse that question and ask if you are aware that the President of the United States ever overrode the State Department in favor of the Defense.

Secretary MARSHALL. I don't recall any such instance. He may have used his influence out of court. I don't know.

Senator BRIDGES. Someone at the Pentagon has issued, we are informed, a statement or order to the effect that all officers when asked about the MacArthur case, so-called, must reply "No comment." Did you issue that order?

Secretary MARSHALL. I didn't issue it, and I didn't know about it.

A SOLDIER'S FIRST LOYALTY

Senator BRIDGES. Now let's take General Eisenhower, for example. I pointed out that you had quoted statements made about General Eisenhower. I call attention to the fact that Europe, you pointed out that in Europe we must have faith in our military, faith in our supreme commander, that you said he should have a reasonable amount of latitude.

Now, the program of the administration is to put through the arms implementation program in Europe.

Now, assuming that General Eisenhower, after being over there, comes back and says honestly that it is unworkable, that he isn't get-

ting the cooperation that he should, and he issues that statement which would be in opposition to the program of the administration. Will he be dismissed?

Secretary MARSHALL. That's a very precise question covering a considerable portion of the waterfront. He might make that statement with the approval of the administration in order to jerk those other countries into action. If he expressed that in opposition to a continuation of the affair which the administration, the President, Chiefs of Staff are insisting upon, I should think he would have to be taken out of command.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I wonder if the Senator would yield at this point for the reading of what I think to be a very pertinent statement.

Senator BRIDGES. I yield with the permission of the committee and the chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Any objection?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I do not want to insist on it.

Senator BRIDGES. All right.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. There is a book called *The Armed Forces Officer* that is rolling on the press right now, issued by the Secretary of Defense, General Marshall. It took me considerable time to get a hold of a copy of this book but I have it, and I would like on that very point to read passages which are put out for the official guidance of officers of the Army or of the Armed Forces.

I am reading from page 8, so that the record will be clear.

The service officer is charged only to take a lively interest in all such discussions—

that is about public matters and affairs of the military—

has no more right to condemn the service unfairly than has any other American. On the other hand, he is not expected to be an intellectual eunuch oblivious to all the faults in the institution to which he gives his loyalty; or to the contrary, that the nature of that loyalty requires that he will use his force toward righting of those things which reason convinces him are going wrong, though making certain that his actions will not do more damage than repair. His ultimate commanding loyalty at all times is to his country and not to his service or superior.

I thought perhaps that might be pertinent in connection with the obligations and responsibilities of officers at this point in your questioning, Senator Bridges.

Senator BRIDGES. Based upon that statement, General Marshall.

Secretary MARSHALL. You mean the one just read?

Senator BRIDGES. Which has just been read, which I have been aware of and others have been aware of, which has been issued by your Department under your direction. Don't you think, General MacArthur could have been putting his loyalty to his country first?

Secretary MARSHALL. I had not heard that particular paragraph before. It is a generalization, of course. My own thought would be that it could not be given application in this matter.

Senator BRIDGES. Well now, what is your idea, General Marshall—is an officer's first loyalty, as this order in this book reads, this directory reads, is his first loyalty to his country?

Secretary MARSHALL. Yes; it is to his country.

Senator BRIDGES. And he takes an oath under the Constitution?

Secretary MARSHALL. Yes.

Senator BRIDGES. And the President of the United States is a creature of the Constitution, is he not?

Secretary MARSHALL. Yes.

Senator BRIDGES. Therefore, an officer's primary object of loyalty should be his country as provided by the Constitution.

Senator MARSHALL. Would you repeat the last one?

Senator BRIDGES. His primary loyalty, his first loyalty, is to his country, as set up under the Constitution of the United States.

Secretary MARSHALL. Correct.

Senator BRIDGES. What I am pointing out is that under the Constitution, when the officer takes his oath, there might be a difference of opinion as to whether General MacArthur was carrying out his responsibilities in a loyal manner?

DISCRETION IN HIGH OFFICE

Secretary MARSHALL. I suppose so. I don't agree though, because I feel that when you take a commission and you take your oath of office under that, you accept in the military service, because of the state of loyalty you have to feel toward your respective commanders, as you go up in the military hierarchy, which is very compelling to any effective army force and military force and, therefore, that you have to accept those inhibitions if you undertake that type of career.

It does not apply to a lawyer or an industrialist, a man in political life, such as yourself, but it does apply, in my opinion, very directly to an individual with a commission in the Army, Navy, the Air Force, or the Marine Corps.

RETIRED OFFICERS ARE FREE AGENTS

There has come to be built up the feeling that when an officer retires he is a free agent, and that, I think, is more or less accepted. I have no comments on that. I never went into the various backs and forth concerned with it; but that is, I think, a common reaction that once a man is retired he is a free agent and can step out and say what he feels.

So long as he holds his post of military nature, he is not that same free agent that he otherwise would be.

I recall in the days of Mr. Wilson there was a considerable difficulty in connection with General Wood, who was quite a conspicuous character in the military service.

He was Governor of Cuba, Governor General in the Philippines, and a military leader. In that particular case General Wood was not relieved, but they subdivided the entire Eastern Department, which extended from Maine to Florida, into three pieces in order to locate him in Charleston or out of the country.

Then his career was very seriously interfered with thereafter, because he was a man of great military competence, in my opinion; and he was a great administrator, in my opinion; but he had virtually defied his Commander in Chief on what was the appropriate policy.

I didn't agree with the defiance; but, as a young officer, I was in agreement with the difference.

Mr. Wilson was considering the whole world; he was considering American public reactions, and finally came out with his proposal to Congress that we declare war.

General Wood was in effect denied service that he might have rendered in a large way in that war by virtue of, by reason of, these acts.

There have been other cases in our history very much along the same line. I suppose there will continue to be, but I think they are very poor examples of the Army, unless the man takes off the mantle of command and steps out and states his views.

SOLVING DIFFERENCES OF OPINION

Senator BRIDGES. Now, General, for a minute assuming in World War II, where you served with distinction as Chief of Staff of the United States Army, you had felt that a policy enunciated by the administration at that time was not in the best interests of the United States, you felt very strongly then about that, what would you have done?

Secretary MARSHALL. I would have done my best directed to the President to have it changed, and I might say I had some very difficult scenes with Mr. Roosevelt over certain phases of the matter, because naturally he had a great many irons in the fire and I only had one, which was the Army and the Air Corps; but I didn't make any public speeches.

I was frequently embarrassed here before the Congress and committees as to the questions, because I thought it was ruinous. I honestly thought it was ruinous for me to come out in opposition to my Commander in Chief.

I must find some other way to accomplish the end, and in most instances I was able to do so. In some I was not. Some, later, it seemed to me the President was right. Others I thought it was convincingly proved that I was right, but I had very difficult scenes in the early stages, particularly when we were building up our forces, but I had them with the President directly, and I was not a very cheerful visitor on many occasions. In the end, Mr. Roosevelt gave me his confidence, and we had no discussions and debates whatsoever.

Senator KNOWLAND. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if the Senator will yield as to an inquiry for procedure. I understand that we now have on the floor of the supplemental appropriation bill, which includes some important civil defense items, NPA, and other matters of some considerable moment. How long does the chairman expect to run along?

Chairman RUSSELL. I had planned to run along until about 12:30, Senator, but I am perfectly willing to recess at any time the majority of the committee wishes.

Senator KNOWLAND. I just wanted to raise the point because there are a good many members of the Appropriations Committee who are Senators here who will be interested in some of those items.

Chairman RUSSELL. I realized the appropriation bill was on the floor, and for that reason I decided not to have an afternoon session today. We can recess now or we can continue for a few moments and recess around 12:30. It is wholly immaterial to anybody on the committee.

Senator McMAHON. I'd like to finish, and I don't think it will take very long, with this present line of questioning.

I would like to see the Senator build up as to what the general might have done.

Senator BRIDGES. Now, my question to you, General, is:

Suppose the difference between you and the administration, the President, had become an absolute difference of opinion, where you thought the best interests of the country were not being served by the President or the administration?

What would you have done, then?

Secretary MARSHALL. I probably would have resigned as Chief of Staff.

Senator BRIDGES. And then, following your resignation, what would you have done?

Secretary MARSHALL. That would have depended on the effect of my resignation. That might be effective without any explanation; and, then again, I might have felt that the situation was so glaring that I must talk to the public.

CONDUCT OF ARMY OFFICERS

Senator BRIDGES. Well now, supposing that an Army officer saw his country just, for example, going into ruin? That is, what he thought was ruin, through communistic infiltration?

Do you consider it his duty to remain silent and say nothing?

Secretary MARSHALL. As to Communist infiltration?

Senator BRIDGES. Yes. It is perhaps a far-reaching case, but just assume that you had an administration where somebody with very pro-Communist views was in your position today, or some other very responsible position, and the Army officer held a very responsible command; or let's take General MacArthur, for example. Suppose he had assigned to him over there, as adviser, someone he knew to be pro-Communist in his outlook, in his approach. And then he protested, and no action was taken.

What should he do—just remain silent?

Secretary MARSHALL. Well, I think it would depend on all the circumstances.

For one thing, he might isolate the fellow so that he couldn't do anything; and he might say it was intolerable and, if they insisted that he should accept the man, he would have to relinquish the responsibility that was placed on him. He might be able to make his case in some other way.

Incidentally, I thought it would have been immensely profitable if General MacArthur, on his own motion, had responded to invitations to come over and talk to the President about a great many of these things, and come in touch with reactions which didn't reach him, except in a rather vague way, in Japan.

So, his recourse was to these statements, released through the press, and others, and of course we all know that what makes a good press may be very bad business, as to its news value.

Senator BRIDGES. The answer to my question on this Communist issue, assuming for a moment and supposing that isolating this person was not possible, then he should remain silent, or should he speak out, because he has taken his oath, and his first loyalty is to his country?

Secretary MARSHALL. Yes, but when you are talking about the country you are not necessarily talking about the public reactions of the day, or the week. It depends entirely on how serious the matter is.

I would say offhand that he could isolate the individual, if it was within his power, and could make it virtually impossible for the man to function, and he would probably find some other way to get rid of him; and, also, I think he could probably give expression to the facts—why he would not use the individual.

REMOVING COMMUNISTS FROM KEY POSITIONS

Senator BRIDGES. Could he do that publicly?

Secretary MARSHALL. Wait a minute, Senator.

I had some occasion out in China along that line, because there were those there who had very decided leanings toward this so-called agrarian communistic group; and many or some—and “many” might be a more accurate statement—were so embittered by the attitude toward the conduct of the Kuomintang government that they sort of automatically got themselves on the other side of the fence.

I ran into that at the start. I had one man removed within 3 days of my arrival there, and sent back to the United States.

I don't know whether he was a Communist or not, but I know the way he was talking was inimical to good government, and he ought to get out. His actions were in a direction other than what we were doing, and I moved him out without publicity at all, and he went back home. Others I discovered in a variety of ways; but to take one issue, one man, and whether we make a speech about that, and our duty to our country or not, you can't answer that “Yes” or “No.”

Senator BRIDGES. The time may come when that issue could conceivably come up in this country, whether or not a man commanding as Chief of Staff or a man commanding one of the great armies of this country, whether his loyalty was to his country first or whether it was to the administration in power; and I believe in civil control, as you do, but I mean there is a vast difference of judgment.

It could conceivably come to where a man might be very direct in having to take that position; could it not?

Secretary MARSHALL. It seems to me, Senator, you are refining this down to a sort of isolated situation.

I don't mean that an Army officer is an absolute mummy, in a sense that he can't speak; he hasn't any view, or when he gets to the card table he is absolutely mum, and things of that sort.

I think these factors—we are dealing with a Commander in Chief, a Supreme Commander, technically, and Commander in Chief of our military forces, and also, in effect, the Commander in Chief for the United Nations forces.

Now, that is a very important relationship. The letter you referred to was written to the former Speaker of the House of Representatives, a man of great political influence, and you have to take all the past things that have occurred here, political as well as military, and then against that background this is released to the public.

I don't think that was a correct action.

MARTIN'S LETTER FROM MAC ARTHUR

Senator BRIDGES. Now, General, this line—General MacArthur has testified here, and you have, too, that MacArthur didn't violate a single military order.

Secretary MARSHALL. That is correct.

Senator BRIDGES. So, we are talking about a directive——

Secretary MARSHALL. That is, a single directive as to military operations.

Senator BRIDGES. As to military operations. Now, we are talking about a directive as to whether a man in a responsible position has a right to express himself on a vital matter.

Now, don't you think, if the Martin letter was a factor in the firing of MacArthur, that MacArthur should have had an inquiry addressed him as to whether or not he knew it was going to the public?

He might have written that in what he supposed to be a confidential vein to a Congressman, to Congressman Martin; and Congressman Martin on his own initiative made that public. If so, General MacArthur shouldn't be blamed for the publication of such a letter.

Secretary MARSHALL. That was only one instance of a great many.

Senator BRIDGES. Would you tell us the name of the man you removed when you had been in China 3 days and sent home?

Secretary MARSHALL. I don't remember his name; didn't within 24 hours of his removal. He had done this, though, I found: He had taken the announced policy of the President, sent out there, and in its distribution through the various agencies this Government had in China had changed the terminology, changed the expressions of the President to create quite a different reaction; because he felt deeply on this thing, he did that.

Senator BRIDGES. Will you furnish the committee with the name of that man when you have a chance?

Secretary MARSHALL. I will try to find out who he was.

Senator BRIDGES. I have a lot of questions, but I won't take more time. I will pass on to the second round.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator George, do you desire to conduct your examination now?

Senator GEORGE. I am not going to ask a lot of questions, but I will ask the general some questions. I think it will take 15 or 20 or 25 minutes maybe, but if you are going to quit for the day——

Chairman RUSSELL. I am trying to ascertain the pleasure of the committee. You are next in order.

Chairman CONNALLY. I think we could run on for a half hour until 1 o'clock.

Senator GEORGE. I have no business on the floor, but a conference.

Senator FULBRIGHT. We ran until 1 yesterday.

Chairman RUSSELL. Suppose we proceed and see how far we get here.

Senator GEORGE. Is Senator Bridges finished?

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes.

UNITED STATES STRENGTH IN JUNE 1950

Senator GEORGE. General Marshall, you went in as Secretary of Defense in September. May I ask if there is in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, your Department, any estimate of the number of troops that would be required of us in Korea, after the decision or when the decision was made that we would go into Korea, to repel the invasion of southern Korea by the North Koreans?

Secretary MARSHALL. Senator, there are successive messages in response to General MacArthur's recommendations as to the number of

divisions they would have to have, and that would be increased if the situation changes.

Senator GEORGE. I meant at the time we decided to go in, General.

Secretary MARSHALL. I don't know about that, sir; I will have to look it up.

Senator GEORGE. If there is an estimate there of the troops that would be required, and if it meets with the pleasure of the chairman and the committee, I would be glad for you to direct me where I can get it.

Secretary MARSHALL. I will find out about that, sir.

Senator GEORGE. In your Department. Yes, sir.

Was there also an estimate furnished the President at the time of our ability to adequately support the troops that we were committing in Korea, both in manpower and matériel of war? Could you say whether that estimate was made? If so, I would be very glad if you could get that for us.

Secretary MARSHALL. I will endeavor to get that, Senator, but I may say, Senator, those questions might be answered very directly by the Chiefs of Staff, who have all the data and are cognizant of what exists and what does not.

Senator GEORGE. Yes. But, of course, I know that the estimate may have varied from time to time, but I am speaking now of the entry into Korea.

Secretary MARSHALL. You are talking about the initial estimates.

Senator GEORGE. What did you say?

Secretary MARSHALL. You are talking about the initial estimates.

Senator GEORGE. The initial estimates, yes, sir; and not only the number of troops then required, but an estimate of our ability and capacity to adequately support those troops by additional manpower and implements of war.

Secretary MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

COALITION IN CHINESE GOVERNMENT

Senator GEORGE. General, you referred to the time that you visited China. That was in 1945, was it not?

Secretary MARSHALL. I arrived in China a few days before Christmas, 1945; yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. You were there almost a year?

Secretary MARSHALL. I was there until the following January, a year later, January 1947, with the exception of a period, I think, of 5 weeks, in March and April of 1946.

Senator GEORGE. Now, General, did you not come back with a rather definite impression that in order to successfully organize or reorganize the Chinese Nationalist Government, it would be necessary to bring about a coalition of the Communists with the Nationalist group in power?

Secretary MARSHALL. Would you state the first part of your question again please, Senator?

Chairman RUSSELL. The reporter I think has it right there where he can read it back.

(The reporter read back the last question.)

Secretary MARSHALL. First, Senator, I will have to turn to the word "coalition." I went over, very hurriedly, of course, and in studying the various policy directives, public statements from this Government and the conditions over there, I came to the conclusion very early that two things had to happen.

One was that there should be a normal democratic form of government, that is with the minority as well as the majority actions and representations in whatever legislative group they had.

The use of the word "coalition" as relating to Cabinet coalition was another matter because I gradually reached the feeling that it was practically impossible for the Nationalist Government Cabinet appointees to work in any degree of harmony, as a matter of fact to work other than with great bitterness constantly of any other members of that Cabinet group that came from the Communist Party.

The temporizing proposal involved there by their own initiative, that is the Kuomintang Government, the Communist group and this minority party group was sort of an over-all council wherein the dominant party, the only party really that had any representation in the legislative assembly, was to have 40 members and all the other groups combined were to have 40, but its action could be vetoed by the Generalissimo, and that veto could only be overridden by a two-thirds vote, which meant that defections would have to be from his own group before he could be countered in his action by veto.

Now that was the only approach to a coalition, it seemed to me, that had any possibility of working. They would have a long way to go even legislatively because the bitternesses were so great, they were founded on so many years of contest and also the resistance of those that were members of the Government by a long period of years of exclusive authority had become great to the point it was seemingly almost impossible to cut their power. So when you speak of coalition, I would feel that you have to define between that and a two-party government and a three-party government, anyway members of the legislative assembly which represented other parties, which was not the case at the time I was there, because the ruling action in China at that time was the group, the top level group, which included military leaders, civil authorities, and others which actually made the laws themselves, and that was the equivalent under their particular form of a national committee here, the Generalissimo deriving his authority from being chairman of that national committee. That overrode everything else.

The great problem was how you could reduce these animosities, this complete distrust on both sides.

There was in between various minor groups, notably the Democratic League I believe they called it, which lined up with the Communists, and the Young China Party, a democratic scientific group I think you could call it, which didn't step to either side, and all of those minor groups represented a very small following, but the tops were intelligent men.

Now the problem, to go back to your word, is a coalition, and the actual situation was one where the bitternesses were so extreme that any normal coalition such as we conceive the word was an impractical proposition in my opinion.

CHINESE POLITICAL CONSULTATIVE CONFERENCE

However, in their own political consultative conference, their PCC as they called it, they themselves shortly after my arrival when their meeting was finally held, had created an organization in which all had agreed, there had been the signatures and the approval of the Generalissimo, to a procedure which involved a coalition cabinet, and that was one of the most serious factors in trying to reach any basis of action.

You were confronted with a force on one side of about 3 million, a military power, and a force on the other side of something between a million and a million and a half, of which about 400,000 were pretty well-trained troops in the way of organization.

Those were in the field against each other, and to set up a political agreement in the midst of that, of course, presented an extraordinarily difficult proposition.

They had decided themselves, that is the Generalissimo, with an open statement in 1937 and finally up to a meeting, meetings which started back in 1944 which Mr. Hurley participated in, and finally Mao Tse-tung himself participated in, that the matters should be settled by political negotiation to bring a cessation of the fighting.

They finally had this meeting and this PCC conference and came out with a form, with the structure of a government, and immediately the fight broke out as to the good faith of the parties in setting up the number of delegates to the proposed constitutional convention which was to have met on May 5, 1946.

I myself did not enter into the political phase of the matter. My job was first to create an armistice so there would be no active fighting during the period of the meetings, the political meetings, and later at the resolution of this PCC I was to act as an adviser in the integration and demobilization of the military forces, Communist and Government.

From that time onward it was a development of inability to produce any agreements between the two forces, political groups, the Communists and the Government which did not involve such extreme suspicions on both sides that a coalition cabinet to my mind was just out of the question. But they had involved themselves in that in their political convention. What I had understood from the start was, particularly as to the desire of the United States Government, was a two-party system.

Of course, there might be other parties, too, but their legislature would have included a minority group as well as a majority group. Therefore it would have been purely a majority group without any other representation.

Does that answer the question, Senator George?

Senator GEORGE. My recollection, General, when you came back, was that you stated to the committee that you had endeavored to bring about, perhaps "coalition" isn't exactly the right term, but to bring about some integration of the Communists and the anti-Communist groups, and I had the very definite impression that you had recognized the very great difficulties involved but that you came back with the view that the only hope of China, long-run view of it, was to bring about an integration of the Communists with the Nationalist force.

Secretary MARSHALL. Those were the instructions that I went to China with in the beginning.

Senator GEORGE. But on you those were more or less your directives, but I thought you came back with that view.

Secretary MARSHALL. When I came back I was hard put to find a long-view conclusion in the matter because of the failing structure of the Kuomintang and the determination, organization, and discipline of the Communist group and their undoubted advice and possible support that would occur later from the Soviet Government.

WILL MAC ARTHUR PLAN PROVOKE RUSSIAN INTERVENTION

Senator GEORGE. Let me ask you one or two questions more. As I understand your position, your view is that in Korea we have three choices. You spoke of the three choices, and the No. 1 choice was the recommendation as made to this committee by General MacArthur.

I would like to ask you this direct question: If you were assured that Soviet Russia would not come into the action in Korea, the war in Korea, would you be disposed to favor the recommendation made by General MacArthur in the hope that it might bring a speedy determination of the war in Korea?

If you will just let me elaborate for just one or two sentences.

The Red Chinese are already in; I feel there would be no dispute about that point. Whether they are in to the utmost of their capacity to wage war ultimately, they probably are in to the extent that they are presently able to wage war. They are already in, therefore. And if you were assured that the Soviet Russia forces would not be thrown into that war, would you be disposed to favor the recommendation of General MacArthur that we follow planes into Manchuria and bomb the military set-ups that were there being formed for troops and for attack purposes on our troops in Korea?

Secretary MARSHALL. Once the Chinese Communist troops had appeared in force in Manchuria, and if, from a hypothetical point of view, there was no danger whatever of a Soviet intervention, I would say that certainly the bombing you mention would start almost immediately.

Senator GEORGE. I apprehended that you would say that.

Secretary MARSHALL. I beg your pardon?

Senator GEORGE. I say I apprehended that you, as a great soldier, would conclude that, because it seems to me it would have to be concluded.

Now, then, General, that brings me to this question—

Secretary MARSHALL. Senator will you let me amplify a little here?

Senator GEORGE. Yes.

Secretary MARSHALL. When you say the Soviet would not intervene, I have to include in that the consideration of whether you are talking about a direct intervention, or, we will say, as to air power, furnishing these people all sorts of matériel and strength in other matters in connection with it. They can do so much sub rosa that can be very harmful. The question then is, Will it be so harmful as to make a less profitable procedure? But I would say, if you can say that we are certain and know beyond a doubt that the Soviet Government is not going to intervene, I think we would use our naval power, and we would use our air power very freely. The restric-

tions would be, I would say, not to use those powers, if avoidable, in a way that claimed a great many innocent victims and left a bitterness that we would be 50 years in overcoming. But I certainly would feel that once the Communist Chinese forces are in Korea in large measure, you would go after the communications, would go after their air installations, and we would do what we could along the cost of China to weaken their hand.

NEED FOR CALCULATED RISKS

Senator GEORGE. General, there is absolutely no finality in dealing with any international problems, as I think you will agree. I know you will recall when even your recommendations for European aid were advanced, that there were some people who were so timorous they felt that might involve us in war with Russia?

I never felt so, but there were others who did and who were better informed about conditions than I was.

Secretary MARSHALL. This was the possibility and yet against that there was the very decided probability, in my opinion, that Western Europe was going communistic.

Senator GEORGE. I agree that there was a responsibility—

Secretary MARSHALL. We either had to allow them to go communistic or do something.

Senator GEORGE. That was a possibility in the minds of a great many well-informed people. A lot of people in this country were skeptical about our direct assistance to Greece and Turkey.

We talk a lot about calculated risks. We took them. We regarded that as unavoidable. I think the decision was wise, including the very present effort to build up the North Atlantic Treaty group.

I am quite sure you will agree that we talked again with Greece about calculated risks. There was nothing absolutely sure about what the Russians or Communist reaction would be to our efforts in that regard.

So it seems to me that when you are dealing with this matter in Korea, you have to consider, of course, whether there is a risk of spreading the war, but it doesn't seem to me that we are required to be certain that to bomb the military set-ups as they are being organized across the boundary from our own troops, we have to know absolutely that Soviet Russia will not come in.

Secretary MARSHALL. You will never know absolutely, of course, Senator.

Senator GEORGE. You can't know.

Secretary MARSHALL. But I would like to expand a little bit on your development there of the idea that some things are unavoidable, I would say. If we don't do them, we lose definitely, and we know that. That would be the European recovery program.

Now to step up to another issue, we had to meet, there was the question of Greece. It was quite apparent to us that unless we did something, Greece would go wholly communistic and that meant probably Italy would and Turkey was then in a serious predicament.

In a sense we had no choice, but to let the thing go or try to save it.

Take the Berlin blockade. There were many that advocated that we breach the Russian set-up and go through their territory with an armed convoy.

We didn't do that. We took the airlift, which was expensive, complicated, and extreme, but we managed to get through without the break.

There was another way to do the thing and we did it that way; whereas, we might have put our trains on the road and shot back the Soviet obstruction and undoubtedly would have promoted a general conflict.

Now, when we come to Korea, you have a question of conducting the operation under the possibilities and we feel to a certain extent the probabilities.

[Deleted.]

Up to the present time what we think has happened to the troops from their air, their air bases and in Manchuria, has not had a significant effect.

We might easily be forced into action and are prepared to take that action, but it is avoidable up to the present time. It may not be avoidable beginning tomorrow, but it is avoidable at the present time, and we have to relate that to the opinion of many other countries, many other peoples that are involved in this same struggle.

Some things are avoidable and the others are almost an abject surrender.

RED CHINESE AIR ACTIVITY

Senator GEORGE. General, I want to ask you this: When the Red Chinese came in in force in late October, early November, I do not recall the exact time, was not that a very definite danger and almost actual disaster to our troops?

Secretary MARSHALL. It threatened to be.

Senator GEORGE. It threatened to be so.

Secretary MARSHALL. Threatened to be disastrous in its results.

Senator GEORGE. Now then, if the Red Chinese should get an air force themselves and come with air, would we be any more justified in going over the boundary line, in destroying their lines of communication, and in breaking up their military formations, than we would have been to have taken the same action after they came over in November in large forces?

Secretary MARSHALL. Senator George—

Senator GEORGE. I am assuming that the Red Chinese do it, not the Soviets; I am not speaking of someone else.

Secretary MARSHALL. I know.

[Deleted.]

Up to the present time, the reaction so far as our troops are concerned on the ground, has been that they have not suffered in a direct way and have not suffered seriously in a direct way, from the fact that these air bases exist in Manchuria, and that we have not bombed them out of commission.

There was a brief period there when this Communist movement into Korea was under way when their air activity threatened to be serious. Its most serious effect was not the destruction it did at that time, but it was having its decided effect on the morale of our aviators who could not strike back because of the immediate retirement of their fast planes behind the Yalu River.

But not material harm was being done to our Armies on the ground, none to our ships whatsoever, and to our stores and our commu-

nications; so we did not have a demanding action there where we had no choice in the matter. We may have no choice, as I say, tomorrow.

[Deleted.]

However, there has been a choice up to that moment—up to this moment—as to whether or not we engage in these other measures, and that choice has been very materially influenced by the large majority of our allies in the United Nations, and that is a very important factor.

Senator GEORGE. I do not question the importance of it. I am not so sure that it should be absolutely controlling on us when the lives of our own troops are at stake.

[Deleted.]

Senator GEORGE. Yes, sir; I understand.

COMBAT CASUALTIES IN KOREA

Now, I am getting to this, General, in the face of your very strong admonition that we should not do anything, and very properly, very proper admonition, to destroy the morale of our troops, that no one should do it.

I am not speaking only of General MacArthur, and I am not reciting it for the purpose of affecting the morale of our troops, I assure you; but nevertheless, we went into Korea, did we not, about the 27th of June 1950?

Secretary MARSHALL. I think about that date.

Senator GEORGE. About that date.

Secretary MARSHALL. The invasion was the 25th.

Senator GEORGE. And up to now our casualties are what, General?

Secretary MARSHALL. I think 10,000 killed.

Senator GEORGE. Are there not more than that, General?

Secretary MARSHALL. I beg pardon?

Senator GEORGE. More than that, is it not?

Secretary MARSHALL. No; I think it is 10,000 killed at the present time, and missing, and wounded 50,000.

Senator GEORGE. Missing and wounded 50,000?

Secretary MARSHALL. I think that is right.

Senator GEORGE. Well, I am speaking of combat casualties.

Secretary MARSHALL. That is what I am talking about, combat casualties.

Senator GEORGE. It includes prisoners of war, missing in action, and the wounded as well as the dead; I am assuming that General MacArthur's statement to us must have been in the neighborhood of being correct, when he said when he left Korea that our casualties had reached 65,000. I do not mean reported casualties, I mean casualties.

Secretary MARSHALL. Well, that would be a difference in what I have said of 5,000.

Senator GEORGE. Yes, sir.

Secretary MARSHALL. And I will have the figures as they are correctly up-to-date tomorrow morning.

Senator GEORGE. Whatever it is it is considerable.

Now, those casualties have been accumulated since June or the first of July, practically, of 1950.

Now, going on another 10 months, or any X months, certainly means that a continued build-up of casualties would result, in the American forces or the United Nations forces, would it not?

Secretary MARSHALL. Yes, sir; but—

Senator GEORGE. That is unavoidable, of course.

Secretary MARSHALL. May I finish the answer?

Senator GEORGE. Yes, sir.

Secretary MARSHALL. But if matters go on, as they have in the past 2 or 3 months, the percentage would not apply, because they are going on at a greatly reduced rate.

What occurred in July and August mounted up the casualties very high on account of missing, who are counted as casualties, and they were cut off here and there in very large numbers, and the casualties during the fall were heavy for us to endure.

The casualties fortunately, beginning in about the first of February, have been greatly reduced, and we have reasonable hope that they will continue at that greatly reduced rate. So, if you say since, from July to the present date, they have been sixty or sixty-five thousand, I do not think you would be justified in taking the same proportion.

Senator GEORGE. Well, that may be true, and I certainly hope it is.

Secretary MARSHALL. Well, that has a great bearing on what we endure, what we can undertake and what we can maintain.

Senator GEORGE. And at the same time they might be in greater proportion.

Secretary MARSHALL. That is always possible.

Senator GEORGE. That is always one of the military possibilities. When we speak about assuming risks that is involved.

Secretary MARSHALL. That is involved, but also the type of campaign is involved very decidedly.

Senator GEORGE. Type of campaign; yes, sir.

Secretary MARSHALL. And we are trying to conduct it on the basis of not paying.

FIELD COMMANDER'S RECOMMENDATIONS

Senator GEORGE. What I am trying to get at, General, is this: Without regard to the use of any of the generalissimo's troops down on Formosa, and wholly aside from the question of whether those troops are going to be used, the wraps are going to be taken off there and leave them free to infiltrate as they may on the mainland of China. As a matter of sound military strategy, of common sense, as a nonmilitary man, such as I am, if the commander in the field knows his troops are being cut down through a period, and if he believes that through the use of his air power he can prevent these build-ups across a boundary line, whether it is a river or imaginary line, and thereby interrupt their supplies, do you see that there is anything other that he can do except recommend that course of action? Can he do anything but insist upon it to his superior officers, if he believes that thereby he can terminate or certainly shorten the war?

Secretary MARSHALL. Well, that is a perfectly proper recommendation from any military commander.

LIKELIHOOD OF RUSSIAN INTERVENTION

Senator GEORGE. Yes.

Now, then, as to whether or not Soviet Russia would come in, do you not think it likely that if Soviet Russia is going to directly in-

tervene or indirectly intervene by furnishing planes and more implements of war, that she had already made that decision in any event?

Secretary MARSHALL. That has been the view of some of our officials. It is a question almost of guesswork.

And also there is this factor to be considered: A certain incident develops issues that go beyond the control of the Government, itself—becomes committed. An example of that is that the Soviets and the Japanese fought actions in Manchuria that involved, I think, three or four divisions. That was not even considered a war and was practically—I don't suppose it was reported to the people of either country, certainly not to the Soviet people at all.

Now, with us it is a little different. Even if it is a squad involved, the whole country takes issue with that matter, and the demand to do something becomes almost imperative. So that is some of the fear we have had in connection with this thing, this situation. And when it comes to just how the Soviets will act, that's guesswork.

IS SOVIET DECISION ALREADY MADE

Senator GEORGE. Of course, I agree it is entirely speculative, General. What I am trying to ask of you is this: If the probabilities, and strong probabilities, are that whatever decision Soviet Russia finally follows has already been made in Korea, is there not sound reason in saying that our Air Force should be used to prevent military build-ups aimed at our own troops across the northern boundary line of Korea?

Secretary MARSHALL. Senator, that is generally a hypothetical question, and there are——

Senator GEORGE. It is pretty real.

Secretary MARSHALL. I beg pardon?

Senator GEORGE. It is pretty real in Korea, if there are 65,000 dead, wounded and missing.

Secretary MARSHALL. I will say in regard to that, the casualties, the casualty list is just as tragic to those responsible for the operations——

Senator GEORGE. That is correct.

Secretary MARSHALL. As they are to anybody else, and when we have to see them every day and check them every day, that is the first question we ask. It is a very agonizing business.

But you are surrounding your question with factors that make it too hypothetical to get a concrete answer. I have said before, and I repeat again, [deleted] that we do not feel up to the present time that the action against the supply bases materially affects the campaign to a degree that makes it advisable to accept the hazards of what occurs next.

Now, as to basing our action on what we think is the Soviet procedure in the direction of their affairs, I don't think we can very well do that because it is speculative.

Senator GEORGE. I agree with you, General, but——

Secretary MARSHALL. It is what has been our critical complication from the very start.

Senator GEORGE. I agree with, and don't you also agree that nations have fallen in many wars in an unrealistic effort to walk around them?

Secretary MARSHALL. I imagine. I don't think offhand of the various occasions, but certainly they have occurred. But you could have

had a lack of realistic appreciation of what was happening in connection with our Berlin blockade before we got it established. Others thought we should go right in and smash our way through. We were not being realistic. That word was used in the criticism of what we were aiming to do. I think we were realistic, and I think we avoided a tragic consequence.

Senator GEORGE. I have no word of criticism to offer on that point.

Secretary MARSHALL. I am talking about the realistic approach, Senator.

Senator GEORGE. Yes.

Secretary MARSHALL. And you have referred to my being a soldier, which I was. But every reaction of a soldier is to hit back, counter immediately and destroy the enemy, all the enemy's possibilities for build-up of his strength and execution of his plans. But here is a case where we have a great many other factors we have to consider, and I think there are very important considerations.

WAGING DEFENSIVE WAR

Senator GEORGE. I grant you that, General. I am not overlooking or leaving out of mind the other factors, such as our allies, their viewpoints, and all the rest. But I am speaking of the Korean thing directly and almost only at this moment.

Would you not agree that it is pretty hard to win the purely defensive war in a narrow area like the Korean Peninsula, particularly if your enemy may immunize himself from your shot by merely going across the river and there rebuilding his forces?

Secretary MARSHALL. I would answer that reference to past history, by saying it is very difficult to win on a defensive basis. It is very reckless when you are understrength to plunge in on an aggressive offensive procedure. There have been some notable defensive campaigns in history which have ended in an offensive and decisive action.

I will say notably one was the peninsula campaign under Wellington. He endured for quite a period of time. His campaign was measured in years, largely, almost entirely for long periods on the defensive. Of course, Torres Vedras lines are famous in history. In the end he really played a leading part in the complete upset of the Napoleonic regime. He had to start on a defensive basis, he had no other choice. We have had to start on a defensive basis because we have really no other choice.

However, we are discussing one phase where we have a choice, which is the use of our air power and our naval power. And I think in regard to them I am just repeating myself time and again on the same issue.

Senator GEORGE. Yes; I understand. I don't care to occasion that, General.

I have no further questions, and I thank you very much.

Chairman RUSSELL. In view of the time, I assume we had best recess here now, and if there is no objection we will stand in recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.

(Whereupon, at 1.10 p. m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene at 10 a. m., Wednesday, May 9, 1951.)



MILITARY SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST

WEDNESDAY, MAY 9, 1951

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES AND THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
UNITED STATES SENATE,
Washington, D. C.

The committees met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in the Caucus Room, Senate Office Building, Senator Richard B. Russell (chairman, Committee on Armed Services), presiding.

Present: Senators Russell (chairman, Committee on Armed Services), Connally (chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations), Byrd, Johnson of Texas, Stennis, Long, Bridges, Saltonstall, Morse, Knowland, Cain, Flanders, George, Green, McMahon, Fulbright, Sparkman, Gillette, Wiley, Smith, Hickenlooper, Lodge, Tobey, and Brewster.

Also present: Mark H. Galusha and Verne D. Mudge, of the staff of the Armed Services Committee; Francis O. Wilcox, chief of staff; Thorsten V. Kalijarvi, staff associate; and C. C. O'Day, clerk, Committee on Foreign Relations.

Chairman RUSSELL. The committee is now in order.

We welcome here Senator Brewster, who, due to the action of the Democratic steering committee and the Republican conference, will today formally be assigned to a seat on the Foreign Relations Committee.

Senator, we are glad to take time by the forelock, and hereby invest you with all the rights, powers, and privileges and benefits and handicaps and disadvantages of being a member of this committee. I do not think it will serve any use and purpose today because I doubt if you will have a chance to ask questions; but you are clothed with all of the rights of a member of this joint committee.

Senator BREWSTER. I appreciate very much your courtesy, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. When the committee recessed on yesterday Senator George, I think, had about concluded his questions for the time being. He is not present now. So, Senator Wiley, under my system of switching from committee to committee, I will now pass to Senator Byrd.

I have been requested, Mr. Secretary, to ask if you are ready to furnish the name of the individual whom you told the committee about in China whom you had seen fit to relieve of his duties and return to the States.

TESTIMONY OF SECRETARY OF DEFENSE GEORGE C. MARSHALL,
ACCOMPANIED BY FELIX LARKIN, GENERAL COUNSEL—Re-
sumed

Secretary MARSHALL. I have not located the man yet. I might say then when I said I had seen fit to relieve him—I inquired about him and said we ought to get him out of there, and they reported to me he had been put on a boat and sent to the United States.

Chairman RUSSELL. You are still trying to find his name?

Secretary MARSHALL. Yes, sir, we are trying to spot the name.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Byrd.

Senator BYRD. I have quite a few questions to ask but I will defer most of them until General Bradley takes the witness stand. These questions relate for the most part to his responsibilities and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

SOVIET-CHINESE TREATY OF 1950

I would like to ask Secretary Marshall if he has any knowledge of this peace pact, defense pact, made between Red China and the Soviet—the mutual assistance pact.

Secretary MARSHALL. I just know they have the pact, and that has been a consideration in the possibility of Russian intervention, and the details of that, of course, the State Department can handle much better than I can.

The fact that the pact directly referred to the Japanese, possible intervention on the mainland of Asia, I know controlled the action of this government in not using any Japanese whatsoever in Korea. Beyond that, Senator, I think I will have to pass it up to the State Department.

Senator BYRD. Just one other observation. Have you furnished for the record a copy of the directive of December 6? I have not seen it.

Chairman RUSSELL. General, it appears on page 178 of the compilation of information which was prepared for this committee.

Senator BYRD. I just wanted to locate that.

Chairman RUSSELL. I think it could also be printed in the record, and I assume that it has been furnished to appear at the end of the day's proceedings for the permanent record as in the case of other documents that have been offered.

Senator WILEY. Have you got the committee print there?

Mr. LARKIN. Yes, sir.

Senator BYRD. I have no further questions.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Wiley?

Senator WILEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary—how are we supposed to address you now, as Secretary or General?

Secretary MARSHALL. I react more quickly to "General."

MARSHALL CONSULTATION WITH MAC ARTHUR ON CHINA POLICY

Senator WILEY. General, all right. To your knowledge, was General MacArthur, after he was appointed to take over Japan, ever consulted by you on your mission to China or by anybody else in the Government in the formation of our China policy?

Secretary MARSHALL. I have no recollection of discussing the matter with General MacArthur on my way out—no, I did not see him on my way out to China.

On my return to the United States for a temporary period in March 1946, I did see him, and I don't recall any discussion with him, specifically regarding the matter. I can't recall what else we talked about, but I was with him in his office for a considerable period, and at his house.

Senator WILEY. What I am getting at—

Secretary MARSHALL. I have no recollection of refraining from comment and I would assume that I made comment, but I have no—there was no formal consultation.

Senator WILEY. Then, your answer is that to your knowledge, this man of vast and long experience in the Philippines and the Far East, was not consulted by those in government who were planning the policy in the east, am I right?

Secretary MARSHALL. I couldn't answer that specifically, Senator, because I think there were consultations with individuals sent out by the State Department, but they can answer that directly.

Senator WILEY. All right.

When you saw him, what was your position in the Government?

Secretary MARSHALL. At the time just referred to I was special representative of the President to China, with the rank of Ambassador.

Senator WILEY. You had no directive from the President to consult then with him in relation to the matter we are now discussing?

Secretary MARSHALL. No, sir; I did not.

Senator WILEY. Now General, if you will take this exhibit, the committee print, and turn to page 184, you will find there a message from the Joint Chiefs of Staff under date of March 24, 1951, which reads as follows:

DIRECTIVES ON CLEARANCE OF PUBLIC STATEMENTS ON POLITICAL MATTERS

To: Commander in Chief, Far East, Tokyo, Japan

From: Joint Chiefs of Staff, personal for MacArthur.

The President has directed that your attention be called to his order as transmitted December 6, 1950. In view of the information given you March 20, 1951, any further statements by you must be co-ordinated as prescribed in the order of December 6.

The President has also directed that in the event Communist military leaders request an armistice in the field, you immediately report that fact to the JCS for instructions.

I call your attention particularly to March 24, the date of this message. Now at that time was there any objection to what MacArthur had previously said?

Secretary MARSHALL. The reason for the directive of December 6 which I referred to in my testimony on the first day specifically.

Senator WILEY. Yes, but I am asking you if at this date—

Secretary MARSHALL. March 20.

Senator WILEY. There was any particular objection to anything he had said or any statement he had made as of that date?

Secretary MARSHALL. Yes, sir. The reference there pertained to his public announcement for the Chinese Military Commander.

Senator WILEY. Of what date?

Secretary MARSHALL. I am just trying to get a date.

Senator WILEY. What I am getting at is whether at that time there had been any specific objection to any of his previous statements.

Secretary MARSHALL. I first said there was to his statements prior to December 6 which gave rise to the December 6 instruction. There was now in connection with this date that you have mentioned the issue by General MacArthur toward a meeting on the field with the Chinese Communist commander, and I am trying to get the date of that.

Chairman RUSSELL. You will find that on page 183 of the compilation.

Secretary MARSHALL. Page what?

Chairman RUSSELL. Page 183 of the compilation, the middle of the page.

Senator WILEY. Well, you will note, General, that that is the same date, so you certainly didn't have that objection in mind, or did you?

Secretary MARSHALL. I couldn't identify these headings. It related to his statement on March 24 to the Chinese military commander for a meeting in connection with a—where he states—

I stand ready at any time to confer in the field with the commander in chief of the enemy forces in an earnest effort to find any military means whereby the realization of the political objectives of the United Nations in Korea, to which no nation may justly take exception, may be accomplished without further bloodshed.

In that communication—

Senator WILEY. That is the same date as the message. You mean to say you had already gotten that statement—

Secretary MARSHALL. That message referred to that statement, whatever the dates are.

Senator WILEY. All right. You are telling according to your best recollections, that on March 24 this message to MacArthur had reference to the statement that MacArthur made on the same date—

Secretary MARSHALL. There is a difference there, sir, because you are getting west of the one-hundred and eightieth meridian.

Senator WILEY. Was there any consultation about any violation by any—

Secretary MARSHALL. I referred to that in my statement that there was a consultation between the Secretary of State and his assistants and Mr. Lovett and General Bradley and I don't remember who else. I think Mr. Harriman, and then a meeting with the President. And out of that came this direction to the Chiefs of Staff to send the message that you originally referred to.

WHAT DIRECTIVES VIOLATED

Senator WILEY. Well, now, let us again refer to this same message of March 24. You say there that "Your attention is called to the order transmitted the 6th of December."

All right. Now, as stated by the chairman, that order is found on page 178 of this committee reprint.

Now, if you will kindly turn to that order and tell me what clause in that order—is that in the record?

Chairman RUSSELL. I instructed that to be put in the record. We are not printing these orders along with this transcript, but they will

appear in the printed record of the hearings and they are identified where they can be found immediately by referring to this compilation that was prepared under my direction for the committee.

Senator WILEY. I understand, Mr. Chairman. I am asking the general to read and to tell me what clause was violated. This order is from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the commander in chief of the Far East and the first paragraph says:

The President as of the 5th of December forwarded a memo to all Cabinet members, to the Chairman of the NSRB, the Administrator ECA, Director CIA, Administrator ESA, and Director of Selective Service, which reads as follows.

Then there are a number of paragraphs. Now, please tell me what provision of the order of December 6 was violated, in your judgment, by this statement, that MacArthur made on March 24 and scattered by the millions over enemy troops.

Secretary MARSHALL (reading):

No speech, press release or other public statement concerning foreign policy should be released until it has received clearance from the Department of State.

No speech, press release or other statement concerning military policy should be released until it has received clearance from the Department of Defense.

That first paragraph that I read is directly involved in this matter, because of his public statement that has been referred to here, on March 24, he refers to the fact, he says:

These basic facts being established, there should be no insuperable difficulty in arriving at decisions on the Korean problem, if the issues are resolved on their own merits without being burdened by extraneous matters not directly related to Korea, such as Formosa and China's seat in the United Nations.

Senator WILEY. What date is that you are referring to?

Secretary MARSHALL. That is his statement on March 24, which caused the message of March 24, that is, in the United States, March 24, to be sent, which specifically directed him in the future that—

Senator KNOWLAND. Mr. Chairman, I wonder, for clarification, isn't there one day's difference in there, isn't March 24 here, the 23d in Korea?

Secretary MARSHALL. Or, vice versa.

Senator KNOWLAND. That way, one day earlier—there would have been one day earlier in Korea, it would have been.

In other words, the 25th of June, here, was the 24th of June in Korea, the day that the fighting broke out.

Senator WILEY. I think the fact is just what is demonstrated, but we can demonstrate that by someone who is an expert on it.

Secretary MARSHALL. Here, Senator, is an explanation, in the fine type at the top of that statement of General MacArthur's, on March 24, that was printed in the New York Times, and is dated, Tokyo, 25th of March.

Senator WILEY. I don't want to be confused.

THE DECEMBER 6 DIRECTIVE ON PUBLIC STATEMENTS

What you have just read out of the statement of December 6, 1950, follows directly under paragraph 1, where it says that the President forwarded it to all these other people.

Does it mention there that MacArthur, or his connection—

Secretary MARSHALL. It says:

This applies to officials in the field, as well as to those in Washington.

Actually, it was intended to do this, in this way: So as to not embarrass him with the public instruction on this particular occasion. It was generated because of these previous articles of a few days before, and in order not to put before the public this difference, the decision was made to make it a broadcast; but that, Senator, was added—to that was added:

This applies to officials in the field, as well as to those in Washington.

Senator WILEY. Well, December 6 does that—does it—the statement of December 6?

Secretary MARSHALL. That is the last sentence in paragraph 1.

STATEMENTS OF MAC ARTHUR SINCE DECEMBER 6, 1950

Senator WILEY. Now then, when MacArthur issued his statement of December 26, 1950, was there any objection to that? Was there any approval or disapproval sent him?

Secretary MARSHALL. In his statement which is reported—did you say March 25?

Senator WILEY. No, December 26; that was his first statement after the December 6 document.

Chairman RUSSELL. The bottom of page 178, following the order of December 6.

Secretary MARSHALL. And your question is, Was that referred here for clearance or was anything, any action, taken, actually taken in relation to it; is that your question?

Senator WILEY. That is right. Did you or anyone else in authority in Washington notify him that this statement was in violation of any order and of the December 6 statement? Did you approve it or disapprove it?

Secretary MARSHALL. I have no recollection of approving or disapproving, and I am reasonably certain there was no action to that extent.

Senator WILEY. All right.

Now, refer to the statement on page 181, the statement of MacArthur on February 13. Was that approved or disapproved by you or by anyone in authority in Washington?

Secretary MARSHALL. I know of no approval or disapproval.

Senator WILEY. All right. Now, the statement of MacArthur on March 7, 1951, was that approved or disapproved by anyone in authority, you or anyone else?

Secretary MARSHALL. I have no knowledge of approval or disapproval.

Senator WILEY. Well then, I call your attention to a message from the Joint Chiefs of Staff on March 20 on page 183.

Secretary MARSHALL. Yes; I have that.

Senator WILEY. All right.

You will notice that there is nothing in there that specifically approves or disapproves, criticizes the previous statements made by MacArthur after December 6. I am going to read it because it is very brief.

To: Commander in Chief, Far East, Tokyo, Japan.

From: Joint Chiefs of Staff.

State planning Presidential announcement shortly that, with clearing of bulk of South Korea of aggression, United Nations now prepared to discuss con-

ditions of settlement in Korea. Strong UN feeling persists that further diplomatic effort toward settlement should be made before any advance with major forces north of thirty-eighth parallel.

Now, you notice you say "strong UN feeling persists." Then continuing:

Time will be required to determine diplomatic reactions and permit new negotiations that may develop. Recognizing that parallel has no military significance, State has asked JCS what authority you should have to permit sufficient freedom of action for next few weeks to provide security for UN forces and maintain contact with enemy. Your recommendations desired.

What was the answer to that?

Secretary MARSHALL. I haven't the message here in my hand, but the reply from General MacArthur was to the effect that he had no request for additional authorities. But he did state that he wanted no further limitations imposed on the employment of his command.

Senator WILEY. Have you the answer in record form any place?

Secretary MARSHALL. You mean the actual message?

Senator WILEY. What?

Secretary MARSHALL. You mean the actual message?

Senator WILEY. Yes.

Secretary MARSHALL. From MacArthur?

Senator WILEY. Yes.

Secretary MARSHALL. He has got it right here.

Senator WILEY. Well, if it is brief, put it in the record.

Secretary MARSHALL. This is the message from General MacArthur in reply to that message you have just read from the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Recommend no further military restrictions be imposed upon the United States command—

that is—

the United Nations command in Korea.

Senator WILEY. Is this from the Chiefs of Staff to MacArthur?

Secretary MARSHALL. This is from MacArthur to the Chiefs of Staff in reply to the message you just read.

The inhibitions which already exist should not be increased. The military disadvantage arising from restrictions upon the scope of our air and naval operations, coupled with the disparity between the size of our command and the enemy ground potential, renders it completely impractical to attempt to clear North Korea, or to make any appreciable effort to that end.

That is his answer to the message you have just read.

Senator WILEY. All right. What is the date of it?

Secretary MARSHALL. The date of that is the 21st of March.

Senator WILEY. At that time was there any notice to MacArthur that he had violated any particular order or directive?

Secretary MARSHALL. None other than that of December 6.

Senator WILEY. Well, was there any notice in there that he had violated the December 6 directive?

Secretary MARSHALL. I said the only order that he had received from the Chiefs of Staff or the President, or otherwise, that I know of—

Senator WILEY. You did not understand my question. My question is this: Up to that date, now, was there any formal notice to MacArthur that he was guilty of violating any directive?

Secretary MARSHALL. None other than that would be drawn from the message of December 6.

Senator WILEY. Well, the message of December 6 that you are talking about is the message to MacArthur that, you claim, determined definitely the scope of his activity. Now I am asking you between December——

Secretary MARSHALL. That I claimed what, sir?

Senator WILEY. I am asking you between December 6, now, and March 21, was there any communication to him that any of these communications that he had made were in violation of the December 6 directive.

Secretary MARSHALL. I answered that, I think, twice, Senator, that I knew of none.

Senator WILEY. Thank you, thank you. All right.

THE MARTIN LETTER

Now, General, will you look at the letter to Mr. Martin, which is on page 185 and 186? Do you have it?

Secretary MARSHALL. I have it, sir.

Senator WILEY. Now that letter, you will notice was written on March 8.

Secretary MARSHALL. General MacArthur's letter was written on March 20, Mr. Martin's letter on March 8.

Senator WILEY. I beg your pardon, letter from Joseph Martin to General MacArthur was March 8. The letter from MacArthur to Joseph Martin, as you say, was March 20.

Now will you read the language in that letter that you claim was violative of any order or directive, because up to that time, as I understand your testimony, the general had received no notice that he had violated any previous order or directive. Will you read to me the language that violates?

Secretary MARSHALL (reading):

It seems strangely difficult for some to realize that here in Asia where the Communist conspirators have elected to make their play for global conquest, and that we have joined the issue thus raised on the battlefield; that here we fight Europe's war with arms which the diplomats there still fight it with words; that if we lose the war to communism in Asia the fall of Europe is inevitable, win it and Europe most probably would avoid war and yet preserve freedom. As you pointed out, we must win. There is no substitute for victory.

That is the leading paragraph in that letter which involves foreign policy, involved the reactions of all of our allies in Western Europe and involved our dealings with our allies, and the question of what voice spoke from this country in the matter of foreign policy.

ADEQUACY OF REASONS FOR REMOVAL

Senator WILEY. I think you have definitely stated the issue. I think the issue now before the bar of public opinion—and that is the only place it could be tried—is whether or not that paragraph justified the method and the act of removing——

Secretary MARSHALL. Oh, there were other passages all through this.

Senator WILEY. Removing General MacArthur?

Secretary MARSHALL. I don't think you can confine it to this one final letter involved in this matter.

Senator WILEY. General, until this letter was written, had the President ever called or been consulted with by you and your people as to the advisability of removing General MacArthur?

Secretary MARSHALL. There was a meeting—until this letter. I am quite certain there was no discussion to the effect that General MacArthur might be relieved in connection with the drafting of the order from the Chief Executive of December 6.

The matter came to a head with this letter we have just been reading. I might say, Senator, that every time there is an indication of a difference, an important difference or an important attitude, you do not necessarily call the individual to account. It is cumulative, and it was decidedly so in this particular instance.

Senator WILEY. I think the record should be clear on it. You say it is cumulative. You should give a bill of particulars and not just simply generalities like that. I see a similarity here between the situation in the Senate when a nomination comes up, to which a Senator says "He is obnoxious." If the Senator doesn't explain that generally kills the nomination.

When the Senator starts to explain, starts to give his reasons, then the Senate sees whether or not the reasons justify the act. Now we know there is no question about the legal authority or the power—

Secretary MARSHALL. There is no question about what?

Senator WILEY. We know there is no question about the legal authority or the power of the President, but we are called upon, as an investigative body to get out all the facts, and that is all I am trying to do here.

I am trying to put myself in the position of General MacArthur and also in the position of the President and you gentlemen who apparently initiated and consummated this job.

PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT ON DISMISSAL

We will carry on this examination. If you will refer to pages 188 and 189, which is the dismissal by the President, and the public statement by the President, in the dismissal he says among other things:

My reasons for your replacement will be made public concurrently with the delivery to you of the foregoing order and are contained in the following message.

That is dated April 10. Then in the statement he says:

With deep regret I have concluded—

this is to the press and to the public—

that General of the Army Douglas MacArthur is unable to give his wholehearted support to the policies of the United States Government and of the United Nations in matters pertaining to his official duties.

Who wrote that last paragraph, General?

Secretary MARSHALL. You mean what you are just reading?

Senator WILEY. The one I just read.

Secretary MARSHALL. You said last paragraph.

Senator WILEY. That is a statement to the public.

Secretary MARSHALL. I am trying to get the particular reference. Are you talking about the whole message?

Senator WILEY. I will re-read it. Who wrote this statement? The President states:

With deep regret I have concluded that General of the Army Douglas MacArthur is unable to give his wholehearted support to the policies of the United States Government and of the United Nations in matters pertaining to his official duties.

Secretary MARSHALL. That message was prepared partially in the Department of Defense, partially in the Department of State and partly, I believe, by the Chiefs of Staff.

POLICIES MAC ARTHUR COULD NOT SUPPORT

Senator WILEY. What does that language in your judgment mean?

Secretary MARSHALL. I think it is very specific. That he is unable to give his wholehearted support to the policies of the United States Government and of the United Nations in matters pertaining to his official duties.

Senator WILEY. What policy?

Secretary MARSHALL. You are referring, I presume, by that question that there is no definite policy in your mind.

Senator WILEY. You say first he can't support policies. I want to know what policies he can't support wholeheartedly and didn't support.

Secretary MARSHALL. The policies involved here related to the conduct of the operations in Korea, our relations with the United Nations in the responsibility of the Chief Executive of this country as the commander of those units, the resolutions of the United Nations in relation to the matters in Korea, over which General MacArthur was the United Nations commander.

Senator WILEY. All right. Those are generalities or conclusions.

Secretary MARSHALL. The resolutions were not generalities.

Senator WILEY. I am asking you specifically what policies. What policy did he not support, what policy could he not support?

I might say that in court I would move to strike that out as not a response, because it simply states a conclusion and not a fact.

Now, if you can state definitely the policies, then we will have the answer.

Secretary MARSHALL. In the first place, the policies were determined by the resolutions of the United Nations Security Council. The further development in connection with the orders from the Chief Executive acting for the United Nations—that is, the President—were based on the original resolutions and were based on the continual contact with the representatives of the nations who were involved in that fight and those pertained to the restrictions on bombing, those pertained to the blockade of the China coast, and those pertained to the use of the troops from Formosa of the Government of China.

Senator WILEY. Don't you mean that to what you have referred to as policies, he may have made counter-recommendations? There may have been disagreement. In your previous statement, however, you said he carried out every military policy. Do you mean that?

Secretary MARSHALL. He did not violate these restrictions. He carried out the military directives, which is quite a different thing from the discussion of the limitations, as they were related to our allies, all of our allies, in the conduct of that campaign.

Senator WILEY. Do you mean to say that a man in General MacArthur's position, who was the Chief of Staff when you were a colonel, had no right to discuss or advise or recommend to you leaders in Washington? Is that what you mean is a violation of policy?

Secretary MARSHALL. There was no limit whatever on his representations of his views to the officials in Washington. There is a great difference between that and the public announcements.

Senator WILEY. We must not get into any heated argument, but I have a right to ask you specifically what was meant by that language, and what policy he violated.

Secretary MARSHALL. Well, I have tried to define it.

Senator WILEY. Be specific. Let us see.

Secretary MARSHALL. I think I have been sufficiently specific.

Senator WILEY. You have been as specific as you can be?

SPECIFIC POLICIES ON WHICH DISAGREEMENT EXISTED

Secretary MARSHALL. I think I have been sufficiently specific. It starts with a resolution or resolutions of the United Nations Security Council; it goes on in the development of affairs in Korea, in relation to the representatives of the various nations concerned.

For example, I went into the details of our effort to introduce "hot pursuit" in the air. That was formally taken up with each of the 13 nations involved, and we received a negative vote. There was a phase of policy precisely which I have already covered, but we were in constant contact with them in relation to the various movements or actions that General MacArthur was proposing to us, the constituted authorities, meaning the Commander in Chief.

Senator WILEY. It seems to me what you have shown is that your associates on the United Nations did not want to follow the policy. You do not claim that there was any violation then by MacArthur, do you? He wanted, first, to bomb north of the Yalu, and he wanted to bomb these two sacred precincts that have been set aside. He wanted to blockade the coast, and so forth.

Now, someone said, "no," to his suggestions. Now, did he violate that "no"?

Secretary MARSHALL. By his public statements or statements that were made public in the ordinary press, he set up a very serious reaction among our allies, which threatened our collective action with them, and which threatened our position in the world in relation to this great crisis, and which threatened to leave us in a situation of going it alone.

Senator WILEY. Now, let us be specific about that. What did he say or do that caused these allies of ours to have so much power that they apparently determined what should be done? What did he say and do?

Secretary MARSHALL. You say that they apparently determined what should be done.

Senator WILEY. What is that?

Secretary MARSHALL. You say, referring to the allies, they apparently determined what should be done. I want to keep that phase of your question before us. They did not determine what should be done, but we had an issue with our allies before the world, when, in effect, this country, in connection with foreign policy, was speaking with two voices.

Now, what was to be the reaction to that, among those allies who were concerned with troops on the ground, who were desperately concerned as to the avoidance of a general war, which would have reached them far more quickly than it would have us so far as our homeland is concerned?

ADEQUACY OF REASONS FOR MAC ARTHUR REMOVAL

Senator WILEY. May I see if I understand that answer, General?

The answer is—that MacArthur, on the ground, 10,000 miles away, had a different idea as to how the battle should be carried on. He gave those different ideas to his superiors here in Washington, and they must have given them to the allies, and they disagreed with his ideas. Because they disagreed with MacArthur's ideas, you people came to the conclusion that he was violating a directive of some kind, which justified his removal?

Secretary MARSHALL. I'll say this, Senator: By his public statements he had created a feeling of great uneasiness among our allies, as to the consequent results from his proposals.

He was creating a feeling of uncertainty with our allies as to who was directing these affairs—that our Chief Executive, as the executive agent for those allies, or otherwise—when he proposed the utilization of the Chinese Nationalist troops from Formosa, he was setting up a very serious consideration, entirely remote from the quality of those troops, which is a matter that the Chiefs of Staff can talk to you more definitely in regard to than I can, because the employment of Chinese Nationalist troops in Korea set up a possible political consequence of great importance to those allies.

Senator WILEY. He didn't use them, sir.

Secretary MARSHALL. I beg pardon?

Senator WILEY. He didn't use them.

Secretary MARSHALL. He was proposing their use, sir.

Senator WILEY. Was that a sufficient crime to take a man of his position out of that job?

Secretary MARSHALL. When you create the feeling among your allies that you are on the verge of doing something which they feel is of great misfortune to them and a hazard to them, you are now involved in a question of policy, and the President of the United States by the Constitution is the only one who should interpret that.

Senator WILEY. I recognize the power, General. You, yourself, testified yesterday that you often had a strong disagreement with Roosevelt but you did not violate policy when it was decided.

Now, then, once you folks decided against MacArthur's suggestions of utilizing the Chinese, in bombing north of the Yalu, bombing Rashin, or whatever they call it, he did not violate that policy, did he?

Secretary MARSHALL. He did not violate the policy by military action, but he took issue with the policy before the world.

Senator WILEY. And that was his major sin?

Secretary MARSHALL. And created a situation where apparently we had two voices speaking for this country because he was the supreme commander of those troops of those various nations involved.

Senator WILEY. Yes. Now have you any documents in the nature of communications from our allies indicating what would prove the statement you just made?

Secretary MARSHALL. I will have to ask you to make that request of the State Department.

Senator WILEY. Well, I certainly request it, because I am very much interested in ascertaining, as I look through this record, just how the situation all at once exploded in our faces as it did.

Now, General—

Secretary MARSHALL. Senator, may I intervene with another comment regarding what you have just said?

Senator WILEY. Yes.

Secretary MARSHALL. As to our allies, they did not determine General MacArthur's relief. They gave no expression of that kind even remotely that I can recall pertaining to his relief. But as to them and the importance of our relations with them, I gave you the example of our failure to establish a basis with them for the hot pursuit.

[Deleted.]

ATTITUDE OF ALLIES TOWARD MAC ARTHUR

Senator WILEY. General, I am not going to discuss the merits or the demerits of MacArthur's proposition because I don't think that is the issue.

I say to you that the future alone may determine whether he was right or you people were right in limiting his authority. What I want to get from you now is this:

Supposing you had said to the Allies, "You gave us this command and we are going to keep MacArthur on the job," what would have happened?

Secretary MARSHALL. Well, I don't know whether you would call that a hypothetical question or not.

Senator WILEY. You are pretty good at any questions.

Secretary MARSHALL. Well, I don't think so. However, I would feel that we were jeopardizing our entire relationship on a collective security basis.

Senator WILEY. Then you mean that the pressure by the Allies was so severe because MacArthur had dared to say what he did say—and I want a bill of particulars—that if we had not listened, it would have jeopardized our relationship. You mean they would have pulled out?

Secretary MARSHALL. That would remain to be seen.

Senator WILEY. Did they call attention to any specific statement of MacArthur's that irritated them so?

Secretary MARSHALL. You will have to ask that of the State Department, sir.

Senator WILEY. What?

Secretary MARSHALL. You will have to ask that of the State Department who had received those. I can only give you second-hand, and I don't think that is advisable.

INTERPRETATION OF DECEMBER 6 DIRECTIVE

Senator WILEY. Now General, if you will refer to page 194 of this record, you will find a statement by Maj. Gen. Courtney Whitney on April 12 that gives the explanation apparently from MacArthur to

Whitney of his understanding of the directive of December 6. Will you take paragraph 2? I will read it:

Immediately after its receipt, General MacArthur submitted a proposed communiqué to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who informed him, among other things, that it was not necessary to submit communiqués referencing military operations.

Is that a fact?

Secretary MARSHALL. That is correct.

Senator WILEY. All right, now let's refer to 2:

The President, in a press conference in January, appeared to this headquarters to specifically define General MacArthur's authority, but denied that there was any curb on his authority "to speak freely on the Korean War."

Senator SMITH. Paragraph 3.

Senator WILEY. Paragraph 3; I beg your pardon. Did MacArthur do anything but speak freely on the Korean War?

Secretary MARSHALL. You have I think to read that in connection with the direction of the Chiefs of Staff to MacArthur who informed him among other things that it was not necessary to submit communiqués reference military operations.

I would assume, though I have not discussed this with the President, that his statement related to military operations and did not relate to the general policy of this Government.

Senator WILEY. All right; refer to 4:

Furthermore, the directive of December 6, by its terms and spirit, was interpreted at this headquarters as applying solely to formal public statements and not to communiqués, correspondence, or personal conversations with others.

Do you think that is a fair implication?

Secretary MARSHALL. I do not. There was in the second paragraph of the message of December 6 specifically said "this applies to officials in the field." Now, the only officials in the field we had were in Korea and in Japan.

Senator WILEY. All right; now 6:

The general has interpreted both his statement of March 24—

which I might say parenthetically we have already referred to, you and I—

and his letter to Congressman Joseph Martin, dispatched from here 4 days prior thereto, as dealing exclusively with the military situation and within the area of his uncontested authority to speak. The one bore no slightest relationship to the other.

What do you think of that?

Secretary MARSHALL. I think that is inconsistent with the statement that he made, because he refers directly to Formosa and China's seat in the United Nations.

Senator WILEY. What?

Secretary MARSHALL. I think that is inconsistent with the statement that General MacArthur made because he referred in that statement to both Formosa and China's seat in the United Nations.

MANNER OF DISMISSAL

Senator WILEY. You wouldn't say, would you, General, it was a customary procedure to dismiss a commander of General MacArthur's stature as abruptly as was done in this case?

Secretary MARSHALL. Well, I think when you say "stature," that is another matter, but as to commanders and senior commanders of armies, there have been other cases.

In this particular case, as I explained to the committee, it was arranged that a high official of the Government, the Secretary of the Army, should present the message of the President and the draft of his statement that he would make to the public at General MacArthur's embassy, which was his home, and at a specific hour in the morning before he went to his office, under those circumstances.

I also explained that what actually happened was that Secretary of the Army Pace, who was in Korea, never received that message, though we did not know it at the time, and that prior to that there came to the attention of the President, his advisers, a leak which they felt would disclose in advance the actions to be taken, and in those circumstances it was the decision of the President to carry out the relief immediately.

Senator WILEY. Is it customary to notify the press of the commander's dismissal before notifying the theater commander?

Secretary MARSHALL. I would say no, and I thought under these circumstances they had managed to avoid that.

Senator WILEY. The main criticism of General MacArthur, as I get it from your testimony, has been concerned with his actions as a theater commander.

REASON FOR RELIEF FROM ALL COMMANDS

Why was it considered necessary to relieve him of his other offices, notably that of the Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces in Japan?

Secretary MARSHALL. I think I stated previously in my testimony, Senator, that that was considered——

Senator WILEY. When and what dates?

Secretary MARSHALL. That was considered on several dates?

Senator WILEY. By whom?

Secretary MARSHALL. By meeting with the President between his special adviser, Ambassador Harriman, by the Secretary of State, by the Secretary of Defense, and by General Bradley, and the discussion——this was prior to the decision as to his relief——

Senator WILEY. How soon?

Secretary MARSHALL. And the discussion ran along the line of: Was it possible as a practical proposition to first retain General MacArthur in his capacity as Supreme Commander until a Japanese treaty could be effected? That was not felt to be a practical proposition.

Then the discussion took up the question of: Could it be arranged to retain General MacArthur in his Japanese control role particularly because of the matter of the Japanese treaty, and the opinion as to that was it was not a practical proposition, because General Ridgway not only would have an unusually hard task owing to the circumstances of his replacement of General MacArthur and his junior position, but he must use all of Japan as a base for his operations in Korea.

And, there would be a divided control, and no one could tell how that would work out.

Therefore, it was considered, in the interest of the campaign, that General Ridgway should not be put in such a complicated position.

I am stating that the matter was considered, and it was felt unwise.

Senator WILEY. Now, I asked you, was that after the Martin letter had come to the attention of—

Secretary MARSHALL. That is correct, sir.

DATES OF DISCUSSION OF MAC ARTHUR RELIEF

Senator WILEY. O. K.; and how soon before the 1 o'clock session that we all heard about did that take place? This other discussion?

Secretary MARSHALL. I think that was first discussed, as nearly as I can recall, on Saturday morning, following—that would be—

Mr. LARKIN. Wouldn't it be about—

Secretary MARSHALL. It isn't "about," it is one date.

Saturday morning, following the first discussion with the President on Friday, which began this group discussion with him.

Senator WILEY. I wonder if we could have the dates, so that we could get the chronology of this?

Secretary MARSHALL. I have got it here.

On Friday, April 6, there was a first meeting with the President; and those in attendance were the same that I named: Ambassador Harriman, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and General Bradley, on Friday, April the 6th.

Senator WILEY. Were there minutes kept of that meeting?

Secretary MARSHALL. No, sir. I know of no minutes. There was no secretary in the room, nobody but the President and ourselves.

Senator WILEY. Was it there agreed upon, at that meeting, that MacArthur would have to go?

Secretary MARSHALL. MacArthur would—what?

Senator WILEY. Would have to go.

Secretary MARSHALL. No, sir; there was no such agreement; and as I have already explained, there was this preliminary discussion, and the President directed us to gather the facts and data and bring it to his attention on the following morning, Saturday, April 7.

There was then a discussion on April 7, and I think, there, at that discussion, arose the discussion as to whether it was possible, whether it was a desirable procedure to attempt to find a method of keeping General MacArthur in command until the conclusion of the Japanese treaty.

Then, I think, on that same Saturday morning, there was a discussion of whether or not it would be wise to continue him in command in Japan, while passing over the military leadership to General Ridgway.

That, for the reasons I have just stated, was not found advisable as a course of action.

At that meeting the President directed that we think over the matter over the weekend, and meanwhile, I was to obtain the views of the Chiefs of Staff as the purely military aspects of the matter. Those were obtained on Sunday afternoon, and we met on Monday morning.

There the discussion was renewed, and General Bradley presented the reactions of the Chiefs of Staff, and the President then took his decision.

Senator WILEY. May I ask you to name the Chiefs of Staff, the personnel?

Secretary MARSHALL. General Vandenberg, General Collins, and Admiral Sherman and, of course, General Bradley, as the Chairman.

Senator WILEY. Their reaction was that he had to go?

Secretary MARSHALL. The reaction that he should be relieved was unanimous, but I prefer that you ask General Bradley specifically as to their reasons.

Senator WILEY. All right.

Now, in this meeting on the 9th—

DATE DECISION WAS MADE TO RELIEVE MAC ARTHUR

Secretary MARSHALL. That is on Monday, is it not, the 9th—that the decision was taken.

Then, there was not another meeting until Tuesday, the 10th, at 3 o'clock, and at that meeting the President considered the various drafts of his communication to General MacArthur, his announcement to the press, my instructions to General Ridgway, as to taking over command.

There were some minor alterations, and those were accepted by the President; then also the instructions to the Secretary of the Army, Mr. Pace, who was then in Korea.

Then, that meeting broke up after about an hour, I presume, 4 o'clock, maybe longer, and the matter then passed into the hands of the White House as to the arrangements for any background or particular release to the press other than the documents I have referred to, and it was during that procedure that this matter of a threatened leak came to our attention, and it was in the interval between that and the preparation of whatever press release was going to be made that involved the action, including the neostyling, up to midnight; I was not in that, so I am just telling you that as it was told me.

Senator WILEY. All right. General, who initiated that first meeting?

Secretary MARSHALL. The first meeting was initiated by the President.

REASONS FOR DISMISSAL

Senator WILEY. Now, as I remember your testimony already, you said that MacArthur did not, in spirit or in letter fail to carry out any military instructions issued to him as the far eastern commander, nor did he violate any military order.

Secretary MARSHALL. That is correct.

Senator WILEY. All right. And I repeat, that in your testimony of May 7 you said,

What is new, what has brought about the need for MacArthur's removal is the wholly unprecedented situation of a local theater commander publicly expressing his displeasure at and his disagreement with the foreign and military policies of the United States.

You agree that is the fact?

Secretary MARSHALL. I stated that.

Senator WILEY. Yes. All right.

SIMULTANEOUS NOTIFICATION OF MAC ARTHUR AND RIDGWAY

The dismissal directing General MacArthur's removal was to take effect immediately upon receipt. Now some time elapsed before General Ridgway was notified of his appointment. Did anyone

think that during this time a contingency might have happened that might have affected the security of the United States troops and the security of the United States, so that it might have been jeopardized?

Secretary MARSHALL. Very careful arrangements were made for the simultaneous notification of General Ridgway with that of General MacArthur. Specifically, the Secretary of the Army, Mr. Pace, was directed, he being in Korea, to arrange to have delivered to General Ridgway at the same time that he made an appointment to deliver the basic communication to General MacArthur, the fact of this relief and the message for his appointment.

General Hull, who is on the General Staff in the Army Department, was to be left in Korea by Mr. Pace, and with the time of Mr. Pace's meeting with General MacArthur, so that the two services would occur simultaneously. Now, so far as I know, the release and the notification of General Ridgway were approximately simultaneous; though, as I have referred to before, the message to Mr. Pace, which went through Pusan, failed to reach him because of a power failure in the radio set-up there.

POSSIBLE LOSS OF INDEPENDENCE OF ACTION

Senator WILEY. It has been charged that the American troops in Korea are subject to the control of the United Nations and of our partners in Korea, in which control we lost independence of military action in a war involving 350,000 of our men, which has resulted to date in over 65,000 casualties.

Would you comment on that statement?

Secretary MARSHALL. Will you read it again, please, Senator?

Senator WILEY. The gist of it is that with our arrangements and allies we have lost our independence of command over our own 350,000 troops.

Secretary MARSHALL. I am sorry; I was looking down at this paper when you started the sentence there and I missed it again.

Senator WILEY. All right, I will read it over again, General.

It has been charged that the American troops in Korea are subject to the control of the United Nations and of our partners in Korea, in which control we have lost independence of military action in a war involving 350,000 of our men, which has resulted to date in 65,000 of our own casualties.

Do you want to comment on that statement?

Secretary MARSHALL. Well, I think the figures as to our men are approximately accurate. The figures that I have here are 62,799 and you said 65,000, which included, according to these figures here, 9,600 dead, and some 42,000 wounded. So that is a reasonably accurate statement in relation to these figures that you have just made.

Now the total casualties I understood you to say were three hundred and some thousand.

Senator WILEY. That is not the point. The point is by virtue of this arrangement we have virtually lost control of our own men. That is what I want to know. Our men amounted to 350,000, our own men in the field.

Secretary MARSHALL. I would say that the casualties suffered by our troops on the ground—

Senator WILEY. It is not casualties——

Secretary MARSHALL. Will you allow me to finish, Senator?

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes, let's proceed in order. The witness will not interrupt the questioner and the questioner will not interrupt the witness.

Secretary MARSHALL. Beg pardon?

Chairman RUSSELL. I was merely observing that we would get along better if there was no interruption on the part of anyone.

Secretary MARSHALL. I guess I am guilty of a couple of interruptions here, too.

Chairman RUSSELL. That the witness should wait until the questioner had completed the question and the questioner wait until the witness completed his answer.

All right.

Senator WILEY. May I say, Mr. Chairman, that I do not want to interrupt. But I thought the General did not understand my question. I tried to make the point that it isn't a question of the number of casualties; it is a question of whether or not we, the American Government, have lost control of the 350,000 soldiers we have got in the field over there by virtue of our alliance with our allies. That is the question—control, not casualties. We have had evidence on casualties.

Secretary MARSHALL. I would say we have not any more than we lost control of our troops in Europe though it was an American allied commander, just as in this case it is an American allied commander.

What I was leading on to say in relation to the casualty figure which has been introduced with this question is that the numbers of the casualties, I think, are very slightly affected, maybe not at all—but very slightly affected by the restrictions that have been imposed partly because of the feeling of our allies and partly because of our own feelings that to act otherwise in those limitations under the general conditions would possibly result in a very much larger casualty list.

CONTRIBUTIONS OF OUR ALLIES IN KOREA

Senator WILEY. General, do you have any figures showing what the contribution of the other United Nations partners has been to date in the Korean affair?

Secretary MARSHALL. Yes, sir; we have that here. [Deleted.] I am sorry, I read one as of an October date, so please strike out that. I have got them on different dates.

I think it is in reply to a question made by Senator Knowland. I am sorry; I got into the wrong sheet.

Senator WILEY. If that is already in the record, give me the total.

Secretary MARSHALL. At the present time, as of April 30——

[Deleted.]

Senator WILEY. And what is our forces there, Army, Air, and Navy?

Secretary MARSHALL. Sorry to delay you here, but I have to get the right paper. I will have to get you the figure. We can't find it here right now.

Senator WILEY. Well, I use the figure 350,000 that was given to me before. Do you think that is approximately right?

Secretary MARSHALL. I don't know, sir. I know it more in terms of divisions and tank units.

Senator WILEY. These figures that you gave us now are the total contributions made by our allies?

Secretary MARSHALL. That is the present status of those contributions and does not include the men that have been evacuated as casualties.

Senator WILEY. I have a note saying that this is 3,000 less than the allies had contributed in June of 1950.

Senator KNOWLAND. Three thousand less than the Republic of China offered in June of 1950.

Secretary MARSHALL. That was 36,000.

Senator KNOWLAND. Thirty-three thousand.

Secretary MARSHALL. Thirty-three thousand.

Senator WILEY. Well, what I am getting at is, could it not be said in the light of these figures that we are already going it alone?

Secretary MARSHALL. I do not think so, sir. I haven't mentioned their ships, carriers, matters of that course, and also airplanes.

Senator WILEY. Are they included in the numbers?

Secretary MARSHALL. As to personnel, but there is a large difference there as to the numbers when it is reflected in terms of a cruiser or reflected in terms of a carrier as compared to a company of infantry, we will say, or a battalion of infantry.

Senator WILEY. There was some statement that at the time of the withdrawal from the Yalu, that one of our allies refused to order their troops to fight at the Chosin Reservoir, is that correct?

Secretary MARSHALL. Will you please read the question?

(The reporter read back the last question.)

MATÉRIEL CONTRIBUTION OF OUR ALLIES AND OURSELVES

Secretary MARSHALL. I have never heard of that. I have here the matériel data if you wish to add that to my statement as to the individual contribution of the Allies as to people.

Senator WILEY. I think it would be worth while, if it is not too long. [Deleted.]

Senator WILEY. Do you know how much the war has cost us, in dollars and cents, to date?

Secretary MARSHALL. I would have to have that calculated for you.

Senator WILEY. Are we providing all of the ammunition, the food, guns, and so forth?

Secretary MARSHALL. I don't think we are, sir; but the Chiefs of Staff can give you that very accurately.

Senator WILEY. All right, sir.

ALLIED SUPPORT FOR AN ECONOMIC BLOCKADE OF CHINA

Now General, the Colonial Office has announced that 120,000 tons of natural rubber were sold from British controlled Malaya to Red China, in the 9 months ending May 1, 1951. This is only one of many such transactions.

What effort has the United States made to bring about an end to this traffic, so far as your knowledge is concerned, and with what success?

Secretary MARSHALL. I stated yesterday, that the complete economic blockade—that we were making—and there was an effort to obtain

a United Nations cooperation with that; and that on May 7, 2 days ago, the United Kingdom and France indicated they were now prepared to support a resolution introduced by the United States, for an international embargo against Communist China.

Chairman CONNALLY. You meant the United Kingdom and France.

Secretary MARSHALL. The United Kingdom and France indicated they are now prepared to support a resolution, introduced by us, for an international embargo against Communist China.

The support of the United Kingdom and France practically assures the adoption of the United States proposal. The imposition of such an international embargo would, of course, make the question of any such blockade of less importance.

Actually, the movement of such critical items through Hong Kong into China has been a matter of serious concern.

I say, it was recently exposed and debated in the British Parliament.

Senator WILEY. Of course, General, we see here an evidence of one of the recommendations of General MacArthur coming about rather belatedly.

He wanted to blockade the coast and stop all this stuff from going in months ago. Now they are ready to inaugurate an international embargo. I think it must be acknowledged it will have little effect, so far as the Russian ports are concerned. Whether or not it would be effective in Hong Kong is another thing.

But, slowly, it seems that the hands of the clock are turning around to some of these four recommendations that he made; including bombing, not excluding as you have got it now, points north of the Yalu River, but bombing the Chinese Communists outright, as nests of rats that have caused casualties to our forces.

Now, with your vast experience with this sort of problem, in two world wars, you must realize the dilemma confronting a theater commander in such a situation.

MARSHALL'S COURSE OF ACTION IN MAC ARTHUR'S POSITION

What would you have done, if you had been General MacArthur; what would you have done that he didn't do, or what would you not have done, that he did do?

Secretary MARSHALL. Well, that question, to use an expression I used the other day, pretty nearly covers the entire water front, and it is a hypothetical question.

I was not sitting in his chair, not under the pressures that he was, and my reply to that would have to be from the abstract, rather than from the concrete.

Senator WILEY. Mr. Chairman, I don't want to interrupt the witness, but I am calling now for specific, concrete facts that I called for before.

Chairman RUSSELL. I think we will make better progress if we let the witness answer in his own way, just as the questioner is permitted to propound his questions in his own way.

Secretary MARSHALL. I think there is a Supreme Court ruling on the hypothetical and the problematical question.

However, I am willing to go ahead with my reply.

I would think, in the main, as I say, speaking from the abstract, rather than his concrete situation, that my struggle would have been with the Government, direct with the Government rather than with the public—the spread of the discussion so that it would reach the whole allied world.

Whether or not I would have reached the situation where I felt that the interests of my country demanded that I step from my responsibility and take the problem to the country is a problematical procedure. But in my own experience, I have had occasions where I had to think very carefully as to whether I should take up an issue which really would mean an apposition to the Government policy and which would necessitate, I felt, my own retirement.

I said in the record the other day that my own reaction was that it would be highly destructive as to the team, and therefore, not in the interests of the country.

There are minor cases where I never got on the point of thinking about retirement in order to clear my hand to speak more frankly, but in each instance, when I was pressing hard for something, and I was not getting it, I had to consider primarily the interests of the team which I thought were the primary interests of the country.

Now, as I say, I have to deal with this in the abstract; it is a hypothetical question, and I think that my answer is about the best that I could make under those conditions.

PERSHING AND PANCHO VILLA IN 1916 AS COMPARED TO SITUATION OF MAC ARTHUR

I have seen other difficulties of commanders and how they have handled them. I referred to one in relation to General Pershing yesterday or the day before, which I think is a very excellent example, in that he was deprived by a Government policy, which related to foreign relations, from even using the railroad to support his penetration of Mexico. That was almost unheard of for a commander, you might say, that he could not use the river or could not use the railroad—in this case it was a railroad—and that Mr. Wilson's reaction in the international complications as to our relationship with Mexico. Could this be an isolated operation toward Villa or would it be a war with Mexico?

There he accepted that, and it imposed the most difficult situation because we had no motor transport organization at that time, and there were very few roads.

That was certainly a limitation directly on his campaign. He did not appeal to the public, and when his whole expedition was canceled, as it were, and he was ordered to withdraw just as he thought he was going to accomplish his capture of Villa, he did not even inform his staff of the order of that withdrawal; he directed it, and it was carried out.

Now, there is one exhibition of a commander in the field being even denied his line of communications, and we know exactly what happened.

He had other difficulties in Europe, but it never went to the public. He was involved in allied affairs that never went to the public. He was concerned there with the reactions of this Government in the way of foreign policy, there is nothing new to that.

The important aspect of the matter is there can be only one voice, there can only be one voice, constitutional and otherwise, it seems to me, in the decisions as to foreign policy at the time they are given out.

I don't mean by that that you don't debate them up here, because you come to the Foreign Relations and Foreign Affairs Committees; but you cannot have two voices.

VOICE OF OTHER NATIONS IN MAC ARTHUR REMOVAL

Senator WILEY. Well, has the British Government or any other of the nations partners in Korea had a voice in removing MacArthur?

Secretary MARSHALL. They did not. They were not advised, there was no suggestion that I know of, there was nothing of that sort whatever that I know of.

I know this: That in this matter I have mentioned the people that the President called in. I understand that he spoke to a few, maybe three or four, outside of Army, Defense Department, outside of the State Department.

I am not at liberty to say who they were, and I don't know but one specifically—two specifically—but outside of that, I don't know of anybody drawn into this discussion at the time, and certainly there was no influence that I know of other than the abstract way from discussions in the press of things abroad.

Senator WILEY. In the various discussions was there anyone that raised the voice in favor of General MacArthur?

Secretary MARSHALL. I do not feel at liberty to discuss that aspect of these meetings with the President. It was a confidential relationship, and I would make no comment on that.

Senator WILEY. Who was the chief prosecutor?

Secretary MARSHALL. I will make no comment on that, sir.

Senator WILEY. It has been alleged that the decisions of the President, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other high-ranking American officials, defense officials, have been vetoed in secret by other governments. You say that isn't true.

Secretary MARSHALL. I would say that that is not true except as specifically stated, where the Chiefs of Staff brought forward a plan authorizing hot pursuit, and that was disapproved by other governments refusing to concur.

[Deleted.]

MAC ARTHUR INFORMATION FROM WASHINGTON

Senator WILEY. Was General MacArthur fully informed about everything which affected his command? In other words, for example was he informed on any friction that might have existed between the United States and its allies?

Secretary MARSHALL. He was notified of the extremely delicate situation regarding a great many of these points.

Senator WILEY. You mean notified by the communiques we have referred to in the cross examination here? Any other way?

Secretary MARSHALL. By cables from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or radios, and also by the President himself in a rather lengthy message in one case that I recall specifically.

Senator WILEY. Can we have copies of those?

Secretary MARSHALL. All of them?

Senator WILEY. The ones that you think are material.

Secretary MARSHALL. I understand that practically all of them are paraphrased in the papers of the Joint Chiefs which have been submitted here to the committee.

FORMOSA AND COMMUNIST CHINA AND UN CEASE-FIRE PROPOSAL

Senator WILEY. United States policy at least at the present opposes the seating of representatives of Communist China in the United Nations and turning Formosa over to Communist China. Yet if these were basic principles, why were we ready to negotiate them under the proposed cease-fire arrangements of the 13 nations cease-fire proposal? Incidentally, was General MacArthur kept informed of these developments?

Secretary MARSHALL. He was kept informed of those developments because I recall that terms were sent out to him for his comment.

However, the draft of the proposed armistice terms excludes any consideration of the Formosa question, and not any discussion, excludes the Formosa question and the seating of the Chinese Communists in the armistice terms.

The discussion of those two factors is a matter we don't control because you always have that in the United Nations and you can't avoid it.

The problem with us is how we handle it under our own terms, which are that Formosa must not be permitted to fall under the control of a Communist government or of a government that is dominated by the Soviet Government, nor must we be involved, must we permit, if it is possible for us to avoid it, an action which permits a nation to shoot its way into the United Nations regime.

MAC ARTHUR'S MARCH 24 STATEMENT

Senator WILEY. I think you have already stated that you felt that MacArthur's statement in relation to a suggested armistice which is found on page 183, was in violation of what you thought was his authority as a military commander.

Secretary MARSHALL. The first half of the question, read it, please. (The reporter read back the last question.)

Secretary MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator WILEY. Now will you turn to that statement and show me where—on page 183. That is one specific item probably we may get.

Secretary MARSHALL. I read, as I recall, from this communication this paragraph:

These basic facts being established, there should be no insuperable difficulty arriving at decisions on the Korean problem if the issues are resolved on their own merits without being burdened by extraneous matters not directly related to Korea, such as Formosa and China's seat in the United Nations.

There are other parts involved with that when he is talking of military weaknesses.

Even under inhibitions which now restrict activity of the United Nations and the corresponding military advantages which accrue to Red China, it has been shown its complete inability to accomplish by force of arms the conquest of Korea.

The enemy therefore must by now be painfully aware that a decision of the United Nations to depart from its tolerant effort to contain the war to the area of Korea through expansion of our military operations to his coastal areas and interior bases would doom Red China to the risk of imminent military collapse.

That involves reactions of our allies as to that phase of the matter. It involves, therefore, foreign policy. And the first paragraph I read is a more direct one, relating to membership in the United Nations and Formosa.

EFFECT OF MAC ARTHUR'S MARCH 24 OFFER ON UN NEGOTIATIONS

Senator WILEY. Now, then, you do not think that as a military commander that he had any authority in relation to seeking an armistice or a cease fire situation with the enemy?

Secretary MARSHALL. I think under the instructions that he had received, that the President was in the midst of preparing for such a negotiatory effort and was clearing that with the nations involved with us in the fighting in Korea, that it should have been evident to him that that would very seriously complicate, if not terminate at that time, that particular effort by the executive agent of the United Nations.

Actually what happened was this matter had been cleared through most of the nations involved.

Senator WILEY. What matter?

Secretary MARSHALL. Of the question of the President's negotiatory effort to bring about a termination of the fighting in Korea, and General MacArthur had been notified that that was in process.

Following that notification, very shortly thereafter, he came out with this announcement which we have just been discussing, and which I just read portions of. The result of that was that the agreement that was just about reached for the President to come forward, as the executive agent of the United Nations, with an effort which it is thought had a possible chance of terminating the fighting—that was dropped because we had spoken again with two voices—General MacArthur's out in the theater and the President about to speak and in consultation with the other nations involved. It terminated immediately their reaction to what we were doing. As one characterized it—that particular move had now become an academic matter.

Senator WILEY. Mr. Chairman, I do not want to take a great deal more of the time of the committee. I have felt this matter very seriously, but I repeat that the statement just made by the general is a conclusion. Some witness should take that statement and get the facts.

I want to say definitely that in the message of March 20, which is the one he talks about, and found on page 183, the President does not tell him not to negotiate, does not tell him to stop. There is the very assignment that we are talking about.

I think it is very important, because to me it is getting more and more a question of sensibility—stepping on somebody's toes 10,000 miles away, which is not like stepping on somebody's toes at home. So I am going to leave that for somebody else to develop because to me that is very significant.

I will go on with a few prepared questions that I have.

WAYS OF ENDING THE CONFLICT

General, how do you visualize the Korean conflict will be terminated?

Secretary MARSHALL. If it goes on in the manner that it has for the last 2 months, and particularly in the last 2 weeks, it would appear that the trained fabric of the Chinese Communist forces will be pretty well torn to pieces.

They must have—I know they must have—a decided limit in the development of trained troops and trained armies no matter how great their population or, we will say, the availability of manpower.

We have apparently been encountering their best troops, and this most recent encounter has involved tremendous casualties for them.

[Deleted.]

Now, the question is how long can they bring forth trained forces sufficient to present a very serious situation to us in Korea. How long under the conditions that have been developing during the last 2 months will they go along before they find it necessary in some way to reach an agreement? Those are matters that no one can foretell.

I would assume, and the Chiefs of Staff can give you much more detail as regards this than I can, that their situation is assuming very serious proportions, and it is not merely a question of a horde of manpower. That overwhelming force was confronting us when they first appeared in Korea, and General MacArthur had the battle to fight against this tremendously outnumbered United Nations forces.

The situation now has resolved itself into one where the Communist powers are being steadily limited by the extremely heavy losses they are suffering.

Whether or not they resort to other means, referring specifically to air operations, I do not know.

[Deleted.]

In any campaign there is always an uncertainty until you reach a successful conclusion. The problem here is what can we do to increase the chances for a successful conclusion without getting ourselves fatally involved in a world struggle.

WITHDRAWAL OF COMMUNISTS WITHOUT NEGOTIATION

Senator WILEY. Well, is there any way the enemy can be brought to the peace table? He came without announcement and began to fight. Supposing he slips across the Yalu without announcement and concentrates in force there without negotiating at the peace table. How do you visualize this conflict will end?

Secretary MARSHALL. That is, you are talking about later events, that he slips across the Yalu? He did slip across the Yalu without any announcement, and he introduced the fight which was so difficult to meet in December and January.

Now, do I understand from your question that you are asking me how a future arrangement might be carried out with the possibility of his slipping across the Yalu again?

Senator WILEY. My question is this: How are we going to terminate this war? I said that the enemy came without announcement, and he may depart without announcement. How are we going to get him to the peace table? Once we get him to the peace table, what is the peace worth?

Supposing he goes north of the Yalu again and without announcement concentrates up there without negotiating at the peace table? How do you visualize the conflict will end then?

Secretary MARSHALL. We always have the difficulty of whether or not agreements reached by negotiation with the Communist groups anywhere in the world can be depended upon and I think in each case where we struggle for negotiatory arrangements we must remain on guard until good faith is established. That would apply to Korea.

If an occasion, development, such as you have pictured should occur, then I would say we have to take up the most economical position in readiness that we can and that would apply to what we can do with the South Korean forces, for them on their own ground, what supporting troops we would have to leave in reserve, what we would leave in Japan in reserve.

Those are all military questions that I think can better be answered, if it is advisable, by the Chiefs of Staff themselves. They have been discussed at considerable length.

REASON FOR PROHIBITION OF BOMBING OF RASHIN

Senator WILEY. Why was General MacArthur forbidden to bomb, I think, Racin, a point 35 miles within the Korean border?

Secretary MARSHALL. That again is a detail which the Chiefs can give you more exactly than I can, but in the rough it was felt that the destruction of the stores at that depot would be accomplished, that immediate destruction, but they could do almost the same thing right over the Soviet border where we could not touch them and in doing the bombing we were running a certain risk as to the involvement of our people, involvement of us with the Soviet Government, because we had to consider the shipping, we had to consider the proximity to the border, and I don't contest General MacArthur's distance there, because we can determine that exactly from the messages, but it seemed to me it was closer than he mentioned.

But the main determining factor, I think—and the Chiefs of Staff can give you that exactly—was that we would only accomplish an immediate destruction of those particular stores and an equivalent arrangement could be set up just across the Soviet boundary.

Senator WILEY. I have looked at your testimony on Monday and heard your testimony this morning, General.

BILL OF PARTICULARS

For my own benefit, if nobody else's, I wonder if I could get what we in the law call a bill of particulars, showing specifically the language that violated what you think the responsibility of MacArthur was as a theater commander.

I would appreciate getting that very much, because I think upon that analysis will depend the judgment of the people of this country if they ever take time to study it out.

Secretary MARSHALL. When you say "theater commander," it is United Nations theater commander, which is a little different from the normal.

SOVIET INTENTIONS IN FAR EAST AND EUROPE

Senator WILEY. I accept that amendment. Yesterday in answering Senator George's questions you seemed to have some reservation about Soviet intentions with regard to Korea. If I read the record correctly, those reservations would seem to apply to General MacArthur's statement that he did not believe that the Soviet action would necessarily be meshed with our moves.

General MacArthur's estimate of what Russia plans to do in Asia coincides exactly with General Eisenhower's estimate of what Russia plans to do in Europe.

You will perhaps recall that General Eisenhower said in testimony before our committee:

If Russia is going to find an excuse for aggression because the Allies have in France, Belgium, and along the Rhine and up through Holland and Norway 30 or 40 divisions, then they are going to attack anyway.

General Marshall, will you please explain why it is assumed that Russian intentions and planning may be so different in the Far East from those plans and intentions in Europe?

Secretary MARSHALL. There is actual fighting going on in the Far East, and Communist China is a very important factor to the Soviet Union in that it provides forces to carry out their aggression against our world, and the Soviet suffer no losses except in the way of the matériel they furnished.

Now whether or not the Soviet Government can afford to have China defeated decisively by the Allies and put in a position where the reaction of China toward the Soviet Government might be one of deep distrust because they were not fully supported, that introduces a factor in a current active situation that is not duplicated in Europe.

It is a problem of estimates, but it has to be considered against the background of at least in point of numbers a very important nation, certainly important to the situation of the Soviet Government in the Far East.

Senator WILEY. I find in the New York Times this statement in which it is said:

What is new and what has brought about the necessity for General MacArthur's removal is the wholly unprecedented situation of a local theater commander publicly expressing his displeasure and his disagreement with the foreign and military policy of the United States.

I think that substantially states what you have said formerly. Thank you, Mr. Secretary General Marshall, and thank all of you for the patience you have manifested.

INVITATIONS TO MAC ARTHUR TO CONSULT IN WASHINGTON

Chairman RUSSELL. Before I turn it over to Senator Saltonstall, I have one question that grew out of yesterday's hearings that I am very curious to clear up.

You testified yesterday, Mr. Secretary:

Incidentally, I thought it would have been immensely profitable if General MacArthur on his own motion had come over here, responded to the invitations to come over and talked to the President about a great many of these things and come in touch with reactions which didn't reach him except in a rather vague way in Japan.

What invitations, if any, did you have reference to?

Secretary MARSHALL. I was under the impression that there had been suggestions before this Korean matter started through the past 2 or 3 years to General MacArthur to come over. I will have to have that checked very carefully.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, now, I know of my own knowledge that committees of Congress have invited him to come here, but what I want to ascertain from you is whether or not you referred to those invitations or whether any invitations or suggestions were extended him by either you or by the President of the United States?

Secretary MARSHALL. I extended him no invitation, but my period of position in the Defense Department is only recent and in the middle of this battle.

Chairman RUSSELL. I understand.

Secretary MARSHALL. His return from there during this fighting is quite another question, and I arranged with General MacArthur where he would meet the President in this Wake Island conference.

The question was whether he should come to Hawaii, which is a more convenient point for the President, or I proposed Wake Island if that took him too long away from his command, and he chose Wake Island rather than Hawaii.

KEEPING TOUCH WITH HOME SITUATION

That was at the time which was very critical in the conduct of operations in Korea, so that during the period that I have been Secretary of Defense, I would not apply that comment of mine, but General MacArthur had been abroad many years, since 1937 I think, and we find officers who have been out of the country 1 year or even 2 years get very much out of touch with conditions and with the problems of the old War Department, in my day there, and I think with the Defense Department in the present set-up, so it is rather difficult to get the full view unless you understand the conditions back home.

I found in my own experience as Chief of Staff that it was difficult for me to get the proper reactions, and for that reason I flew here and there all over the United States and pretty much all over the world, I think some eight or nine hundred thousand miles.

I found recommendations to me from the Chiefs of Staff of which I was a member, from the working parties of the Chiefs of Staff, of which I was a member, that I didn't agree with when I arrived on the ground and talked to the people concerned.

Now, one way, we have had a great many trips by the Chiefs of Staff in person to Korea and to Japan to see General MacArthur. But one gets decidedly out of touch without being aware of it when he is completely removed from the conditions here at home in the United States and in Washington in particular. To that is what I have reference.

Chairman RUSSELL. General, with particular reference to the invitation, you do not know of any invitation that was extended by the President?

Secretary MARSHALL. No; I don't, but I will check that.

Chairman RUSSELL. What date did you become Secretary of Defense?

Secretary MARSHALL. I think it was late September. I think it was the 18th of September last.

Chairman RUSSELL. The Korean conflict—

Secretary MARSHALL. Started June 25.

Chairman RUSSELL. Had been in progress for almost 2 months at that time—nearly 3 months.

Secretary MARSHALL. July, August, and most of September.

Chairman RUSSELL. Nearly 3 months.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Did you say Secretary of State in your question, Mr. Chairman?

Chairman RUSSELL. I intended to say Secretary of Defense, and I think I said that.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Pardon me.

LETTERS TO CONGRESSMEN

Senator WILEY. There is one question that I neglected to ask. I might say that I said to you, General—if you had been in MacArthur's place, had the same conviction as he had, what would you have done? And you said it was a hypothetical question.

Now, let me put a direct question. If you had been in MacArthur's place, and a representative of the legislative branch of this Government wrote you a letter, and you had the same convictions that MacArthur had, would you have written your Senator or your Congressman?

Secretary MARSHALL. I do not think I would have written it in the terms that General MacArthur employed. I have had many requests of Members of Congress related to various disputed matters, but I don't think I have ever taken that line.

Senator WILEY. Were you a theater commander?

Secretary MARSHALL. No, sir; I was not.

Senator WILEY. 10,000 miles away, not 20 miles like Sheridan.

Secretary MARSHALL. I might say I suffered more from close proximity than he has suffered from it by distance.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Saltonstall.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Mr. Chairman, I have a very few questions.

MANPOWER CONTRIBUTION OF ALLIES IN KOREA

The first thing I would like to clear up for the record this morning, which I think is very important, General Marshall, to clear up—you gave us an exact list of the number of men from other countries that were in Korea, and you stated you did not know the exact number of our men. But you did say that you knew it more by divisions. Can you make an estimate by the number of divisions of approximately how many of our men are in Korea? I think it is very important that we know that.

[Deleted.]

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN MAC ARTHUR AND ADMINISTRATION

Senator SALTONSTALL. Now, Senator Wiley has asked you about the background, and the facts leading up to General MacArthur's unfortunate and sudden dismissal.

Now, as I see it, there were two general categories of questions that we are involved in here, in this committee:

One is the question of his disobeyal of orders, that led to his dismissal; and, the other is the question of the differences of opinion with relation to policy in the Far East.

Now, I have listened to all of General MacArthur's testimony, and all of yours, and it appears to me that the differences between the administration's policy, as stated by you, and General MacArthur's opinion, really boils down to a clash of opinion as to the Soviet's intentions, and the Soviet's capabilities for waging war in the Far East.

Do you agree that that is the basis of the difference in between you?

Secretary MARSHALL. That is the principal basis of the difference of opinion, as to what is the proper course to follow.

Senator SALTONSTALL. And that comes down to, really, a question of trying to interpret the Soviet's intentions, and trying to determine from our knowledge, through our intelligence, of his capabilities in the Far East for waging war, an aggressive war, rather than purely defensive, and as to his intentions of putting those capabilities to work; is that not about it?

Secretary MARSHALL. Including his relations with the Chinese Communist regime, which is an important factor; but you mention the dominant factors.

Senator SALTONSTALL. So that, sitting as members of this committee, really we have—and trying to get the basic facts on which these opinions are based—that is the essential question that we have got to determine, is it not?

Secretary MARSHALL. I would say so.

INITIATIVE ON NEGOTIATION OF A CEASE-FIRE

Senator SALTONSTALL. Now, another thing that is not clear in my mind, and has worried me with relation to these hearings, is, you have stated that the administration's policy is one of resisting aggression in Korea.

Under such a policy how can we take the initiative in negotiating a cease-fire order? Must not any request for a cease-fire order come from the Red Chinese? In other words, must not they say, "We have had enough"?

How can the United Nations or the United States, acting for the United Nations take the initiative?

Secretary MARSHALL. They are the aggressors very specifically. When we halt that aggression, when we destroy large portions of the armies of that aggression, I do not think it is out of the way for us, as a United Nations group, to ask them if they didn't have enough to bring to a halt this sacrifice of life, and find a basis for adjustment.

Senator SALTONSTALL. As General MacArthur stated to us, as I understood it, he advocated policies of action on our part that might lead us to be able to tell them, "Now we are going to continue to go on unless you say you have had enough."

Now, the administration's policy, on the other hand, is to try to kill off enough Red Chinese, when they come on us, so that they will say that they have had enough; isn't that about the difference?

Secretary MARSHALL. I think that is about it.

Senator SALTONSTALL. So, it is very difficult for us to take the initiative, really, or more difficult.

Secretary MARSHALL. Well, I don't know about that, Senator. If we are in a position of having inflicted losses on them—not only done it once, but a number of times—and the trained fabric of their armies is being destroyed, I don't see any limitation, or I mean, any hesitation that would be imposed on us in trying to bring what they usually term as “this useless effusion of blood” to an end.

We have that basis always, because the part of this affair that touches us most deeply is this sacrifice of life. It is bad with us, but it is terrible with them.

Now, our effort throughout is to find a solution that is not an appeasement in any manner, but stops this sacrifice of life, and particularly that prevents it from extending itself over wider areas, and possibly, the entire world.

Senator SALTONSTALL. In connection with what we have just been discussing, there is another possibility which you may rightly say is hypothetical, but really is quite realistic in my opinion.

COMMUNIST WITHDRAWAL WITHOUT NEGOTIATION

Assuming for a moment that the Red Chinese simply leave substantial forces in Korea and make no attack upon us—they just stay there, which seems to me to be a real possibility—what do we do then if we have not got in Korea sufficient forces to put on an aggressive attack to drive them out?

Won't just a stalemate exist that may last for some years?

Secretary MARSHALL. We have considered that specifically and I would ask that this part of the record be kept clear of publication.

[Deleted.]

Secretary MARSHALL. We have studied that a great deal and what we might do under the circumstances.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Now, may I ask three or four detailed questions rather than questions of policy.

CIA WARNING ABOUT COMMUNIST BUILD-UP IN LAST JUNE

Admiral Hillenkoeter testified before the Appropriations Committee last June that the Department of Defense and the Department of State were repeatedly warned by the CIA of build-ups of North Korean forces just above the thirty-eighth parallel, with a final warning given on June 17, I think was the date.

Is there anything in the records—I know you weren't Secretary of Defense at the time—is there anything in the records to show that these warnings went out to General MacArthur to give him or his staff information concerning this build-up?

Secretary MARSHALL. You would have to ask the Chiefs of Staff in regard to that, Senator. I checked or had checked for me and the individual officers responsible brought to me to see if there was any doubt at all as to the information of that nature, that it was or was not transmitted to General MacArthur. I was assured that it was.

They checked over all the various things, particularly the information from the CIA, which was Admiral Hillenkoeter's responsibility at that time, but that check may have been limited to the period I was Secretary of Defense.

I don't think it was, but the Chiefs of Staff can answer that much more accurately than I can.

Senator SALTONSTALL. So far as you know—and I think you testified to this yesterday—the information that Gen. Bedell Smith and his CIA Department were getting and evaluating was going to General MacArthur in the field.

Secretary MARSHALL. It was going to General MacArthur's headquarters.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Now, Senator Wiley has suggested that I ask this question of you, sir, with relation to the questions that I had asked you.

It has been suggested that the Russian tactics are to get its stooges, the Red Chinese in this instance, so exhausted that it can easily take over the country if the Red Chinese are essentially weakened.

Do you think that is a possibility in the minds of the Russians?

Secretary MARSHALL. I don't know. It is a consideration.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Now, here is one thing that interests me very much, and I don't know that it has been asked you.

PRESIDENT'S LETTER OF JANUARY 13 TO MAC ARTHUR

In the record of the Joint Chiefs of Staff there is a rather full statement—I refer by the records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff report for the Senate Committee on Korean Operations—I refer particularly to page 87—in this record there is a rather full statement concerning the President's message of January 13 to General MacArthur.

This was written the day after the statement of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of January 12 on which the 16 objectives were set forth.

This message of the President states certain objectives that we wish—we, the administration—wish to obtain.

Do you know anything about the circumstances surrounding the writing of this message and its purpose and were you consulted about it?

Now, I refer particularly to these several sentences:

The President emphasized that pending the build-up of our national strength, we must act with great prudence insofar as extending the area of hostilities was concerned. Steps which might in themselves be fully justified, which might lend some assistance to the campaign in Korea, would not be beneficial if they would involve Japan or Western Europe in large scale hostilities. The President recognized the continued resistance might not be militarily possible with the limited forces available to General MacArthur. In any event, the United Nations forces must be preserved as an effective instrument for the defense of Japan and elsewhere. A successful resistance in Korea, however, would serve the following purposes.

And then goes on to suggest purposes from A to J. The first one is to demonstrate that aggression would not be accepted by the free world.

Now, I think it is very interesting to know that the President followed up the statement of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to General MacArthur, or the recommendations, by an apparent letter.

BACKGROUND OF JANUARY 13, 1951, LETTER

I wondered how that letter happened to be written and how it was delivered to General MacArthur.

Secretary MARSHALL. I haven't the specific recollection of the incident and the Chiefs of Staff can give you this more accurately, but my possibly imperfect recollection of it is that in discussing the paper of the Chiefs of Staff of January 12, the question came up as to whether there should be included in it definements of foreign policy and that in order to avoid any confusion in the matter this message, which covers the foreign policy aspects, the high governmental aspects, was made a separate message to General MacArthur.

At that time we were in a very difficult situation in Korea. General MacArthur was entertaining the possibility, which was approaching a probability, that we might have to withdraw from the country.

Therefore, it was felt very important to give him this intimate outline by the President himself as to what were the factors concerned at this time.

Meanwhile the other message—that of the Chiefs of Staff with their tentative proposals—went to the Security Council for a careful working over, but also they went to General MacArthur for his information.

So he had those tentative proposals and he had this detailed statement by the President on the high policy basis of this Government.

Senator SALTONSTALL. In other words, the President wanted to give him the high policy purposes and the Joint Chiefs of Staff the military purposes.

Secretary MARSHALL. Their paper of January 12 was intended for the Security Council, but General MacArthur should have the benefit of that paper.

I stated yesterday I didn't recall exactly the manner of its being brought to General MacArthur's attention, but I was quite certain that General Collins went over it with him personally, because he arrived out there about the 13th, I think, in Tokyo.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Thank you.

Now, I have just two more questions, General.

NEED FOR NATIONALIST TROOPS ON FORMOSA

Do I understand, from your testimony, that you do not approve of using the Chinese Nationalist troops, or forces, in Korea, because you still consider them necessary for the defense of Formosa?

Secretary MARSHALL. That is the view I am quite certain the Chiefs of Staff have.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Now, Senator Russell asked you this question, and I think this is not a reiteration of his question; I hope it is a little different from what Senator Russell asked, but, it seems to me that if this had been done, it might have avoided this very sad and unfortunate dismissal of General MacArthur.

I ask it in this form:

POSSIBLE REQUEST FOR MAC ARTHUR CONSULTATION IN WASHINGTON

You stated yesterday you felt MacArthur should have taken the initiative to come home and discuss his opinions with the authorities here in the Department of Defense, and with the President; and my question is, Why was he not requested to come home, by either the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or yourself, or possibly the President, in order that these differences of opinion could have been discussed here, face to face, and his summary dismissal avoided?

Secretary MARSHALL. I thought I just answered that, Senator.

Senator SALTONSTALL. I think you did, sir, except for the fact that you said—you used the word “invitation,” and I used the word “request.”

Secretary MARSHALL. No. What I was referring to was that during actual fighting I doubted the advisability of General MacArthur coming back, because all during the fall, and up to the middle of January, the situation was terrible, and his direction and control might have to be exercised almost hourly; so I related to that the fact that the President undertook to meet him more than half way, and that I personally suggested that, got the President's approval to the suggestion that, General MacArthur give his choice between Wake Island and Hawaii, so as not to take him away from Tokyo any longer than might be necessary.

Therefore, he selected Wake Island, rather than meeting the President in Honolulu. I think I said “Tokyo.” I should have said “Honolulu.”

So, that was my reaction to the actual fighting period out there; but there was a long period in which he was Supreme Commander in Japan, where he had not been in the United States; and a much longer period when he had been in the Far East and had not been home at all; and his reactions were obtained merely from the papers, and from visitors.

Senator SALTONSTALL. May I say, most respectfully, and I hope I say this respectfully to you—I want to know—General Eisenhower, during World War II, was brought home to this country one or two times, very secretly.

Secretary MARSHALL. He was brought home, I think, offhand, once, when he was transferring from Africa to England, and an immediate action from England was not due for some time, some months, and we were the ones that would order that action.

Senator SALTONSTALL. May I ask this final question:

FACE-TO-FACE CONSULTATION

Do you not agree with me—assuming we both feel that General MacArthur's dismissal under the circumstances was most unfortunate, and that it stirred up the emotional feelings of the country to a tremendous degree, do you not think it could have been avoided, and the benefits of General MacArthur's knowledge and ability in the Far East continued, if there had been more face-to-face discussions of the points of view?

Secretary MARSHALL. We thought we were getting that in the meeting at Wake Island where it was face to face. I presume that if it had been practicable for him to leave his theater of operations during these critical days and come back here and talk to the President personally and the Defense Department, particularly the Chiefs of Staff, that it would have been decidedly helpful, but many other reactions to be considered also, but the main point was that he was engaged in a very active operation and a very perilous one for a long period of time, and I personally thought, as I endeavored to explain, that he should not be drawn away from his command unless he elected himself to that arrangement.

The original proposal to the President was that he was to come to Hawaii, and I intervened with the President to say that I thought with conditions of affairs in Korea, that might be a very serious matter and would he have any objection if I also proposed Wake Island, and he said he had none, and I did it on that basis, but my purpose in doing it was to protect him from a long trip and being absent at a critical moment.

Senator SALTONSTALL. And to give him the opportunity to talk to his Commander in Chief?

Secretary MARSHALL. Yes, and there was an opportunity and the length of that interview was largely decided by General MacArthur.

Senator SALTONSTALL. I thank you, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Smith.

LENGTH OF HEARING

Senator KNOWLAND. Mr. Chairman, might I raise just a procedural question. I understand that we have had one quorum call to the floor of the Senate relative to the supplemental appropriation bill, and there is a matter dealing with civil defense which the Senator from Connecticut and myself as well as I assume all the other Senators have quite a vital interest in one way or the other. What is the intention of the Senator on procedure today?

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, due to the fact that this bill is pending on the floor, Senator Knowland, I had not planned to have an afternoon session, but unless there is some discussion which members of this committee are very intensely interested in, I would like to push along here for a while and see what develops.

I am not trying to hurry anybody. I have not made any statement here with respect to repetitious questions or anything else. Of course the committee can recess at any time it sees fit.

My own view is that we should not undertake to have an afternoon session this afternoon. I don't know how long Senator Smith will take. He is a very keen student of international questions and a ranking member of the Foreign Relations Committee, but I thought we might start and see how far we go and when we get down to the voting stage in the Senate, why we will of course recess until tomorrow morning. Is that agreeable to the Senator?

Senator KNOWLAND. That is agreeable. I just wanted to know so I could adjust myself accordingly.

Chairman RUSSELL. All right, Senator Smith, you may proceed.

Senator SMITH. General Marshall—I say General, and you are as well as Secretary—I want to open my questions by expressing to you my appreciation of your great services. And you recall well the support I gave you in your Marshall plan in Europe and so forth, and my eagerness to cooperate in every way possible.

I am frank to say that I am very much troubled over this incident, as I assume you are, and I want to get for the record and my own satisfaction some facts here which I still don't find.

EXTENSION OF WAR TO CHINA

Let me start by saying this: General, in your opening statement I find what seem to me to be the two charges on which General Mac-

Arthur was summarily removed. First, I find on page 799 of the record where you made this statement:

General MacArthur, on the other hand, would have us on our own initiative carry the conflict beyond Korea against the mainland of Communist China, both from the sea and from the air. He would have us accept the risk involvement not only in an extension of the war with Red China, but in an all-out war with the Soviet Union. He would have us do this even at the expense of losing our allies and wrecking the coalition of free peoples throughout the world. He would have us do this even though the effect of such action might expose Western Europe to attack by the millions of Soviet troops poised in middle and eastern Europe.

I was present at all of the testimony MacArthur gave. I have tried to read every document that has a bearing on this, and I am frank to say that I cannot find in any of that material documentation that would support this general statement you have made here. Can you support this with documentation? I will not delay it now. I would like to have that first paragraph on page 799 supported by any statements that MacArthur may have made, that took that position.

Secretary MARSHALL. I will endeavor to do so.

Senator SMITH. He made it appear to us that he was just as anxious to limit the war to Korea as anybody else was, and he was trying to do something to draw off those troops, those Communist troops, who were pressing us so hard. Every suggestion he made was with the idea simply of drawing off those troops and relieving the pressure on our boys in Korea.

I think it is an unjust implication to General MacArthur, which has been carried in the papers all over the place, that he is trying to carry the war to Communist China and get us mixed up in an all-out war with Communist China and bring Russia in.

I just mention that in passing, but it seems to be an overstatement of General MacArthur's position if you examine the record.

The other matter was brought out by Senator Wiley this morning, and is on page 800, and this seems to be the real reason for General MacArthur's removal. It has already been read, but I will read it again as I want to follow it up.

PUBLIC DISAGREEMENT WITH ADMINISTRATION POLICY

What is new, and what has brought about the necessity for General MacArthur's removal, is the wholly unprecedented situation of a local theater commander publicly expressing his displeasure at and his disagreement with the foreign and military policy of the United States.

You have indicated your reasons why you think General MacArthur did the things implied in this statement, but I think we cannot emphasize too much that that seems to be the gist of the complaint against him. And this documentation which we had reference to this morning seems to be all that we have to carry this out.

Now I find in the documentation the three documents that are important.

One was the Presidential statement of December 6, and which you said was aimed directly at General MacArthur apparently for some previous acts which he had done, and which we have no evidence whatsoever on.

Secretary MARSHALL. I read them in my statement the first day, sir.

Senator SMITH. How is that?

Secretary MARSHALL. I outlined them the first day.

Senator SMITH. What previous actions were they?

Secretary MARSHALL. It was statements that appeared in the press and interviews in answering questions of the New York Times.

Senator SMITH. Well, I did not get that. Is that all in the record?

Secretary MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator SMITH. Is that full documentation in the record?

Secretary MARSHALL. Yes, sir; that is all in the record.

Senator SMITH. Let me ask you in that connection, this statement of the President of December 6 was issued to MacArthur, and many others, as Senator Wiley brought out. The two sections you read were:

No speech, press release, or other public statement concerning foreign policy should be released until it has received clearance from the Department of State.

No speech, press release, or other statement concerning military policy should be released until it has received clearance from the Department of Defense.

AUTHORITY OF THEATER COMMANDERS TO ISSUE STATEMENTS

I just wanted to ask you this question: I have noticed recently in the papers a number of statements by General Ridgway, apparently in line with his command.

Are you requiring him to check all those things here before he puts them out? Are they all cleared here?

Secretary MARSHALL. Whenever they apply to foreign policy, yes, to clear them.

Senator SMITH. Have any of General Ridgway's statements up to date been cleared?

Secretary MARSHALL. I would have to check up on that. I don't think he has made any statement regarding foreign policy.

Senator SMITH. I have had called to my attention—I don't recollect right now—

Secretary MARSHALL. He has the specific authority, just as General MacArthur had, the specific authority of making communiqués which related to the actual battle in Korea.

Senator SMITH. And you think that General MacArthur violated that in the statement you complained about?

Secretary MARSHALL. No, sir; it was where he passed beyond that into matters that affected our foreign policy.

Senator SMITH. Well, is that particular statement of his of the 20th the particular reference you have in mind?

I have just had called to my attention in this connection statements by General Ridgway. I wondered if they were cleared with the Department of State. This is in Look magazine of May 22.

Secretary MARSHALL. I will check on that for you, sir.

Senator SMITH. Well this is the statement:

There is no finer military team than the United Nations command which was organized by the brilliant, inspired leadership of its former Commander in Chief, General of the Army Douglas MacArthur.

I assume there is no question on that.

Then it goes on to say:

The deadly purpose of communism is unchanging. Nowhere is its menace more manifestly alive and potent than in Korea. Here its intent is implacable so that all can see. It has announced its intention, and every action supports that intention, of either driving United Nations forces from the peninsula or de-

stroying them in place. The Eighth Army is fully aware of this menace. It trusts that the peoples from whom it comes are likewise aware.

It seems to me that the language here is along the line of the language that General MacArthur's statements are criticized for, and I am just pointing that out because I am a little troubled by this attack on MacArthur in these statements.

I asked the question whether this has been cleared.

Secretary MARSHALL. I said I would have that checked.

NO REFERENCE TO FOREIGN POLICY IN RIDGWAY STATEMENT

Senator SMITH. This article by Ridgway, which is a very conclusive article, was cleared by the State Department, was it? If it was not, was this a violation of this regulation—by the Defense Department?

Secretary MARSHALL. I will have that checked, Senator, but I might observe there is nothing in that article, so far as you read it to me, that is at all in contrast to our foreign policy.

Senator SMITH. I did not know what was in the statements that you complained of that General MacArthur made that was in contrast with our foreign policy.

All he said was that Formosa, and the question of admission of Red China, were not matters that should be brought to any discussions for a cease fire. Certainly, that is not foreign to our policy, is it? I thought we had said right along we were not going to let those two things come along in the cease-fire negotiation or discussion?

Secretary MARSHALL. The issue there, Senator, was he was bringing up those matters, and mentioning them and taking action just ahead of the time the President was going to come out with an announcement in accordance with the other 13 allies that we have.

REQUEST FOR MAC ARTHUR OPINION ON PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT

Senator SMITH. Well, do you feel that the statement which you read here and which Senator Wiley read, was an adequate statement to ask MacArthur not to say anything about it? It seemed to me they asked him for his recommendations. They did not tell him not to enter into negotiations. I realize there is a difference of opinion; I realize that, but it seems to me that would not be a ground for summarily dismissing General MacArthur; that is a——

Secretary MARSHALL. Taking, first, your reference to that sentence for his reactions, that was largely on my initiative, because I thought that it was important that he have an opportunity to state whether the existing limiting factors and the instructions, particularly regarding the thirty-eighth parallel, in any way embarrassed him in trying to maintain the security position of his command, while the President was bringing about this negotiatory arrangement.

Now, it was put in the terms that the State Department then agreed that we would ask General MacArthur what he had to say about that. Did he want any specific authority other than what he already had in order to cover this time factor that is indicated there?

Senator SMITH. Well, did you think that was a warning to him not to say anything on the subject?

Secretary MARSHALL. It was not intended as a warning at all. It was intended——

Senator SMITH. That is quite what my point is.

Secretary MARSHALL. It was intended as an accommodation to him.

Senator SMITH. I am not quite clear.

Secretary MARSHALL. His answer was not direct to the question, because he spoke of he did not want any more limitations. What we were asking him was did he need any extension of what he understood his present limitations were and we were thinking particularly of the thirty-eighth parallel, because he was poised right along it at that time.

Senator SMITH. I would think, from the language of this message from the Joint Chiefs winding up with "your recommendations are desired," that it was not a violation of anything that I can read in here when he said he didn't want any more limitations on his operations.

Secretary MARSHALL. Well, it was not a violation. We just were trying to find out from him if he wanted some extension of what he thought his limitations were in relation to the thirty-eighth parallel, and that was always a very difficult thing to handle, because, on the one side, we felt it had no real significance; and on the other side, there was a feeling, particularly by certain foreign governments, that it was of importance in relation to any movement of ours north of that parallel.

Senator SMITH. Well, I understand that. There may be a question of what your strategy was that was being discussed there.

FREEDOM TO DISCUSS KOREAN WAR

What I am getting at is where General MacArthur, by anything he did at that time, violated any of these directives you are talking about.

I am still in the dark on that, especially as it is called to my attention that the President in his press conference in January, appeared—to this headquarters to specifically define General MacArthur's authority, but denied that there was any curb on his authority to speak freely on the Korean War.

That is the statement that General Whitney made as to what they understood in Tokyo was the interpretation of this document of December 6.

Secretary MARSHALL. Well, the President's statement, where he uses the term or the phrase "and the Korean War," presents a question of whether or not the war includes comments that go into the foreign policy in relation to that war.

I am quite certain that was not the intention of the President; but the issue there, I think, Senator, that is troubling you in particular, is that this message from which you have been reading was a message primarily of information to General MacArthur that the President was preparing to make an approach toward trying to bring to a halt the operations in Korea; and the message indicates that it had to be negotiated among our allies or with our allies engaged with us, in the fighting of Korea, and it would take us a certain possible period of time in which to do that.

MAC ARTHUR'S MARCH 24 STATEMENT IN RELATION TO PRESIDENT'S
PROPOSED STATEMENT

Now it went on to add the questions you have been referring to which were for General MacArthur's convenience, we will say, that is in his military disposition.

What the issue in the matter is, is that he himself stepped forward in an approach to a possible settlement with the Communist forces just in advance of the time he knew the President was going to do the same thing and was in communication with our allies to arrange a procedure that would be acceptable to all of them.

Senator SMITH. Well, you imply by that that General MacArthur jumped the gun so to speak, and moved in before the President. Is that your implication?

Secretary MARSHALL. That is what was done.

Senator SMITH. Well, I can say that the question that was discussed here in the testimony of General MacArthur will show that he denied it definitely. He had no such thought in any way, shape, or manner like that.

Secretary MARSHALL. I am merely talking about what happened.

Senator SMITH. There is doubt among us as to what these messages mean. It is strange that a man of his experience, of his character, of his wonderful record in Japan, should be fired summarily for that particular item. It is just beyond my comprehension.

Secretary MARSHALL. He was not fired summarily for that particular item. It was an accumulation of things.

Senator SMITH. I am going to try to bring out, if I can, why he was fired.

Secretary MARSHALL. Yes.

MAC ARTHUR LETTER TO REPRESENTATIVE MARTIN

Senator SMITH. Now the other thing that you mentioned, General, was the letter to Joe Martin, to Congressman Martin.

General MacArthur testified here that that was a routine letter. He had many of them from Congressmen and Senators and he always tried to write when he had an opportunity to.

He said when he was told that this had created a sensation here, he had forgot it and had to look it up to see what it was all about. He had forgotten exactly what he had said.

I have tried in reading that letter to see what was so terrible about it. You state in your testimony here on page 858:

Shortly after General MacArthur's statement of March 24, Congressman Joseph Martin of Massachusetts released for publication a letter addressed to him by General MacArthur dated March 20.

Note that date. We brought out this morning that the letter from Representative Martin was dated March 8, I think. His answer is dated March 20, so it has no relation to this other statement you are referring to, nor did it have any relation to the notice that was sent about the President planning an announcement. They were not related obviously.

Senator WILEY. The 24th.

Senator SMITH. General MacArthur's statement was the 24th, but this statement of the Commander in Chief, from the Joint Chiefs to

the Commander in Chief with regard to the Presidential announcement was dated March 20. The letter, the routine answer that General MacArthur called it to the Martin letter, was dated March 20, and he wasn't responsible for publication. Representative Martin did that on his own responsibility.

I asked him why he did it, and whether he had any authority to make it public. He said he did not have any authority to, but he assumed it was all right because he was not told not to. I do not see how we can possibly blame General MacArthur for giving publicity to those views in writing a friend of this kind.

TALKING AND WRITING TO CONGRESSMEN

In my case I was out there with General MacArthur at one time and I asked him a lot of questions. Should he not have answered them? What is your attitude toward those who are in the Congress trying to get facts? Aren't we entitled to be told what these leaders feel?

I talked to military men and naval men. I did not give any publicity to their answers, but I did talk with them very freely and I am just wondering whether it is the attitude of the administration that we, members of the Foreign Relations Committee, can't go to Tokyo and can't get help from any source that has to do with our foreign policy.

Secretary MARSHALL. There is always the issue of the position of the military official in relation to his directives from his superiors and in relation to his testimony before the committees of Congress and in relation to his conversation with members of the committees of Congress.

That always is a very serious matter for consideration, and I think all the circumstances surrounding the procedure have to be taken under very careful thought, and in this particular instance I think those are the facts and the judgments will have to be made by you gentlemen.

THE MARTIN LETTER

Senator SMITH. Now, General, you said in your testimony here referring to the letter to Joseph Martin:

In this letter which like the March 24 release had not been cleared in accordance with the President's directive of December 6, General MacArthur dealt further with the question of whether or not to carry the war to China, whether to use the Nationalist Chinese forces on Formosa, and whether to apply our maximum strength in Asia or in Europe.

Well, I have read that letter over and over again and I can't see how those conclusions could necessarily be drawn from it.

He did agree generally with the views apparently that Congressman Martin had expressed to him, whatever he said. I don't know what Congressman Martin did say in the letter.

Senator McMAHON. Would the Senator like that speech inserted in the record at this point?

Senator SMITH. Which speech?

Senator McMAHON. Martin's speech.

Senator SMITH. I don't care one way or the other. I have no objection to it.

Senator McMAHON. If the Senator doesn't object, I offer it for the record.

(The document above referred to will appear in the appendix.)

REASONS FOR DISMISSAL

Senator SMITH. The point I am making is that in this letter which caused such a furor, I can't see what was said that would justify the summary dismissal of General MacArthur.

Secretary MARSHALL. That single letter I am quite certain, Senator, did not act to his dismissal. It was an accumulation.

Senator SMITH. That is what I want to get at. I am glad you said that.

Secretary MARSHALL. I have referred to that several times.

Senator SMITH. That is exactly what I want to get at. I just assumed that this letter to Congressman Martin and this statement of the 24th by General MacArthur couldn't be the grounds for the summary dismissal.

Secretary MARSHALL. It was an accumulation, and the letter to Congressman Martin brought it to a head.

Senator SMITH. It probably was the sparkplug or something that set the engine off.

STRATEMEYER INTERVIEW

I have another question here that I think is relevant. Then I will go on to some others. I would like to ask you whether General Stratemeyer's interview with the United States News and World Report, which I read with great interest a week or so ago, and which certainly contained General Stratemeyer's views was cleared with the State Department or the Defense Department?

Secretary MARSHALL. I do not think it was, sir, and I will have that checked for you.

Senator SMITH. Is the plan contemplated of dismissing General Stratemeyer because of that interview?

Secretary MARSHALL. That issue has not been brought up with the President. We didn't particularly appreciate the article at the time it came out, but we had enough of excitement in the air at the moment, and he was not a person in the prominent position of General MacArthur.

DISMISSAL OF PERSON DURING CHINA MISSION

Senator SMITH. I would like to ask you this in connection with your testimony of yesterday, if I may: You said that you discharged one individual in the China theater approximately 3 days after you got there, because of his Communist leanings. I believe you also stated you discovered he was making changes in documents sent from Washington for distribution.

Secretary MARSHALL. I probably had better restate that because I don't get it very clearly in the words you have just read.

When I arrived in China it was, I think, about 2 or 3 days after the President's statement of policy was made public, and in the transmittal of that policy by the agency that we had in China, which was under the State Department, a member of that agency who directed

the transmittal of this policy statement over the various communication lines for public information we had there, materially changed some of the wording so that it took the policy out of it which had been very carefully thought into it, so as not to give offense to the generalissimo.

The Associated Press went ahead with its distribution, not changing any of the language whatsoever, and that fortunately got out, but there was a very unfortunate reaction which was immediately set up which would seem to have been the intention of the individual who did it to embarrass Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.

When I was told of this immediately after my arrival—and I don't even recall the individual's name; I suppose they mentioned it to me—I found out what service he was in and I said, "Well, you ought to get him out of here right away," and they reported back that he had left within 3 days. That is what I know about it.

Senator SMITH. Since your statement yesterday, I have been trying to see who that individual was.

Secretary MARSHALL. We are trying to find out. I know what service he was in.

Senator SMITH. Is it by any chance Mr. Benjamin Kaiser?

Secretary MARSHALL. USIS was the service.

Senator SMITH. Do you recall whether it was a man by the name of Benjamin Kaiser, K-a-i-s-e-r?

Secretary MARSHALL. I wouldn't attempt to guess because that came and happened and was over in a few moments so far as I was concerned.

He was in the USIS which had been taken over by the State Department just a short time before in the dissolution of the OSS, that is Donovan's organization.

Senator SMITH. Now General, we were discussing this morning earlier this question of the dismissal. As Senator Saltonstall said, we have two things here. One is a difference of opinion on strategy and so on, and the other is the dismissal and the necessity for it.

INVITATIONS TO MAC ARTHUR TO CONSULT ON POLICY

I would like to ask you the question because I explored it before and I was quite shocked when I was out there at what I discovered. Did the Secretary of Defense or the Secretary of State ever invite MacArthur to come to the United States and confer on these issues, or, on the other hand, did either of the Secretaries themselves ever go to the Far East since MacArthur has been there to confer on the Far East question?

Secretary MARSHALL. During my term of office I certainly did not, and I haven't been to the Far East during that period.

Senator SMITH. Your visit was prior to being Secretary of State of course, and Secretary of Defense?

Secretary MARSHALL. That question—

Senator SMITH. I say your visit to the Far East—

Secretary MARSHALL. I made no visit to the Far East since becoming Secretary of Defense, and I know of no invitation to General MacArthur by the Secretary of Defense or by the Secretary of State for that matter, though I cannot be certain of that.

Senator SMITH. Could you give me any reason why he was left isolated out there? Was it because you had every confidence in his judgment in managing the difficult job he had?

Secretary MARSHALL. I didn't get the first part of that.
(The reporter read back the last question.)

VISITS OF DEFENSE PERSONNEL TO MAC ARTHUR

Secretary MARSHALL. So far as I personally was concerned, I had just taken over the Department of Defense, and we had a tremendous program of immediate build-up of our forces, and legislation which is still now pending before the Congress. I was involved in three different appropriations preparations, in billions. I was involved in appearing before committees up here; and I was attempting to adjust and set up procedures different from what had been in the Department of Defense; and a rather short period of time was involved.

However, prior to my becoming Secretary of Defense, my predecessor, Mr. Johnson, did go to Tokyo and talk to General MacArthur, the exact date I don't recall. I think he only went once.

The members of the Chiefs of Staff were out there frequently; and, at one stage, General Bradley and myself were conferring together as to our going, but we found our involvements here of such critical importance that it was not arrangeable, at least for me to go with him, or for me to go alone.

Senator SMITH. Of course, since the outbreak of the Korean War, the Joint Chiefs have been out there a number of times; but prior to that, and since VJ-day, since the Japanese War closed, unless I was wrongly informed, no members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or the Joint Chiefs together, had been to the Far East to confer with MacArthur.

In other words, there wasn't a single member of the Joint Chiefs who had been to the Far East until 1949, when I got there and General Collins came.

Secretary MARSHALL. I will check up on that. I thought they had.

Senator SMITH. General Collins came when I was there in 1949, but I was told that prior to that time, the Joint Chiefs had been so much occupied in other parts of the world they were not able to get out there and discuss the problems of the Far East, and MacArthur was left without the direct advice of his superiors.

I was quite upset about that, and I asked about it, and I would like to have it confirmed, one way or the other.

Secretary MARSHALL. In the first place, General Bradley and the Joint Chiefs can answer that directly.

In the next place, I will check with Mr. Johnson as to whether he made more than one visit, and the date of the visit I know he did make.

I have answered as to myself.

Senator SMITH. General Marshall, when General MacArthur was here, I asked him this question. I said:

MAC ARTHUR STATEMENT ON QUESTION OF INSUBORDINATION

General MacArthur, prior to your abrupt dismissal, had you been called to Washington to confer with your superiors, or had the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or either of them, gone to Tokyo to discuss any possible disagreement with you, would it have been necessary to dismiss you summarily, or would you, on request, have turned your command over to General Ridgway?

General MacArthur's reply was as follows:

There isn't any possibility of my disagreeing with any order I might have received, whether I regarded it as good, bad, or indifferent.

What I was requesting was some directive. The lack of directives was what I was trying to bring to their attention and ask them for a decision.

Had any decision whatsoever been reached, I would have, to the very best of my ability, carried it out.

I resent, with every fiber in my body, any inference that can be drawn that I have been, in any degree insubordinate or disrespectful of the President of the United States, or the policies of this country, or even of the policies and directives of the United Nations.

Senator SMITH. Then, had you been requested to turn over your command, by the request of the United States administration, you would have done so, without it being necessary to dismiss you summarily, wouldn't you?

General MACARTHUR. Of course I would. The slightest indication from higher authorities that they believed I should withdraw—I would have complied with.

RELATIONSHIP OF SCAP AND KOREAN WAR

Senator SMITH. In that case then, you could have been left your responsibilities in Japan as the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers to continue the negotiations with Senator Dulles, or Ambassador Dulles, on the Japanese peace treaty.

In other words, there was no connection between the SCAP job you had and other personal difference on Korean strategy?

General MACARTHUR. There is no connection whatsoever, as far as I know.

The two offices are entirely separate and distinct.

Now, my question is this, General. Assuming a difference of judgment on the Korean campaign strategy, what did that actually have to do with General MacArthur's position in Japan as Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers?

Secretary MARSHALL. In effect, Senator, it had this to do with having two high American authorities, one conducting a campaign, using all of Japan as a base, and the other in a very preeminent position and with a very conspicuous career, particularly in the minds of the Japanese people, being on the ground also where possible conflicts might arise.

We have had in connection with the possible basis for a peace treaty with Japan the complication of how we approach that portion which might under some terms take Japan entirely out of the main control of the United States while our troops are still engaged in fighting in Korea.

That would present a very serious consideration for the commander of those troops because he would have to depend on Japan as a base and yet his authority over that would have been eliminated.

There are also several other factors connected with the possible terms of that Japanese peace treaty settlement, and you would have the interim situation as to whether or not there should be a civilian representative of our Government in supreme authority on the ground while we had a military commander using all of the country necessarily as a base for an active operation in Korea.

Now, in those ways the matters were interwoven.

POSSIBLE COMMITTEE RECESS

Senator KNOWLAND. Might I just raise a query here? I don't want to certainly interrupt the able Senator from New Jersey, who is doing an excellent job bringing out points in which we are all vitally interested, but it is now past 1 o'clock; and I was wondering whether it would be any great inconvenience if we stopped at this point, because we do have a supplemental appropriations bill involving vast

sums on the floor, including civil defense and other matters of importance.

I am wondering whether it wouldn't be a good place to break off to meet tomorrow, since the chairman had previously indicated we would run to 1 o'clock.

Senator SMITH. I am entirely willing to do that if that is the chairman's wish, providing I can continue my interrogation tomorrow morning.

Senator MORSE. I move we recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.

Chairman RUSSELL. Before I put that motion, I would like to state in view of my pleasantries this morning with regard to Senator Brewster, that I understand that he has now been confirmed by the Senate as a member of this committee and obtains the rights and matters that I mentioned.

Senator WILEY. May I say, Mr. Chairman, on behalf of the Republican branch of the Foreign Relations Committee, that we accept him with all that graciousness that one Republican or one Democrat can extend to another. With his fine ability I am sure he will contribute toward the constructive work in the Foreign Relations Committee.

Senator SMITH. I echo that sentiment for the record because we are very happy to have the distinguished Senator.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Saltonstall has advised me he thought perhaps the Secretary was in a position to make a more definite statement with respect to the number of American troops in Korea. I think it would be well to have it.

Secretary MARSHALL. I have that data for you. Do you want me to read that into the record?

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes.

[Deleted.]

NAME OF PERSON DISMISSED BY MARSHALL ON CHINA MISSION

Chairman RUSSELL. There is another matter that I desire to introduce before this record is closed.

There has been handed me from a reputable representative of the press what purports to be a dispatch which states as follows:

While the Senate Armed Forces-Foreign Relations Committees pressed Defense Secretary George C. Marshall for the name of a Government employee whom he summarily fired during his 1945 mission to China, United Press Bureau Manager Victor Kendrick advised his home office from Hongkong that he was the man.

But Kendrick put the incident in a light considerably different from Marshall's.

I shall ask the reporter at this juncture to copy the text of this dispatch for the record that will be released, unless some member of this committee insist I read it all into the record.

(The dispatch reads in full as follows:)

While the Senate Armed Forces-Foreign Relations Committees pressed Defense Secretary George C. Marshall for the name of a Government employee whom he summarily fired during his 1945 mission to China, United Press Bureau Manager Victor Kendrick advised his home office from Hong Kong that he was the man.

KENDRICK STATEMENT ON INCIDENT

But Kendrick put the incident in a light considerably different from Marshall's. The Secretary was discussing before the committees yesterday his mission to

China, which he visited in 1945 as President Truman's special representative, when the matter of the discharged employee came up.

He said he fired one Government employee 3 days after arriving in China on charges of misrepresenting Mr. Truman's December 15, 1945, policy statement seeking agreement between the Chinese Nationalists and Communists.

"He had taken the announced policy of the President, sent out there, and, in its distribution through the various agencies this Government had in China, had changed the terminology, changed the expressions of the President to create quite a different reaction; because he felt deeply on this thing, he did that," Marshall said of the discharged employee.

The point at issue apparently was whether Mr. Truman's policy was or was not to persuade the Chinese Nationalists to admit Chinese Communists into the government.

Marshall said many Americans in China had become so embittered against the Nationalists that they almost automatically sympathized with the Chinese Communists.

"I don't know whether he (the discharged employee) was a Communist or not," Marshall said, "But I know the way he was talking was inimicable to good government, and he ought to get out."

Senators demanded the man's name which Marshall said he could not remember. Again today Marshall said he had so far been unable to determine who it was, but that the search still was on.

Bureau Manager Kendrick learned of Marshall's testimony yesterday in the regular news dispatches received by his Bureau for distribution to UP clients in the Hong Kong area. His communication to his home office was as follows:

"General Marshall's Tuesday testimony mentions a Government employee whom Marshall fired in Shanghai in December 1945, because he claimed the employee misrepresented President Truman's December 15 policy statement urging the (Chinese) Nationalists to accept the Chinese Communists into the Government.

"According to the UP report, Marshall said he did not remember the employee's name but told Senator Styles Bridges, Republican, New Hampshire, he would try to find out.

"Since I was the person involved, I wish to go on record and authorize you to issue a statement in my behalf in case my name is mentioned publicly.

"At that time I held the job of news editor in the Shanghai Office of War Information with the principal function of trying to get OWI news releases printed in Shanghai newspapers. Mr. Truman's statement arrived via OWI radio in the form of bare text with no accompanying news story.

"In accordance with accepted journalistic procedure, I rewrote the story so that the papers would have both text and story (news summary). Marshall, therefore, was incorrect when he claimed "I changed the terminology of a Presidential statement."

"Mr. Truman's statement implied that the United States would quit giving the Nationalists further aid unless they accepted the Chinese Reds into the government and that is precisely what my rewritten story said.

"This is borne out by Mr. Truman's directive to Marshall of the same date wherein (the directive said):

" 'In your conversations with Chiang Kai-shek and other Chinese leaders, you are authorized to speak with utmost frankness. Particularly, you may state, in connection with the Chinese desire for credits, technical assistance in the economic field and military assistance * * * that a China disunited and torn by civil strife could not be considered realistically as a proper place for American assistance along the lines enumerated.'

"The public disclosure of something which was common knowledge among American officials and newsmen in Shanghai—that the State Department was trying to pressure Chiang into accepting Chinese Communists—may have embarrassed the State Department at that particular time, but it was the truth and Marshall knows it."

Chairman RUSSELL. The motion is that the committee stand in recess until tomorrow morning at 10 o'clock. Without objection, that will be so ordered.

(Whereupon, at 1:15 p. m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene at 10 a. m., Thursday, May 10, 1951.)

MILITARY SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST

THURSDAY, MAY 10, 1951

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES AND THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
UNITED STATES SENATE,
Washington, D. C.

The committees met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10:05 a. m., in the caucus room, Senate Office Building, Senator Richard B. Russell (chairman, Committee on Armed Services), presiding.

Present: Senators Russell (chairman, Committee on Armed Services), Connally (chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations), Byrd, Johnson (Texas), Stennis, Long, Bridges, Saltonstall, Morse, Knowland, Cain, Flanders, George, Green, McMahon, Sparkman, Gillette, Wiley, Smith (New Jersey), Hickenlooper, Lodge, Tobey and Brewster.

Also present: Mark H. Galusha and Verne D. Mudge, of the staff of the Armed Services Committee; Francis O. Wilcox, chief of staff; Thorsten V. Kalijarvi, staff associate; and Pat M. Holt, associate clerk, Committee on Foreign Relations.

Chairman RUSSELL. The committee will come to order.

At the time the committee recessed on yesterday, Senator Smith was questioning Secretary Marshall.

I understand you have not concluded your questions, so you will proceed.

**TESTIMONY OF SECRETARY OF DEFENSE GEORGE C. MARSHALL,
ACCOMPANIED BY FELIX LARKIN, GENERAL COUNSEL—Re-
sumed**

Senator SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary Marshall or General Marshall, there was a question that came to my attention this morning from something I saw in the morning paper on this. I will just diverge from my other line of questioning a minute to ask you this question:

POLITICAL AND MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE OF THIRTY-EIGHTH PARALLEL

Would you consider the question of whether we should settle at the Thirty-eighth Parallel a policy question or a military question?

Secretary MARSHALL. I would feel that as to the Thirty-eighth Parallel, the security of the Army would be involved, as it was in the instructions given General MacArthur on the first return to the Thirty-eighth Parallel, after the aggression started there, and more particularly recently, after the withdrawal from North Korea south

of Seoul, to south of Seoul, and the return of the force under General Ridgway to the vicinity of the thirty-eighth parallel.

There was a military factor of the security of that command, meaning that part of the command might have to move north of the parallel in order to furnish adequate protection against turning movements, for example.

There was also the general political factor as to whether we should renew a movement into North Korea, a limited movement into North Korea. That was a political factor.

Senator SMITH. What I am trying to get at is what kind of an issue is a military command in the field justified in commenting on. We criticized General MacArthur for having said certain things. What brought this question to my mind was to read in Mr. Walter Lippmann's column this morning in commenting on something else, where he said:

But General Ridgway, who did such extraordinary things in averting what looked like a military defeat, went on record 2 months ago saying that "it would be a tremendous victory for the United Nations if the war ended with our forces in control up to the Thirty-eighth Parallel."

I am just wondering whether a statement like that was cleared with the Department of Defense, or whether that was a statement that General Ridgway was justified in making without clearance?

Secretary MARSHALL. I am quite certain that that was not cleared with the Department of Defense.

Senator SMITH. Well, isn't that the type of statement which you criticized General MacArthur for?

Secretary MARSHALL. I don't think that there is a sufficient parallel there, Senator. We have, for example, had no general public discussions regarding the thirty-eighth parallel so far as the commanders in the field and the Government here in Washington.

There Ridgway was saying something to the encouragement of his forces as he did in a statement that was released this morning.

Senator SMITH. I recall that in our discussions yesterday the point was brought out that the President of the United States at the press conference in January appeared to the Tokyo headquarters at least to define specifically General MacArthur's authority but denied there was any curb on his authority to speak freely on the Korean War. He has been criticized since for speaking on the Korean War, and yet it seems to me General Ridgway was doing the same. I admit it is a close line.

I want to get clear the statements military men can make without being cleared with the Department of Defense, and the kind that they would be reprimanded for if they didn't clear with the Department of Defense. I won't labor the point. I just want to bring this incident to your attention to see whether you felt there was an indiscretion there by General Ridgway 2 months ago in making that sort of a statement. It begins:

It would be a tremendous victory for the United Nations if the war ended with our forces in control up to the thirty-eighth parallel.

If that isn't a matter of policy, I don't see what would be. It doesn't say anything about the safety of the troops.

Secretary MARSHALL. That quite evidently was directed at his own troops and their morale, I would say. That is my own opinion.

GENERAL MAC ARTHUR AND THE JAPANESE TREATY

Senator SMITH. Now, to continue my discussion of yesterday, General, I want to get clearly in my mind this other responsibility that General MacArthur had as Supreme Commander of the Allied Nations in Japan. As I understand, it was very much concerned with the Japanese Peace Treaty. Mr. John Foster Dulles had just come back from Japan after having been in negotiations on the peace treaty, both with Japanese leaders and with our allies in Australia, and New Zealand. Supposedly General MacArthur was in on the whole discussion.

Now, I would like to ask the question whether, in determining to remove General MacArthur from SCAP, Mr. Dulles was consulted, whether the possible effect on the peace treaty was considered at all by the groups that removed General MacArthur.

Secretary MARSHALL. Mr. Dulles was not consulted. I do not know whom the President spoke to other than the four officials I have mentioned—myself, Secretary of State, Ambassador Harriman, and General Bradley. I know the President did speak to three or four others. I am quite certain Mr. Dulles was not among those four, but I cannot be positive.

Senator SMITH. Does it not seem strange that when the President asked Mr. Dulles to take the responsibility of carrying on the negotiations for the peace treaty, Mr. Dulles was not asked what his views would be on the possible effect on all that by the removal of General MacArthur?

Secretary MARSHALL. I believe I explained yesterday that that matter of General MacArthur's relation to the peace treaty was discussed at considerable length. However, the Secretary of State was present to give his views in relation to that matter.

Senator SMITH. Was there any suggestion in any of the discussions of improper conduct on the part of General MacArthur in the exercise of these commands other than the Korean command, in the decision to remove him as Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers? Did those who made or concurred in this decision take into account the inevitable adverse relations with Japan in this critical moment? Did they consider what might be the effect on Japan?

Secretary MARSHALL. That was very carefully considered.

Senator SMITH. Let me ask you this question; I think it was asked, in another form by Senator Bridges, yesterday:

Is there any other American whose personal prestige with the Japanese people and the Japanese Government was in any way equal to that of General MacArthur?

Secretary MARSHALL. I think it was generally recognized that his prestige with the Japanese people was not to be duplicated, certainly in a short time, by any other individual.

Senator SMITH. Well, I'm not quite clear, then, why all the haste was necessary.

POSSIBILITY OF CONSULTATION PRIOR TO DISMISSAL

I read to you yesterday the questions I put to General MacArthur, whether he would have turned his command over to General Ridgway, if requested by his superiors.

Why wasn't it possible to send a member of the Joint Chiefs over to talk with him, or have him come here, and explore this with him, and request him to turn over his command, which he would have done? Why was it necessary to humiliate him by this public discharge, without notice?

Secretary MARSHALL. That was the fault of the radio——

Senator SMITH. Why was it necessary to humiliate him to the further extent of taking him out of the Japanese command, where it is conceded he has done one of the most outstanding jobs in history, with the Japanese people?

Secretary MARSHALL. Starting with the last phase of your question, first, Senator: I went into that the other day, and explained that it had been discussed at considerable length, and the feeling was, and decision finally was that it would be most unwise to have the possible confusion of conflict between General Ridgway, who was undertaking an extremely difficult job, under the circumstances, with all of the forces based in Japan, the utilization of Japanese facilities, and, I presume, of the Japanese people, and at the same time to have another American in authority in the same region, and it was felt that that would result in a divided authority which might open up many confusions.

Senator SMITH. Isn't it a fact that General Ridgway was General MacArthur's choice for the command in Korea?

Secretary MARSHALL. I was not in Washington at that time. I don't know whether he sent the name in or it was proposed to him, but I know he highly approved.

DIVIDED COMMAND BETWEEN JAPAN AND KOREA

Senator SMITH. General MacArthur testified here he would have suggested the name of Ridgway. It seems with the divided command, with General Ridgway in Japan and General Van Fleet in Korea, you have the divided command.

Secretary MARSHALL. But General Van Fleet is under General Ridgway.

Senator SMITH. Sir?

Secretary MARSHALL. He is subordinate to General Ridgway.

Senator SMITH. General Ridgway on every matter except Korean strategy could have been subordinate to General MacArthur.

Secretary MARSHALL. I didn't understand.

Senator SMITH. You say General Van Fleet is subordinate to General Ridgway.

Secretary MARSHALL. Yes.

Senator SMITH. You didn't think it was possible to have General Ridgway in command of Korea in the matter of strategy there and still have General Ridgway subordinate to General MacArthur so far as Japanese relationships and the peace treaty were concerned. I am frankly concerned because I am on the subcommittee of the Foreign Relations Committee. We have been considering this Japanese peace treaty for a long time and have been in constant talks with Mr. Dulles. I feel very much frustrated by this development, because I don't know what our responsibilities are, how we carry through on them.

General Ridgway admittedly knows nothing about them, and Mr. Dulles may have to go out there with very little background and carry the load.

It that what the group contemplated?

Secretary MARSHALL. You are going now into a detail which comes within the State Department and does not come within the Defense Department.

Senator SMITH. I thought that you, as one of those who participated in deciding that General MacArthur must go, must realize the importance of the Japanese situation.

Secretary MARSHALL. All I can say is, as I explained, that it was discussed at length.

DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO DISMISSAL

Senator SMITH. Now, Mr. Chairman, I would like very much to have appear in the appendix—I think we have all these documents, but I think they ought to appear together—the documents including the President's order dismissing General MacArthur and the supporting documents that were given to the press, so that the appendix will show those documents together. I want the documents together with the justification in the President's statement for General MacArthur's dismissal.

Chairman RUSSELL. Those documents have already been printed in the—

Senator SMITH. They are printed in this report.

Chairman RUSSELL. In the compilation that was arranged for the benefit of the committee, but I see no objection to having them reprinted again, and if no member of the committee objects, they will be printed in the appendix along with the other documents.

Senator SMITH. I would like them reprinted with some kind of a caption that these documents, including the President's order of dismissal, were the statements issued by the White House as the justification for the dismissal.

Chairman RUSSELL. Very well. If you will prepare the caption you desire, we will have it appear.

Senator SMITH. I thank the chairman, and I will take it up with our staff.

Now, General Marshall, I think we agreed yesterday that probably the documents we were considering were not the sole cause of General MacArthur's dismissal.

Secretary MARSHALL. Correct, sir.

Senator SMITH. There were other causes.

Secretary MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator SMITH. I want, if I can, to see if I can find out for the record and for our own information what the background causes were of General MacArthur's dismissal, and in doing that I want to go back and ask you a few questions about your experience in China.

You have testified, if I understood you correctly, that you went to China in Christmas of 1945. You came back once for a short trip but stayed there until January 1947.

Secretary MARSHALL. Correct, sir.

Senator SMITH. Now might I ask you this. Had you been to China before that trip or was that your first trip to China?

Secretary MARSHALL. I was there from 1924 to 1927.

Senator SMITH. 1924 to 1927. That is sometime back before the recent crisis.

Secretary MARSHALL. That is the only other time. I had been in Manchuria in 1914.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR CHINA MISSION OF MARSHALL

Senator SMITH. Well, now could I ask you this. What was the directive that you received for your trip to China in Christmas 1945? I would like very much to know what the general outline of that directive was. There have been different reports about it.

Secretary MARSHALL. I haven't the actual directive, but I have a summation of it here. The objectives as stated in President Truman's instructions to me—

Senator SMITH. I would be satisfied if you are willing to put the directive in the record as one of our documents.

Secretary MARSHALL. That is very simple to do that. I was trying to transpose the discussion here into the statement of the directive, and I can't do it very conveniently.

Senator SMITH. If we can do that, I would like to have it in the record.

(The document above referred to will be found in the appendix of this record.)

Senator SMITH. Let me ask you your recollection of the broad reaches of that directive. What were you supposed to do in China?

Secretary MARSHALL. I was supposed primarily to bring an end to the fighting. That was the primary purpose of my trip. I was not, except in an inferential manner, to go into the political factors.

Those were stated in the President's directive, and they had as their background previous meetings and discussions which had occurred, and particularly in which General Hurley, then Ambassador, represented this Government.

The principal factor in relation to the President's directive was that there had been an agreement between all the parties in China, the Kuomintang or Government Party, the Communist Party and the minor parties to a meeting called a political consultative conference which had been agreed upon in October of 1945, and in December, about the 16th, 1945, the date was announced for that meeting of January 10, 1946.

I arrived under this Presidential directive just before Christmas in 1945, and my job under that directive as I comprehended it and as you can read and form your own conclusions was to bring about a cessation of hostilities which were rapidly building up, and between the date of my arrival and the morning of January 10 about 30 minutes before this general meeting with political purposes of the political consultative conference, there was a signed agreement between the representatives of the Communist regime as for their armies, and the representatives of the Generalissimo as for the armies of the Nationalist Government which was an armistice and which it was left to me to implement, and I did that by establishing in Peiping an executive headquarters of our people, the Government people and the Communist people.

Senator SMITH. You were trying to get them together, to cease fighting; that was the purpose of your trip?

Secretary MARSHALL. I was trying to bring about an armistice.

MARSHALL'S FUNCTIONS IN CHINA

Senator SMITH. Let me ask you this: When you did discover that you could not mix the two groups, you could not get them together, did you have any authority beyond that to make any recommendations with regard to our relationship with the Kuomintang government or the Commies or anything else?

Secretary MARSHALL. I don't quite understand what you mean by "authority." I made recommendations back to our Government, to the President directly, to him.

But, Senator, I moved into another role immediately after that; this meeting took place, this political meeting took place, in which I did not participate, and they reached a signed agreement—all the parties involved.

Chairman RUSSELL. Who were the parties, just to clear up the record?

Secretary MARSHALL. The National Government delegates, the Communist regime delegates, the Democratic League delegates, the Young China Party delegates; one other party called the Democratic Scientific Group delegates, and delegates without any party affiliations.

In that conclusion that they arrived at were two important matters: One was that there should be a constitutional convention on May 5, 1946; and that there should be a committee set up to which I was to be the adviser for the purpose of demobilizing the tremendous forces then under arms, and amalgamating the Communist forces, as reduced, with the government forces, as also reduced.

So, I sat as an adviser to that committee, and a working detailed agreement was arrived at—I have forgotten the date, but it occurred just the day before I left Chungking on my return to the United States in March of 1946.

Now, then, between that and the following fall occurred a great many events, and thereafter, I became involved in the matter of the differences as to the political factors regarding which they could not reach an agreement which permitted them to have the constitutional convention on May 5, and to set up the interim state council, which was to act while they were getting ready to put a constitution into effect.

WHO PREPARED UNNA DIRECTIVES?

Senator SMITH. Do you recall who had a hand in the preparation of the directives that sent you to China?

Secretary MARSHALL. At that time, Senator—Mr. Byrnes was Secretary of State, and I presume he had a hand in it; Mr. Acheson was Under Secretary of State, and I presume he had a hand in it; John Carter Vincent was the head of the China group in the State Department—certainly, he had a hand in it. I do not know what others did.

On my part, General Hull, who is now on duty in the Army headquarters, and was the head of the Operations Division during the

war for me, he represented my interests so far as I was concerned in that, together with a man from Time magazine forces, who had helped me briefly in the latter part of the war in the preparation of my final report, and who the directorship of Time loaned me to take to China with me, because he had been there throughout a good period of the war.

CONSULTATION WITH GENERAL MAC ARTHUR DURING CHINA MISSION

Senator SMITH. Did I understand you to say yesterday that you did not see General MacArthur on that trip to confer with him on the general Far East situation?

Secretary MARSHALL. On the trip out I did not go through Japan, I went through the Philippines and Indochina. On my return in March, I came back to Tokyo and saw General MacArthur then.

Senator SMITH. Did you discuss the Chinese situation with him at that time?

Secretary MARSHALL. I think I stated yesterday—anyway, I state it today, that I have no distinct recollection of a conversation with General MacArthur in regard to China. I would assume we talked it over because it was the foremost thought in my mind. But I am quite certain there was not a formal discussion of the matter.

Senator SMITH. You mentioned Time magazine. Can you tell us who it was on Time magazine?

Secretary MARSHALL. I just remembered his name—Mr. Shepley.

Senator SMITH. Would you spell it for the record?

Secretary MARSHALL. S-h-e-p-l-e-y. I think it is James Shepley.

DIFFERENCES BETWEEN WEDEMEYER AND STILWELL VIEWS

Senator SMITH. Now we are all aware, Secretary Marshall, that there were differences of opinion with regard to our whole China policy. I want to ask you what part General Stilwell played in that whole picture in determining these policies. He was, as I understand, one of your advisers in that matter at the time.

Secretary MARSHALL. He was the theater commander.

Senator SMITH. Yes. I want to get the difference if I can. What I am after is the difference between General Stilwell's views and Wedemeyer's views because that, I think, has an important bearing on the subject.

Secretary MARSHALL. I think the reports will show, and they can be brought into this—I am going back into recollection—that General Stilwell's view, basic view, was very much the same as General Wedemeyer's. His methods of procedure would naturally have been quite different from those of General Wedemeyer because Stilwell was a very positive, impatient individual, and he had an extremely difficult role to perform.

Stilwell, as I recall this phase, was intensely desirous of bringing the Communist army forces and the Nationalist army forces together in coordinated operations against the Japanese. And I think the records will show that he felt that the Nationalist forces were inclined or too much involved in fighting the Communists rather than getting together in the operation against the Japanese.

General Wedemeyer at that time, November 20, 1945, stated that—
The Nationalist Government was completely unprepared for the occupation of Manchuria in the face of Communist opposition.

On November 20, 1945, General Wedemeyer reported, he being then the commander of our troops in China and the chief of staff to the Generalissimo, Chiang Kai-shek, reported—

Chinese Communist guerillas and saboteurs can and probably will, if present activities are reliable indication, restrict and harass the movements of National Government forces to such an extent that the results will be a costly and extended campaign. Logistical support for National Government forces and measures for their security in the heart of Manchuria have not been fully appreciated by the Generalissimo or his Chinese staff. These facts, plus the lack of appropriate forces and transport, have caused me to advise the Generalissimo that he should concentrate his efforts on the recovery of North China and the consolidation of his military and political position there prior to any attempt to occupy Manchuria.

Among General Wedemeyer's conclusions at that time were the following:

The Generalissimo will be able to stabilize the situation in South China provided he accepts the assistance of foreign administrators and technicians and engages in political, economic, and social reforms through honest, competent civilian officials. He will be unable to stabilize the situation in North China for months or perhaps even years unless a satisfactory settlement with the Chinese Communists is achieved and followed up realistically by the kind of action suggested in the previous paragraph.

He will be unable to occupy Manchuria for many years unless satisfactory agreements are reached with Russia and the Chinese Communists.

I have no specific recollection of General Stilwell's attitude regarding those matters because he was relieved of his command before we got to that particular phase.

What I do recognize was his desire to bring a concerted action against the Japanese, on the part of the Nationalist forces, and the Communist regime forces.

Senator SMITH. That report you read from was about 1945?

Secretary MARSHALL. The date of that, from General Wedemeyer, was November 14, 1945.

Senator SMITH. Just after VJ-day, wasn't it? VJ-day was in August, wasn't it, 1945?

Secretary MARSHALL. VJ-day was in August.

Senator SMITH. Yes; I recall.

Now, General, I want to move from there to why General Wedemeyer was called back to a special mission in China in 1947.

THE WEDEMEYER MISSION TO CHINA

You say, in your previous testimony, that you had suggested to the President that he be asked to go on a special mission.

Secretary MARSHALL. I decided, in an effort to find out what best could be done, that General Wedemeyer was the best available person for that purpose, as he had been in China for a considerable period, he had commanded our forces in China, and he had been chief of staff to the Generalissimo, and the Generalissimo had great confidence in him.

As I recall the conversational arrangements at the time, General Wedemeyer felt that in order to pursue this in the most effective

manner, he not only should have a certain group with him, to look at various aspects, including the economic, but he should have a directive from the President, which gave him a status which would make practicable the investigation on the level we wished it made.

I told him to write his own directive for the President's use, or at least, his consideration.

I don't recall to what extent it was modified. I think I recollect no modifications.

In any event I took the matter then to the President, with the draft of the directive for General Wedemeyer. The President thought it a wise thing to send him, and it was appropriate to have that directive. Then, he authorized its issue to General Wedemeyer.

Senator SMITH. Well then, when General Wedemeyer came back and made his report on both China and Korea, as you have testified, that report was suppressed for certain reasons having to do with the present trusteeship in Manchuria. General Wedemeyer still, in that report, feels that we should support Chiang Kai-shek, and the Chinese Nationalists, and was opposed by the views of certain of the people in the State Department, on the other side.

DIFFERING VIEWS ON CHINESE COMMUNISTS

What I am trying to bring out here, and I get this from reading the white paper, is a conflict of views. There were certain of our representatives in the Far East who were urging the State Department to think in terms of the Communist movement as an agrarian reform program, something we should hitch up to, and we should, slowly but decisively, throw over Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang. I'd like to ask you, at that point, whether Mr. Owen Lattimore and Mr. John Carter Vincent were not two of the persons who were a good deal behind the thinking that led to that change of view in the State Department, and led to lining up some of our younger representatives out there, on that side of the fence?

Secretary MARSHALL. Mr. Lattimore was not in the State Department at the time I was Chief of Staff.

Senator SMITH. I know that. He was a very close adviser.

Secretary MARSHALL. This covers the period that I was Secretary of State. I said Chief of Staff. I meant Secretary of State. He did not come to my attention until a long time afterward.

John Carter Vincent, who represented the Chinese phases in the State Department for a considerable period of time, had very definite views regarding the Nationalist regime, but I personally received no impression while I was in the State Department that they were talking about an agrarian communistic regime quite remote from a Marxist-Soviet regime.

As I explained yesterday, I myself knew that the leaders were Marxist Communists because they asserted that time and again to me, and were very jealous of that characterization, so I do not know of this agrarian idea except as I explained yesterday, there were those undoubtedly who felt that the majority of the Communists in China were of the agrarian industries, because the Communist regime did not include any industrial areas of any importance.

Senator SMITH. Isn't it true, General, that there were two views developing as to the Chinese Communists and as to the Chinese Na-

tionalists? There was a school of thought here that was pressing hard to have the Communists taken over as our interests, and to let the Nationalist Chiang Kai-shek go rapidly despite the fact that Chiang Kai-shek had been our ally during the war?

General Wedemeyer, I think, always favored our continuing support of General Chiang Kai-shek with all his faults and with all his weaknesses.

Secretary MARSHALL. What is that about General Wedemeyer?

Senator SMITH. General Wedemeyer was on the Chiang Kai-shek Nationalist side of the debate. What I am leading up to is that I understood that General MacArthur very definitely favored that side in this discussion. He thought we were making a great mistake to move over into the Chinese Communist support, which was advocated by so many of our own State Department people.

I am just trying to bring out whether that background hasn't something to do with the present prejudice obviously in the Department of Defense and the Department of State against General MacArthur and has something to do with the cause of his removal. That is what I am trying to get at, frankly.

Secretary MARSHALL. Will you read that?

(The reporter read back the last question.)

Secretary MARSHALL. I don't think that had any connection with it whatsoever, Senator.

Senator SMITH. Well, I was studying this in 1949 when I was here. I happened to be laid up with illness at the time but I was able to do a lot of reading.

TWO SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT ON CHINA POLICY

I read the white paper through from cover to cover and I came to the conclusion that there were two schools of thought on this matter: The Lattimore-Vincent school followed by a number of our younger men like John Davis Service, and others in the State Department (I don't think Stilwell was so much, although he was opposed to Chiang Kai-shek), which was opposed to our giving further aid to Chiang Kai-shek, and on the other hand the Wedemeyer school. I was convinced from having seen General Wedemeyer personally that he was in favor of the Chiang Kai-shek support and thought it was a wise policy.

Then I talked to Mr. Jessup about it. Mr. Jessup was appointed head of a special committee. Mr. Jessup obviously was in the Lattimore-Vincent group favoring later recognition, bringing the Commies in and stopping the war by that route.

Then these things happened which gave me a great deal of concern. Quite suddenly General Wedemeyer was removed from the Pentagon in Washington and sent out to California in command of the Sixth Army, which looked like a promotion, but really took him away from any further consideration of these policies.

His report was not published and yet his report, as I read it, as subsequently published and the white paper, indicates his support of the Chiang Kai-shek position and his feeling we should continue to support Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalists as one of our allies against this Communist menace.

Then another thing happened which gave me concern, and that was this: Admiral Badger, who had been in charge of our Seventh Fleet and who in that capacity had responsibility for the mainland of China, as distinguished from General MacArthur, who had charge of our island defenses, was removed.

Admiral Badger came back; he met before our committee; we talked with him, and I talked with him privately; and I found he was distressed over the trend.

That is why, as a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, I asked permission of the Senate to go to the Far East; and I went to the Far East because of this concern.

I came back with the feeling that we were in a very critical situation, and I made a report to that effect which I need not go into now. I came to the feeling that there was a very distinct issue between what you might call the MacArthur-Wedemeyer group, who felt we had made a serious mistake in our attitude toward the Nationalists, and the other side, headed by the State Department (Dean Acheson and others) who wanted to build up the group sympathetic with recognizing the Commies. In fact, I was told shortly after I got back that we had given the green light to Great Britain to recognize the Chinese Communists, though when I got back, the first thing I did was to urge on Secretary Acheson not to do that under any circumstances.

I was convinced that the movement in China was a conquest by Russia by a subversive method, and that recognition of the Chinese Communists would simply mean we were conceding that China could go behind the iron curtain.

That is why I was so concerned. I was entirely sincere about it, no politics or anything else in it. It was just a desire to get the facts. I would like to have very much, if I have made my position clear, your comment on that development, which gave a number of us a great deal of concern.

FACTS ON WEDEMEYER AND BADGER RELIEFS

Secretary MARSHALL. Now, as to the facts, in the first place, regarding General Wedemeyer, General Bradley can testify to you in person regarding this, because he was Chief of Staff at the time.

He referred to this appearance in the press of the implication that General Wedemeyer was banished to San Francisco—this is hearsay now on my part—General Bradley stated that General Wedemeyer came to him and asked for relief here, and asked specifically for the assignment to the Army headquarters in San Francisco as his special desire, and that was considered a very favorable assignment.

So, his relief here, and his assignment there, were at his request. But General Bradley can testify to you in regard to that in person.

I don't know anything of any of the factors surrounding the case of Admiral Badger, so I will have nothing to say about that.

As to the build-up of this divided view as to the policy to be followed in China, as related to the Nationalist government regime, and Chiang Kai-shek, in particular, and the Communist regime: I was Secretary of State in 1947 and 1948. I ceased to function the first week in December 1948.

EFFORTS TO HELP CHINA IN 1947 AND 1948

Now, during that period, I know, so far as I was concerned as Secretary, and insofar as the efforts of those around me under my direction were concerned, we were trying to find how best we could help that situation.

I specifically was endeavoring to see what support could be given the generalissimo, and by "support" I meant actual dollars and cents, on the one side, at least, and matériel, that his representatives came to me in regard to, thought I was Secretary of State, in addition.

Our difficulty—my difficulty—was getting the necessary support from the various financial agencies of the Government with which I had to deal, and it took months to get the necessary agreements from the Advisory Board, which is the Secretary of the Treasury, the head of the Federal Reserve Board, the President of the Import-Export Bank, and a representative of the State Department.

It took months to get their agreements. It took a considerable period of time to get agreements through the Bureau of the Budget, because of their inability to find a factual basis for these funds; and you will recall that I finally came to Congress for \$570 million, but that took a period of 3 or 4 months to clear through the necessary governmental channels in order to bring it to Congress.

The point I am making is that I was trying to bring it to Congress, and it was very difficult to do because of the views as to the lack of justification as to the funds themselves.

Now, throughout this time we were endeavoring to find some way effectively to get this situation under control in China.

EXTENT OF COMMITMENT TO AID CHIANG

There, the issue in my mind, as Secretary of State, was to what extent this Government could commit itself to a possible involvement of a very heavy nature in regard to operations in China itself.

The situation, the conditions as I understood them, and having been out there some time, and having officers under me pretty much all over North China reporting to me with frequency, the situation was such that we would literally have to take over control of the country in order to insure that the armies functioned with efficiency. We would have to make a very considerable initial contribution, and we would be involved in the possibility of very extensive continuing responsibilities in a very large area.

At that time, our own military position was extraordinarily weak. I think I mentioned the other day that my recollection is—but the Chiefs of Staff can give you the accurate information—we had one and a third divisions in the entire United States.

As I recall General Wedemeyer's estimates, about 10,000 officers and others would be necessary to oversee and direct those various operations.

In view of our general world situation, our own military weakness, the global reaction to this situation, and my own knowledge out of that brief contact of mine in China, we could not afford to commit this Government to such a procedure.

Therefore, I was not in agreement with undertaking that, nor were, as I think at that time, though they can answer the question directly,

the Chiefs of Staff, because that was out of my bailiwick; that was in the War Department, the Navy Department of those days, and then finally, the Defense Department.

So, the real issue was how you would meet this situation without a tremendous commitment of this Government on the land area in Asia.

I knew of my own knowledge the very doubtful basis on which their operations and their governmental procedure rested.

I knew the difficulties they would have in maintaining morale, and in maintaining their military force with any degree of fighting efficiency; and I had very decided professional military doubts as to the competence of the leadership that would have to undertake these operations.

Now, those were the problems that I was struggling with personally, while I was Secretary of State, rather than the feeling on the one side of bolstering up, we will say, the Communist procedure, and the feeling on the other side, in regard to the Nationalist forces.

BREAKDOWN OF MEDIATION RESULTED IN AID TO CHIANG

The procedure of mediation, which was my principal role while I was out there, between Christmas 1945, and early January 1947, had been eliminated by the complete inability to gain any headway with that at all.

The Communists had openly proceeded in defiance of the Nationalist Government, and also openly in very bitter attacks against the United States, and against me personally.

It was no longer conceivable to proceed on any basis of mediation.

Senator SMITH. Then, you came to the conclusion that the directives you received could not be carried out? Were you aware of these two schools of thought right in our own State Department at the time: There were those who favored the one point of view and the others who still favored the Nationalist Chinese?

Secretary MARSHALL. I was stating a generality there which was probably unwise, but within the State Department, the problem had become, on my return, one of what could we do to bolster up the Nationalist Government. That was the problem, and the complication of the problem was what we felt, as regards the foundation on which that Government had come to rest.

There was no longer at that time, certainly in my opinion, a possibility in the immediate future of dealing on a practical basis with the Communist regime.

MAC ARTHUR VIEW OF CHINESE SITUATION AND MARSHALL MISSION

Senator SMITH. I had sent to me recently by a friend of mine a statement which I would like to read to you. It is not very long. It has a bearing on this because it reflects what apparently was General MacArthur's view on some of these things. And that is one of the reasons I was wondering whether the whole Chinese trouble had a bearing on this present decision to remove General MacArthur. I am quoting now from a communication I received from a friend of mine, and I think pretty good authority:

Shortly after VJ-day General MacArthur forwarded a report to the War Department evaluating the armed forces in China. He reported that the Chinese Communists had between 125,000 and 250,000 guerrillas badly armed. Under

his command were 4,000,000 Chinese regulars and the American-Chinese Air Force.

He proposed that with Chinese Government agreement America guarantee the personal safety of the Communist leaders and their right to participate as a legal political party in free elections, under American supervision after peace was restored. For this they were to lay down their arms. If the Communists refused to agree he proposed that he surround and disarm them by force.

That is General MacArthur.

Dozens of officials of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines and OSS saw that report. General MacArthur's proposal was exactly in accordance with the Atlantic Charter and the four freedoms, for which we claim to be fighting.

Decision on this report was postponed. The next month Ambassador Pat Hurley returned and resigned for reasons never made public.

General Marshall was appointed and on December 11, 1945, sat down with Dean Acheson to write out the instructions President Truman was to give him. According to General Marshall's testimony the rough draft was sent over to John Carter Vincent to be polished up. The instructions were the exact opposite of the Supreme Commander's, that is MacArthur's recommendations, they demanded practical control of the Government of China by the Communists without an election and while they kept their Army.

That was a statement that was sent to me by a gentleman who says he gets from various sources the general picture that MacArthur recommended this for a program and Mr. Vincent and others took a crack at this and decided on different procedure, and that led to your trip to China.

I think we ought to get the facts straight on this because there are so many rumors. And the same kind of things that have disturbed you disturbed me and led to my going out there and trying to find out what the truth was.

I couldn't help but feel after my trip there you had two schools of thought here and also on the ground in China, with MacArthur and Wedemeyer strong for the bolstering up as far as we could all the anti-Communist forces in that area, and others here who wanted more or less to appease them, which lead to the agitation in joining the British in recognizing the Chinese Communists.

I was told in Hong Kong by the British people there they would have to recognize the Communists or else they would lose Hong Kong. They knew that, and they had their trade. And when I got back here I was shocked to be told that Secretary Acheson had given the green light to the British and said, "Go ahead and recognize them, and we will come along a little bit later."

Could you tell us whether we did approve the recognition of the Chinese Communists by the British and did imply we would go along with them?

General MARSHALL. You ask me that——

Senator SMITH. That is what——

General MARSHALL. I don't know as to that, and you will have to ask Mr. Acheson. But I have a reference to make to what you just read.

Senator SMITH. Yes.

WHO DREW UP DIRECTIVE FOR MARSHALL'S MISSION

Secretary MARSHALL. In the first place I have not a recollection of that report of General MacArthur's, but I have a very decided recollection of the reference in there that I sat down in the State Department and drew up this policy. I did not.

Senator SMITH. I am very glad to get that.

Chairman RUSSELL. Just a minute.

Secretary MARSHALL. I sat in this room for 5 or 6 days during that period, morning and afternoon, being investigated in regard to Pearl Harbor while this was going on and the drafting of the policy was taking place in the State Department.

On 1 or 2 days during the lunch period I had a chance to talk to Mr. Byrnes briefly in regard to it, and finally one morning—whether it was a Saturday morning or not I don't recall—I met with Mr. Byrnes, my own advisers that I have mentioned, Mr. Acheson, and Vincent when the document was read through which had been drafted and which the men that were looking after my interests thought was all right, but I spent my time up here, and when I finished up here I was engaged, as you would understand, each night in trying to find what was the position I was to take the next day against the questioning around this same table, so my preparation for going to China was largely a matter in this room of the investigation regarding Pearl Harbor.

Senator SMITH. Thank you very much, General, for that. I did want to get that clear if I could.

Chairman CONNALLY. Mr. Chairman, will the Senator from New Jersey tell us who this wise man is that advised him?

Senator SMITH. It isn't a wise man; just a letter I have from a friend of mine.

Chairman CONNALLY. Tell us who he is.

Senator SMITH. I prefer not to do it.

Chairman CONNALLY. I do not know how to weigh his testimony.

Senator SMITH. I am just perfectly willing to take General Marshall's statement he did not know anything about the first part of it, and the last part of it was untrue. That is perfectly clear. I am not questioning that at all. I just raised the question because it was brought to my attention.

Now Secretary Marshall, I would like to turn for a moment to this question of Formosa. I think you have indicated that you agree that Formosa should not be allowed to get into the hands of an enemy of the United States. That has been the position of General MacArthur and of the Joint Chiefs and so forth.

CHANGES IN POLICY TOWARD FORMOSA AND KOREA

What troubles me about the Formosa issue is that when I came back I talked to the State Department about it from my own observations, and I understood that was our position. That was our position in December of 1949, and yet on January 5, a statement came out from the White House practically cutting off all further aid to Formosa. So far as this policy was concerned, it seemed to me they had ignored the position of the Joint Chiefs, who I had been told were prepared to recommend that the opposite position be taken and Formosa not be allowed to get into the hands of the enemy.

That has always confused me because there was a difference apparently between the White House—

Secretary MARSHALL. Is that January 5, 1949?

Senator SMITH. That was January the 5th statement.

Secretary MARSHALL. 1949?

Senator SMITH. No; 1950, January 5, 1950, but I had been over there in 1949 and everybody I had talked to felt that the Joint Chiefs' position was absolutely sound; we should not let it get in hostile hands.

We did not want the base for ourselves, but it would be very serious for our line of defense there if it got in hostile hands.

On January 5 the President issued this statement practically taking the position that we would give no further military aid to Formosa. A few days later the Secretary of State made an address to the press here at a press luncheon at which I was present in which he eliminated Formosa entirely in his description of what our western line of defense was. It ran down from Japan, Okinawa, the Philippines, left out Formosa and left out Korea. I felt very much depressed, I am frank to say, after that statement because I felt that the Secretary of State had completely ignored the views of many of us who thought we were dealing with it on a bipartisan basis.

I was on the Foreign Relations Committee, and I talked about Formosa and the recognition issue. I was told when I inquired about this after I got back from the Far East and when they were trying to determine policy, that the adviser they called in to tell them what to do was Mr. Owen Lattimore. At the very time when I was hoping I could get a hearing with the special group studying the policy.

I was not given any hearing, nor was any attention paid to my recommendations. But Mr. Owen Lattimore did meet with this group, and that is when it was decided, let Korea go but don't let anybody know you are doing it.

Now do you know anything about that at all?

Secretary MARSHALL. I think that question has to go to the Secretary of State and the Chiefs of Staff. That is not in my period.

Senator SMITH. All right. Now, Mr. Secretary, I am going to be through in just a few minutes, but I want to ask you a few questions about the United Nations.

UNITED NATIONS ROLE IN KOREA

I am one of those, as you know, who has been a great supporter of the United Nations. I think it is the great hope of the world if it works out properly. I was very much pleased when the United Nations acted originally in June of last year on the Korean crisis, and they recognized the North Koreans promptly as aggressors; but later, when the Chinese Communists came in, it took them 3 months to recognize the obvious fact that the Chinese Communists were aggressors in Korea.

Here was a situation where the Chinese Communists were defying the authority of the United Nations. General MacArthur, of course, was commander in chief of the United Nations forces. He was asking for directives.

They appointed a committee of the United Nations to determine what sanctions should be applied in order to stop this aggression. The committee has been debating that ever since. That is, another 3 or 4 months passed.

As I understood General MacArthur's position from his testimony here and talking to him personally, all he has ever asked for is to be told what to do. He made his suggestions, and the Joint Chiefs made suggestions which later were more or less laid on the table because

they didn't seem necessary because conditions improved. He was asking what to do. The United Nations apparently cannot come to an agreement even on such mild methods of sanctions provided by the Charter as an economic blockade or actual blockade of the China coast.

I just don't understand what we can do with the United Nations. I am just wondering whether you know how much pressure we have put on the United Nations to apply some of these sanctions.

Did we take the position in the United Nations that there should be an economic blockade, that there should be a naval blockade of the whole China coast, and that the Nationalist troops on Formosa should have the wraps taken off so they could make forays or at least be a threat that would ease the pressure of those Chinese Communists on our troops?

Those are the issues I understood General MacArthur was raising. He wanted to have some way of pulling off that pressure.

Secretary MARSHALL. I think, as to the pressure and procedure question, that question should go to the Secretary of State; but I stated yesterday and also the day before as to the economic blockade. We gradually brought them around to the point where Great Britain and France will proceed to endorse our resolution to that effect. So we have made that much of a gain.

Senator SMITH. How recently was that?

Secretary MARSHALL. May the 7th.

Senator SMITH. May 7?

Secretary MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator SMITH. Just a few days ago?

Secretary MARSHALL. Yes, sir; so it makes the naval blockade an academic question.

Now, it isn't for me to give any opinions as to legislative and other general debates; but my own experience has been, it takes quite a time, sometimes, in very critical times, to reach a conclusion, and certainly when you are dealing with 60 nations you have added immeasurably to the complications involved, but I am no authority on that.

Senator SMITH. There is just one more question I wanted to ask you.

ISSUE OF FORMOSA AND CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN UNITED NATIONS

I think you agreed that a discussion of any immediate cease-fire or armistice with the Koreans would exclude the question of the recognition of Communist China in the United Nations?

Secretary MARSHALL. That it will be excluded by the Government.

Senator SMITH. And the question of turning Formosa over to them?

Secretary MARSHALL. Yes.

Senator SMITH. That will be excluded?

Secretary MARSHALL. Yes.

Senator SMITH. In the event that some other country may bring up the issue of recognition and of Formosa, do you believe the United States should definitely exercise a veto?

Secretary MARSHALL. That is the very decided impression I have, at the present time.

Senator SMITH. Do you think we should exercise it?

Secretary MARSHALL. Think we should—

Senator SMITH. That we should exercise the veto?

Secretary MARSHALL. I won't go into the technical part of that, but we should certainly never yield to it.

Senator SMITH. Never yield?

I am glad to hear you say that, because I have been led to understand that if that came up in a meeting of the Security Council, it would be a procedural question and we could not take a veto action because of the position we took on veto procedures. This, however, is virtually the conquest of China by an external power—we have a question of external power, which is very different from an internal revolution.

I want to make it clear, for the record, that I feel definitely that we must stand firm against the recognition of Communist China, or else we will be giving up everything that the Korean struggle has been for.

Secretary MARSHALL. I think that what has not been understood is that we can't avoid a discussion of the problem, and the problem has been as to how best to handle that discussion.

Senator SMITH. Of course we will oppose it.

The biggest question is whether, if the majority vote for it, we are going to apply our veto, as we have a right to do, in the Security Council.

That raises another question of consequence.

If it comes up in the Assembly, I am not sure of the legality of it. I want to make it clear that, with all my power, I am going to oppose the admission of the Chinese Communists who have defied that body, as a reward for the success they have had in their aggression, and I hope you share my view on that.

Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I regret I have taken so much of your time, but I felt that we should explore all those matters.

QUESTIONING BY SENATORS

Chairman RUSSELL. At the risk of being misunderstood, I want to make a brief statement about these hearings.

I want to preface that statement by saying that I am not being critical of any member of the committee. I am not undertaking to apply any standards for the taking of this testimony.

We here have General Marshall before us for, I believe it is, the fourth day.

We have a great many other witnesses who are to follow him, and I hope that we may be able to conclude the hearings before too much time elapses. I will not fix any time.

I know that all Senators are entitled to ask all the questions they wish, and there are certain reasons, at times, why a Senator would wish to ask a repetitious question, because it fits into the mosaic that he desires to develop; but it will be very helpful, if the Senators do not have that purpose in view, if they would cull over the questions they have had prepared, in order that we might not go over the same ground too much, or too often.

Sometimes I can understand why the Senators would like to go over the same ground, and I have no criticism, and I have not criticism of him if he does; but if, where we have long lists of questions, if we could cull out those that have been covered, I think that it would be very helpful.

Now, it would also be very helpful if the Senators would maintain the perfectly magnificent record of promptness in attending hearings that has been established during the first several days.

We have been able to get a quorum present here almost on the hour of convening, except on the last 2 days. That would be helpful and save us some 10 or 15 minutes, if we could get a quorum here promptly at 10 o'clock.

I do not want to cut anybody off, but it is confusing to me, and I think it must be confusing to the witnesses, and I have been here early myself, where we make too long prefatory statements to our questions.

I merely lay those matters before you for your consideration, not with any intent or idea of gagging any Senators, or preventing them from asking any questions that they might desire.

I also said, for the benefit of some of those Senators who do not sit here at the top of the table, who might have a long list of questions in the first instance, that could be culled; in the second place, they desire to have an opportunity to ask those questions.

I hope, Senator Johnson, since you are next in order, that you do not think I have directed this entirely to you.

POSSIBLE RULE FOR QUESTIONING WITNESSES

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, just thinking aloud, by way of suggestion—but we are going to have many witnesses before the committee, and I would like to make a suggestion that we follow the schedule of questioning where each man, on the first round, asks questions for 30 minutes, and then passes over; and, on the second round, for 30 minutes, and passes over, with the understanding that we will have as many rounds as are necessary to accommodate the full list of questions of each member of the committee.

Chairman RUSSELL. You have heard that suggestion, gentlemen. This examination, of course, is in the hands, wholly, of the committee.

Senator STENNIS. Mr. Chairman, may I observe, and there is no nature of complaint in this—I am down at the end of the table, and the subjects are very thoroughly exhausted before they get here.

That is entirely all right, but I believe that the committee, or the Chair, is going to have to adopt some rule or policy that will hasten the matter along.

With the number of witnesses to be examined, and with every Senator having unlimited time, I do not believe it will work. It will extend this matter for 60 days, if that can't be checked in some reasonable manner.

Senator JOHNSON. Mr. Chairman, if Senator Morse will make that a motion, I will be glad to second it, and we can get the wishes of the committee.

Senator KNOWLAND. Mr. Chairman, just before the question is put, I doubt if I would take any more than a half hour, but it would seem to me that if we are going to invoke some of these rules, they should be invoked prior to starting around the table.

Now, this may be the last time that the Congress of the United States, and the American people, have an opportunity to develop some facts which have not yet been developed.

At Yalta, at the Yalta Conference, three or four of the participants of that conference have died and are no longer available, except in their writings, as to what took place.

The other day, all of us felt that the Senator from Oregon did an excellent job in his examination of General MacArthur, taking 2 days; and there was certainly no complaint because I think he contributed a great deal to the hearings; but I do not personally consider it quite proper, when we get part way down the table, to invoke a rule which had not been invoked at the start.

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, the Senator from California completely convinces me that the application of my rule at this present time might be, in effect, discriminatory, and therefore I will not make the motion, but will serve notice that with the next witness, I will move that we follow a procedure where each member of the committee will be allowed to cross-examine for 30 minutes at a time, but with the distinct understanding that each member of this committee will be allowed sufficient time before a witness is excused to complete whatever questioning he feels he must ask.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, the motion having been withdrawn, Senator Johnson, you are now recognized.

Senator McMAHON. I hope the spirit of it, Mr. Chairman, continues on.

Senator GREEN. Mr. Chairman, I have a suggestion I would like to make in that connection. I think it would shorten the hearings, and that is: that any questioner, when he reads statements or asks questions, should claim responsibility for them. It seems to me he ought to make them his own, before he asks any questions.

Chairman RUSSELL. That is a question for the——

Senator GREEN. I think the chairman made some such suggestion at the beginning, did he not?

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, I think that that was discussed at some stage of the proceedings, Senator; but I don't know that it was adopted as any rule by the committee.

The committee has it within its power to take action in that direction, if it desires to do so.

NO LIMIT ON QUESTIONING

Senator SMITH. Mr. Chairman, just in that connection, I think that I probably offended, but I want to call attention to the fact that I understood, when we started with General MacArthur, that we were going to take a round of two questionings all around. I personally did not ask all the questions I had in mind because I wanted to give everybody a chance, but we seem to have broken away from that.

Chairman RUSSELL. The Senator had two opportunities.

Senator SMITH. One of our members took 2 hours with General MacArthur. I apologize, I didn't think I would take more than a half to three-quarters of an hour, but things developed from each answer.

I apologize for taking too much time. I think it was too long.

Chairman RUSSELL. I haven't criticized the Senator. He is wholly within his rights; but I do want to have the record clearly show that the Senator was not in any way cut off in his examination of General MacArthur, because we went around the table twice, and I called on each member, each Senator, and did not undertake to limit any Sen-

ator in any way; so, each Senator had two opportunities to ask questions.

Senator SMITH. I agree with that. I just wanted to make it clear that I imposed the limitation on myself to make progress.

Chairman RUSSELL. Oh, yes.

Senator SMITH. I feel that we had abandoned that rule because of the length of some of the examination that had taken place and, therefore, I felt entitled to go ahead.

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Morse?

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, on the comment as to the procedure, I think the chairman has been exceedingly fair, and he has made clear to each member of the committee at all times that he has the right to ask questions for such period of time as he, in his judgment, wants to ask those question.

I do not think the Senator from New Jersey has to apologize to anybody for his examination. He has been within his rights, and he certainly has conducted the examination, I think, in a very fair manner.

But I think, and the only suggestion I have tried to make, is that we ought to work out a rotation system here, because I am going to ask of each witness whatever questions I want to for as long a period as I want to, within such rotation system, and I am going to be my own judge as to what questions I should ask, and how long I should take in asking.

I think as long as we are in session, each member of the committee has that clear right, as the chairman has made so clear to the members of the committee; and that our responsibility to our colleagues, it seems to me, is only to go along with a fair rotation procedure so that we share the time. But I think now is the time to make perfectly clear, so far as the junior Senator from Oregon is concerned, that I am never going to agree to any procedure that is going to limit an exhaustive examination of a witness, whether it takes me a day or two or three; I am going to complete my examination.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, the Chair would be the last to suggest any limitation.

Senator MORSE. I understand.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Johnson.

GENERAL AREAS OF QUESTIONING

Senator JOHNSON. There are three general areas that I want to cover with you. They are fields that you have gone over to some extent yourself in your previous testimony, and I realize that your answers are likely to be briefer than the questions, but I want them in the record to avoid any possible confusion.

Now, the areas that I want to cover with you, General, are, first, your opinion and the justification for the recall of General MacArthur; second, the wisdom of the program that we are carrying on in Korea; and, third, the preparedness and mobilization effort in this country.

MAC ARTHUR'S ATTITUDE TOWARD PRESENT POLICY

Now, as I recall your testimony, General, I believe you said that you recommended the recall of General MacArthur because you be-

lieved that he did not favor and could not wholeheartedly support the policies of the Commander in Chief and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The question I want to ask you is this: In view of General MacArthur's statement to the Congress, and in view of his testimony to this committee, in your opinion, is there any doubt about whether he favored the present policy?

Secretary MARSHALL. There is none, sir.

Senator JOHNSON. And would you care to elaborate on that a little bit?

Secretary MARSHALL. No, I think that covers the question.

Senator JOHNSON. In other words, it's your position that he made it abundantly clear upon his return to this country and his public appearances and his appearances before this committee that he did not favor and wholeheartedly support the program adopted by this Government.

Secretary MARSHALL. That is correct, sir.

MAC ARTHUR STATEMENTS AND DECEMBER 6 DIRECTIVE

Senator JOHNSON. Now, General, I would like for you to put before you the committee print entitled "The Military Situation in the Far East" and turn to page 178 of that committee print. Page 178 sets forth the December 6 directive which has been discussed here at some length.

I will not read all of that directive, but I want to quote the ninth paragraph of that document and I want you to follow me very carefully as I quote it.

Officials overseas, including military commanders and diplomatic representatives, should be ordered to exercise extreme caution in public statements, to clear all but routine statements with their departments, and to refrain from direct communication on military or foreign policy with newspapers, magazines, or other publicity media in the United States.

I am merely quoting that paragraph, General Marshall, to serve as the basis for the next few questions that I want to ask you and I want your answers in the record.

STATEMENT OF FEBRUARY 14, 1951

I would like for you to turn to page 181 of the same booklet where there is a statement by General MacArthur printed in the New York Times of February 14. I wish you would please look at the fourth paragraph of that statement and I would like to quote a few lines of it, and I quote:

The concept advanced by some that we should establish a line across Korea and enter into positional warfare is wholly unrealistic and illusory. It fails completely to take into account the length of such a line at the narrowest lateral, the rugged terrain which is involved and the relatively small force which could be committed to the purpose.

I want you to look at those lines, General, and I want you to look at the balance of the paragraph and the paragraph that follows, and then I should like for you to tell this committee if in your opinion those paragraphs comply meticulously with the directive of December 6 as transmitted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Secretary MARSHALL. I do not think they did.

Senator JOHNSON. Now remember, General, in asking these questions I am not necessarily adopting your view as to what does and what does not comply, but I am seeking to ascertain your views.

Your views should mean much to this committee because you have spent the major portion of your life in the military service, and would you tell the committee how many years you spent in the uniform?

Secretary MARSHALL. A little over 43 years. I am stopping when I went to China.

Senator JOHNSON. And since then you have served as Special Ambassador, Secretary of State of this country, and presently Secretary of Defense.

Secretary MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator JOHNSON. For a total of how many years of public service to your country?

Secretary MARSHALL. A little over 49 years, sir.

STATEMENT OF MARCH 8, 1951

Senator JOHNSON. Now, General, I would like to direct your attention to the bottom of page 182 and the top of page 183 of the same booklet. It is a paragraph from the New York Times of March 8, which reads, quoting General MacArthur, and I quote:

Vital decisions have yet to be made, decisions far beyond the scope of the authority vested in me as the military commander, decisions which are neither solely political nor military, but which must provide on the highest international level an answer to the obscurities which now becloud the unsolved problems raised by Red China's undeclared war in Korea.

Tell me, General, in your opinion does that paragraph comply meticulously with the directive of December 6?

Secretary MARSHALL. I do not think it did.

STATEMENT OF MARCH 24, 1951

Senator JOHNSON. All right, General. Now I direct your attention to page 184, which carries another statement by General MacArthur, printed in the New York Times of March 24. The second complete paragraph on that page says in part, and I quote:

Even under inhibitions which now restrict activities of United Nations forces—and so forth.

General, will you look at that whole paragraph and tell me whether in your opinion it complies meticulously with the directive of December 6.

Secretary MARSHALL. I do not think it did.

LETTER OF MARCH 20, 1951

Senator JOHNSON. Now, General, would you turn to page 186 of the committee booklet which carries the March 20 letter written to Representative Joseph W. Martin, the minority leader in the House of Representatives.

The first paragraph on that page reads as follows, and I quote:

Generally these views are well known and clearly understood, as they follow the conventional pattern of meeting force with maximum force, as we have never failed to do in the past. Your view with respect to the utilization of the Chinese forces on Formosa is in conflict with neither logic nor this tradition.

General, in your opinion, under all the circumstances, does that paragraph comply meticulously with the directive of December 6?

Secretary MARSHALL. I do not think it does.

Senator JOHNSON. In other words, General, there are four instances here in which in your opinion General MacArthur failed to comply with the directive of December 6? Is that correct?

Secretary MARSHALL. I will have to ask you to repeat that.

Senator JOHNSON. I have related four instances in which in your opinion General MacArthur did not comply with the directive of December 6. Is that correct?

Secretary MARSHALL. That is correct.

LETTER TO FREEMAN MAGAZINE, APRIL 5, 1951

Senator JOHNSON. Now, General, on page 186 of this booklet we find a brief message from General MacArthur to the editor of the Freeman magazine. It is dated April 5. Would you read that message, General, and tell me whether in your opinion, and under all the circumstances existing, it complies meticulously with the directive of December 6?

Secretary MARSHALL. You are referring to General MacArthur's message of April 5?

Senator JOHNSON. I am referring to page 186, dated April 5, General MacArthur's brief message to the editor of the Freeman magazine.

Secretary MARSHALL. That message involves a procedure to which I cannot give a categorical reply.

Senator JOHNSON. General, would you turn——

Secretary MARSHALL. I have not finished.

Senator JOHNSON. I beg your pardon.

Secretary MARSHALL. It might be taken to imply that this was a political decision regarding which General MacArthur—or beyond General MacArthur's authority. It might be merely a way of expressing his compliance with the instructions of December 6.

Under the circumstances where his recommendation was followed in this matter, where it was brought to his attention by the Chiefs of Staff, and the arms and equipment available, and where he made a recommendation which they accepted, there is the possible implication that that created an impression that he was held remote from this question as to the arming of these additional Korean individuals. I don't know.

PRESENT COURSE OF ACTION

Senator JOHNSON. Now, General, I want to go into the second field of questioning as I outlined, and I think it is pretty simple.

You and General MacArthur have agreed that there are three alternatives in Korea: First, we can get out; second, we can continue our present course as planned; and third, we can adopt the recommendations made to this committee and to the country by General MacArthur.

General, I want to know whether in the light of the wealth of military experience that you have had and the outstanding service you have rendered this Nation, and in view of the fact that I assume you have available to you today the best military advice in this country—I want to know whether it is your opinion that the present

course that this Nation is following in Korea is calculated to bring us the quickest victory for our objectives with the least loss of life.

Secretary MARSHALL. The best military advice I have, in which I concur with the information available to me, is that the course we are now following is the only practical course at the moment which we feel can lead to a successful outcome of that campaign in terminating the aggression, and a victory in consequence, with the least loss of life and with the least possibility of the intervention of the Soviet Government.

STATUS OF PREPAREDNESS AND MOBILIZATION

Senator JOHNSON. Now, General, are you completely satisfied in the light of world conditions as we meet here this morning with the preparedness and mobilization effort that is being made by this country and the results we are obtaining?

Secretary MARSHALL. Speaking purely from the Defense Department's point of view, and very frankly, I am not. We are in a situation where time is of imperative importance and where our basic plan to meet this crisis in a manner that can be sustained without too serious economic involvements is completely held up here in Congress.

All our planning has been based in general on that manpower program. We are being called upon to submit new legislation regarding the vitalization of the reserves. Naturally that legislation has to be based on what comes from the Congress in regard to the manpower problem, which really means universal military training and service.

Every day—it used to be every week of delay was a great embarrassment to us in our planning; now it has gotten to the point where I think I can say without overemphasis, that every day of delay is unfortunate—to put it very mildly.

Now, as to appropriations, I think the Congress has gone ahead very rapidly in such complicated matters. As to how the present budget proposals are going to be handled, that remains to be seen. But I certainly feel up to the present time that the Congress has gone ahead in an exceedingly complicated and embarrassing proposition with reasonable rapidity.

As to the developments in our preparedness program in other fields outside of the Defense Department, I wouldn't make a comment on that, sir. Mr. Lovett could do that better than I could because he is heavily involved in all of the questions of inflation and controls and matters of that sort.

PREPAREDNESS TO FIGHT ON TWO FRONTS

Senator JOHNSON. General Marshall, when General MacArthur was here, he testified to his belief that we should, and we were able to fight communism on two or more fronts, if that became necessary.

He pointed out, if it would be necessary for us to do this, it would be equally necessary for the enemy to meet the hardships and demands of a multiple front in a total war.

He regarded it, as I remember his statement to the joint session, as defeatist attitude to take another position.

Would you care to comment on this particular point of view, and our ability to meet the challenges of the global problems as they may be presented?

Secretary MARSHALL. I think the consideration of the statement has to be very specially qualified with the understanding that we are not in a position now to take measures which, we will say, were characterized by General MacArthur the opposite of defeatist measures.

We are gathering our strength as rapidly as we can, and we certainly do not want to become involved in a world struggle at any time, and certainly not prior to the time we are reasonably prepared to meet it.

Senator JOHNSON. You do not think that we are presently prepared to meet it?

Secretary MARSHALL. What is the question?

Senator JOHNSON. And you do not think that we are presently prepared to meet it?

Secretary MARSHALL. I am quite certain we are not.

GLOBAL ASPECTS OF KOREAN SITUATION

Senator JOHNSON. General Marshall, when General MacArthur was here he testified that his present knowledge of global problems was very general. He has been a theater commander and, on some of the important issues of the day that were mentioned to him, he said he had not given them much thought in 14 years.

Do you consider this significant in appraising the soundness of his proposals for the Korean campaign?

Secretary MARSHALL. Would you repeat the question, Mr. Reporter? (The pending question was read.)

Secretary MARSHALL. Well, I think that is made very clear by General MacArthur himself that the global consequences have not been entirely apparent to him.

Senator JOHNSON. In other words, you think it is quite likely that, when General MacArthur or any other great general had been removed from the intelligence and diplomatic reports of the world for a long period of time, he might very well arrive at the conclusion he has arrived at, so far as Korea is concerned. On the other hand, if he were here and looking at the whole world and the reports that were received on it, he might arrive at an entirely different conclusion?

Secretary MARSHALL. I think that is quite possible.

CONSULTATION WITH MAC ARTHUR

Senator JOHNSON. General, have you been able to determine the occasions, if any, on which the President invited General MacArthur to come to the United States to discuss problems with him?

Secretary MARSHALL. I have not gotten the data on that yet, sir.

Senator JOHNSON. Have you had an opportunity to check with General Bradley as to whether any members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have been in the Far East to consult with General MacArthur between VJ-day and the visit of General Collins in 1949?

Secretary MARSHALL. They are going through their files, I am told, and have not come up to me with the report yet.

Senator JOHNSON. Thank you very much, General.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Green.

SIGNIFICANCE OF SOVIET-CHINESE TREATY

Senator GREEN. General Marshall, in all this discussion there was no mention of the treaty between Russia—Soviet Russia—and Red China until yesterday in the questioning of you as a witness, and then it was treated as a matter of not the greatest consequence, I suppose because of the fact that many of us doubt very much whether Russia will feel any moral obligation to keep its treaties.

However, aren't there other reasons to give significance to that treaty? Hasn't it meant a great deal to Red China and the people of Red China? Would not there be a serious setback to Russian influence in China if after all the publicity given to this treaty Russia failed to live up to it in case of aggression against China?

Secretary MARSHALL. I would say that that is the case. I believe I put forward yesterday some appreciation of that situation as to the possibilities of China, the Chinese Communist regime feeling that the Soviets had let them down, which might have very disastrous consequences, and therefore they would be impelled to act possibly in advance of their previous decisions.

Senator GREEN. The treaty calls upon Russia to come to China's aid in case of attack either by Japan or any other nation, does it not?

Secretary MARSHALL. Well, I have here the particular paragraph to which I had reference yesterday. The preamble notes that the signatories were, to quote—

Filled with determination jointly to prevent by the consolidation of friendship and cooperation between the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics and the people of the Republic of China the rebirth of Japanese imperialism and a repetition of aggression on the part of Japan or any other state which should unite in any form with Japan in acts of aggression.

You will recall that the propaganda which is released from Russia and by the Chinese Communists talks continuously of our aggression, particularly of this country. Article I stipulates:

Both high contracting parties undertake jointly to take all necessary measures at their disposal for the purpose of preventing a repetition of aggression and violation of peace on the part of Japan or any other state which should unite with Japan directly or indirectly in acts of aggression.

In the event of one of the high contracting parties being attacked by Japan or states allied with it and thus being involved in a state of war, the other high contracting party will immediately render military and other assistance with all means at its disposal.

During the past 6 months the Soviet Government and Communist China have, as I have said, publicly called attention to that treaty in connection with events in Korea and in the alleged rearmament of Japan, and I might add to that it has enough there for them to twist any meaning they may so desire.

Senator GREEN. And that condition meeting that treaty would arise if we carried out a policy of bombing the coastal cities of China?

Secretary MARSHALL. That was the fear and the thought of the Chiefs of Staff and others in the Government in connection with this particular matter.

Senator GREEN. So that if that policy were carried out, no matter what our motive might be in a limited attack on China, it would call upon Russia to come to China's aid.

Secretary MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator GREEN. And the failure to do so would have great consequences, not only to China but on our whole program of global warfare?

Secretary MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator GREEN. After all, doesn't the difference between the policy of the Government of the United States and the policy proposed by General MacArthur come down to the difference between regarding this as a problem limited to the territory of Korea, or that part of Asia adjoining, on the one hand, and regarding it as a part of the great global warfare which is possible, on the other?

Secretary MARSHALL. I think that is correct, sir. I think that is correct.

INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS AND NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE

Senator GREEN. There is one other minor question I would like to draw attention to.

Some of the questioners kept asking whether, if we did this or we did that—agreed to do this or agreed to do that—it wouldn't be giving up our independence.

Now isn't any international agreement in a certain sense, limited sense, giving up our independence?

Secretary MARSHALL. It is a limitation on our sovereignty.

Senator GREEN. It is a limitation on independence, if it is proper to use the strict meaning of the word; and so it is a question of degree. If we are not going it alone in all matters, we must give up a part of our independence, if you give the strict meaning of the word, but in the customary meaning of the word it is not giving up our independence.

So I think we ought to be careful, should we not, as to how we use that word "independence"?

Secretary MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator GREEN. That is all; thank you.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Morse.

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, I shall ask questions for 30 minutes, with the distinct understanding that I shall complete my examination on the second round.

Chairman RUSSELL. You may operate under any rule you seek to impose on yourself, Senator. The committee hasn't imposed any.

Senator MORSE. I thought the Chair would be interested in the rule I have imposed on myself.

Chairman RUSSELL. I have no complaint to find.

Senator WILEY. Mr. Chairman, may I suggest that the Senator from Oregon, who on many occasions can let his voice ring out in the Senate, raise his voice here instead of being so subdued? It is very difficult to hear him over here.

Senator JOHNSON. I would like for the record to show that I have meticulously complied with the injunction of the chairman and made my questions brief and to the point.

Chairman RUSSELL. I don't know that they were injunctions, but the Senator's examination, in time and manner, met with my complete approval.

Senator JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

EFFECT OF A BLOCKADE AGAINST PORT ARTHUR

Senator MORSE. General, in my examination of General MacArthur I asked him if he would favor the blockade of Port Arthur, and his reply was that he would; and I asked him, in effect, if he thought that might hasten the entrance of Russia into a full-scale war in Asia; and he replied in substance that he didn't think it would, because of his view that he thinks they will come into the war if and when they are ready and want to, and that their action will not be determined by any such specific event as the blockade of Port Arthur.

I would like to ask you a few questions about that blockade.

It is true, is it not, that Port Arthur is one of the principal Russian ports in the Pacific?

Secretary MARSHALL. That is their warm-water port.

Senator MORSE. It is true, is it not, that it is a great international port into which ships under many flags ply?

Secretary MARSHALL. Dairen; not Port Arthur.

Senator MORSE. Yes. In your opinion, might the blockade of Port Arthur create such a state of international tension as to have an effect on the earlier entrance of Russia into the war than might otherwise be the case if the port was not blockaded?

Secretary MARSHALL. That is correct, sir. I think it would introduce that likelihood.

Senator MORSE. In light of history, have we not learned that the Russian people have usually rallied to the defense of their country whenever they have felt that a foreign power was encroaching either on their land territory or upon their exit to the rest of the world through a port?

Secretary MARSHALL. I think that is correct, sir.

Senator MORSE. Therefore, am I correct in concluding that one of the reasons for the opposition of the Defense Establishment, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to General MacArthur's suggestion concerning the type of blockade that he advocated was the feeling or fear on the part of the leaders of the Defense Establishment that it might have a very direct effect on hastening the time when Russia might enter a full-scale war in Asia?

Secretary MARSHALL. That is correct, sir.

Senator MORSE. Is it not also true, General Marshall, that Great Britain has in the past, and we assume as long as it is an open port, probably would in the future, had various ships under the British flag going into Dairen?

Secretary MARSHALL. I think they have been, but I am not clear on that.

BRITISH VIEW ON INTERFERENCE ON HIGH SEAS

Senator MORSE. Is it not a historic fact that one of the great policies of Great Britain, as far as international relations are concerned, has been to resist any interference with her shipping on the high seas in connection with any blockade?

Secretary MARSHALL. That is correct, sir. I must add, though, that they have been equally resistant to our penetrating their blockade when we were at peace with the nation concerned.

Senator MORSE. In other words, one of the great historic policies of Great Britain has always been to resist any interference with the Union Jack on the high seas as far as freedom of the seas is concerned?

Secretary MARSHALL. That is correct, sir.

Senator MORSE. If we blockaded Port Arthur and if that led to either the stopping of a British ship or a sinking of a British ship, and it would be a useless blockade if we didn't enforce it, would that not run the danger of creating a state of tension between the United States and Great Britain?

Secretary MARSHALL. That was considered in deciding on the matter of the blockade.

EFFECT OF BLOCKADE ON RELATIONS WITH OUR ALLIES

Senator MORSE. That leads me then—and I summarize a great many questions in view of the answer that you have just given me—that leads me then to the general question as to the relationship of the proposal of General MacArthur to impose the type of blockade that he recommended, to our relations with our allies in the United Nations.

Is it true that it was felt in the Defense Establishment that General MacArthur's recommendation in this specific respect would weaken the relationships between the United States and her allies in the United Nations, rather than strengthen those relationships?

Secretary MARSHALL. It would have imperiled them.

Senator MORSE. There was a danger that it might have caused a complete breakdown of a united program in Asia in respect to the whole Korean War?

Secretary MARSHALL. I think so.

EFFECT OF MAC ARTHUR'S MARCH 24 STATEMENT OF ALLIES

Senator MORSE. Do you know whether or not it is true, General Marshall, that after General MacArthur served his notice on the Chinese Communist leaders, in which he proposed a willingness on his part to meet with them in the field and discuss surrender and warned them that failing to comply with his notice might result in further military action on the part of the United States, including bombing and the blockade proposal—following that notice by General MacArthur, do you know whether or not some of our United Nations allies, and particularly Canada, filed rather strong protests with our Government over that notice of General MacArthur?

Secretary MARSHALL. I cannot answer that specifically, Senator. I was told of the general reaction. Mr. Acheson can give you the details.

Senator MORSE. But, on the basis of hearsay, is it your understanding, and is it fair for this committee to draw the conclusion from that understanding, that General MacArthur's notice to the Communist military leaders did create a much more complicated situation between the United States and our allies in respect to trying to reach agreement on what our future program in Korea should be?

Secretary MARSHALL. My understand was that it created a very serious situation with our allies, along the line of their uncertainty as to just how we were proceeding; the President bringing something to their attention, and gaging their action to find agreement with him, and before that can be accomplished, the leader in the field comes

forward with a proposition which terminates that endeavor of the Chief Executive of the United Nations, or the President, to handle the matter. So, apparently we had two voices speaking at the same time.

Senator MORSE. And it is your position, General Marshall, that because of our relationship with our allies in the United Nations, only one American voice can speak on foreign policy in Asia, and that must necessarily, under our Constitution, be the President of the United States rather than an American military commander in the field?

Secretary MARSHALL. That is my view, sir.

Senator MORSE. General Marshall, is it your view that the course of action we follow in Asia can have a direct effect on Russia in that that course of action may be such as to hasten an early entrance into a full-scale conflict in Asia by Russia?

Secretary MARSHALL. I think it creates that possibility.

EFFECT OF BOMBING MANCHURIAN RAILROADS

Senator MORSE. General MacArthur testified, in answer to a question that I put to him, that if the Chinese Communist leaders did not respond favorably to the ultimatum that he proposed, that we should issue to them, warning them in advance that if they did not agree to an honorable cease-fire order, and stop their aggression in Korea, that he would favor the bombing of the Manchurian Railroad, pointing out in his testimony that the Manchurian Railroad was one of the principal channels of supply to the Chinese Communist forces.

Is it your understanding, General, that Soviet Russia has some arrangement with Red China whereby there is joint administration of at least segments of the Manchurian Railroad?

Secretary MARSHALL. I assume there would be that arrangement because there already were treaty provisions between the original Nationalist Government in China and the Soviet Union.

Senator MORSE. Is it not true that the Manchurian Railroad is a very vital transportation line to the borders of Russia not only from China but from such important centers as Vladivostok as well as Port Arthur?

Secretary MARSHALL. The northern portion of that line is.

Senator MORSE. In your opinion, General, do you think that the bombing of the Manchurian Railroad by the United Nations forces in Asia might have the effect of precipitating Russia into a full-scale war in Asia?

Secretary MARSHALL. We feared that.

Senator MORSE. Is that one of the reasons why the Defense Department advised against adopting General MacArthur's recommendations for extending the war in Asia?

Secretary MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

AVOIDING OUTBREAK OF WAR NOW

Senator MORSE. Now if Russia should come into the war on a full-scale basis in the immediate future, am I correct in my understanding of your testimony that irrespective of the damage that the United States forces could impose upon her in the early stages of such a war,

knowledge of her present massing of military strength is such that the Defense Department believes she could inflict such great damage on our own forces in Asia because of their present position of vulnerability, that it is the opinion of the Defense Establishment that we should do what we can to avoid an act that would bring Russia into the war at this time until our defenses in Asia are much stronger than they are at the present time?

Secretary MARSHALL. Certainly we should delay that eventuality as much as we possibly can, and of course in the end we hope to avoid it entirely.

Senator MORSE. In the course of his testimony as well as in his public statements, including his speech before the joint meeting of Congress, General MacArthur left me with the impression, and I dare say from my mail that he has left many other Americans with the impression, that the adoption of his recommendations would result in reducing our casualties in Korea, in saving American lives and in a much quicker victory in Asia than will be the case if we do not follow his recommendations.

WILL MAC ARTHUR'S RECOMMENDATIONS REDUCE OR INCREASE AMERICAN CASUALTIES

May I say that I think the American people are very much concerned about the heavy casualties in Korea, and therefore their reaction to General MacArthur's statement about this particular point is a most natural and understandable one, and if it is true that his recommendations would result in the saving of great loss of life, their question is why don't we follow his recommendations.

I think they are entitled to a specific answer to that question, and therefore I put it to you this way. Is it your opinion, General Marshall, that if we adopted General MacArthur's recommendations for an extension of the war in Asia, that just the opposite of the effect that he believes would be the case, namely a reduction of casualties, would in fact be the case, namely an increase in casualties?

Secretary MARSHALL. That was our fear.

Senator MORSE. And because the Defense Department feared that the program that General MacArthur has recommended for conducting the war in Asia would result in a greater loss of American life in the immediate future during that period of time that it is going to take for us to get strong enough to meet an all-out Russian offensive, the Defense Establishment, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff, recommended against the adoption of General MacArthur's recommendations. Is that true?

Secretary MARSHALL. That is correct, sir.

PREROGATIVE OF COMMANDER TO NEGOTIATE WITH ENEMY

Senator MORSE. Now, yesterday—and I let the record speak for itself and express now my understanding of the implication of the questions of the distinguished Senator from Massachusetts, Mr. Saltonstall—I understood that he questioned you about the notice that General MacArthur served on the Communist Chinese leaders, and pointed out that General MacArthur had testified before this committee that the notice that he served has always been considered within the prerogatives,

powers, and authority of a commander in the field dealing directly with the military leaders of the enemy.

I listened to your answer, and I am not exactly clear as to your meaning, and therefore I wish to press that question a bit further.

My understanding of your answer was to the effect that although a military leader has the prerogative and authority when in the midst of a military campaign to negotiate with the leaders of the enemy in the field, that in this particular case General MacArthur had received notice through his channel of superior command that the President of the United States was in the midst of preparing a statement on the basis of which negotiations with our allies in the United Nations would take place, and that even though General MacArthur had received a notice that such negotiations were in process at the executive level in this country, he nevertheless issued his notice to the Chinese Communist leaders, that he would meet them in the field to negotiate terms of surrender, and then went beyond that to make a statement of policy as to what would happen if they did not negotiate with him. Is that a correct statement?

Secretary MARSHALL. That is a correct statement.

Senator MORSE. Of the meaning at least of your testimony of yesterday?

Secretary MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator MORSE. Now, General—

Secretary MARSHALL. I might add in connection therewith that we had lengthy communications back and forth between our allied commanders and the Chiefs of Staff [deleted] as to the very questions you are talking about—to what extent the commander could say anything. They were all under very careful instructions from the governments concerned as to just exactly what steps would be taken, and they did not move on their own initiative.

MAC ARTHUR'S MARCH 24 OFFER TO NEGOTIATE AND ITS EFFECT ON OUR ALLIES

Senator MORSE. Now, General, is it your opinion that in view of the information which had been supplied him prior to the statement that he issued to the Chinese Communist military leaders, wise discretion and the exercise of good judgment on his part in view of all that had preceded in the operation of the Korean War and his relationships and exchanges with the Defense Establishment, General MacArthur should have known that the statement that he issued to the Chinese Communist leaders should have been cleared first with his superior chain of command?

Secretary MARSHALL. It would have seemed so to me, sir.

Senator MORSE. As you have testified, is it true that the statement that he issued to the Chinese leaders created such difficulties within the group of our United Nations' allies that it became necessary for the President of the United States to drop at that point further negotiations with our allies in respect to proposals to be offered the Chinese in regard to terms for the settlement of the conflict?

Secretary MARSHALL. It created, I think specifically, a loss of confidence in the leadership of this Government.

Senator MORSE. On the part of the others?

Secretary MARSHALL. Yes; sir; on the part of the allies.

Senator MORSE. Would you say that in part the attitude of our allies could be summarized by their expressing the attitude that they would like to know who was in command of the foreign policy of the United States?

Secretary MARSHALL. I would not undertake to answer that, but Mr. Acheson can tell you specifically.

Senator MORSE. At least, are you willing to say that they were so disturbed by the two voices on foreign policy in Asia that it created difficulties in further negotiations?

Secretary MARSHALL. It suspended the efforts we were then making.

Senator MORSE. Not only created difficulties, but the difficulties took the form of suspending the negotiations.

STATE DEPARTMENT VIEW ON CHINA IN 1945-47

General, I followed very closely the examination of the Senator from New Jersey, Senator Smith, this morning, and I have been left in some doubt by your answer to one question he asked you as to the point of view that existed in the State Department at the time that you went to China in 1945, from 1945 to January 1947. I understood the Senator from New Jersey to express the view that it had been reported to him and he had observed himself, that apparently there were two points of view within the State Department at that time—one group believing that this country should do everything it could to strengthen the hands of the Generalissimo and his Nationalist forces, and the other group being of the opinion that any support, further support, of the Generalissimo would be support of a hopeless cause, and that therefore steps ought to be taken by our Government to co-operate with the Communists in China.

My question is this: Is it true, in accordance with your own knowledge, that from 1945 to January 1947 when you were on the China mission, you encountered any such division of point of view within the official staff of the State Department?

Secretary MARSHALL. No, sir; I did not. The views I generally encountered were that there was so much dissatisfaction with the operations of the then government of the whole of China, the Kuomintang Party, that they would be unable to make their case, and that they would lose by reason of the lack of a solid public following; while on the Communist side, which was highly organized, heavily indoctrinated, and under strong discipline, a very serious attack, political as well as military, could be made against the existing Kuomintang government.

The feelings were directed to lack of confidence in the ability of that particular government to stand solidly with the people unless it engaged in very material reforms.

That was the question in all of this; and as in all such cases, the great problem was how we were to handle the attack of the Communist regime or the minority party, whatever you wish to call it, under those circumstances which gave them every opportunity to tear down to their own advantage.

Senator MORSE. General Marshall, when you were the head of the China mission from 1945 to 1947, and subsequently when you were Secretary of State, did you at any time find within the State Depart-

ment any officials who were pro-Communist and who wanted the policy of this Government to be one of supporting the Chinese Communists?

Secretary MARSHALL. No, sir, I did not; I am speaking in regard to those people with whom I came in contact.

Senator MORSE. That is what I am asking. I am asking within your knowledge.

Secretary MARSHALL. I did not.

Senator MORSE. And the answer is, you did not come in contact with any such persons?

Secretary MARSHALL. No, sir.

Senator MORSE. And you knew of no such movement within the State Department during that period of service?

Secretary MARSHALL. It never came to my attention, sir.

ADEQUACY OF INSTRUCTIONS TO MAC ARTHUR

Senator MORSE. In his able examination of you this morning, the Senator from New Jersey, Mr. Smith, made a point in one of his questions, which I do not think the record shows you commented upon or answered; when he said, in effect—I am not and I do not quote him verbatim—that his understanding of General MacArthur's statements and testimony was that all MacArthur sought at any time was to be told what he was to do in connection with his command in Asia in relation to our Government's policy.

Do you know, General, of any time when General MacArthur did not have, in your opinion, full and adequate instructions as to what our policy in Asia was, and as to what he was to do in carrying out that policy?

Secretary MARSHALL. I think he had everything this Government could give him at the time.

I must interject with reference to the previous testimony of mine, and the messages that have been read into this hearing, that at the period of the discussion of whether or not our troops should move north of the thirty-eighth parallel, and the United Nations were considering it, there came a period there of a very short time, we will say, a week, or maybe 2 weeks, where a positive attitude was difficult to find, but even there, he was informed that he could go ahead.

Later, when under General Ridgway's resumption of the initiative our troops approached the thirty-eighth parallel, the record shows that we were trying to obtain from the United Nations the necessary general understanding and concurrence in the matter, and he was kept informed of what was going on; and, finally, the message of the President of January 13 outlined the entire policy. I think it is possible that General MacArthur's references, in part, were directed to how we would bring the campaign to a conclusion, and there is where we arrived at differences of opinion and not differences of policy.

Senator MORSE. That deals with my very next question. Do you think that there is a possibility that the impression that General MacArthur left with some of us on the committee—and I may say he left with me the same impression he left with the Senator from New Jersey on this point—was an impression based upon the fact that he had disagreements with his superiors in his line of command rather

than with any failure on the part of his superiors to give him adequate instructions as to what the policy of the Government was and what he should do about that policy?

Secretary MARSHALL. I think that is correct. I think he was given full information right along the line.

Senator MORSE. I think I have about two more minutes of my half hour, and I do not want to get into another larger subject, but I want to cover a couple of minor points here, General.

TIME REQUIRED TO REACH DECISIONS THROUGH DEMOCRATIC PROCESS

In his examination of you this morning, the Senator from New Jersey pointed out that the United Nations was some 3 months reaching any comity of opinion concerning Chinese aggression in Asia and in reaching any general agreement as to what they should do in support of united action in meeting that aggression.

You have already testified that with the some 60 members of the United Nations involved in this particular joint action in Korea, that it necessarily must take time, pointing out I think in your testimony that the legislative process itself is sometimes slow, whether it is in Congress or in the United Nations Organization. How long has the military manpower bill been before the Congress of the United States, General?

Secretary MARSHALL. I am told since the first week in January.

Senator MORSE. Well, that is all of 3 months, which only bears out the fact that when we are dealing with major legislative problems in our own country, we can't get overnight action; is that not true?

Secretary MARSHALL. The only time I ever heard of getting overnight action did actually occur with the United Nations in the Security Council on the aggression into Korea.

Senator MORSE. And that was on the main decision as to whether or not they would decree that there was aggression in Korea, that overnight action.

Secretary MARSHALL. It was an action by the National Security Council that in a sense gave us a free hand to go into Korea and resist the aggression.

Senator MORSE. Yes; but based upon a recognition that the Chinese Communists were the aggressors.

Secretary MARSHALL. But the final recognition did not come for a long time after that.

Senator MORSE. That is right.

STATUS OF PREPAREDNESS PROGRAM

Now General, you spoke this morning in reply to the question as to whether or not you thought we were mobilizing fast enough. Is it true that the state of mobilization and our defenses are in such a condition of inadequacy at the present time that the head of our civilian defense program, Governor Caldwell, is correct in warning the American people that if world war III should break out in the immediate future, there is a serious danger that a considerable number of the enemy planes would be able to break through our defenses and deliver their bomb loads on American soil?

Secretary MARSHALL. I think that is correct, sir.

Senator MORSE. And is that danger another factor that was taken into consideration by the men in the Defense Establishment when they advised against adopting General MacArthur's recommendation—their fear that those recommendations might be the spark that would bring Russia into the war immediately?

Secretary MARSHALL. That was one of many considerations along that line.

Senator MORSE. Are we not, General, short of trained military manpower at the present time, to a very serious degree?

Secretary MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator MORSE. And is it not also true that we are short of modern equipment at the present time to a serious degree, including planes, tanks, and other military equipment?

Secretary MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator MORSE. Is it not true that our Allied strength is in exactly the same condition of inadequate preparedness at the present time?

Secretary MARSHALL. Much more so.

Senator MORSE. I conclude, Mr. Chairman, at this time with this question: In view of the answers that you have just given to the last few questions I have asked you on the state of American and Allied preparedness, is it not important in the opinion of our officials in the Defense Establishment that we do what we can to keep the Asiatic war on a limited basis over a period in the immediate future until through a united American people we can devote our full energies to complete military mobilization and thereby strengthen our defenses so we can meet a Russian attack with some reasonable assurance of victory, if it comes?

Secretary MARSHALL. I would qualify in relation to my answer to that, to this extent; that I would not wish to imply that the operation in Korea necessarily had to be continued for the length of time to reach our reasonable full power development of military preparedness, but I do answer very specifically to the point that we should do everything in our power to limit the operations in Korea in a manner that will to the least create a possibility of a general war.

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, I think I have taken 31 minutes. I will reserve the rest of my questions.

Chairman RUSSELL. I shall not quarrel with the Senator about 1 minute.

Senator Hickenlooper.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

RESISTING AGGRESSION IN EUROPE AND ASIA

General Marshall, in your testimony on yesterday, with respect to the North Atlantic Pact, and the military assistance to European countries under that pact, I believe you said, in effect, that we had no choice there; that is, our best interests dictated that we had no choice other than to participate in the North Atlantic Pact, and its implementation by arms and troops. Am I correct in that assumption?

Secretary MARSHALL. You are correct, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Do you state, in your opinion, that we had no choice in connection with sending troops to Korea—by the same yardstick?

Secretary MARSHALL. I was not in that decision, but it would seem so.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. In the case of Europe the assumption was that we had no choice except to participate in the North Atlantic Pact, for the purpose of the security of the United States; and resistance to Communism or aggression. Is that not true?

Secretary MARSHALL. That is correct, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. In the case of Korea, I would assume, then, the same reasoning applies. Our intervention with troops in the Korean War is to serve generally the same purpose of resisting and putting down aggression, except this is an active, shooting war, whereas our activities in Europe are still in the nature of passive action, in building up our defenses?

Secretary MARSHALL. Yes, sir; to the extent that in Western Europe, we met a blockade, if not aggression, by the Soviets, in connection with the airlift into Berlin; and as I said, we did that in the best way we could, to avoid a complete break, and in opposition to the contentions that we should make a break by forcing our entrance.

Now, when it comes to Korea, as I say, I wasn't in the decision; I came in and found a war in progress. There was the great issue of whether we, and the United Nations, appeared before the world, all of the weaker nations, in a position where we gave proof that we would resist aggression, or we would stand away and let the country be overwhelmed.

RISK OF RUSSIAN INTERVENTION

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Now, in the Berlin airlift, before it was started and while it was going on, there were very grave questions indeed as to whether or not it would precipitate active resistance by the Russians to the point where it might even cause a third world war?

Secretary MARSHALL. That is correct.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. In the Korean situation, today, there is also grave question as to whether or not certain actions of ours, in the interest of a military victory in the field, might not precipitate Russian intervention; is that correct?

Secretary MARSHALL. That is correct, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. In the case of the Berlin airlift, we were not only in direct contact with the Russians, but we had to fly over, and, in a way, if the Russians wanted to twist it, violate Russian-controlled territory. Yet, we did not hesitate to take that risk in the interests of preserving and establishing a principle; isn't that correct?

Secretary MARSHALL. That is correct, with this additional remark: We had no other recourse, saving the abandonment of Berlin to the Soviets, with all of the attendant changes of circumstances surrounding that.

MILITARY STRATEGY IN KOREA

Senator HICKENLOOPER. In the case of Korea our troops have been in there now, and I think everyone will admit that they have not brought the war to a conclusion. They are still fighting back and forth in the Korean Peninsula. I don't intend to put words in your mouth, but I suggest from a military standpoint purely, leaving out the political implications, every military man in this country probably

would agree that the strategy and tactics for a successful conclusion, of that action in Korea against the Reds would include, among other things, going over with our present air power and bombing the arsenals at Mukden and the installation at Harbin and the lines of supply which are enabling the Reds to go back and recoup themselves so they can attack again.

Now, I don't want to turn your answer in any way, shape, or form—I am speaking purely from the standpoint of a military campaign and the successful winning of the battle.

Secretary MARSHALL. At the present time, in the opinion of my military advisers and my own—that is, I concur with them—the Ground Forces have suffered in a rather remote way from our failure to do the bombing that you have just referred to.

They have not been subjected to air attacks of any moment whatsoever, and they have enjoyed a tremendous protection of our air and the knowledge of a tremendous development against the ground troops of the aggressor.

Also there has to be taken into consideration the fact that we started almost from zero in this Korean affair, first with our small air component there and the few naval ships available, and then with a single reinforced infantry battalion, and from that worked up to the present force. [Deleted.]

But there has also been the period of the desperate campaign to maintain that force. It has destroyed one army, that of the North Koreans, and a new rehabilitated North Korean force has come in; and it has undertaken, as General MacArthur very clearly stated, a campaign against troops sent in by another nation, which presented quite a new situation.

But even so, we have just now, in this current month, reached the point where that command is being vitalized by the fact that a man is given an opportunity to come back to his home, he doesn't fight on without any hope as to eventual relief, except through a casualty.

We have two more divisions in Japan, which changed the security aspect of that country quite a bit, and we have the basis of a continual flow of replacements and troops for rotation, and from those factors, the situation as to the Allied Command has greatly changed. Now, let us see what is going to happen next.

STALEMATE VERSUS AGGRESSIVE ACTION

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, General, may I suggest, and I do not imply that you are suggesting this at all—may I suggest that that kind of an argument may appeal to some as saying that American lives are expendable in a holding action, at a same time when we have power to affirmatively hit the enemy where he produces his supplies to replenish himself.

Secretary MARSHALL. Well, if by hitting those supplies to replenish himself, which we do not think have vitally affected the campaign, we hazard a general war, then I think the American people are on the side that the Defense Department, the Chiefs of Staff, and the civilian authority of the Government favor.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. We did not——

Secretary MARSHALL. May I add a little to that?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes.

Secretary MARSHALL. In all of these things, as I referred to the other day, always there comes up the question of a stalemate, but each of these other times we have finally gotten through the stalemate against the criticisms and the opposition that always has arisen.

Here we are up against a proposition where the stalemate is characterized with great frequency. None of these things are going to be rapidly decisive, but I think the procedure we are following is in the interests of the American people, and is in the interests of minimum casualties, and in the interests of a successful solution.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. General, I suggest to you that it has been pretty well bandied about as a statement in the world for a great many years that the British—and I do not say that it is true necessarily—that the British have lost every battle but the last one.

Secretary MARSHALL. You are thinking largely of Waterloo.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Whether that is true or not, it has also given rise to the famous British statement that the British somehow muddle through; that eventually there comes a time when they will win the last battle, which is the decisive one, and that is the one that they want to win.

I believe, by the same token, that our military tactics and strategy in this country have always been of an aggressive nature; we believe in getting the thing over with; we believe in an aggressiveness rather than muddling through. I wonder, is it not a true military statement that no one ever wins a real victory by merely sitting back on his haunches on the defensive? In other words, don't we have to at some time take the offensive in order to win a conclusive victory?

Secretary MARSHALL. That is certainly so; but I referred the other day to one of the most successful defenses in history, which really was the determining result in the breakdown of the Napoleonic regime, and that was the peninsula campaign, which was largely defensive, and year in and year out was under continuous attack in the Parliament, and the man they were attacking eventually came out of the defensive and went on the offensive.

WELLINGTON'S CAMPAIGN AGAINST NAPOLEON

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I heard that statement yesterday with great interest, General. I do not by any stretch of the imagination want to be understood as posing my military history knowledge against yours, and I have very little, but I had read a number of things about the Napoleonic campaign, especially about Wellington. It is my impression that Wellington fought in a defensive campaign because he did not have the tools to fight an offensive campaign with. As soon as and when he finally got the tools and the weapons to fight an offensive campaign with, he immediately took the offensive and thereby gained the eventual victory, and broke Napoleon's back.

Secretary MARSHALL. I think you will find there that that does not come clearly out. There were a great many other considerations involved in it. One was opportunity; one was the decimation of the French strength against him in faulty campaigns.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes.

Secretary MARSHALL. And finally, the most destructive one was where he went into complete defensive positions in the famous Torres Vedras line, and the other command literally destroyed itself.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes, I understand all those factors are involved.

Secretary MARSHALL. Well, they are very definitely involved, and they resulted in the basic decisions.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. He fought a long defensive campaign.

Secretary MARSHALL. But he did not receive great reinforcements for the finish of that campaign.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. He fought a great defensive campaign in the Iberian Peninsula, I believe for a great and long period of time, eventually defeating the French forces down there.

Secretary MARSHALL. Well, he defeated one after the other.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes.

Secretary MARSHALL. In the matter of their unsuccessful attacks; and their group finally wasted away and left themselves wide open for the action that was taken to carry that campaign to a successful conclusion.

OTHER DEFENSIVE BATTLES OF HISTORY

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, I might suggest another campaign which might be considered a victory on the theory of defense, and that was the Battle of the Masurian Lakes at Tannenberg, in which, of course, very small, about a quarter of the number of Germans were in a defensive action, although there was some offense too, I believe, and succeeded in decimating the oncoming Russians, and they had no more trouble with them the rest of the time during World War I.

Secretary MARSHALL. You can come over here to this country and take Braddock's 13,000, or whatever the number was, which were completely washed out by the French and Indians.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Those are particular battles.

Secretary MARSHALL. I was merely addressing myself to your comment that no war was ever won successfully by defensive action.

Chairman RUSSELL. At this point, Senator Hickenlooper, I would like to interrupt to take up a matter with the Armed Services Committee.

(Whereupon, a separate matter was discussed by the members of the Armed Services Committee.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Hickenlooper.

ACCEPTANCE OF RISKS IN EUROPE AND THE FAR EAST

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Chairman, I am perfectly willing to go over because I have a large number of questions and will be some considerable time and cannot possibly finish today. But there is one question that I would like to ask General Marshall now in view of the questions I have asked him up to this point. And that is: Why did we accept most serious risks in Europe, both in the question of the Berlin airlift and in the matter of arming under the North Atlantic Pact—why did we accept those risks in Europe in the interests of either resisting or pushing back communism and refuse now to accept the risks which many will admit exist, refuse to accept the risks in this Korean War of bombing the sources of supply along the line of known and accepted military principles?

Secretary MARSHALL. In Western Europe, as I said the other day, we literally had no choice. Beginning with our European recovery program and later taking up the rearmament of Western Europe, it

was a proposition of whether we simply let that be overrun by the Communist conquest, either political or military, to our calamitous disadvantage, but we had no choice in that means.

Now, in Korea I have stated that our command, in the opinion of my military advisers and in my own concurrence, has not suffered to any material extent from the lack of bombing that you have specifically referred to.

[Deleted.]

The concensus of opinion is that to do as you have indicated in your question involves a risk so great, involves a risk so great, that it is not in the interest of the country, and not in the interest of that Army to take that risk.

That is a matter of opinion. That is a matter of judgment. But the unanimous judgment on this side of the water in connection with it, of the constituted authorities in connection with it, is that the risk is too great.

And this would be off the record, but I think it is pretty important.

[Deleted.]

DAMAGE CAUSED BY NOT BOMBING MANCHURIAN BASES

Senator HICKENLOOPER. At that point of the comparative damage which we have suffered, I would like to suggest, General, that there have been two great assaults by Chinese Communists across the Yalu and against our forces in which we have suffered thousands of casualties. Those assaults were implemented and supplied by the base in Manchuria.

Had we destroyed those bases, had we attacked them and bombed them, it seems perfectly reasonable to me to believe that they would not have had the equipment and the material to mount those two assaults as effectively and as vigorously as they did. Therefore, I suggest that from my view we have suffered tremendously by not destroying their sources of supply and their lines of communication in the past, because it has enabled them to mount unrestrictedly two major assaults which came across the Yalu and which we knew were coming. My position is that we have suffered greatly by this policy of not going back and attacking and destroying their sources of supply and their marshaling centers and their lines of communication.

Now I merely state that as my view. I may say this: Yesterday lads from this immediate territory who have just come back from Korea told the story of lying up in the hills and watching the Chinese form across the Yalu 2 or 3 miles away and of marching their equipment and their guns across the Yalu and of being forbidden to call for artillery or for air support to destroy that very concentration that they could see building up. They had to just sit there and wait to meet it, which was a most discouraging thing and they suffered casualties as a result of it.

Secretary MARSHALL. The implication of your statement or their description is that we had artillery mounted along the Yalu. We had one regiment at one place well up toward the north. We had one regiment of an ROK division midway down toward the south, but as to having artillery mounted to react cross the Yalu near the main centers of approach, that was not the case.

I do say this in response to your outlines: That at the time of the entry of the Chinese Communists forces into North Korea, that is the end of October and the early part of November, notably around November 6 I think, that there was a case where we were greatly hampered and our troops were affected by the fact that the movement of the Chinese Communist troops down the main artery to cross the Yalu near Sinuiju did affect that materially and that that was the time we brought up to our allies the question of hot pursuit which was dropped not entirely because of the fact that all of them were solidly against it, but because the whole set-up of the campaign changed, and with the distance between our troops and the Yalu, there was a reasonable opportunity to act against their communications and against their planes when they came in.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Just one more question, and then I will close, Mr. Chairman. I hadn't anticipated asking so many at this moment.

You stated that we were short of artillery along the Yalu.

Secretary MARSHALL. Not short. It had not reached there.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. We didn't have any, then, except token.

Secretary MARSHALL. We had not reached the Yalu line.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. We did have airplanes and fighters and bombers, which could very easily and quickly have crossed the Yalu and could have inflicted great damage on those lines of supply.

Secretary MARSHALL. That is correct.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, Mr. Chairman, I think this would be a good place to stop.

Senator KNOWLAND. Mr. Chairman, I have one procedural matter.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I would like to go on tomorrow, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. You don't lose your right of your position if the committee recesses.

Senator KNOWLAND. Mr. Chairman, I have one procedural point.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator KNOWLAND. I have one procedural question.

CORRECTION OF THE RECORD

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Smith has one likewise.

Senator SMITH. I have been looking into the record on MacArthur's colloquy about the statement he issued March 24 and I find on page 179 the reference to September 24, which is obviously the same statement; and I just ask unanimous consent that the record be changed from September to March so that the reference to his statement will have the correct date.

Chairman RUSSELL. That is General MacArthur's testimony on page 179, bottom of the page, changing General MacArthur's testimony.

I assume General MacArthur would have no objection to correcting the date.

Senator SMITH. I may say, Mr. Chairman, a few pages earlier he made the same slip and corrected himself, saying he meant March 24.

Chairman RUSSELL. If there is no objection, the permanent record will be altered accordingly.

INCLUSION OF PREVIOUSLY EXCLUDED DOCUMENT

Senator KNOWLAND. In the document furnished us by the Defense Establishment of classified information, which is paraphrased, and directing General Marshall's attention to pages 103 and 104 dealing with the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs regarding a settlement or a cease-fire arrangement and under what conditions it should be brought about, I called the attention of the committee the other day to the fact that what appears to be a complete record, probably as a result of inadvertence did not include a paraphrase of Secretary Marshall's endorsement of the Joint Chiefs' recommendations.

You will recall that they recommended that in any discussions the matter of UN membership and the matter of Formosa should not even be a subject of discussion and General Marshall apparently said he approved of everything except he did feel that these two matters could be discussed.

I think in in order to get that booklet, which is supposed to be a complete record, that some paraphrase should be included in the booklet so the committee will have complete information.

Secretary MARSHALL. May I answer that?

I have here that letter of March 31, and it is classified as Top Secret, but I can see no reason why it should not be in the record. I will take the responsibility for down-grading it, and giving it to the committee.

It is the letter of March 31, do you wish me to read it?

Chairman RUSSELL. If you have declassified it.

Secretary MARSHALL (reading):

DEAR MR. SECRETARY:

This is addressed to the Secretary of State, in 1951:

With reference to our discussion regarding Korea on March 19, 1951, with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I am transmitting herewith—

We had a general meeting—

for your information and consideration, a memorandum of March 27, 1951, from the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the United States position regarding an armistice in Korea. These views supersede those of the Joint Chiefs of Staff which were submitted to the National Security Council on December 13, 1950.

I am in general agreement with the terms, conditions, and arrangements enumerated in paragraphs 6 and 7 of the Joint Chiefs memorandum. However, I believe that the questions of Formosa and Chinese Communist membership in the United Nations, as well as other general political and security factors referred to in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the memorandum of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, would be fitting topics in the consideration of basic terms of settlement of the Korean situation, and might be taken up in discussions between our two Departments on the over-all question of Korea.


That is signed by Robert A. Lovett, Acting Secretary.

Chairman RUSSELL. Is there anything further?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. If not, the committee will stand recessed until tomorrow morning at 10 o'clock.

(Thereupon, at 1:12 p. m., the committee stood in recess until the following morning, Friday, May 11, 1951, at 10 a. m.)



MILITARY SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST

FRIDAY, MAY 11, 1951

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES AND THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
UNITED STATES SENATE,
Washington, D. C.

The committees met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10:05 a. m., in the caucus room, Senate Office Building, Senator Richard B. Russell (chairman, Committee on Armed Services), presiding.

Present: Senators Russell (chairman, Committee on Armed Services), Connally (chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations), Bridges, Byrd, Saltonstall, Johnson (Texas), Morse, Kefauver, Knowland, Cain, Stennis, Flanders, Long, George, Smith (New Jersey), Green, Hickenlooper, McMahon, Lodge, Fulbright, Tobey, Sparkman, and Gillette.

Also present: Mark H. Galusha and Verne D. Mudge, of the staff of the Armed Services Committee; Francis O. Wilcox, Chief of Staff; Thorsten V. Kalijarvi, staff associate; and Pat M. Holt, associate clerk, Committee on Foreign Relations.

Chairman RUSSELL. The committee will now come to order.

When the committee recessed on yesterday, Senator Hickenlooper had not concluded questions, so we will now proceed with Senator Hickenlooper.

**TESTIMONY OF SECRETARY OF DEFENSE GEORGE C. MARSHALL,
ACCOMPANIED BY FELIX LARKIN, GENERAL COUNSEL—Re-
sumed**

CALCULATED RISKS COMPARED

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Chairman.

General Marshall, on yesterday, a few questions which I had asked you at that time were directed, I believe, entirely to our acceptance of a calculated risk in Europe which was generally agreed by everyone to be a calculated risk regarding the possible starting of a third world war, and now when we are in a situation of desperation—that is, fighting and war—we refuse the acceptance of a similar calculated risk; we do not carry out the military activities of bombing bases of supply back in Manchuria where the Reds of China are actually fighting with us.

For the sake of the record this morning, would you care to amplify that or discuss it any further?

Secretary MARSHALL. Well, if you desire me to do so, Senator. I can only repeat largely what I stated the other day. First, that it was felt we had no choice in Western Europe but to proceed as we did,

unless we allowed that region to go by default to Communist domination, and that that in our view was not similar to the present situation where we are in action, and the question is whether or not we can extend that action without developing an enlarged war on the Chinese side, or a full war because of the reactions of the Soviet Union.

The principal difference that I see in the matter is that we have an issue there that is very critical to the Soviet Union in that they now are in complete accord with the Chinese Communist government so far as we know, and they have a treaty of accord.

That is being imperiled, I would assume, and my associates have assumed, by what is happening to the Communist forces in Korea.

Therefore, the situation as to the possible actions of the Soviet Government is a more acute one by far than that in Western Europe, because, if they lose a close community of interests and cooperative arrangement with China at this time, that would be a very great loss to them of something they now possess.

Here is a situation where the Chinese can be brought to feel, by continued highly destructive losses, that the Soviets have let them down. Therefore, the situation is more dangerous. Now, that is the general view we have taken.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I think I follow your statement, General, and still I want to say, without any disrespect, that I cannot fully agree with it. It seems to me that, if the Soviet interest is so much in accord with that of the Communist Chinese, then that interest would dictate that they would see the Communist Chinese through to victory in spite of anything. If we continue as we are in Korea and the Communist Chinese face what may seem to be certain defeat under that policy, then by that same argument the Russians are going to come in anyway to save them from that defeat. Therefore, it would seem that there would be no more motivating influence for the Russians to come, or there would be just as much motivating influence, I should say, for the Russians to come in if the Chinese are facing defeat in Korea, as if they were facing disaster in results from our bombing of the bases in, let's say, Mukden and Harbin.

That is my view on that philosophy. It seems we are doing nothing but losing. I mean we might just as well take after them in Manchuria with our bombers and destroy their built-up depots and so on, since the reasoning would seem to dictate that Russia would come in just as quickly one way or the other.

Secretary MARSHALL. Well, Senator, of course, that is bound to be a matter of judgment.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Oh, yes.

JUDGMENT OF THE JCS

Secretary MARSHALL. And on my part, particularly the reactions and the views of the Chiefs of Staff, there are decided technical involvements as to possibilities one way or the other, and there is the particular issue that you have just been discussing with me.

Now, I say it is a matter of judgment. I was questioning several members of the Chiefs of Staff this morning to find out if my general statements to you yesterday were in accord with their views. We are talking now about the effect of not bombing on the build-up of the Communist forces in Korea and the effect of the bombing on the

Chinese Communist forces in Korea. We are also discussing the reactions as affecting our forces and casualties.

I will go into that phase of it a moment later. But, first, I have said it is a matter of judgment. Well, whose judgment?

My reactions in this matter come very largely from the Chiefs of Staff, and I would like to recite to you gentlemen my opinion of them as an advisory agency.

General Bradley has had considerable fighting experience, and he has commanded the largest force of ground troops in history, ours or anybody else's in the field; so, he is not inexperienced; aside from being a very level-headed man, and one of great honesty of purpose.

General Vandenberg has commanded, I think, the largest pursuit of battle formation of planes, in contrast with bombers, of any man in history. That is a considerable experience.

Admiral Sherman has commanded ships in the Pacific. He had one submarined from under him, a carrier. He has been Nimitz's deputy chief of staff in the Pacific campaign. He is not, therefore, detached in his view of the Pacific. He has been in command of the Mediterranean Fleet, and knows the Mediterranean, and the principal people there from the Middle East to Gibraltar, and Spain.

General Collins commanded a division which terminated the fighting in Guadalcanal. I believe he got out of a sick bed to redeem the temporary reverse we were suffering in the Russell Islands. He commanded a corps in landing on Utah Beach. He captured Cherbourg in the first large capture after Africa of Germans.

He conducted a classic battle, which received almost no publicity in this country, in destroying large portions of the two armies remaining of the Germans at Mainz in which I think his captures alone were about 23,000, and the destruction was considerably beyond that.

He captured Aachen; he captured Dusseldorf, Cologne, across the Rhine, when he arrived at the Elbe. There is a great deal of experience in that.

So, when these men analyze these various questions, all of them, and talk out their various points of view, and bring them to me and to the President, I think it is a very formidable general opinion on affairs in the world; and I didn't mention that they had been to Japan quite frequently, and to Korea frequently and recently. So, here is an opinion of quite a group.

I frankly doubt that this Government will ever be so fortunate as to have such a collection of experience at one time in the Chiefs of Staff.

When I was Chief of Staff, the first Joint Chiefs of Staff, I didn't have that experience at all, nor did Admiral King, nor did General Arnold; but these men have it, and they have a world picture before them every day; and, therefore, when I refer to the views of the Chiefs of Staff, I think I am correct in saying that I am referring to a very vital opinion as to what is best to be done in connection with these various matters we are discussing.

[Deleted.]

POSSIBLE RED CHINESE ACTION

Senator HICKENLOOPER. General, is there any substantial doubt in the minds of our military authorities that the Chinese Communists will not use air and use every weapon at their command before they would eventually capitulate?

Won't they use all the forces they have to prevent a defeat?

[Deleted.]

Senator HICKENLOOPER. The philosophy is for us to sit back and wait until they throw their full power against us and then retaliate rather than to use the tactics or the strategy or whatever mixed terms one might use, to attempt to destroy them on the ground before they are able to inflict whatever damage the initial wave would inflict on us.

Secretary MARSHALL. That is one way of putting it, Senator. I would say we are not waiting for that. We are going ahead with our own maneuvers to produce the most advantageous situation we can. Let me add one further thing.

I would feel, Senator, if I may say so, that this particular phase of the matter can be discussed with much more satisfaction I think to you directly with the Chiefs of Staff.

MILITARY OR POLICY DECISION

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, I presume so far as details are concerned that is true, but yet this is a question of broad policy which probably goes beyond the, one might say, limited authority of the Chiefs of Staff. They are limited to purely military, which leads me to ask this question.

I think it has been testified, that normal military strategy, leaving out other implications such as the attitude of our allies, and things of that kind, dictates purely as a military axiom that you hit the enemy where it hurts worst, and stop his sources of supply. That is one of the great tactics of winning battles, et cetera.

Therefore, if we are not using our air power to go back and destroy before they can get their air power off the ground or to destroy before they can resupply their troops, or to destroy the supplies which they will use to build up a new offensive, as I see in the paper they are doing today, then that decision must therefore be a political decision and not a military decision. Doesn't that follow?

Secretary MARSHALL. It follows to an extent, but there is a heavy military involvement in making the decision.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I understand, but in the last analysis if it were purely a military matter, purely winning a campaign from a military standpoint, those bases would be bombed.

They were bombed in Europe. One of the great factors, probably the great factor in our eventual success was that we disrupted the Germans' sources of supply and their ability to supply their troops. We confused their communication by strategic bombing and otherwise, and that contributed to the victory in battle.

Secretary MARSHALL. It was a very important factor in that battle.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. It was one. I did not say it was the entire factor, but it was one of the important factors.

Therefore, I suggest that the decision not to use that well-accepted and I think well-proven tactic of destroying the enemy's sources of supply must be a political decision rather than purely a military decision.

Secretary MARSHALL. However, in making that statement, Senator, you have had a preface that we were not to consider these other questions and allies, and things of that sort.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I prefaced it for the purpose of saying if it were purely a military campaign, those other considerations would be left out.

Secretary MARSHALL. If I understood you correctly, it seems to me that would not be a political decision; that it would be just an ordinary battle decision.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, I understand. Apparently I haven't made myself clear. I am attempting to get clear in my mind what seems to me to be the fact that the failure to use the power we have, which is among other things air, deep in the enemy's territory at his sources of supply, must in the last analysis be a political decision, that is, it must be in the field of politics.

PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE TO MAC ARTHUR, JANUARY 13

Secretary MARSHALL. Largely that, and may I read into the record, if it is agreeable to you, Senator, the President's message to General MacArthur on the political attitude of the Government in this matter?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes indeed.

Secretary MARSHALL. Which I have had paraphrased. It was referred to the other day. I have had it paraphrased so that it can be printed.

Chairman RUSSELL. Is that the January 13 document?

Secretary MARSHALL. That is the message, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. Will you furnish that in paraphrase in its entirety? I have been requested by members of the committee to secure that entire document.

Secretary MARSHALL. It's been declassified with the approval of the President, and in a manner that we do not think discloses any cryptographic information and things of that sort.

Chairman RUSSELL. All right.

Secretary MARSHALL. Is it agreeable that I read this?

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. It is with me; yes, sir.

Secretary MARSHALL. This is from the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the 13th of January, addressed to General MacArthur in Tokyo, Japan, and it was sent on this date in order to give the political factors involved in a directive from the Chiefs of Staff that was dispatched the day before, the tentative proposals of the Chiefs of Staff to the Security Council of January 12.

And, as I said yesterday, I believe, my understanding was, which I find now is correct, that the directive from the Chiefs of Staff to General MacArthur of January 11 was without any political inclusions, and therefore it was thought desirable that the President should send a message to General MacArthur with the political factors and over-all directives of the Government, though he didn't classify this as a directive.

The following message from the President to General MacArthur is transmitted:

"I want you to know that the situation in Korea is receiving the utmost attention here and that our efforts are concentrated upon finding the right decisions on this matter of the greatest importance to the future of America and to the survival of free peoples everywhere.

"I wish in this telegram to tell you of my views as to our basic national and international purposes in continuing the resistance to aggression in Korea. We need your judgment as to the maximum effort which could reasonably be

expected from the United Nations forces under your command to support the resistance to aggression which we are trying rapidly to organize on a world-wide basis.

"This present telegram is not to be taken in any sense as a directive. Its purpose is to give you something of what is in our minds regarding the political factors.

"1. Successful resistance in Korea would serve the following purposes:

"A. To demonstrate that aggression will not be accepted by us or by the United Nations, and to provide a rallying point around which the spirits and energies of the free world can be mobilized to meet the world-wide threat which the Soviet Union now poses.

"B. To deflate the dangerously exaggerated political and military prestige of Communist China which now threatens to undermine the resistance of non-Communist Asia and to consolidate the hold of Communism on China itself.

"C. To afford more time for, and to give direct assistance to, the organization of non-Communist resistance in Asia, both outside and inside China.

"D. To carry out our commitments of honor to the South Koreans and to demonstrate to the world that the friendship of the United States is of inestimable value in time of adversity.

"E. To make possible a far more satisfactory peace settlement for Japan, and to contribute greatly to the posttreaty security position of Japan in relation to the Continent.

"F. To lend resolution to many countries not only in Asia but also in Europe and the Middle East who are now living within the shadow of Communist power, and to let them know that they need not now rush to come to terms with communism on whatever terms they can get, meaning complete submission.

"G. To inspire those who may be called upon to fight against great odds if subjected to a sudden onslaught by the Soviet Union or by Communist China.

"H. To lend point and urgency to the rapid build-up of the defense of the Western World.

"I. To bring the United Nations through its first great effort in collective security and to produce a free world coalition of incalculable value to the national security interests of the United States.

"J. To alert the peoples behind the iron curtain that their masters are bent upon wars of aggression, and that this crime will be resisted by the free world.

"2. Our courses of action at this time should be such as to consolidate the great majority of the United Nations. This majority is not merely part of the organization but is also the nations whom we would desperately need to count on as allies in the event the Soviet Union moves against us. Further, pending the build-up of our national strength we must act with great prudence insofar as extending the area of hostilities is concerned. Steps which might in themselves be justified and which might lend some assistance to the campaign in Korea would not be beneficial if they thereby involved Japan or Western Europe in large-scale hostilities.

"We recognize, of course, that continued resistance might not be militarily possible with the limited forces with which you are being called upon to meet large Chinese armies. Further, in the present world situation your forces must be preserved as an effective instrument for the defense of Japan and elsewhere. However, some of the important purposes mentioned above might be supported if you should think it practicable and advisable by continued resistance from offshore islands of Korea, particularly from Cheju-Do, if it becomes impractical to hold an important portion of Korea itself. In the worst case it would be important that if we must withdraw from Korea, it be clear to the world that that course is forced upon us by military necessity and that we shall not accept the result politically or militarily until the aggression has been rectified.

"In reaching a final decision about Korea, I shall have to give constant thought to the main threat from the Soviet Union and to the need for rapid expansion of our Armed Forces to meet this great danger.

"I am encouraged to believe that the free world is getting a much clearer and realistic picture of the dangers before us and that the necessary courage and energy will be forthcoming. Recent proceedings in the United Nations have disclosed a certain amount of confusion and wishful thinking but I believe that most members have been actuated by a desire to be absolutely sure that all possible avenues to peaceful settlement have been fully explored. I believe that the great majority is now rapidly consolidating and that the result will be an encouraging and formidable combination in defense of freedom. The entire Nation is grateful for your splendid leadership in the difficult struggle in Korea

and for the superb performance of your forces under the most difficult circumstances."

JCS RECOMMENDATIONS

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Now, General, with regard to the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the 12th of January, the day before that document was issued, have the Joint Chiefs of Staff ever withdrawn their recommendations of that document containing, among others, the four points that were referred to in General MacArthur's testimony and in your testimony? Have the Joint Chiefs of Staff ever formally withdrawn those recommendations?

Secretary MARSHALL. Will you read the first part of the question? (The question was read as directed.)

Secretary MARSHALL. The Joint Chiefs were of the opinion that with the radically changed situation in Korea it was not advisable to carry out certain of those tentative proposals and, therefore, that matter just passed to the consideration of the senior planners of the National Security Council.

However, Senator, again I say they can speak much more specifically to you on that.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes; but the point of my question was this: On the 12th of January they issued a formalized recommendation; that is, they formalized it by putting it on paper, and issued it to various people, including General MacArthur's command.

Have the recommendations contained in that document so put on paper and formalized ever been formally withdrawn by another formalized recommendation, as such?

Secretary MARSHALL. As to the formal transmittal of the proposal to withdraw those recommendations, I don't recall any such.

As to the discussions in regard to them, I do recall a number of discussions by the Chiefs of Staff, and which were carried, through General Bradley and myself, to the Security Council.

Those recommendations have been, I know, amalgamated with the general planning considerations that are continuous in the National Security Council.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Now, on yesterday, and the day before——

Secretary MARSHALL. May I add one other factor?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Surely.

Secretary MARSHALL. As I said, they had sent a directive to General MacArthur on the previous day, and that was the reason for this statement of the President's which I have just read to you.

This other was a planning paper and was taken to General MacArthur by General Collins, personally.

INTERPRETATION OF JCS RECOMMENDATIONS

Senator HICKENLOOPER. In that document of recommendations of the Joint Chiefs, of January the 12th, I believe it said to prepare now for certain activities which have already been gone over in the record, and which I shall not recanvass here. I believe it said to prepare now for certain activities in event of two happenings which were the necesasry for the evacuation of Korea, if we evacuated Korea, or the stabilization of the situation.

Now, didn't the situation became stabilized some time after that?

Secretary MARSHALL. Technically, no; because there has been considerable change in the situation since that time, in the movement of the troops, in the morale of the Army, which has a great deal to do with stabilization.

You are familiar with the advances beyond Seoul, and up beyond the thirty-eighth parallel, the recent maneuvers which moved south of it, and then they returned to some of the positions that had been previously evacuated.

At the time that paper was prepared and transmitted, through me, to the National Security Council, the position of our troops was well south of Seoul; I have forgotten what river it was along, and it has changed considerably since that, so I wouldn't say it is a stalemate; and I know, at the time, when they used the second word that you are referring to, in particular, it was a question of whether the Army was going to be able to produce a strong set-up in which it could face this overwhelming, as it was thought to be, attack by the Chinese Communist forces.

However, I will say again, Senator, these men submitted this as a planning study. There have been many submitted, and it has been considered in that way.

I stated that it has not been disapproved; it has not been vetoed; there has been no specific action taken by any other members of the Government concerned to block the procedure, because they have gone over, the Chiefs of Staff, each phase of it and have been satisfied with the decisions.

Again you can consult them and hear from them direct.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. But, General you are not using the term "stalemate" as synonymous with "stabilization," are you?

Secretary MARSHALL. I was assuming somebody else might be, not meaning specifically you, Senator, but generally it has been used a great deal.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. It would seem to me that stabilization of our situation in Korea would be when the confusion of a retreat or anything of that kind had been settled and we were integrated and morale had been restored and we were in a position where we were moving with some reliance.

It would seem to me we long since stabilized our position in Korea.

Secretary MARSHALL. That is a discussion of terminology, and you can get at it very much better by the men who used it as to exactly what they meant by it.

AIR FORCE IN KOREA

Senator HICKENLOOPER. You referred a moment ago to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who are very distinguished military men and have performed very fine service for our country. There is no dispute about that and they are men in authoritative positions.

I would like to read to you a quotation from General Vandenberg referring generally to the Korean situation. He is quoted in the magazine called the Air Force, which is sponsored by a distinguished group of air officers. I think they are all former air officers and retired. His statement contained in one of the national magazines some time ago is quoted in this article on the use of air in Korea.

The article says, among other things, and I am quoting from the article now:

Tactical air power is likewise under wraps, for, as General Vandenberg has explained—

and then quoting General Vandenberg—

“isloating the battlefield from reinforcements is the prime function of tactical air. Air power was rendered practically inoperative when the United Nations in an effort to avoid a diplomatic rupture with the Chinese Communists halted offensive action at the Yalu River.”

That closes the quote from General Vandenberg. Then the article continues the paragraph and said:

This means simply that the Air Force in Korea has been unable, due to diplomatic restrictions, to interdict the enemy at vulnerable points, especially during periods when the battle line was close to the Manchurian boundary, that the Air Force has not been able to conduct full-scale counterair operations, since our planes have not been allowed to cross the diplomatic boundary line even in the air, and finally that the Air Force has not been able to eliminate enemy airfields over the boundary, airfields which have posed a constant threat of hostile air action.

I quote that and refer to it largely for the purpose of supporting the contention that from the military point of view such actions are necessary. Therefore the failure to do this must be of a political decision. That is, it must come from a political decision.

Secretary MARSHALL. Referring to that particular quotation and that particular article, I should suppose that it is written as of the period of the first entrance of the Chinese Communist forces into Korea when we were forced into a withdrawal clear into South Korea.

Now, as I have said before, Senator, at that period we suffered very directly and very seriously from the fact that we could not carry our air beyond the Yalu River, and at that time the Chiefs of Staff brought forth a proposal that we should introduce as a first step hot pursuit, of which I was very emphatically in favor.

I explained to you what had happened with our allies with regard to that where we had a complete negation so far as they were concerned and they had troops on the ground with us, but by the time we had gotten their reactions our forces were south of the Thirty-eighth parallel, which means they were roughly 200 miles south of the Yalu, which changed the air situation very materially because, while further north we either had to bomb into Manchuria to check the movements forward because they could reach us in the night, as I think General MacArthur has already covered, we were now in a position where we had 200 miles in which to deal with them and deal with supplies.

[Deleted.]

I am merely saying that we were in a very difficult position around the period of November 6 and for a short time thereafter.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. General Marshall, was Van Fleet General Ridgway's personal selection for the commander of the Eighth Army?

Secretary MARSHALL. No, sir; I don't think he was. He accepted it. The personal selection was mine. There was complete agreement on the part of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with that.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. General Ridgway was not consulted about the assignment of General Van Fleet to the Eighth Army?

Secretary MARSHALL. Yes; there was a communication back and forth on that.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Did Secretary Pace, to your knowledge, have any knowledge of the determination or the decision to relieve General MacArthur?

I am not talking about his delivering the message to him, but did he have any knowledge in advance, either prior to his departure to the Orient or during his trip over there or at any time prior to the issuance, public issuance of the order, did he have any knowledge of the decision to relieve General MacArthur?

GENERAL RIDGWAY'S APPOINTMENT

Secretary MARSHALL. He had no knowledge of the decision until he reached Korea itself, and his knowledge then was the receipt of one message which directed him to inform General Ridgway of his appointment.

The remainder of the instructions, as I have explained, never reached him, but he had no previous knowledge on his trip to Japan.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, is it correct that General Ridgway was aware of this prior to knowledge on the part of General MacArthur?

Secretary MARSHALL. No, sir; but this is second-hand information I am giving you. Mr. Pace said that when he received this message, which he did not fully understand because he had not received the preceding message, he informed General Ridgway of it and they debated the surprising nature of the message when General Almond, the chief of staff of the Tenth Corps—and they were on his front—informed them it was already on the radio.

OFFICER'S PERSONAL VIEWS

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Now, General, getting to the question of the propriety of General MacArthur's statements, I want to read to you the policy as publicly announced by the Chief of Staff of the Army on or about the first part of February. I can't find the exact date of this particular testimony, but it is some place between the 1st and the 15th, probably the 1st of February. It can be ascertained.

Page 160 of the hearings before the Foreign Relations Committee and the Armed Services Committee on Senate Concurrent Resolution 8, regarding the troops-to-Europe issue, this question was asked of General Collins by Senator Lodge, a member of this committee. Senator Lodge said as follows:

I would like to ask you this question. There has been a good deal of talk about there being a gag on officers in the armed services insofar as expressing their opinions before committees of Congress is concerned. Can you tell me is there such a gag?

General COLLINS. Definitely not.

Senator LODGE. In other words, an officer is free to respond to an invitation by any committee of Congress to come up and say what he thinks?

General COLLINS. Completely so. So far as the Army is concerned, I can say without any reservation whatever that here in essence are the instructions that we have complied with for years. An officer called before a committee of the Congress must present the considered view of the Department of the Army or the War Department. I think that is a logical thing because then, rather than getting mere individual opinions, the Congress has the benefit of something that has been carefully processed and evaluated by the staff and acted upon by the Secretary of the Army or the War Department itself. That rule still holds.

However, an officer is permitted in answer to queries complete and utterly unfettered personal views so long as he says, "This is my personal view."

Senator LODGE. So that is a protection to the public and to the Member of Congress involved, is it not, so that he will know that the officer is expressing a personal view and not a view of the Department.

I think perhaps to complete the record I will read all of it in. There are just two more paragraphs.

General COLLINS. That is it exactly; and I think that distinction is very important because you gentlemen are entitled to know what, as I said earlier, the considered judgment of the Department is. You are also entitled in my opinion, if you desire it, to have the views of any individual that you call on. And I can assure you that no Army officer is inhibited in any way from giving you his personal views so long as he makes it clear that they are his personal views.

Senator LODGE. And if an Army officer comes up here and says, "It is my personal view that we should have more armored divisions and less infantry divisions," he has a right to say it, and it will not be held against him later; is that right?

General COLLINS. Absolutely. He does say it right within our own Department. In other words, if the day comes when we could get unanimity of opinion among our officers, then I would think there was something the matter with us.

There is some more colloquy along that line, but those are the important things. I would be glad to have the whole thing put in if anybody thinks it is necessary.

But there is a statement made publicly in an official capacity, I take it, by the Chief of Staff of the Army, who was General MacArthur's superior, and from whom General MacArthur received his orders and his directives. The statement was made publicly here, which says that an officer under the policy of the American Army has the most complete right to express his personal views so long as he says they are his personal views and it is clear that they are his personal views.

OFFICERS AS COMMITTEE WITNESSES

I will admit for the sake of the discussion which may follow that he says before a committee of Congress. But I submit that is only a technical distinction between a committee of Congress where an officer is testifying publicly and the officer expressing his personal views to a Member of Congress who is an official of this branch of the Government.

In the light of that apparent policy, where is the ground for the castigation or the recall of General MacArthur for expressing his personal views, for instance, in a private letter to Representative Martin?

I ask, in the light of this apparent policy which says that our officers have the utmost freedom to express their personal views, so long as they make it clear they are their personal views, where can the criticism lie?

Secretary MARSHALL. That particular issue, of course, has been up many times. Without elaborating, I said virtually the same thing the other day. I have forgotten in connection with what it was.

Here I think, though, is quite a different situation. You say it is a technical point, that that is before a committee of the Congress. I think it is more than technical when you are considering releases to the press, to the whole world from the commander of the force putting himself before the whole world in various releases or statements in direct contradiction of the President of the United States, our Commander in Chief. That, I think, is quite a different situation, and I think you yourself would really have to agree with that.

Let me illustrate a little bit.

You are talking before a committee of Congress, and almost 9 times out of 10, or 19 out of 20, that is a member of the department here in Washington, the Navy Department, the Air Department, or the Army Department.

Now, we are turning to a supreme commander of an international force who, in one way or another, is bringing before the entire world and all our allies an issue of rather complete difference with his Commander in Chief, who is the executive agent of those allies of the United Nations and whose troops are in his armies.

Suppose, like was done during the Civil War, you call in the commander of an army which is engaged with the enemy, or rather you call in a commander of an army which is engaged with the enemy, and he brings out his differences of opinion before the Congress with his own army commander, and to that extent really discredits him as to his judgment in the handling of that army, and that becomes a public property, that information?

Well, I think we all must admit that that would have a very destructive effect on the morale of that entire force. It would certainly have a very weakening effect on that commander concerned.

If we took the supreme commander in Tokyo and his commander in Korea, and he differs with him as to the strategic and tactical instructions he is receiving, and by statements of one kind or another of releases which go to the press, he makes it well known that he is in disagreement with his supreme commander and that the casualties that they are suffering are not justified, well, you would not have very much of an army and, I think, he would be relieved almost instantly. I think he would have to be relieved.

So, it goes much further, Senator, than, I think, of coming before a committee of Congress; it goes much further.

You are getting at the whole position of a soldier. You are not talking about technical things, do we have more ships of the carrier type or more battleships; do we have more tanks and less airplanes, if you are limited in funds, but you are dealing with an actuality, an army in the field, and with the allies whose troops are in that army. I do not think that is comparable.

DUTIES OF CONGRESS

Senator HICKENLOOPER. General, do you believe it is the duty of the Congress, which passes the laws of authorization, to inform itself, and the Members of the Congress to inform themselves? Or must the Congress just supinely take decisions that are built up in other departments of the Government, and follow them, without, in the long run being justified?

In other words, do not the Members of the Congress have the obligation to inform themselves as much as they can?

Secretary MARSHALL. Under the Constitution, the Congress does not command armies, and an army is a very special entity.

I feel that our greatest long-term security, in our procedure, our Government, and our military force, lies in the fact that our representatives in Congress are in the middle, as it were, of the general plot, and the people of this country are kept as fully informed as it seems safe to do so.

Now, it is a very difficult line to draw; but it is a very important one.

We almost had tragedies, great tragedies in the Civil War. We did have, undoubtedly, failures or armies because of a procedure that was highly destructive of discipline, particularly destructive of the individual commander who was being attacked from below by subordinates who were jealous of his position.

What would you say, Senator, to this: Congress was not kept advised of our atomic developments. We couldn't. It would just defeat us entirely if we did that. We went a long time without any contact with Congress, and finally we did contact the top leadership, but even then we didn't explain just what we were doing.

There are considerations of strategy. You could carry, I think, your argument into the field that the American people had a right to determine the strategy of a battle, or something of that kind. You couldn't possibly hope to win a battle on a basis of something of that kind, we all recognize that, just as I feel that the individual officer, when he accepts a special position in relation to his Army, I don't mean in the general term that I am in the Army—but he is an entity in the Army and there are great reservations as to his procedure, and you cannot, I believe, escape them with any hope of success.

Certainly you would have profound confusion.

I think there are other methods, there are other means of the Congress to deal with such situations, but I don't think the example there is comparable to the real incident that we are considering.

MAC ARTHUR STATEMENTS PRIOR TO RECALL

Senator HICKENLOOPER. General, I now refer to the examination of Senator Johnson from Texas on yesterday, and the document called the Compilation of Certain Published Information on the Military Situation in the Far East by this committee. Senator Johnson referred to this document which contains a number of statements. I refer to document "E," on page 181, the statement of General MacArthur, February 13, 1951, beginning with the fourth paragraph and continuing through the fifth paragraph of that document. I believe that in answer to a question of Senator Johnson you stated that that was one of the objectionable statements that General MacArthur had made.

I have read those two paragraphs very carefully, and I see nothing in them that does anything except recite the factual situation at the time. I see nothing there that disagrees with any policy and yet that seemed to be an objectionable statement.

It does state that "the concept advanced by some that we should establish a line across Korea and enter into positional warfare is wholly unrealistic and delusory."

It would seem to me that this is a statement which could be very properly made by a commander in the field. No decision had been made on it. He was expressing what a great many people believed to be true; and the whole discussion in those two paragraphs would seem to me to be the expression of known fact.

I now mention the paragraph beginning at the bottom of page 182 with the words "vital decisions". General MacArthur is quoted in the public press as saying—

Vital decisions have yet to be made, decisions far beyond the scope of the authority vested in me as the military commander, which are neither solely

political nor solely military, but which provide on the highest international level an answer to the obscurities which now becloud the unsolved problems raised by Red China's undeclared war in Korea.

I fail to see anything in that except an acknowledgment that he is subject to these decisions, which everyone apparently was aware had not finally been made, and which were in a state of flux at that time. It seems to me to be a perfectly factual, perfectly true, and certainly a noninflammatory statement.

I merely register my objection at this time that I see nothing there that would be objectionable.

Senator JOHNSON. Would the Senator yield?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes; I am raising it now because I didn't care to interrupt the Senator at the time he was questioning on those points.

Senator JOHNSON. If the Senator doesn't desire to have me interrupt—

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I was merely explaining why I am going into the question.

Senator JOHNSON. There is nothing in the question of the Senator from Texas to indicate he had objection to statements made by anyone and, as near as I can recall, there is nothing in the reply that referred to objection.

The question merely was whether it was General Marshall's opinion that those statements were in conflict with the directive, and General Marshall testified that it was his opinion.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I merely wanted to canvass them because I see nothing in any of them that could be so interpreted. That happens to be my own personal view, and as I say, at the time the questions were answered, I couldn't get into the discussion.

Then on page 184, in the second full paragraph on that page, to which the Senator from Texas referred, beginning with the word in the second sentence of that paragraph, "Even under inhibitions"—I will read that:

Even under inhibitions which now restrict activity of the United Nations forces and the corresponding military advantages which accrue to Red China, it has been shown its complete inability to accomplish by force of arms the conquest of Korea—

referring, I take it, to the Red Chinese inability.

It seems to me that is an utterly factual statement which violates no directive or which violates no particular policy.

MAC ARTHUR'S LETTER TO MARTIN

Now, we turn again to the letter to Congressman Martin, his letter to General MacArthur being on page 185 and the beginning of General MacArthur's reply at the bottom of that page, but the statements which were referred to in Senator Johnson's questioning are on 186 in the second paragraph, beginning with the second sentence of that paragraph, which says:

Generally these views are well known and clearly understood, as they follow the conventional pattern of meeting force with maximum counter force, as we have never failed to do in the past.

Now, on that sentence, General, do you consider that an untrue statement—that is, a statement that is not supported by facts?

Secretary MARSHALL. Senator, I consider the letter is an expression of views in one way or another practically in complete disagreement with the Commander in Chief; and as to the statement on page 183 of March 24, the issue there was that that statement brought to a halt the efforts of our Commander in Chief and the executive agent of the United Nations in a procedure which was hoped might produce a halt, a stoppage of hostilities—in other words, a cease-fire basis for the beginning of some negotiatory settlement.

The evidence in that case, leaving out our own opinions, was that it did stop it, and it called a halt to the action of our allies, who were involved in it, and they dropped the consideration of the proposition that had been made to them by the executive agent of the United Nations forces, our Commander in Chief; that is a fact.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I think we are talking about two different things.

Secretary MARSHALL. I beg your pardon?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I think we are talking about two different things. I have not referred to the message of General MacArthur to the enemy.

Senator MARSHALL. I did not get your last statement.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I said, I have not referred to the message of General MacArthur to the enemy, that is, proposing—

Secretary MARSHALL. I thought you referred to one paragraph of it.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. No, I believe not.

Secretary MARSHALL. On 184, the second full paragraph, it says, "Even under inhibitions which now restrict," and so fourth.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, I referred to that, but that is a statement of the New York Times.

Secretary MARSHALL. Well, that is the statement of his proposal to the Chinese Communist field commander.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, I do not get the connection.

Secretary MARSHALL. That statement at the time was not referred back to Washington, and the wording of it came from this New York Times' issue of March 24.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Now, General, in connection with the capitulation or surrender or discussion of the settlement of the conflict in Korea with the Red Chinese, how was it proposed that we go about that? That is, what did we propose to do? Who were we going to talk to? Who were we going to have a conference with? How would the matter be settled?

Secretary MARSHALL. Suppose, Senator, you question the State Department on the exact terms of procedure rather than me.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. All right.

Secretary MARSHALL. The document concerned was cleared by the Chiefs of Staff, it was cleared by me and, of course, by the State Department with the President.

DECISION TO RELIEVE MACARTHUR

Senator HICKENLOOPER. If you will bear with me for just a moment, Mr. Chairman, I will be able to conclude this almost immediately.

General Marshall, I assume it is your view that the greatest possible unity of the American people is essential in any emergency action at this time—

Secretary MARSHALL. I think that is correct, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER (continuing). And that in view of the unity and confidence of our allies, the United Nations, and the Japanese people, in view of their location in the Orient, and their confidence is very desirable, in view of that fact, and in view of what has happened since the relief of General MacArthur, would you support the action that was taken and in the method by which that was taken if you had it to do over again?

Secretary MARSHALL. That is a hypothetical question, Senator, and I do not think it is a very fair one; but I would say, yes, this was foreseen.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. So that the action was taken although it was foreseen that great doubt and confusion would arise in the minds of the American people, and it was also taken with the knowledge that General MacArthur stood very high in the opinion and the confidence of the Japanese people. That is correct, is it? Those things were foreseen and calculated in advance of this decision?

Secretary MARSHALL. That was foreseen, discussed, in advance of this decision. The decision came because it was felt it was unavoidable.

It was also felt after the height of the emotional wave passed there would be some sober thinking.

Senator McMAHON. That is going on, General.

Pardon me.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. That might be interpreted as an assumption that the American people would lull themselves into a situation of indifference after a period of time, also.

Secretary MARSHALL. I think sober thinking and lull are not comparative terms.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. One argument might support the philosophy of sober thinking, and the other might support the hope for a lull in public agitation.

Secretary MARSHALL. I might add to what I said by stating it was felt a very regrettable, a very tragic state of affairs, but that the decision was inescapable.

BRADLEY'S STORY REGARDING MONTGOMERY

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Now just one other thing, or two, here. I want to ask whether General Bradley's story currently appearing in Life magazine has been cleared with the Department of Defense or any other proper department.

Secretary MARSHALL. It was not cleared with me, and you will have to ask General Bradley, because I just began reading it in Life.

I know this: That General Bradley was talking to me about his date of retirement, and I think he was considering the publication of the matter on his retirement.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I shall not burden the record by going into a great deal of detail, but I think everyone will agree in reading that article that it contains a great number or a very substantial number of serious and, as I interpret them, quite sharp criticisms and many statements of discredit directed at Field Marshal Montgomery whose country is one of our greatest allies, Great Britain. It is significant that General Montgomery has been selected as the deputy

commander for the North Atlantic Pact ground forces, or so I believe.

My question is: Should General Bradley be recalled for his very sharp criticisms of an ally and a commander who is second in command over whatever American troops will be sent to that allied army in Europe?

Secretary MARSHALL. I don't think so.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Is General Bradley any more authorized to speak frankly his mind which may give offense to our allies than General MacArthur?

Secretary MARSHALL. The situation is quite different; General Bradley is talking about a past war.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. But a present commander.

Secretary MARSHALL. He is talking about a past war and in his individual contacts with the various commanders concerned.

In this case we are dealing with the present fight and the Supreme Commander and our allies.

SOVIET TIMETABLE

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Getting back for just a moment to the Russians and the Soviet program, do you believe, General, that the Russians would precipitate a third world war merely on the theory of supporting a treaty obligation which they had, as a matter of honor?

Secretary MARSHALL. Not as a matter of honor, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I agree with you thoroughly. In other words, do you believe that Russia, if she does, will precipitate a third world war when Russia is ready for that third world war or thinks she is ready for it?

Secretary MARSHALL. Not entirely that, sir, and I explained the reaction I thought that was a possibility in the Far East as to China.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I understand that, but Russia has rolled with the punch a great many times when if they wanted to precipitate a third world war, they undoubtedly could have.

Secretary MARSHALL. When you speak of rolling with the punch, you are involving now some 400,000,000 people.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. In other words, I have the feeling that Russia will not engage in a third world war or start one until Russia believes the time is propitious and right and she is ready for it.

Secretary MARSHALL. I would agree with you, I think that would be their governing motive in the matter.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Until Russia feels that that time is right, no particular incident short of actual attack by some country on the territorial integrity of Russia, such as to their cities or something of that kind, can Russia be forced into a third world war.

Secretary MARSHALL. She can't be forced into a third world war I do not think, but I don't agree with your conclusion of your statement because I return again to I think they might take action because of what they considered a great peril to their interests.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I have occupied a great deal of time, Mr. Chairman. I may have on the second round, if we ever have one, some more questions, but with apologies for taking so much time as I have, I will ask no more questions at this time.

PROCEDURE OF INTERROGATION

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Knowland.

Senator KNOWLAND. Mr. Chairman, I just want to say on behalf of Senator Kefauver that he told me that he had to go to a Judiciary Committee meeting, some hearings, and expressed the hope that when he did return to the committee that he might have the opportunity to propound such questions as he wanted to propound to General Marshall. I told him I would express his desire in the matter and it is a matter for the committee to decide.

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, I would like to make a suggestion.

If a member of a committee is not here to take his turn in cross-examination no matter what the cause, that he at least not be allowed to interrupt a Senator who is in the process of examining the witness, not be allowed to ask his questions until the Senator examining at the time he returns completes his examination.

Senator McMAHON. Mr. Chairman, I would like to make this point. If Senator Kefauver were here, I would follow him. Now it apparently means I am going to follow Senator Knowland.

Chairman RUSSELL. Oh, no, I am not doing that. I am trying to have orderly procedure here and I am taking one Senator off of each of these committees in order.

I regret very much Senator Kefauver was called away, but I do not propose to return to the Armed Services Committee on the next question. It will be up to the committee to decide whether Senator Kefauver shall be permitted to ask his questions.

Unless the Chair is overridden, I am going to follow the policy I have adopted and call on the members of these committees alternately.

Senator McMAHON. All I can say is I am sorry Senator Kefauver is not here because by the looks of what I see over there my turn would come much quicker than it would if—

Senator KNOWLAND. I would say to the Senator from Connecticut he need not be disturbed by the material I have. It is just for reference and these are not all questions.

Chairman RUSSELL. The Senator is recognized, and he will be permitted to conclude his questioning before any other Senator is called upon; and when he has concluded his examination, or questioning, I will then call upon the next member in order on the Foreign Relations Committee, who will be the Senator from Connecticut.

AMERICAN INTERNAL UNITY

Senator KNOWLAND. Mr. Chairman, first I would like to make a brief statement to Secretary Marshall.

It seems to me that what our combined committees are trying to do—we are seeking facts upon which a better informed Congress, and a public, may find a basis for a foreign policy in the Far East, as well as in Europe, that will have, and deserve the substantial support of the overwhelming group of the American people.

I noticed in the press the other day that among the news agencies which had requested copies of our public transcript, had been the Tass Agency of the Soviet Union.

So there be no misunderstanding to Tass, and those who may read the documents which they get, I think there should be no misinterpret-

tation that this discussion which is going on represents any fundamental cleavage in the American people's determination to help maintain a free world.

The American people were subject to some controversy before the attack on Pearl Harbor. When this attack took place, the American people united, as they have in all past circumstances of a similar character, and as I believe they will in any future challenge to the American way of life, and to our fundamental needs as a free nation in support of a free world.

So, I do not view these hearings with some of the misgivings that have been expressed in the press, and otherwise, that this may do damage to our basic national unity.

I feel that out of this will come a clearer determination that we do not intend to be pushed around by the Soviet Union or any nation which is endeavoring to impose its will upon the free people of the world.

JCS RECOMMENDATIONS ON MAC ARTHUR REMOVAL

Now, Mr. Secretary, I would like to ask this question :

Did the Joint Chiefs of Staff ever hold a formal meeting to recommend the summary removal of General MacArthur; and I refer you to page 860 of the public record in which you start to outline the various steps which took place, starting on the 5th day of April which, as I understand, was the day that the Martin letter became public?

Did the Joint Chiefs of Staff ever hold a formal meeting to recommend the summary dismissal of General MacArthur?

Secretary MARSHALL. They held a meeting on the afternoon of that Sunday, the 8th, I believe, in which they came to certain conclusions which General Bradley can give you; and I noticed, and I presume you are referred to this, in the JCS narrative, they used the expression "an informal meeting."

I asked them what the word "informal" meant, and they said that it meant that they didn't have the subsidiary members present, but the Chiefs of Staff themselves met and came to these decisions; but they used this word "informal" here—rather, it was used for them by those that prepared this paper; because the six or seven other subsidiary members of the staff were not present.

Senator KNOWLAND. Were all of the Joint Chiefs of Staff present, including the nonvoting chairman, General Bradley?

Secretary MARSHALL. All were present; yes, sir; and they met for, I think, 2 hours, from 2 until 4 o'clock.

Senator KNOWLAND. That was on the Sunday—

Secretary MARSHALL. Sunday, the 8th.

Senator KNOWLAND. Sunday the 8th.

Now, calling your attention again to page 860 of the public transcript, I note that this language appears :

Later that afternoon the three Chiefs of Staff met with me and General Bradley and stated their recommendations in the matter based on purely military considerations.

What is the significance of that language that they furnished their recommendations "based on purely military considerations"?

Secretary MARSHALL. That was the direction of the President to me to secure the views of the Chiefs of Staff based on purely military considerations. He did not define them.

My assumption would be that he was considering the effect on the Army, of our operations there, of the transfer of command, and matters of that sort.

Senator KNOWLAND. Well, what was the recommendation of the Joint Chiefs, based—and quoting again—“purely military considerations” to the summary dismissal of General MacArthur?

Secretary MARSHALL. Senator, I would much prefer that you ask that question of General Bradley, because he kept a note of it and I did not; and also when we came to the meeting the following day, on Monday the 9th, I had General Bradley state those views—I did not state them—because he had sat with them and he had kept the note and I have not even got it myself now.

Senator KNOWLAND. Well, the only reason—I do not like to press the point, Mr. Secretary, but you are the chief civilian head of the National Defense Establishment, and according to the testimony at that particular meeting where the Joint Chiefs were present, all of them, that is General Bradley, General Vandenberg, General Collins, and Admiral Sherman, their recommendations in the matter, based on purely military considerations, were presented to you as the chief civilian officer of the National Defense Establishment.

Secretary MARSHALL. That is correct, sir.

Senator KNOWLAND. And I would like to know, if you could recollect, just what they told you as to their views concerning the summary dismissal of the general.

Secretary MARSHALL. I repeat again, Senator, that General Bradley made a very careful note of them, and used this in his presentation to the President. They were satisfying to me, and they influenced my views in the matter, and I do not want to try offhand to recount them to you. You will have them the moment General Bradley steps in.

Senator KNOWLAND. I will examine General Bradley when that time comes.

PREPARATION OF ORDERS REMOVING MAC ARTHUR

Now, Mr. Secretary, no one questions—at least no one that I have heard of questions—the power of the President to change commanders. General MacArthur himself made very clear in his own testimony his viewpoint on this matter, and I would like to ask this question: Was the order from the President, the final order which led to the sending of the directive removing General MacArthur from his four far eastern commands, given to you as Secretary of Defense by the President as a written or a verbal order, or to whom was the order transmitted?

Secretary MARSHALL. As nearly as I can answer that question, as I understand it, the President gave no written directive. The President approved, with minor modifications that he stated, documents which were drafted for his consideration.

On Monday morning the 9th, at 8:50 a. m., we had a meeting with the President, the same group of four—

Senator KNOWLAND. That is of the same group of four being—was that Mr. Harriman, and the President—

Secretary MARSHALL. Myself, Mr. Harriman, Mr. Acheson, and General Bradley.

Senator KNOWLAND. And General Bradley.

Secretary MARSHALL. And resumed the situation, as we saw it; and General Bradley stating the views of the Chiefs of Staff.

The President orally stated that General MacArthur should be relieved, and he directed us to prepare the necessary papers for the method of relief, meaning the technical involvements and the commands, and the following day, at 3 o'clock, Tuesday, we met again, the same group, with the President, and there submitted these drafts of his directive to General MacArthur for his relief, and of his statement, his public statement, that was to be made, and of the draft of the order that I was to issue to General Ridgway to take the command.

Those were in draft form. There were minor corrections or adjustments made in them, and then they were prepared for issue.

So, to answer your question as nearly as I understood it, that constituted the President's action in the matter of the relief, and when he authorized the actual dispatch of the orders.

OFFICIAL PROCEDURE IN REMOVING MAC ARTHUR

Senator KNOWLAND. Now, I do not want to be repetitious on it, but I think it is a matter in which the committees and the country have some interest—again not challenging the President's right to do it or the decision which felt that it was necessary for them to make a command—but to a great many people, both those who had some service in the Army and those who had not, the method of relief seems to be so unusual that as soon as the general read the orders, as I understand it, he was relieved then and there, without the opportunity to turn over his command, to finish his business, or anything else—that seems to be such an unusual situation that I would like to ask when the President gave his directive to either you or General Bradley or to whomever it was given, did he say in effect, "General, prepare the orders to General MacArthur summarily removing him" or did he merely say, "Prepare directives which will relieve General MacArthur of his command"?

Secretary MARSHALL. So far as I recall, he directed that we prepare the drafts of the directives for the relief of General MacArthur—

Senator KNOWLAND. Forthwith?

Secretary MARSHALL. Of his command. I am quite certain the word "summary" was not used, nor the word "forthwith," but he did consider the replacement of General Ridgway by General Van Fleet and questioned particularly how quickly General Van Fleet could be gotten under way.

Senator KNOWLAND. Now, in the statements that were issued to the—that were issued subsequent to the relief of General MacArthur from the White House, my recollection is—and we can get the exact language—that it said that this matter had the approval of all the chief civilian and military advisers of the President.

Based on that statement, I would like to ask if among all of the top civilian and military advisers of the President if not a single individual raised the point on this summary dismissal and advocated that perhaps it could be done in the more normal way of permitting the general to turn over his command to his successor.

Secretary MARSHALL. It was a discussion of the method of presenting the relief to General MacArthur which took the line which should

be done by a high official of the Government and it should be done at the embassy and not at his office and that is where Mr. Pace, Secretary of the Army, came into the consideration. I have already covered what happened in his case.

As far as I can recall there was no specific discussion as to the hour or immediacy of relief, that is, advance notice to General MacArthur before any press release or any directive was received by him.

MAC ARTHUR'S SPECIAL STATUS

Senator KNOWLAND. Now, General, you have already testified to the effect that Mr. Secretary Pace, the Secretary of the Army, had had no advance notice of the removal of General MacArthur. Secretary Pace is the immediate civilian superior to any Army general, I would assume. Is it not somewhat of an unusual procedure that one of the chief commanders in the field would be removed without prior consultation with the Secretary of the Army?

Secretary MARSHALL. I think in this case it is a little bit different, Senator. In the first place, General MacArthur was the supreme commander; he had Army and Navy and Air under his command, and he was in a very special status.

In the next place, Mr. Pace was out of the country when this came to its final issue, and there was no opportunity to bring him into it unless there was a delay of action; and he was not General MacArthur's superior in the ordinary sense of the word. The Chiefs of Staff, as a group, were issuing the orders. General Collins was the executive agent of the Chiefs of Staff in handling these matters with General MacArthur. I would not have said that General Collins commanded General MacArthur because he did not. But the set-up is a little bit different than that which is normally the case.

TERMS OF A CEASE FIRE

Senator KNOWLAND. Now, General, on page 795 of the public transcript, you state our position with regard to Formosa and Red China's membership in the United Nations.

Did the Joint Chiefs recommend that these two issues not be subjects of discussion, which I understand was their recommendation at the time?

Secretary MARSHALL. Did the Joint Chiefs recommend that these two issues be not the subject of discussion?

Senator KNOWLAND. Discussion in any cease-fire arrangement.

Secretary MARSHALL. They recommended as to the cease fire that those phases be not included. They did not recommend that there would be no discussion of them in the final settlement.

I read in the New York Times this morning that the submission yesterday of that letter of March 31 was the indication that the Joint Chief's recommendation had been disapproved. It had not at all. There was no recommendation by them that this should not be discussed. There was a recommendation by the Defense Department that this should be discussed between the State Department and ourselves.

Senator KNOWLAND. Well, not just let me get that clear, General. I had understood from the earlier testimony—and if you can find the paraphrase in the documents before us, it might be helpful—

I had understood that the Joint Chiefs had made a definite recommendation that in any cease-fire negotiation that the question of turning Formosa over to Communist China and the question of Communist China's admission into the United Nations should not be subject to discussion in those negotiations. Am I right or am I wrong?

Secretary MARSHALL. That is correct.

CEASE FIRE COMPARED TO OVERALL PROPOSITION

Senator KNOWLAND. Then I understood from your endorsement or letter which was put into the record yesterday, that as to the other things they had discussed, you approved them, but you disapproved their recommendation relative to these two matters being subject of discussion.

Secretary MARSHALL. No; they didn't recommend they be not subject to discussion. That memorandum really covered two different debates that were going on at the same time. One was with the State Department in relation to the negotiations that we were bound to get into in New York, and the other was connected with the terms of the armistice or cease fire.

Now the Chiefs of Staff emphatically recommended that those terms of the cease fire in no way include reference to Formosa and the entry of the Chinese Communists into the United Nations.

Senator KNOWLAND. That is right—that is as I understand it.

Secretary MARSHALL. Now there was an additional discussion going on in meetings with them and the State Department representatives and also on a higher level regarding how we were going to handle these negotiations. I am not talking about the armistice terms; I am talking about the general proposition. We were not going to have this factor in the armistice terms, that is, from our point of view.

What was done in that second paragraph of the letter Mr. Lovett signed was to raise the point with the State Department that this should be discussed between us so that we'd have a clear understanding of how it is going to be handled and not any confused view of that matter. That is all that was.

There more properly could have been two letters because the second paragraph of that letter referred to other discussions that were going on.

Senator KNOWLAND. So that your letter which you put into the record yesterday reading:

With reference to our discussions regarding Korea on March 19, 1951 with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I am transmitting herewith for your information and consideration a memorandum of March 27, 1951 from the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the United States position regarding an armistice in Korea.

These views supercede those of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and were submitted to the National Security Council on December 13, 1950. I am in general agreement with the terms, conditions, and arrangements enumerated in paragraphs 6 and 7 of the Joint Chiefs' memorandum. However, I believe that the questions of Formosa and Chinese Communist membership in the United Nations as well as other general political and security factors referred to in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the memorandum of the Joint Chiefs of Staff would be fitting topics in the consideration of the basic terms of settlement of the Korean situation and might be taken up in discussions between our two departments on the overall questions of Korea.

Now you refer in this letter specifically to the several paragraphs in the letter of the Joint Chiefs, do you not?

Secretary MARSHALL. That is correct. I have them right here.

Senator KNOWLAND. And do you not in effect countermand their recommendations regarding Formosa and Communist China membership in the UN?

Secretary MARSHALL. Not in any respect whatsoever, sir. In March the Department of State inquired of the Department of Defense orally and informally as to the Department of Defense views on the relationship between the disposition of Formosa and a settlement of the Korean conflict in the light of the far eastern problems.

At about the same time the State Department asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff—the first one was with the Defense Department, you see—to review a prior Joint Chiefs memorandum containing recommendations for cease-fire arrangements. The answers to these two requests were combined in a study which included a set of specific armistice arrangements and a number of broad political and security considerations relating generally to a possible basis for an acceptable ultimate solution of the entire Korean problem following an armistice.

I was not here at the moment. It was over the week end, and the State Department as I understand it was very anxious to get the draft of the armistice terms because they were having discussions with our allies preliminary to formal action in the United Nations Organization, so the reply had to be hurried to them.

Now the two things that I have just referred to were combined into the one memorandum; the first request of the State Department to the Defense Department as to the view of the Defense Department on the relationship between the disposition of Formosa and a settlement of the Korean conflict in the light of the far eastern problems. Now that was one thing.

The other was their request on the Joint Chiefs of Staff to review the armistice terms they had submitted last fall or December, and see if they were appropriate at the present time or required modification, and they modified them, not materially but specifically and forwarded them up with a specific statement that Formosa and the entry of the Chinese Communists into the United Nations should not be considered, should not be a part in any way of that armistice term, that is the cease-fire term.

Now then, this one memorandum answered both things to the extent that it suggested that we go ahead with the State Department in answer to this first request they had made of the Defense Department orally and informally as to the views of the Defense Department on the relationship between the disposition of Formosa and a settlement of the Korean problem.

Now what was in the minds of people that drafted that letter, Mr. Lovett and what had been in my own mind was that we must have a complete understanding as to just what the procedure was going to be because we don't conduct that with the United Nations.

The State Department conducts that. They put those things in one letter, that's all.

I went over this morning with the Chiefs of Staff to find out if in their own communication, which I have here, there was any implication at all to the effect that you feared, and there was none.

Senator KNOWLAND. Now, General, how do the recommendations regarding armistice negotiations differ between the Joint Chiefs'

recommendations of March 27 or whatever the date was, and the 13th of December recommendations?

Secretary MARSHALL. How do they differ?

Senator KNOWLAND. Yes.

Secretary MARSHALL. In what particular effect?

Senator KNOWLAND. Well, specifically on the 13th of December had the Joint Chiefs recommended that the disposal of Formosa and the admission of Red China into the United Nations, had they recommended that that be excluded at that time?

Secretary MARSHALL. I will have to get the document.

Senator KNOWLAND. Could you get that and make it available for the record?

Secretary MARSHALL. Yes. I can get the document and make the fact available for the record. The document I probably cannot.

DEFENSE AND STATE DEPARTMENTS CONSULTATIONS

Senator KNOWLAND. Now, General, normally in the negotiations that are going on at Lake Success, is it customary before the United States makes a proposal or the State Department acting for this Government makes a proposal, to have full consultations with the Defense Establishment as to its strategic impact on the defenses of our Nation?

Secretary MARSHALL. That has been the procedure since I have been Secretary of Defense, and as a matter of fact I instituted the procedure of our meeting with the State Department officials in the Office of the Chiefs of Staff, as I described the other day, where we all sit down together, and that has also been paralleled by similar meetings of lower level officials of both the State Department and the Defense Department, and they have been on both sides.

As I explained the other day, one thing I thought was important that was not going on at the time I took office was intimate discussions back and forth rather than the exchange of memorandums, so that has been carried to a very full degree in all of these matters.

INDIAN PROPOSAL FOR CEASE FIRE

Senator KNOWLAND. Now, since you have testified that there is a most intimate relationship and a full exchange of information, I assume that the Department of Defense was fully conversant with the fact that the United States representative, Mr. Austin, at the United Nations in Lake Success, had been instructed to vote for the Indian proposal of January 11 of this year; am I correct in that assumption?

Secretary MARSHALL. I will have to check the actual figures.

Senator KNOWLAND. To refresh your memory, the New York Times of January 12, an article by Mr. Walter Sullivan, from Lake Success, states that the United States representative, Mr. Austin, voted for the Indian proposal at that time, which, among other things, provided that there would be a five-member nation group set up consisting of Communist China, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, the United States, and one other nation, to consider the cease-fire proposals and an armistice.

Now three of those nations—namely the Soviet Union, Communist China, and Great Britain—had already publicly been on record in

favor of the admission of Communist China into the United Nations and the turning over of the eight million free people on Formosa to the Chinese Communists.

So that when we consented to go into such a meeting, we went in with our eyes open, that we would be outvoted at least three to two and possibly four to one, depending on who the other nation might be.

Now, in that same article, Mr. Sullivan says:

United States circles indicated an expectation that the Chinese Communists would reject the plan presented today and implied that American support had been given with this expectation in mind.

As a former Secretary of State and a man of great experience in our Government, don't you think, if that is correct, that is a rather dangerous doctrine upon which this Government's foreign policies might be based? Because it was just possible that Communist China might have accepted the proposal.

Secretary MARSHALL. I recall now the incident that you have just described in detail, and I also recall part of the discussion as to the tactics to be applied to that particular situation; so I was aware of it.

Now, as to the basis of the tactics, that is a question for the Secretary of State, but I was aware of it.

FATE OF FORMOSA

Senator KNOWLAND. Now, in the same article it says this:

One of the key points discussed by delegations afterward was the possible outcome of talks between the great powers, including Communist China, on Formosa. Sir General—

meaning Sir Benegal Rau, the Indian delegate—

indicated that in India's view, if today's proposal were carried out faithfully Formosa would be turned over to China.

Your testimony is not, is it, Mr. Secretary, that we agreed to vote for this proposal in other than in good faith, and that if we go into a conference, is there not, at least, some moral obligation to be bound by the result of such a conference?

Secretary MARSHALL. I will have to get you to get the State Department to comment on that, to ask them regarding that maneuver. You are getting into another kind of maneuver which I was not completely involved in, only partially.

Senator KNOWLAND. The only reason I raise it at this point, Mr. Secretary, is that it appears that from the March memorandum of the Joint Chiefs, as modified by Mr. Lovett's letter put into the record yesterday, that we were getting around to the place where we again were expressing the point that at least from the point of view of negotiation we would consider, as we did on January 11, to discuss the turning over of Formosa and the admission of Red China.

Secretary MARSHALL. Very specifically there was to be no negotiation about Formosa, and the inclusion of Communist China in the United Nations in connection with the cease-fire terms; that was excluded, and that was accepted on that basis by the State Department. But what we did want, and that is the reason this has gotten involved in semantics and things of that sort, what we did want, was to have a very clear undersanding of just what the procedure was going to

be, which is just what you are talking about, and that is the reason we wanted to have this discussion with the State Department to decide specifically on how this was going to be met, because there were other parties who could bring up these negotiations, and we had to meet them in our handling of the matter, and we wanted no doubt about how that was going to be done.

Senator KNOWLAND. But, Mr. Secretary, I assure you I am not interested in engaging in semantics. I am interested in the matter as a Member of the Senate of the United States, in the fact that on January 11, the representative of this Government voted for a proposal which might very well have led, had it been accepted by Communist China, to the very thing which I now find that, at least in March, if not in December, the Joint Chiefs had strongly recommended not even be a subject of discussion.

Secretary MARSHALL. When I referred to semantics, Senator, I was talking about the interpretation of what that second paragraph actually meant; that it actually meant that we wanted to have a meeting with the State Department to determine specifically how this procedure by the other countries who would be involved, who would be free to enter into the debate, was to be handled.

Senator KNOWLAND. Now, Mr. Secretary, as far as these discussions are concerned, among other suggestions which have been made by both India and Communist China, and the Soviet Union, had been that they might sit in on the discussions of a Japanese peace treaty.

As I understand it, our State Department took—and I think quite correctly, and should be commended for so doing—a very adamant position that as far as the discussions of the Japanese peace treaty were concerned, that Red China would not be brought into those discussions; so it is not a question of saying that anything that they want to discuss shall be brought into the negotiations.

My question to you now is, If it were proper for the State Department to, in effect, exercise a veto on permitting Red China to discuss the Japanese peace treaty, why would it not also be perfectly reasonable for the State Department to follow out the advice of the Joint Chiefs and not even discuss the turning over of Formosa or the admission of Red China to the United Nations?

Secretary MARSHALL. The Chiefs of Staff did not advise against the discussion; they did state that those two considerations should have no part in the terms for a cease-fire.

Senator KNOWLAND. Now, leaving that for a moment, and we will inquire—

Secretary MARSHALL. May I add that I had them sit down with the document and read it and refresh their own minds and state to me whether they felt there was any implication there that they had recommended that there be no discussion, as a separate proposition, between the State Department and the Defense Department in regard to this matter.

They stated, reading their own document, there had not been.

STATE DEPARTMENT'S FORMOSA POLICY

Senator KNOWLAND. Well, then, as the Secretary of National Defense, who is kept fully advised by the Department of State on the positions of the State Department in matters which may affect the

interest of this Nation—is the State Department now willing to discuss the question of turning Formosa over to the Chinese Communists, or admitting Red China into the United Nations?

Secretary MARSHALL. What we are trying to make clear is what the State Department should do in this matter, and that is the reason we want to have discussions with them in regard to it, so that there could be no doubts between the Defense Department and the State Department as to how the matter, the issue shall be met, because we will have to face the issue, and how we will meet it.

Senator KNOWLAND. Mr. Secretary, I want to commend you very strongly for your statement of yesterday. I think you left no doubt, certainly in my mind, and I don't think in the minds of anybody who will read this record, that as far as you personally were concerned, and presumably speaking for the Department which you head, you do not believe that Formosa should be turned over to the Chinese Communists, and you don't believe, as you put it, that Red China should be able to shoot her way into the United Nations.

I commend you for a forthright statement, one that is understandable to this committee, and to the Congress, and upon which there can be no misinterpretation.

Now, I am asking you, as the head of one of our great departments, the second ranking man in the Cabinet of the President of the United States, whether you believe the position which you have expressed is the position which the Department of State has expressed in this matter?

Secretary MARSHALL. That is my understanding; but I want to have these meetings so that we have completely developed exactly the procedure that this Government shall take.

As a matter of fact, Senator, where apparently we have gotten in trouble with the understanding of this case—it is doing the very thing you evidently imply you think should be done—that is, meeting with the State Department and settling in a very clear way just exactly how we shall proceed.

Senator KNOWLAND. Well, and I think that is a very commendable thing that it be done in conferences and not by paper work; but you, I think, will grant that we Members of the Congress read for the first time in one of the great papers of this Nation that our representative at Lake Success has voted for a proposal which might very well lead to the doing of things which you have testified might be very harmful to our Nation's security.

We are concerned to know, basically, what is our policy in the Far East, and Korea, and to get as forthright an answer from the State Department as you have given this committee.

Secretary MARSHALL. Well, what I am concerned with is that you read that letter in the light of what is happening and what its purpose is, and it involves no disapproval whatsoever of the Chiefs of Staff's views.

Senator KNOWLAND. I am glad to hear that, and I hope when the Secretary of State testifies before the committee he can give us as clear an understanding as to what the State Department views are in regard to this matter.

MAC ARTHUR'S MARCH PROPOSALS

Now you have testified, Mr. Secretary, that in your judgment the so-called March proposals of General MacArthur had upset the apple cart, so to speak, in some delicate negotiations which were under consideration by this Government and possibly by us in negotiation with the other governments. Am I correct in my understanding?

Secretary MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator KNOWLAND. Do you know whether the actual formula of the so-called peace proposal which was under discussion, and which presumably was upset by the MacArthur statement, was ever submitted either for information or comment to the supreme commander in the Far East?

Secretary MARSHALL. The actual text, I believe, was not.

Senator KNOWLAND. Was there anything submitted to the supreme commander, General MacArthur, in the Far East other than that one message that went to him which you have previously mentioned?

Secretary MARSHALL. Not that I know of, Senator.

Senator KNOWLAND. Do you have that message?

Secretary MARSHALL. Yes, sir; I have it right here.

Senator KNOWLAND. Would you mind reading it into the record at this point?

Secretary MARSHALL. On the 20th of March 1951 the Joint Chiefs of Staff dispatched the following message to General MacArthur:

State—

meaning the State Department—

planning a Presidential announcement shortly that, with clearing of bulk of South Korea of aggressors, the United Nations now preparing to discuss the conditions of settlement in Korea. United Nations feeling exists that further diplomatic efforts toward settlement should be made before any advance with major forces north of thirty-eighth parallel. Time will be required to determine diplomatic reactions and permit new negotiations that may develop.

Recognizing that the parallel—

meaning the thirty-eighth parallel—

has no military significance, State has asked Joint Chiefs what authority you should have to permit sufficient freedom of action for next few weeks to provide security for United Nations forces and maintain contact with the enemy. Your recommendations desired.

His recommendation in regard to this was he did not need any additional freedom of action but he did not want any further limitations on his action.

Senator KNOWLAND. And you interpreted that at least, even if General MacArthur did not, as preventing him as a field commander to suggest to the opposing field commander of the Communists that he might enter into negotiations for a cease-fire on the field?

Secretary MARSHALL. Yes; and also the fact that he had included reference to Formosa and entrance of the Chinese Communists into the United Nations and matters of that sort. Because he was advised there that this thing was going to happen, and this was the executive agent of the United Nations that was going to make the public approach, and that they were in the midst of the negotiations.

As I stated, I think it had been completed with all but one or two nations, and the restraint there was merely a very minor consideration. They all dropped it instantly when his action occurred.

DRAFTING CEASE-FIRE PROPOSAL

Senator KNOWLAND. Now I take it that, inasmuch as these March proposals had been submitted to all but two or three nations, that obviously the formula must have been pretty well agreed upon by the Government of the United States. Were you thoroughly familiar with the proposals that we were making?

Secretary MARSHALL. At the time I was because the first draft of the proposal was sent over to the Chiefs of Staff; and they went over it and discussed it with members of the State Department; part of their views were incorporated in it; and it went back to the State Department, who then returned with the document, as I recall; and there was an open discussion with Mr. Acheson, Mr. Lovett, and myself and the Chiefs of Staff in final regard to it.

Then that was transmitted, so far as the Defense Department was concerned, by me to the State Department in the present terms that were acceptable.

Senator KNOWLAND. Can you recall what the terms of that proposal were?

Secretary MARSHALL. I can't recall the detail. It is a rather lengthy document.

Sentor KNOWLAND. Could I read you a memo and see whether any or all of these might be included:

1. Soviet Russia is being approached via England and India in an attempt to make her accept the following compromise solutions and to use her good offices to persuade Red China to agree to them.

2. A meeting of the United Nations Council to be held, at which helpful allies of the United States will explain that—

(a) The Korean War is a UN affair.

(b) It has become a war with Red China; therefore it can only be ended by negotiating with Red China.

(c) The presence of Red China in the UN thus becomes indispensable.

(d) Admission of Red China to the UN is a procedural matter precluding the use of the veto and requiring only a simple majority vote.

(e) It would not necessarily call for United States recognition of Red China for, after all, there are precedents in the UN of nations sitting in and discussing problems with other nations without recognizing them. Cuba has no diplomatic relations with the Soviets or their satellites, and Chile has severed hers.

(f) In this way the United States, while perfunctorily protected against the seating of Red China for internal reasons, will be enabled without any prejudices to accept the vote of the majority of the Council on the seating of Red China.

3. As soon as this is done, a cease-fire to take place and a UN-Red China peace settlement to be negotiated on the following basis:

(a) Red Chinese troops and UN troops to be evacuated from Korea;

(b) Dr. Ralph Bunche to be appointed UN High Commissioner for the whole of Korea.

(c) A UN militia composed of men of various UN member nations to be placed at Bunche's disposal for the maintenance of law and order in Korea, the Soviets to take part in this alongside of the other UN Council powers.

(d) Under Bunche, supported by this international militia and other UN assistant commissioners, free and unfettered elections to be held under UN supervision.

(e) In deference to American susceptibility, now threatened by MacArthur's views, every effort to be made to leave Formosa out of the picture, at least up to the time of the final restoration of peace and the holding of Korean elections. Preliminary soundings apparently make Nehru hopeful that Peiping will not

insist on immediate liquidation of Chiang Kai-shek if secretly assured it will follow in the course of time.

Is there anything in that memorandum which——

Secretary MARSHALL. I am not familiar with that memorandum, sir. The State Department can bring it up here. It was a public announcement rather than tactical political discussion.

NEGOTIATIONS FOR A CEASE-FIRE

Senator KNOWLAND. Well, certainly, before they made a public announcement, in effect a public notice to the Chinese Communists that they wanted to bring a cease-fire and enter into negotiations, there must have been some specific matters discussed as to what would be considered and how far our Government would be willing to go, would there not?

Secretary MARSHALL. There was a discussion of the various terms involved in this pronouncement.

Senator McMAHON. So we can follow his examination, would the Senator tell us, if this is a memornadum which the Senator from California wrote?

Senator KNOWLAND. This is a memorandum of some of the terms and conditions I had been given to understand were the subject of discussion, and I am trying to find out whether that is correct, and whether any of these proposals were, in fact, the subject of discussion with other nations relative to a possible cease-fire.

Senator McMAHON. I don't want to hold up the Senator, but I would like to ask this: Is it an official memorandum?

Senator KNOWLAND. No; it is not an official——

Senator McMAHON. This is a compendium of various rumors?

Senator KNOWLAND. A compendium of various reports.

Senator McMAHON. Rumors and reports. Thank you.

Senator KNOWLAND. I understand you to say, insofar as you can recall, none of these various reports, so far as you know, were to be included in any cease-fire arrangement with the Communists.

Secretary MARSHALL. Well, there were a good many you covered, Senator, but none of them awakened any memory of mine as to this specific communication, which was the terms and conditions we would propose to bring about a meeting with the representatives of the Communist China Government toward the cessation of hostilities.

UNITED STATES CONSIDERATIONS BEFORE NEGOTIATION

Senator KNOWLAND. Would it be possible for you to indicate what were some of the proposals we were willing to include in such negotiations?

Secretary MARSHALL. I haven't the document here, but I should think that is something for the State Department. We concurred in this document. I haven't got it here, sir.

Senator KNOWLAND. Now let me understand that. You say you concurred in the document. Are you referring to the public announcement that was to be made by the President of the United States——

Secretary MARSHALL. With the concurrence of our allies.

Senator KNOWLAND. With the concurrence of other allies, to Communist China.

Secretary MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator KNOWLAND. All right, that is one document, and I understand you concurred in that.

Secretary MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator KNOWLAND. That is a public statement that you believe General MacArthur's statement might have upset the appercart on.

Now certainly in our State Department and Defense Establishment before we make arrangements to go into a meeting with another power, even if it is a friendly one, and certainly if it is a potentially unfriendly one or an actual foe in a war that is now going on, we must have worked out some papers on the basis of just how far we were willing to go and what price we were willing to pay in order to bring the negotiations to a successful conclusion.

Was that phase of the problem discussed by the State Department with the Defense Establishment?

Secretary MARSHALL. I am quite certain that it was discussed with the Chiefs of Staff when they brought up their suggestions to me as to the handling of the document.

Senator KNOWLAND. But you do not at this time recall any of those fundamental principles which would underlie and be a directive to our negotiating officials as to how far they were authorized to go in order to bring such a meeting to a successful conclusion?

Secretary MARSHALL. Nothing, except the very broad principles that I have referred to regarding Formosa; regarding the entry of the Chinese Communists, the Chinese Communist government, in the United Nations, and in regard to security arrangements that we must have.

The whole procedure of how we would handle a cease fire, how we could make it a safe proposition for us to go along with, all of that was worked out in detail and, of course, preceded by discussions.

Now the matters that you have read to me in that paper seem to include the maneuvers we would have before the United Nations committee or whatever it was or whatever formal committee it should be. I cannot go into that phase of the matter; but there were specific things that were involved in this.

We were coming up with the proposal to the Chinese Communists that would place us in an awkward position that might weaken our position, not only at the moment in regard to security but in the further final settlements, whatever they might be.

Now those, and how we would handle the thing for the security of our forces to make this thing a practical proposition, those were all gone into, and I am fairly familiar with them. But the actual details of them will come very much better from the Chiefs of Staff.

MANEUVERS OF NEGOTIATION

Senator KNOWLAND. Now, when you make a proposal to a government which is engaging you in fighting, in Korea in this particular case, they, of course, have certain objectives; they have publicly stated them.

When we agree to sit down and negotiate regarding some of those matters that they have publicly expressed their views on, do we not at least indicate that, while we ourselves may vote against the turning over of Formosa and be very adamant about it, and we may vote

against Chinese membership in the United Nations, and be very adamant about it, that if we enter into a committee of 5 or 7 or 13 and are outvoted, then what position are we in if we have agreed to discuss these matters?

Secretary MARSHALL. Well, an agreement to discuss is inevitably involved in any kind of negotiation in regard to matters pertaining to the United Nations, and the use of the word "agreement" hardly enters into it because that is a matter of course rather than a matter of agreement.

The method of controlling, delimiting that agreement, is, of course, something else.

Now in this particular case there would be a great deal in the way of tactics in handling the matter which would have to be gone into, but there were certain things that were very definite regarding Formosa, regarding the entrance of the Chinese Communist Government into the United Nations, and that is a long-term proposition, because you look to the future as to when, if ever, they become a respectable government that can be treated as one of the family of nations.

All that, of course, is part—part of the matter of State Department technique in the strategy and tactics which Mr. Austin, in certain measure, becomes highly involved in.

From the Defense Department, what we are concerned with is that nothing is done to endanger our immediate position at present, and nothing is done which is going to be an embarrassment to us in the long view.

Now we come back to one of the moot points in this whole affair, which is Formosa.

Senator KNOWLAND. Is what?

UNITED STATES POSITION REGARDING FORMOSA

Secretary MARSHALL. Formosa. We are very clear on that, that Formosa must never be allowed to come under the control of a Communist government or of a government that is under Soviet Communist domination. Now that is clear; however otherwise that might be handled is another matter which undoubtedly would be discussed one way or another.

The entry of the Chinese Communists into the United Nations is a matter right now we are adamant in regard to.

Now, you have to take the long view into the future and, if you could conceive of that becoming, as I say, a respected government in the family of nations, then you have got a new consideration on your hands. What that will be and how far off in the future that will be, if it ever comes up, is something else.

UNITED STATES POSITION AS AFFECTED BY UN VOTING

Senator KNOWLAND. But, General, you testified here, either yesterday or the day before, that, in regard to this question of hot pursuit, it was the unanimous recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that it was approved by you as Secretary of National Defense, that it was, as I understood your testimony, approved by the President of the United States, and that the State Department, through its representatives, was directed to take the matter up with the United

Nations members, who are now allied with us, by making contributions in Korea, and by a vote unanimously of 13 members they disagreed with the views which were apparently strongly held by this Government.

Now in view of that testimony, I raise the same question regarding this situation on Formosa and on the UN membership.

Supposing we are again outvoted 13 to 1, where does that leave us? You have testified that we reversed the best judgment of our Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense, the President of the United States, on this question of hot pursuit, because 13 other nations allied with us voted "no," and we voted "yes."

Now supposing in this meeting that is proposed to go into negotiations with respect to a cease fire we are outvoted 13 to 1 on the question of Formosa and UN membership?

Secretary MARSHALL. You are now, it seems to me, bringing up the question of our tactics and strategy in the diplomatic way in connection with our membership in the United Nations and our immediate obligations and responsibilities in the Far East, in Korea in particular.

I am not apprised at the present time of just what decisions this Government has taken in regard to certain policies involved in this matter. Specifically I am thinking now of the veto. There have been certain developments there.

I believe as they say there is a great field day for lawyers in regard to one part of it, but I believe at the present time that where on one side, we will say the Security Council, the veto doesn't apply because they held it is a procedural matter, and you have got a technical word there on which they twist and turn, and on the other side that it come into the Assembly and you have a different picture.

I may have just reversed it, but anyway those matters are involved on which the State Department can talk with much more exactitude than I can.

USE OF VETO

Senator KNOWLAND. But it becomes a very material fact, does it not, General, when the State Department has publicly announced that in the matter of the admission of Communist China that they specifically have stated they would not use the veto?

Now that means that, if you do not use a veto, whether it is because they can't legally use it or because there is a difference of opinion and they have taken their stand based on one opinion, then it means that it is subject to the majority vote or whatever the vote is required on the admission of a government like Communist China.

Secretary MARSHALL. All I can say to that is, Senator, we have a very clear opinion that Formosa shall not fall under the control of the Communist Government or a dominated government by the Soviet Union, and the same as to the membership in the United Nations.

Now just how that is maneuvered, how that is maintained, I think your questions apply more to the State Department than they do to me.

PROPOSALS FOR NEGOTIATION

Senator KNOWLAND. Might I ask just one more question on that point and then we will reserve the balance for the State Department.

On this discussion regarding the so-called March proposal, can you recall whether or not among the suggestions made was that in effect there should be a UN trusteeship set up over all of Korea under some trustee? Either Dr. Bunche or someone else?

Secretary MARSHALL. I don't recall that, sir. I must confess to considerable vagueness about a document that I read and passed on, but the document is available and can be, I presume, made a matter of at least confidential evidence before this committee.

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, may I ask the Senator from California a question, or rather make a suggestion to him?

Chairman RUSSELL. If he will yield for that purpose.

Senator KNOWLAND. I will be glad to yield.

Senator MORSE. Is the Senator going to call during his examination for the supplying of this committee with the document the Secretary of Defense says he concurred in at the time, because I think it goes to the heart of the line of questioning the Senator is now following and I would like to see that document.

Senator KNOWLAND. I would say that I was next going to ask of the Department of National Defense if they could supply, with the permission of the President or whoever's permission would have to be secured, the document which the State Department was upset about because of General MacArthur's appeal to the Communist leaders to surrender in March, and also if they could provide for the committee in either executive, if it is a highly classified document or otherwise, the general basis upon which these negotiations would be conducted.

Secretary MARSHALL. Well, Senator, isn't that really for the State Department?

Senator KNOWLAND. Well, I thought, however, with your contacts with the Department you might pass on to them that this question has been raised.

Secretary MARSHALL. But it is a very clear statement—

Chairman RUSSELL. Submit a formal request for it, then, Senator—

MANNER OF MAC ARTHUR'S RELIEF

Senator KNOWLAND. I will submit, during the noon hour, a letter regarding it.

Now, going back to the question of the relief of General MacArthur, in the manner in which it was done, but not in the least questioning the right of the President to do it, I would like to ask whether, during these conferences which took place on the 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, and 9th of April, whether any thought had been given or discussion had taken place relative to calling him back to the United States for consultations, temporarily turning over his command to General Ridgway, as was finally done, on a face-to-face basis, to see if they couldn't find an area of agreement such as we are trying to find in these combined committees?

Secretary MARSHALL. I don't recall of any such discussions. I would assume that they thought an effort had been made by the President going out as far as Wake Island to see him.

Senator KNOWLAND. Now, as the chief civilian head of the National Defense Establishment, as distinguished from the Joint Chiefs, do you know whether or not any or all of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have ever been to Formosa?

Secretary MARSHALL. I don't recall of such a visit, but I will have it looked up so as I can report to you; but, of course, they can tell you, also.

Senator KNOWLAND. Now could you also check—and I think it took place prior to your taking over the office of Secretary of National Defense—my information had been to the effect that either one or several of the Joint Chiefs had given some consideration at the time I think Secretary Johnson went out to Formosa, to have one of them go down to Formosa, and that that matter was discussed with the Department of State and at least a considerable amount of cold water was thrown on the suggestion?

Would you have any recollection—

Secretary MARSHALL. I don't know about that, sir; but you referred to Formosa, and I think you meant Tokyo.

Senator KNOWLAND. When they went to Tokyo.

If we might correct the record in that regard—that when Secretary Johnson went to Tokyo, you think some suggestion had been made?

Secretary MARSHALL. I don't know anything in regard to that, sir.

MILITARY RESTRICTIONS, JUNE, 1950

Senator KNOWLAND. Now, Mr. Secretary, in June of 1950, shortly after the invasion took place, the aggression took place in Korea, which was the 25th of June, Korean time and the 24th of June, Washington time, the first directive that had gone to the Far East Command, as I understand it, was that our planes and ships should not go north of the Thirty-eighth parallel. Is that correct?

I refer you to page 8 of the Joint Chiefs of Staff report to the Senate committees on Korean operations.

Secretary MARSHALL. What you want to find out is—

Senator KNOWLAND. What I want to find out—we now have restrictions against the Air Force going north of the Yalu River, and the reasons have been given. And, while some people may differ as to the logic or the judgment in those restrictions, they nevertheless exist. An honest difference of opinion can exist and does exist between General MacArthur, on the one hand, and the President or the Government, on the other, as to the advisability of bombing north of the Yalu River.

Now I am trying to bring out here—was it not a fact that in the opening phases of the aggression by the North Koreans against the Republic of Korea, when General MacArthur was given his first directives relative to assistance to the Republic of Korea, that he was restricted from using his air power and naval power north of the Thirty-eighth Parallel in the same way that he is now restricted, or was while he was still commander, from using it north of Yalu River?

Secretary MARSHALL. I have here a message of the 29th of June. Will that cover the date question?

Senator KNOWLAND. I think the earlier message was the 26th of June.

Secretary MARSHALL. I don't get anything on the 26th.

Senator KNOWLAND. I think if you look in your paraphrasing on page 8 you will see it in both subparagraph A and in paragraph 14.

What I am trying to bring out here is that there were restrictions at that time to the use by General MacArthur of either air or naval

power north of the Thirty-eighth Parallel in the same way that there is now restrictions against the use of air power north of the Yalu River. And I am trying to establish whether that is a fact or not.

Secretary MARSHALL. I am trying to find the message that has that in it. There is a message of the 29th here which is rather specific. I cannot find the other message.

Senator KNOWLAND. Let me read the paraphrase to you, and I am reading out of this Joint Chiefs memorandum for the benefit of Admiral Davis so he will know where it is coming from. And I read:

In order to clear South Korea of North Korean military forces, all military targets south of the thirty-eighth parallel were cleared for attack by the Air Forces. Similarly naval forces were authorized to operate against forces engaged in aggression against South Korea without restriction in coastal waters and sea approaches south of the thirty-eighth parallel.

That was on the 26th.

Now, also on the 26th apparently, in subparagraph 14 appears the following:

The instructions furnished Commander in Chief, Far East, by the Joint Chiefs of Staff of June 26, 1950, provided for the employment of United States naval and air forces against North Korean units south of the thirty-eight parallel only.

Now, they are the messages of the 26th.

Now, you say there was a message of the 29th?

Secretary MARSHALL. Well, I find here they have given me a brief of these first messages but not the detailed messages. However, on the 29th there is a more specific message relating to that same thing. But as to this, of course, the Chiefs of Staff can give you a much more exact reply than I can, except that I might say that this is the period when we were trying to clear our citizens and other people out of there by planes. The aggression started on the 25th, which was our 24th.

Senator KNOWLAND. Yes; but all of our people were in South Korea, and, as I read this, our Air Force had all the authority they needed to bomb in South Korea, which was our friend and ally and the victim of aggression, and in which our citizens resided; but they were restricted from bombing in the area of the North Koreans, who were the aggressors, who were making war upon this nation which had been established by the United Nations; and they, the aggressor, was off limits in the same way that the Chinese aggressor is today off limits north of the Yalu. Is that not correct?

Secretary MARSHALL. That is correct, sir; but, while they can give you the accurate condition of affairs under which this was done, my assumption would be—I am talking about a period when I was not in the play—that they were giving directives for bombing on the aggressors who themselves were south of the Thirty-eighth parallel.

Senator KNOWLAND. I understand that. Clearly that is right.

FIRST DIRECTIVES TO KOREAN THEATER

Secretary MARSHALL. And they didn't have, I imagine, very much with which to do it; and they were trying to get these people out; and they didn't want any further involvements at that moment until they caught their breath and figured out what had best be done.

However, on the 29th here is definite case where I have the message, which will have to be paraphrased or excluded from the testimony.

In support of resolutions of the United Nations approved on the 25th of June and transmitted on the 28th, and the 27th of June transmitted—as a certain reference—you will employ naval and air forces available to the Far East Command to provide fullest possible support for South Korean forces by attack on military targets so as to permit these forces to clear South Korea of North Korean forces.

Employment of Army forces will be limited to essential communications and other essential service units except that you are authorized to employ such Army combat and service forces as to insure the retention of a port and air base in the general area of Pusan-Chinhae.

By naval and air action you will defend Formosa against invasion or attack.

I will skip that.

You are authorized to extend your operations in Northern Korea against air bases, depots, tanks, farms, troop columns, and other purely military targets, if and when this becomes essential for the performance of your mission, as given in a preceding paragraph, or to avoid unnecessary casualties to our forces. Special care will be taken to insure that operations in North Korea stay well clear of the frontiers of Manchuria or the Soviet Union.

The decision to commit United States air and naval forces and limited Army forces to provide cover and support for South Korean troops does not constitute a decision to engage in war with the Soviet Union if Soviet forces intervene in Korea. Decision regarding Korea, however, is taken in full realization of the risk involved. If Soviet forces actively oppose our operations in Korea, your forces should defend themselves but should take no action to aggravate the situation, and you should report the situation to Washington.

Later on they came to successive moves where our ground forces were increased, and finally it developed into a general procedure of attack. But there was the release into North Korea on the 29th, which would I believe be the 30th.

Senator KNOWLAND. Do you know whether or not the original directive that they would not go north of the Thirty-eighth parallel was done at the instigation and suggestion of the Joint Chiefs, or was that a suggestion that came out of either the United Nations or the State Department?

Secretary MARSHALL. I can't answer that, sir, but I might say those preliminary directives in the first 36 or 48 hours were very hasty messages to General MacArthur, and the situation as to the employment of our troops developed very rapidly.

Senator KNOWLAND. I might say, Mr. Secretary, that on the 29th of June I wrote to the Honorable Louis Johnson, Secretary of National Defense, a communication which ended up with this paragraph:

To permit aggressor forces of Communist North Korea to be secure in their bases, depots, and military installations north of the thirty-eighth parallel permits them to supply and resupply their aggressive forces now south of the line of demarcation.

In addition, it seems to me that the damage to military installations should not be limited to the territory of the victims of the aggression while the aggressor's installations are free from danger and fully available to him to try the same thing again if he is not successful in his present venture.

It seems to me that that same principle relative to allowing the North Koreans to be secure is somewhat similar but, of course, broader in the situation of having the Chinese Communist safe in his lair.

ADDITIONAL ARMS FOR SOUTH KOREA

Now, in the release, Mr. Secretary, to the American public relative to the removal of General MacArthur, there appeared some correspondence relative to the arming of the ROK forces or Republic of

Korea forces. Do you know how that particular exchange of correspondence happened to have been included for release and at whose suggestion that was made?

Secretary MARSHALL. I don't recall the specific suggestion but there had been these factors leading up to it. In the debate on the floor of the House of Representatives the issue was brought up of our apparent failure to profitably employ some 500,000 South Korean young men, and the indications were that our manpower limits would be cut, would be reduced because of this acknowledged failure to profit by manpower that was otherwise available to this country.

It thereupon became necessary in order to provide some basis for an answer to that, to be able to present a convincing statement to individuals rather than a general debate on the floor of the fact that we had considered that question.

As a matter of fact I had put it up to the Chiefs of Staff in December and they about the 5th of January had sent a proposal with a series of suggestions to General MacArthur and he had considered it at that time as inadvisable for very specific reasons.

Now therefore nothing further was done about it and the weapons concerned, I believe, went over to the Japanese police reserve or whatever they call that.

Now, on a Saturday, as I recall, the 7th of April, there was published in a small magazine in New York a reply by General MacArthur in relation to this same matter in which he said—I have forgotten the exact language, but you have it here—that this was a matter involving foreign policy and therefore he could make no statement on the question.

That was the reason for including, because in this particular exchange the deciding action had been General MacArthur's in that particular case, and for very definite reasons and I thought very excellent reasons, but the implication was in the minds of those who just read the message without any knowledge of the facts, that here was an opportunity to use 500,000 men, we will say, and for some foreign relations reason which he was under wraps, as it were, to disclose, that was not done.

That is the only reason I could give you for including that document in the release. I was not present during the decision as to the documents to be released.

Senator KNOWLAND. Mr. Secretary, on the message of January 4 from the Joint Chiefs to the Commander in Chief, that was purely a tentative proposal upon which his comments had been asked, was it not?

Secretary MARSHALL. That is correct.

Senator KNOWLAND. And may I call your attention, just to refresh your memory, that on May the 8th you wrote a letter to Senator Homer Ferguson, of Michigan, the second paragraph of which reads as follows: He had inquired about this situation, and I quote. [Reading:]

The memorandum of January 4, from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command, was not a final determination upon the desirability of arming the Republic of Korea manpower, but represented the preliminary planning on which to obtain the comments of the field commander.

I agree with you that circumstances have substantially changed since that time. Continuous consideration has been given to the problem since January, as well as before.

Now, my recollection of General MacArthur's testimony was that in January we were in a retrograde movement. No one was quite certain of how far back we might be pushed. We might be pushed back to the Pusan beachhead again, and that under those circumstances, and with the general conditions he was facing, as between arming 75,000 of the security force, or of the auxiliary police in Japan, and as between arming the Koreans, that probably, in his judgment at least, whether sound or unsound is not for me to say—in his judgment, at least, those arms which were available could better be used in Japan, under the circumstances then existing.

Is that substantially correct?

Secretary MARSHALL. I think that is approximately correct.

[Deleted.]

I thought that phase of the matter, I don't know as it applies so directly to what we are saying, would be of interest here, because the situation has not changed in that respect.

[Deleted.]

Senator KNOWLAND. Your recollection may be clearer than mine on it, but my recollection of General MacArthur's testimony was that the reasons that he had stated on this retragrade movement, were that he did not feel it advisable to equip a large number of reinforcements; he stated that some of them had fought very well, and that some, because of lack of training and leadership, have not given as good an account of themselves, and he agreed, I think, with your observation that one of the great handicaps was the lack of an officer corps because the country has only been in existence as a republic for less than 2 years, and here we send our officers to West Point and Command and General Staff Schools, and so forth, and they have had no opportunity to properly train and adequately staff a command set-up for the Korean Army.

Secretary MARSHALL. Here is the exact reference, which I am quoting here from the actual message, which would have to be paraphrased before it is issued. This is from General MacArthur on the 6th of January:

Consider here that the influence of past and possibly future events is of importance equal to or greater than material availability in analyzing problems of arming additional ROK manpower.

[Deleted.]

The type and quantity of weapons indicated by the Chiefs of Staff as being currently available would have equal application to equipment of the National Police Reserve in Japan.

In view of [deleted] the probable restricted size of the battle front in which we may operate in the near future, and the high priority of Police Reserve, Japan requirements, the value of attempting to organize, train, and arm additional ROK units in the immediate future appears questionable.

They have omitted from this message his discussion of the significant portions, as he describes it, significant portions of the young Koreans that were—significant amounts of arms that have been issued to young Koreans, have brought little result in their defense of local districts in the rear of the battle line.

KOREAN REQUEST FOR ARMS

Senator KNOWLAND. But presumably, Mr. Secretary, this question of the arming of the South Koreans must have assumed rather large proportions in the mind of the President and his chief civilian and

military advisers, when considering all the correspondence that had flown back and forth between General MacArthur and Washington, that this particular item was picked out for the purpose of supporting his dismissal.

You now testify that presumably his judgment was correct, and yet the correspondence on it is included, presumably, as a basis for his dismissal.

Secretary MARSHALL. I think I explained, Senator, in relation to that, that his answer to this to the editor of the Freeman Magazine said:

There is nothing I can add to the information therein contained.

That is the New York Times dispatch.

The issue is one determined by the Republic of Korea and the United States Government, and involves basic political decisions beyond my authority.

Senator KNOWLAND. Well, isn't that correct, Mr. Secretary? In other words, has not, as a matter of fact, the President of the Republic of Korea, Mr. Syngman Rhee, through our Ambassador, Mr. Muccio, in Korea, and through the Korean Ambassador in Washington, on several occasions pleaded for arms and equipment that would arm several hundred thousand of the youth group and others in Korea who, at least, the President of Korea feels would be available to resist aggression? Now, that is a fact, is it not?

Secretary MARSHALL. That is a fact, and they approached me as Secretary of Defense, and I addressed a memorandum to the Chiefs of Staff to see what could be done about it; and out of that came the Chiefs of Staff message to General MacArthur.

Senator KNOWLAND. Now, as a matter of fact, Mr. Secretary, isn't it also true that when the Joint Chiefs sent their tentative memo of January 4, saying that X number of weapons could be furnished, that was just a small fraction of the amount of equipment which has been requested by the Government of the Republic of Korea for their forces, and that the reason that it could not be supplied, other than the advisability of supplying it, is because the weapons are not available due to our own requirements and the requirements of our North Atlantic allies and other allies under the MDAP program.

So does it become a fact when General MacArthur says this is a matter between governments and "is on an echelon higher than mine"—

Secretary MARSHALL. It is a matter literally between the Chiefs of Staff and General MacArthur. If he accepted any of the suggestions made or had his own proposal as to the weapons, they were going to be sent that way. There wasn't any question about that.

WEAPON SUPPLY

Senator KNOWLAND. But did General MacArthur have sufficient weapons or did the Joint Chiefs offer General MacArthur sufficient weapons to have equipped two or three hundred thousand South Korean troops had he the desire to do so?

Secretary MARSHALL. They offered availability of 160,000 rifles, with spare parts for 50,000; 70,000 submachine guns; 150,000 carbines; 8,000 Browning automatic rifles. That is a pretty considerable num-

ber, because one man doesn't carry two kinds of rifles or a submachine-gun and a rifle.

Also ammunition supply for the submachine guns, Browning automatic rifles; 100,000 Model 1903 rifles and 100,000 M1 cargines is feasible. Of course, he had other ammunition out there, so the two had to be considered together.

Senator KNOWLAND. That in your judgment as a military man might be sufficient to equip what you would call a constabulary force, but you wouldn't say that equipment would be sufficient to equip divisions to meet the type of aggression coming down from North Korea, would you?

Secretary MARSHALL. It wasn't merely a question of divisions.

Based on availability of above weapons it appears that ROK forces could be increased from 200,000 to 300,000 men, armed with rifles, auto rifles, carbines, and submachine guns. However, unless used in part to form new divisions, which would be relatively ineffective due to lack of infantry supporting weapons and artillery. It is probable that only on the order of 75,000 can be effectively utilized initially, with an ultimate build-up to approximately 100,000 in the following type organizations:

A. Augment the rifle strength—

that is, increase the rifle strength—

of the South Korean divisions and other UN forces.

B. Form special units for guarding lines of communications and for operations against Communist guerrillas.

C. Conduct guerrilla operations in Communist-held territory.

3. Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that recruitment for new units should include, but not be limited to, the membership of the Korean Youth Corps and/or any other group in the ROK. Arms should be issued only to organized units under the control and discipline of the military authorities in Korea.

4. Request your comment and recommendations to include:

A. Total number of additional ROK personnel that can be profitably employed.

B. Method of employment, namely, new divisions, additional strength in current divisions, etc.

C. Length of time required to organize and train additional manpower.

D. Other points in connection with current problem.

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, I raise a procedural point with the Senator from California. It is now 1:10 and I was hoping, and I suppose others did, that we were going to recess at 1 as usual, and I made a luncheon engagement in view of that assumption, and I wonder if we can't recess now and reconvene and have the Senator from California continue at the time we reconvene.

Chairman RUSSELL. I shall be happy to take that course if that meets with the pleasure of the Senator from California.

Senator KNOWLAND. It meets with my pleasure.

Chairman RUSSELL. Very well, gentlemen, we will stand in recess until 2:30.

(Whereupon at 1:15 p. m. the hearing was recessed to reconvene at 2:30 p. m. this same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

(Present: Senators Russell (chairman, Committee on Armed Services), Connally (chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations), Byrd, Johnson of Texas, Stennis, Long, Saltonstall, Morse, Knowland, Cain, Flanders, George, Green, McMahon, Gillette, Smith of New Jersey, Hickenlooper, and Lodge.)

Chairman RUSSELL. When the committee recessed, shortly after 1 o'clock, Senator Knowland was examining General Marshall and had not concluded; so, you may proceed, now, Senator Knowland.

SOURCE OF RED CHINESE WEAPONS

Senator KNOWLAND. Mr. Secretary, we had completed, at the time of the recess, our discussion of the ROK forces, insofar as our arming them was concerned.

I would like to turn to a different subject.

A good deal has appeared in the Press and on the radio to the effect that Red Chinese are using weapons of American manufacture against our troops, that were originally furnished to Chiang Kai-shek's forces during the war against Japan or, subsequently, in the postwar period.

That has been the point that has been raised by some people also who have opposed giving additional supplies to the Republic of China.

I would like to ask you whether you have any figures available, to your own knowledge, or whether you could secure them for the committee, which would show what portions of the arms that are being captured from Chinese Communists at the present time, and North Korean Communists, are of American manufacture, as distinguished from German or Japanese or Russian or Chinese manufacture, in the arsenals at Mukden and otherwise?

Secretary MARSHALL. I think I saw a statement of that. I will obtain it for you.

Senator KNOWLAND. Now, is it true that during World War II, that the United States shipped considerable quantities of lend-lease supplies to the Soviet Union?

Secretary MARSHALL. Yes, very material.

Senator KNOWLAND. And it is quite possible that some arms or equipment of American manufacture could have been resupplied by the Soviet Union to the North Koreans, or to the Chinese Communists for the very propaganda purposes that they have made use of it for?

Secretary MARSHALL. I suppose that is a possibility.

Senator KNOWLAND. It is also true, is it not, General, that in the earlier stages of the fighting and in some of the retrograde movements both earlier in the Korean War right after the invasion and even more recently, that like all military units we have had to abandon some equipment ourselves even in this Korean War?

Secretary MARSHALL. I believe that is correct.

Senator KNOWLAND. I would like just for the record at this time to quote from the official booklet of the United States Department of Commerce, Foreign Transactions of the United States Government, Basic Data Through December 31, 1950, to show that the following materials were given to the several countries in the war periods:

France, \$1,770,000,000; the British Commonwealth, \$4,281,000,000; the Soviet Union, \$10,769,000,000; China, \$1,247,000,000. That is the World War II period.

Now, in the postwar period it shows that the British Commonwealth total grants and credit were \$6,010,000,000; France, \$3,910,000,000; Germany, which was a former enemy country, \$3,085,000,000; Italy, which was a former enemy country, \$2,066,000,000; Japan, a former

enemy country, \$1,706,000,000; and China, \$1,567,000,000, from the official reports of the United States Department of Commerce.

Now, with reference to the assistance that had been given to the Republic of China, Mr. Secretary, and because of your intimate knowledge of the situation in that country, I want to direct your attention with reference to this aid to China to pages 691 and 692 of the United States Relations with China, a document issued by the Department of State, otherwise known as the white paper, and in that—

Secretary MARSHALL. What page, please?

LEND LEASE TO CHINA

Senator KNOWLAND. 691 and 692. In that is the statement issued by President Truman on United States policy toward China issued December 18, 1946, and I call your attention—I am going only to read two paragraphs to lay a basis for some questions I desire to ask. At the bottom of page 691 appears this language, and I quote:

Assistance took the form of goods and equipment and of services. Almost half the total made available to China consisted of services such as those involved in air and water transportation of troops.

According to the latest figures reported, lend-lease assistance to China up to V-J-day totaled approximately \$870 million. From V-J-day to the end of February, shortly after General Marshall's arriving, the total was approximately \$600 million, mostly in transportation costs.

Thereafter the program was reduced to the fulfillment of outstanding commitments, much of which was later suspended.

And then going down to the third paragraph on that page—and this is all I am going to read of the statement:

China agreed to buy all surplus property owned by the United States in China and on 17 Pacific islands and bases with certain exceptions. Six months of negotiations preceded the agreement finally signed in August. It was imperative that the matter be concluded in the Pacific, as had already been done in Europe, especially in view of the rapid deterioration of the matériel in open storage under tropical conditions, and the urgent need for the partial alleviation of the acute economic distress of the Chinese people which it was hoped the transaction would permit.

Aircraft, all nondemilitarized combat material and fixed installations outside of China were excluded; thus, no weapons which could be used in the fighting of the civil war were made available through this agreement.

FIRST HINTS OF COMMUNIST AGGRESSION

Now, Mr. Secretary, referring to your mission to China, when did the administration in your judgment first realize the danger of Soviet or satellite aggression—at the time of the Greek-Turkish Pact, the Berlin blockade, or at some other time and place?

Secretary MARSHALL. It was the question, I think, Senator, of when and to what degree there would be an overt evidence of this. It was plainly apparent while I was in China that the Soviet Government by its representatives at Yunan was keeping very close touch with Mao Tse-tung's headquarters of his regime. The actions of the Soviet representatives in Nanking, before that in Chungking, with which I came in contact, indicated to me a very aloof procedure, though the Ambassador himself, rather his wife, made very pleasant approaches to Mrs. Marshall and myself.

The issue was to what extent they were prepared to go in the way of overt acts.

I endeavored throughout a long period of time in that year of 1946 when the fighting became pretty general, beginning largely in June of 1946, to get positive evidence of Soviet equipment in the hands of the Chinese Communist forces, evidence that they were being supplied by the Soviet Government.

In the main I never received any evidence of any material quantities. There were many allegations, but from the officers I had in various parts of China—north China specifically—I never ran down any specific proof of material quantities of Soviet equipment being provided for the Communist, Chinese Communist, forces.

I would like this comment off the record.

[Deleted.]

No more off the record.

Their first—your question was to the Soviets or to the Chinese Communists themselves?

Senator KNOWLAND. No, to the Soviet Union and any of its satellites. When did we first get on notice that there was danger of aggression from that source?

Secretary MARSHALL. The first positive indication of that came out of the contacts in Manchuria leading up to the capture of Chanchung, and there I felt that part of that had been a very serious misplay by the commander of the Nationalist forces in Manchuria.

He had needlessly endangered his command and had conducted operations in the hinterlands which were extermination, an effort to exterminate all Communists in that region, and they retaliated, of course, and very effectively.

The first aggressive reaction in north China developed with the attack on the Marine convoy to Tientsin, which was deliberately planned and executed and was a stroke at us in which we lost Marine Corps lives.

Prior to that there were many contacts between the various forces that did not get into a full-fledged battle. We were still sparring back and forth to keep an armistice condition, but it was growing more difficult and more difficult with each week, but until this affair outside of Peiping, there had not been a deliberate break which struck at us specifically, which means that they were taking measures against the Nationalist Government and ourselves all included, which is a very definite departure from what had been the status before.

Prior to that, particularly the latter part of June, there was a very aggressive Communist propaganda against us which came out of the renewed consideration in the last week of Congress for the military mission to China, which had never been concluded—it was on a temporary basis under the President's war powers—and the necessary congressional action relating to the supplies and disposal of surplus property and matters of that sort, that was very aggressive, and it was as much, you might say, a hostile action as anything else; but it became apparent week by week after that time in June, and working up to it—

Senator KNOWLAND. That was June of 1946 or 1945?

Secretary MARSHALL. This is all 1946.

Senator KNOWLAND. 1946.

Secretary MARSHALL. As we approached the fall we were getting more and more into a situation where there was no longer any question of mediation, and where there was a definite attack on the United States, either in propaganda as to public opinion, or as the case of this Marine Corps convoy near Peiping.

The Manchurian phase had a portion of its genesis in March, and I felt there that matters were precipitated largely by the manner in which the Nationalist troop commander proceeded in the case. But it was a gradual development from a greater willingness than the National Government displayed to get ahead with the political agreement on the part of the Communists, and then it developed from that into these sporadic fights, and then into a very flat defiance.

CASE OF CAPT. JOHN M. BIRCH

Senator KNOWLAND. When you were in China, Mr. Secretary—and I realize you had so many problems that it might not be likely that you would recall the incident, but perhaps you might—do you recall our command over there mentioning the case of Capt. John M. Birch?

Secretary MARSHALL. I recall that he lost his life there.

Senator KNOWLAND. That is right.

Do you recall the circumstances of his losing his life?

Secretary MARSHALL. I don't recall them right now, sir.

Senator KNOWLAND. Just to refresh your memory, he was an American officer from the State of our chairman, Senator Russell, and our other member Senator Walter George.

Chairman RUSSELL. A very fine young man from a splendid family.

Senator KNOWLAND. He met his death on the 25th day of August 1945, which was after VJ day, when he had gone on a reconnaissance mission.

He was shot in cold blood by the Chinese Communist officers over to whose command post he had gone in line of duty.

He and a Chinese officer who was with him were, after being shot, thrown into a ditch and left for dead. Birch was dead; the Chinese officer, however, was alive, and that evening some friendly Chinese picked him up after the Chinese Communists had departed, and sent him back to our lines.

At the time the announcement was made of his death, it was merely reported that he had been killed along the railroad right-of-way, which might have almost indicated that he had been run over by a train.

I would say, Mr. Chairman, that that is a matter that I wrote you about yesterday. I have seen the confidential report on the whole circumstances leading to Captain Birch's death, and I have asked that that be made available to us, because I think that as early as 1945 there was a clear indication by an overt act on the part of the Chinese Communists that even preceded these circumstances of the attack on the United States Marines, and so forth, mentioned by the general, their intentions. I will not pursue that any further except to say that we have requested it.

INDICATIONS OF AGGRESSION BEFORE JUNE 1950

Now, Mr. Secretary, did this Government, so far as you know—and I realize that you were not Secretary of Defense at the time the hostilities opened—but, to your knowledge, do you know whether the United States Government had had any indications of the danger of this overt aggression prior to the 25th day of June, Korean time?

Secretary MARSHALL. I cannot answer that. I have heard various discussions, but they have not registered with me sufficiently to remain on my mind, because that was water over the dam, as far as I am concerned.

Senator KNOWLAND. I might also state, Mr. Chairman, that I have also requested that the executive hearings of the Committee on Appropriations, held on the 26th, 27th and, I believe, the 28th of June, immediately following the Korean aggression, wherein we had testimony from Secretary Acheson, Secretary Johnson, certain Army officers, and at a later meeting where Admiral Hillenkoeter appeared—the chairman may remember those hearings; and I believe that they contain some pertinent material which would be helpful to this committee, and I understand we have already officially requested of the Appropriations Committee that those files that are now locked up in the safe be made available to us.

Chairman RUSSELL. I think that I was present throughout all of those hearings. I received the Senator's request and on the same day I forwarded it to the chairman of the Appropriations Committee, Senator McKellar.

I was told by Mr. Everard Smith, who is the clerk of that committee, that due to the nature of the testimony the rules of the committee provided that the committee had to take action to release them; and the chairman would, at the first available time, have a committee meeting and provide for the release of that data.

PAULEY REPORT

Senator KNOWLAND. Now, Mr. Secretary, were you familiar, either as Secretary of State or subsequently as Secretary of National Defense, with the Pauley Report on Reparations in Manchuria and Korea, as well as a report he made on Germany?

Secretary MARSHALL. He sent me a copy of the report. He talked to me about his findings in Manchuria while I was in Nanking.

Senator KNOWLAND. That report——

Senator SMITH. Might I ask the witness to speak a little louder? We cannot hear him clearly.

Secretary MARSHALL. Sorry. I will do that.

Senator KNOWLAND. That report was made in his letter to the President in 1945; is that correct?

Secretary MARSHALL. I think it must be 1946.

Senator KNOWLAND. Well, it was late 1945 or——

Secretary MARSHALL. He talked to me about it at Nanking.

Senator KNOWLAND. Or 1946.

Secretary MARSHALL. That would be in the summer, almost, of 1946.

Senator KNOWLAND. At any rate, it was prior to the Wedemeyer report on Korea, which was in 1947?

Secretary MARSHALL. Oh, yes; that was in 1947.

HEARINGS REGARDING WEDEMEYER REPORT

Senator KNOWLAND. Now, with reference to the Wedemeyer report on Korea, that report was made directly to the President, or was it made to the President through you?

Secretary MARSHALL. Well, it was submitted to me, and the President was furnished a copy, as I recall the affair.

Anyway, he received the report.

Senator KNOWLAND. In 1947, on Wednesday, the 17th of December, there was a hearing before the Senate Committee on Appropriations. At that meeting, General Wedemeyer had been requested to appear and to testify.

I will not read the entire proceedings into the record; but, to lay a foundation for a couple of questions on this subject, I would like to read to you from the transcript of testimony.

Chairman BRIDGES had been discussing the so-called Wedemeyer report, which was made in September of that year, this being December.

Chairman BRIDGES. General, do you have the report with you today?

General WEDEMEYER. No, sir; I do not.

Chairman BRIDGES. Are you prepared to make the report available to this committee for consideration in regard to the appropriations being discussed today?

General WEDEMEYER. Mr. Chairman, I have given careful thought to this matter because, as a soldier, my commander in chief has directed me to maintain security on the report; and, as a temporary special envoy, the Secretary of State and the President admonished me and asked me to insure that the members of my mission would maintain security with reference to the report. We have tried very carefully to carry out their instructions.

Therefore, I would be embarrassed if the committee asked me to reveal the contents of any report without the authority of the President or the Secretary of State.

I thought perhaps I could help you this way, sir. I could give you my observations as a normal observer in that area, and I would try to delineate in my mind between the information that I had received as a result of my special position as a special envoy and the information that I would have obtained had I been an ordinary observer going through those areas and talking to businessmen, the intelligentsia, the liberals, and the individuals of various shades of political leanings. I feel that such information would be helpful to this committee, and yet I would not be embarrassed by disobedience or disregard of instructions given to me by the President and the Secretary of State.

Now, Mr. Secretary, I took the trouble to read that into the record in view of the examination this morning by Senator Hickenlooper wherein he had quoted from an earlier examination by Senator Lodge of Massachusetts, merely to show what great difficulty at times responsible committees of the Congress, who also have a constitutional obligation, have in getting information which might be helpful to them in reaching this area of agreement to which we have referred.

I would like to ask, Mr. Secretary, if subsequent to the testimony given by General Wedemeyer and indication was given to him that he had either violated directives or had testified more than he should have before the Appropriations Committee?

Secretary MARSHALL. I don't recall any such advice or admonition. What I do recall is a somewhat later date, and I am not very specific about this.

He had a discussion with the press which was brought to me by the press, which created an embarrassment to our procedure in the State Department, and that was brought to his attention; but I recall of nothing in relation to these hearings up here, and I might add, I think I should add, that our problem there was one of going ahead with our efforts in regard to Communist procedure in Greece, and not having that confused with what we thought was highly impractical and which he had not yet caught up with due to his absence from the country and his drafting of the report in Hawaii. The proposal to have a trusteeship with the Soviets or the carrying of this case to the United Nations would be a great embarrassment to us at that time in view of what was happening in Greece, and also it would, we felt, be a very decided embarrassment in relation to the Generalissimo.

The Generalissimo had stated to me very specifically not once but several times that he would have nothing to do whatsoever with any effort to settle the affairs out there which included the Soviet Government and included the British Government.

WEDEMAYER ESTIMATES

Senator KNOWLAND. Well, in response to questions by Senator Bridges and Senator Reed, at that time, General Wedemeyer seemed to me to have had a very good grasp on the situation, not only in the Far East but also in other sections of the world. This is what he testified to. He said:

Therefore, a program for Europe should not be evolved disregarding a program for China or vice versa. The timing and the proportion of assistance that we give to China should be commensurate, first, with our ability to meet commitments all over the world as required by the situation. There is a bottom to our economic barrel.

Secretary MARSHALL. He is speaking of matériel there; I was talking about negotiations before the United Nations of a very delicate nature.

Senator KNOWLAND. That is right.

Then General Wedemeyer went on to testify to the following:

The relevant and important facts are that the man has opposed—and he is speaking of Chiang Kai-shek—

has opposed communism throughout his history, and he has also stayed on with us as an ally in the war, containing in China one million and a half Japanese soldiers who might have been employed against our men in the Pacific. It would have made our task more costly in lives and time in the Pacific. But, no, the Generalissimo chose to remain faithful to his allies.

Do you agree, General, with General Wedemeyer's estimate of the situation?

Secretary MARSHALL. I think that is a correct statement.

Senator KNOWLAND. That he performed a useful service in not making peace with the Japanese?

Secretary MARSHALL. Very much so.

Senator KNOWLAND. Then General Wedemeyer went on to say:

I personally think he is a fine character, and that you gentlemen on this committee would admire him and respect him.

That is all I am going to read.

Secretary MARSHALL. I would like to add to that my own regard for the Generalissimo, who I thought was a very fine character, and I was

really fond of him. The question of his handling of the situation and in direct relationship to his own people was another matter.

MARSHALL'S BRIEFING ON CHINA

Senator KNOWLAND. Now you testified within the last several days—you have been on here for quite a time—to the effect that you had not had the opportunity of sitting in on very many briefings prior to going out to China; that you were here, as I understood you to say, as a witness in the Pearl Harbor hearings; and, except for perhaps at noontime, perhaps some other period, that you had not had much of an opportunity to go into the matter as fully as you otherwise might have done.

I did understand you to say that you had, you thought, conferred with Secretary Byrnes at one of the luncheon periods and also that Mr. John Carter Vincent had, you understood, participated in the drafting of the directives. Is that substantially correct?

Secretary MARSHALL. I said that as I recalled, I had one discussion in the matter with Mr. Byrnes during the luncheon period between hearings up here, and that on another occasion I had had a meeting, I thought, on early Saturday morning, my dim recollection is, before coming up here for a continuation of the hearing, in which Mr. Byrnes was presiding; Mr. Acheson, as Under Secretary, was present; John Carter Vincent was present; my special assistant for the moment, General Hull, was present, and my civilian helper, James Shepley, was present. That, I think, was about an hour and a half, but my time was almost exclusively occupied in this affair up here. So that any study of the general question was not a practical proposition for me.

I had a general understanding of events in China to the extent of the struggle they were getting to have the Generalissimo's forces and the Communist forces unite against the Japanese, and General Wedemeyer's expressions as to that which I read yesterday, and General Stilwell continued his fight to accomplish the same thing.

The transitions of government, the movement from a tutelage setup, a single party government by Sun Yat-sen's conception—all that was new to me, I had to get into that, and I did most of it on my flight out to China.

THE WHITE PAPER

Senator KNOWLAND. Would you say, Mr. Secretary, that this would be an accurate statement, as you understand it, and I quote:

As the Communists entered—
that is entered Manchuria—

they obtained large stocks of matériel from the Japanese Kwantung Army, which the Russians had conveniently abandoned.

Secretary MARSHALL. That is correct, in my opinion.

Senator KNOWLAND. That is a statement by Mr. Secretary Acheson in the foreword of the white paper, to which we have already referred.

Now, reading another paragraph from this document, I quote:

By the time General Marshall left China at the beginning of 1947, the Nationalists were apparently at the very peak of their military successes and territorial expansion. The following year and a half revealed, however, that their seeming strength was illusory and that their victories were built on sand.

Do you substantially agree with that statement?

Secretary MARSHALL. I agree with that, sir. I might give an example. The fact that they were keen on capturing cities and occupying cities and automatically becoming involved in longer and longer lines of communications, which presented a perfect opportunity for communistic operations against them.

In other words, it was a complete overextension and in a manner that imperiled the whole procedure. So that the seeming success was in reality, in our opinion—and we so informed the Generalissimo time after time—a great weakness.

MARSHALL'S MISSION TO CHINA

Senator KNOWLAND. General, how far did your instructions suggest that you should go in suggesting to the Government of the Republic of China that they should form a coalition government?

Secretary MARSHALL. I did not have to make any suggestion of that nature, because they had agreed on the meeting before I arrived in China in late December 1945, and I was immediately engaged in finding out the facts and conditions and circumstances of the hostilities then in progress, with only a brief period of days in which to develop an agreement to a cease fire. As I stated the other day, I remained aloof from the political discussions because that was a Chinese affair.

Our Government had represented its interests in the development of a two-party government, and beyond that I did not touch the matter at all, except to furnish the generalissimo confidentially our Bill of Rights and a possible interim set-up while they were reaching formal constitutional status.

I think that was prepared by Dr. Fairchild, I think he is from Yale, who was out there. But that did not enter into their political adjustments in this matter.

I merely received the result of that which, first, required me at their request to be an adviser to the committee for the demobilization of the Nationalist army, to a large extent, and the Communist armies, and their amalgamation.

It was not until we reached the end of April, on my return, that I became more directly involved in the political factors, and those consisted of an effort to find some way to break down the differences between the two sides in carrying out the policies adopted by the political consultative conference.

Senator KNOWLAND. Now, am I to understand, General, on that answer—because it gives me a little different concept of your mission than I heretofore had—that primarily your mission was more or less limited to getting the armies consolidated on some, what you felt, equitable basis, but the political features of a coalition were not under your immediate supervision or direction or responsibility?

Secretary MARSHALL. I would have said that my directive in general terms, gave me enough authority to have moved into that if I had thought it advisable. But our Government had presented its views, what it thought was desirable procedure, and these people, culminating their various steps from the initial statement of the generalissimo in 1937, and the specific one in 1941, had moved into the adjustments by themselves, which seemed to be the highly desirable way to do it; and as I was a mediator in connection, first, with determining the

basis of a cease fire, and then its execution, which is the more difficult part of it, it seemed to me highly desirable that I remain aloof from the political development.

Of course, when that conference came to a close, I then moved into that plain military aspect of it, and then returned here to get money and to get equipment and to get ships, and things they needed.

CHINESE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION

Now, when I returned to China in the latter part of April and found this complete impasse had developed in regard to the constitutional convention, the fight was in regard to the number of delegates which they had left to be settled by a committee and, of course, the committee was not able to settle it, there, I moved in definitely in connection with the political set-up, not as to the general types of government but as to how to get them together in the matter of delegates, particularly the State Council which remained the argumentative basis for months there.

It, of course, was—those efforts were dominated all the way through by the increasing evidence that we were going to have a breakdown of the cease-fire and armistice terms; and I was struggling both ways, one to preserve the cease fire that we had in force, and the other was to try to find some way to get them together on their generally agreed policy; but with the specific failure to implement it, largely—almost entirely—over the matter of delegates, either to the constitutional convention or to the membership of the State Council, or to any introduction of Communists in the cabinet.

Senator KNOWLAND. Well, while your immediate objective might not have been the political coalition phases, it is a fact, is it not, General, that through our State Department and our representatives in China, both the regular ones and the special ones who had been sent out there, that we had rather clearly indicated long before your mission took place that it was the best judgment or the desire, as you might want to put it, of the Government of the United States that the Communist forces should be brought into a coalition.

Secretary MARSHALL. If you mean by a coalition a two-party government that certainly was the case.

Senator KNOWLAND. Well, General—

Secretary MARSHALL. Where I got into the discussion of coalition related to whether it was a practical proposition to have a coalition cabinet, but I didn't—

UNITED STATES INTEREST IN CHINESE COALITION GOVERNMENT

Senator KNOWLAND. Let me read you from page 549 of the China white paper, "The Summary of the Notes on Conversations between Vice President Henry A. Wallace and President Chiang Kai-shek, June 21 to 24, 1944." Now, that was a year before your mission—a year and a half—and in that, according to the notes, in addition to Mr. Wallace there were present at the conference, President Chiang, Vice President Wallace, and Dr. T. V. Soong, translator, and I quote:

Mr. Wallace said that President Roosevelt had talked about the Communists in China. President Roosevelt had assumed that inasmuch as the Communists and the members of the Kuomintang were all Chinese they were basically

friends, and nothing should be final between friends. President Roosevelt cited the Bryan treaty and it quoted Al Smith and Charles Francis Adams to support his point. President Roosevelt had indicated that if the parties could not get together they might call in a friend, and had indicated that he might be that friend.

Wouldn't you say, Mr. Secretary, that that indicated that at least, according to Mr. Wallace's version of what his conversations with the President had been, that he indicated that the Communists should be taken into the government as early as 1944?

Secretary MARSHALL. I think that is very clearly the case.

CAIRO AND TEHRAN CONFERENCES

Senator KNOWLAND. Now I would like to read this paragraph from the following page to lay a foundation for some questions, and I am reading, from page 550:

However, after discussing the matter with Mr. Vincent—

I take it that that is John Carter Vincent—

that evening, Mr. Wallace made it clear to President Chiang the next morning before breakfast that President Roosevelt had not suggested acting as an arbiter between China and the U. S. S. R., and that whereas he felt that the United States would be quite willing to use its good offices to get the U. S. S. R. and China together, it could not undertake the role of middleman in negotiations between the U. S. S. R. and China or become a party or guarantor of any agreement reached between China and the U. S. S. R.

And I think that that would have some significance when we get on to the Yalta Conference and the later agreements between the Soviet Union and China.

Now I want to call your attention to page 551. The conversations continue, and this was on June 22 at 4:30 p. m. Present: President Chiang, Madam Chiang, Vice President Wallace, Dr. T. V. Soong, Dr. Wang Shih Chieh, Messrs. Vincent, Lattimore, and Hazard. This is about halfway down:

President Chiang then referred to his conversations with President Roosevelt at Cairo. He said that President Roosevelt had promised an all-out campaign in Burma early in 1944 but that at Tehran President Roosevelt had reversed his decision indicating that the necessary amphibious landing craft would not be available for such a campaign.

Mr. Secretary, you were the Chief of Staff of the United States and in a position with the Combined Chiefs at that time. Do you feel that the necessities required a change in the agreements which had been reached at Cairo? Do you have any independent recollection of that?

Secretary MARSHALL. Yes, I recall very clearly. As a matter of fact the military discussions in Cairo were largely occupied with the utilization of 27 LST's that is a landing craft, and the final decision at Cairo was that a certain number of these, if not all, would be employed in amphibious landing by the British on the shores of Burma. The British were not much inclined to make this landing.

The Generalissimo felt that unless this landing was made, his forces could not cooperate in the campaign then being planned, and out of this grew the decision that the landing craft should be sent there.

Now after they had gotten most of the way—I have forgotten to what point, but that is to be looked up—they were recalled, and I am

a little dim in my memory as to the exact reason that they were recalled, but it was I think a British reason because they had been reluctant in the first place, but I can obtain that accurately for you by looking into the records, which makes it rather simple I think to know what that was.

CHINESE-SOVIET RELATIONS BEFORE YALTA

Senator KNOWLAND. Now, Mr. Secretary, one more quotation from these hearings that were held. This is on June 23, at 9 in the morning.

Present: President Chiang; Vice President Wallace; Dr. Hollington Tong, translating; Dr. Wang Shih Chieh; Mr. Lattimore, assisting in translating; and Mr. Vincent.

And, I am reading from page 556.

President Chiang said:

I am confident that what President Roosevelt stands for is good for China, and for the furtherance of the war; but one of the things we are fighting for is the maintenance of order. Please tell President Roosevelt that I will follow his advice, but I must insist on the maintenance of law and order and upon the observance of discipline.

Mr. Wallace again stressed a point that there should be no situations in China which might lead to a conflict with the U. S. S. R. President Chiang said that the Chinese Government had gone far out of its way to come to an agreement with the Communists in order to avoid a conflict with the U. S. S. R., and added that anything not detrimental to the sovereignty of the Chinese Government would be done to avoid a conflict with the U. S. S. R.

At that point Mr. Wallace again said that the United States could not be expected to be a party to negotiations between China and the U. S. S. R. He also said that President Chiang's formula for settlement with the Communists might prove transitory unless China reached an understanding with the U. S. S. R. He referred again to Ambassador Harriman's discussion with Mr. Stalin as indicating the necessity for an agreement with the U. S. S. R.

Now, in reading this in cold type, and some years after the event, it appears that even before Yalta, we were indicating to the Chinese, through the voice of Vice President Wallace, Vice President of the United States, and presumably going over as emissary of the President of the United States, with Mr. John Carter Vincent and Mr. Owen Lattimore, who was on the official staff, we were indicating to President Chiang that he had better come to some agreement with the Soviet Union; and we were also indicating to him that he would have to do his negotiating alone, and we would not use our good offices.

Is that a fair interpretation of that paragraph?

Secretary MARSHALL. That would seem so; but may I observe, Senator, that you are getting into a lot of State Department things certain parts of which you have been questioning me about, I have a first-rate knowledge of; but all of this, I have not.

Senator KNOWLAND. I was just wondering whether or not, prior to going on your mission to China, whether you had been briefed in this regard, or whether or not you had had made available to you the report of Vice President Wallace, to the President of the United States?

I might say, at that point, that for some five—well, for more than that—for some 6 years Members of Congress had endeavored to get a copy of this Wallace report and it wasn't until, I believe, Senator O'Connor, of Maryland, through some method, had either written to

Mr. Wallace, or Mr. Wallace had written to him, that finally a report had been made available.

Senator KNOWLAND. Now it would seem to me since this presumably was an officially sponsored State Department mission it would have been an essential part, in fairness to you, of your briefing before going over there on this mission which they asked you to undertake.

Secretary MARSHALL. Well, my briefing, of course, was exceedingly brief.

UNITED STATES POSITION ON FORMATION OF CHINESE COALITION

Senator KNOWLAND. Now I asked earlier as to the amount of—I do not like to use the word “pressure”—but the amount of suggestion which was used by the Government of the United States in urging the Government of the Republic of China to have this coalition.

I would like to read to you a letter, which is a photostat that I have, on the letterhead of the Department of State, Washington, dated October 2, 1946. I presume that was during the period of time that you were still there. It was addressed to Admiral W. W. Smith, Chairman, United States Maritime Commission, Washington, D. C.

DEAR ADMIRAL SMITH: I refer to your letter of September 5, 1946, asking the views of the State Department with respect to the extension of the Maritime Commission of a credit to China of \$76 million for the purchase of 159 war-built vessels under the Merchant Ship Sales Act of 1946.

The Department of State has no objection to the negotiation and conclusion of a credit for the above purpose. Such an arrangement would be in line with the general policy of this Government to assist in the rehabilitation of essential aspects of the Chinese economy.

In accordance with general policy toward credit assistance to China, however, the Department requests that any transfer of war-built commercial-type vessels to China on a credit basis be subject to the following provisos:

“It is the desire of the United States Government that these commercial-type vessels be destined for a united and democratic China under a coalition government. It is, therefore, understood by the Chinese Government that if it appears to be in the best interests of the United States, the latter may discontinue the transfer of these vessels.”

The Department of State will promptly inform the Maritime Commission if at any time it appears to be in the best interests of the United States to terminate or suspend such transfers and requests that it be kept currently informed of the status of transfers of ships being purchased.

The Department is also interested in development concerning the terms of such credit arrangements as may be negotiated with China.

Now, Mr. Secretary, speaking as a layman, I cannot help in reading that letter but get the very strong impression we were saying to the Governor of China:

Any aid we give has a string attached to it, not in the sense of cleaning up your Government so there is no corruption or improving your armed services so they are more efficient, but the proviso is that you must establish a coalition government.

And I think it is pretty well documented that coalition meant that the Communists must be taken into the Government.

Now what would be your interpretation of that letter?

Secretary MARSHALL. I think that would be approximately my interpretation.

I have a paper here, some notes, along the general line of this development regarding which you have been questioning me.

INITIATION OF COALITION MOVEMENT

Now the initiation of the movement for the Chinese Communists to be absorbed in their Government was the statement by the generalissimo in 1937, which was plainly to that effect.

That came to a head more in 1943 on September 13, when he stated to his Central Executive Committee:

I am of the opinion that, first of all, we should clearly recognize that the Chinese Communist problem is a purely political problem and should be solved by political means.

In that same year of 1944 General Hurley became involved that fall in connection with an effort to find a basis for a meeting and understanding between the Government and the Chinese Communist regime.

FIRST UNITED STATES NOTE ON CHINESE COALITION

The first United States official suggestion—these are the notes I have here—the first United States official suggestion of the desirability of Communist participation in the Chinese Government was made by Ambassador Gauss in August 1944, when he suggested to the generalissimo the possibility of a war council of all parties or groups to make plans for the then-existing crisis during the war against Japan.

This was endorsed by President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull. The first United States official participation in the Kuomintang-Communist negotiations was that of General Hurley, as I have said, who undertook active measures of mediation in November 1944, with the direction and advice of the generalissimo and members of his cabinet and on the invitation of the Communist Party.

Now, that leads into the later developments of which we have been talking. The earlier part, the part that I have been reading these notes from, of course, is something that Mr. Acheson can talk on very much more to the point than I can.

Senator KNOWLAND. I am trying to limit my questions to you dealing with the period immediately preceding your mission to China for the purpose of getting as much clarification as we can on the subject, because it is difficult from merely reading the cold print sometimes to know the background.

WEDEMEYER MEMO TO CHIANG KAI-SHEK

But I want to call your attention to a top-secret memorandum No. C-62-7 of November 10, 1945, of Wedemeyer to Chiang Kai-shek.

I might say, just for the benefit of the committee, that this document had apparently been stolen in a Chinese equivalent of a "pumpkin papers" situation and was published by a Communist magazine in Hong Kong in, I believe, 1949 or 1950, and came to me—someone sent it—and I in turn turned it over to official Government agencies to be translated and made copies available to the several interested departments.

Then I requested that a copy of the document be furnished so that we could compare it to see if in translation there had been any errors made.

I will address a letter to the chairman this afternoon, requesting that this document be made available so there may be some minor errors in it in translation, but I want to call your attention to these paragraphs.

CHINESE INTERNAL CONFLICT

General Wedemeyer had come back to this country and then he went on back to China and he tells about his conferences with the President and with the Secretary of State and the Joint Chiefs.

Now, I wish you would pay particular attention to this language.

Senator SALTONSTALL. What is the date?

Senator KNOWLAND. November 10, 1945.

3. Conference with Secretary of State.

A. He repeated the President's words promising support to you and the Nationalist Government, but he also declared the President's instructions that the United States positively should not participate in China's military clashes nor could any facilities be furnished for the Central Government's actions against rebellious military elements within Chinese territory.

Now, the first part of it I thoroughly understand. We didn't want to get the American troops at that time embroiled in what we thought then perhaps was purely a civil war without necessarily being a Russian background to it.

But the second part of it, as I read it, saying—

Nor should any facilities be given for the Central Government's action against rebellious military elements within Chinese territory—

indicates that any of the help that we might give to the Government could not be used for putting down rebellion.

EFFECT OF COALITION ON UNITED STATES AID

Now, I call your attention to the second page, and he says this—this has to do with the subsection—

Conference with the Joint Chiefs of Staff—

and I am reading from subparagraph D—

They—

meaning the Joint Chiefs of Staff—

They declared plainly American military aid to China will cease immediately if evidence compels the United States Government to believe that any Chinese troops receiving such aid are using it to support any government which the United States cannot accept, to conduct civil war, or for aggressive or coercive purposes. The degree to which China has obtained political stability and security under a unified government completely representative of the people will be regarded as a fundamental condition governing the United States economic, military, and other forms of assistance. The United States Government will from time to time consider the degree to which China has met the aforesaid fundamental conditions as a standard according to which to decide whether or not to continue aid. It was further emphasized that China must strive to reduce its military forces to 50 divisions and to see that air transport equipment is provided to facilitate their movement.

Mr. Secretary, as I read that now, it seems to me that we are saying that unless they set up a government of a coalition, including the Communists, they will not get economic aid, as indicated by the letter from the State Department to the Maritime Commission, and there

is other documentation that can be made, but I don't want to encumber the record with it.

Then, on the military sphere, we say aid will not be given, and it may be withdrawn unless you establish a government more or less on the specifications that we have laid out.

UNITED STATES EFFECT ON CHINESE POLITICS

Now my specific question to you, Mr. Secretary, is this. We seem to have been bringing a great deal of influence to bear if not pressure upon the Government of the Republic of China to make a deal with the Communists. What pressure were we bringing on the Communists or what pressure could we bring on the Communists to make a deal that would be satisfactory to the Nationalist Government in China?

The Communists, according to the white paper, were in Manchuria where the captured Japanese stocks of arms and material were being turned over to them, so they were relatively unconcerned on that score.

We were in a position to either help or withhold help to the Government of the Republic. All of our pressure seemed to have been on the Government of the Republic to make a deal with the Chinese Communists. It seems to me that that put them at considerable disadvantage, particularly if, as we now know, the Chinese Communists undoubtedly had ample notice that we were exercising that influence upon the Government of the Republic.

Secretary MARSHALL. In the first place, Senator, the development in Manchuria occurred later than that. That occurred largely during March of 1946, I believe, at the time I returned to the United States.

Next, undoubtedly this Government was influencing the Kuomintang Nationalist Government to bring about a more general people's government than was in existence at that time.

Also, the general instructions we had in the intent of all the movements, the decisions of the Chiefs of Staff so far as they were approved were to avoid in every way we could being engaged in a civil war in China.

Now as to the Communists themselves, you are correct when you say there was very little influence we could bring to bear upon them, unless you undertook to increase the efficiency of the Chinese forces by not only additional equipment but more particularly, we will say, leadership and advice of the officers from our Government who had been with their divisions during the fighting against the Japanese.

It was a continuous effort at that time to keep clear of the involvement of a civil war, and that, of course, was related to our demobilization procedure and the fact that we could not do these things very effectively, but it is to avoid civil war in China.

I repeat again that you are quite correct in my opinion when you state that the forces that we could bring to bear upon the Communists were very restricted unless we in an all-out manner tried to build up the effectiveness of the Chinese Nationalist Army.

We did, however, do a great many things which were severely attacked by the Communists. One was we moved the Nationalist forces by plane in to seize various cities like Peiping, Tientsin, and so forth,

Tsingtao, in our planes before the Communists could take over those cities.

We moved their troops to Manchuria through Chinwangtao and that section by ships in order to get them up there, and those measures in part were severely attacked by the Communists who tried to discourage us from doing more.

I think those were very proper moves to make and we found a basis of agreement which the Communists could only deny in propaganda on their own part to this movement into Manchuria, because that was in the terms of the general settlement in the cease-fire that we had established.

But to go back to your first question and repeat what I have said, compress what I have said in regard to that, we did deliberately make every effort to avoid participating in a civil war in China, and I think undoubtedly our Government exercised its influence toward the establishment by the Nationalist Government of a people's government which include the Communist regime.

COMPARING GREEK AND CHINESE SITUATIONS

Senator KNOWLAND. Now, in Greece, where civil war was going on, and the President of the United States enunciated the so-called Truman doctrine, civil war was, of course, going on in that country against Communist forces.

Now, it is true that Greece is a much smaller nation, but the fact of the matter is, is it not, Mr. Secretary, that we sent a mission under General Van Fleet, with officers and enlisted men, for the purpose of supervising the training and the aid of the Greek Government forces for the purpose of overcoming the Communist opposition?

We did not suggest to the Government of Greece that they make a settlement by taking Communists into a coalition government.

Secretary MARSHALL. No; I am quite certain that we did not.

The situation in Greece, however, Senator, I think, was a little different from that in China, because of the proximity of the satellite states which were almost openly supporting this operation, which we knew were equipping it almost entirely, and which also were protecting these Communist forces, guerrilla forces, by permitting them to retreat across the border and be rearmed and reequipped and returned to the fight.

Senator KNOWLAND. Wasn't that—

Secretary MARSHALL. It was very much as the North Koreans moved into Manchuria, were reconstructed and brought back into the fight.

Senator KNOWLAND. That is just the point I am raising. Is it not the equivalent of the situation of going north of the Yalu River, where the Greek guerrillas could retire north of the river, regroup, reequip themselves, and come back in, and it was not until Yugoslavia finally closed its border with Greece that at least that source of re-equipment was cut off; is that not correct?

Secretary MARSHALL. That is correct; but I think you would have to qualify that by stating that the procedure we followed, at least did not set up a reaction in Yugoslavia which encouraged them never to have any relationship with us on the basis that is now apparently developing.

However, in the procedure in Greece, there was another factor. We did not at first allow our officers to be out with the troops. We provided training in the rear and in the use of the equipment that we were offering.

On that, later on when the situation got into very dangerous condition, we did extend the authority under General Van Fleet, who went out there in the last phase to see if he could not improve the situation by better direction or advice to their troops; but we forbade our officers to be involved in it at all in the fighting fronts, in the beginning in this struggle to keep this thing and hold this affair in a manner that would not involve us in the actual business of the operations.

I say, later, we changed that to permit our officers to go forward because we not only had a serious situation, but we had a condition in the Greek Government that we felt made it safe to follow such a procedure.

Senator KNOWLAND. Well, in other words, while we did not have actual troops firing on the enemy in Greece, after a time when we felt that the original method of training was not sufficient, we did enable our officers, I believe, to go down, I believe, to battalion level—maybe to a lower level—to give such advice as they might be able to, to the Greek officers and the Greek Government forces. That is my understanding.

WAR POWERS OF PRESIDENT

Secretary MARSHALL. That is correct.

Now, in China in the spring of 1946, I had General Wedemeyer, who was then in command of our troops out in China, and they had not then been entirely evacuated, set up under the President's temporary war authority, the military mission to China.

It never was confirmed by the Congress. The naval mission was confirmed. The military mission was not confirmed; but it continued in existence under the war powers of the President.

I had that set up, I think, in April of 1946 as a means of building up the efficiency of the Chinese Government forces, and it was a very large mission.

BARR MISSION TO CHINA

Senator KNOWLAND. Directing your attention to the postwar period in China, and not the wartime period, when they were fighting allies, who you have testified and General Wedemeyer testified before the Appropriations Committee, had probably kept occupied a million and a half or so Japanese soldiers, but directing it exclusively to the postwar period, is it not correct that when General Barr was sent out to head the so-called Barr mission to China, he was under specific instructions that his officers and enlisted men should not be assigned to the combat units of the Nationalist forces?

Secretary MARSHALL. I think that is correct, sir.

Senator KNOWLAND. So that is a great difference between the latter stages of the Van Fleet mission to Greece and the so-called Barr mission to China?

Secretary MARSHALL. That is correct; but later on his authority was extended so that he in a measure could send his people forward.

Senator KNOWLAND. But—and this is a very important point, and I wish that you would bring it to the committee—my information is that though the instructions may have been modified, permitting him to send people forward, that, as a matter of fact, no such instructions were issued by General Barr to put American officers or enlisted men with the lower units of the Chinese National Army.

Secretary MARSHALL. I can't answer that.

Senator KNOWLAND. If you could check up on that, I would appreciate it.

Secretary MARSHALL. Yes.

MANCHURIA'S STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE

Senator KNOWLAND. Now, is there not this additional difference between the situation in Korea and the situation in Greece—in Greece with the possible exception of an incidental casualty that might have taken place, and I do not recall that there were any, though there might have been one or two casualties, or perhaps a few more, in the Korean situation we do have this casualty list which is approaching the 65,000 mark. Now is it your professional judgment as a soldier, is it your professional judgment as a soldier that the ability of the North Korean Communists and the Chinese Communists to make war upon us is increased or decreased by having Manchuria in Communist hands?

Secretary MARSHALL. Is the ability of the North Korean and the Communist Chinese increased or decreased?

Senator KNOWLAND. Yes.

Secretary MARSHALL. I would say that it is increased.

Senator KNOWLAND. And you would say that it was substantially increased, having a common frontier over which they could pass for regrouping, reequipment, and reinforcement?

Secretary MARSHALL. I don't know that I would say substantially increased, but it is increased. And the discussion I had this morning, particularly yesterday afternoon, with Senator Hickenlooper, was related to what that really involved us in in the way of casualties.

Senator KNOWLAND. Now, I don't think you get—perhaps I did not make myself clear, General. What I am now trying to get does not particularly relate to this situation on casualties and the desirability or lack of desirability of attacking the arsenals, depots, airports, and so on, in Manchuria. I am now merely raising the question whether in your professional judgment as a military man the capacity of the North Korean Communists to make war upon us is substantially increased by their having a common frontier with another Communist power, namely Red Manchuria.

Secretary MARSHALL. I think that is correct, sir.

PARTICIPANTS IN YALTA CONFERENCE

Senator KNOWLAND. Now, Mr. Chairman, very briefly I would just like to turn to the question then of the Yalta Conference, at which some believe at least the Communists got a foothold in Manchuria.

Mr. Secretary, do you recall offhand those who constituted the group of the advisers of the President of the United States at Yalta?

Secretary MARSHALL. I know, of course, Mr. Stettinius was one, Freeman Matthews, as I remember, was one. I learned afterward that Hiss was one. I don't remember the names of the others.

Senator KNOWLAND. Well, could I read the list and see if this is the group that you might recall?

For the United States of America—Edward R. Stettinius, Secretary of State; Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy, USN, Chief of Staff to the President.

Secretary MARSHALL. That is correct.

Senator KNOWLAND. Harry L. Hopkins, special assistant to the President; Justice James F. Byrnes, Director, Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion.

Secretary MARSHALL. Yes.

Senator KNOWLAND. General of the Army George C. Marshall, USA, Chief of Staff, United States Army; Fleet Adm. Ernest J. King, USN, Chief of Naval Operations and commander in chief, United States Fleet; Lt. Gen. Brehon B. Somervell, commanding general, Army Service Forces; Vice Adm. Emory S. Land, War Shipping Administrator.

Maj. Gen. L. S. Kuter, USA, commanding general, United States Army Air Forces; W. Averill Harriman, Ambassador to the U. S. S. R.

H. Freeman Matthews, Director of European Affairs, State Department; Alger Hiss, Deputy Director, Office of Special Political Affairs, Department of State; Charles E. Bohlen, Assistant to the Secretary of State—together with political, military, and technical advisers.

Is that the list of the principal advisers as you recall them?

Secretary MARSHALL. Yes, sir. I thought your original question was directed to the political end rather than the military end.

Senator KNOWLAND. It was directed to both because some of the questions will apply to both.

Secretary MARSHALL. That is the group as I recall it.

Senator KNOWLAND. Now, Mr. Secretary, I take it that on the military phase of the situation that you and Fleet Admiral King were the senior military advisers to the President there; apparently General Arnold, I understand, was not well or for some reason did not go and sent Lieutenant General or rather Major General Kuter there in his place; and Lieutenant General Somervell was dealing, I assume, with logistic problems. But the three that I have mentioned heretofore were the senior military advisers.

Now at Yalta, to the best of your recollection, did the American delegation have information which indicated that the Japanese might surrender earlier than we had originally contemplated?

Secretary MARSHALL. Not to my knowledge, sir. If there was any, it was not convincing to us.

May I add to your summary there that Admiral Leahy was almost entirely engaged in the political discussions. He went with the President. The military discussions were with myself, Admiral King, and General Kuter, and I was chairman for the Chiefs of Staff in practically all of them. Admiral Leahy, as I say, attended all the political sessions and was not sitting in except maybe on rather rare occasions with the Chiefs of Staff.

Senator KNOWLAND. One of the difficulties we have, Mr. Secretary, is that sometimes there is a very fine line between the political discus-

sions and the military; and when we seek information—I am not now speaking of this testimony, because you have frankly been answering all of the questions of the committee during the several days that you have been here—but I am making the general observation that sometimes we ask for information and the State Department will say that is military information, and the military may quite properly say that it is political; and it is hard to draw a clear-cut line.

Secretary MARSHALL. Sometimes, Senator, we say that to each other, right now, when they are dealing with each other.

That isn't exclusively for the Congress.

JAPANESE PEACE BIDS

Senator KNOWLAND. For the purposes of clarification, because I think that if we can clarify as much as possible it may help us reach that common area of agreement that I hope the committee sessions may develop—there was an article which appeared in the Times-Herald of Washington, on Sunday, August 19, 1945, which I will just read a couple of paragraphs from, to refresh your memory to see whether you can throw any light upon them. It says:

Release of all censorship restrictions in the United States makes it possible to report that the first Japanese peace bid was relayed to the White House 7 months ago.

Two days before the late President Roosevelt left the last week in January for the Yalta conference with Prime Minister Churchill and Marshal Stalin, he received a Japanese offer identical with the terms subsequently concluded by his successor Harry S. Truman.

The Japanese offer, based on five separate overtures, was relayed to the White House by General MacArthur in a 40-page communication. The American commander, who had just returned triumphantly to Bataan, urged negotiations on the basis of the Jap overtures.

The offer, as relayed by MacArthur, contemplated abject surrender of everything but the person of the Emperor. The suggestion was advanced from the Japanese quarters making the offer that the Emperor become a puppet in the hands of American forces.

Two of the five Jap overtures were made through American channels and three through British channels. All came from responsible Japanese, acting for Emperor Hirohito.

Do you have any knowledge, directly or indirectly, that there had been preliminary offers of surrender from Japan?

Secretary MARSHALL. I have no recollection of any that were received, with any degree of authenticity with regard to them.

That particular communication from General MacArthur I will have checked and inform the committee in regard to that.

I would say this: That during the early months of 1945, there were a series of communications between Japanese Ambassadors, or Ministers in Europe—I think notably from Berlin, before they closed in on Berlin; from Moscow, before the Soviets declared war on Japan; from Madrid—I think it was either Madrid or Lisbon; and from Stockholm, I think; and also, I believe, from Switzerland.

Now, in these communications which we were reading, they were appeals largely from those Ambassadors to the Prime Minister of Japan, to proceed immediately to obtain a surrender.

Some, as I recall, described the terrific ravaging of Europe by this continued defense.

As I recall, the replies from the Prime Minister of Japan were in the nature of discussions and a reiteration of the difficulty of carrying out such a procedure with the army and with the people.

So, in our own minds, we had the evidence that the representatives of the Japanese Government in Europe, seeing what was occurring in Europe, were hopeful of seeing the struggle brought to a close.

I remember now, as I am talking, that the point, as made by them, was the endurance of the empire. They were thinking in terms of 50 years, as I recall some of them put it very plainly—the army was thinking of the army, because the survival of the empire was their interest—the army's intention was—what the honor of the army today is, meaning 1945.

EVENTS LEADING TO USE OF ATOM BOMB

From these messages, specifically those from the Japanese Prime Minister, it was evident to us that the army was still largely in control and they were preparing to fight to the bitter end just as they had done on all of the islands up to and including Okinawa where I think we had to kill 120,000 of them.

Therefore it was the opinion of the Chiefs of Staff at that time that only a tremendous pressure on Japan itself had any hope of terminating the army dictation, and later, that despite the horrible bombing of Tokyo, some 100,000 lives sacrificed there in flames and explosions, that nothing less than a terrific shock would produce a surrender, particularly a surrender that was carried throughout the Japanese interests from Burma, China, Indonesia down in New Guinea where we had left them behind, and of course further north.

Our great struggle there was to precipitate that general surrender so that we would not be involved with various hold-out commands in various parts of the Far East. Therefore our own conclusion, that of the Chiefs of Staff, was that we had to either invade Japan to bring this to a conclusion with shock action, which developed the atomic bomb.

The most convincing evidence that I recall that it had to be that, was the failure of that terrific destruction in Tokyo to produce any definite results. As to these leads towards surrender, particularly those you say that went to the White House, I will check up on that, but certainly I was not conscious of such a thing and my associates on the Chiefs of Staff with all of this information of these messages we had deciphered and all were not conscious of such an immediate prospect of a surrender.

Senator KNOWLAND. Could you have your records checked to see whether any such message had come in from General MacArthur and make it available if it did, or from any other source?

Secretary MARSHALL. I am quite certain we would have seen that if it had been sent in by General MacArthur.

SOVIET'S ENTRANCE IN FAR EASTERN WAR

Senator KNOWLAND. Now at the Yalta conference, the question arose I assume in the military meetings with the senior military officers as to the desirability of the Soviet Union being brought into the war in the Far East. Could you tell us what the discussions were

and what your recommendations were relative to the desirability or need for the Soviet Union to enter the war in the Far East?

Secretary MARSHALL. The Chiefs of Staff quite certainly unanimous, for that was a very essential factor in bringing the war to an early termination, we anticipated a very powerful influence from the Kwantung Army in Manchuria and probably the portions that were in Korea.

Later we were to find it possible to isolate them, but not before they had transferred a very considerable portion of the Kwantung Army to Kyushu. It was the opinion of the Chiefs of Staff that it was highly important that the Soviets carry out the campaign against Manchuria and against Korea.

Senator KNOWLAND. Were the Chiefs unanimous in that viewpoint?

Secretary MARSHALL. I think they were unanimous. We can ascertain that, but I am quite certain they were unanimous because I never recall any other debate on the question, and one must remember I think in that connection that we were having a terrific fight on every island we touched where we had to exterminate every Japanese, a most remarkable state of affairs.

It carried to the Philippines until I think every member of the infamous Eighteenth Division that had conducted the death march after the surrender of Bataan was killed in the fight in Leyte, so there was nobody left in enough position to really try them in regard to that, and that division was the troop unit that was most involved.

STRATEGY IN TERMINATING JAPANESE WAR

So we were considering a landing in Japan where there were supposed to be and actually were, I believe, about two and a half million troops that had not yet been engaged in battle unless they were recovered wounded.

We had seen how they fought at Saipan, the Philippines, at Leyte, and later on Guam, and particularly in Okinawa. We were confronted with the necessity of making a landing of three army corps, that is, three different places—on Kyushu in the fall, and tremendous forces north of Tokyo, in the Tokyo plain, the following spring, presumably about the first of March.

We had to visualize very heavy casualties unless we had enough atomic bombs at the time to supplement the troop action, if the functioning of the bomb proved satisfactory for that purpose.

It was considered for a time—rather, for a time there was consideration as to whether or not we should attempt to isolate Japan and not land on Japanese shores.

That decision was finally taken not to do that, I think along about July, but it is very easily ascertained, because I sent a radio to General MacArthur and told him what the conception was on the part of some reaching the President, that there should be no landing in Japan, but there should be an encirclement.

We felt—I am speaking now for General Arnold and myself—we felt that we would become involved in many ways and it would be a far more expensive procedure and we were not settling the surrender we wanted in China, Burma, Indonesia, and so on.

So I sent a radio to General MacArthur reciting the facts and asking for his reaction, as he would be the commander. He came back

strongly, very courageously, I felt in favor of the landing in Japan rather than the temporizing measure.

I mention these things because they showed that these assumptions that all we had to do was stand aside and we would have gotten the surrender were quite different in their effect on the Chiefs of Staff. We didn't get that at all, and yet we saw all the information.

Along with the same arguments, I read sometimes some members of the Air Corps think by ordinary bombing—I do not think so. We had the demonstration of that, which I thought was horrible, much worse than Hiroshima, much worse than Nagasaki, because that was an instantaneous thing and the other was a horrible night of a hundred thousand people losing their lives.

That seemed to make very little impression, but a tremendous shock action ended the affair, and the first one didn't do it. They couldn't find out about Hiroshima for two or three days, because all communications were out. Everybody thereabouts was semi-paralyzed, but I think they just about found out what happened when in came the news of Nagasaki, and they knew what that meant. How many more bombs there were they had no way of knowing. [Deleted.]

Now, up to that time we had no assurance that we could get a surrender in the opinion of the Chiefs of Staff who presumably were the best informed in our Government, other than the President, we will say.

TERMS OF THE YALTA AGREEMENT

Senator KNOWLAND. Now, in the preparation for the conference at Yalta, before the military and civilian advisers went out there, did they contact the supreme commander in the Far East, General MacArthur, and Admiral Nimitz, who, I believe, was handling another area in the Pacific, as to their views on the advisability or desirability of having the Soviet Union enter the war?

Secretary MARSHALL. I don't recall that, but we can check up and find out, sir.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Chairman, might I ask who were the Joint Chiefs of Staff at that time you are speaking of now?

Secretary MARSHALL. Admiral Leahy, Admiral King, General Arnold, and myself.

Senator KNOWLAND. Now, it was not until June 15, 1945, that the Generalissimo was notified of the Yalta agreement, according to the White Paper, relative to that situation on the Manchurian understanding.

Do you know at what time General MacArthur had been notified of the Manchurian provisions of the Yalta agreement?

Secretary MARSHALL. I will have to check that up, sir; I don't recall.

Senator KNOWLAND. My recollection is that Secretary Byrnes, who was apparently at Yalta, in his book, *Speaking Frankly*, indicated that the particular features dealing with Manchuria had not been known to him until after he became Secretary of State.

Were you familiar at Yalta with the Manchurian provisions of giving Dairen and the rights on the Manchurian railroad and Port Arthur to the Soviet Union?

Secretary MARSHALL. I don't think I was, sir.

Senator KNOWLAND. You were not. Was that made in the political—

Secretary MARSHALL. Yes.

Senator KNOWLAND (continuing). Committee?

Secretary MARSHALL. Those were entirely separate from the military.

Senator KNOWLAND. They were separate from the military?

Secretary MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator KNOWLAND. Well, didn't they have a considerable amount of military significance, as, of course, we have hindsight now, which we didn't have then, but didn't those decisions have a considerable amount of military significance?

Secretary MARSHALL. As to the future; yes, sir.

Senator KNOWLAND. And that feature of it was not discussed with the three chiefs?

Secretary MARSHALL. Not to my recollection, Senator.

Senator KNOWLAND. With the exception of the Manchurian-Chinese features of the Yalta agreement, on the other phases of them, were there any conferences where the entire American delegation got together and discussed, for instance, the Polish terms on holding free elections, or the—

Secretary MARSHALL. Not with the military.

Senator KNOWLAND. Not with the military.

You devoted primarily your attention to working out the final phases of the military features?

Secretary MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

PUBLICATION OF CONFERENCE AGREEMENTS

Senator KNOWLAND. I noticed with reference to the Potsdam agreement that in Senate Document Report No. 1440 made by Mr. Vandenberg for the Committee on Foreign Relations to accompany Senate Resolution 213, calling on the President for information concerning the Potsdam agreements and violations thereof by Soviet Russia, I call your attention to the following section of the committee report on page 2:

Senate Resolution 213 also asked full information concerning any undisclosed Postdam obligations to which the Government is committed. The State Department's response to this inquiry is as follows—

and this is the matter to which I referred earlier on the difficulty of getting information.

"All political agreements concluded at Potsdam to which this Government is a party are matters of public record; the only agreements which have not yet been disclosed were military agreements concerning the conduct of military operations in the Pacific."

Secretary MARSHALL. What is the date of that?

Senator KNOWLAND. This report to the Senate was made on June 2, 1948; made by Senator Vandenberg, then chairman of the committee.

I might say prior to this next question that as one who has studied a number of these documents, I have been under the impression that with the situation relating to the Soviet Union, there were still some undisclosed agreements.

I have inquired of the State Department relative to the Moscow meetings, and categorically asked them whether there were any undisclosed agreements at Moscow.

I received a categorical answer that everything had been published. I have made inquiries as to Yalta and Tehran, and have been given the same assurances.

I had not, however, asked about this Potsdam meeting until I ran across this situation in this committee report.

Do you know to what military agreements relating to the Far East mentioned by the State Department in this communication to Senator Vandenberg, which up to 1948, 3 years after the war, this relates which still had not been published, and would you know why they would not be available to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations?

Secretary MARSHALL. Is that the Potsdam——

Senator KNOWLAND. That is Potsdam.

Secretary MARSHALL. I will have to look it up; I don't recall.

Senator KNOWLAND. I will say, Mr. Chairman, that that is one of the other documents which I have both communicated with the State Department and the Defense Establishment, and I think sent copies of the communications to you in the early phases of getting the committee set up here.

Chairman RUSSELL. I think—I am not sure—they have been submitted formally by the chairman of this committee to the Defense Establishment. I am advised by General Mudge that is the fact.

Senator KNOWLAND. All right.

BRITISH ATTITUDE TOWARD FORMOSA

Mr. Chairman, I regret very much having taken more time than I had intended. There is still information I would like to go into. I do not want to consume all the time. I have tried to the best of my ability not to cover ground which has been covered before. I think the information is important if we are to reach a common understanding as Americans, and I have tried to pursue this in that spirit.

I merely want to call the Secretary's attention to an article which appears in the Washington Daily News of this evening under the heading "Morrison would give island to Reds. Britain and United States Split on Formosa."

I will just read three paragraphs of the story, which says:

Britain still favors handing Formosa to Red China, but only after peace has been restored in Korea, Foreign Secretary Herbert Morrison told Commons today.

Mr. Morrison's speech followed by only a few hours testimony by United States Defense Secretary George C. Marshall, who told a Senate committee yesterday that the United States should refuse to discuss turning over Formosa to the Reds.

Senator H. Alexander Smith (Republican, N. J.) had asked General Marshall if the question of transferring Formosa to Communist hands should be excluded in any cease-fire negotiations for Korea with the Chinese Reds.

"Yes," the general had replied.

Mr. Morrison told Commons that the Government still subscribes to the Cairo declaration of 1943 awarding Formosa to the Republic of China after World War II.

"But," he said, "the first step was to obtain a Korean peace settlement. Then the UN might 'usefully' consider the Formosan dispute at 'the appropriate time,' he said."

Now, that brings us back to the questions this morning relative to these documents that we were discussing as to just what, if any—the proposal we had discussed—were the other UN nations with regard to this question of Formosa, and UN membership for Red China?

Secretary MARSHALL. I have not had an opportunity to go into that in detail, Senator, since you questioned me this morning. However, I did find out this much in relation to your statement of what had occurred.

I think, in January, was it, I found out that it was not a five-man committee, but those five particular governments were to be members of a committee which would have others involved. Now, beyond that, I have no additional information.

Chairman RUSSELL. I think that this committee can testify you have had mighty little opportunity to gain much information.

Secretary MARSHALL. I had about 10 minutes.

NO POLITICAL CANDIDACIES OF JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Senator KNOWLAND. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator McMahon.

Senator McMAHON. General, have you ever been a candidate for any political office?

Secretary MARSHALL. No, sir.

Senator McMAHON. As far as you know, has General Bradley ever been a candidate for any political office?

Secretary MARSHALL. Not that I know of, sir.

Senator McMAHON. Admiral Sherman?

Secretary MARSHALL. Not that I know.

Senator McMAHON. General Vandenberg?

Secretary MARSHALL. The same.

Senator McMAHON. And General Collins?

Secretary MARSHALL. The same.

ESSENCE OF CHINESE POLICY

Senator McMAHON. General, we have had a very interesting exploratory session here this afternoon into past history in the light of hindsight which is always instructive and entertaining. What date did the Japanese war come to an end?

Secretary MARSHALL. August 13, I think, 1945.

Senator McMAHON. The policy in China before that date, I presume, was certainly designed to further the security of the United States troops?

Secretary MARSHALL. It was, but particularly to bring about a coordination of effort of the Nationalist forces and the Chinese Communist forces against the Japanese.

Senator McMAHON. And the Japanese at that time were the main enemy, were they not?

Secretary MARSHALL. They were; yes, sir.

Senator McMAHON. General, I believe Mr. Patrick J. Hurley preceded you as the Ambassador, and I believe you said, made the first formal proposals for the bringing together of these two forces in China for the purpose of avoiding a civil war. Is that correct?

Secretary MARSHALL. It was Ambassador Gauss.

Senator McMAHON. I beg your pardon, it was Gauss. When did Hurley come into the picture?

Secretary MARSHALL. Just a short time thereafter. Gauss in 1944 and Hurley also in '44, and I think within a short time of each other.

Senator McMAHON. Mr. Hurley was the Secretary of War in Mr. Herbert Hoover's cabinet, was he not?

Secretary MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

HURLEY'S COMPARISON OF COMMUNIST AND NATIONALIST OBJECTIVES

Senator McMAHON. Perhaps at this time in the record it would be a good thing if I were to read in a press conference which Mr. Hurley had on Monday, April 2, 1945. This was a press conference that General Hurley held in China, and I quote:

You gentlemen—

meaning the gentlemen of the press—

should know though, I believe you all do know, that it is a matter of common knowledge that the Communist Party of China supports the principles of Dr. Sun Yat-sen. That was generally referred to as the people's three principles of China. The three principles are government of the people, by the people, and for the people. All the demands that the Communist Party has been making have been on a democratic basis. That has led to the statement that the Communist Party in China are not in fact real Communists. The Communist Party of China is supporting exactly the same principles as those promulgated by the National Government of China and conceded to be objectives also of the National Government.

General, when you got over there, you didn't believe that, did you?

Secretary MARSHALL. Well, I was in an inquisitive mood, I will say that, when I arrived.

Chairman CONNALLY. Who said that, Hurley?

Senator McMAHON. Hurley. Here is a man now asking Hurley a question:

Sir, I am not sure that I understand that last sentence. You said the Communist Party is supporting the same principles as the National Government of China?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Could you tell us what is the divergence between them? How do they differ?

Answer. Well, as a matter of fact the divergence between the parties of China seems to be not in the objectives desired because they both assert that they are for the establishment of a government in China that will decentralize authority and conduct itself along democratic lines employing democratic processes. The divergence between them is the procedure by which they can be achieved.

To go a little further, the Communist Party would like for the National Government to inaugurate certain reforms immediately and to do this they have suggested a bipartisan coalition government. The National Government, that is the Kuomintang Party, has stated that it has a program outlined by the liberator of China, Dr. Sun Yat-sen, whereby the authority of the Government of China is to be returned to the people of China under a constitution and not through an aggregation of political parties.

The National Government of China contends that it is now in the process of a meeting being held on the 5th of next month, a program whereby it will return control of the government to the people.

The National Government claims that it would not be justified in turning over the authority of government to any organization or political parties or any coalition of politicians but that it is the attitude of the National Government to return the control of China to the people and let the people select their own leaders.

Question. What is the relative difference between the Chinese Communists in China and the Communists in America, Britain and elsewhere?

Answer. Well, I know the difference between the Republicans and Democrats in Oklahoma, but you are getting too deep for me when you are trying to make me outline the difference between foreign political parties.

Question. Is this Communist delegate who has been appointed to the Chinese delegation really a Communist as far as you know?

Answer. I think he is. I do know that he was their representative at Chungking and that he is now in Yunnan, and I have had many conferences with him.

Now to say whether he is a real Communist as you understand communism, I would not say that. I don't know, because there was a question whether any of the Chinese Communists are real Communists, but I do say this: That he does belong to the Communist Party and does cooperate with and serve that party. How to determine what is the degree of communism and what kind of communism it is I could not give you a definition of that.

Do you remember reading that press interview, General?

Secretary MARSHALL. I was aware of it.

Senator McMAHON. Do you remember when Hurley went to see Stalin when he was engaged in his mission?

Secretary MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator McMAHON. Do you remember what he said, when he came out of the interview, to the press?

Secretary MARSHALL. I don't recall that.

Senator McMAHON. I will refresh your recollection by pointing out that he said he believed Stalin had no designs on China.

MARSHALL'S REPORT TO FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE

Now, General, when you came back here after your mission, which of course, took place after the cessation of hostilities, did you not come up and make a report to the Foreign Relations Committee?

Secretary MARSHALL. I think I did, sir.

Senator McMAHON. I have tried to ascertain if there was a record of that conference and unfortunately there was not. I have a list of the members of the Foreign Relations Committee—

Chairman CONNALLY. Let me interrupt. That was when you came back for a month or so and then went back to China.

Secretary MARSHALL. I think so. I don't recall a second conference. There may have been one, but there would be a record of that in the State Department.

Chairman CONNALLY. I am speaking about the conference you had with us when you first went out there, and then you came back and reported to us, and then you went back to China.

Secretary MARSHALL. That is very definite. I had a conference with the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate and with the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House.

Senator MACMAHON. Now, as I understand it, there was no record of that conference, but on the Foreign Relations Committee at the time were the following Senators: Vandenberg, Capper, White, Wiley, Smith, Hickenlooper, Lodge, Connally, George, Wagner, Thomas, Barkley, and Hatch.

I do not know whether or not—the question is withdrawn.

Senator Hickenlooper has just called my attention to the fact that this was during 1947 and the conference that I am talking about, of which there was no record, took place during April, I think it was,

of 1946 when you came home and reported up to the Foreign Relations Committee.

Senator LODGE. Will the Senator permit me to say that I was not a Member of the Senate at that time.

Senator McMAHON. That is right.

Senator SMITH. And I was not a member of the committee.

Senator McMAHON. I cured that by withdrawing the question and pointing out that this was during the spring of 1946.

Now, General, you reported to this committee as to your findings in China at that time. I have only hearsay to go on. I have made some inquiries. Is it true that you met with a general acceptance and approval of the way you had carried out your mission?

Secretary MARSHALL. There was no expression, formal expression of opinion. I got the impression that I was being supported.

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN POLITICAL AND MILITARY OBJECTIVES

Senator McMAHON. General, I think it would be worthwhile to clear up the difference, if there is a difference, between our political objectives in Korea and our military objectives in Korea. I think it is important that we have that in the record.

Would you please do that for me, sir?

Secretary MARSHALL. Our military objective in Korea is to resist this aggression and in general to secure the situation. That may mean the advance into Northern Korea, as it did at one stage, or our holding South Korea safe from aggression.

The advance into North Korea as a military proposition was the destruction of the North Korean forces. At the present time the military objective is dominated by the factor that the security of our forces is the preeminent requirement because we are so much outnumbered in Communist Chinese strength.

But in general terms, it remains the same—to resist the aggression, which carries with it the implication that we not only resist the aggression but within our means we try to terminate the possibility of a continuation of the aggressive threats.

As to the political requirements or policies governing the situation, I must ask you to question the State Department on that, because it involves information that, first, ought to be very accurate for the benefit of you gentlemen, and, in the next place, I do not think should be advertised in part. Because while it is a political policy, it pertains very directly to a military procedure.

DIVERGENCE OF ADMINISTRATION AND MAC ARTHUR VIEWS

Senator McMAHON. General, I don't wish to pursue, intermittently, the subject of the reasons for General MacArthur's recall; but I do think that there are one or two matters that might be adverted to so that we would have the record more complete on that subject.

There can be no doubt in the minds of the American people today, sir, that General MacArthur is completely out of sympathy with the Government's policy in the Far East, growing out of his testimony before this committee, and out of his address to the Congress.

Do you not agree with that statement?

Secretary MARSHALL. I think that is a correct statement.

PUBLICATION OF MAC ARTHUR VIEWS

Senator McMAHON. His views, as expressed here before this committee, and in the address to the Congress, in the main, did not come as any surprise to you, did they?

Secretary MARSHALL. No, sir.

Senator McMAHON. And the reason they had not come as a surprise to you was because you had read his views in the public press, isn't that true?

Secretary MARSHALL. In part.

Senator McMAHON. In part?

Secretary MARSHALL. Yes.

Senator McMAHON. And the "in part" basis of your answer, I will ask you if it does not rest on a series of events—August 6, 1950:

A "reliable source" reported from Tokyo that General MacArthur felt the United States should take more aggressive action against communism, not only in Korea, but elsewhere in Asia.

Is this a part of the basis to your belief that he had openly and completely expressed his views that were in divergence with those of the Government, when, on August 27, 1950, without prior knowledge of the President, yourself, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Department of State, he suggested unilateral action by the United States on Formosa?

This message came at a time when the President and Ambassador Austin were negotiating with the United Nations on the status of Formosa. You remember that message to the Veterans of Foreign Wars, and the President's order to him to withdraw that message?

He did withdraw that statement, but it was printed in United States News and World Report, if you will remember.

On August 28, on the same day that the President ordered him to withdraw the message, the President stated that in the field of foreign relations there can be but one voice stating the position of the United States—that of the President.

Do you remember that statement, General?

Secretary MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator McMAHON. On December 6, 1950, a directive to Cabinet members and other officials, which was transmitted to General MacArthur, specified that statements, speeches, and press releases concerning foreign policy or military policy should be cleared in advance with the Department of State and the Department of Defense. That has been adverted to many times in this hearing.

You are familiar with that directive.

Now, General, I want to refer to February 6, 1951, where an Associated Press dispatch from Tokyo stated that:

General Douglas MacArthur is believed to have recommended to Washington that Chinese Nationalist troops be used against the Red Chinese forces in Korea and elsewhere.

This story noted that the UN commander has asked in at least three public statements for authority to bomb what he calls "the privileged sanctuary of Manchuria."

On March 7, 1951, General MacArthur complained of "abnormal military inhibitions" and said "a military stalemate seemed inevitable."

I will skip the business of the Joint Chiefs of Staff telling General MacArthur about the planned announcement of the President on March 20, which has been referred to so many times, and now come to the Joseph W. Martin, Congressman Martin, incident.

I would like to call your attention on page 185 to Martin's letter to General MacArthur, in which he stated in the last paragraph:

I would deem it a great help if I could have your views on this point, either on a confidential basis or otherwise.

I will ask you if there is any indication in the reply of General MacArthur to Mr. Martin that it was to be regarded by Mr. Martin as confidential?

Secretary MARSHALL. I see none.

MARTIN'S SPEECH

Senator McMAHON. I would like to call your attention to some of the statements that were made in the speech of Congressman Martin, which speech got the wholehearted endorsement of General MacArthur. Let's see what Martin was talking about. I have had that portion of the speech on the Far East, inserted in the appendix to volume 6, beginning on page 1151. It is a full and complete presentation of the so-called MacArthur viewpoint on how we should conduct our operations in the Far East.

I will challenge anyone to deny that statement. I will not take the time of the committee, of course, to read the whole thing, but let me quote what General MacArthur endorsed. Said Mr. Martin:

But I protest with every resource at my command the formulation of any over-all strategy which virtually ignores the focal point of our trouble today in Asia. I might add that Republicans in countless numbers, myself included, have been protesting such a policy, such a strategy, for years. Again, if we really want to take the pressure off our forces in Korea, if we want to diminish the threat of a Soviet sweep across Europe, why, may I ask, do we not employ—get this figure—

the 800,000 anti-Communist Chinese troops on Formosa?

I call your attention on page 1155—

What could be sounder logic—

said Mr. Martin—

both strategically and militarily, than to allow the anti-Communist forces of the generalissimo on Formosa to participate in the war against the Chinese Reds? Why not let them open a second front in Asia?

And then the Congressman went on to give his strategic reasons, which are largely General MacArthur's reasons, as to why this militarily would prove a valid adventure.

Then later on in the speech, Mr. Martin said this:

The answer is that we do have military people who favor the employment of the anti-Communist forces of the Republic of China. There is good reason to believe that General MacArthur favors such an operation. There is good reason to believe that there are people in the Pentagon who favors such an operation.

Now, I call attention to the fact that in General MacArthur's reply to Mr. Martin, he says, on page 186:

Your view with respect to the utilization of the Chinese forces on Formosa is in conflict with neither logic nor this tradition.

He did not add that it is in conflict with the President's, with his Commander in Chief. But I will ask you isn't that implication plainly in the letter?

Secretary MARSHALL. I think it is.

ADMINISTRATION'S CONSIDERATIONS IN ADOPTING POLICY

Senator McMAHON. General, I think the American people would appreciate it if you could assure them that the strategy that has been adopted by the Government, as I understand it, with the united backing of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and with yourself, and with the backing of the President of the United States, is the strategy which you have adopted after looking at the global picture and weighing what might be termed the global considerations." Is that not true?

Secretary MARSHALL. That is correct, sir.

Senator McMAHON. I presume the global considerations are of a great number, and of a great variety.

I presume that you looked at the consequences of the Soviet taking over Western Europe?

Secretary MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator McMAHON. Have you examined, and by "you," I mean the top command, both the President of the United States and the Military Establishment—have you examined and weighed the state of our civil preparedness in this country?

Secretary MARSHALL. To a certain extent, yes, sir.

Senator McMAHON. Have you weighed and considered the atomic program, and its implications?

Secretary MARSHALL. Very closely, sir.

Senator McMAHON. What was that?

Secretary MARSHALL. Very closely, sir.

Senator McMAHON. Have you weighed the state of our mobilization in this country?

Secretary MARSHALL. With exactitude.

Senator McMAHON. Have you made an estimate of the potentialities of the Soviet Union?

Secretary MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator McMAHON. Have you carefully weighed the intelligence of which you are possessed, bearing upon the intentions of the Soviet Union?

Secretary MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator McMAHON. Have I omitted any major, what might be called major factors, General, which you have weighed?

Secretary MARSHALL. I don't recall any at this moment.

Senator McMAHON. And as a result of weighing these factors, are you now prepared to tell the people of the United States that it is the unanimous judgment of the top command of this Government that our Nation's security is best furthered and best protected by the policy we are pursuing in the Far East?

Secretary MARSHALL. Exactly that, sir.

Senator McMAHON. I presume, General, that you have taken into consideration not only the casualties that we are suffering in Korea today, but also the casualties that we might suffer as a result of precipitant headlong and unwise military adventures?

Secretary MARSHALL. We have considered all those factors, sir.
Senator McMAHON. That is all.

Chairman CONNALLY. May I suggest that in the factors you submitted to the General a while ago, you did not mention our relations with our allies.

Senator McMAHON. Thank you.

Chairman CONNALLY. I think that should be inserted.

Senator McMAHON. I think the General would certainly like that inserted.

Secretary MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

COLLECTIVE SECURITY

Senator McMAHON. May I assume, General, that the co-use with our allies of certain portions of the geography of the earth is of the utmost importance to a defense of the United States of America.

Secretary MARSHALL. I would think so absolutely, sir; and that is the principle of collective security, which is the only principle that we think can carry us to a peace.

Senator McMAHON. Thank you very much.

PROCEDURE OF INTERROGATION

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Cain, I believe you are next. It was my intention to recess about 5:15. I do not want to stop in the middle of your questioning. I will leave it up to you whether you wish to proceed, or I will declare a recess at this stage.

Senator CAIN. I am completely at your service and that of General Marshall. I presume if you recess now, I might be so fortunate as to ask some questions of the General tomorrow.

Chairman RUSSELL. If you have been reached in the regular order, and if we recess at this period, I should think you would be the first questioner tomorrow.

Senator CAIN. Then whatever your convenience, mine is the same.

Chairman RUSSELL. I want to make a brief statement. We will meet tomorrow morning at 10 o'clock. I have been advised by Senator Byrd—I have not discussed it with the Secretary—that they are having a great day in honor of General Marshall as the leading, most outstanding alumnus of Virginia Military Institute, starting Monday evening; is it, General?

Secretary MARSHALL. Yes.

Chairman RUSSELL. We will have a session tomorrow, and if we cannot get through with the examination of the General tomorrow, I understand you will be available Monday morning.

Secretary MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator LODGE. Are you planning a meeting Saturday afternoon?

Chairman RUSSELL. I do not know any reason why we should not.

Senator LODGE. I just wanted to know.

Chairman RUSSELL. We met last Saturday. I do not know any reason why we should not meet this Saturday afternoon.

If we cannot conclude by Monday, you will not be available here until Wednesday; is that right?

Secretary MARSHALL. Wednesday morning, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. I fervently hope, and I am quite sure it is at least shared by Secretary Marshall, that we will be through examining him by noon Monday. But, in the event we are not, it has been my thought that perhaps before we started with General Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, that we would return to Secretary Marshall, but it would be a little more in order to have Secretary Pace of the Department of the Army up on Tuesday when Secretary Marshall could not be here. I do not imagine his examination will take an extremely long time, and that would not break the order of the examination as it would to proceed to General Bradley.

I lay that before you, gentlemen.

Senator KNOWLAND. Might I ask a question on procedure? As I understand it, tomorrow, if it is convenient, Senator Cain will proceed with his questioning.

Now as I understand the procedure which you have outlined, if General Marshall is not finished, then Secretary Pace will come up. When the Joint Chiefs come up, might I suggest the Joint Chiefs come up individually rather than en masse?

Chairman RUSSELL. We will follow the order as I designated.

PROPOSED TIME LIMITATION ON INTERROGATION

Senator LONG. Mr. Chairman, might I make a motion for the future? The other day when we were about halfway around the table Senator Morse made a motion that, on the first round of examination of witnesses, each person could ask questions for the first half hour. That would include the answers, and then that, on the second round, the same procedure would be followed.

I would like to move, because we have gone two-thirds of the way down the line by now on General Marshall's testimony, although I can assure you that General Marshall will not have to take more than a half an hour to answer my questions, but with the future witnesses I would like to move that we allow each person on the committee, each Senator, a half hour the first round and that after that on the second round they can take as much time as they care to.

Chairman RUSSELL. I understand the parliamentary situation, Senator Long. Senator Morse has made a motion to that effect, and before we start the examination of any other witness, there will be a vote on that motion.

Senator LODGE. Mr. Chairman, I would like to say I think we ought to be able to do it in half an hour rather than 15 minutes. I think that, if members really prepare themselves carefully and study hard and get their questions carefully phrased, just as much could be developed in 15 minutes as in half an hour, and with all the different witnesses we have got to hear I do not know when we are ever going to get through if we consume time at the rate that we have been consuming it.

From the standpoint of public education and public presentation, you make a much better record if the questions and the answers are much more concise. That is just my opinion.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, it of course will be in order for you to offer a substitute to Senator Morse's motion or an amendment there to strike out "30" and insert "15."

Senator KNOWLAND. Mr. Chairman, might I ask just for clarification so the record will be complete, is the Senator from Massachusetts suggesting that there be a time limit of 15 minutes on each Senator on the questions that are asked?

Senator LODGE. No. The Senator from Massachusetts has been here too long to make such a proposal as that. The Senator from Massachusetts is proposing that, on the first round, there be a 15-minute limit, but that everybody gets a second crack so there is no censorship or no suppression or anything of that kind. This is an effort to have everybody be concise, which I think is in the public interest.

I first proposed the 5-minute rule. We had our organization meeting and I didn't get very far with that. I do not know that I am going to get very far with the 15-minute rule, but I am going to just have that little speech.

Chairman RUSSELL. Very well, we now stand in recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.

(Whereupon, at 5:05 p. m., the hearing was adjourned to reconvene on Saturday, May 12, 1951, at 10 a. m.)

MILITARY SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST

SATURDAY, MAY 12, 1951

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES AND THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
UNITED STATES SENATE,
Washington, D. C.

The committees met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10:02 a. m., in the caucus room, Senate Office Building, Senator Richard B. Russell (chairman, Committee on Armed Services) presiding.

Present: Senators Russell (chairman, Committee on Armed Services), Connally (chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations), Saltonstall, Johnson of Texas, Morse, Kefauver, Knowland, Cain, Stennis, Flanders, Long, George, Smith of New Jersey, Green, Lodge, Sparkman, and Gillette.

Also present: Mark H. Galusha and Verne D. Mudge, of the staff of the Armed Services Committee; Francis O. Wilcox, chief of staff; Thorsten V. Kalijarvi, staff associate; and Pat M. Holt, associate clerk, Committee on Foreign Relations.

Chairman RUSSELL. The committee will be in order.

Just as the committee recessed on yesterday, we had reached Senator Cain. He was given assurances that his position would be maintained on today. Senator Cain, you may proceed.

**TESTIMONY OF SECRETARY OF DEFENSE GEORGE C. MARSHALL,
ACCOMPANIED BY FELIX LARKIN, GENERAL COUNSEL—Resumed**

Senator CAIN. Thank you, sir.

General Marshall, good morning. If I did not believe that the free world through the United Nations has failed to keep its own promises and has failed to carry out its mission in Korea, and because of these failures the free world is headed from my point of view for trouble of a far more serious character than confronts us at this perilous time, I would not bother, sir, to consume a minute of your time or ask you a question, but because I do believe deeply on this matter, I have a number of questions, but they have been so designed as to permit of the briefest kind of answer.

During the extended course of your testimony, General Marshall, you have not suggested how long the Korean War is likely to continue or what additional methods and means and strength may be employed to conclude that war.

It is because of this uncertainty that I seek information at the outset concerning the agencies of authority which consider the policies involved in the Korean War, but before beginning that inquiry, General

Marshall, may I ask if you have had the Washington Post of this morning called to your attention?

Secretary MARSHALL. I read a copy myself.

PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE TO MAC ARTHUR OF JANUARY 13 AND THE JCS STUDY
OF JANUARY 12

Senator CAIN. It is against that paper, sir, that I would like to ask you several questions. You testified yesterday that the message of the President of January 13 was sent to General MacArthur in order to give the political factors involved in a directive from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Security Council of January 12.

Is it not a fact, sir, that the January 12 communication was dispatched by mail so that it cannot have been in General MacArthur's hands when he received the President's telegram of January 13?

Secretary MARSHALL. The directive I referred to was of January 11. January 12 was not a directive. It was a proposal to the National Security Council and it was shown to General MacArthur by General Collins in addition to being mailed out.

Senator CAIN. Do you know, General Marshall, the contents of the message which General MacArthur sent and to which the President's message of January 13 was a reply?

I have been advised that the message of January 13 was in response to a request for advice from General MacArthur, and if that is a fact, it has not thus far been mentioned in these hearings.

Secretary MARSHALL. In several of General MacArthur's communications, once the Chinese Communist forces had developed in Korea, he stated that this had changed the character of the war and it required a consideration of a change of policy on the highest governmental level.

The message you refer to from the President to General MacArthur developed from the fact that a directive was prepared by the Chiefs of Staff, and the question was whether that should include in it other than purely military terms. It was decided that it was better to send the directive on a purely military basis and then have the President himself send the message of January 13.

Senator CAIN. If I have understood you, then, sir, correctly, you have stated it to be a fact that the January 13 message of the President to General MacArthur was a direct reply to a specific inquiry from General MacArthur asking for instructions because his previous instructions were not clear. And did not then General MacArthur ask specifically whether he was to evacuate immediately or to attempt to stay on in Korea for a limited time or to hold out indefinitely? That is my understanding of the chronological facts in the question, General Marshall.

Secretary MARSHALL. As I stated before, there were numerous references by General MacArthur to the decisions of this Government once the Chinese Communist military effort had developed in Korea. Various messages in reply were sent as to the status of affairs and as to the governmental considerations, notably in the effort to obtain an action by the United Nations to declare the Chinese aggressors in Korea.

Now, this message of January 13 to General MacArthur was in an endeavor to make clear to him the position in which we stood from the President, because the message in the form of a military directive

had been sent him on the 11th at a very critical time in the progress of military events in Korea.

MAC ARTHUR OPINION ON HOLDING KOREA IN JANUARY

Senator CAIN. General Marshall, do you know it to be so that General MacArthur, before receiving the communication from the President of January 13, had stated that in his opinion he could hold on in Korea for any length of time up to the complete destruction of his own forces, if political considerations or political factors dictated such a course?

Secretary MARSHALL. I think that is included in one of his replies.

Senator CAIN. I think you have told us that General MacArthur stated in previous messages that the decisions required involved questions of a highest national and international importance, above and beyond that which could be made by a theater commander on his own responsibility?

Secretary MARSHALL. That is correct, sir.

Senator CAIN. Do you know it to be so, sir—at least, I was so advised from a news dispatch of yesterday coming out of New York, which quoted General Whitney as saying—that General Collins and General Vandenberg, two members of the JCS, were present with General MacArthur and his senior staff officers when the January 13 message arrived from the President?

Secretary MARSHALL. I think it will be better, Senator, to ask them directly.

Senator CAIN. Thank you, sir.

Have you been advised that during that meeting, which was attended by General MacArthur, General Collins, General Vandenberg, and others that General Vandenberg or General Collins said he thought it, the message, meant evacuation after a limited period in which it would appear that our troops were being forced out of Korea by military pressure?

Secretary MARSHALL. I do not recall at the moment the exact account that General Collins gave us of his interview, but he can testify to that.

Senator CAIN. I thank you, sir.

Do you know whether or not it is so that General MacArthur interpreted the January 13 message clearly to mean that there would be and should be no evacuation, and that General Vandenberg expressed himself as inclined to agree with General MacArthur's interpretation of the message?

Secretary MARSHALL. The message distinctly said it was not a directive.

BACKGROUND OF PRESIDENT'S JANUARY 13, 1951, MESSAGE

Senator CAIN. I hope you will not misunderstand this question. Why were not the messages from General MacArthur to which the President was replying on January 13 made available to this committee yesterday so that the whole of the matter concerning the circumstances of the President's reply might have been made available to this committee and the Nation at the same time?

Secretary MARSHALL. I don't quite get the point, Senator.

Senator CAIN. The point I seek to establish, sir, is that from my point of view—and I stand to be corrected—the message of the 13th of January was not sent on the President's initiative; it was sent primarily in response to one or more messages seeking advice from General MacArthur in the field.

Secretary MARSHALL. I couldn't answer that specifically "Yes" or "No." As I have repeated, there were a number of questions from General MacArthur along this general line. There were messages from the Chiefs of Staff which involved military factors and called to his notice political factors.

In this particular case—and the Chiefs of Staff can testify to you directly themselves—in drawing up their directive to him the question was whether or not any mention or whether or not they should inject into that both the military and the political, and it was decided it would be far better to make a complete separation, and that was the genesis of the President's message, to the best of my understanding.

Senator CAIN. I thank you, sir.

Would you tell us as precisely as you can, General Marshall, how the January 13 message of the President contradicts or modifies or clarifies the January 12 recommendations of the JCS?

Secretary MARSHALL. They were two quite different things. One was a series of possible actions in a great dilemma to be considered by the National Security Council because of their involvement.

The message by the President, as I think he states in there in so many words, was to bring General MacArthur into complete understanding of the attitude of this Government as expressed by the President himself.

RELATIONSHIP OF JANUARY 13 TO JANUARY 11 STATEMENT

Senator CAIN. I think I have understood you to say that the January 13 message was sent to General MacArthur for a number of reasons, one of which was to throw some light on the January 11 directive, to which you made reference yesterday; is that correct?

Secretary MARSHALL. The expression "throw some light," I don't think is quite accurate to the point in this case. It was to avoid complicating the directive of January 11 with political factors and to have them go to General MacArthur as a distinct statement.

Senator CAIN. May I ask, sir, why did the January 13 message of the President state precisely in the language of the President, "The present telegram is not to be taken in any sense as a directive," when it had a relationship to a directive of 2 days before? Why was one a directive and the other merely an expression of opinion?

Secretary MARSHALL. In other words, I am quite certain the Chiefs of Staff can, I think, give you a very direct answer on this, although probably it is in the State Department bailiwick.

In order to avoid any confusion in regard to the directive they sent him, I might state for myself, that I found it desirable never to write a letter to a commander in the field. I had learned that early in the war, because it either watered down, or gave some other possibility of interpretation to the directive. I expect that is the reason that I was not involved in that particular drafting.

Senator CAIN. I thank you, sir.

THE VOICE OF CONGRESS IN FOREIGN POLICY

General Marshall, you referred in your previous testimony to two voices in our Government, in a matter of American policy. Your reference was obviously made to the voice of the State Department, or our administration as a whole, or General MacArthur; but at this time I wish to ask you this question:

Do you take the view that the Congress of the United States, a coordinate branch of the Government, should have no part in the making of American policy in the world?

Secretary MARSHALL. No, sir. I would not put it that way; but the President has a constitutional power in stating our foreign policy, and I am talking about stating it, not discussing it.

Senator CAIN. Is it not true, sir, that under the Constitution, the power to declare war and the power to make peace is a function of the Congress, and that our Constitution, therefore, calls for two voices in the making of American policy and the taking of American action?

Secretary MARSHALL. I think there you have a difference, that you get into, pretty legalistic for me, between a statement to the world on a policy, and an action, legalistically, under our Constitution, by both the Congress and the President.

Senator CAIN. I am seriously interested in your view, sir.

PROPRIETY OF MAC ARTHUR LETTER TO REPRESENTATIVE MARTIN

My next question is: Since the Constitution states that Congress shall have the power, and I quote "to make rules for the government, and regulations of the land and naval forces," do you wish your testimony of recent days to stand, that no commander of high rank should furnish to a Member of Congress, and particularly to a minority leader of the House of Representatives, information that may be sought from that commander?

Secretary MARSHALL. I would have to qualify that to the extent of saying that you had a very special situation here, in which the views of the supreme commander in the field were in direct contrast to that of the administration, and had, in various ways, been given public notice, to our embarrassment in our relations with our allies and in the development of fears among those allies.

Now, I think the answer has to be directly related to that statement.

I had to answer that at considerable length yesterday, in relation to an article, or an answer by General Collins, the Chief of Staff, to the Foreign Relations or the Foreign Affairs Committee.

I took the view there, and I think it is a correct one, that when we were involved in the special position of a man, and particularly in regard to military operations, there it is not at all the procedure that would be followed by a member of the War Department, a member of the Defense Department coming before committees of Congress, and also statements before committees of Congress after the event.

Here was a world position of the supreme commander of United Nations forces and here was the President of the United States as the executive agent for those United Nation forces, and the declarations one way or the other by that supreme commander have to be very intimately related to that.

As I recall—the letters will show—Mr. Martin asked whether this should be treated confidential or not, and there was no reference to that in General MacArthur's reply.

Senator CAIN. Certainly both of us are in agreement that the question itself is very troublesome, and the question has given rise to most of the inquiry in which all of us are and have been engaged for some time.

May I suggest, General Marshall, that if you consider that you have previously answered adequately to your satisfaction any question I may ask you this morning, if you would merely say so, that will be quite sufficient for me.

Secretary MARSHALL. Thank you.

Senator CAIN. Because then I can retrace my steps and get the substance of your answer.

This is a question which appears to be pressing, but I just want your own view of it. Did you, General Marshall, withhold from this joint committee any information or comment because it might seem to reflect upon the Democrat administration in power which you have called the constituted authority?

Isn't that the plain implication of your statements here that Army officers and members of the military service in command positions must not give any information which could be the basis of criticism of our differences as to the manner in which the Armed Forces of the United States were being employed?

Secretary MARSHALL. That was not my intention whatever and I don't think I can recall anything that I have withheld along that line.

I am having particular reference in all of this to leadership in the field of the going operation and a developing situation.

Senator CAIN. General Marshall, if you will help me now, sir, understand the nature and position of those authoritative sources that have the management of the Korean War in their hands, I will appreciate it.

MANNER OF SENDING DIRECTIVES TO MAC ARTHUR

You testified on page 804 of the hearings several days ago that proposals pertaining to directives which are issued from week to week or sometimes from day to day are forwarded from the JCS to yourself as the Secretary of Defense, and by yourself to the President. Is my understanding correct, sir?

Secretary MARSHALL. That is correct, to a limited extent because in certain cases it goes direct to the National Security Council.

ROLE OF NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL (NSC)

Senator CAIN. I wanted to ask you about that in a minute, but I wanted to know more than I presently know of the nature of the directives that bypass the National Security Council.

Secretary MARSHALL. They are of a nature that do not develop changes of policy and matters of great serious moment. The President requires that he see all the instructions from the executive agent of the Chiefs of Staff, who is General Collins, before they go to General MacArthur, or General Ridgway. And for convenience I would

either take those to the President, but as a rule General Bradley does in connection with his morning appointment.

Now if it as a very important thing and yet not one that seems to be a general policy consideration in a large way, I would take that personally to the President myself. But that has been seldom the case.

But when a measure or proposal such as that of January 12 came up, that went directly to the National Security Council as a matter of course.

Senator CAIN. Because it involved high——

Secretary MARSHALL. Very major decisions.

Senator CAIN. And fundamental national policy.

Secretary MARSHALL. Exactly.

Senator CAIN. General Marshall, you testified on page 804 of the hearings that basic directives flow from the JCS to the Defense Secretary to the National Security Council to the President; is that correct, sir?

Secretary MARSHALL. Yes, sir; and that is a statutory requirement.

Senator CAIN. You have stated that the National Security Council is composed of the President, the Vice President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board; is that correct?

Secretary MARSHALL. That is correct.

Senator CAIN. Will you briefly outline the functions of the National Security Council?

Secretary MARSHALL. Pardon my delay in answering this.

Senator CAIN. Certainly, sir. These questions are not only of interest to me but several of my colleagues have said since the hearings began, that they had never heretofore understood the importance of the National Security Council, and I think the Nation ought to understand its relationship to other activities.

STATUTORY PROVISIONS RELATING TO NSC

Secretary MARSHALL. In the first place, it is a statutory organization and the law reads:

There is hereby established a council to be known as the National Security Council, hereinafter in this section referred to as the Council. The President of the United States shall preside over the meetings of the Council, provided that in his absence he may designate a member of the Council to preside in his place.

The functions of the Council shall be to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security so as to enable the military services and the other departments and agencies of the Government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving the national security. The Council shall be composed of the President, the Vice President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board, and the secretaries and under secretaries of other executive departments and of the military departments, the Chairman of the Munitions Board, and the Chairman of the Research and Development Board when appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to serve at his pleasure.

In addition to performing such other functions as the President may direct for the purpose of more effectively coordinating the policies and functions of the departments and the agencies of the Government relating to the national security, it shall, subject to the direction of the President, be the duty of the Council:

1. To assess and appraise the objectives, commitments and risks of the United States in relation to our actual and potential military power in the interest of national security for the purpose of making recommendations to the President in connection therewith; and

(2) To consider policies on matters of common interest to the departments and agencies of the Government concerned with the national security, and to make recommendations to the President in connection therewith.

(c) The Council shall have a staff to be headed by a civilian executive secretary who shall be appointed by a President, and who shall receive compensation at the rate of \$10,000 a year. The executive secretary, subject to the direction of the Council, is hereby authorized, subject to the civil-service laws and the Classification Act of 1923, as amended, to appoint and fix the compensation of such personnel as may be necessary to perform such duties as may be prescribed by the Council in connection with the performance of its functions.

(d) The Council shall, from time to time, make such recommendations, and such other reports to the President as it deems appropriate or as the President may require.

Senator CAIN. I thank you, sir.

General Marshall, do we then rightly conclude from what you have just read that the National Security Council is with respect to national and global security matters in which this country has a definite interest, and the war in Korea, by all odds the most important policy-making body in the United States?

Secretary MARSHALL. That is right, sir.

NATIONAL SECURITY RESOURCES BOARD

Senator CAIN. It, therefore, goes without question that its members ought to be individuals possessed of high capacity and of names which call forth confidence to the extent possible from the American people.

Mr. Secretary, what is your relationship and acquaintance with Mr. Robert J. Smith?

Secretary MARSHALL. I may know him, but I don't recall.

Senator CAIN. He is the Vice Chairman of the National Security Resources Board, sir.

What is your acquaintance and relationship with Mr. Jack O. Gorrie?

Senator LODGE. What is that name?

Senator CAIN. Jack O. Gorrie.

Secretary MARSHALL. I may know him, but I don't recall the name.

Senator CAIN. He is, sir, the executive assistant of the National Security Resources Board.

General Marshall, will the acting head of the National Security Resources Board, for Mr. Symington, its secretary—resigned some weeks ago—attend meetings of the National Security Council—will the acting head?

Secretary MARSHALL. I presume so, sir.

Senator CAIN. Will you state, sir, how often the National Security Council meets, and are minutes taken of those meetings?

Secretary MARSHALL. Usually it meets Wednesday afternoons. At one time it was meeting twice a week.

Senator CAIN. General Marshall, are you quite familiar with the basic functions of the National Security Resources Board?

Secretary MARSHALL. I have read the directive and I have attended some of the meetings.

Senator CAIN. I thank you, sir.

Has the opinion of the National Security Board been requested by the President of the United States concerning the selection of a new Chairman for the National Security Resources Board?

Secretary MARSHALL. I don't know, sir.

Senator CAIN. Has the question of who ought to replace Mr. Symington as the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board—for that replacement will become automatically a member of the National Security Council—been discussed by the National Security Council since the resignation of Mr. Symington?

Secretary MARSHALL. I recall no such discussion.

NSC AND DISCUSSION OF MAC ARTHUR DISMISSAL

Senator CAIN. May I ask if the dismissal of General Douglas MacArthur was discussed by the National Security Council?

Secretary MARSHALL. It was not.

Senator CAIN. May I ask, General—for I think this question is very important—why it was not, when I bear in mind what you have just read to this committee, a part of which charges the National Security Council with advising the President of the United States with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security so as to enable the military services and other departments and agencies of the Government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving the national security.

It is my interpretation of the statute—and I seek not to go backward and to get any change in the decision to remove General MacArthur—that there was every reason to believe that the National Security Council was required to consider the question of General MacArthur's removal in the interests of national security. I may be wrong.

Secretary MARSHALL. I think that is a matter of opinion, sir. I do not think so.

ROLE OF SECRETARY OF THE ARMY IN MAC ARTHUR DISMISSAL

Senator CAIN. I have understood you, General Marshall, to testify that the Secretary of the Army was directed to notify General MacArthur in Tokyo that General MacArthur was to be removed.

I have understood you to say that the Secretary of the Army did not fulfill this mission because of a breakdown in communications.

I have understood you to say that the Secretary of the Army was not informed before he left the United States for the Far East that General MacArthur was to be relieved.

Is my understanding correct, sir?

Secretary MARSHALL. That is correct, sir, except that the matter of his making the delivery to General MacArthur was prevented not only by a breakdown of power, but by a later decision of the President to proceed immediately with the relief.

Senator CAIN. I thank you, sir.

Would you give us in just a sentence or two the primary functions of the Secretary of the Army?

Well, perhaps that isn't necessary. I seek to save the general as much as I possibly can of his time. Let me ask my next question.

Chairman RUSSELL. I have here another copy of the National Security Act of 1947.

Senator CAIN. I know, General Marshall, that the Secretary of the Army is responsible for the discipline and morale of the Army of the United States.

Would you tell me how a decision would be reached to relieve General MacArthur without consultation by the JCS and others in high authority with the Secretary of the Army?

Secretary MARSHALL. In the first place, the Secretary of the Army was not here, and in the next place, as I endeavored to explain yesterday, General MacArthur was not serving under the Secretary of the Army; he was serving not only as a commander of the United States Air, Naval, and Army Forces in Korea, but also as the commander of the United Nations forces in Korea.

Therefore, it would not, in my opinion, be the function of the Secretary of the Army to enter into the matter of his relief or retention on duty.

Senator CAIN. I may appear, General Marshall, to be even more curious than some of my colleagues, but I am endeavoring to anticipate the requirements of the future, and I want to know before I get through, with your help, if I can, by exactly what means our supreme commander in the Far East was removed, so I will know whom to question should there be a recurrence in some other theater in years to come.

CONSULTATION OF CIVILIAN SECRETARIES IN DEFENSE DEPARTMENT

General Marshall, were the views of either the civilian Secretary of the Navy or the civilian Secretary of the Air Force requested in connection with the dismissal of General MacArthur?

Secretary MARSHALL. Not to my knowledge.

Senator CAIN. General Marshall, I am advised that the Secretary of the Army is a member of the Armed Forces Policy Council, which advises the Secretary of Defense on matters of broad policy relating to the Armed Forces.

Was the question of General MacArthur's dismissal referred to that Policy Board?

Secretary MARSHALL. It was not.

Senator CAIN. I thank you, sir.

I have gathered then from your answers—and I want to be very certain if I am right—that no civilian within the Department of Defense or the Department of the Army was consulted or had any influence in the dismissal of General MacArthur; is that correct, sir?

Secretary MARSHALL. I am supposed to be the civilian Secretary of Defense. Out of my past I was a soldier. My answer would be that I am the supposed civilian representative of the Department of Defense. I recall your action in connection with clearing the way for my nomination as to the importance of having a civilian as Secretary of Defense.

Senator CAIN. It is not my intention or desire to embarrass you, General Marshall. I have and have had a very real respect for your military knowledge. I address you as "General" because old soldiers

never die and you are and will remain, for as long as you live, sir, a five-star general.

I just want our people to know—and it is without any criticism of you whatsoever—that we created through the National Security Act of 1947 a Defense Establishment which was designed to have at its head as the Secretary of Defense a civilian. It was designed to have at the head of each one of the three services a civilian.

Under the circumstances which pertain, though the chief of staff of each of the services is in himself subordinate to the civilian head of each of those three services, none of the civilians were conferred or consulted with or had any part to play in a great question which involved basically the national security of our country. I think it is a bad procedure, sir.

ROLE OF THE JCS IN MAC ARTHUR DISMISSAL

General Marshall, will you please relate any conversations you had with Admiral Sherman, with General Vandenberg, with General Collins either individually or collectively covering, (a) the question of replacing General MacArthur in his several commands, and (b) the method to be followed in replacing the general.

Secretary MARSHALL. I had no personal discussions with any one of the three officials that you have mentioned in the matter. General Bradley carried the questions to the Chiefs of Staff and came back with the information desired which was largely one of procedure so far as military command relationships were concerned, not the political aspects, not the public aspects.

After the Chiefs of Staff had had a meeting on Sunday afternoon, the 9th, I believe, of several hours, they came to my office with General Bradley and they each stated respectively their views, and the common view of the three.

I, as I recall, did not discuss the matter with them. I heard what they had to say. General Bradley—there must have been some discussion. I don't crystallize it in my mind now because it lasted from 4 o'clock until 6, but I think it related to procedure which would be followed in the event of General MacArthur's relief in order to protect the interests of the Army. That is my recollection.

Senator CAIN. But as you recall, sir, during that conversation no chief of staff of any of the three services reflected in your presence on the method, the wisdom or lack of wisdom in peremptorily relieving General MacArthur of his command?

Secretary MARSHALL. I don't recall any other than the discussion on Mr. Pace.

Senator CAIN. As to how Mr. Pace was to be employed in this question?

Secretary MARSHALL. If and how.

Senator CAIN. By indirection I have served under your command across the seas, so you know that I seek not to embarrass you at any time, but the reason I have asked some of these questions is that it would not have been possible for a conversation of that character to have taken place if those three civilian Secretaries had been present at such a meeting, because in being civilians they would not be content with a staff officer's rapid evaluation of the situation.

Those civilian Secretaries would have asked pressing questions concerning aren't there other alternative courses which we might follow.

It is a great pity if not tragedy in my view that such a procedure was not followed.

RELATIONSHIP OF RIDGWAY TO MAC ARTHUR

General Marshall, you have repeatedly stated that General MacArthur was relieved of all of his commands on receipt of orders because of your desire to free General Ridgway, General MacArthur's successor, of any embarrassment. I am unable to—

Secretary MARSHALL. Embarrassment or complications?

Senator CAIN. I am unable to understand what you have meant.

May I ask if General Ridgway was not sent to Korea at the direct request of General MacArthur?

Secretary MARSHALL. I was not in the Department at the moment that that decision was taken; but my understanding is that General MacArthur either made the request, or specifically confirmed it, but that can be looked up and the information furnished.

Senator CAIN. General MacArthur testified that General Ridgway did come to Korea at his direct request.

I have understood, and I can easily understand this, that it was the view, or the wish, casual, probably, of the Defense Department to send a general other than General Ridgway to Korea, but that the Defense Department immediately concurred in General MacArthur's personal request that General Ridgway come to him.

I think there is some small measure of importance in that question of mine, and in your answer.

I want, in my own right, now to take just one or two seconds to have the record show again that General MacArthur has publicly said to this committee, and the country, that he and General Ridgway had a mutual and high respect for each other.

General MacArthur testified:

General Ridgway was my selection and recommendation as the commander of the Eighth Army after the unfortunate death of that very magnificent soldier, General Walker.

I have known General Ridgway for 30 years. I don't think you could have a more admirable selection in the Far East than General Ridgway. I hold him in the highest esteem, not only as a soldier but as a cultured gentleman and one of the most magnificent characters I have ever been acquainted with.

I asked General MacArthur a question as to whether or not from the moment General Ridgway went to Korea, he was not under General MacArthur's direct command, and the general's answer is this:

That is absolutely correct, and I don't know how there could have been any more complete cooperation, devotion, and loyalty than between General Ridgway and myself.

General, given this information, may I ask you again how did you and your associates conclude that it would embarrass General Ridgway if General MacArthur was given time in which to personally turn over his several commands to General Ridgway?

Secretary MARSHALL. I have already stated my views to that. Do you wish me to state them again?

Senator CAIN. No, sir. If you think you have stated them adequately, that is sufficient for me.

Secretary MARSHALL. I think I have, sir.

Senator CAIN. General Marshall, I have stressed this point because I am not going to be a party to a movement which is afoot in this country to discredit General MacArthur by an implication that bad blood existed between General MacArthur and General Ridgway, and that General Ridgway was sent to Korea in anticipation of the removal of General Douglas MacArthur; and your observations have helped in clearing away any possible uncertainty that exists on that question.

Secretary MARSHALL. I will go further than that to say that any such idea is extraordinarily incorrect.

Senator CAIN. I think that statement is very good for our country, and I personally and officially appreciate it.

POSSIBILITY OF PERSONAL CONSULTATION WITH MAC ARTHUR PRIOR TO
DISMISSAL

General Marshall, you have stated many times, sir, that it was not advisable to order General MacArthur back to this country for discussions with the JCS, with yourself, and perhaps the National Security Council and the President, which might easily have resolved or found an adequate answer for the differences between General MacArthur and those in higher authority in this country, because of the critical situation in Korea. I do not understand, sir, your stated reasons when I consider that General Ridgway took command of the Eighth Army last December.

Would you tell us, please, why the situation would have become more critical if General MacArthur had been brought home for consultation? I call your attention to the fact that General MacArthur was relieved of his commands in the face of what the President announced to the country was a pending offensive by the enemy.

Secretary MARSHALL. I do not, I think, imply that the situation would have been made the more critical by General MacArthur's return to Washington, but that his return to Washington seemed inadvisable in view of the critical situation. I have gone into this before, but I will do it again, Senator.

General MacArthur theretofore at various times—I will refer to some of the dates here if you wish me to—has indicated a reluctance to come to this country in connection with various factors relating to the far eastern question, and at this time, as you say, a pending offense, an advance of his troops, was just about to take place. And when the President consulted me and then instructed me regarding his having an opportunity to discuss with General MacArthur the various factors, and with others at the same time the President would take with him, and with the Ambassador of ours to Korea, he stated that he desired General MacArthur to meet him in Hawaii, and that he, the President, would go that far, and that would not take General MacArthur away from Tokyo for an undue length of time at such a critical period. And I suggested to the President that in view of the circumstances, it seemed to me that if the President was willing to go to Wake Island, he should give General MacArthur the chance to decide for himself what to do; and I put the question up to General MacArthur—Hawaii or the President's willingness to go as far as Wake Island—and General MacArthur replied, "Wake Island."

There was an example, at least, of my own feeling as to the critical importance of his being on the ground at that time.

Now, as to his relation to the offensive procedure that was going on in Korea, at the time of his relief, his relief brought about another commander, so that there was no question about who was in control of the situation, and that commander came directly out of Korea; that is directly out of Korea, and intimately familiar with every stage of the military fight in that region. In fact, he was largely the director of it, and I would state that if it had been found necessary to succeed General MacArthur with somebody other than General Ridgway, I don't know exactly how I would have appraised that situation, but it would have been quite different, because of the fact that an entirely new man was being put into the position; whereas the great issue was the battle, and General Ridgway was intimately familiar with every phase of it.

ALERTING VAN FLEET

Senator CAIN. May I ask how much prior warning General Van Fleet had that he was going to take over command of the Eighth Army in the face of an offensive which, presumably, was even beginning to move as of the time General Van Fleet was brought into Korea?

Secretary MARSHALL. General Van Fleet had been on 12 hours alert for some time—I think a matter of 1 or 2 months, because they felt that General Ridgway was taking some risks in the way he was moving about in his theater, and flying up to the advance posts there, and in the light of what had happened to General Walker, that we must have another man immediately available in case General Ridgway met with some accident or become a casualty.

Actually, Van Fleet was in Florida at the time, and his interpretation was that he could fly back by air in 3 or 4 hours, so that he was in the status of an alert, and he was immediately ordered back to Washington to get under way to go to Japan. I have forgotten whether his instructions were sent Monday or in advance of the decision. I don't think it was; I think it was sent after the decision Monday morning.

Senator CAIN. You certainly know the attitude of mind of General Ridgway.

Secretary MARSHALL. I did not quite understand, Senator.

PREFERENCES OF GENERAL RIDGWAY

Senator CAIN. I say you certainly know the attitude of mind of your great commander, General Ridgway, who can cover more ground more rapidly and more effectively than any person I have ever previously known.

My own view is that one of his handicaps as supreme commander in the Far East, is that he has occupational and administrative duties in Japan, which will keep him from doing what he would most like to do, which would be to lead his troops into action.

Secretary MARSHALL. I might add that we gave him the freedom to make his own decision as to when he transferred the actual command to the army; that is, if he wished to make Van Fleet his deputy

during a period of this fight, so that he could go to Tokyo and come back, and be in a clear status of the army commander, or transfer the command immediately. He chose to transfer the command immediately.

Senator CAIN. Well, you had, sir, no other course to pursue, did you? I mean, with the removal of General MacArthur and with imposing two different commands on his successor, General Ridgway, you had to leave it up to the discretion of General Ridgway as to where he could be of the greatest amount of service to his responsibility, and at the time he took command of not only the commander—not only the continued command of or was then in command of the Eighth Army, but was going to be supreme commander in the Far East.

Secretary MARSHALL. That is correct, sir.

Senator CAIN. One fact seems to remain before me. General Ridgway had imposed upon him new responsibilities at the very moment when he was straining every effort to defeat the offensive of the enemy.

FACTORS CONSIDERED IN MAC ARTHUR DISMISSAL

General Marshall, so far as I know, General MacArthur has probably turned more swords into useful ploughshares than any military figure in history.

All of us recognize General MacArthur to be an outstanding world military leader, and one of the great Americans of all time.

We likewise know that leadership is the crying need of the world at this time.

Against this background this question: Did you, sir, or others in your presence, appreciate and understand that the method you and others had in mind for removing General MacArthur would destroy his usefulness as a national leader within the administration in this continuing day of crisis? Was that one of the considerations before you and other serious-minded people?

Secretary MARSHALL. The serious considerations that were discussed within my recollection related to the immediate reactions that would flow from his relief, and which I think we had a correct estimate of, and very particularly the reactions of his army, which was the most important reaction of all to be considered. Beyond that, I do not think the discussion went.

CONSULTATION WITH SENATE AND HOUSE CHAIRMEN ON MAC ARTHUR DISMISSAL

Senator CAIN. General Marshall, one last question about the MacArthur question please: Was either the chairman of the Senate or the House Armed Services Committees consulted regarding the MacArthur removal?

Secretary MARSHALL. I cannot answer that. As I said before, I got the impression, if not the statement, of the President, that he had seen several—I think he mentioned four—important leaders, and discussed that with them on Sunday, the 9th. Who they were, I do not know, except one case, and I would not state that.

Senator CAIN. Well, may I ask you this—

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Cain, will you pardon me just a moment?

Senator CAIN. Certainly, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. I should like to state in this connection that I had no knowledge whatever that this matter was even under consideration. Since you involved me in that question, I state further that I happened to be out of the city at the time, and I knew nothing about it until the final order came to me that action was taken.

PERSONS CONSULTED ON MAC ARTHUR DISMISSAL

Senator CAIN. General Marshall, on the basis of your testimony we know that the JCS discussed the General MacArthur question. We know that the President did; we know that the Secretary of State did; we know that Mr. Harriman did; we know that you did. So far as we know, no one else was consulted.

I think it very important for us to determine, if we can, the names and portfolios of every single American who had anything to do with this question.

My question to you is to whom we might turn for information regarding those members or those citizens in or out of the Congress whose views were requested or who were consulted about the removal of our far eastern commander?

Secretary MARSHALL. Certainly not the Secretary of Defense, because I don't know, in the first place, and it isn't my role, in the second, to describe just what the President does. I should think the President himself was the individual concerned.

Senator CAIN. I thank you, sir.

THREAT OF AGGRESSION IN EUROPE

General Marshall, I should like very briefly to refer to the relationship between Western Europe and the Far East. Is it not generally agreed that the primary desire and aim of Russia is to secure control of Western Europe?

Secretary MARSHALL. I would assume so.

Senator CAIN. Is it not generally agreed that the defense establishment of our allies in the North Atlantic Treaty is several years away to be prepared to effectively resist any large-scale aggression in Western Europe?

Secretary MARSHALL. I will not—I do not wish to answer the question as to several years away, Senator; but—

Senator CAIN. They are not immediately prepared?

Secretary MARSHALL. They are not immediately prepared.

Senator CAIN. I thank you, sir.

General Marshall, are the United States and our allies in Western Europe not proceeding on the assumption that an aggression is not likely to take place in Western Europe until the Allies have created an adequate defense establishment?

Secretary MARSHALL. To that I would say certainly, so far as the officials involved in this matter in this Government are concerned, our present conception is that we can never tell at what moment the reaction from Russia might come.

You have to evaluate or guess the Russian appreciation of our power atomically, how much of a deterrent that is, and other factors within Russia itself with which we are not sufficiently familiar.

Senator CAIN. Is there any reason to believe, on the basis of your intelligence reports, that an aggressor is presently threatening to invade Western Europe?

Secretary MARSHALL. The impression from the reports that we gather from many sources is there has been a continuous build-up and not necessarily in strength, though it may be, but particularly in arrangements, specifically in the satellite states, and in regard to disposition of Soviet troops in Western Europe, and as to Soviet increases in strength, as we understand them, in the Far East.

Senator CAIN. General Marshall, is it not generally agreed that America and her Western European allies would become immediately involved in war if an aggressor occupied Berlin or any part of Western to do it, but I want to pose it to you.

Secretary MARSHALL. I would assume so.

Senator CAIN. I seem to recall, General Marshall, that Russia publicly protested against our sending American divisions to join the North Atlantic Treaty International Army. Did the Russians not state that this act by us increased the possibility of war in Europe?

Secretary MARSHALL. I do not recall the exact wording of the statement, but I think that was the general effect.

Senator CAIN. My memory seems to tell me that Russia protested the establishment of our airlift to Berlin.

Secretary MARSHALL. Very specifically.

Senator CAIN. Has Russia, General Marshall, to your knowledge ever protested against our considering the need for bombing military installations which are being employed by our present enemy, Red China, in Manchuria or China?

Secretary MARSHALL. I do not recall that specific allegation or statement in regard to that, but I think there has been a great deal that has come out through Pravda and others as to American aggression, imperialistic effort.

Senator CAIN. But as the Secretary of Defense you know of no official protest that Russia has lodged either with our Government or with the United Nations?

Secretary MARSHALL. I don't recall such.

RELATIVE THREAT OF RUSSIAN INTERVENTION IN EUROPE AND FAR EAST

Senator CAIN. General Marshall, you have gone over this ground quite a number of times. If you care to recapitulate in just a sentence or two, I would appreciate it.

What are your fundamental reasons for assuming that an aggression will not take place in Western Europe until we are better prepared to meet it, while seemingly you believe that Russia will enter the Korean conflict if we bomb and destroy military installations possessed by the Red Chinese?

I ask this question in part because it has seemed apparent to me for some time that Russia could presently, today, defeat any forces which might be opposed to her in Western Europe.

Secretary MARSHALL. In regard to Western Europe, first I go on the basis myself that Russia may step into the aggression at any moment. Also that that is no argument that we do not do our best to prepare for it even though it may take 2 or 3 years.

In other words, we don't sit impotent and say Russia can act at any time and therefore we do nothing. That is the sense of the European situation, and those arguments came up in connection with the rearmament proposals.

They came to me in some cases direct because I was called in to testify, though I was not then in the Government in respect to specific office.

I felt that we could never follow any such course as that, to just say we can do nothing because they can intervene, and again you had other involvements, other possibilities to consider which I have already referred to.

Now I will try to be brief again in regard to the difference I think in the situation in the Far East, and it is this in the main: that Russia possesses a very valuable ally in China. That you might say is a Russian protectorate in a sense, but one who is paying a great bill of human lives and other things in order to fulfill that role.

Now in view of their treaty with the Chinese Communist regime or government, if it appears that they have failed to support that government in its fight in Korea, we have a very special situation because it affects every other satellite of the Soviet Government.

They get their example from that, and to use the common expression in this country, that they have been sold down the river after a great sacrifice of life, so it has seemed to me and my associates and advisers that we are confronted by a Soviet Government in a very difficult position itself as to what it does in relation to the failure up to the present time of the Chinese Communist forces to drive us out of Korea.

IMPORTANCE OF SOVIET-CHINESE TREATY

Senator CAIN. I thought, sir, the other day you testified with reference to the treaty that you did not know very much about it?

Secretary MARSHALL. I read into the record the two pertinent sections.

Senator CAIN. My interpretation of that treaty was that it ran between Russia and China and was directed at a militaristic Japan in the future, or an imperialistic Japan in the future.

Secretary MARSHALL. It ran directly to what?

Senator CAIN. To the Japanese question and not even by implication, as I read it, to the Korean question.

Secretary MARSHALL. It uses the expression "or any other nation or people."

Senator CAIN. Allies, yes, sir; assisting Japan.

Secretary MARSHALL. Assisting Japan.

Now, if you recall, they alleged several times that we had introduced Japanese into Korea.

Senator CAIN. I do so recall.

Secretary MARSHALL. And we felt that that was for the very purpose——

Senator CAIN. Of setting the stage?

Secretary MARSHALL. Setting the stage for the very actions we have been concerned about.

Now here are the exact—it uses the word "rebirth of Japanese imperialism"; that is in it. But "violation of the peace," and they say

we have violated the peace, that it was not aggression or invasion of Korea. But we are all familiar with that business.

But it has a very pertinent relation to the possible Soviet interpretation of this treaty, certainly the instructions to their own people. [Reading:]

The violation of the peace on the part of Japan or any other State which should unite with Japan directly or indirectly in acts of aggression.

That gives them a very wide latitude in view of some of their perversions of the facts in the past.

Senator CAIN. Yes, sir. You do not then put very much credence in the belief held by some that Russia might be very strongly inclined to let China and the United States wage war against each other to the further weakening of both powers, and by that means leaving Russia in a far stronger position even than she is today.

Secretary MARSHALL. I would qualify that as to the weakening of China, but I would say that the Soviet Government would be perfectly ruthless in its relationship to China in the matter if the Chinese could continue to embroil us in a general action out there which would weaken our general position.

GAIN IN STRENGTH SINCE JUNE 1950

Senator CAIN. As a result of your testimony on Thursday I read a large headline in the Washington Daily News, which went like this—"United States not strong enough to risk war—Marshall." Does that reasonably well represent your view, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary MARSHALL. Well, we certainly do not wish to risk war at any stage, and now in particular when we haven't yet developed our strength.

Senator CAIN. General Marshall, are we and our allies not stronger today than we were last June when the Korean conflict began?

Secretary MARSHALL. Certainly we are materially stronger, because in the period of 6 months we doubled the strength of personnel in the Army alone in that time, and that is a very rapid development. But we haven't had an opportunity for this all to crystallize into the means to be employed, nor have we been able to obtain the matériel which is an essential part of our defense.

Now, as to allies, they have moved at a very slow pace until our reaction to the Korean affair, and that stimulated and accelerated, brought to a head in an effective manner the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

EFFECTIVENESS OF UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO EUROPE

Senator CAIN. I understand, sir, that since VJ-day we have spent roughly a hundred billion dollars for our own defense and that of our allies. I do not know how much money or what amount of matériel and arms we have provided our North Atlantic allies with since the Korean War began. It must, however, be a very large figure and amount of supplies.

Do you know to what extent our assistance in western Europe in the last 10 or 11 months has added to the state of defense preparation of our allies in western Europe?

Secretary MARSHALL. I would have to get you the data. I remember the last paper I looked at about a month ago showed that about 50 percent of the product of the first appropriation in the rearmament had been shipped in goods to Europe. The others were more long term items and there was a question, once, in one particular instance which I would not care to publicize, where the thought was—that the demands exceeded the capacity to digest it.

Senator CAIN. General Marshall, have you reason to know that there are today more combat divisions among our allies in western Europe than there were 10 months ago?

Secretary MARSHALL. I will have to get you the actual figures on that.

Senator CAIN. Thank you, sir.

Secretary MARSHALL. I know what it was to be——

Senator CAIN. But you do not know whether it has so become?

Secretary MARSHALL. Well, it is a question of how you evaluate the particular unit, whether you call it really an effective division, or not; and that is what General Eisenhower has been in the process of determining, and has not yet reported to us in detail.

Senator CAIN. I can think of no more important answer, because it is against that answer that we, in the Congress, must devise plans for the future.

PRESENT RISKS IN ADDITION TO THOSE EXISTING IN JUNE 1950

General Marshall, please, if you will, sir, define the hazards and the risks which are present today, with reference to Korea, that were not present and recognizable last June?

This question is predicated on the fact that Russia and China are geographically situated today where they were last June; and that our Defense Establishment, and a good many of us in the Congress, were completely aware, last June, that Red Chinese forces were situated in considerable strength in Manchuria, and that other Red forces could easily be transported to that area.

What about the risks, today, that were not recognized last June, when we entered this conflict?

Secretary MARSHALL. Well, of course I would have to very carefully evaluate what we thought last June, because I not only was not in that, but was very remote from it.

Senator CAIN. I am going to get into that question, sir, because I seek to find out, as an American citizen, whether we thought, last June——

Secretary MARSHALL. The Chiefs of Staff can answer you as to that, sir.

Senator CAIN. Thank you, sir.

General Marshall, we have been told in the press that there are far more than a half-million Red Chinese deployed today in North Korea.

Would you tell us from what areas these troops are being supplied?

Secretary MARSHALL. I would have to question the Chiefs of Staff on that. I can give it to you roughly, but I don't think it would be accurate.

Senator CAIN. Thank you, sir.

POSSIBLE EFFECTIVENESS OF BOMBING MANCHURIA

General Marshall, in a colloquy with Senator Hickenlooper on Thursday, the subject of bombing Red Chinese bases come up. You said this:

At the present time, in the opinion of my military advisers, and my own, the ground forces of the Allies have suffered in a rather remote way from our failure to do the bombing that you have just referred to.

I fail, sir, to see either logic or reason in this reply.

If those supply depots had been destroyed by bombing, how would the Chinese Reds now be maintaining more than a half-million troops in North Korea?

Secretary MARSHALL. The destruction of those supply bases, and all would depend, in its effectiveness, on the keeping interrupted the railroads and all, coming down from Manchuria, across the Yalu, into Korea.

Now, we have been bombing the bridges and the tunnels in Korea, and the supplies come on down the road.

Where unlimited manpower is available, there is a very quick repair in such matters; but when you are——

Senator CAIN. What do you mean by that, "when limited manpower is available?"

Secretary MARSHALL. Unlimited manpower.

Senator CAIN. I beg your pardon, sir.

Secretary MARSHALL. The repairs are very quickly made.

I remember, in discussing the bombing of airfields in China, by us, during the war, they said it was hardly worth the effort, that the hordes of Chinese were carried in by the Japanese, and all the holes filled up in a matter of an hour or two, and things were back to where they were before, and it was a question of whether this particular effort was justified, except as a momentary interruption.

However, in reference to my reply to Senator Hickenlooper, as to the remote way——

Senator CAIN. That phrase.

Secretary MARSHALL. It is a two-way road there, which I had in mind, because we have been spared a great deal because we haven't set up a bombing air war.

Now, I stated my own intense interest, and the recommendation of the Chiefs of Staff, for air action across the Yalu at the time of this very serious build-up of Chinese Communist forces in Korea, which General MacArthur very graphically pictured as the way they were rolling down the road and coming across the bridges of the Yalu, and our close distance from the Yalu gave our planes almost no room in which to operate.

Now, we dropped the pressure on the issue when the situation entirely changed, and when we were far back, several hundred miles from the Yalu.

Senator CAIN. Do you mind if I interrupt?

You say we dropped the pressure when we were——

Secretary MARSHALL. I am talking about the hot pursuit.

Senator CAIN. When we had retired.

Secretary MARSHALL. When we got within about 200 miles back and we had that distance in which to operate against their communications.

Senator CAIN. Yes, sir.

FACTORS CONSIDERED IN DECIDING AGAINST BOMBING MANCHURIAN BASES
AND RASHIN

Secretary MARSHALL. But in relation to the period when we were aggressively trying to force our allies into an agreement, we—meaning the Chiefs of Staff—got into other discussions which were rather opposing this procedure for the reason that we didn't want any risk of retaliatory bombing on our bridgehead, beachhead, on the northeastern coast of Korea where our losses might have been terrific in shipping and evacuation,

[Deleted.]

Secretary MARSHALL. We had a very compact target, the ships tied up to the docks, a very vulnerable target, and we could have been done considerable harm.

We went ahead with our effort to get action to meet the situation on the Yalu, but we realized as we talked about it that we might get into deep trouble in this beachhead where we were evacuating. It is on the northeastern coast.

[Deleted.]

Senator CAIN. I hope, sir, you will not think I am burdening the record or you. I do not pretend to be a soldier of any capacity, but I have spent many days in the field, and I am asking these questions in an effort, a deep effort, to understand what we are doing.

Secretary MARSHALL. I may suggest, Senator, that you can get very direct responses to these from the Chiefs of Staff, because they did the elaborate discussion, and they came in with the recommendations.

Senator CAIN. But the theory and the subject of logistics is one over which you have been an acknowledged authority for a good part of your life, sir.

General Marshall, it seems to me logical to assume that thousands and thousands of enemy forces have been maintained in Korea because they have been supplied from Rashin. General MacArthur said of Rashin:

It is the great central distributing point from Manchuria down the east coast of Korea. Its usefulness to the enemy is self-evident. Great accumulations, depot accumulations, were made there. End of his quotation.

Now, I am just assuming that is a military estimate of a situation made in a theater of operations by officers who were on the ground.

How, then, do you reconcile this military estimate, which was concurred in by General Stratemeyer, with your statement of the other day that our Ground Forces have suffered in a rather remote way from our failure to bomb enemy supply sources?

Secretary MARSHALL. Senator, if you will propound that question to the Chiefs of Staff, they will tell you exactly why they came up with the recommendation that we should not bomb Rashin.

Senator CAIN. Thank you, sir.

PRESSURES FOR ECONOMIC AND NAVAL BLOCKADE

General Marshall, my understanding of the requirements of a military campaign is that forces cannot fight without being supplied in the field with weapons, food, ammunition, and clothing. If the Chinese

Reds were prevented from supplying their forces in the field, to my mind, the war in Korea would soon be over.

Against this truism, have I not understood you to testify that you have been and are today strongly in support of an effective naval and economic blockade of China?

Secretary MARSHALL. Correct, sir.

Senator CAIN. General Marshall, you have testified that you could only comment on the effectiveness of our economic blockade of China. You said that you knew very little about what other nations were doing to establish an economic blockade of Red China. Did I understand you correctly?

Secretary MARSHALL. I think I added to it something in regard to the supplies going to the port of Hong Kong, specifically rubber.

Senator CAIN. Yes; but you said you were not very familiar with what steps our allies were taking to impose an economic blockade of their own on Red China.

Secretary MARSHALL. I was not familiar with what steps they were taking because they weren't taking the steps that we thought were necessary.

Senator CAIN. What we are trying to get at is: Who in our Government is driving in hope that our allies will take the same sort of steps that we are taking, because of your testimony that an effective naval and economic blockade of China would result possibly in the end of the war and certainly in minimizing the loss of life to which our forces are exposed every day in the week.

Secretary MARSHALL. That is carried on through the State Department and I also added in my statement the other day here on May 7 we had gotten the agreement with the British and the French which was the most important agreement to get through the necessary resolution to the United Nations.

Senator CAIN. Thank you, sir. Here is a question which perhaps you will suggest I should ask of the Secretary of State. I will be glad to do it, but I want to pose it to you.

BRITISH CHANGE OF VIEW ON ECONOMIC BLOCKADE

You have said in your testimony that Great Britain is giving some present consideration to joining with us to impose an economic and naval blockade on China. I have reason to believe that this is a contrary position to one the British have held for months. I must read this short passage.

On Monday, April 9, only a little over a month ago, Sir Gladwyn Jebb, Britain's chief representative to the United Nations, spoke before a large American audience in San Francisco on a day when I was there. In that speech Jebb warned against the danger of any military action, air raids or naval blockades against China as inevitably leading to unlimited war, nor he said did he favor imposing sanctions on China for fear they might be dangerous, doubled-edged or merely useless. End of the reference to Jebb.

It seems fantastic to this American, General Marshall, that a chief representative of one of our chief allies should so firmly oppose before an American audience your views as given to this committee as Secretary of Defense and as a member of the National Security Council.

Please tell us again what positive steps are being taken today to get Great Britain and the rest of our allies in agreement on the need for a complete economic and naval blockade of Red China.

Secretary MARSHALL. Well, as you suggested, that is a question for the State Department, but they have been pressing in every way. They have to get an action, formal action by the United Nations in connection with it, and as I just said, on May 7 the United Kingdom and France indicated they were now prepared to support a resolution introduced by the United States for an international embargo against Communist China. There has been a change of view.

Senator CAIN. Thank you, sir. General Marshall, I suppose we agree that the Allied forces have been confronted by two different kinds of wars since our forces were first committed in Korea.

MEASURES TO MEET PRESENT SITUATION IN KOREA

As I understand it, the first war began in June against the North Korean aggressor, and ended in late November when the Chinese Reds committed their forces across the Yalu River. The second war finds us at war with the North Koreans and with the Red Chinese.

Will you explain for the benefit of this committee what we are doing to win the second war that we did not do and employ in practically winning the first war? What I am getting at is, is our general plan today what it was when we were confronted with an entirely different situation last June?

Secretary MARSHALL. I would say it is not, for the reason that at that time we possessed forces of sufficient strength and of competence to destroy the North Korean Army, and General MacArthur did destroy it.

[Deleted.]

Senator CAIN. Thank you, sir.

On March 28, 1951 the New York Times said this:

WORSENING OF WORLD SITUATION

General Marshall declared today that he was astonished at the relaxation in public and congressional support for a long-term defense effort. Deploring emotional reaction to day to day events, General Marshall observed that the Soviet Union's activities covered the globe. In his opinion he said the world situation was now more serious than last November.

You did not at that time, sir, clarify your remark about how the world crisis had worsened. I wonder if you would care to do so now, and I will appreciate your opinion as to whether the world situation is more serious or less serious than it was last March.

Secretary MARSHALL. Last March?

Senator CAIN. That is when you make this comment, sir, in a news conference, the first, I think, you held, after you became the Secretary of Defense.

Secretary MARSHALL. Are you referring, when you say last March, to the change of the situation between last March and now? My statement was made in March.

Senator CAIN. Yes, sir.

Secretary MARSHALL. In reference to November—

Senator CAIN. And you said that the world situation was in March worse than it was in last November.

Secretary MARSHALL. That is correct, sir.

Senator CAIN. And I wonder, in your opinion——

Secretary MARSHALL. And just a few minutes ago I answered that.

Senator CAIN. I thank you, sir.

REQUEST FOR ESTIMATE OF MILITARY SITUATION IN FAR EAST BEFORE
DECISION TO HELP SOUTH KOREA

General Marshall, you have suggested that no request was made of the Department of Defense or of the Far East Command for an estimate of the military situation before the United Nations resolved to employ military force to stop the aggressor in Korea. Is my impression concerning this a correct one?

Secretary MARSHALL. I will have to ask you to state it again, because I don't recall——

Senator CAIN. Thank you. I read rapidly in the hope that you may have time saved, sir, thereby.

You have suggested in all of your testimony, which began last Monday, that no request was made of the Department of Defense or of the Far East Command for an estimate of the military situation before the United Nations resolved to employ military force to stop the aggressor in Korea.

Secretary MARSHALL. I didn't recall that I stated that, sir, because I was not connected with the Department at that time, and the exact maneuvers, diplomatic and otherwise, that took place in regard to the decision to go into Korea, I only knew from reading the messages from General MacArthur.

Senator CAIN. That is to say, General Marshall, in your capacity as Secretary of Defense, you do not know whether a military opinion was requested of either our Defense Establishment or of General MacArthur's command in the Far East prior to the decision of the United Nations to commit American forces in Korea?

Secretary MARSHALL. I would say, Senator, that I could look into the records and see, but I was not an actor at the time.

Senator CAIN. Thank you, sir.

I had better ask those several questions then directly of one or more of the JCS.

COMMUNISM IN ARMED FORCES

General Marshall, in your opinion, are there today any considerable number of Communists in the officer corps of our Army, Navy, or Air Force?

Secretary MARSHALL. I don't know of any, sir.

Senator CAIN. What action would you take if you found Communists within our Armed Forces, particularly in its officer corps?

Secretary MARSHALL. I think there is a prescribed action in connection with loyalty tests and matters of that sort, which I cannot quote offhand.

Senator CAIN. Well, you are certain, sir, that if Communists were found among the officer corps, that they would summarily be dismissed from the service?

Secretary MARSHALL. Within our recourse to law in the manner of doing it.

Senator CAIN. Do you, General Marshall, out of your wide experience, see any difference between Russian, Chinese, and American Communists?

Secretary MARSHALL. My own reaction is that the Chinese Communist leadership is identical with the Soviet Communists, and these groups in America, as far as I obtain from the press, and what I got while I was Secretary of State, have the same objectives and employ different means, according to the circumstances.

Senator CAIN. Are those objectives the total destruction of free institutions and control of them on the face of the earth?

Secretary MARSHALL. I am not quite so certain as to that, but I do feel absolutely certain it is the complete domination——

Senator CAIN. Of the world?

Secretary MARSHALL (continuing.) Of the world.

MARSHALL TESTIMONY IN 1946 ON MILITARY MISSION TO CHINA

Senator CAIN. General Marshall, would you explain to the committee what you had in mind in June of 1946 when you strongly urged the passage of H. R. 6795, which was designed to amalgamate the Chinese Communists and Nationalist army, in a letter supporting this bill, where you said,

Without passage of the bill the President and myself would lack authorization to carry out a phase of American policy toward China which appears vital to the success of our announced policy. The President, under the terms of the bill, will have the authority to proceed at his discretion in accordance with the situation toward the establishment by the Chinese of unified or national defense forces to include in its leadership both Communists and leadership——

Secretary MARSHALL. What was the bill?

Senator CAIN. The bill, sir, was this: A bill to provide military advice and assistance to the Republic of China; to aid in the modernizing of its armed forces for the fulfillment of obligations which may devolve upon it.

Secretary MARSHALL. I understand what the bill is.

Senator CAIN. The date of this testimony, at which your letter was read, was June 14, 1946.

Just what were we trying to get at when we, in America, were insisting that Communist and Nationalist Chinese leadership be amalgamated within the future armies of China?

Secretary MARSHALL. The bill, as I recall, referred to the establishment of an Army mission to Japan, isn't that correct?

Senator CONNALLY. China.

Senator CAIN. Did he say Japan? He meant China.

This is what the Secretary of State said in support of your letter with reference to the bill. He was answering a question apparently by Mr. Eaton.

Senator LODGE. What is the date of that?

Senator CAIN. June 14, 1946, Senator.

What General Marshall was asked to do, and agreed to do, and what is necessary to be done, is that when the plan for the amalgamation of the two armies is accepted and begins to go into effect, those units of the Communist Army which are going to be amalgamated within the Nationalist Army will receive a period of training from 60 to 90 days before they march out to join their opposite numbers in the other army.

Secretary MARSHALL. I recall now what the issue is.

Senator CAIN. Yes.

SITUATION IN CHINA AT THAT TIME

Secretary MARSHALL. Under the political consultative conference recommendation, which was agreed to by all concerned, there was to be a demobilization of the Nationalist Army from some 400 divisions more or less, to 50, and on the Communist side, from a million and a half troops to 10 divisions—in others words, 60 divisions in all.

Now it was found in this committee, to which I was the adviser by reason of this arrangement which the Chinese had entered into among themselves, that when we tried to establish a rate of demobilization—and it had to be a comparative rate—between the Nationalist divisions and the Communist divisions, that we had no measure of organization or set-up in a very formal way in connection with the Communist forces. They did not have definite divisional organizations; they had very little artillery; they had no specific unit except in a few cases that was a division. And they were unwilling to accept any set-up of comparative demobilization rates, we thought, because they had no organized unit of that character as the basis of such a procedure.

Now it was thought that with the setting up of this military mission of ours to the Nationalist Government in China that one of its subsidiary functions would be to try to get this force of the Communists in such a shape that we could amalgamate the units and demobilize the rest.

Roughly, at a certain stage, which was about a year later than the initiation of the maneuver, there were to be two Nationalist divisions and one Communist division in certain armies, they call them—we call them army corps—and in others there were to be two Communist divisions and one Nationalist division. That amalgamation would not have occurred for about a year.

Now in the first place, this was the normal request to get legal authority other than the President's war power to set up this mission, which the Navy had already gotten; and at the same time we wanted to have it so written that we could bring in these additional men which we needed for about 60 days or something like that to get this Communist group in a form that we could bring them in and amalgamate them with the others.

The whole thing, the whole procedure was in accordance with this agreed program between the Nationalist Government and the Communist regime as to the exact procedure to be followed in reducing the troops.

Senator CAIN. Well, I think it is just a statement of fact that all of us have learned a very great deal in recent years with reference to the general subject and objectives of communism.

Secretary MARSHALL. I think you have to have in mind that we had the Soviets as our allies during the war, and we have now a question of something—whether it was a civil war or whether it was something more far-reaching.

Senator CAIN. This bill which did not become law, and which was supported strongly by our Government, simply meant that in 1946 there was no deep-seated recognition on our part that you simply can not mix Communists and free leadership. We thought it was possible.

Is it fair to ask you, sir, that if this proposition were presently before us, or was before us immediately before the Korean conflict

that there would have been any desire on our part to encourage an amalgamation of Nationalist and Chinese Communists armies in China?

Secretary MARSHALL. No, sir. We reached a point where—well, you couldn't mediate; that is the reason I left. And later on we did away with our executive headquarters there for the conduct of cease-fire procedure and abandoned any effort along that line.

Senator CAIN. I ask that question not as any point of criticism but to show how rapidly this world is moving.

Chairman RUSSELL. Did you complete your statement, General?

Secretary MARSHALL. I think I will drop it. Yes.

CHANGES IN KOREA MISSION BETWEEN JUNE 1950 AND NOW

Senator CAIN. General Marshall, have we reason to believe that the Allied mission in Korea is a different mission today than it was for several months after war began last June?

Secretary MARSHALL. I am sorry, I can't answer that offhand. I should be able to, but I can't.

Senator CAIN. Permit me to help if I may.

You testified the other day—I have the words down somewhere—that our mission in Korea when we undertook it—

Secretary MARSHALL. I recall that.

Senator CAIN. Was to make of Korea, I use the phrase, free, united, and self-controlled. I think you used independent, unified, and democratic.

Secretary MARSHALL. Yes.

Senator CAIN. Has that original mission been changed?

Secretary MARSHALL. That is what I am sorry I can't give you the answer to.

Senator CAIN. Do you think, sir—I offer this without criticism but I want to get the facts—that the following comment from the President of the United States on October 10, 1950, is a correct statement of fact?—The President said with reference to General MacArthur:

His mission has been to repeal aggression and to restore international peace and security in the area as called for by the United Nations.

In your opinion is that a correct statement of fact?

Secretary MARSHALL. I think it is, sir.

Senator CAIN. Thank you. Do you think this comment from Ambassador Austin, offered to the General Assembly of the United Nations, on October 6, 1950, is a correct statement of fact?

In June and July of this year the Security Council gave all the necessary military authority to the United Nations' commander to repel the aggressor army and restore peace in Korea.

Secretary MARSHALL. I think he is referring to movements north of the thirty-eighth parallel, and I do not think he is referring to air bombing.

Senator CAIN. No, sir. He is referring, as I understand it, to General MacArthur having possessed sufficient authority to win the first war against the North Koreans, which was concluded as of the time the Chinese Reds entered a new conflict. My own impression is that that is a correct statement as of the time he gave it in October of 1950.

Secretary MARSHALL. I should think so.

Senator CAIN. General Marshall, does the United Nations commander possess "all the necessary military authority to repel the aggressor army and restore peace in Korea"?

Secretary MARSHALL. Except as to air action. [Deleted.]

Senator CAIN. It would include a sufficient number of troops within that authority to carry out his mission to repel the aggressor, sir?

Secretary MARSHALL. The authority is not a question of the number of troops. The shipment of troops to him doesn't change the policy.

Senator CAIN. General Marshall, if the United Nations commander does not now possess the necessary military power to carry out his stated mission to repel the enemy in Korea, must we not then logically conclude that the Korean mission has been changed? That is to say we are no longer presently attempting to force the aggressor out of Korea; we have changed our posture. In other words, we are now resisting, where for a long time we were determined to repel attack.

Secretary MARSHALL. For a long time our purpose was to halt the aggression and to destroy the cause of the action, which was the North Korean Army.

Senator CAIN. Right, sir.

Secretary MARSHALL. At the present time the method of destroying the cause of it has changed.

Senator CAIN. Thank you, sir.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Senator Cain, would it be possible to have read General Marshall's answer to your previous question on that subject?

Senator CAIN. Certainly, sir.

(Whereupon the record was read by the reporter.)

PRESIDENT'S SPEECH OF OCTOBER 24, 1950

Senator CAIN. General Marshall, I hope you will reflect on the following paragraph which the President used in a speech before the General Assembly on October 24. The title of his speech was "A New Page in History." In it the President stated these things as being true—and to me this is the crux of the whole dilemma which surrounds the free world right now.

In uniting to crush the aggression in Korea these member nations have done no more than the Charter called for. But the important thing is that they have done it, and they have done it successfully.

They have given dramatic evidence that the Charter works. They have proved that the Charter is a living instrument backed by the material and moral strength of members both large and small.

In your opinion why did the President—make no reference to him as a person, that is not intended—say these things last October when they are so totally contrary to the facts of today? And I draw particularly your attention to these two comments:

United to crush the aggressor—
and that—

contributions both moral and material are being provided by all the free members of the United Nations,

and those comments were made last October.

Secretary MARSHALL. Will you read the first part of your question? I don't mean the present statement.

Senator CAIN. In your opinion why did the President say these things last October with such conviction when these things are so totally contrary to the facts of today?

Secretary MARSHALL. They were evidenced by the facts of the period of which he was talking about, and in the language of the messages from General MacArthur, an entirely new situation had developed, in one way which had developed and in another way which had not.

It was another effort to do the same thing, first by the North Koreans that failed, now by the Chinese Communist forces.

Senator CAIN. Well, there was a great hope and a great inspiration in what our Chief Executive said last October. How very, very far as we have slid backward on the basis of the facts from what we thought was possible to be true just a few short months ago.

General Marshall, in thinking about Korea and about possible and likely future acts of aggression, I ask you, if you will, to comment briefly on the following quotation from the same speech in which the President said:

UNITED NATIONS CONTRIBUTIONS TO KOREAN WAR

To maintain the peace the United Nations must be able to learn the facts about any threat of aggression. It must be able to call quickly upon the member nations to act if the threat becomes serious. Above all, the peace-loving nations must have the military strength available when called upon to act decisively to put down aggression.

Have you any solid reasons to offer on or off the record—I care not which—why the many members of the United Nations failed so completely in 10 months of war, and against that beautiful declaration of the President 4 months after the war began, to satisfy the requirements of the war in Korea?

[Deleted.]

Senator CAIN. Mr. Secretary, I wrote this question, and therefore I will read it as I wrote it, but I think now, against what you have just said, part of it is not necessary.

It seems clear to me that either the United Nations or the United States can be charged with a serious lack of leadership in the last 10 months. After 10 months of war, 14 out of 55 free nations have contributed any forces to Korea.

I spent, sir, all of last August and July in Europe, last summer; I wanted to get an answer as to why people weren't contributing more to a war which belonged to them as well as to my country.

There was no evidence during that period of any kind—and I went to every official source in every country in Europe—that our American Government was encouraging the governments of our allies to participate in the Korean War.

There was likewise little evidence that these governments were even thinking about the question.

You are about as well qualified as anyone I can think of to reflect on the question of why we have done, collectively, so little in 10 months, to crush an enemy who is determined to crush and destroy our forces.

[Deleted.]

Secretary MARSHALL. I could not give you any answer that you couldn't get out of the information you generally have, in the press from these various countries, as to their feelings, their all agreeing to

the principles of collective action, and afraid, here and there, of this consequence or that consequence; and also of their political, we will say, inability to meet the issue.

I imagine that is a very great factor in various countries.

Senator CAIN. It is, sir.

Secretary MARSHALL. We had some tragic examples of that, particularly when Mr. Stimson was Secretary of State; and we had the birth of the First World War, and the political repercussions; general public support or influence discredited, practically, what he was proposing, and that applied to some of the greatest countries in the world at that time.

Senator CAIN. Thank you, sir.

Against what you have just said concerning political uncertainties throughout the world, and particularly among some of our allies, and about fear in general, let me ask this question, purely personal:

ANTICIPATION OF FUTURE EVENTS

I see no reason, Mr. Secretary, why we should fail to face up to mistakes, and refuse to recognize mistakes when they are made. It seems to me that it is reasonable to believe and admit, publicly, so that we can get on a more positive course of action, that the United Nations had absolutely no understanding of what it was undertaking when it resolved to crush the Korean aggressor last June.

Against everything you have said, there couldn't have been any evaluation of what was likely to happen, or else the United Nations simply weren't prepared to undertake it.

We have undertaken something that, up to date, is beyond our capacity to master, or so it seems to me.

Secretary MARSHALL. Well, I get the implication from the form of the question that unless we could see the way clear to the end, at the very start, we should do nothing.

I cannot agree with that.

Also, I think everyone must recognize that when you once start a military action, it sets up a chain of reactions, and it is pretty difficult to tell exactly where that is going to end.

We have had a great many examples of that in history.

Senator CAIN. That is why I asked that question some few minutes ago: What are the hazards present today that were not recognized last June; because to me, the trap we found ourselves in was an obvious possibility from the very moment on the 25th of June that our Government committed American forces to that area of conflict.

Secretary MARSHALL. As I have said before, I was not an actor in the Government at that time, but I should say you were faced with a situation where you just established before the world that you would not protect any country which has set up a really and truly democratic country, under our assistance and attendance, at the accouchement, and let all the world see, and the smaller nations in particular, that they would sink without any support from us.

Senator CAIN. General Marshall, it is my own view that the choice of decision lies much more fully with our enemies today than it lies with us.

Secretary MARSHALL. That is very much the case.

ADVISABILITY OF ADVERTISING OUR INTENTIONS TO ENEMY

Senator CAIN. As a military man of great experience, you have testified that we should not authentically tell the enemy anything. I enjoyed your use of the word "authentically." I remembered it sufficiently well to write it down.

May I ask you, sir, if the Department of Defense wrote any part of the President's speech of April 11 in which he advised the enemy that the free forces have no intention of bombing Manchuria or China or permitting the Chinese Nationalist troops to be engaged against their countrymen, who are our enemies?

Secretary MARSHALL. I don't recall, sir. We generally are called upon to send somebody from the Defense Department to the White House to see—to participate in, at least, the revision or the drafting of any speech.

Senator CAIN. As a military man of great experience, do you approve of the declarations of intention which the Chief Executive stated to the enemy on April 11 in which he advised the enemy of what we were not going to do in the future?

Secretary MARSHALL. That is a question of judgment as to what result they were attempting to get at in connection with that matter. That is a considered statement, and not an accidental disclosure, and just exactly what was the purpose of that, I have not discussed with the President, so I cannot answer it.

Senator CAIN. Your answer is interesting to me, because you are the chief military adviser to the President of the United States, and that the President, now or in the future, should decide to advise the enemy of adopting a military course of action without consultation with his Secretary of Defense is completely beyond my comprehension, sir.

Secretary MARSHALL. I stated that we had a representative, I assume, at the White House at the time that speech was drafted, to bring—

Senator CAIN. You so stated, sir, but you did not state that whoever your representative was took up the question of the advisability of such a declaration being made to our enemy.

Secretary MARSHALL. Well, he came back undoubtedly from the White House to consider with our people in the Defense Department; I don't recall the specific issue being brought to me personally.

Senator CAIN. Thank you.

General Marshall, the United Nations has repeatedly stated its determination to put out any fire of aggression which is started by any aggressor anywhere.

As the Secretary of Defense, as a military man, do you approve of offering this sort of advise to our potential enemies?

Secretary MARSHALL. I would rather not comment on that, sir.

Senator CAIN. All right, sir.

I think it is important because we have set up a determination in terms of words which, in terms of fire power, we have not been able to accomplish in the first test of our determination.

It seems to me, sir, that this type of declaration has added substantially to the enemy's power of decision.

Do you not think that these declarations permit an enemy to choose his own time and place for an aggression? I think you can answer that one, if you will, sir.

Secretary MARSHALL. Well, I would say that they don't restrict his choice of the time and place. He is aware of most of those, in the first place, and he is now being told in this particular instance that we will resist in any region. How we'll resist is another matter, of course.

For example, we have the Communist effort to dominate Indochina. Now, how do we participate there? The French are carrying out the main resistance; we are providing matériel; we are providing planes and transportation to that extent, and we have other provisions that I cannot mention.

PREPAREDNESS TO STOP AGGRESSION

Senator CAIN. General Marshall, these are two brief questions. Perhaps, you will think they are repetitious, in which event you will just pass them by.

Do you not believe as a military strategist that it is unwise to, for the free nations, say that they are going to stop aggression unless they are prepared to do so?

Secretary MARSHALL. You are now, I think, Senator, getting involved in or involving me, rather, in a debate as to—

Senator CAIN. I have no intention of doing that, sir.

Secretary MARSHALL. I mean involving me in a debate as to the wisdom of certain procedures and declarations, and to their possible effects. It may be a very deliberate intention to create a certain impression, and I would have to sit down and analyze each one with some care.

Senator CAIN. Now, I would prefer to ask that question when the Secretary of State comes here.

Secretary MARSHALL. These all amount to a phase of psychological warfare. Maybe it is not a wise phase; maybe you don't agree with that, but I could not offhand reply.

Senator CAIN. Well, we Americans of both parties at this table are trying, with the help of so many distinguished and qualified witnesses, to determine what is the wise course of action to pursue in the future.

Frim my limited background and knowledge, brainpower, I think the free nations are on very unsound grounds in some of the declarations they have made, because they have not, in practice, been able to live up to their declarations.

KNOWLEDGE OF ATOMIC BOMB STRENGTH

Senator CAIN. You testified, General Marshall, the other day, that you only know of our atom bomb strength through what you read in the press.

Secretary MARSHALL. No; I don't think I said that, sir.

Senator CAIN. I understood you to say that.

Secretary MARSHALL. That certainly would not be the case. Now, what is the question, sir?

Senator CAIN. I merely said that you testified that you know only of our atom bomb strength through what you read in the press.

I was merely going to ask you to whom should this committee turn for the fullest possible information we are entitled to have?

Secretary MARSHALL. I think there must be some misunderstanding of the statement. I don't recall that—

Senator CAIN. I would withdraw the question easily.

LIMITED WAR

General Marshall, as we move as rapidly as we can to a conclusion, how would you characterize the conflict in Korea? Is it, in your opinion, a police action or a war, and if it is a war, would you define it to be a large or a small war?

Secretary MARSHALL. I would characterize it as a limited war which I hope will remain limited.

ACCURACY OF CASUALTY FIGURES

Senator CAIN. General Marshall, I read daily in the press that our forces can practically calculate to the individual how many casualties they inflict on the enemy.

In a couple of newspapers in front of me, there are 51 chances out of 52, that I could open it up and see where on yesterday some authoritative source in the Far East said that we killed 5,000 or 4,083. They are very specific.

No reference has been made, however, in recent weeks to my knowledge, to American or Allied casualties.

Would you tell us, as a military man, how we can be so accurate with reference to the enemy, while taking so much time to evaluate our own losses? I believe, sir, that my Nation would be more anxious about the Korean War, and treat it much more realistically if our casualties, rather than those of the enemy, were in the headlines of every American paper every day.

Secretary MARSHALL. As to the delay, Senator, the first factor is we wait until the next of kin have been notified.

Senator CAIN. Notified.

Secretary MARSHALL. As to the—I think there are pretty regular announcements of casualties.

Senator CAIN. Well, I personally have not seen them in the daily press recently.

Secretary MARSHALL. There are weekly announcements in detail.

As to accuracy, I will say this: While the snow was on the ground it was a comparatively easy matter to check. The aviator or an artilleryman or even the infantryman gave his estimates of what he had done, and then they went over the ground, if they didn't actually take it over by conquest, with these small planes, and actually counted the casualties.

For example, I know—I am just thinking of various instances when I was concerned with the same problem, in my mind as to the accuracy of the statement where, in one case, there was a battalion, or there was an action and it was fought, and it was thought that it was taken against some three-thousand-odd of the enemy, and they felt they had inflicted 1,100 casualties.

When they took over the ground they found 2,800 casualties.

They had another case that I can recall now at the moment of where in another battalion we had 7 killed and 22 wounded, and when they took over and counted, they had 300 enemy casualties.

They had another case where the Navy bombarded Wonsan, a port on the east coast of China, and later on they landed a group the way

they do from time to time, and they counted either 3,800 or 4,800 dead as a result of their catching these fellows in buildings. It was a concentration point.

Now, there we had exact figures, and there we had a confirmation of the previous estimates, and in most cases, the estimates were below what actually was discovered.

Now, here very recently in the last few days we had a highly exaggerated estimate by pilots as to the number of planes destroyed in one bombardment at Sinuiju. I think they said 35 planes; actually, the report finally came back to us from the photographs and others that one plane was destroyed and one damaged.

Well now, there is the check—all the point I am trying to make is—

Senator CAIN. Yes, sir.

Secretary MARSHALL. There is the check; and I think that the casualties inflicted have been far—have been considerably under the estimates for the reason that we don't pick up the wounded. We don't get that part.

They are all drawn off, as a rule, so under the old schedules of probabilities, which is not the case now—I don't know what the probability scale is now—it was four wounded to one killed.

Well, of course, if that were true, it would be a tremendous casualty list. I don't think that holds any more. I think it is probably almost one to one or two to one.

AMERICAN CASUALTIES IN KOREA

Senator CAIN. I raise the question partly because it seems to me we place an undue emphasis for public consumption on how many we are killing of the enemy, when I individually as an American, am much more concerned with how many Americans are being killed by the enemy.

Secretary MARSHALL. Well, there is a release that comes out every week. There is no holding back on that.

Senator CAIN. I did not so mean to imply.

Secretary MARSHALL. I have been very much interested as an important question with respect to the comparative rate of casualties from January, February, March, and April, as compared with the previous period of 6 months, if you consider the small June involvement as part of that period, although they had the heaviest proportions of losses incurred in those early days at the end of June.

Senator CAIN. Have our casualties, General Marshall, before the recent counteroffensive—

Chairman RUSSELL. General, did you finish that statement about casualties?

Secretary MARSHALL. I have something else. The rate of casualties per hundred men per week in the last 2 months is one quarter the rate during the period of June to August, and one-half the casualties of November and December.

Senator CAIN. What is the date from which you are reading, sir?

Secretary MARSHALL. Through May 4. This is a percentage rate which doesn't appeal to me much because it is a little difficult to understand.

I was trying to get a clear statement because it is not only of profound interest as to casualties, but it is of equally profound interest as to the extent to which we can conduct this operation against the Chinese without too serious an attrition on our own part.

Now the casualties per week per 100 starting back in June, June 25 to August 25 were 1.2 percent. In other words, the casualties of 100 men per week at that rate were 1.2 percent, and that, of course, includes large numbers in those days who were absent, unaccounted for, prisoners presumably.

From the 25th of August to the 23rd of September the casualties per 100 per week were 1.4 percent. September to October, 1 month, nine-tenths of a percent; October through November 17, three-tenths of a percent per 100 per week.

Now the 17th of November through the 15th of December there were six-tenths of 1 percent. You see, it is considerably lower than it was in June and August, but it is going up in connection with those heavy operations of that period.

From the 15th of December through the 12th of January there was seven-tenths of a percent out of 100 men per week. The 25th of January to the 9th of February two-tenths of 1 percent. That happened to be that very critical period, but it was critical in the sense that we had gotten into a position and they had not caught up with that position.

Senator CAIN. Those are all battle casualties, sir?

Secretary MARSHALL. Yes, sir; these are battle casualties.

Senator CAIN. You are not referring to theater illnesses and things of that character?

Secretary MARSHALL. No. From the 9th of February through the 9th of March five-tenths of a percent for every 100 men. From the 9th of March through the 6th of April three-tenths of 1 percent, and the 6th of April through May 4th, three-tenths of 1 percent, so we have had an average really from January through April of about three-tenths of a percent per 100 per week.

SICKNESS AND CASUALTIES

Senator CAIN. General Marshall, do you consider a casualty to be any individual who is killed or wounded or sick or hurt or lost in the combat area?

Secretary MARSHALL. That is this in terms of killed or wounded or missing, of course. Now what I had them go back and check carefully was whether the eliminations by serious frostbite were involved there, and they have yet to tell me, but they thought they were not in these figures.

Senator CAIN. That was the question that we had in mind.

Secretary MARSHALL. When it comes to the sick out of the campaign, I think they have always exceeded the casualty rate, but in most instances those men go back because it is a temporary situation, except that during the winter campaign those that were casualties by reason of frostbite, frozen feet in particular, and those that were casualties by reason of pneumonia, they did not go back because that would render them continuously susceptible to a return of the previous difficulty.

Senator CAIN. Well, when you get an answer to your question as to whether or not the frostbite and other sickness cases are included——

Secretary MARSHALL. I know the other sickness cases are not. I heard it was a possibility that maybe the frostbite was in this.

Senator CAIN. If it would not be inconvenient, I would appreciate your advice on this thing.

Just a few more questions, sir. The Senator from California has asked me to ask a question which I think is pertinent. Do these figures refer to the combat area or to the communications zone as well?

Secretary MARSHALL. This is the combat area.

Senator CAIN. That would be restricted to Korea itself?

Secretary MARSHALL. Korea itself, and I have not given you comparative casualties. I know at one state when I was checking up on the casualties of a month here rather recently, there were 99 percent Army and 1 percent combined Navy and Air.

Chairman RUSSELL. Where do you place the Marine Corps?

Secretary MARSHALL. Army and Marine Corps—ground troops.

EFFECT OF REMAINING IN KOREA OF CIVILIAN POPULATION

Senator CAIN. I have never been in Korea, sir. You have testified that we should give no consideration to withdrawing from Korea because in part it would expose the Koreans to assassination and destruction.

I share that view of yours that we shouldn't get out unless we have to. However, if we long continue our present policy of what appears to me to be containment in Korea, will the free forces through the use of their air, naval, and artillery power not largely destroy all of North Korea and the civilians who live in that tragic piece of real estate?

Secretary MARSHALL. I lost the question part of it at the end.

Senator CAIN. If we stay where we are in Korea without forcing a decision by military arms, is it not likely or is it not logical to assume that a few more months of this procedure will destroy the future usefulness of all of North Korea?

Secretary MARSHALL. Well, of course, that is a factor in this matter, particularly as we have had to be ruthless in destroying buildings which shelter the enemy and conceal them from our view.

As to the hydroelectric plants and installations of that character, we have kept, we haven't bombed them out in most instances because their relation to it was not immediately so direct as to demand that destruction, and they always remained a possibility in negotiations, but here recently, when they blew out the gates of the reservoir, that affects that very directly; but that was unavoidable, that had to be done.

Senator CAIN. As just a citizen, I am concerned about civilians everywhere. Military necessity has required us to do things in this Korean War that we have never had to do before; at least, so far as I know, in protecting the integrity of our own troops.

As I understand it, we have had to pursue a scorched-earth policy in front of our operations just to give our own people a chance to live.

Secretary MARSHALL. That is correct.

POSSIBLE NEED FOR A DECLARATION OF WAR

Senator CAIN. You have been known to me nearly all my life, General Marshall, as a man of the highest moral character. You will agree that we started out last June, in concert with our friends in the United Nations, to crush the enemy and to restore Korea to a united, independent and democratic position.

You will probably agree—I think you have already so stated—that the free forces have waged war for months against the North Koreans and the Red Chinese.

Please just satisfy my deep-seated curiosity and tell me what modern-day factors require a formal declaration of war against our enemies. That is an important question, General Marshall.

Secretary MARSHALL. Not only a moral question, but it certainly bears a very direct relation to our democratic processes.

Senator CAIN. Right.

Secretary MARSHALL. Reference has been made here to the constitutional right of the Congress.

Senator CAIN. I made those references, sir.

Secretary MARSHALL. That is the law, and it is inconceivable that we could have a surprise attack and gain the advantages of such a sudden procedure. With the debate in Congress that can't be done. So under our constitutional set-up that cannot be done.

Now my own reaction to it is that there is an immense advantage on the part of the Nation that can move into the conflict in a moment without any formal declaration, and I think there is a much greater disadvantage in the long term as a result of having done so. So that we have to face the tremendous disadvantage of being put under attack in a moment—we don't know where. And the world knows that we cannot do that ourselves. We cannot and we would not.

Now, as I say, I have sat in a seat where I feel probably more vulnerable to the disadvantage than most people would, because you just can't tell where the event is going to break out. And yet I do feel that our great strength before the world lies in the fact that we would not do such a thing as that.

In a sense it's rather an academic discussion because our Constitution forbids it, and we are certainly not going to change the Constitution to a more violent form of action. It goes contrary to all of our feelings.

But I would say this: When you are considering that there are a great many other considerations that should come into play, and the principal one is that it should be apparent before the world that if they do seize this advantage, they are going to pay a terrible price absolutely and certainly. And that means a state of preparedness in some way that we can maintain without its destructive effect on our economy and without its unfortunate effect on our young men.

EFFECT OF ALLIES ON RECOGNITION OF A STATE OF WAR

Senator CAIN. Is this a fair question, the answer to which in my opinion could be completely off the record if that is your wish? It seems to me if we were not associated with others—and I am among those who think we ought to be associated with others—that it would

be inconceivable to believe that the United States of America would be at war for 10 months against ruthless enemies without the Congress recognizing that state of war officially and declaring war upon our enemy. Am I right or wrong in my anxiety over this question of morality, General?

Secretary MARSHALL. Well, there you are getting a little beyond the question of morality. You are getting around very directly, not beyond but you getting around, it seems to me, very directly to the question of the complications of collective action. I might say that the reactions to these troublesome problems that grow out of collective action are much more emphatic among those who are trying to direct the military effort. But we have to come before the public, and we have to in a very careful manner, and we have to restrain ourselves in our dealings with our allies if we hope to be able to pursue on the basis of collective action.

Senator CAIN. General Marshall, my next question has a relation to what you have just stated.

AGGRESSION AND DECLARATIONS OF WAR

Perhaps we have reached a state in the development of the world where official war is a thing of the past. Perhaps the best we can look forward to is an age of aggression which will never formally be recognized as being war and which will generally reach no positive decisions. Do you share any of my apprehension on this subject?

Secretary MARSHALL. I don't quite believe that, sir. Certainly some very peculiar things have gone on in these years—notably the state of what amounted to an actual war in China with the Japanese for a long period of time, which we did not recognize as a war. Of course, there were certain reasons for that, legal and others, in connection with what we might do to help in the situation, but it led to that precedent with regard to the matter you have just questioned me on.

POSSIBLE PROLONGATION OF KOREAN SITUATION

Senator CAIN. General Marshall, if we are to carry out our stated mission, which is to make Korea free, but remain satisfied with a war which may reach no final decision for years, will we not injure our ability to wage a larger war if it comes, and will we not indicate or run a risk of indicating to the free citizens of the world that their governments—there being a distinction I make between a citizen and his government—will we not indicate to the free citizens of the world that their free governments are unable to collectively get together to crush aggression, Korea being the first example?

Secretary MARSHALL. I believe you used the plural in there when you said "years"?

Senator CAIN. Yes, sir.

Secretary MARSHALL. Well, I would say that if the Korean situation prolonged itself into years, then we are in a very difficult, very dangerous situation.

Senator CAIN. I used the word plurally because there has been no evidence yet submitted by anyone that gives any indication of when it is to be concluded.

Secretary MARSHALL. I think I referred to examples of that before, which came before committees of Congress, as to our policy in Greece and as to our policy in the Berlin blockade and other policies.

Senator CAIN. Thank you, sir.

Will you state what reasons you may have as to how we might reach a reasonable and lasting settlement of the Korean War without convincing the Chinese Reds that they will be decisively defeated on the field of battle?

Secretary MARSHALL. I will say this—that our attitude in the matter in December was one thing, we were in a very weak position; and our attitude now is quite another.

IMPORTANCE OF FORMOSA

Senator CAIN. General Marshall, General MacArthur testified and did so at some length in front of a map, that if Formosa is occupied by an enemy, that the first line of defense for the United States would logically move back to the west coast of America. May I ask to what extent do you agree with this military estimate of that situation?

Secretary MARSHALL. I think that is an overemphasis—when you put it that way—as to the result; but I think it would be a highly dangerous business for the United States to have Formosa pass into unfriendly hands.

Senator CAIN. Thank you, sir. Two more questions.

MAC ARTHUR POSITION ON COMMITMENT OF AMERICAN TROOPS TO CHINESE MAINLAND

A very great deal has been said on what General MacArthur did and did not recommend either to the JCS or to the public. Will you state if there is any truth whatsoever in the following comment which was recently offered about General MacArthur by a prominent person? I ask this question directly and pointedly because, to the extent we can, we seek to have fair play for every person who appears as a witness before this committee—or at least I do.

The quotation:

We are in a far better position in Korea to meet the added force of Red China with the Allied Powers who are with us there than we would be in if we had to continue with what we are doing in Korea and at the same time commit the monumental folly which MacArthur said is necessary of sending an independent additional armed force from this country to the mainland of China.

I think you have testified that General MacArthur never violated a military order, and I ask you if you have ever known him to suggest or recommend committing an American ground force to the mainland of China.

Secretary MARSHALL. I recall no recommendations of that character of his.

Senator CAIN. General Marshall, I wish only to express my real appreciation for this opportunity to ask you a number of questions which are and have been of very great concern to me.

Chairman RUSSELL. General, I have one or two questions I wanted to ask while Senator Lodge is returning. I have been sitting here listening to this testimony, and I am one member of the committee that has heard practically every word that has been testified.

BOMBING MANCHURIA BUT NOT RUSSIA

As I understand it, North Korea borders both on Manchuria and on Soviet Russia.

Secretary MARSHALL. That is correct.

Chairman RUSSELL. It has been stated that this Rashin was an important distribution center for supplies that come in from Soviet Russia. How could we completely interdict the supplies that are coming from unfriendly sources to our enemies in North Korea by merely bombing in Manchuria? Would it not be necessary also to bomb communications and bases in that portion of Soviet Russia which adjoins Korea to absolutely interdict those supplies?

Secretary MARSHALL. Are you talking specifically in regard to Rashin or the whole proposition?

Chairman RUSSELL. I am talking about the whole proposition—of the fact that Korea adjoins both Manchuria and Soviet Russia. If we bomb the bases in Manchuria, would that, even if it were completely successful—

Secretary MARSHALL. The source of supply that comes from Russia is in their industrial area, which is far back from the Manchurian frontier.

Chairman RUSSELL. How do they bring it into Korea? Do they not have to come in through Soviet Russia?

Secretary MARSHALL. Yes, sir; it comes in from Soviet Russia, goes into Manchuria, and comes down on the Eastern Manchurian Railroad.

What I am trying to explain, Senator, is that the source of supply comes from far back in the Soviet Union where it has its industrial set-up.

Now the bombing that has been referred to here, I believe, relates to destroying the supply accumulations that you have, depots, after it is brought down near the frontier—notably Mukden, and I presume other points to the southeast of Mukden toward Antung. Quite certainly they would have dispersed their supply depots against the possibility of air attack.

Also, I presume that they have depots that are north of Mukden—Changchung, for example. To what degree they would have established and organized supply depots, I don't know; but the bombing generally, I believe, that has been referred to here pertains largely to between Mukden and the Yalu frontier, and to Racin. That is inside Korea, but very close to the frontier.

SOVIET SUPPLY LINES INTO MANCHURIA AND KOREA

Chairman RUSSELL. What prompted the question was your statement here the other day that if they bombed Racin, and incidentally I believe it has been bombed on one occasion, they would remove their supply bases a short distance away, across the frontier; and if they moved those bases across the frontier, would they be on Soviet territory, or Manchurian?

Secretary MARSHALL. In that case they would be in Soviet territory.

Chairman RUSSELL. Would be within Soviet territory?

Secretary MARSHALL. However, I would like to add, Senator, that I was speaking from recollection and the Chiefs of Staff can answer that with precision, because they were the ones concerned over the matter and made the final recommendation, and they can give you the distances and facts and railroad connections which are related to the bombing, for instance, and destroying of Racin; but as to the renewal of the same service across the boundary in eastern Siberia—

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, is it possible to bring supplies from eastern Siberia directly into Korea?

Secretary MARSHALL. It is, by way of Racin.

Chairman RUSSELL. Do the Soviets have any supply depots in eastern Siberia?

Secretary MARSHALL. Well, I presume they have, with relation to Vladivostok, and their troops on that portion of the frontier.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, if supplies were moved from Vladivostok to the Korean border, do you know how they would be handled? Would they be brought over Soviet territory, or would they go through North Korea—

Secretary MARSHALL. That portion of the Korean border, they would be brought from Soviet territory.

Chairman RUSSELL. The point I want to make is: Is it possible, even if you destroy the bases in Manchuria, to completely shut off all sources of supply beyond the North Korean border, without also bombing the territory of Soviet Russia?

Secretary MARSHALL. It would be possible to work considerable damage to the supplies coming down in by way of the main arteries, down through Mukden, and to the southeast, and across the Yalu River.

I would have to turn to the Chiefs of Staff to give you the exact railroad set-up, as to leading into Racin, whether it would be a return of stores from the Vladivostok district, up to the northwest, and then into Racin, or whether it would be supplies coming from the west, down to Racin, I cannot answer that accurately, Senator.

Chairman RUSSELL. I will take that up with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

All right, Senator Lodge.

Senator LODGE. Before I begin, Mr. Chairman, let us say that, when I made my suggestion yesterday evening, I had in mind that it would shorten the initial round of questions. I certainly am not criticizing any of the members of the committee, and I think that, broadly speaking, the questions have contributed to clarification of public opinion.

I simply wanted to indicate a way to a democratic and orderly procedure that might tend to shorten the future proceedings.

Now, Mr. Secretary, if there is any question that I ask you that you would rather I would ask somebody else, I hope you will tell me; and if there is anything you want off the record, I hope that you will say so.

I will begin with a few isolated questions, and then I have one or two points I would like to develop.

CASUALTY RATE IN KOREA COMPARED TO WORLD WAR II

In response to Senator Cain, you stated that the casualty rate had been falling in Korea; and I wondered how it compared during the

last 6 months, let's say, with the casualty rate in World War II in Europe.

Do you have any idea what such a comparison would show?

Secretary MARSHALL. I don't know how we would get at that unless we took a certain phase of that war when there was a general troop advance or defense. You could take a casualty rate in the Battle of the Bulge, for example, and get a very definite rate, and there I think the rate of casualties was much heavier.

At the present time the casualty rate is, considering combat, very low. In the latter part of June and in July and in August it was high, particularly in terms of missing. I don't know how I could answer that, Senator. I will have to look at the records and see if we can just take one piece that is comparable to the Korean action.

Senator LODGE. Yes. Would you have any idea of the ratio of American casualties to enemy casualties in this Korean War as compared with the war against the Germans?

Secretary MARSHALL. I will have to get that information for you, sir.

OFFER OF CHINESE NATIONALIST TROOPS FOR KOREA

Senator LODGE. I have been asked to ask you this question. Why do we still reject the use in Korea of 33,000 troops offered by the Chinese Nationalists? Do we still? Why do we still reject the use in Korea of 33,000 troops offered by the Chinese Nationalists?

Secretary MARSHALL. I think I have answered that before, but I will do it again. In the first place, the 33,000 number has rather gone out of the picture because that was the first proposal of the generalissimo, Chiang Kai-shek, and to which there was an unfavorable reaction both from General MacArthur and from the Chiefs of Staff reaction and the global effects.

Then later in November to 60,000 that General MacArthur I think expressed a desire for, and the view of the Chiefs of Staff as to that were first that the primary hazard there is the defense of Formosa, and in the next place that the report that they had received which General MacArthur's Fox committee of some 37 men indicated a state of readiness which didn't seem to be conducive of successful action by those troops, and more in particular from that record it appeared that if they were taken out and they were the best equipped and the chosen troops, it would greatly weaken that garrison.

Senator LODGE. Is that still the position today?

Secretary MARSHALL. But the main consideration, of course, was the possible effect on our relations with our allies and development of an enlarged war.

Senator LODGE. Is that still the position today?

Secretary MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

WISDOM OF ORIGINAL CROSSING OF THIRTY-EIGHTH PARALLEL

Senator LODGE. Using hindsight, do you think it would have been better for all concerned if our military effort had stopped at the waist of Korea in the general neighborhood of the line Pyongyang-Wonsan instead of spreading out all along the northern frontier?

Secretary MARSHALL. Well, in the light of everything that has happened, yes, but I don't know as that is a fair statement.

In the first place, the movement north of the parallel by the original effort worked out to the destruction, almost complete destruction, of the North Korean Army which would seem to be a very important factor in establishing the security of the South Korean Republic and making possible a general unification of all of Korea.

Later an entirely different question was posed as to the advance of our force when there were indications of the possibility of a Communist build-up of Chinese troops, and in the light of after events it was, I think, unfortunate.

There is the factor we determined what they had and, as General MacArthur puts it, we upset their plans and precipitated their action and made it known to us.

You have another situation, of course, in northeast Korea where the Tenth Corps was deployed over a wide area. That deployment, of course, came out of a period when General MacArthur was attempting to unify the country, to set up a basis for elections and matters of that character.

Then you come to the Monday quarterbacking on the very first moves that would be made in regrouping the entire command in the light of what was happened on the western flank directly south of the river and down toward the thirty-eighth parallel. I don't like to answer the question because it is awfully easy to tell what is the right thing the day after.

ARMING OF SOUTH KOREANS

Senator LODGE. On March 31 the New York Times published a dispatch stating that the South Korean Government was being forced to release 120,000 men because it lacked the means to rearm or to feed them, and it quoted President Singhman Rhee of Korea as saying that he had told the United Nations that he is prepared to supply 500,000 men in addition to the 250,000 South Koreans who are now fighting. He repeatedly asked for guns to arm at least 100,000 and hasn't been able to get them. Do you know what the facts are about that?

Secretary MARSHALL. I have described that in some detail in relation to the approach to me by the Ambassador of the South Korean Government to the United States, and my request on the Chiefs of Staff to look in on the matter.

Their message to General MacArthur and General MacArthur's reply to them, and later communications, one within the last week in connection with what is the advantageous use of these men, to what extent is it profitable to arm them, to what extent we can afford to arm them.

I would rather not get on the record in that matter at the present time because General Ridgeway's detailed report of the last 10 days presents a very complicated picture.

[Deleted.]

Senator LODGE. Thank you.

EFFECT OF BOMBING MANCHURIA ON EUROPEAN SITUATION

You stated on Monday that the bombing of Chinese bases might, and I quote, "Expose Western Europe to attack by the millions of Soviet troops poised in Middle and Eastern Europe."

Would you care to say what is the basis for the belief in that possibility?

Secretary MARSHALL. Of the effect of our bombing attack or the poised troops in——

Senator LODGE. On the fact that the bombing of these Chinese bases might result in an attack on Western Europe.

Secretary MARSHALL. Because we felt that carrying the bombing into China would certainly enlarge the struggle, enlarge the activities and might develop a situation that would be much more difficult to meet in view of the possible Soviet intervention in order to protect China.

The implication, of course, in that is that if we could eliminate the Chinese effort by bombing, that it would be a very powerful consideration in the end. But the general feeling has been that in the opinion of the Chiefs of Staff and myself and the other agencies of the Government, if we restrain our activities, restrict our activities to the Korean border and the seas alongside, that we can possibly carry on to a successful termination a limited war and more particularly one in which we hold our allies with us.

If we had no other reaction than the fact that our allies think that that would provoke a Soviet reaction, we would have to consider very, very seriously whether we just disagree with that and go ahead, the more so when we have to consider their troops on the ground serving with us and whether they would continue in such service.

However, the view is not only that of our allies but it is our own view that it is an unnecessary risk to the situation in Korea.

Senator LODGE. Is that the principal ground, would you say, on which our allies oppose the policy of delivery of an ultimatum against the Chinese Communists, to be followed by bombing?

Secretary MARSHALL. Will you repeat it, please?

Senator LODGE. Do you consider that the principal reason that actuates the allies in opposing General MacArthur's policy of an ultimatum against the Chinese Communists, to be followed by bombing, is the fear that it will spread the war and result in Western Europe being invaded?

Secretary MARSHALL. My hesitation is in relation to whether it is only Western Europe, but I will say it is the fear of the invasion of Western Europe.

Senator LODGE. Because there was a time, was there not, when there was a fear that the strength of the west might get sucked into the Orient to an undue degree, but it is definitely established now, is it not, that we will not permit the major part of our forces to be engulfed in the Orient; isn't that true?

Secretary MARSHALL. That is our hope.

INTERESTS OF OUR ALLIES IN SUCCESS IN KOREA

Senator LODGE. Certainly, it is true, is it not, that our allies, generally speaking, have as great an interest as we have in success in Korea?

Secretary MARSHALL. I would say certainly that and maybe more, because many of them are very close to the principal enemy, or opponent.

Senator LODGE. And our allies have, have they not, just as great an interest as we have in establishing the authority of the United Nations?

Secretary MARSHALL. I would say that is a fact.

Senator LODGE. And I believe it is true, is it not, that when the aggression in Korea occurred last summer, the allies applauded our decision to resist aggression in Korea very enthusiastically.

Secretary MARSHALL. I think it had a tremendous effect all over Europe.

Senator LODGE. And, in fact, it restored the confidence in Europe in the possibility of avoiding a war, didn't it?

So it certainly seems reasonable to except, does it not, that a really skillful and persuasive American diplomacy should be able to hold our allies together as regards a sound policy in Asia?

Secretary MARSHALL. That would be my assumption.

Senator LODGE. Must we not do three things simultaneously—keep faith with our own troops, carry out the anti-aggression policy, and retain our allies—do all three?

Secretary MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

RELATIONSHIP OF ALLIES' CONTRIBUTION IN KOREA TO THEIR COMMITMENTS ELSEWHERE

Senator LODGE. Now, Senator Cain spoke of the contributions that the members of the United Nations were making to the fighting in Korea, which struck a responsive chord with me, because when Senator Sparkman and I were at the United Nations, it became very evident that the contributions of some nations were going to be disappointing, and I issued a statement in September, I think, saying that there wasn't anything that could shake American confidence in the United Nations more than a failure on the part of the members to put up manpower in proportion to population.

With that as a background, let me ask you: Is it not true that some nations have military commitments in addition to their commitments toward Korea, so that they are not completely free to do whatever they might like to do with regard to Korea? Isn't that true?

Secretary MARSHALL. That is true.

[Deleted.]

Senator LODGE. Is it not true that the contribution of other nations to the fighting in Korea is steadily increasing, albeit rather slowly.

Secretary MARSHALL. I think it is increasing. I think we have good prospects for further increases.

[Deleted.]

Senator LODGE. Yes. Would you say that the fighting in Indochina had a fairly direct strategic relationship to the fighting in Korea?

Secretary MARSHALL. I think it has a very direct relationship, and I think the operations in Korea in the destruction that has been effected on the Chinese Communists supposedly picked troops has quite probably restrained action by the Communist Chinese forces on the Indochina frontier.

ECONOMIC BLOCKADE ON AGGRESSORS

Senator LODGE. Would you not say that it was vital for the allies, at least not to hamper the operations of troops by sending war materials to the enemy, even though some of them are not sending troops themselves?

Secretary MARSHALL. I quite agree with that, sir.

Senator LODGE. It is true, is it not, that in some cases we are obtaining valuable articles in exchange for the shipment of war materials? Do you not understand that to be the case?

Secretary MARSHALL. I understand that to be the case. However, when you speak of war material, I don't think there should be any question about their not permitting any actual material. I think it is in the raw materials that we get into trouble, and some materials of a special kind.

I think the time has not only come, but arrived some time back, for the allies to enforce absolutely a strict embargo.

Senator LODGE. Upon all finished goods that have a military potential?

Secretary MARSHALL. Finished goods that are directly military, and raw materials and material of that kind that can have an effect on the fighting of the army, and there, of course, you come to the problem of endeavoring to provide materials that will only be used by the civil population, which you know full well that the civil population will certainly not get if the Chinese Communist armies need it.

Senator LODGE. Yes.

Secretary MARSHALL. So, while you have a compassionate interest in the civilian population you cannot control the Communist procedure.

Senator LODGE. I am glad to hear you make that statement.

NEED FOR BASES IN EUROPE

In addition to the many other ways in which allies are helpful, is it not actually essential for us to have bases in Western Europe from which our strategic air force can operate against the Soviet potential in case of trouble?

Secretary MARSHALL. I think that is vital.

Senator LODGE. Yes. And, therefore, we cannot make maximum use of our air power without such bases in Western Europe?

Secretary MARSHALL. That is correct. We would be greatly limited.

RUSSIAN CONTROL OVER AND SUPPORT OF RED CHINA

Senator LODGE. Do you think the Kremlin has enough influence over the Chinese Communists to call off the Korean aggression if they wanted to do so?

Secretary MARSHALL. My assumption would be they could do it in a moment.

Senator LODGE. So, they are really the real opponent, are they not?

Secretary MARSHALL. That is our opponent.

Senator LODGE. Do you think the Russians are helping the Communist Chinese much at the present moment?

Secretary MARSHALL. They are certainly providing them with the bulk of their war-making matériel. They have provided apparently large numbers of planes, which have not yet been brought into use, and so far as we can ascertain, they have been providing the training of the personnel that would employ these planes.

To what extent they are involved in the rehabilitation and build-up of North Korean units, I don't know. They provide a very solid background in front of which the Communist Chinese forces operate.

I think it might be put this way: That the Chinese Communist forces would be utterly unable to maintain themselves without a very direct support by the Soviet Government.

Senator LODGE. That is logistical support, is it not?

Secretary MARSHALL. Logistical support in terms of the actual material, war material, and tremendous moral support that they are standing behind them.

Senator LODGE. Do you think they are in a position to increase their help very materially, or do you believe that they are so far away from the main base of Russian military strength that they could not do much more even if the conflict were to broaden?

Secretary MARSHALL. They could do quite a little bit more.

[Deleted.]

FACTORS INVOLVED IN BOMBING MANCHURIA

Senator LODGE. My question is a limited question aimed at keeping faith with the troops in Korea, regardless of the American public at home, and regardless of allies or anything else, and it is aimed to get the answer to the question as to whether the decision not to bomb the Chinese bases is directly in the interests of the actual American troops in Korea.

Secretary MARSHALL. I will answer that, Senator, by saying to a certain extent it is, and to a certain extent it is not, and the question is on which side the percentage would favor our troops against the restrictions as to the operations.

[Deleted.]

But I must say this: That you have got to consider very carefully the situation at the time. Now, the situation about November 6—no, we will say November 6 to the end of the month—was one where our troops were at a tremendous disadvantage, because of the processes of the rapid build-up of the Chinese Communist forces in Korea.

There is no question in my mind but freedom to bomb across the Yalu River would have been greatly to the advantage of our troops.

Now that they are 200-and-some miles south of the Yalu, the situation is quite different.

Senator LODGE. In other words, the question of whether you bomb, or whether you don't bomb, changes constantly with the factors of time, circumstance, and geography, doesn't it?

Secretary MARSHALL. That is right.

Senator LODGE. And you cannot lay down an arbitrary rule that is good for all conditions, can you?

Secretary MARSHALL. You cannot; and right under the present considerations, it has seemed that we derive advantages from the fact that no air operations, no hostile air operations are against us.

Senator LODGE. I am drawing to my close.

USING OUR TIME FOR PREPAREDNESS

It is said that the services of our men in Korea is buying time, or gaining time for us here in the United States.

Are you satisfied that we are making the best possible use of this time, insofar as creating a big enough Army, Navy and Air Force is concerned?

Secretary MARSHALL. I made a statement the other day that I was much concerned over the delay in getting the necessary legislative action to enable us to go ahead with the various measures that are concerned in the build-up of our forces and that, I think, is a delay that is regrettable, and serious.

As to the production of munitions, I think that the time we need there is to allow that to go through the necessary processes; and I believe, so far as I can ascertain, that we are proceeding there with reasonably rapidity; when you get into the effect of inflationary reactions and limitations of raw materials—the withdrawals of raw materials from civil production—I am not well enough informed to answer that except that I know the inflationary reaction is serious to us because we lose the power to buy the material that was the basis of the original estimate on which the appropriation was made.

Senator LODGE. When you referred to legislation, you have particularly in mind, have you not, universal military service and training, is that right?

Secretary MARSHALL. Exactly that, sir.

Senator LODGE. I remember that you said on Friday, in reply to Senator Johnson, that in your opinion we were not getting ready fast enough; and in connection with that, I would like to ask you whether you think the Air Force today has got enough tactical strength to provide us with a 2 to 1 superiority in Europe? That is—tactical aviation?

Secretary MARSHALL. I will not attempt to answer that. General Vandenberg can answer that directly. He has all the numbers at his disposal.

ADEQUACY OF 95 AIR GROUPS

Senator LODGE. Maybe you would not want to answer this question, either, and you can say so, of course, if you don't: Whether you think that the proposed total of 95 air groups which has been the administration's proposed figure, is big enough or whether it should not be 150 air groups?

Secretary MARSHALL. My reaction to that has been that we will have time, under the present set-up that is being made, for the production of planes, to increase that, along with the situation as it appears to us as we get a little further along, because the important thing now is the rapid turn-out of planes up to the 95 groups—that is the first thing; and the next thing is a set-up of industry in relation to that, in such a manner that they can very quickly increase production if we find that to be a necessary procedure.

I think we have that set-up well under way, and as we—I have forgotten the date when the 95 groups was to come into being. Maybe you have it there?

Senator LODGE. I wasn't talking about the construction and development that has been authorized as of the end of the current fiscal year; I was talking about for the next fiscal year ending June 30, 1952.

The information that I have is that we are tremendously outnumbered in tactical aviation; that air defense is very inadequate; and in order to build up the tactical force and do the other things we need to do, we ought to have an objective, for June 30, 1952, of 150 groups, rather than 95.

Secretary MARSHALL. I wouldn't reply to that, off-hand.

In these meetings on the budget, in which the Air brought forward their proposals; and all that was very lengthily discussed, and my understanding of that is, and Mr. Lovett, who presided at each of the meetings, he could answer that directly—that there was a general agreement that the set-up, as proposed, was suitable to the situation—of course assuming that our outlay in additional facilities would permit a very rapid rate of increase over and above the original estimates.

Senator LODGE. Well, I always understood that the broad tactical theory of the defense of Western Europe presumed that the western nations would not have a superiority in ground forces, and that their chance of being successful lay in having mobile and highly trained ground troops who could force the enemy to channelize into certain lines where we could then strike him with overwhelming tactical air power.

Isn't that roughly correct?

Secretary MARSHALL. That is roughly correct.

Senator LODGE. And I have further been led to believe, and I made some rather conspicuous statements about it that nobody has challenged, that insofar as that tactical aviation is concerned, we not only do not have any superiority, but we are in a very flagrant inferiority, and that is why I asked the question.

ADEQUACY OF ARMY STRENGTH

Do you consider that the proposed army strength of 18 divisions and 48 regimental combat teams is big enough?

Secretary MARSHALL. At the moment it is big enough in the sense that it is about all we can get ready hurriedly in an efficient and effective manner. There may be further increases necessary, and we have the means now of making them in a more effective manner than the original increases which consisted of entirely new divisions and the National Guard divisions in a very limited state of training.

Now particularly if this manpower bill is finally confirmed, we have the means of doing with considerable rapidity what we haven't done up to the present time.

I don't want to disclose at this moment just exactly what the thinking is, but there has been a very careful calculation in the matter, all I would say is that we are trying very hard to see that these things are effective, and that we don't proceed faster than we can produce the effective result. But we set up the machinery like the additional facilities—I am talking about in relation to industry—that makes it possible to make these increases very quickly in an effective manner when we feel we just must do it.

WISDOM OF DEMOBILIZATION AT END OF WORLD WAR II

Senator LODGE. Do you not feel that we did demobilize too much and too rapidly at the end of World War II?

Secretary MARSHALL. Oh, yes, sir.

Senator LODGE. And that we thereby gravely weakened our diplomatic initiative and power for peace by so doing?

Secretary MARSHALL. Yes, sir. But I would say there that the important thing was to firmly set up a system that had some chance of enduring, and the failure to do that was the most serious error of all.

Maintaining a very large force, well, I do not think it is a practical political question. But I do think the confused and tumultuous demobilization was very injurious, and I feel more strongly that the failure to establish a very definite procedure for maintaining our defensive posture was a very serious error, just as I think now is the time to do this.

EFFECTIVE SPEED OF MOBILIZATION

Senator LODGE. Well, do you not think that we ought to, given—this is a very broad question but, after all, we have to face broad questions—given the intensity of our national temperament—we are not phlegmatic like some peoples are—and given our political institutions and our economic institutions, do you not think it would be better for us rapidly to build up our military strength and to regain the diplomatic initiative we have lost, and organize the peace, and try to do it in a hurry rather than to drag along half in and half out for 10 years?

Secretary MARSHALL. I don't think we are dragging along, sir. I think we are getting this thing in such a way there is some possibility that we will not suffer from these periods of indifference which seem to come so quickly and react against us very directly.

When you build up a force the major consideration is the system under which you do it. Now we labored, and you were a participant in the labor of developing, effective troops at the time of the last war. However, your experience was a special one because you were under an unusual driver, as a man, and you were in a unit that was in no way affected by past conditions of that unit. It was a new unit, and you suffered from none of the limitations that were inherent in another system of development.

So that we went into these preparations and we had a long, unduly prolonged, period of carrying the burden of the force and not getting the advantage of it as a force.

Now I think that is a great error because you carry an immense burden. You have withdrawn manpower from industry, and you have not only withdrawn manpower from industry, but we could not get the manpower to set up the special training that was needed to replace the casualties.

You saw some of the effect of reduced units, which is a very fatal effect.

So that while it appeared to the public, maybe, that we had all these divisions on active duty, actually we were limited by the numbers. Under the conditions, if we could have set up what we have been struggling to do now, and I think are doing very successfully at the present time, this basic condition which enables us rapidly to do something effectively, it is very much better than getting a great many units on active duty when they are going to be longer, much longer, in being brought to a state of fighting efficiency.

Now that is my experience. I was forced in many ways—I say "I"; I was Chief of Staff of the Army—in going along with the immediate calling out of the entire National Guard. I wanted to delay

even the way we came into the selective service. I was told politically that was not possible; I had to do it right now or it wouldn't work, we couldn't carry it through.

Well, that was wrong. That didn't accelerate our preparation, that almost limited it for the time being, and made the procedure one of embarrassment. We were submerged under complications, under lack of equipment, under all sorts of conditions adverse to a speedy development of efficiency.

I think now we have a set-up that has been very rapidly developed to enable us to do these things efficiently and effectively.

FUNDAMENTAL STRENGTH AVAILABLE NOW

Now when do we make the next step in increases is something else that I don't want to go into right now, but I think we have a much more powerful set-up than is apparent to the public, and I think also we have a set-up that will enable us, I think, to maintain military strength without the shock of having appropriations cut to an extent that causes the collapse of that strength.

Now I have been criticized for talking too much about collapses, but I have seen a good many of them and I saw a very recent one, and where the criticism was not enough is being done, at the same time I couldn't get things done and there was talk of asking for too much.

Now that's all in a period of about 2 months. We are never going to change, so we must have something that is a workable procedure. I think we have got it.

I think the power we have developed now is far beyond the comprehension of the general public or they would bring tremendous pressure to bear I think to pass this manpower bill into an effective law as quickly as possible.

I am talking at considerable length, but I feel very strongly about it and I am almost absolutely certain I am right. I apologize for my emphasis.

Senator LODGE. Well, that is very, very interesting and just the kind of—

Secretary MARSHALL. The application right now to this Korean situation. Here we are going into this month where certainly in the next 3 or 4 weeks we get up to the point of 20,000 men outside of replacements for casualties can go into that force. That is more than a division a month. Well, that creates a tremendous power that has heretofore been lacking.

Senator LODGE. It means you are going to get some real rotation in Korea, doesn't it?

Secretary MARSHALL. When you put in 20,000 fresh men in addition to replacement of casualties a month and the prospect of 25,000 without too long a delay, you are putting in there the equivalent of over a division. Actually that would be 7,000 men more than a division once a month.

That will have a tremendous effect, and we are getting the benefit of those men who come back here with their war experience in all of the units. Now that I think is getting at an effective basis of progression.

Senator LODGE. Those men who have come back will be the seed corn for the new army, will they not?

Secretary MARSHALL. They will be the experts on how you actually do it today.

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, I would like to raise a procedural point by way of a motion to recess.

Senator LODGE. Will you just let me finish? I have listened to everybody else and I would like to just have a chance to finish. I won't be long.

So you think that the objective of the Army is high enough now?

Secretary MARSHALL. At the present moment.

NEED FOR TACTICAL AVIATION

Senator LODGE. One final question. Is it now true when you have American troops actually overseas such as we will have in Europe, that it is just as vital for them to have tactical aviation in support of them as it is to have artillery or machine guns or anything else?

Secretary MARSHALL. Tactical aviation is absolutely essential.

Senator LODGE. And so if we haven't got the tactical superiority in Europe we certainly ought to go ahead and get it, oughtn't we?

Secretary MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator LODGE. Thank you very much, General.

Secretary MARSHALL. I am sorry I took up so much of your time.

Senator LODGE. I am glad you did. I think it is very valuable.

Chairman RUSSELL. Just one moment. Senator George had a question to ask. Before he does, I want to find out if any member of the committee wishes us to have the security room manned on Sunday?

Senator GEORGE. I don't believe we should open it up.

Chairman RUSSELL. If no one suggests that they want to use it tomorrow, why General Mudge, will you advise the officer in charge to that effect?

Senator GEORGE, you wanted to ask the general a question.

Senator GEORGE. I wished to ask the general this. I asked for the initial estimate of the number of our forces and character that would be required to repel the aggression in Korea, the initial estimate, and I am not quite sure you said you would get it or that the Joint Chiefs——

Secretary MARSHALL. I think I recall the question, Senator George. Of course the record will show it. I call on the Joint Chiefs to give me that information.

Senator GEORGE. I merely wished to know, General——

Secretary MARSHALL. I recall the question. Mr. Larkin tells me that it went to the Chiefs of Staff.

NATIONS WHICH VETOED THE PLAN OF "HOT PURSUIT"

Senator GEORGE. Now I wish to ask one additional question but merely for the purpose of asking whether the facts are in the record already.

You have spoken of this proposal to pursue the planes that may attack in Korea. You referred to it as the hot pursuit program, suggestion or recommendation which was vetoed by, I believe you said, 13 nations.

Secretary MARSHALL. Thirteen nations.

Senator GEORGE. Did you put into the record the names of those nations?

Secretary MARSHALL. They were the nations who have troops fighting with us in Korea. Those are the only ones we polled on that.

Senator GEORGE. And that is in the record. They could be identified from the record already?

Secretary MARSHALL. Their names I believe are in the record, Senator.

Senator GEORGE. You think they are already in the record?

Secretary MARSHALL. I gave you the name of every country that had a contribution to our forces in Korea.

Senator GEORGE. And those were the ones that vetoed the hot pursuit recommendation?

Secretary MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. Also, General, I don't know whether the record discloses the period of when that veto was taking place, over which it was taking place; is that in the record?

Secretary MARSHALL. I do not think it is. We will obtain the actual dates, though the State Department can give you that accurately and can give you the reactions of the nations.

Senator GEORGE. And the period of time over which you were conferring with the nations?

Secretary MARSHALL. Yes.

Senator GEORGE. The State Department can furnish it?

Secretary MARSHALL. They were the ones who conducted the negotiations.

Senator GEORGE. Very well.

Secretary MARSHALL. That is one specific date in the Defense Department. That is the recommendation of the Chiefs of Staff and then the State Department went to work on the nations involved to get their acquiescence.

INFORMATION REQUESTED FROM DEFENSE DEPARTMENT

Chairman RUSSELL. There are a number of matters in this same status as those referred to by Senator George. I had a list of them I had asked to have prepared—haven't been able to locate them in this voluminous mass of matter I have accumulated.

I had assumed, Mr. Larkin, that you or someone else was keeping a list of that. When will you be ready to respond to those questions?

Mr. LARKIN. We are continually gathering the material, Mr. Chairman, and some of it is difficult to obtain or at least it takes time. I think we have responded to a majority of your written requests. There are a number of verbal requests from members which we are still working on.

Chairman RUSSELL. Among them there was one by Senator Knowland on the percentage of arms captured from the Chinese Reds that were of American manufacture as distinguished from Chinese, Russian, and German; and also Senator Knowland wanted to be informed as to whether General Barr ever insisted upon having instructions for American officers and enlisted men to go to the forward units of the Chinese Nationalist Army; as to whether or not General MacArthur in January of 1945 forwarded a communication to the White House to the effect that the Japanese were contemplating complete surrender of everything but the person of the Emperor; whether in the preparation for the conference at Yalta military and civilian

advisers contacted General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz as to their views on the advisability of having the Soviet Union enter the war in the Pacific; as to whether General MacArthur was first notified about the Manchurian provisions contained in the Yalta agreement; and also by Senator Knowland, to ascertain whether the Joint Chiefs in their memorandum of December 13, 1950, recommended that the armistice proposal then being considered not include any reference to the admission of Red China to the United Nations or the disposition of Formosa.

I have those listed, and I hope that the Department will see that that information is furnished at the first possible date.

CORRECTION IN THE RECORD

Senator KNOWLAND. I have a correction in the record that won't take half a minute, if I might call it to the attention of the committee.

Chairman RUSSELL. What page?

Senator KNOWLAND. 1415.

Chairman RUSSELL. That is in yesterday's transcript?

Senator KNOWLAND. Yesterday's record, on the fourth paragraph down, where I was giving basic data from the United States Department of Commerce on the amount of aid to certain countries during the war years, it read, "France, \$1,770,000,000." The British Commonwealth should have read \$23,904,000,000. Then the Soviet Union, \$10,769,000,000; China, \$1,247,000,000. That is the World War II period.

Either I inadvertently picked up a wrong column here, and read Great Britain, \$4,281,000,000 when it was \$23,904,000,000.

Chairman RUSSELL. I made a notation here to check on that because it was inconceivable to me that that included everything.

REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL WITNESSES

Senator LODGE. I would like to request that some time in the proceedings we hear Mr. George Kennan on his estimates of the Russian intentions.

Chairman RUSSELL. Under the procedure we adopted, if you will drop me a note giving me Mr. Kennan's name and saying you want to hear him on just what you stated there, I will be very glad to proceed with it. When we proceed further with the hearings, I shall bring to the attention of the committee an entire list of all those that have been requested, and we will evolve some procedure for determining the suggested lengths to which we will go in hearing these people.

The full committee will have an opportunity to participate but I want members to please let me have them in writing and I can bring them all out and have them before the committee at the proper time.

Secretary MARSHALL. May I make a comment?

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes, sir.

Secretary MARSHALL. I recall in the answers I gave to Senator Cain he coupled the naval blockade with the economic blockade.

Senator CAIN. Yes, sir.

Secretary MARSHALL. My reply would indicate that I was applying it to both naval and economic. The answer applied to the economic.

Senator CAIN. Would you care to respond to the question as to

whether or not you are in support of a naval blockade as well as an economic blockade, General?

Secretary MARSHALL. Not at the present time, sir, not in support at the present time.

Chairman RUSSELL. The committee will now stand in recess until 2:30 this afternoon.

(Whereupon, at 1:35 p. m. the committee recessed to reconvene in the same room at 2:30 p. m.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

Present: Senators Russell (chairman, Committee on Armed Services), Connally (chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations), Green, Fulbright, Sparkman, Gillette, Smith of New Jersey, Lodge, Johnson of Texas, Stennis, Hunt, Long, Saltonstall, Morse, Knowland, Cain, and Flanders.

Chairman RUSSELL. The committee will come to order.

Senator Stennis, you may proceed.

Senator STENNIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I think you have thoroughly exhausted the subject and then covered it and recovered it again, and very eminently, so I think, and you have given us a great deal of very helpful and hopeful light.

I remember when I first came on the committee you gave me a good strong briefing on the UMT plan, the military manpower bill that was very helpful to me indeed.

POSSIBLE RISKS OF BOMBING MANCHURIA

Now when you were giving answers there to Senator Lodge there was a little confusion over here and I did not get the benefit of just what you said with reference to this matter of bombing, the hazard that would be entailed from the bombing of the Manchurian or Chinese area. Would you mind briefly repeating that again?

You explained the hazards that would come from it and how it would lead on over as you thought perhaps into the European picture. Would you mind repeating that briefly please.

Secretary MARSHALL. Well, we feel that the Soviet interest in the outcome of this Korean struggle is a very vital one as it affects their relations with their satellites, particularly the eastern satellites, and as the Chinese Communist group is the largest and the most valuable potential that they have to fight their battles for them.

Now the bombing into Manchuria in close proximity we will say to the Soviet Union territory, both those cases we think create a hazard that might result in the Soviet intervention which we fear would start a general struggle all over the world.

[Deleted.]

We do not think it is advisable to take the hazard which we think is very serious in leading to an all-out war, and in connection therewith, the comparison as to the western European hazards, we feel are quite different from those that exist in connection with the Korean operation.

The same thought applies to other factors in connection with the extension of our operations outside of Korea proper; and in my dis-

cussions, particularly today, and yesterday with Senator Hickenlooper, I also brought out the factor that it was not entirely a one-way street.

[Deleted.]

Senator STENNIS. Well, I thank you, sir, and I apologize for asking you to repeat that, but I thought it might be cut off the record, and I knew that we did not get it here over on this side because of the confusion to the rear somewhere.

RUSSIA AS A DETERMINING FACTOR IN KOREA

Now, there is some thought right along that line, General, of what is going to involve Russia in the war is a victory for us in Korea, and that is the thought to the effect that she is not going to let her side, so to speak, lose, and if that theory should be correct, why a quick victory over there—I mean a bombing—or hope for a quick victory through bombing—would not be any worse than a slow solution through the present tactics, would it?

Secretary MARSHALL. I wouldn't answer—I couldn't answer that yes or no.

Senator STENNIS. No.

Secretary MARSHALL. Because you have got two factors in there. You have got a very important factor in there in that if you take one presentation there it would merely mean that we don't do anything—

Senator STENNIS. Yes.

Secretary MARSHALL (continuing). For fear we win. Well, we cannot accept that.

So, on the other hand, we are fearful of this particular procedure's provoking it.

But our position before the world is quite different if we have been quite sincere and long-suffering in endeavoring to avoid such a development.

Senator STENNIS. Well, it boils down, after all, in a very broad way to the question of what will Russia do? Or what is going to be her position? That is the main argument, and that is where the real differences of opinion come about, is it not, General?

Secretary MARSHALL. In general, yes. I think we feel that our great opponent is the Soviet Union.

Senator STENNIS. Yes.

Secretary MARSHALL. And that opponent exercises a tremendous influence over all these satellite countries and over a country like China, which you may not accurately characterize as a satellite country, but which, nevertheless, is highly dependent on the Soviet Union.

Senator STENNIS. Well, one thing that has concerned me all along is about the failure of the embargo, the failure to stop the flow of the goods in there, and I can tell from your testimony you have been very much concerned about that.

FACTORS INVOLVED IN NEGOTIATING WITH LARGE GROUP OF NATIONS

I am interested in the future operations of the United Nations. It seems to me like the big question involved here is, Is it going to be able to function well enough on this first test to survive as an institution? And I cannot understand why they have been so slow about going into this economic blockade.

Now it is not something you are to blame for, or any individual or anything like that, but any comment or any additional light you could give on that I would think would be very helpful.

Secretary MARSHALL. Well, I can think of none at the moment, Senator, other than your own experience in the political discussions, in reaching agreements; and when you add to it the number of nations involved, it is an extraordinarily difficult matter; when you have their troops involved, you have added to the complications.

Now, I referred—I think before this committee, but I will state this in case I didn't—that in the last war, we were only involved, so far as our direct negotiatory arrangements were concerned, with the British Commonwealth, that is, Great Britain, as the leader of the British Commonwealth.

Senator STENNIS. Yes.

Secretary MARSHALL. So, we had a Combined Chiefs of Staff of the British and ourselves. The French did not come back into the struggle for a long time, of course, not that we were not able to raise some troops after taking over north Africa, and equipping them and training them.

Now, we had many difficulties, and yet there were just two sides to our discussions in the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Now, the minute you add to that a large number of groups, take the North Atlantic Treaty Organization—there we have 12 nations, and they have their chiefs of staff, men like General Bradley, and they have their committees—

Senator STENNIS. Yes.

Secretary MARSHALL. Now, when you try to get together with them, you have instantly gotten the increased difficulty of any negotiatory proceedings, and that is bound to be—is bound to make it very difficult.

I think the difficulty increases with each stage of additions to the numbers involved.

Now, I think someone either put the question to me, or made the observation that we were approaching a time when collective action, in some ways, became a rather impractical proposition?

I would say it becomes a difficult proposition but a very essential proposition, but it requires a great deal of patience.

We have that in our procedures here of necessity, and yet this is all among ourselves.

PROBLEMS OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY

Now, when you add these other nations to it, that increases the difficulty tremendously; and as we go into this business of this group of nations being involved in a military question of decision, and all the combinations involved in that, then you have an extraordinarily difficult procedural set-up.

Yet, unless one is opposed to the policy or the theory of collective security toward the peace of the world, there is no other method possible.

Now, how do you do it? Well, I think if you go back through history, you will find time after time, when we have these annoying complications, these dangerous effects of such complications, and yet we have before us what to me is a matter of vast importance. That is, the development, gradual strengthening of the United Nations organization itself.

There has hardly been a time when we weren't involved one way or another in extreme complications—Russian vetoes, for example, complete stalemates, for example, and this time, at least at the start, they made a very rapid approach, but it is nothing unusual, it is nothing unusual when you get into difficulties, to find the complete cooperation at the start developed into a very puzzling complication.

You take, to get very intimate, you take our set-up as we went into the Battle of the Bulge. Everything is fine up until the time we get into the battle and then we have recriminations from this source and from that to do something other than what we were doing. That is natural. A nation reacts almost like an individual, and we have got that right now.

Senator STENNIS. Well, continuing on with that thought, it seems to me like what is on trial here is this idea of collective security in operation, and I believe that the thing that his disturbed the American people more than any other thing about the whole Korean matter is this economic situation, these goods being fed into China.

There might not have been as much noise made about that, but I believe that caused more concern among the thinking people and here is the idea of collective security being on trial and the leading nation, the most powerful nation, taking a strong position for that economic blockade and its people being so deeply concerned about it, it looks to me like that would be a powerful argument.

Secretary MARSHALL. It has caused a great bitterness, of course.

Senator STENNIS. I mean it would be a powerful argument in favor of the blockade with the other nations going on, argument to them to go on and accede to it.

If that could be cleared up, it would certainly add a great deal to the idea of collective action, it seems to me.

Secretary MARSHALL. I think the economic blockade we are on the way to very rapidly clearing up.

Senator STENNIS. I am referring to the economic blockade. Now, we voted overnight, the United Nations voted overnight to send troops in there and go to war, so to speak, and now we have spent months since Red China actually came in without taking a final vote to really impose sanctions.

Secretary MARSHALL. The moment the situation became difficult then you were involved in all sorts of, you might say, withdrawals and certainly extreme reticence.

ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST AGGRESSORS

Senator STENNIS. I know in my study of the United Nations that its conception at the time it was being organized at all, it was greatly emphasized the effectiveness of an economic blockade on a nation that set out to disturb the peace, so to speak, and it seems to me like the main weapon there is what we have fallen down perhaps the worst on in this first great test of the operations.

Secretary MARSHALL. Well, I would think, Senator, we have a very special condition which I hope will pass, and that is a large number of nations who are very weakly prepared and one nation that is completely prepared so far as we know, and shows every indication of action completely against our interests.

Now I hope that situation gradually fades away in the world, and if it does to any extent, then I think the United Nations procedures would be greatly simplified.

Senator STENNIS. And as I understand you awhile ago, you said you saw strong hope for developments along that line, even in the last few weeks.

Secretary MARSHALL. I expressed my thought I think as to the developments of accord in connection with this particular operation, but you are always going to have an extremely difficult condition in the United Nations so long as so much of the world is weak and the aggressive nation, the one with an intent which is against all of our interests, is very strong.

Senator STENNIS. Yes. Well, I had a memorandum here about the nations that objected to the principle that you referred to as hot pursuit when you wanted to invoke this policy there of hot pursuit, and you said just before lunch that you had already put the names of those nations in the record.

Secretary MARSHALL. It went in the record as the nations contributing forces or means to the fighting in Korea.

Senator STENNIS. Yes. Well, back to the time that Senator George questioned you, I believe that was Monday morning or Tuesday morning anyway, about your mission to China, I was not a member of the Congress when you made that mission and I did not clearly get your testimony the other day, although you were clear. I just did not quite understand it.

Now you went to China, you did not go there as a soldier; you went there as a special representative of the State Department?

Secretary MARSHALL. A special representative of the President, with the rank of Ambassador.

DIRECTIVE FOR CHINA MISSION

Senator STENNIS. Special representative of the President with the rank of Ambassador. And you said something the other day, you more or less adopted Senator George's language, but in referring to your directive would you mind repeating again there just what your directive was?

Secretary MARSHALL. My directive was to endeavor to bring to an end the internal strife in China—that is, the civil war—and the policy of our Government, as announced, related to the expressions by the President of the feeling of this country that it be advisable, desirable, that the Chinese would form a representative government, which means, in effect, a two-party government, in which all parties would be represented, including the Communist Party. That directive was based on negotiations that had been started by the Kuomintang government and been carried forward, particularly from 1943 to the summer of 1944, and finally under Mr. Hurley's attendance in the fall of 1944.

That procedure had come to a definite head in October 1945, when the proposal was made that they have this conference, this PCC, Political Consultative Conference; and on December 18, when they had agreed on the date for that conference, which was January 10, 1946.

Now, my directive in the beginning was to endeavor to use my influence in whatever way it was possible to do so, to bring the fighting

to an end, and the desire over there of the various parties interested, Government, the Communists and other parties was to bring the fighting to a close before the meeting of January 10, between these various groups, and that was accomplished on the morning of the 10th. I got there just before Christmas.

SUBSEQUENT FUNCTIONS ON CHINA MISSION

Then, thereafter, when they had reached their own agreements in this political conference of all the parties, as a result of that, in part, I was called upon to act as an adviser to their representatives toward the demobilization of the military forces and their amalgamation, and then later——

Senator STENNIS. Now, pardon me, was that the Nationalist forces and the Communist forces?

Secretary MARSHALL. The Communist forces.

Senator STENNIS. They were going to demobilize? They had agreed to that?

Secretary MARSHALL. They had agreed on that.

Senator STENNIS. All right.

Secretary MARSHALL. And there were to be 50 Government divisions and 10 Communist divisions, and they were to be amalgamated in Army corps—armies, as they call them.

So, then I returned to the United States at that moment to see about getting money and technical advice, construction companies, and shipping and surplus property, and UNRRA.

And on my return to China in April I found that there had been a very decided break in carrying out the terms of their agreement among themselves. From then on I was involved both in the military side in endeavoring to keep the peace and on the political side in trying to find some basis for implementing their agreements that would be acceptable to all parties.

Senator STENNIS. Was that—or that never was consummated. The Nationalist power gradually went down from that time on?

Secretary MARSHALL. The Nationalist power started on the downhill the following December.

Senator STENNIS. Well, the term has been used so much that you went over there to form a coalition with the Nationalists and the Communists. And as I understood the other day, you said that was not the proper use of the term. As I understood, you said you went to help form a representative government, the two-party system.

Secretary MARSHALL. I was having specific reference to the fact that under the terms of their political agreement among themselves was involved the idea of having a coalition cabinet, and that was the thing they couldn't start at all. All the other disagreements in the main were based on representation.

I made a misstatement, it was brought to my attention, in the record, when I stated the State Council consisting of representation of which 40 were of the National Government; actually it was 20 of the National Government and 20 of the others.

Senator STENNIS. All of the others combined?

Secretary MARSHALL. All of the other parties, yes; with the proviso that the Generalissimo had the power of veto, and that could only be overridden by a two-thirds vote, which meant that part of his own

party would have to be disaffected. Now it was a struggle to get that going, which was to be the intermediate set-up until a properly based constitution could be agreed upon.

Senator STENNIS. And did you see hope there—did you expect that plan to work when it was agreed on on January 10?

Secretary MARSHALL. It looked like it was very favorable. It wasn't agreed on January 10. The meeting started on January 10.

Senator STENNIS. It was started and agreed on soon after that.

Secretary MARSHALL. It looked like it had a fair chance of success because the Communists were very anxious to go through with it, because I think quite evidently, they felt that their discipline and their strength, particularly with the people of the lower classes, the peasantry, was so much better than that of the National Government that they could gain the control politically.

POSSIBLE THIRD FORCE IN CHINA

And the hope in the matter so far as I saw it was that other parties—the Young China Party, Democratic League and so on, I think there were about four—and the nonparty group could coalesce and the Generalissimo back them, and they would be a group which I would think have drawn strength from both the other parties, those that were outraged at the character of the operations of the Nationalist party in its lower echelons, and those that had gone into the Communist party, who were not real Communists, these individuals, but they were violently antagonistic to the present regime of the Nationalist Government. And it looked as though there would be enough drawn from those groups, together with what existed in the way of an independent group, which was a very small group, to hold the balance of power between the two, alongside of the evident factor to me and to my associates that the Kuomintang Government was utterly incapable of suppressing the Communists by military means.

Senator STENNIS. And when you got back over there from your trip to America, to check with these business firms and engineering firms and all, you found that it had already broken apart, and never did operate—

Secretary MARSHALL. It had broken apart to the extent that they hadn't gotten together in the way it was indicated in their agreements, in council.

Senator STENNIS. Well, there was a matter just a few days ago, mentioned here, that I didn't fully understand.

COORDINATION BETWEEN DEFENSE AND STATE DEPARTMENTS

You were talking about the operation of the State Department and the Defense Department, in working together at what you called the lower echelons, the working squads.

The question was first brought up by Senator Bridges, I believe, about Secretary Louis Johnson, and what changes were made after you went in on that.

I didn't understand exactly how that operated.

You put in the policy, I mean, the program of the lower echelon, working squads from the State Department and Defense Department working together—was that it?

Secretary MARSHALL: I can best explain what the condition was when I went in.

Senator STENNIS. Yes, sir.

Secretary MARSHALL. There was rather a prohibition against individual contacts that were not formalized; so it consisted, except at the top level, largely of a exchange of memorandums, and what I did was authorize and encourage communications back and forth by the individuals concerned; and when I spoke of the lower level, working levels, I mean the pick-and-shovel men that study the documents and see what all of the implications are that they can figure out, and as a rule, propose the solution.

Well, in doing that, they would discuss, back and forth, so you would have a considerable measure of agreement before you got any further.

Then it would come to the Chiefs of Staff, and they would have meetings directly with members of the State Department.

Finally, when the matter was still in trouble, we would have those meetings in the office of the Chief of Staff, with Mr. Acheson and his assistants, and Mr. Lovett and myself and all the Chiefs of Staff, and go over each phase of the matter; or, in a very vital period, we would meet before we ever really got started in the matter, and discuss it in general, to see how it appealed to the various members, in trying to reach a—

Senator STENNIS. That was considered the most practical way of getting these viewpoints, and all considered, is the method evolved?

Secretary MARSHALL. That is what I have always found in such administration. I merely went ahead on the basis on which I was accustomed to.

MILITARY MISSION TO FORMOSA

Senator STENNIS. Switching over to another subject, I understand, General Fox was sent to Formosa by General MacArthur in September 1950—

Secretary MARSHALL. August.

Senator STENNIS. August 1950, and reported back that the troops were not in condition, and so forth—were not, I will say, in condition to go into battle, then.

Well now, I didn't understand whether there was another mission which went back later, or—that presently something is going on, I understand, with reference to training?

Secretary MARSHALL. A military mission has been sent out there.

Senator STENNIS. Yes; but has there ever been a time when those men were what you would call ready for service in Korea?

Secretary MARSHALL. I could not go back of that Commission.

Senator STENNIS. I mean they were not in August 1950, but at any time since August 1950 have they been ready for battle service?

Secretary MARSHALL. I can't tell you that until I see the report of our military mission which has just gone out there.

ADEQUACY OF OUR INTELLIGENCE

Senator STENNIS. Well, I do not mean to try to go into it in detail, but after reading the Wake Island report, the report of the Wake Island conference, General Marshall, the thing that impressed me

was how they were all off, you might say, on their intelligence and how far wrong they were as to what was going to happen.

There has been a great deal said about the lack of intelligence and the lack of cooperation among the different agencies of intelligence. As I say, it has a great bearing in my thinking because it is quite disappointing to me to see how far off all of them were at this Wake Island conference. Could you give us any light on the operation of intelligence or should that come better from the Chiefs of Staff? I leave that to you.

Secretary MARSHALL. I will say this, Senator, and it is a rather touchy subject.

Senator STENNIS. Well, I am asking it just for light.

Chairman CONNALLY. Turn the light on.

Secretary MARSHALL. Well, I am trying to answer you.

Senator STENNIS. I know you are.

Secretary MARSHALL. It is a rather touchy subject, particularly because it takes a long time to develop an effective intelligence service such as we intend for the CIA under General Smith, and one of our great difficulties as I see it is the amount of public discussion in regard to it, because all of that detracts against it.

I think those special agencies, notably Great Britain and others, you never hear of them, I doubt if you even know the designation of the unit. It is just kept entirely out of discussion, comment, and we have a long way to go to reach the point where we have more authoritative sources.

However, in this particular case, it is bound to be a matter of speculation. It is bound to be a matter of speculation.

You could have a concentration of troops as a threat and you could have a concentration of troops with the definite intent to go ahead aggressively; but I believe that we will be quite a while yet before we have developed our Central Intelligence Agency to the point where it can give us more accurate reports.

It is a problem not only of direction, but more particularly of opportunity for development, because you can't do any of these things openly.

We are weakened a great deal by the concentration of public attention on the instrument from which we expect all this secret data, because if other countries know what we are about, we don't get anything along that particular line. So I think it is of great importance that it be made more effective, but I think it has to be given time and it has to be given more secrecy, more remoteness from public attention, or it can never be very effective, in my own opinion; because its most effective sources you have just got to be absolutely silent about and hardly even think about.

That comes up in a great many matters. In its inception, first build-up, I was opposed to some of the first contacts being proposed, not by the agency, but by others, in connection with the Government; and I thought those contacts should not be because it involved too many people, involved almost essentially a breakdown, and therefore it would be an ineffective service; and therefore it is not as dependable as it should be.

Senator STENNIS. I reckon we can express the hope that the intelligence upon which our Army is having to operate there is better than

it was just prior to the invasion by the Chinese Reds. I am sure you have cause to think it will be better.

Secretary MARSHALL. We have a good many struggles with intelligence. The Battle of the Bulge, landing in Normandy was a German struggle for intelligence, our landing in Africa was a struggle for intelligence. All that is involved. Some have been successful and some have not. That is always the case, but I hope it will be improved.

RETALIATORY BOMBING

Senator STENNIS. You spoke of this retaliatory bombing that we could experience. Now, where was this strength to come from, this retaliatory bombing?

Secretary MARSHALL. In November, so far as our information was concerned that I was aware of, there was a build-up in the number of planes that the Chinese Communists were reported to have in Manchuria; but later on in January and particularly March, there were indications of a very decided build-up, which added to the threat of a very effective retaliation, but that was not the case in a large way, as I recall the information, in November.

Senator STENNIS. Well now, this build-up of that strength, this was not coming directly out of China, was it? Do you not think there was a Soviet connection there when that new air strength—

Secretary MARSHALL. I am quite certain the Chinese did not build the planes.

Senator STENNIS. Yes. They build practically none, as I understand it, practically none in China.

Secretary MARSHALL. I don't think they build bombers and fighting planes.

ROTATION OF TROOPS IN KOREA

Senator STENNIS. Well, you mention here about the replacements and all. This replacement program for the soldiers, then, is already in operation as to Korea, and it is just a matter now of the wheel continuing to turn, is that correct?

Secretary MARSHALL. Rotation.

Senator STENNIS. Rotation; yes.

Secretary MARSHALL. Yes, sir. You see, up until March, we couldn't even obtain enough men for the actual replacements of casualties, except by going into our units back here and taking them away from those units, and to that extent decidedly lessening and temporarily destroying, almost, the efficiency of those units.

Finally, in March we began to catch up in the production of trained men so that we reached a point toward the latter part of March where for the first time we could provide all the replacements from these trained men.

Now, the next struggle was to get enough trained and developed as individuals to start the rotation. So, I think actually what happened in the end of March was that for the first time we provided all the replacements that were needed for casualties, discharges, and other gradual reductions of the forces, and about 7,000 men, for the first time for rotation.

Now, since that, we have been able in April to provide all the men for replacements, and I think it is 12,000 for rotation.

As we get into this month, May, by the end of May, we ought to be approaching 20,000 for rotation, and be able to meet all of our replacements without touching any of our units in this country.

To step away from the Korean campaign, we want to increase this production of trained men so that we can begin to put in the ranks of the National Guard the trained basic soldiers.

Senator STENNIS. So, you have then the replacement program, and the rotation program already in effect now.

Secretary MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator STENNIS. But that does not involve any reinforcements, not any large-scale reinforcements anyway?

Secretary MARSHALL. It has involved up to March, including March, the build-up to normal organizational strength because they were still about almost 2,000 under strength in American soldiers. The deficiency was being made up by South Korean soldiers.

But by the end of March, I think we had replaced, in some cases not even replaced because they had never had them, a full strength of United States soldiers.

Senator STENNIS. You mean the divisions were something like 2,000 short and filled by South Koreans?

Secretary MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator STENNIS. But all that you have said does not mean that you are having any additional number of divisions there at any given time?

Secretary MARSHALL. What I have been talking about is the refreshing and stimulating and strengthening of the unit and the great improvement of morale as a result of those actions. I have said nothing about reinforcements.

Senator STENNIS. That we understand.

Thank you very much, General Marshall, and thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Thank you, Senator Stennis.

Senator Fulbright?

Senator FULBRIGHT. Mr. Secretary, I hesitate to burden this record any further, but for appearance's sake I had better direct a few remarks to show my presence here. Perhaps not all arguments have been thrust upon you in the last 6 days, but I will try to limit myself to just a few questions.

Senator KNOWLAND. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if the Senator would like to speak up. We would like to hear his questions over here.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Well, Senator, General Marshall's voice is exhausted after talking for a week, and I unconsciously sort of felt that mine was too. I do not blame him.

Secretary MARSHALL. I will try to do better.

Senator FULBRIGHT. He sounds just like I feel after I have been talking for 4 or 5 hours at a stretch.

COMMUNISM OR RUSSIA AS ENEMY

You said a moment ago, I believe, in answer to a question of Senator Stennis, that you regard our great opponent as Soviet Russia.

Secretary MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FULBRIGHT. You do not regard this struggle as a sort of modern ideological crusade against communism, I take it?

Secretary MARSHALL. When I said Soviet Russia and the Soviet Union, I was thinking in terms of the Communist government.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Well, that is true; they are communistic, with which I agree. I understood you to say that the enemy we are concerned about its Russia. It is the armies of Soviet Russia.

Secretary MARSHALL. That is correct, sir.

Senator FULBRIGHT. If those armies did not happen to be Communist, but were the old-fashioned imperialists of the Czars, you would still be concerned about them, wouldn't you?

Secretary MARSHALL. If they had shown the indications—

Senator FULBRIGHT. That is what I mean. If they aggressed against, if they invaded countries, if they exhibited a tendency to expand, dominate all their neighbors, which the old-fashioned imperialism did in various instances from Napoleon to the Czars, whenever they had an opportunity.

My only point is that you do not look upon this as sort of a crusade against communism everywhere and in any form; but it is because it is an aggressive force, and has taken on the power of the Russian state is what concerns you, is it not?

Secretary MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Now, with regard to Yugoslavia, it was my understanding that the Department of Defense supported our actions in giving relief assistance to Yugoslavia this year; is that not correct?

Secretary MARSHALL. During my period; that is correct; and I think otherwise elsewhere.

Think Senator FULBRIGHT. If I recall correctly, General Bradley or General Collins, some member came up and testified in behalf of that legislation.

Secretary MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Well, now the Yugoslavs are admitted Communists, are they not?

Secretary MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FULBRIGHT. But the significant thing is that they do not adhere nor are they subject to the directions of Moscow. Isn't that what makes them different from other Communists?

Secretary MARSHALL. Exactly that.

Senator FULBRIGHT. It seems to me a good illustration of the point I am seeking to make is this is not a crusade. What we are really concerned about is the threatening force of arms directed by Moscow, is that correct?

Secretary MARSHALL. That is correct, with the results that would follow.

EFFORTS AT PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

Senator FULBRIGHT. I grant that communism has turned out to be an effective tool in the hands of an expansive power and one that has made it difficult for us to combat because as a nation we do not understand very well psychological warfare, for example. We have refused up to now to support adequately a propaganda effort.

Right now the House has recently cut I think 90 percent off of the recommended program and we have always had difficulty in the Congress in such a program. Well, it is in that field that communism is especially effective as a propaganda weapon, is it not?

Secretary MARSHALL. That is correct, sir.

*Note
Yugoslavia
is a
Communist
country*

Senator FULBRIGHT. It seems to me that is a matter which some of our people are a little bit confused about and it may lead to some important differences as to the way we approached the war.

VICTORY, UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER, AND NEGOTIATION

Now it leads to one other question. General MacArthur made a statement that was received with much enthusiasm that there is no substitute for victory. Now if it is an ideological crusade, I think the idea that you just can't compromise with sin fits very well, but if it is a continuation of the age-old struggle between tyranny in one form or another and the forces of law and order as we believe they are, it seems to me that there is room for qualifying the thought that there is no substitute for victory. Here is what I have in mind. We had unconditional victory in the last war, did we not?

Secretary MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FULBRIGHT. We defeated Germany and Japan unconditionally.

Secretary MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I would not say that the result has been entirely satisfactory, has it?

Secretary MARSHALL. It wouldn't seem so, sir.

Senator FULBRIGHT. So it looks as if we are justified in examining that idea of unconditional surrender, does it not?

Secretary MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Isn't that what you really are approaching in your policy in Korea. You are seeking a way that you can compromise—compromise is a bad word. It has come to have a meaning perhaps that is difficult to explain, like the word "appeasement," which used to be a very respectable word but now has become a word which you don't dare to use in any connection. So we will leave those two words out. Aren't we trying in Korea essentially not go for all-out victory in the sense we did in the last war, partly because we found that not to be effective to achieve our purposes, but to do something short of that which in this instance is to avoid a war as long as we possibly can, with the hope that we may never have an all-out war? Isn't that what your real objective is?

Secretary MARSHALL. That is the objective to the extent that it first appeared necessary to destroy the aggressor considering the geographical situation and the continued menace which would follow for the South Korean Government if that aggressor from North Korea remained in organized being.

Now, as I understood the application of the United Nations action in the matter and our own procedure in connection with it, we were trying to bring to a halt any idea of aggression, of any people who attempt that sort of action, and particularly recognizing that this was an aggression which was undoubtedly stimulated, organized, by the Soviet Union.

NEW CONCEPTS OF TERMINATING WAR OTHER THAN BY UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER

Senator FULBRIGHT. Yes. I grant that is certainly an essential and, you might say, primary purpose—to prevent the expansion of Russian power, to prevent aggression. But I cannot quite agree.

nor do I not think you mean to say, that that is all of it, that it is purely negative. It seems to me that we at the same time are trying to establish the machinery by which these international disputes may be settled by some kind of persuasion or reason rather than this idea of complete victory, unconditional surrender.

To put it another way: Do you not think we would be perhaps faced with a difficult situation assuming we completely defeated China and Russia? What would we do with them? Would we not have the same situation on a bigger scale than we have had with Germany and Japan—a very difficult situation with regard to administration? We do not have the people. We would not want to go in and administer. I mean that idea of complete victory does not entirely solve the situation, does it? What we really want is for them to give up their aggression and to accept the United Nations, is it not, which would bring a machinery for settling our differences by peaceful means rather by force? Would you not say that is really our objectives?

Secretary MARSHALL. I think our real desire is to have them establish the practice of acting like a decent nation should.

Senator FULBRIGHT. That is right, through the United Nations. That is the way we have suggested.

Secretary MARSHALL. That is our machinery——

Senator FULBRIGHT. That is the machinery we have accepted——

Secretary MARSHALL. For that action.

Senator FULBRIGHT. It seems to me that this idea there is no policy in Korea, that there is no objective is one that is not sound, even though this objective is a new kind of objective and one that is not surrounded by all the glamor and emotional connections that the old-fashioned victory is surrounded with. It is much easier to appeal to most people's emotions by talking with the language and concepts we used a century ago, but it seems to me this objective is just as real, albeit it is a new one, a new kind of objective. But it is one we consciously wanted new because we are not satisfied with the old way of having a war every 25 years. It seems to me that is what we had in mind.

I grant it is a very difficult thing to put into language that is appealing to the press and to the people, but that still remains the job, I think, of the Government to do it

I just wondered if some thoughts along that line might not be helpful, because I feel very strongly myself that that is what we are groping for in this struggle in Korea, the first and the most real opportunity to try to make the United Nations have some substance and have some real meaning.

We had that opportunity in Ethiopia and it was turned down by the League of Nations. Wouldn't you say that is a fairly good example?

Secretary MARSHALL. I think that is a very good example.

Senator FULBRIGHT. If we had done the same thing then as now, or, even better, if we had done the same thing when Hitler moved into the Rhineland and said, "No, you won't"—even if we had to go to war, we might very well have established the principle then we are trying to establish now; is that true?

Secretary MARSHALL. I think that is so. What we are struggling for is a genuine basis of collective action.

Senator FULBRIGHT. That is right.

Secretary MARSHALL. To secure the peace.

Senator FULBRIGHT. The trouble we have is that those words, "collective action" and "reason" and "reconciliation of differences" don't sound good and they are not sort of vaguely connected with knights in shining armor and they don't look good in headlines and that is why it is extremely difficult to sell these ideas to the people, it seems to me.

The other approach has a great deal more sex appeal in a political sense, political appeal, than the old-fashioned way.

DANGER OF WAR

One other thing. I would take it from that that you do not feel that full-scale war with Russia is inevitable at all.

Secretary MARSHALL. I do not think it is inevitable. I think it is a very dangerous possibility.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I agree with that.

Secretary MARSHALL. And I think the degree of danger depends a great deal on how we carry ourselves. One simple factor is that we prepare to meet such an emergency in time to have the deterrent action that we so much hope for.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I have had a feeling myself—and, of course, I don't pose as an expert—but a sort of feeling about the matter that if we can get through the next 18 months without a real war with Russia, that we might very well be over the hump, that they would not dare—

Secretary MARSHALL. How many months?

Senator FULBRIGHT. Just out of the air I said 18 months. I was taking that—that isn't far from what—

Secretary MARSHALL. That certainly will make a great difference in our strength if we proceed in the way we are going and we would present a much more formidable prospect to the Soviet Government in their undertaking an aggressive operation.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I think after this initial difficulty with our allies, that as this thing develops, our own differences can be reconciled and we are making progress, I believe, in spite of our mutual criticisms, toward a better understanding among ourselves.

CASUALTIES DURING LAST COMMUNIST OFFENSIVE

Which brings me up to my last question. Have you any statistics on the casualties of this last 3 weeks? I have heard it said, I believe, and read estimates of tremendous casualties, something in the neighborhood of 80,000 for our enemies and some three or four thousand for ourselves, of which a very large percentage were of our allies.

Is there anything secret about those statistics?

Secretary MARSHALL. No, sir; we will get you exactly that.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Do you happen to have them?

Secretary MARSHALL. I want to get the exact terms of what you are talking about.

Senator FULBRIGHT. That I would think would be interesting. I do not mean that casualties are ever anything but very sad things, but still they give an insight into the thing.

How many of the casualties were our enemies—I don't know whether you have it—dead and battle casualties, as a whole, and our own; and especially with our own, how many were Americans and how many were allies.

I was told, and I don't vouch for it at all, because it was unofficial, that ours were somewhere in the neighborhood of 4,000, and that half of those were our allies and half, Americans.

Secretary MARSHALL. Well, you spoke of the last 3 weeks, and I presume you were referring to, or covering this recent phase of the Soviet attack?

Senator FULBRIGHT. That is right.

Secretary MARSHALL. I will obtain that for you, in those terms that you have mentioned.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I think it would be very interesting.

Secretary MARSHALL. We have them in a number of different ways, but they are very hard to resolve to a particular period. I will have that done.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

I want to draw the chairman's attention to the fact that I took only 20 minutes.

Chairman RUSSELL. Thank you, Senator.

Senator Flanders.

Senator FLANDERS. General Marshall, I also am going to try to be very brief.

Did I call you "General Marshall," or "General MacArthur?"

I intended to say "General Marshall" or "Secretary Marshall."

SUPPLY DEPOTS IN SIBERIA AND PREPARATION FOR POSSIBLE OFFENSIVE

When General MacArthur was here, I questioned him with regard to whether or not there were any large deposits of, or reserves of supplies in Siberia which were adequate for carrying on a fairly continued offensive, as distinguished from a defensive.

I don't remember his exact words, but he said he felt that the Soviet preparations were defensive only, and he knew of no large reserves of supplies.

Now, you have spoken, I think of—I think you used the phrase "thousands of planes" in the Vladivostok region, and large land forces on Sakhalin.

Do you feel that the Russians are prepared for an offensive movement of some dimensions?

Secretary MARSHALL. I felt, from the information that has been given me from our various sources, that the Soviet had a considerable build-up in the Far East, which had built up in a rather recent period, notably in Sakhalin, and the vicinity of Vladivostok, as to the planes, and Port Arthur and Dairen, as to planes.

Now, as to the build-up of supplies, I don't recall exactly what has been given me, but as to the possible power of such a Soviet set-up, I have gotten the impression from the information that it conveys a great threat to Japan, and it was that reason in particular that caused me to exercise considerable pressure to have the two divisions of the National Guard sent out to Hokkaido. General MacArthur had asked for four divisions at an earlier period when there were none available for—

Senator FLANDERS. Hokkaido is the northern island—

Secretary MARSHALL. The northern island, which comes very close to Sakhalin, and my own fear, without recalling the exact details of the thing—my own fear was very great that our hazard was there, and we should terminate it as quickly as we could do it; [deleted] so that my reaction from the data was very different from that I read—which he stated; but I think you could get a more precise answer from the Chiefs of Staff.

Senator FLANDERS. Would you be willing to say whether you think the difference of opinion between yourself and General MacArthur, on this matter, is a difference of judgment or a difference of information?

Secretary MARSHALL. I don't know, sir. I have checked very carefully to see that all the information from the CIA went to his headquarters, and I presume, of course, he either saw it specifically or it was briefed for his attention.

Senator FLANDERS. Here is another matter. This is a thing which has puzzled me in the testimony.

JUSTIFICATION FOR FURTHER OFFENSIVE ACTIONS AS RECOMMENDED BY
JCS, JANUARY 12, 1951

Why would the various proposals of January 12, listed by the Joints Chiefs of Staff and sent to General MacArthur on January 12—conditioned on the conflict being stabilized, or having Korea evacuated—why were these suggested methods of offensive action tied to stalemate or defeat—perhaps the words “stalemate” is not equivalent to “stabilized,” if so, I don't know what stabilized means?

Secretary MARSHALL. I have talked about that in various ways, Senator; but I do suggest that you ask the originators of the phrase, and they can give you a direct answer as to what their intent was.

Senator FLANDERS. I have listened and, to some extent, scanned the testimony and still find myself mystified by that situation; but I will ask the head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The next question I am afraid I will have to wait for the answer, too: Why is not such a stalemate as you hope for a justification for the offensive actions proposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

I will excuse you—I just ask that question now, and am excusing you from answering, and reminding myself to ask the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

I think that is a very mysterious situation, from anything I have been able to read in the record here, or from any of the witnesses.

Now, Mr. Secretary, you and I are about the same age. I looked it up in certain books of reference, and find that I am 3 months and 3 days older than you are.

Secretary MARSHALL. That gives you an advantage.

Senator FLANDERS. However, I am not going to pull seniority on this thing.

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN KOREAN CONFLICT AND PREVIOUS WARS

We have seen, I think, in our lifetime, I reckon, about five wars. We have seen the Spanish-American War, the Philippine War, the conquest of the native tribes of the Philippines, the First World War, the Second World War, and this war, not now officially a war, but having all of the obvious aspects of a war.

I think in all of those except this last one, we have seen an immense amount of discussion and dissension among the American people, and in the Congress as we approached it.

However, in each case, as Senator Knowland said yesterday or the day before, when it became obvious that we were in the fight, the American people buckled down and saw it through.

Now, this latest event, it seems to me, has two unusual features: One of them is that almost immediately it seemed to meet the approval of the people—in fact, I must admit, or think, I can say that it met, at the time, with the approval of some of us who are criticizing it now; but it did meet with general approval because it seemed to be the thing to do, both in policy and as a matter of right and morals as well.

But there is one thing that it seems to me in which this particular contest differs from any we have ever had, and perhaps differs from anything that the world has seen hitherto, and that is that we are given no idea as to what the military end of our present engagement is going to be. We have presented to us a sort of vacuum. And it is my strong belief that the attractiveness of General MacArthur's program is because it drops into this aching void of one knowing nothing of what the military end is that we are aiming at. And General MacArthur proposes something to put in there and nobody else does.

I am speaking for myself when I say that nobody else does because I cannot get my fingers on anything definite except just keeping on a while longer and seeing what happens.

I think that accounts—aside from General MacArthur's great achievements, his great reputation, and his undoubted picturesqueness, he has offered an end.

REASONABLE CONCLUSION OF KOREAN WAR

I think along with that goes a certain suspicion on the part of the American people that there may be an end in sight, but one which is not thought politic to put into words. It is difficult to think of any conclusion which can be arrived at by negotiation with those who oppose us which does not involve appeasement. So I think that is the question that is in the back of the minds of everybody, and it keeps continually coming to the surface as the real expectation of the end—an end in which the military operations are concluded on an agreement which either immediately or in due course of time, whatever the due course of time may be, involves the recognition of Communist China in place of Nationalist China in the United Nations, and the turning over of Formosa.

Now, you have unequivocally and unhesitatingly disavowed for yourself that end to this military operation, as I have heard you and as I have read what you have said. But in the absence of any other possible conclusion presented, it seems to me that that suspicion is bound to remain and bound to grow.

And so I have made a speech instead of asking you a question, but leading up to this question: Can you suggest any end to these military operations which would be a reasonable conclusion to come to to bring them to a conclusion?

Secretary MARSHALL. Of course, I am a little embarrassed there, Senator, with going into statements that lead to the conclusion of a war plan. However, I can say this: Up to the present time, and particularly during the last 3 months, there has developed a procedure as to the way our forces are being conducted, first under General Ridgway, and now under General Van Fleet, which has been highly destructive of Chinese Communist power, meaning trained forces.

[Deleted.]

We face a situation where in the opinion of the Chiefs of Staff—and you can ask them directly—of the procedures to be followed there does not appear at the moment any along the line of the conventional military operation.

Just what we can do to change that aspect is a matter that is constantly under consideration, but as I have said many times, we feel that the procedures as proposed by General MacArthur of limitations that we should not abandon, I mean of not limitations, of conditions which we consider we should not risk.

Now I appreciate the point of view as to public reactions and congressional reactions in this matter. I don't know what else to say to you at this time. I do not think the situation is so dubious as has been expressed here a great many times, and I am getting an increasing confidence toward the possibility of a satisfactory conclusion. Whether or not it will be a military triumph or not I don't know how you would characterize it.

It would be a triumphant demonstration, I think, of our military powers in proportion to the people engaged, but it would not include, I am quite certain, the matters that you referred to which you fear in relation to Formosa and the entrance of the Communist Government into the United Nations.

Senator FLANDERS. Have you any thought or suggestion as to with whom we would treat when it came to such a conclusion as we hoped for? Would it be with some exhausted remnant of the North Korean Government or would it be with Communist China or would it be with Russia or who would it be with?

Secretary MARSHALL. I hope it won't be with Russia. I can't answer you specifically, Senator.

Senator FLANDERS. If I knew with whom we could treat, I could make a suggestion.

Secretary MARSHALL. Well, the suggestion might be very valuable. I will say this, though, that in treating certainly with the Soviet Union, and I presume with the North Korean representation, and I also feel certain with the Chinese regime representation, that we would have to proceed to get the best conditions but we would never dare relax with the feeling that they were conclusive for quite a time.

Senator FLANDERS. Mr. Chairman, may I make a 3-minute suggestion?

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes, sir; we have no limitation here.

Senator FLANDERS. Except that we are supposed to ask questions and listen.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, you will not be setting any new precedent if you make a great long statement before you ask a question, Senator.

Senator FLANDERS. Well, I will promise to ask a question at the end of it. This will not take me long, but if we knew with whom to treat, with whom to discuss, here is something we might do.

Senator CONNALLY. Mr. Chairman, may I ask the Senator a question?

Senator FLANDERS. Yes, sir.

Senator CONNALLY. Would you consider it proper that we might deal with an intermediary—some government?

Senator FLANDERS. Yes; an intermediary between us and whom?

Senator CONNALLY. All of them.

Senator FLANDERS. The question is with whom.

Senator CONNALLY. All of them.

Senator FLANDERS. Yes.

Senator CONNALLY. You suggest that.

Senator FLANDERS. Yes.

SUGGESTION FOR RESOLVING CONFLICT

Suppose that we ask our Ambassador, Mr. Austin, in the United Nations to call attention to the immense loss of life, the immense cost and the suffering, both of the armies and the civilian populations that was going on; make the proposal, which is essentially the original United Nations' purpose, of arranging a cease fire, but setting up a commission to administer the cease fire and the withdrawal of forces, but have ready a distinctly United Nations force in which we would not be 90 percent or thereabout of the thing, to maintain civil order, and then spend—allow 3 years of government under the United Nations to be followed by a free election at the end, and then spend a fraction of what we are now spending, and ask the other nations to appropriate their corresponding fractions to rebuilding that unhappy country.

Now, that is something that is new in the world's history, and it seems to me something new is required; and it just strikes me that if that is subject to the veto power of the Soviet Government their faces would get very red if they proposed to veto a proposal of that sort.

Secretary MARSHALL. I don't think they possess a blush.

Senator FLANDERS. Well, it seems to me that some unusual way out of this thing has to be found, and I am just making this suggestion, and I promised to ask a question at the end of it, and the question would be, Do you think it is worth considering?

Secretary MARSHALL. Well, I think certain phases of that have already been considered. I don't undertake to pass on the complete statement, but I know certain phases of that we have been considering very carefully; how, if the fighting was terminated, would we set up the situation under those conditions.

Senator FLANDERS. The additional point, then, that I am recommending, and trying to make, is as to whether the suggestion may not contain in it some things that would tend to end the fighting; that is, not merely to apply it after the fighting, but there may be in it something useful in shortening the period of conflict.

Secretary MARSHALL. And I might also say that Mr. Pace, if you call him before your committee, as I believe you are doing, can give you, I think, some very illuminating statements regarding the role he was

to carry out in the rehabilitation of Korea after this devastating experience.

Senator FLANDERS. That is all, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, General Marshall.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Sparkman.

Senator SPARKMAN. I have sat here all through this week listening to you, I have been here, I believe, every session and most of the time and, in addition to that, I have been reading the transcript each day.

I wish to say I think you have made a wonderful contribution in the manner in which you have cleared up many of these things that many of us were wondering about.

I think you have given us a background and perspective that otherwise we might not have had.

FACTORS CONSIDERED IN POSSIBLE USE OF NATIONALIST TROOPS

I realize that most of the questions that I should like to ask have been asked, most of them many times, and I hope that I shall not keep you very long. I do want to ask just a few brief questions, which I think will call for very brief answers; first, with reference to the use of the Nationalist troops. Now, General MacArthur in his testimony said that in his opinion it would take about 4 months to make them ready for use.

I did not get whether he meant 4 months from this time or from what time. Could you tell us about that?

Secretary MARSHALL. I can't answer that offhand. I have forgotten. All I remember is Chiang Kai-shek offered 33,000 the one period.

Senator SPARKMAN. In the period——

Secretary MARSHALL. In the beginning, and it wasn't found advisable to accept them on the basis of efficiency, equipment——

Senator CONNALLY. Didn't he refuse to accept them?

Secretary MARSHALL. I beg your pardon?

Senator CONNALLY. Didn't he oppose accepting them at that time?

Senator SPARKMAN. General MacArthur did.

Senator CONNALLY. That is what I am talking about.

Senator SPARKMAN. For two reasons.

Secretary MARSHALL. On our side of the water on the ground of the hazard introduced into the general situation in relation to enlargement of the war and the possibility of the Soviet Government coming into the war.

Again in November he made another proposal, which was either forty thousand or sixty thousand—I think sixty thousand—and the reaction of the Chiefs of Staff to that was based largely on the Fox group of 37 men.

Senator SPARKMAN. That was the group General MacArthur himself sent down.

Secretary MARSHALL. It came from his headquarters under his direction, but it was requested by the Chiefs of Staff.

Senator SPARKMAN. I remember his testifying——

Secretary MARSHALL. Covered most of the month of August and they made the report the 11th of September.

Senator SPARKMAN. As I understand it, this mission recently has been sent in accordance with the recommendations made by that board

and in accordance with the recommendations subsequently carried out with the Generalissimo.

Secretary MARSHALL. That is correct, I think.

Senator SPARKMAN. Now, General MacArthur also testified before us that it was not his recommendation that the Nationalist troops be moved to the mainland en masse, but that he did think that there were possibilities for a limited number to be used in Korea for some—through infiltration to join the guerrillas, the non-Communists on the mainland, and others to be used in small forays or commando landing parties and such as that.

I don't know whether you care to comment on it or not, but is there very much guerrilla activity going on? That is, back of the Communist lines.

Secretary MARSHALL. I would not like to talk about that, sir.

Senator SPARKMAN. I will not press for it.

UNITED STATES POLICY WITH RESPECT TO FORMOSA AND SEATING OF
CHINESE COMMUNISTS IN THE UN

General MacArthur did say—and as I understand, this has been the view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, too—that the primary objective of the forces on Formosa is to defend Formosa.

Secretary MARSHALL. Correct, sir.

Senator SPARKMAN. And has been from the first.

Secretary MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator SPARKMAN. General Marshall, that leads me to this question, and it seems that you are going to have to repeat this just about every day in order to keep people from saying the wrong thing—and that is with reference to Formosa. You have said here, without any equivocation, that it is the policy of our Government, and has been, I believe you said for at least 2 years, that Formosa should under no conditions fall into Communist hands.

Secretary MARSHALL. The reference to 2 years, I don't think is correct.

Senator SPARKMAN. I thought I saw that used.

Secretary MARSHALL. I don't recall making that statement, but it has been for some time the definite policy, it has been the recommendation of the Chiefs of Staff, it has been my own thought, and it has been the policy of the Government.

Senator SPARKMAN. And it is very definitely the policy of the Government now?

Secretary MARSHALL. That is correct, sir.

Senator SPARKMAN. And that same thing applies to the recognition of Red China?

Secretary MARSHALL. It does.

Senator SPARKMAN. And seating of Red China in the United Nations.

Secretary MARSHALL. Yes.

Senator SPARKMAN. And the admission of Red China—

Secretary MARSHALL. Just a minute, Senator. The recognition of Red China I am not commenting on one way or the other, but the two things I was talking about were their introduction to the United Nations and the security of Formosa.

Senator SPARKMAN. And the security of Formosa?

Secretary MARSHALL. From Communist control.

USE OF VETO TO PREVENT SEATING OF COMMUNIST CHINA IN UNITED NATIONS

Senator SPARKMAN. Now, General Marshall, you were quoted as saying that you would advocate the use of the veto to prevent the seating of Communist China in the United Nations and, of course, it is charged repeatedly that the United States is going to favor or at least to let go by sufferance the seating of Red China in the United Nations.

Now, you know nothing of any such plan as that, do you?

Secretary MARSHALL. No, sir; I do not.

Senator SPARKMAN. Did you say—the record—it seems there was a break into your answer, and the record was not carried out fully—but, in your opinion, if the veto can be used, do you believe it ought to be used?

Secretary MARSHALL. Well, I stepped into pretty deep water there. In the first place, I think I said that the power of the veto is a legal question in some respects, and it is any lawyers' respective view.

As to the policy of this Government as to the use of the veto, I am not sufficiently informed; at the time I was talking about it, I was endeavoring to make clear that I thought very positive action should be taken to prevent Formosa from falling into the control or the domination of any Communist government or regime.

Senator SPARKMAN. Or to allow China to be seated in the United Nations?

Secretary MARSHALL. The same.

Senator SPARKMAN. As I recall, you bracketed the two together.

Secretary MARSHALL. I have not discussed this with the State Department as to the veto provision, because that wasn't exactly my bailiwick, but I did barge into it.

Senator SPARKMAN. General Marshall, I want to say I am certainly in complete accord with you; yet I think it is only fair for the record to show the thing you have just said, that there is honest difference of opinion over the legal question as to whether or not the veto can be used, and I will call your attention—

Secretary MARSHALL. I was merely told by my lawyer in the Defense Department that this was a lawyer's paradise for backs and forths. That is all I know.

Senator SPARKMAN. We will not tie you into legal discussions, but I call your attention to an article in the Washington Evening Star of yesterday afternoon, an Associated Press article quoting former United States Senator Warren R. Austin, of Vermont, who is now our Ambassador to the United Nations and our Representative on the Security Council, in which he dictated a statement and, Mr. Chairman, I should like to read the statement into the record. Mr. Austin's statement in part follows, and I quote:

There is a great deal of confusion on the question of whether or not the seating of the Chinese Communists can be vetoed. The Charter of the United Nations gives the great powers the right to the admission of new members, but the Charter names China as a member of the United Nations.

Therefore the issue is not one of whether or not China should be admitted but rather one posing the question which one of two claimant governments should occupy the Chinese seat. This is a decision to be made by two-thirds majority of the 60 members of the United Nations and not one on which the exercise of the veto will be allowed. It is a question of credentials, not of

admission. We believe in rule by law and we believe the law does not give us the power to veto in this matter.

However, we shall continue to do everything in our power to persuade the majority not to admit the Chinese Reds.

I just thought that in all fairness to the record it would be well to have that placed in it at this point.

Senator SMITH. Will the Senator yield for just a second?

Senator SPARKMAN. Very briefly; yes.

Senator SMITH. Would you object to putting in the editorial on the same subject in the New York Times this morning?

Senator SPARKMAN. No, no; I would be very glad to because I admit the differences that do exist, real differences of good lawyers, and I would be very glad to have that in at the same point.

Chairman RUSSELL. The editorial will go into the appendix. I believe that will be exhibit F, according to the chart I am trying to keep.

Senator SMITH. Put those two editorials together as they are.

Senator SPARKMAN. This is an Associated Press news item.

(The editorial above referred to will be found in the appendix of this record.)

Senator SMITH. Thank you, Senator.

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes, sir.

USE OF SOUTH KOREANS INSTEAD OF CHINESE NATIONALIST TO HELP KOREA

Now General Marshall, there is another question I am not sure has been answered. If it has, I do not care about cluttering up the record, but the question that has always come into my mind has been this with reference to the use of Nationalist troops. Let me say I for one have always felt that the Nationalist troops on Formosa did constitute a real asset for this country both for the defense of Formosa and for possible use to help any movement that might be to our advantage. So I am not one that believes that they just ought to be discredited entirely. But the question has often come to my mind whether or not it would be just as economical and just as feasible to use these additional South Koreans that are available in lieu of the Nationalist Chinese, that is in Korea.

Secretary MARSHALL. Well, the best military opinion I can give you now and coming from out there is our present use of them in filling vacancies in the existing South Korean divisions is their most effective use, and it is not desirable under the conditions that now exist to increase the number of divisions. That is General Ridgway's recommendation, and I think approximately General MacArthur's recommendation.

INTENTIONS IN PRESIDENT'S JANUARY 13, 1951 LETTER

Senator SPARKMAN. Now, General Marshall, you placed this letter from President Truman on January 13 in the record yesterday or the day before, I have forgotten which—it must have been the day before yesterday because in yesterday morning's Washington Post was a news item headed—"MacArthur's views on message given." General MacArthur himself is not quoted, but General Whitney, his aide, is quoted.

The substance of it is that by the letter of January 13 the President, in effect, was intending to pull out of Korea, and that it was to be taken as an excuse—in fact, General Whitney used the phrase—"to make the Eighth Army a scapegoat."

Now, as a matter of fact, the impression I got from reading the letter was that the purpose of it, and perhaps the effect of it, was to stimulate greater resistance over there rather than any urging or indication of pulling out or withdrawal.

Secretary MARSHALL. I am quite certain there was no consideration of any kind in the most remote manner of the President trying to make the Eighth Army a scapegoat. I think the message itself can be read in plain terms, and I would not endeavor to interpret it because I think it is a simple matter of understanding.

Senator SPARKMAN. Was there any intention at any time to make the Eighth Army the scapegoat?

Secretary MARSHALL. I have just answered that.

Senator SPARKMAN. I mean not in connection with this letter but at any time.

Secretary MARSHALL. That would almost be treasonable.

Senator SPARKMAN. Well, I agree with you, and yet that is the statement that I am reading from this—

Secretary MARSHALL. I didn't select that aide, you know.

Senator SPARKMAN. United Press article. He refers to it in so many words.

Secretary MARSHALL. I don't care to discuss it, Senator.

Senator SPARKMAN. He says, "MacArthur wasn't going to use the Eighth Army as a scapegoat."

Secretary MARSHALL. I don't care to discuss his procedure.

Senator SPARKMAN. All right. I just wanted to be certain that we got it onto the record that it was not intended to lessen the resistance but really to step it up, was it not?

Secretary MARSHALL. I think you can read the message from the President and understand it very clearly.

Senator SPARKMAN. That is the way I read it.

MAC ARTHUR'S RECOMMENDATION ON ARMING JAPANESE POLICE INSTEAD OF SOUTH KOREANS

Now, I was very glad that you brought out many of these things in a true perspective—for instance, the message to General MacArthur suggesting the possibility of sending arms over there to use to arm South Koreans, by which the number could be increased, as I recall, a minimum of 75,000 and a maximum of 300,000, and he decided it would be better to use it on the Japanese state police. As I understand, the Joint Chiefs of Staff went along with his recommendation.

Secretary MARSHALL. I think that is correct.

Senator SPARKMAN. You told us that, I believe.

Secretary MARSHALL. Yes.

Senator SPARKMAN. Now reading the telegram that he sent back to Mr. Henry Hazlitt in response to his telegram, there is just nothing wrong on the face of it; but when you read it together with the directive that had gone out from the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the decision, why, it seems to me that, what shall we say, he was passing the buck. You will recall that he said—

Secretary MARSHALL. Yes, sir; I recall.

Senator SPARKMAN. He said it was a political matter over which he had no control.

Secretary MARSHALL. I didn't know whether you had finished or not. He did not receive a directive from the Chief of Staffs. He received——

Senator SPARKMAN. A suggestion?

Secretary MARSHALL. A proposal to which they wished to have a reply. And then he made a reply.

And as to the message he received, I don't care to go into the interpretation, its possible implication.

Senator SPARKMAN. Standing alone it would have been all right. But denying that he had any part in it, it seems to me that did not coincide with the exchange of the two earlier messages.

Secretary MARSHALL. I don't think he denied he didn't have any part in it.

Senator SPARKMAN. Well, he said it was beyond his "control" or some such word. I will get the exact language:

The issue is one determined by the Republic of Korea and the United States Government and involves basic political decisions beyond my authority.

I do not care about belaboring that point. You discussed it very fully yesterday, as I recall.

BRITISH TRADE WITH COMMUNIST CHINA

Now, General Marshall, General MacArthur also testified about the trade with Red China. Any trade that is going in there, particularly with items that are usable for war purposes, is a matter of great concern to all of us.

When he was here he had a report which have been given to him, as I recall, by the consul general at Hong Kong which showed that, I believe, some \$40,000,000 worth of products had gone through the port of Hong Kong over a period of 3 weeks' time.

He said that they contained both proscribed and nonproscribed materials. Then, later on he detailed some of those things that were included in there.

Just yesterday, I attended a committee meeting of the Banking and Currency Committee in which we had some people up to discuss this question of trade, and in the course of it I was given, and I got a copy of the speech that Sir Hartley Shawcross, the president of the board of trade, made in the House of Commons on May 10, and I was attracted by this paragraph:

General MacArthur, if correctly reported, seems perhaps not to have fully appreciated the nature of some of the information in the document itself.

He is talking about this report.

He referred by name to a number of items on this so-called strategic list, as I think it was called, but he did not mention the smallness of the quantities of many of the items involved. Thus he referred to petroleum, Diesel oils, fuel oils, gasoline, kerosene, and lubricants. Certainly, they were on the list. His recital of the fact caused very naturally great anxiety. What he does not seem to have pointed out, at any rate so far as the reports over here are concerned, is that the list showed nil quantities as having been exported to China. In fact, all exports of that kind had been prohibited as long ago as July 1950.

I close the quotation.

I presume you have no knowledge of those things yourself?

Secretary MARSHALL. I have not a detailed knowledge.

Senator SPARKMAN. Mr. Chairman, let me ask you, was this report that General MacArthur purported to be quoting from—I will not say quoting, but listing these things from—was it introduced, placed in the record?

Chairman RUSSELL. I do not recall that it was.

JAPANESE TRADE WITH COMMUNIST CHINA

Senator SPARKMAN. If not, I should like for us to request it from General MacArthur or ask the State Department to get us a copy of that report, and at the same time, I should like for you to ask the State Department to give us a report covering the trade of Japan with Red China from July 1 of last year to the present time.

It is my understanding that several million dollars' worth of goods are going from Japan, and have been right up certainly until within the last few days.

I do not do this in any sense of criticism, but to indicate the difficulty of this whole thing.

I know that the trade with Japan can be sustained on economic facts, but I think that it is well to have it in the record, have it available for the record in order that we may see the complexity of this whole trade situation.

Chairman RUSSELL. Under the procedure we have adopted here, if the Senator will just drop me a little note indicating these documents he desires, I shall undertake, as chairman of the committee, to secure them for use of the committee.

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes, Mr. Chairman; thank you, I will do that.

CHARACTER OF ADMINISTRATION POLICY IN KOREA

Now, General, just another question or two and I am going to quit: General Marshall, when General MacArthur was before us, an excerpt from a talk given by Dean Rusk was read to him, and I want to quote it to you just very briefly:

What we are trying to do is to maintain peace and security without a general war. We are saying to the aggressors, "You will not be allowed to get away with your crime. You must stop it." At the same time, we are trying to prevent a general conflagration which would consume the very things we are now trying to defend.

The question was put to General MacArthur—he was asked to give his opinion of that statement, and General MacArthur said this, and I quote his words, as found on page 100 of the transcript:

That policy, as you have read it, seems to me to introduce a new concept into military operations, the concept of appeasement.

Do you construe that as appeasement?

Secretary MARSHALL. Will you read Rusk's statement again, please?

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes.

What we are trying to do is to maintain peace and security without a general war. We are saying to the aggressors, "You will not be allowed to get away with your crime. You must stop it." At the same time, we are trying to prevent a general conflagration which would consume the very things we are now trying to defend.

Secretary MARSHALL. It does not appear as appeasement to me.

Senator SPARKMAN. Isn't that a statement of what we are trying to do, stop the aggressor and to prevent the spread of the conflagration?

Secretary MARSHALL. I think that is a simple statement of the effort.

CHINESE COMMUNISTS RELATIONS TO RUSSIA

Senator SPARKMAN. Secretary Marshall, as I understand, some of the basic differences in the opinions that you have stated here and the opinions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as you have given them and those entertained by General MacArthur, have to do with the ability of the Chinese to fight, the ability of the Soviets to come to her aid, and also as to the tie between Red China and Soviet Russia.

General MacArthur has stated on several different occasions that while China, Red China, and Russia were associates or allies, and I believe he referred to their courses as being parallel, that he considered Red China as being independent and acting on her own.

Do you believe that Red China does act on her own or is she subject to direction and influence from Moscow?

Secretary MARSHALL. I have gone on the assumption that she was operating not only in conjunction with but literally under the direction of the Soviet Union.

Senator SPARKMAN. Well, of course, I think so too and I think, I was greatly surprised when General MacArthur made that statement in effect when he spoke to Congress and again when he testified here that China parallels Russia but is not under the power or the direction, control, the influence of Moscow.

Thank you very much, General Marshall.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Long.

Senator LONG. I will try to be fairly brief, General Marshall, although I do want to cover several subjects. I believe you have been pretty clear with regard to your mission to China in 1946. There is one thing that I wanted to get clear in my own mind, however.

RELATIVE STRENGTH OF CHINESE NATIONALISTS AND COMMUNISTS IN 1946

I believe you stated that after negotiations broke down, that the Chinese Nationalist troops were defeated by the Chinese Communists notwithstanding the fact that there were about 3,000,000 Chinese Nationalist troops and about a million and a half Chinese Communist troops, is that correct?

Secretary MARSHALL. Those were the comparative strengths, I think, in December of 1946, and at that time the Nationalist Government was at the peak of its military progress, and from that time on it went into the down grade. Does that answer the question?

Senator LONG. Are you now referring to the close of the truce period, the period at which the truce was ended?

Secretary MARSHALL. The truce period closed before that. The general effort of the Nationalist Government to destroy the power of the Communist regime by military action had its beginnings in June.

Senator LONG. What year?

Secretary MARSHALL. 1946, and it was a sporadic procedure with a great deal of negotiations in the effort to terminate the development of hostilities.

Manchuria was somewhat apart at the time. It was very active fighting there on both sides, but in north China the truce had been generally kept, but, as I say, in June it began to react in north China and both sides became heavily involved here and there, and it was constantly increasing the menace of general fighting.

The actual last ameliatory efforts I think were in October. I have forgotten just what the exact date was, but it ceased to be a practical proposition to mediate in any way toward terminating hostilities because for my own part I felt that the Communists were so engaged in at least propaganda attacks against the United States and certainly some deliberate attacks which I referred to in connection with the marines in north China, that it was no longer a practical proposition for me to attempt to be a go-between between the two Governments.

Senator LONG. You stated that at that time you felt that the Chinese Nationalists were at the very peak of their military power?

Secretary MARSHALL. Yes, sir. Not military power so much as the military achievements, but I think I also said afterward that they had gotten themselves into a position of great weakness by an over-extension.

Senator LONG. Because they had overextended their position.

Secretary MARSHALL. They had overextended their position.

CORRECTION IN THE RECORD

Senator SPARKMAN. Will the Senator yield to me for about 20 seconds to correct an error?

Senator LONG. Yes.

Senator SPARKMAN. If this may be placed back where I was asking General Marshall questions, I think I asked this question wrong. General Whitney said that this letter told MacArthur to hold his position and that it represented a reversal of policy. I think I stated my question wrong a while ago.

The final question I asked you did bear on the same thing, and, Mr. Chairman, if I may in order that it be straight I would like to insert the item at that point.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator, under the procedure we have adopted here, you will have to read it if it gets into the record. Otherwise we can have it appear in the appendix. We will be glad to have it appear in the appendix just as it is.

Senator SPARKMAN. If the Senator will let me read just about 30 seconds, I will do so:

MacArthur believed, Whitney said, that the message differed from previous directives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff because it directed him to hold indefinitely in Korea. He said MacArthur construed it as the President's implication that he desired our position in Korea to be held indefinitely and that this was a reversal of the views he, MacArthur, had previously received from Washington.

Chairman RUSSELL. Do you desire the remainder of it to be printed?

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes; I think it would be well for the whole thing to go in as an exhibit.

Chairman RUSSELL. That will appear in the appendix.

Senator SPARKMAN. Thank you.

(The article above referred to will be found in the appendix of this record.)

Senator LONG. The point I had in mind is at the time these negotiations broke down, the Chinese Nationalists had about 3 million troops and the Chinese Communists had about a million and a half according to your best recollection.

Secretary MARSHALL. That is my recollection of the period.

RELATIVE EQUIPMENT OF CHINESE NATIONALIST AND COMMUNISTS IN 1946

Senator LONG. Now, what is your impression of the equipment the troops had? How well were the Chinese Nationalists equipped compared to the equipment available to the Chinese Communists?

Secretary MARSHALL. The equipment of the Chinese Nationalists was of a regular order. They were in divisional units and they had for the most part the equipment appropriate to that sort of a unit.

Senator LONG. Did it include artillery? Did they have good artillery, good tanks, that sort of thing?

Secretary MARSHALL. Well, they had not so many tanks and I don't know how good they were. Their artillery was in part good and a part ineffective.

The Communists were equipped with nondescript material, some that they had taken from the Japanese, some that they had taken from the Nationalist Government in various military encounters, and some presumably that they had obtained from Russia but we had a very hard time identifying equipment picked up in captures that were of that nature.

As a matter of fact, they seldom lost any equipment. They salvaged all their equipment in most actions because there was a great dearth of it among their troops.

Senator LONG. Would you say that generally speaking the Chinese Nationalists were far better equipped than the Chinese Communists?

Secretary MARSHALL. Very much so.

REASONS FOR NATIONALISTS LOSS OF MAINLAND

Senator LONG. Notwithstanding that, the Chinese Nationalists were finally driven off the continent during the next 2 years. What was your impression as to the morale of the Chinese Nationalist troops engaged in those encounters?

Secretary MARSHALL. It depended very largely on leadership, and I thought in the main they had very ineffective leadership and they handled their operations with a great deal of ineptitude, and I think that was the characterization of the operations many times by my observers and those that were out there after I left China.

Senator LONG. I have read details of even whole divisions that were sent into battle well equipped that surrendered without even firing a shot, it was said, but I am sure what the person who told me that meant was that they surrendered without making a serious effort. Do you know whether any surrenders of that sort occurred?

Secretary MARSHALL. I wouldn't like to answer that because I don't remember specific details.

It was a general impression of their failure to fight to the point of justification of the advantages they possessed in the way of equipment, but not to mention the disadvantages they possessed in the lack of leadership, effective leadership.

Chairman CONNALLY. May I intervene right there just for a moment. I heard General Barr. General Barr was our military man with the troops, was he not?

Secretary MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Chairman CONNALLY. He testified and told us that he never knew of a defeat of the Nationalists by reason of their lack of arms or equipment or supplies, ammunition, but that defeats were caused by their unwillingness to fight.

Thank you.

Senator LONG. I wanted to get the details on that. Now, do you believe or have reason to believe that substantial additional military aid from this Nation at that time would have changed the result?

Secretary MARSHALL. I do not think so. I think the question was one of leadership, and the question was one of the support of the army by the people.

Senator LONG. Do you think they would have changed the result had we had more American military advisers to advise the Chinese Nationalists tactically?

Secretary MARSHALL. I think the presence of American military advisers with the troops would have been helpful but what was basically lacking was the support of the army by the people, meaning the men in the army themselves had acquired a feeling of resentment toward the Government or uncertainty as to the Government which so weakened their willingness to fight that along with the incapacity of leadership their effectiveness was greatly limited.

Senator LONG. I have heard this story several times, that there was a great amount of, shall we say, graft in the ranks of the army, that in some cases money that was supposed to go to pay the troops went to the higher ranking officers, and by the time it got down to the troops, the officers had entered into speculations and inflation had set in so that the money wouldn't buy what it would have bought originally or that possibly the troops didn't get their full amount anyway. Was it your impression based on the advice given you by your military advisers that there was some merit to those rumors?

Secretary MARSHALL. There had been considerable merit to those rumors during periods of the war which General Stilwell brought to my attention.

At the time I was out there, I think in the main that procedure had been halted. Always there would be a certain portion of it because that was sort of habitual under the conditions of the years in China.

Later on I can only guess what would happen when the severely inflationary situation developed and it took so much money to buy anything and the troops or their leaders couldn't meet the situation without getting additional funds.

To what extent that developed, I don't know.

TRUMAN DOCTRINE AND GREEK-TURKISH PROGRAM

Senator LONG. Now, it was subsequent to that time that the Greek-Turkish aid program was put into effect, that the Truman doctrine was announced, is that correct?

Secretary MARSHALL. It was authorized, I think, along about in the late spring of 1947; but probably did not get underway until that summer.

Senator LONG. Now, in the Greek-Turkish aid program, particularly as applied to Greece, there were actually efforts made by this Government to improve upon the quality of the government by the Greeks, as I understand it, as well as to give them advice and military aid.

COMPARISON BETWEEN TRUMAN DOCTRINE AND CHINA

That program was announced and adopted subsequent to the unsuccessful attempt to stabilize the situation in China, is that correct?

Secretary MARSHALL. That is correct, sir.

Senator LONG. There is some argument that possibly at the time we undertook that bold policy in Greece, that we should have pursued the same course in China.

Looking back on it, do you have the impression that that would have been practical, at the time?

Secretary MARSHALL. Well, the effort of our Government, in many ways, through many people, was to try to bring influence to bear that would improve the administrative procedure of the government, and brighten it up, as it were.

Senator LONG. Speaking of the Chinese Government, now?

Secretary MARSHALL. Chinese Nationalist Government.

Senator LONG. Yes, sir.

Secretary MARSHALL. But the doctrine promulgated by the President of the United States was directly along that line.

What we did in Greece, was not done by compulsion; it was not done, we will say, assertively; but it was done by continual efforts along diplomatic lines, by the Ambassador, and it was done, and in this group that was sent out to Greece to make particularly the economic recovery of Greece possible, it was done in connection with that, which, of course, exercised quite an influence on the Greek Government because they were receiving money to do certain things, and if they were unwilling to try to clarify their governmental situation, it was confessedly in a poor way, why, they would be in a rather inconsistent position.

However, I think in Greece, though I don't know this authoritatively, the complication was—many parties, many parties, and under the threat of changes of control at any moment.

In China, you were not having any changes at all, and had not had for a long period of years, but they were suffering from the corrosive effect of people a long time in authority.

Senator LONG. By and large, one of the main differences of the result in the Greek policy and the Chinese policy, I take it then, would be the difference of cooperation between the two Governments and the difference of understanding between the people who were trying to work it out, and in Greece you had occidental people who seemed to understand our way of doing things better, and in China we had great difficulty in working out an understanding on how to try to meet the situation, I take it?

Secretary MARSHALL. Yes; we were dealing with a China of several thousand years of, we will say, culture or methods or procedures, good, bad and indifferent, and with a fixative which was very hard to overcome.

In Greece you had all sorts of complications, but they were quite a different character, I think, in the main.

THE MARSHALL PLAN AND EASTERN EUROPE

Senator LONG. Yes. Now, after the successful approach in Greece and Turkish aid, you then proposed what has now become known the world over as the Marshall plan to attempt to stabilize the world economy and particularly the free nations. And that was in a large measure proposed, I take it, to prevent the spread of communism, to prevent governments from falling under the domination of the Soviet; is that correct?

Secretary MARSHALL. It was to produce a healthy situation as rapidly as possible because we felt that in the poverty-stricken state of Europe, if that was long continued, we would have developed an utterly impossible situation governmentally, which would have been largely communistic.

Senator LONG. Now there has been some point made that it was originally proposed under the Marshall plan that the Soviet and her satellites could have shared in that program. Is that correct, that originally they could have participated in it if they cared to?

Secretary MARSHALL. It was wide open so far as west of Asia. And if you recall, Molotoff came to Paris with a large entourage of people to work on various aspects of it, and for some reason, which he would not explain, but apparently his feeling that the British and the French had sort of ganged up against the Soviet Union, and that I was in the plot, he, without any notice, departed from Paris.

But specifically, the proposal was worded so that it included all of those nations. And I might say, I think, that in the discussion with my own people in the State Department there was some opposition to stating it that way because they felt that the entry of the Soviet into the matter would merely mean a stalemate—they would just make it impossible to proceed. I felt that that was a probability, but that, nevertheless, we must make the proposal in those terms because it would be most unwise for us to set the line of demarcation which the iron curtain now does define.

Senator LONG. In other words, if the world was to be divided into two blocs, one bloc of largely capitalist nations and free nations, and another of Communist nations, if that cleavage were to take place, we should not take the initiative in making it so?

Secretary MARSHALL. That is it, sir.

Senator LONG. And you didn't want the remaining free nations to go behind the iron curtain, or to become Communist because of the economic breakdown of their economy?

Secretary MARSHALL. That is it.

Senator LONG. Of course, when the Soviet group declined to cooperate, that made it fairly simple for you to go right ahead then with the free nations that did desire to participate?

Secretary MARSHALL. In one way it made it simple, but we had continuous efforts, and in a very disagreeable and dangerous way, by Communist procedures to try to break it down.

Senator LONG. If the Soviet satellite nations had seen fit to go along, that might itself have posed some problem for the Soviet, in that by those nations cooperating with this nation, their desire would certainly have been to cooperate with our peaceful intentions to better the world generally. It would have been difficult for the Soviet to have

lined them up on that basis, inimical to the proper interests of this Nation; is that correct?

Secretary MARSHALL. If they had gone along with good faith, it would have had a tremendous effect in Europe.

Senator LONG. It would have been a tremendous effect in reducing the aggressive designs of the Communists in Russia as well as in their satellite countries.

IMPORTANCE OF FORMOSA TO UNITED STATES

Now the question has been raised about Formosa, and I would like to get your judgment on it if you would comment on it. Do you believe that if Formosa should fall into unfriendly hands that it actually throws our defense back to California and the western coast of the United States?

Secretary MARSHALL. I will try to recall how I answered that question this morning. I think I said that I did not think it retired our frontiers to that extent, but I thought it would be a great danger to our position in the western Pacific.

Senator LONG. Just measuring it on a map or on a globe of the world, roughly, I discovered that it is farther from Formosa to the United States than it is from the equator to the North Pole, and that we have a large and substantial number of islands between Formosa and the United States no matter what course one would take; is that correct?

Secretary MARSHALL. I would have to go sit down with you to study that map. That is a brand-new approach.

Senator LONG. Nevertheless, this Nation, having the greatest Navy that the world has ever known, and having air power that certainly need not take a back seat to any nation, do you see why we would be forced back in our defenses?

[Deleted.]

Senator LONG. I see. Now, if we bring Chiang's troops into Korea, speaking of the Chinese Nationalists, would that tend to complicate our problem in trying to arrange negotiations to arrive at a settlement of the Korean question?

I have in mind, for example, that if we get the civil war of China going on in Korea, it might make it more difficult to work out a settlement there.

Secretary MARSHALL. We thought of that difficulty, but our main reaction was to the development of a situation which would introduce the threat of development into a general war and the specific reaction in the opinion of our allies that this would be a very dangerous procedure.

Senator LONG. I see. Now, you have stated that under no conditions should we let Formosa fall into Red hands, particularly if we were in position to prevent that.

If Chiang's troops are not able to defend it, how are we going to keep it from falling into their hands?

Secretary MARSHALL. The move at the present time by our mission going out there is to try to improve their training and build up, we hope, their morale and also they have the stimulating effect of the commitment of this Government to help them on the sea in resisting, on the sea and in the air, of course, in resisting an invasion.

Senator LONG. Do you think that we can afford to make commitments indefinitely that will keep our Navy in position to prevent them from crossing——

Secretary MARSHALL. I could not answer that right now.

Senator LONG (continuing). To Formosa.

If we expect to do that indefinitely, that, too, makes it more difficult to work out a final settlement of the Korean question, does it not?

Secretary MARSHALL. It is related to it.

CHINESE COMMUNIST AIR POWER AND MECHANIZED STRENGTH

Senator LONG. Now, with regard to the fighting in Korea, how much more, if anything, do you think the Chinese Government would be able to do in carrying the war to us? You stated, I believe, that she does have a substantial number of airplanes that could be flown in, is that correct?

Secretary MARSHALL. I stated in regard to—Chinese Communist forces?

Senator LONG. Chinese Communist forces.

Secretary MARSHALL. The reports we have indicate a considerable build-up in the number of planes.

[Deleted.]

Senator LONG. Do you have the impression that China would be able to substantially increase the amount of mechanized equipment that is presently operating against us in Korea?

Secretary MARSHALL. Do you mean to introduce it into Korea or to produce it as a matter of industrial——

Senator LONG. I mean to send more into Korea. I do not believe she has the industrial potential to produce a great amount, but do you believe that she might have a substantial amount of additional mechanized equipment that could be sent into Korea?

Secretary MARSHALL. We have assumed all along that they have tanks in some numbers, and probably artillery.

Senator LONG. So far, they have used very little in the way of tanks, have they?

Secretary MARSHALL. They used them a great deal at the start; that is the north China element. Those were all knocked out, of course, in the end.

Senator LONG. You mean the North Korean elements. You said north China; you mean the North Koreans.

Secretary MARSHALL. Yes.

Senator LONG. Have you seen any evidence of the Chinese Communists using those?

Secretary MARSHALL. Well, it is hard to identify a tank from the air as being a Chinese or North Korean tank. Our air has destroyed a good many tanks from week to week, where they have picked them up on the road, and the great difficulty of the Chinese Communist forces in the war and the North Korean forces has been to bring this heavy equipment forward, because of the damage that is inflicted upon their transportation, and the damage that is inflicted on such heavy matériel by our planes.

They are restricted to movements almost entirely at night, and they have bad, very bad, trails to go over, and then in concealment, photographically and otherwise, we generally can locate about where they

are, so that they have had a very hard time introducing this heavier equipment into the fighting since it has developed in the present stage.

Senator LONG. Well, I take it then that you doubt that they are pulling their punches insofar as using mechanized equipment is concerned?

Secretary MARSHALL. I think they have done the best they could under the circumstances.

CHINESE COMMUNIST MANPOWER SITUATION

Senator LONG. And so far as you know, there is no reason to believe that they could send large numbers of tanks and half-tracks and motorized equipment in in addition to what they have already sent forward?

Secretary MARSHALL. Well, they may have been training personnel to handle this additional and larger number of heavy pieces of matériel, because they have had very heavy losses with what they have had, and they have to replace that with trained people, as well as the matériel itself.

I would rather assume that they are having more difficulty in replacing trained personnel than they are in the matter of the equipment. I am just guessing; and they are having great difficulty, I know, with all heavy equipment in carrying it on the front, and keeping it sufficiently concealed there to be ready for a movement forward.

Senator LONG. Now, China had an army of a million and a half in the civil war, and presumably they have increased their armies substantially more since that time.

Do you believe that they are able to maintain a greater force of manpower in the field than they presently have against us?

Secretary MARSHALL. I would have difficulty in answering that, except to say that I do feel that they have had a very serious proportion of their trained force debilitated, dissipated, in one way or another from the actions they have been in.

Now, to what extent they have remaining well-trained elements I couldn't answer that, but the Chiefs of Staff may be able to give you a more direct reply.

Senator LONG. Well, my impression is that so far they have had between 200,000 and 300,000 men operating against us, who were Chinese Communists.

A country of that enormous population, to a layman, would seem to be capable, at least, of putting millions of men into the field, or at least an army of a million or 2 million men, and that is a desire I have—I am curious to know whether or not you thought they were able to maintain a larger army in Korea than they are presently maintaining there?

Secretary MARSHALL. Well, I think you would get a better answer of that from the Chiefs of Staff, but you have got to consider order in China; you have got to consider their commitments to the south opposite Indochina; and order in China, and various strong locations which have to be kept under strong control.

Senator LONG. General MacArthur made the statement that China is already making her maximum effort in Korea. Are you inclined to agree with that statement?

Secretary MARSHALL. Well, I am inclined to agree with that statement.

[Deleted.]

Senator LONG. I would like to ask this question with regard to our allies in the North Atlantic Treaty organization:

POSSIBLE RELEASE OF EUROPEAN TROOPS FOR KOREA THROUGH SENDING
AMERICAN TROOPS TO EUROPE

Although we need more troops in Europe, I take it, why can't we work out some basis upon which they could share the fighting in Korea, while we send additional American troops to protect the areas within the borders of those nations?

For example, we are sending four divisions, as fast as we can raise them, to Europe. That gives them additional security. Why can't they send some of the divisions that they are raising, in view of that, to help out with the actual fighting, bleeding, and sacrifice that must go into fighting for freedom?

Secretary MARSHALL. We would be getting nowhere on that basis of putting in and taking out at the same time.

What we are trying to build up is a respectable defense in Western Europe.

Senator LONG. I believe that the average American would be very happy to have them put in six divisions and let us take out six of our combat divisions. They would get better protection, and at the same time have the opportunity to share some of the sacrifices, sir.

Has that been considered?

Secretary MARSHALL. I do not think that has been considered.

REINFORCEMENTS TO KOREA

Senator LONG. Now, along the same line, wouldn't all of our troops in Korea be safer if we had a reasonable margin of safety there? In other words, if we had more troops, wouldn't each man be safer and have a better chance?

Secretary MARSHALL. I think that is so.

Senator LONG. Therefore I was wondering why not send more troops, even if it was more of our own?

Secretary MARSHALL. You ask that from the Chiefs of Staff, and get their direct answer to that, because that is getting right into our general war plans.

Senator LONG. All right, sir.

MOST ADVANTAGEOUS TIME TO WIN A GENERAL WAR

Along a different line, do you believe that we could win a war against Russia, if the war was started now?

Secretary MARSHALL. I don't want to talk about it on the record, and I would rather hesitate to talk about it off the record.

Senator LONG. The point I had in mind is that it has been my feeling that if a war against Soviet Russia occurred in another 2 years or another year, say, we might have a greater certainty to winning the war, but that to win it would mean a greater cost.

For example, if the war occurred later on, even though we might have our Nation better prepared, you would have to recognize the

fact that the progress our enemies would make, in terms of atomic preparedness, would enable them to inflict much greater damage upon us, even though we correspondingly would be able to increase—inflict much greater damage upon them.

[Deleted.]

Senator LONG. Of course the point I had in mind, again, General Marshall, and if you would not care to comment on it, I would completely understand, but it does seem to me that in our planning, we are overlooking the fact that even though we might somewhat increase our certainty of victory by postponing a risk that we must some day take, nevertheless we are going to have greater damage done to us by postponing it.

Now, it would seem that if we would take stronger and more forceful efforts against China, that we could probably shorten the conflict there.

I don't know, but I assume that would be possible, might be possible, and as far as the risk of war with China, at least as far as Russia is concerned, it would seem like it might be unwise just to indefinitely continue to let her feel that we are afraid to call her hand.

Secretary MARSHALL. We are—what?

Senator LONG. We afraid to call her hand.

Secretary MARSHALL. Well, you would have to qualify that last expression, because when they are losing many thousands of people with each operation, the question is whether they will end up with any hands.

Senator LONG. In other words, you are not inclined to go along with those who feel that we are being bled white in Korea, while Red Russia remains aloof, with every bit as much potential as she ever had?

Secretary MARSHALL. I think the desire of the Russians is to have us bled white in Korea. There is no question about that in my mind—to have us more completely engaged there than we can afford to be, in view of the situation, the vulnerability of Western Europe.

Senator LONG. The point I had in mind being that if we could adopt measures that would bring it to a speedier conclusion there, even at the risk of war with Russia, is she gaining or are we gaining in this case.

I take it that you do believe that time is on our side?

Secretary MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator LONG. In postponing an ultimate conflict?

Secretary MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator LONG. And, of course, what you are hopeful of is that we will be able to prevent a war; that sooner or later we will be able to work it out without any war at all—that is our real objective?

Secretary MARSHALL. That is correct.

DISPERSAL OF INDUSTRY

Senator LONG. Do you believe it would be a good idea to further disperse our industry?

Secretary MARSHALL. What?

Senator LONG. Further disperse our industries in this Nation.

Secretary MARSHALL. That is getting into a pretty technical question at the present time. The dispersal of industry is a very expensive

business, and a very difficult business when you are trying to increase production.

I would not care to comment on that at this particular moment. I used to know pretty well all the conditions, but I don't know them sufficiently well to comment on them at the present time, except to say that that particular proposal has not been brought to my attention.

EFFECTIVENESS OF UNITED STATES POLICY IN KOREA

Senator LONG. Now, there are some people who feel that by taking a somewhat hesitant policy about going all out against our enemies, we may be actually encouraging them to become aggressive, on the theory that because we do not meet them with a more forceful solution to the question, that they may be encouraged to think that we are afraid of them.

Do you have any comment to make on that?

Secretary MARSHALL. Well, I would say that we have a very difficult situation in relation to things like that, when all of our thoughts have to be expressed publicly, and we don't get theirs at all.

Senator LONG. General Marshall, so far, with regard to the Berlin blockade and the policy that we followed in Greece, we have had the previous situations where there appeared to be stalemates, and that were enormously expensive to this Nation; and in those previous occasions what they called the stalemate proved to be the dawn just before the daybreak, didn't it?

Secretary MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator LONG. And that is what you are hoping this situation in Korea will be?

Secretary MARSHALL. Very much so.

Senator LONG. A prelude to a victory for what we are trying to accomplish.

Secretary MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator LONG. And so, although in one sense it would appear to be a stalemate, your judgment is that actually we are winning, at least we are day by day reaching what we could regard as a successful outcome of this venture to resist aggression?

Secretary MARSHALL. We are moving toward that.

Senator LONG. Moving toward——

Secretary MARSHALL. A successful outcome.

Senator LONG. Originally we started out, I believe, in your language to repel an attack, or repel an aggression and to destroy the aggressor.

Now, we are not trying to destroy the Chinese aggressors, as a nation, I take it, or as a government?

Secretary MARSHALL. The aggressor in Korea we would destroy, if we could, if that were a practical military operation at the moment.

We are destroying them, in one sense, day by day.

Senator LONG. Even General MacArthur has not recommended that we attempt to actually destroy the Chinese Government; so insofar as destroying the aggressor, we were at one time attempting to destroy the North Korean Government as an aggressor, but we are not trying to destroy the Chinese Communist Government, as a——

Secretary MARSHALL. We are trying to destroy the North Korean Army, and pacify Korea.

Senator LONG. Pacify what?

Secretary MARSHALL. Pacify Korea.

PRESIDENT'S SPEECH OF APRIL 11, 1951

Senator LONG. The statement of the President, on April 11, 1951, is to the effect that we are trying to limit the conflict, and that even though it may not be limited, that we are not going to accept the responsibility of being the ones that broaden it into an all-out war.

That is the policy that this Nation is still pursuing, I take it?

Secretary MARSHALL. It is not only the question of not accepting responsibility. We don't want to develop into an all-out war; and particularly if we would lose our allies by doing so.

Senator LONG. The President said in that speech:

If the Communist authorities realize that they cannot defeat us in Korea, if they realize it would be foolhardy to widen the hostilities beyond Korea, then they may recognize the fallacy of continuing their aggression. A peaceable settlement may then be possible. The door is always open.

I take it that in line with that, it is your feeling that when they proceeded to launch their last offensive, which cost them enormously in manpower, with very little loss in manpower to this Nation, that that type thing should hasten their realization that they cannot defeat our forces and drive them out and that should hasten the day when you should be able to work out a satisfactory solution to the Korean question.

Secretary MARSHALL. Somewhat along that line, sir.

Senator LONG. That is all the questions I want to ask you, General. Thank you.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Gillette.

Senator GILLETTE. Mr. Chairman, is it the desire of the chairman to finish with the General tonight?

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, of course, if that can be accomplished without curtailing any Senator in the questions that he proposes to propound, I should like very much, if we could, to complete the first round of questions today.

Senator GILLETTE. In compliance with that, I shall be very glad——

Chairman RUSSELL. General Marshall, what are your wishes in that matter?

Secretary MARSHALL. I beg your pardon?

Chairman RUSSELL. What are your wishes in that matter?

Secretary MARSHALL. I would like to finish, but I am in your hands.

Chairman RUSSELL. You may proceed.

Senator GILLETTE. General, a number of years ago when I was company commander, I used to feel sorry for the little fellow who was No. 8 in the last set of squads down at the end of the line; and during this long week I have been exemplifying that No. 8 man down at the left end of the line.

But, realizing how worn and tired you must be in this prolonged grilling, I shall make my interrogation very, very short.

ESSENTIAL ISSUES IN HEARING

We have been sitting here, as you know, General, in conformity with unanimous-consent request that the chairman of the Armed Services Committee had secured from the Senate and which he very cogently and very clearly presented at the outset of these hearings.

The Armed Services Committee is not only sitting in that capacity, in conformity with the senatorial permission, but they are sitting

in conformity with their responsibility as an agency of the United States under the rules of the Senate. We of the Foreign Relations Committee have been sitting in through their courtesy.

None of us are sitting as a high board of strategy, as I conceive it, but trying to develop facts that will aid in dispelling the confusion that is general throughout the country, which has been brought to a head with the recall of General MacArthur.

In my opinion, there were two great issues that have been joined here:

First, was there such a conflict of views as to the conduct of the military effort in Korea between the Commander in Chief and his Joint Chiefs of Staff, on the one hand, and the field commander, on the other, as to seriously imperil the successful conduct of the war?

Was an implementing field commander taking a position in public pronouncements or statements that would be made public incompatible with or having an adverse effect on policies of our country, which had been determined through the policy-making process?

This hearing, of course, has covered that over and over again, and you have been asked numerous questions and have answered and we shall continue.

I want to ask you just three or four questions in connection with that issue and then I will refer to what I conceive to be the second real issue.

EFFECTIVENESS OF PRESSURE ON OUR ALLIES TO AGREE TO MACARTHUR PROGRAM

It is asserted that we have been reluctant to accept some of the suggestions made by General MacArthur and those who believe, as he has asserted, that it does not meet with the approval of our allies and that we would risk alienation of our allies.

My first question, Is it reasonable to fear that our allies would risk losing United States' great economic and military aid by refusing to accept our views as to bombing Manchurian bases and blockading China coasts or using Chiang's troops as a Chinese mainland threat if we presented these proposals with definite insistence?

[Deleted.]

Senator GILLETTE. Thank you, sir.

EXISTENCE OF SOVIET THREATS TO ENGAGE IN WAR IF CERTAIN ACTIONS WERE TAKEN

The second question, Can any instance be named where the Soviet Republic at any time, any place, or any circumstances, including the Yugoslavian episode, threatened or intimated that she would risk total war with us with our war potential including our atomic-warfare development, if we took certain steps contemplated or suggested by General MacArthur to quickly end the Korean conflict?

Secretary MARSHALL. The question was not related exclusively to Korea, was it?

Senator GILLETTE. Yes, sir.

Secretary MARSHALL. I thought you said any place.

Senator GILLETTE. Can any instance be named where the Soviet at any time, any place, or any circumstance, including Yugoslavia,

threatened or intimidated that she would risk total war with us with our war potential, including atomic-warfare development, if we took certain steps to quickly end the Korean conflict?

Secretary MARSHALL. How does that question include Yugoslavia?

Senator GILLETTE. We will eliminate Yugoslavia. Has she at any time to your knowledge intimidated or suggested that if we took the steps suggested to end the Korean conflict, that she would risk total war with us?

Secretary MARSHALL. I think there have been implications but I don't recall any specific statement.

RELATIONSHIP OF SOVIET PETROLEUM SUPPLY TO CAPACITY TO PRECIPITATE WAR

Senator GILLETTE. Now the third question, Is it reasonable to assume that Soviet rulers would today risk a prolonged highly mechanized war with the free world when the United States and Great Britain together control 80 percent of the world's oil and could quickly destroy oil fields possibly accessible to the Soviet to keep these supplies from her? Do you think that she would risk a war with that potential?

Secretary MARSHALL. We have felt that she has built up her power to the extent that would enable her to inflict great damage on us.

How it would work out in the long run of the fight, I don't know, but we have been increasingly informed from various sources that she was poised ready to do that if she chose and gave every indication of not allowing the various moves she made to deter her from an action that might precipitate the war.

Senator GILLETTE. Now, those three questions I have just asked you, of course, are slanted somewhat favorable to the MacArthur view. This question I shall now ask you is slanted in the other direction.

POSSIBILITY OF GENERAL WAR IF MANCHURIA AND CHINA ARE ATTACKED

Many people are saying throughout the country in commenting on the MacArthur position, "We do not want a general war. We only want to bombard Manchuria and attack China to shorten the Korean conflict."

Now the question, Is it not a fact that there are others with great power uncommitted in this struggle who will take part in that decision? Maybe they will not precipitate a general war if we take the steps indicated, but maybe they will. Would not those of you and us making our decisions be completely irresponsible if not criminal if you did not take into consideration the awful possibilities of a general war?

Secretary MARSHALL. That is correct, sir.

Senator GILLETTE. Now I have four or five very short questions, or they can be answered, I am sure, very briefly, that I do not believe have been touched on.

[Deleted.]

USEFULNESS OF A CHINESE NATIONALIST ATTACK ON MAINLAND

Senator GILLETTE. Do you believe, General, as a military man, that the threat such as General MacArthur has advocated of an attack by troops of Chiang on the China mainland would have the effect of a

diversionary action that would compel Red China to withdraw the pressure on the northern end of Korea?

Secretary MARSHALL. I think that it might be an embarrassment to the Chinese Communist Government, but I do not believe, with my own knowledge of these troops, and with my knowledge of how much support they would have to receive from us—water and air, and particularly in securing their supply service and continuing it in action—that the result would be commensurate with the effort that we would have to make.

Senator GILLETTE. You have argued very cogently in my opinion relative to the claim that our present method of attempting to destroy manpower would be relatively useless because of the comparatively inexhaustible manpower that could be thrown against us by Red China. You have argued, as I said, in my opinion cogently, that the supply of trained manpower is not inexhaustible, that to be effective they must throw in trained troops. You did not in my recollection refer to another factor which seems to me of importance, and I shall ask you with reference to it.

EFFECT OF COMMUNIST TRAINED MANPOWER LOSSES ON THEIR EFFICIENCY

I hold in my hand what purports to be a copy of a memorandum, a letter, given by certain underground Korean forces to Marshall Carter of the State Department under date of October 30, 1948, in which the statement was made that—

The Soviet Ambassador, Nicholai Vassily, in May 1948, initiated the idea of a formation of an International Red Army in the Mongolian Peoples Republic to be known as the Mongolian Peoples Republic Army, of 250,00 men, and setting out the component parts that they contemplated.

Two thousand selective Japanese and others were picked to train 14,500 men to be future officers of this International Red Army in Asia, to be called the Soviet Foreign Legion.

Is it not a very important factor that the loss of these trained officer personnel would be probably to a large extent irreplaceable?

Secretary MARSHALL. It would be a matter of certainly very slow replacement, a very serious loss.

Senator GILLETTE. And it would definitely impair, would it not, the efficacy of any forces thrown against us?

Secretary MARSHALL. It would very materially impair their ability to make use of their unlimited manpower.

VOLUME OF OUR CASUALTIES IN KOREA

Senator GILLETTE. I wanted to ask you one question with reference to the percentage of casualties. To me it seems deplorable that with practical lack of air force thrown against our men in Korea, or the United Nations army, that we have suffered casualties of approximately 25 percent of the troops engaged. Is it not true that is a very unusual percentage in the type of warfare we are conducting there?

Secretary MARSHALL. I think the larger portions of those casualties developed during a period when we were tremendously outnumbered.

The casualties, for example, in the few days of June were as high, almost, as any month in the war. The invasion didn't begin until the 25th of June. The casualties in July and August were very heavy,

and a very considerable percentage of those were men missing in action, presumably prisoners.

Now, when you come around to the type of warfare we are now engaged in, of the past three months, those casualties, those casualty rates, have been very greatly reduced.

INVITATIONS TO MAC ARTHUR TO RETURN TO THE UNITED STATES

Senator GILLETTE. Just one other question, and then I will revert to this second issue.

I think in answer to questions as to the determination where the President should meet General MacArthur, and as to why General MacArthur had not been asked to come over here where the matter could be canvassed with him, rather than for him to proceed without, you stated that he had shown a "marked reluctance" to come to the United States. Is that correct?

Secretary MARSHALL. I think I stated that I thought it was unfortunate that he had not come to the United States, and gotten in touch with the public and the reactions here, and our other problems relating to the general situation in the Far East as seen in this locale.

Senator GILLETTE. Then, I am in error when I understood you to say that he had shown marked reluctance.

Secretary MARSHALL. Reluctance? I don't recall using that language. Of course, the record will show.

Senator GILLETTE. Of course, marked reluctance of any soldier, from a private up to the supreme commander is not usually considered a heavy factor in issuing orders to him, is it?

Secretary MARSHALL. Well, the reluctance, if any, expressed by General MacArthur, in my comments would be those of the advisability of his leaving his present responsibilities in the critical state in which they were.

I have here a summary, in answer to questions of some member of the committee, as to invitations to General MacArthur to come to this country.

I might lead off with one dug out of the record sent by me shortly before I retired as Chief of Staff, September 17, 1945.

I addressed this to General MacArthur:

When the situation in Japan permits, I suggest that you make a visit home where undoubtedly a series of welcomes and celebrations will be proposed. This would amount to visits to several representative cities throughout the United States, including a stop in your State.

Admiral Leahy has communicated with you in reference to a request from the Governor of Wisconsin that you come home there. In Washington the Congress would certainly invite you to address a joint session, and there would be a reception or dinner by the President.

Following all this, you would probably want to consider a period of rest. Available is a completely staffed de luxe cottage at the Ashford General Hospital—

which I believe is a reference to White Sulphur Springs, which was formerly the Greenbriar Hotel—

at White Sulphur Springs.

I believe your return should best be timed with the hearings of the congressional committees on the postwar national defense. They have indicated their desire to have you testify. I understand these hearings will be conducted during late October and November. Please let me have your views concerning such proposed visit, together with your desires.

It would be well to consider bringing back in your party some representative enlisted men as well as officers and naval officers, in addition to members of your staff.

Senator GILLETTE. What date was that, please?

Secretary MARSHALL. That was my message of September 17, 1945.

General MacArthur did not think it was wise for him to come back at that time.

Further search of the records show these invitations to General MacArthur, and I will give you a brief response:

On March 1, 1948, Congressman Eaton asked him, on behalf of the Foreign Affairs Committee. He said he was sorry he could not make the trip at that time. That will be in your records up here.

On May 27, 1948, Senator Bridges asked him on behalf of the Senate Appropriations Committee. He said he was sorry he could not make it at that time.

On August 12, 1949, the combined Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees passed a resolution that the Secretary of Defense request General MacArthur and Admiral Badger to return if not incompatible with national interests to give views on pending arms implementation bill.

The Secretary of Defense transmitted the resolution for MacArthur's comments, and MacArthur rejected the invitation. I don't know what the manner of the statement was, but you would have that here in your own records—the rejection.

Now, in addition, I found out on inquiry that in 1946 some time in the summer, the President sent a communication through his aide, to General MacArthur, inviting him to come back, in particular to receive a decoration.

VISITS OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OFFICIALS TO MAC ARTHUR

I believe that covers that phase of the matter, but I would like to add to it this further statement in regard to one of the questions asked, that is the visits to General MacArthur himself. I found that Admiral Leahy had not made such a visit, but that the Chiefs of Staff, complete with General Bradley, the Chairman, had visited General MacArthur in January and February 1950; that General Bradley in June 1950, interviewed General MacArthur in Tokyo, with the then Secretary of Defense, Mr. Johnson; and on the 12th to the 18th of October, as you just referred, he accompanied the President to the interview on Wake Island.

Admiral Sherman made the visit, of course, with the Chiefs of Staff in January and February to Tokyo to see General MacArthur, and in August 1950, with General Collins, he made another visit. General Eisenhower visited him in the period between April and May 1946. General Collins, the Chief of Staff of the Army, visited him in October 1949, and in January to February appeared with the complete Chiefs of Staff group. Then in July, he proceeded again out there, and interviewed General MacArthur in company with General Vandenberg, and in August, he duplicated that visit in company with Admiral Sherman; and then again, he made a visit in early December 1950, and then again in January, January 12 or 18, I don't know what specific time he was in Tokyo, in company with General Vandenberg, he made another visit.

General Vandenberg, I have already referred to, visited General MacArthur with the Chiefs of Staff in January and February. He visited him with General Collins in July, and he visited him again with General Collins in January 1951. I am sorry to have interrupted the trend of your questions.

Senator GILLETTE. Well, General, that answers much more explicitly, much more fully than I anticipated, the question that I asked you, which was specifically whether marked reluctance was usually a factor in determining orders to be issued from any member of the armed services, from the top to the bottom.

Secretary MARSHALL. Well, his regrets in each case were based on the importance of the situation there.

Senator GILLETTE. I see.

ADJUSTMENT OF POLICIES TO CHINESE COMMUNIST INTERVENTION

Now I have just one more question, and it is based, it is what I conceive to be this second issue, and it is based on this question from General MacArthur's address to the joint session of Congress, and I quote:

Our victory was complete and our objectives had been reached when Red China intervened with a numerically superior ground force. This created a new war and an entirely new situation, a situation not contemplated when our forces were committed against the North Korean invaders, a situation which called for new decisions in the diplomatic sphere to permit the realistic adjustment of military strategy. Such decisions have not been forthcoming. While no man in his right mind would advocate sending our ground forces into continental China, and such was never given a thought, the new situation did urgently demand a drastic revision of strategic planning if our political aim was to defeat this new enemy, as we defeated the old.

Now predicated upon that statement, here is my question: Did our policy makers at a time when we were suffering serious reverses in Korea, through the entry of new elements into the war, fail to adjust policies to the changed conditions and factors, and actually leave the field commander to operate without specific policies or directions for military implementation?

Secretary MARSHALL. I do not think that was the case.

Senator GILLETTE. That is all, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, General.

RECORD OF HEARING SO FAR

Chairman RUSSELL. Gentlemen, that concludes the first round of questions. I have heretofore referred to the unusual nature of these hearings, and I think the committee might be interested in some data that the staff of the committee has assembled with respect to this hearing.

We have been here now for 9 days and in that period we have heard only two witnesses. That is, so far as I know, a new record for investigations by a committee of the Congress.

The staff has assembled these figures as to dates: General MacArthur was on the stand between 22 and 23 hours, and General Marshall has been on the stand for more than 24 hours. General MacArthur's testimony was 787 pages; up to last evening General Marshall's testimony covered 700 pages, and the estimate for today compared with the same time for yesterday's, would run it over 900 pages of testimony, and that would be the case of General Marshall.

If you are interested, the words deleted from General MacArthur's testimony on account of the security angle amounted to 2,800, which is 1.4 percent of the total words. The words deleted from General Marshall's testimony up through yesterday were 6,600 for a percentage of 3.8 percent.

When we see these two men who have made such great contributions to their country appear before this committee and stand this grueling examination, I think I can with certitude observe that these men who came into the army in the period of the old soldiers of the song not only do not die but they are a tough breed and don't fade very easily.

The members of the committee have been able to get up, walk around, even retire from the room for a few moments on occasion, and neither of these witnesses has asked at any moment that there be any recess in the hearings for any reason, and have insisted at times when the committee has indicated a desire to recess, that they desired to have the hearings continue.

COMMENDATION OF WITNESS

General, I want to thank you for your complete cooperation with this committee. You have been here with us for 6 days, and you have had propounded to you innumerable questions dealing with a great many different matters.

In view of the fact that you have served as Chief of Staff, as Ambassador and personal representative of the President to China at one of the most critical periods of history, served as Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, why you have been asked about not only a number of policies but a number of specific instances.

Your recollection as to details and as to dates of all of these various transactions has been perfectly astonishing to me. I have sat here and wondered if I could recall as vividly incidents of my legislative career over the past several years as you have this very varied experience that you have had, and I have concluded that I would not like to have been put to the test.

Some of these questions have very frankly been repetitious and your patience has been almost infinite. You have replied to them again and again—not all of them. When I say "all," I mean all of them, of course, haven't been repetitious, but some of them unquestionably have.

I think we are building a record in these hearings, whatever else they might accomplish, that will be a rich treasure house for the historian when he goes to analyze and to write the history of this period of our Nation's history.

I thank you, sir, for your cooperation and for the great assistance that you have been to this committee. I am afraid that it will be necessary for me to request you to be back here on Monday morning at 10 o'clock.

I hope that Senators over the week end, if they don't read this record, will reflect upon these hearings. If they do, I think that they will see that the ground has been rather thoroughly covered as to the general aspects of the issues before us.

It doesn't mean that there won't be other questions that will be asked to elaborate upon to bring out different thoughts on some of

these questions, but I hope that it will result in avoiding going over the same ground again and again.

I want to thank the members of this committee for their splendid cooperation and for the calm and judicious approach that each Senator has made to this subject.

I still hope that these hearings will be of great benefit to the American people and we shall continue in our effort to arrive at the truth, to gain some knowledge of all of these facts that are of such vital importance to enable us to discharge our responsibilities as Senators under the Constitution.

Senator KNOWLAND. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if I could ask to have placed in the appendix of our daily record here the citations which have been given by the Government of the United States to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, one of them awarding him the Distinguished Service Medal and the other one awarding him the Legion of Merit, Degree of Chief Commander, and have it appear in our appendix.

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes, sir; without objection, that will appear in the appendix.

Any other matter to be brought to the attention of the committee? If not, we stand in recess until 10 o'clock Monday morning.

Secretary MARSHALL. You wish me here, Mr. Chairman?

Chairman RUSSELL. Mr. Secretary, I am afraid I must ask you to be here.

Secretary MARSHALL. I will be here.

Chairman RUSSELL. I understand your position. If we don't finish with you, we understand entirely that you must leave here Monday afternoon; but if you can be here Monday morning, we would like to have you.

(Whereupon, at 5:33 p. m. the committee recessed to reconvene at 10 a. m., Monday, May 14, 1951.)

MILITARY SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST

MONDAY, MAY 14, 1951

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES AND THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
UNITED STATES SENATE,
Washington, D. C.

The committees met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m. in the caucus room, Senate Office Building, Senator Richard B. Russell (chairman, Committee on Armed Services) presiding.

Present: Senators Russell (chairman, Committee on Armed Services), Connally (chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations), George, Green, McMahon, Gillette, Smith (New Jersey), Hickenlooper, Lodge, Brewster, Johnson (Texas), Stennis, Hunt, Long, Bridges, Saltonstall, Morse, Knowland, Cain, and Flanders.

Also present: Mark H. Galusha and Verne D. Mudge of the committee staff of the Armed Services Committee; Francis O. Wilcox, chief of staff; Torsten V. Kalijarvi, staff associate, Committee on Foreign Relations; and C. C. O'Day, clerk.

RESPONSIBILITY OF SAFEGUARDING SECURITY

Chairman RUSSELL. The committee will be in order.

Gentlemen, before we resume our questioning of General Marshall this morning, I desire to make a brief statement. It relates to a subject which has caused my increasing concern as these hearings have progressed.

Since this inquiry was first ordered I have experienced a deep sense of uneasiness. It was apparent from the first that the subject matter would be broad, as broad as the foreign policy of the United States. It was equally obvious that it would deal with almost every vital military and diplomatic issue and penetrate to the very heart of the plans for our Nation's survival. Such has been the case.

We are taking testimony not only on the general outlines of American foreign policy but on some of the intimate plans and information possessed by our Nation. We are entering doors that have been barred, we are opening books that have been guarded, we are unlocking secrets that have been protected in steel safes; in short, we are stripping the Nation's security framework to the bare skeleton. In some instances not only is the evidence stamped with the highest security classification, but the very form in which we receive it is secret. Its release without a paraphrase of the words would aid an enemy in breaking our carefully guarded codes and cryptographic system.

I had considerable sympathy for General Marshall the other day when he said that he sometimes feels as though he were compelled to

act as a sort of intelligence agent for the Soviet. Many of us have shared his frustration as we have seen his estimates, his recommendations and his proposed actions printed each day in the press for all the world to read. A certain amount of public discussion on these subjects is inherent in our system. It is unavoidable in a democracy.

At the outset we agreed unanimously that the matters under inquiry are so important that we must have all of the available facts. We have also agreed that the American people are entitled to every single piece of information that can be safely spread on the public record. To those agreements I am a party, but I have insisted with all the power of my being that these hearings should not serve to create an arsenal from which our enemies can draw intelligence weapons that they may use to kill our men in Korea or to imperil our future security.

Gentlemen, I can scarcely conceive of a graver responsibility. American boys are fighting and dying on a little tip of land thousands of miles from this hearing room. Our country is confronted on a perimeter of half a world with the most serious challenge to its very existence.

If any action of ours adds even remotely to the dangers that face our fighting men, if carelessness or indiscretion increases the perils that face our Nation, neither our God nor our fellow citizens will ever forgive us, nor would we deserves such forgiveness.

We have undertaken to throw about of these hearings every possible security safeguard that human ingenuity can provide. The original documents and the undeleted record are guarded as carefully as such things can be. The transcript issued to the press and to the public is being censored by the most competent and trustworthy man that we could find, but gentlemen, all of these safeguards, all of these carefully planned measures depend ultimately upon our acceptance of our responsibilities as Senators.

We can consult security officers, we can install safes, we can post armed guards, but only an individual sense of responsibility can prevent any member of this committee or any guest Senator from walking outside that door and revealing his knowledge to the world.

There are already cases in point. I have seen at least two newspaper stories purporting to quote unidentified Senators on evidence said to have been submitted to this committee which did not appear in the released transcript. I shall not of course comment on the accuracy or inaccuracy of such stories. To do so might give the Soviets a touchstone for determining which of them are authentic and which are not.

Perhaps neither of these will do material harm, but if others are to follow, we are indeed embarking upon a dangerous course. Somewhere along the line there will be a vital slip, and because of the slip men will die needlessly.

I am of course convinced that no Senator would deliberately release information that would endanger his Nation or his fellow Americans. That is not the problem.

The great danger is the ever present threat of a careless word, a slip of the tongue or in disclosing facts in confidence to those unworthy of such confidence. It takes very little to give the agents of the Kremlin a clue which may lead them to a rich motherlode of information.

The evidence being adduced here has not been brought us to appease an appetite for the sensational or to satisfy idle curiosity. It is being supplied to aid us in fulfilling our high constitutional duties.

There have been occasions when I have received information on secret matters that I would rather not have. It was unnecessary to me in the discharge of my duties. Some such information will be presented to this committee. This has caused me serious misgivings.

I have lain awake at night wondering whether by some incautious act, some error of judgment, we may betray something of vital import to our country. Although carefull censored, even the public record has carried some material which strike me as dangerous. I am sure it is a great understatement to say that there have been some matters publicized which it cannot help the country to have our enemies know.

As the custodians of secret information, we have a double responsibility to the American people. It is our responsibility to make wise, courageous, and patriotic use of it.

We have the added responsibility of jealously protecting it to insure it will not be used to our Nation's harm. This is no time to gamble with security.

Such stakes as the lives of Americans and the safety of our Nation are too precious to hazard. Let us embrace this opportunity to prove that democracy can meet such a challenge. This we can do if we accept in full the responsibilities of Senators of the United States.

Now, gentlemen, when we recessed on Saturday we had completed the first round of questioning of Secretary Marshall. There are those who had not been present and, of course, they will be reached on this second round.

I have only one question, Mr. Secretary.

RELEASE OF WAKE ISLAND NOTES

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes, Senator.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. If it is not offensive, before we get into your question may I be accorded the privilege of a slight comment on your statement?

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I agree with the most sensible purposes and objectives of the chairman's statement. I think we ought to try to follow it most meticulously.

Now, I think that an admonition is not out of order, or out of place; but I call the chairman's attention, and the committee's attention, to the great discouragement that occurs to the Members of Congress when certain newspapermen apparently get access to top secret documents that could come only from administrative agencies, when no effort is made in tracing down these leaks that come out of administrative agencies. I think that an admonition and concern should be given to the portion of this committee about that unwarranted and unauthorized access to top secret information that is given certain favored newspapermen and certain favored columnists.

Those things have happened with too great frequency in the past, and have happened under such circumstances that they could not have come from Members of Congress or congressional committees, but could have only come from administrative agencies. I think the ad-

monition can well be taken by the administrative agencies, and I would like to see a far greater zeal on the part of those agencies to protect top secret documents in the future than they have exercised, apparently, in many instances, in the past.

Mr. Chairman, for one example, I refer to the Wake Island top secret minutes. That is one of the latest. There is a myriad of them that emanate. Therefore, I think the chairman is perfectly proper in his statement to this committee.

I also feel that there are administrative agencies that have a primary responsibility regarding these documents, these top secret documents, that can well exercise not only a great deal more discretion but a great deal more of their legal responsibility in seeing that leaks do not occur. That information, portions of information out of these top secret documents, should not be made available to the public in such a way as to let the Kremlin know, if you please, what newspapermen have particularly favored access to information that the committees of Congress are not permitted to have.

SECURITY IS EVERYONE'S JOB

Chairman RUSSELL. I should like to say in reply to that that release from any source whatever, whether it be executive, administrative, or any other branch of our Government, on the part of anyone who is charged with responsibility of handling documents that are classified is abhorrent to me, as abhorrent as it is to the Senator from Iowa or anybody else.

I have been greatly concerned about releases that have apparently come through the administrative agencies of the executive branch. Some of them occurred even before this incident we have under inquiry here that I condemned, but I, of course, have no control over the administrative branch of the Government.

But I do have a very definite responsibility here that has disturbed me greatly, and for that reason I made that statement; but certainly the same admonition that I have undertaken to state here applies with equal force to any portion of the executive branch of the Government.

Senator BRIDGES. Mr. Chairman, may I comment on this problem, too. The thing to which Senator Hickenlooper referred disturbed me. If you will recall, the Wake Island report appeared in the New York Times. It appeared when it was classified top secret. The version which appeared in the New York Times contained some things certain items and certain matter that, even when it was declassified, were considered to be too secret to be released.

Now, that is certainly a serious breach, and personally I would like to see us find out who released that report. It is a violation of top secret security of the United States Government. Who gave the New York Times material which was classified "top secret"?

This is a specific case in connection with these hearings but there have been others, and, as far as I know, I haven't heard of one single, solitary thing that the Defense Department or anybody else has done to find out where that leak came from; not only to find out where it came from, but to take steps to punish the people who gave it out.

Now, I agree with all which has been said about the committee and the Senators. But I also say that people who had this top secret

classified information originally in their possession are the chief offenders.

Chairman RUSSELL. I reiterate that I condemn rather than condone any of the releases to which the Senator refers or any other releases that might have taken place, but I shall not use dereliction on the part of anyone else as an excuse for dereliction on my part, nor do I think this committee would like to use that as an excuse.

MAC ARTHUR'S STATEMENTS

Now, General Marshall, I have one question that I do not intend for you to answer now, but I wish to have you prepare an answer for the benefit of this committee.

I would like to have you furnish in writing for the record the text of all of General MacArthur's statements which are regarded as having significance in connection with his dismissal.

I would also like you to furnish in writing a full explanation as to why it is contended that each of these statements was considered to be in violation of directives or in conflict with known policies of the United States.

I think it is very important that that matter be presented for the record. We have dealt with it here in bits and dribbles but I should like to see a complete statement, and I think it would be very helpful to this committee.

Senator Connally.

Senator CONNALLY. Senator George is in a hurry.

Senator GEORGE. Go ahead.

Senator CONNALLY. Very well.

TESTIMONY OF SECRETARY OF DEFENSE GEORGE C. MARSHALL, ACCOMPANIED BY FELIX LARKIN, GENERAL COUNSEL—Resumed

USE OF GROUND TROOPS

Senator CONNALLY. General Marshall, do you believe that our air power and Navy could win a war against Red China and keep them from an invasion of—

Secretary MARSHALL. Keep them from—

Senator CONNALLY. Keep them from making an invasion of Korea.

Secretary MARSHALL. Formosa, you mean?

Senator CONNALLY. No. I mean keep them from coming over like they are now. Could our Navy and Air alone, without any ground troops—

Secretary MARSHALL. I do not think they could, sir.

Senator CONNALLY. I believe it is contended by General MacArthur that he would not favor sending a single soldier, ground soldier to China.

Secretary MARSHALL. That was my understanding.

Senator CONNALLY. General, if we become involved in a war with Red China, and Russia should intervene, in that case, would we not have to send ground troops?

Secretary MARSHALL. Well, we would have to accept the fact that we could not reach the ground in China proper except by air and close naval action otherwise.

Senator CONNALLY. I believe that is all for the present.
Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Bridges?

DECISION TO RECALL MAC ARTHUR

Senator BRIDGES. General Marshall, you said that the reason General MacArthur was recalled, as he was, and the reason he got the rather unusual notice, was due to the fact that the plan which was set up for notifying him of his recall, that of having Secretary Pace formally call on him and notify him, was changed. You indicated that it was changed for two reasons: One, that the power facilities broke down, and the message could not get through to Secretary Pace on time and, secondly, there was a leak.

Now, we have been talking about leaks this morning, and I would like to ask you who was present at the conference where this decision was reached on the recall of General MacArthur?

Secretary MARSHALL. I was not present, Senator, but General Bradley was, and I think the question had better go to him, because I don't recall exactly who was present.

Senator BRIDGES. You were not present when the decision was made?

Secretary MARSHALL. I was not present.

Senator BRIDGES. My point was that the leak must have come from a pretty high source. If you were not present and did not know about the procedure to be followed, why then, of course, you could not be considered responsible for the leak, and the question should be addressed to somebody who was present.

Secretary MARSHALL. I was communicated with over the telephone.

Senator BRIDGES. Yes.

Secretary MARSHALL. About 10:30 at night, I believe.

Senator BRIDGES. Mr. Secretary, with regard to the question that has been asked you on the conflict between the views of the Defense Department and the State Department, are you familiar with the Joint Chiefs of Staff views on the National Security Council policy paper toward Asia which was being considered by the Security Council in 1949?

Secretary MARSHALL. No; I am not familiar, sir.

Senator BRIDGES. If you are not familiar with it, then you could not comment on whether the Joint Chiefs of Staff were in conflict with the position taken by the State Department?

Secretary MARSHALL. I am not familiar with that, sir.

PROVOCATIVENESS OF BOMBING MANCHURIA

Senator BRIDGES. You reiterated several times, in answer to several questions, that the bombing of Chinese Communist bases and Chinese Communist supply lines might involve us in a war with Soviet Russia. But, as I followed your answers to the questions, at no time have you given a specific reason as to why you think the bombing of Chinese Communist bases might bring on a war. I mean you have referred to it in very general terms. Do you have some reason for that belief, some specific reason for that belief.

Secretary MARSHALL. I am sorry my previous statements were not clear enough. I thought I had explained.

However, it starts with the treaty relationship between the Soviet Government and the Chinese Communist regime; the possible reaction that might be the basis is one factor. Another factor is that carrying of the war into Manchuria, that is, north of the Yalu, would involve a very considerable reaction, and as to the Chinese Communist regime, whether or not the Soviet Government was letting them down in the circumstances that were created by that bombing, and the Soviet reaction as to what extent they could have a satellite as important to them as the Chinese Communist regime develop a feeling that they would have to go it alone.

Those would be the main considerations involved in the opinion that it was dangerous to carry out that bombing you have referred to. [Deleted.]

ENEMY STRENGTH ON MANCHURIAN BORDER

Senator BRIDGES. Mr. Secretary, you referred several times to the very sizable strength of the enemy on the borders up there in the Korean area. You indicated it is unusual strength. I want to ask you if it is not true that Russia has consistently maintained large numbers of ground forces and air forces on these borders for a period of many years even before the Korean conflict started?

Secretary MARSHALL. That is correct, sir, but I was given the impression or the information that more recently, notably since, I think, December, that there had been sizable increases in the garrisons in that region.

BERLIN AIRLIFT

Senator BRIDGES. General Marshall, another thing that you have referred to quite often in your testimony is the Berlin airlift. You have commented very favorably upon our ability to meet the challenge to Berlin through the airlift. You haven't discussed at all who was responsible for the necessity of meeting such a challenge. In other words, who negotiated the agreement by which we occupied Berlin, for example, without a land corridor for access to Berlin? Are you familiar with that, General Marshall?

Secretary MARSHALL. I think that came to its head in the Potsdam agreement, but I cannot be too certain between Yalta and that period.

Senator BRIDGES. But who would we ask that could give us that?

Secretary MARSHALL. The State Department would have the records.

Senator BRIDGES. The State Department would have the details?

Secretary MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

COMPARING EAST AND WEST POLICIES

Senator BRIDGES. General Marshall, in the light of your testimony, do you see anything strange in the logic which blames the government of the Chinese Nationalists for its failure to stave off communism after aid to it had been cut off, and the logic which praises the governments of Europe for being wise enough to accept our aid so that the same thing did not happen to them?

Secretary MARSHALL. I am not quite certain that I understand the question, Senator.

Senator BRIDGES. What I mean is, there is a difference of logic here, as I see it, in running through your testimony. Whereas Chiang Kai-shek and the Chinese Nationalists are blamed for their failure to resist the Communist hordes in China after we had stopped giving them certain aid, we turn around and praise European governments who have, after accepting our aid, been resisting communism.

In other words, what I am getting at is that we have done the reverse in these areas of the world.

Secretary MARSHALL. Well, I am still a little doubtful, but I will try to answer. It seems to me that the way you have stated the question implies that the withdrawal of our aid from the Chinese Nationalist Government brought about the fall, the inability of that Government to resist the Communists' infiltration and military—

Senator BRIDGES. That was what I intended to infer, that it was a major cause. I said you were right, I intended to infer that was a major cause in China.

Secretary MARSHALL. Then if I have got the question right, I don't think it's comparable on that basis for the reason that we provided a great deal of aid, and I know while I was Secretary of State we brought before Congress an item of 570 millions which involved the practicability of the Chinese Nationalists or Kuomintang Government of utilizing the funds that they already had to pay for imports into China, to buy the armament they might need, and that would be replaced out of this 570 million that I referred to. Four hundred million was actually appropriated, I believe, and one portion of 125 millions, I think, was left for them to dispose of as they saw fit. In other words, they could buy arms with it or not as they saw fit.

What actually happened as I analyze the situation was that they had taken the equipment that we had given them, the munitions that we had provided them and the airlift and fighting planes that we had provided them with, and had attempted something that we all considered was a military impossibility for them, and they had wrecked themselves on that basis together with the character of leadership that was involved.

They had a great advantage in equipment, they had an advantage in numbers. They lacked in leadership and they lacked the general support of the Chinese public because of the character of government that had been carried on through a period of years.

Now when they had overextended themselves, particularly in the matter of capturing cities, which they had to support, and the communications which they had to cover, they fell, you might say, of their own weight. That was quite a different situation in Europe. That is as near as I can answer the question, Senator.

NATIONALISTS' FIGHTING ABILITY

Senator BRIDGES. Are you familiar with the statement made by one of the principal leaders of the Communist Government of Red China to the effect that, back when the fighting was still going on, on the mainland, that they had suffered terrific losses, and that they had sustained 1,300,000 casualties?

Are you familiar with that?

Secretary MARSHALL. "They" being who?

Senator BRIDGES. The Chinese Communists announced that they had suffered great losses.

Secretary MARSHALL. I don't recall that statement, sir.

Senator BRIDGES. That differs quite a lot from the information which is put out in this country, that the Chinese Nationalists didn't fight.

If the Chinese Communists suffered 1,300,000 casualties, certainly somebody did something to inflict those casualties, and that came as a statement from one of the Chinese Communist Government officials.

AID TO CHINA

Are you familiar with the statement that Mr. Acheson made on March 20, 1947, before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, in which he said?—

The Chinese Government is not in the position at the present time that the Greek Government is in, not approaching collapse, not threatened with defeat against communism. The war with the Communists is going on much as it has for the last 20 years.

Secretary MARSHALL. Well, if I was familiar, at that time, I presume I was, I have forgotten just the details of that.

Senator BRIDGES. Do you think that was a correct statement, at that time?

Secretary MARSHALL. Hearing it today, the way you have read it, it would seem so.

Senator BRIDGES. You think that the State Department was justified in its opposition to certain congressional demands for aid to China?

Would you say, now, that the rather publicized Eightieth Congress possessed some foresight, and might have been unnecessarily belittled, in our actions, in the light of recent events in Asia?

Secretary MARSHALL. That is quite a question, Senator.

Senator BRIDGES. If you remember, the Eightieth Congress did take rather a forthright position on aid to China. I am just asking you for comment, General.

Secretary MARSHALL. All I can say is, in the document I read here before a committee, we asked for \$575 million, and as I recall, I may be incorrect, but as I recall, the Congress appropriated \$400 million, which would have some bearing on that particular question.

Senator BRIDGES. I did not get that.

Secretary MARSHALL. Which would have some bearing on that particular question.

Senator BRIDGES. You asked for how many?

Secretary MARSHALL. \$570 million.

Senator BRIDGES. And Congress appropriated how much?

Secretary MARSHALL. \$400 million. That can be checked. I can be wrong, but that is my recollection.

Senator BRIDGES. I want to check on it, too, because I think you are wrong; but I would not say so now. You are talking from memory, and I am, but I certainly would like to check it very carefully.

Well, do you think the statement that Senator McCarran made in the United States Senate recently, when he said:

Thanks to General MacArthur, Japan, who was our enemy, is now our friend, while thanks to the State Department, China who was our friend is now our enemy—

is correct?

Secretary MARSHALL. I do not think it is. In part it is correct; in part it is not, in my opinion.

DIRECTIVES ON CHINESE MISSION

Senator BRIDGES. Now, General, do you have a memory of a copy of a draft prepared before you went to China on your mission, your Chinese mission? Was there a draft of instructions to you prepared by the Defense Department at that time?

Secretary MARSHALL. I don't recall. There may have been, sir; I don't recall.

Senator BRIDGES. Would you check for us and find out whether or not there was? My information is that there was a draft prepared for you. It was prepared and cleared by the heads of the Department at that time. Then your formal directives or instructions, which you received from the State Department, were far different from the directive which was prepared or suggested by the heads of the Defense Department. If this is true, I think that the committee should have a copy of each to see the differences in the two directives.

Secretary MARSHALL. I presume when you say Defense Department, of that period, you are talking about the War Department.

Senator BRIDGES. Let me see—1947, 1948—we had a Defense Department—yes; that is right; it would be the War Department at that time.

No more questions.

RUSSIAN OIL SUPPLY

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator George?

Senator GEORGE. General Marshall, have you any dependable estimates of the petroleum supplies held by the Soviets in Siberia, the Vladivostok area, or in that area?

Secretary MARSHALL. No, sir; I have not with me. I would have to go back to find out.

Senator GEORGE. Have you that? Is that available?

Secretary MARSHALL. Well, I will inquire of the Munitions Board and see if we have anything, and submit it to the committee, if you wish me to do so.

Senator GEORGE. I would be very glad if you would do so. Is there any oil of any consequence in that area that is being taken out of the ground now?

Secretary MARSHALL. I think so, but I am too vague at the moment to answer that.

Senator GEORGE. Of any great consequence.

Have you any estimate of the oil supplies available to Soviet Russia, the Soviets, in the western European area?

Secretary MARSHALL. I have not myself, sir. Baku is the nearest principal supply that I recall.

Senator GEORGE. General, this perhaps does not lie within your knowledge, but I would like to know if Russia had the oil supplies in the Middle East now, would it not take her months under the circumstances of war, to lay pipelines and construct the necessary machinery and equipment for the refining of that oil?

Secretary MARSHALL. If she did not control the refining establishments already in that region and they were not destroyed, I would

assume that would be the case.

Senator GEORGE. It would take her months. Would you be able to estimate how many months?

Secretary MARSHALL. I could not do that offhand, sir. I think possibly—

Senator GEORGE. I think it is generally conceded, is it not, General Marshall, that even their refining processes are not strictly modern, including those that they have in the Western European and the Baku area. So I would like for you, if you can, to give us an estimate of their oil in storage, presumably held in tankers, as I can conceive of no other way Soviet Russia could have any great supply of oil available to them in the Far East, in the Siberian or Vladivostok area or Manchurian area.

Secretary MARSHALL. I will take your question from the record and see what information they can give you.

Senator GEORGE. What she has available in storage or from production in the western European area in comparison with the supplies that would be available to the North Atlantic area countries in western Europe in the event of an outbreak of hostilities.

BOMBING AN AMERICAN CITY

Now, General, in emphasizing the number of casualties that we might suffer in the event of the bombing of American cities, I think it has been suggested here and outside, as well, by responsible spokesmen of the Government, that the bombing of a single American city would result in more casualties than we have suffered in Korea since June 27 last.

I want to ask you one question, General. Do you not believe that the bombing of a single American city would unify this country against the Soviet forces everywhere instantly and to a higher degree than they have yet been unified?

Secretary MARSHALL. I would assume that would be the case, exactly as it was with Pearl Harbor.

Senator GEORGE. It would mean if Russia should bomb a single American city, she would have decided upon all-out war; is that right?

Secretary MARSHALL. That would be my conclusion.

Senator GEORGE. No further questions.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Saltonstall.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman; I would like to ask just a very few questions in summing up.

General Marshall, Chairman Russell has asked you for the written statements of General MacArthur that the Defense Department considered violating the President's instructions, and why. That is one question that is before this committee, as I see it.

The other question is the question of the policy in the Far East.

SUMMARY COMPARISON OF MARSHALL AND MAC ARTHUR PLANS

Now, may I just ask you to see if I have these summed up fairly clearly in my mind—the differences between you and General MacArthur.

Now, I have read and reread General MacArthur's speech before Congress, and I have listened to your testimony. General MacArthur

stated emphatically that we should never let Formosa get into the hands of the Chinese. On that I understand you to agree with him?

Secretary MARSHALL. Yes.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Mr. Secretary, General MacArthur has stated that we should never assent to the Red Chinese becoming a member of the United Nations. Do you also agree with him on that?

Secretary MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Third. General MacArthur advocated an economic and a naval blockade of China. An economic blockade is now, we hope, becoming more effective. When it is effective, I understand from you that you consider a naval blockade becomes relatively unimportant.

Secretary MARSHALL. That is correct.

Senator SALTONSTALL. You also agree with General MacArthur that no ground troops should under any circumstances be sent onto the mainland of China?

Secretary MARSHALL. Correct.

Senator SALTONSTALL. General MacArthur advocates the removal of restrictions on air reconnaissance of Chinese coastal areas and Manchuria. As I understand it, on this you do not agree with him as you believe it might tend to bring Russia actively into the war.

[Deleted.]

Senator SALTONSTALL. General MacArthur advocates the bombing of centers of supply in Manchuria.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Chairman, I hope the Senator from Massachusetts will excuse my interruptions, but I believe his question applied both to the coast of China and to air reconnaissance of Manchuria, and I do not know whether General Marshall understood that fully in the answer to the question.

[Deleted.]

Senator SALTONSTALL. I thank the Senator from Iowa.

General MacArthur's statement was on air reconnaissance over China and Manchuria.

[Deleted.]

Senator SALTONSTALL. You are also not in agreement with him as to the advocacy of bombing the supply centers in Manchuria?

Secretary MARSHALL. Under present circumstances.

[Deleted.]

Senator SALTONSTALL. General MacArthur advocates the removal of restrictions on Chiang's forces on Formosa and logistical support to contribute to effective operations against the Chinese mainland. As I have listened to your testimony and to the evidence given Congress, we are now doing more to help Chiang's forces, and we are sending over a military mission to advise them. On this, how much difference of opinion now exists between you and General MacArthur?

[Deleted.]

We also feel that at the present time while we are endeavoring to hold this to a limited war confined to the Korean Peninsula, that it would be ill advised to carry out such action since we are directly contributing to the defense of Formosa by the instructions to the Seventh Fleet, by our mission that we have established there, by the supplies that we are shipping there, and that therefore we would be endangering the confinement of the present operations to the Korean Peninsula. I think that covers the attitude.

Oh, I remember now. May I add what I was trying to think of. It does not appear to us—and you can question the Chiefs of Staff very directly on this—that the return from such action would be in proportion to the probable results brought about by such action. That is all, sir.

Senator SALTONSTALL. I thank you, sir. Do I sum that up, what you have just said, reasonably correctly from your previous testimony and what you have just said?

[Deleted.]

Is that a fair statement, summary of your statement?

Secretary MARSHALL. Yes, sir; but it implies the general trend of my answer which I prefer to have off the record.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Yes. Now I believe that those sum up General MacArthur's recommendations. As I see it, you and he agree on some, the principal ones on which you do not agree are the questions of bombing in Manchuria and the use of Chiang's forces on the mainland.

Does not the real difference between you—and I have been trying to get the differences of opinion to make up my own mind—boil down, as I tried to ask you the other day, to an effort to determine the Soviet's intentions and the Soviet's capabilities to carry out those intentions in the Far East, as to their effect on the starting of world war III?

(The reporter read back the last question.)

Secretary MARSHALL. Senator, the portion of your question which brings up the consideration of developing the Soviet intentions I don't quite understand because we could find out very quickly if we did some of these things that we think hazard our entrance into a full war.

We would learn their intentions in a very positive manner. Now other than that, I assume you are referring to our intelligence services as to what is going on.

Senator SALTONSTALL. No. Perhaps I didn't put my question clearly, General Marshall.

What I was trying to analyze was the difference of opinion between you and General MacArthur, through your testimony and his, before this committee, particularly of the effect of bombing in Manchuria, and the use of Chinese Nationalist forces on the mainland.

To put it in the form of a question, doesn't the difference of opinion between you really boil down to the question of trying to analyze, as a calculated risk, to use that expression, the Soviet's intentions in the Far East, and their capability of carrying out those intentions, in other words?

Secretary MARSHALL. I understand that question; and I think——

Senator SALTONSTALL. That is what I am trying to say.

Secretary MARSHALL. That is a positive difference. Analyzing that difference met my previous comment.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Well, haven't we, as members of this committee, got to determine, in our judgment, if we have to reach a conclusion on this subject, as to whether the calculated risk is best, one way, or the calculated risk is best the other way, as far as the United States is concerned?

Secretary MARSHALL. I think so.

I might add a consideration to those questions that you have just asked, which I would assume General MacArthur did not bring into his

statements here in this country: That is, the effect of utilizing Chinese Nationalist troops from Formosa, in Korea; and I would disagree as to that.

Senator SALTONSTALL. What was that last?

Secretary MARSHALL. I would disagree as to that.

Senator SALTONSTALL. I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Smith.

Senator SMITH. General Marshall, I have a few questions here that I would like to ask you, if I may.

I was talking with Senator Thye of Minnesota, after the hearing on Saturday, and he raised a question with me with regard to the Yalta Conference. I told him that I would be glad to join with him in asking certain questions to clear up some doubts in my own mind on that subject.

My first question is: Did you testify that you were one of the United States representatives at Yalta?

Secretary MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

CHINA UNREPRESENTED AT YALTA

Senator SMITH. Let me ask you: Why were Nationalist China and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek not included in the Yalta Conference?

Secretary MARSHALL. Well, that is a question directed at a portion of the conference with which I am not familiar. I should imagine the reason was that the Russian Government was not at war with Japan at that time, and one of the problems the Japanese had to consider was whether or not the Russian Government would go to war with Japan.

The Chinese Nationalist Government under Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek was at war with Japan. I should imagine in those circumstances there was that reason, though I don't know, and you will have to ask that of some other source.

Senator SMITH. The reason for my question is that there was some disposition of China's status, and so forth at the Yalta Conference. I was wondering why—

Secretary MARSHALL. I was not in the political portion.

Senator SMITH. That was the political side, of course. Do you recall what was the secret agreement that affected China at Yalta?

Secretary MARSHALL. Well, I wish you would ask that of the State Department and not of me, sir.

YALTA SECRET AGREEMENT

Senator SMITH. I find in the book by Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., entitled "Roosevelt and the Russians; the Yalta Conference"—

Secretary MARSHALL. I think I know what you are talking about. I remember your question the other day. We have been checking to see if there was a secret agreement of a military nature.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Stettinius was there as Secretary of State at that time. He says on pages 93 and 94 of that book that on February 11, 1945, the following agreement was signed by Marshal Stalin, Prime Minister Churchill, and President Roosevelt, and then follows the agreement, which is just a page.

Mr. Chairman, if I may have this inserted in this place in the record, I won't read it, except the high spots, but if it has to go in the appendix—

Chairman RUSSELL. In accordance with our policy, it will have to appear in the appendix unless you read it.

Senator SMITH. The following agreement, referred to later as the secret agreement, is as follows. Now I am quoting from Mr. Stettinius:

The leaders of the three Great Powers—the Soviet Union, the United States of America and Great Britain—have agreed that in 2 or 3 months after Germany has surrendered and the war in Europe has terminated the Soviet Union shall enter into the war against Japan on the side of the Allies on condition that:

1. The status quo in Outer-Mongolia (The Mongolian People's Republic) shall be preserved;

2. The former rights of Russia violated by the treacherous attack of Japan in 1904 shall be restored, viz:

(a) the southern part of Sakhalin as well as all the islands adjacent to it shall be returned to the Soviet Union.

(b) the commercial port of Dairen shall be internationalized, the preeminent interests of the Soviet Union in this port being safeguarded and the lease of Port Arthur as a naval base of the U. S. S. R. restored.

(c) the Chinese-Eastern Railroad and the South Manchurian Railroad which provides an outlet to Dairen shall be jointly operated by the establishment of a joint Soviet-Chinese company, it being understood that the preeminent interests of the Soviet Union shall be safeguarded and that China shall retain full sovereignty in Manchuria;

3. The Kurile Islands shall be handed over to the Soviet Union.

It is understood that the agreement concerning Outer Mongolia and the ports and railroads referred to above will require concurrence of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. The President will take measures in order to obtain this concurrence on advice from Marshal Stalin.

The heads of the three great powers have agreed that these claims of the Soviet Union shall be unquestionably fulfilled after Japan has been defeated.

For its part, the Soviet Union expresses its readiness to conclude with the National Government of China a pact of friendship and alliance between the U. S. S. R. and China in order to render assistance to China with its armed forces for the purpose of liberating China from the Japanese yoke.

That is the end of the secret agreement as reported by Mr. Stettinius.

STETTINIUS COMMENTS ON YALTA

This is important. Mr. Stettinius goes on to say in his book on page 94, just following the quotation of the text of this secret agreement:

This agreement regarding Japan, a top secret document, did not appear in the protocol of the Yalta Conference. It was taken to Washington and deposited in the President's personal safe. Few of the President's closest advisers knew of its existence. It was feared that if too many people knew about it, the information would leak out and reach Japan.

Then, a little lower down the same page, Mr. Stettinius writes, and I quote again:

The Chinese were not notified immediately of this agreement at Yalta for fear the secret would not be kept in Chungking. Marshal Stalin told President Roosevelt at Yalta that the Russians would start sending divisions across Siberia but insisted that this must be done in complete secrecy. The President agreed, therefore, that only after the troop movements were completed would he explain the situation to the Chinese.

The President, of course, did not live long enough to do this.

That is the end of Mr. Stettinius' quotation.

MARSHALL'S FAMILIARITY WITH YALTA AGREEMENT

Now, I would like to ask you if you were familiar with this so-called secret agreement with regard to China?

Secretary MARSHALL. I did not know the factors of it at the time.

Senator SMITH. Can you tell me how this agreement with Russia was carried out? Was Russia to take over the surrender of Manchuria? I do not remember that.

Secretary MARSHALL. Russia did.

CAPTURED JAPANESE WEAPONS

Senator SMITH. That was my recollection. Did Russia turn over the Japanese-captured arms, and so forth, which they got in Manchuria by surrender to the Chinese Communists?

Secretary MARSHALL. So far as we know, they left them in dumps in Manchuria, and when they withdrew they were opened to Chinese Communists, who rearmed themselves.

Senator SMITH. The Chinese Communists got them.

Did this possibly cause Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek to lose face in China, especially in Manchuria? He was not notified of something happening. The Russians came in and took over the surrender of the Japanese. These arms were turned over to the Communists, just at the time the generalissimo was having his trouble with the Communists.

Secretary MARSHALL. I think, Senator, most of the weapons from dumps in Manchuria were taken over by the Chinese Communists at a much later date, after the generalissimo was and had been apprised of the factors that you have been referring to.

My own recollection is that that apparently occurred with the Russian formal withdrawal from Manchuria, after I went to China, and in 1946.

I know they were as far south, as the reports show, as the Yellow Sea at the time I was there, and this was quite a long period before they made the evacuation.

SOVIET EVACUATION OF CHINA

The Chinese Government, I believe, requested a delay of 1 or 2 months in the evacuation schedule for the Soviet troops, because they were not prepared to take over, and they wished to take over from the Soviet troops before the Communists could arrive in force.

Now, I think after that——

Senator SMITH. You meant by that, the Nationalist Government, Chiang Kai-shek's Government?

Secretary MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator SMITH. Very well.

Secretary MARSHALL. Now, after that, the Soviet troops withdrew, and my recollection of the factors involved in that were that they virtually removed most of the rolling stock in that withdrawal, which left little for the Nationalist Government to utilize for its troops in following up the withdrawal, and we never knew specifically what happened, but there were rumors, and there were accusations, on the part of the Chinese Nationalist Government that Communist troops had

been facilitated in their movement north, and they then obtained these dumps of supplies.

Senator SMITH. Well, those are the rumors and the story that we have all heard with regard to that. Of course, it would be followed up by the thought, as I was told in China, that with those developments the people of China felt that Great Britain and the United States had not done much for Chiang Kai-shek. To use a slang expression, they had sold him down the river at Yalta in this secret agreement, with the Russians taking over, and those supplies going to the Chinese Communists.

CHIANG'S PRESTIGE AS AFFECTED BY YALTA

My question is to this purpose: We have later been saying that Chiang Kai-shek lost his prestige, lost face and that a lot of his troops defected, going over to the other side.

Now is it not a fair question to ask whether these developments in Manchuria along with this secret agreement at Yalta were not important contributory factors resulting in the loss of morale in Chiang's troops, their later defection, and to the falling away of the Chinese people from Chiang? I believe you testified to this earlier as undoubtedly being the case.

Secretary MARSHALL. I assume that the knowledge of these proposed concessions, as it were, to be made by the Chinese Nationalist Government in their established relations with the Soviet Government, certainly were a great worry to the generalissimo. How much was publicized over China generally I don't know. But, on the other hand, there was a movement of troops into Manchuria, which was carried out by our Navy, and they were landed there; and supplies were gotten for them there.

I personally arranged to have all our subarctic clothing brought down; had the officer go with it until it was all shipped, headed for the Manchurian coast.

We also transported ammunition I think directly from Okinawa to the Manchurian coast as a base of supply for those forces because they were going in with very inadequate supplies and very inadequate clothing into the winter of early 1946, so that, so far as the military reaction is concerned, we had a very large movement I think of five or six armies to Manchuria—these figures are obtainable from the records—and transported by our naval shipping, and the troops themselves equipped with these special clothes that we were providing for them when the first units had gone in there with cotton clothes from down near Canton, and it was 30° and 40° below zero, so you will have to make your own estimate as to the reaction of the troops, as to the generalissimo losing face.

I would suppose that, so far as those troops are concerned, that would not have been the case.

CHINESE DEMOCRATIC LEADERSHIP

Senator SMITH. One question more on that China situation when you were there. What steps if any were taken by the United States to help train a free and democratic leadership in China? We have heard General Chiang criticized for not developing a democratic leadership and meeting the needs of the people.

Now I know we did contribute military aid and advice for a time there, but did we contribute any efforts to develop a free and democratic leadership in China to bring about reforms that might have helped Chiang Kai-shek's administration?

Secretary MARSHALL. I am trying to figure out in my own mind how much is the military part and how much is the political part.

On the military side we set up this military mission to which I have referred, and did it under the war powers of the President, and that was to engage in developing an effective army.

We ran into the difficulty of not being able to convince them that they could do a great deal south of the Yangtze River in preparing a solid basis for their military forces, what we are doing in this country, what we call basic military training.

I wanted that established all over that portion of central China south of the river, and had virtually picked out the man to direct it and arranged it so it would be done in such a manner it wouldn't revitalize the military control of the civil authority which we were trying to see developed, but we were not successful in that.

As to the commanders, where I thought their great weakness lay, a large number were demobilized but had to be continued on the payroll, and as to top commanders, we were far less successful because where I proposed the relief of this one and the relief of that one, I was not successful in doing so, notably in Manchuria. They were getting into trouble in which they could not sustain themselves.

That is the best I can give you on the military side. Now on the political side in the set-up of the military system that was proposed and which was approved in connection with the demobilization of the forces and their reorganization and their integration, it was so set up that the military would no longer have control of the civil authorities, that military command would be restricted to military forces just as it is in this country.

And the supply factor would be handled so nearly as it was arrangeable in a way that could not be perverted and twisted off to some other use, and would be less subject to bad faith in the way it was conducted.

That is a statement largely military, but it was basic as to the build-up of any kind of a democratic government, because in each region where there was a military commander he commanded that region and his troops were his sanction for that control. That had to be broken down or we got nowhere beyond a military dictatorship in effect. So the terms of the demobilization, which are in print, as a matter of fact, envisaged a very careful set-up to prevent the continuance of that manner of military control which was exerted throughout the country.

TRANSFERRING UNITED STATES ALLIANCE

Senator SMITH. At about that same time, General, as I read the white paper, some of our representatives in China were arguing in favor of the Chinese Communists, as agrarian revolutionists. They suggested we ought to be turning our attention to them and giving less support to General Chiang and the National Government. It is that turn-over of policy that I am trying to locate the timing of.

Secretary MARSHALL. I think you are involved there, Senator, in a gradual procedure.

Senator SMITH. Yes.

Secretary MARSHALL. For example, there was the period there along about August and September of 1946 when a last effort was made to see if we could call off the military contests, in central China in particular, that we ceased shipping munitions for use on the battlefield during this final effort to try to bring to a halt the military operations that were then going on and which were developing into a general war all over North China. It had developed into a fight in Manchuria, but we had been able up to the middle of June to avoid that in North China.

Now it was in the final effort to try to control that, in which it was quite evidently a campaign of the generalissimo to defeat the communistic effort by military action, that the first step was taken to cut off the further shipments at that time of munitions that could be immediately used on the battlefield. For instance, it didn't affect transport planes but it did affect combat planes. However, their state of equipment was such that they were amply provided up through, we will say, into the middle of the winter. It did not succeed to that end. And then there was a gradual procedure where the supply of military matériel, part of that was resumed later on. I have forgotten just what the dates are, but that can be gotten out of the record and particularly out of the State Department evidence.

RELATIONS WITH MAC ARTHUR BEFORE KOREAN WAR

Senator SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

I want to turn again to the MacArthur situation and ask you this question: Did any misunderstandings or disagreements between General MacArthur and the Department of Defense or the Department of State exist prior to the Korean aggression of 1950—June 1950? We have been discussing here the differences between the Departments here and the general since the Korean outbreak. What I want to know now is whether any disagreements or misunderstandings existed between General MacArthur and the Department prior to the Korean outbreak.

Secretary MARSHALL. I cannot answer that, sir.

I can find out, on the Defense Department side. I could have the records looked into and send you an answer; but you can get a direct answer, I think, from General Bradley, as Chief of Staff; and, on the State Department side, I do not know.

Senator SMITH. You were, I think, Secretary of State prior to the Korean aggression?

Secretary MARSHALL. I was Secretary of State until January 3, 1949; and I ceased to function as Secretary of State the first week of December—

Senator SMITH. Do you recall any disagreement or misunderstanding with General MacArthur while you were Secretary of State?

Secretary MARSHALL. I would not wish to answer that offhand, because we were in the midst of discussions all the time as to the manner of how the Japanese Nation was to be set up again, and more particularly in regard to the economic procedures.

All of those matters were settled in the discussions.

Now just the various phases of the matters I couldn't testify to offhand.

Senator SMITH. Well, could you say whether those discussions on economic and other problems were on an amicable basis, or were there sharp divergencies? I understand that some of the conferring with General MacArthur on the economic situation came to some disagreement with the general.

Secretary MARSHALL. Well, I couldn't answer that very well. I know we sent out various people in connection with it.

VISITS OF POLICY MAKERS TO FAR EAST

Senator SMITH. Now General, did any of the policy makers in the Department of State or the Department of Defense get to the Far East, and consider General MacArthur's problems with him, prior to the Korean aggression, in June of 1950? I ask specifically if any of the following with the Department of State were there:

You testified you didn't go, yourself.

I understand that Mr. Lovett, Under Secretary Lovett hadn't been out there; Secretary Acheson, of the State Department, had not been out there; Under Secretary Webb, of the State Department, never was out there; Assistant Secretary Dean Rusk, up to that time, had not been out there; Ambassador Jessup, who had taken quite an active part in developing foreign policies, I was told, had never been out there until after my trip in 1949; and I am just wondering whether I am mistaken in the information that I have, that none of the group, this group had ever been out there and discussed with General MacArthur, on the ground, some of the problems that he was facing?

Secretary MARSHALL. I think that Mr. Dean Rusk, present Assistant Secretary of State, who is involved in far eastern policy, made the trip out there.

Senator SMITH. Of course he has been there since the Korean outbreak, I know, a number of times; but I was wondering if he had been there prior to that time?

Secretary MARSHALL. I think so, but that information can be obtained from the State Department.

I will ask for it.

Senator SMITH. Now, none of the following, from the Department of Defense was out there:

The Secretary of War, or of the Navy, prior to unification; yourself, since you have been Secretary of Defense—you testified you have not been out there; Secretary Lovett, of Defense, has not been out there.

I understand that of the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air, only Secretary Pace has been out there, and that is very recently.

Secretary MARSHALL. Mr. Matthews has been out there.

Senator SMITH. Secretary Matthews was out there?

Secretary MARSHALL. Yes.

Senator SMITH. But not prior to the Korean outbreak?

Secretary MARSHALL. After the Korean outbreak.

Senator SMITH. Of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, only General Collins went out there, when I was there in the fall of 1949.

Of course, they have all been out there since the Korean outbreak. Prior to that, when some of these other problems were brewing, I cannot find that any of our Joint Chiefs of Staff, or any of our leaders

in the Defense Department or State Department ever went out there, although all of them were going to Europe constantly.

Secretary MARSHALL. General Eisenhower was out there in April and May 1946.

Senator SMITH. 1946?

Secretary MARSHALL. Yes.

Senator SMITH. Was he Chief of Staff, then?

Secretary MARSHALL. He was Chief of Staff then, and——

Senator SMITH. I am glad to get that——

Secretary MARSHALL. And General Collins was there in 1949.

Chairman RUSSELL. Let the witness finish answering the question, please.

Secretary MARSHALL. General Collins was there in 1949.

Those are the principal visits I have here.

Senator SMITH. That is what I thought, from your testimony, that General Collins had been there, and you say now, General Eisenhower.

Secretary MARSHALL. Now, I am not including Secretary Pace. We would have to look that up, because I think that he was out there several times.

Senator SMITH. I just am not clear why with these matters developing out there, if there were any misunderstandings with General MacArthur, there wasn't some attempt made to go out there and try to straighten them out.

Let me ask you this question:

I understood you to testify that none of those named, like the Joint Chiefs of Staff, have been to Formosa since the outbreak in Korea. Is it true that none of our chief policy makers has ever been to Formosa?

Secretary MARSHALL. They are looking up the record now. I haven't got the word, but they can tell you directly, when they come in here.

Senator SMITH. My next question on this same line is:

Were there any disagreements with General MacArthur that were taken up with him at Wake Island?

From this report that we have had published here, apparently there was nothing very much in the way of a disagreement at Wake Island.

Secretary MARSHALL. All I have had is that report. I have had nothing in addition to that; and General Bradley, who was present, can give you a direct answer.

Senator SMITH. Well, finally, on this point:

METHOD OF MAC ARTHUR RECALL

I am troubled by this question: In the light of the differences, why could not a personal meeting in Washington or Tokyo have been arranged with General MacArthur, in order to request him to turn over his Korean command to General Ridgway and to discuss the general SCAP situation with him?

With a matter of this importance, it is hard for me to understand why some one of the Joint Chiefs of Staff wouldn't have gone to General MacArthur and called attention to this disagreement, and asked him, as I asked him here, the question of whether he wouldn't turn over his Korean command to General Ridgway, in the light of

those differences. He answered here that he would have, of course, had he been asked. I am not clear why it was necessary to take this abrupt action with a man of his caliber, who is a five-star general.

Secretary MARSHALL. It was felt, in the opinion of all those I have mentioned, sir, it was necessary to do that.

Senator SMITH. Had to move rapidly.

Now, could I ask you this question, which may be a little embarrassing, but I do want to get an answer to it?

Is the report true that the removal of General MacArthur had been planned by the executive department for a long time, long before you were made Secretary of Defense?

Secretary MARSHALL. It would have to be—depending on just a guess, on my part, or a statement from what I'd know.

I would have said that that was not the case at all; that there was really very genuine regret that the action of dismissal was actually taken, and that very careful consideration was given to ways and means possibly to avoid that action.

I cannot speak for the President. I cannot speak for my predecessors, but I have received no indication whatsoever that there was any such idea on foot.

The general assumption was that General MacArthur would remain in office until the Japanese peace treaty was signed; and the question then was, How—where should he go, and where did he wish to go?

Senator SMITH. Would that be after the Japanese peace treaty?

Secretary MARSHALL. After the peace treaty was signed.

Senator SMITH. I understood him to say, that it had been in his mind to retire after the peace treaty was signed, because he felt that he should then withdraw.

Secretary MARSHALL. That was the general assumption, and I have already stated that one of the considerations that was talked over, was this action that was taken, and whether it could be stayed until such time as the peace treaty had been accomplished. That was considered at some length.

RED CHINA'S ENTRANCE TO UN

Senator SMITH. Now, this is just confirming, I think what you have testified to here before.

It has been stated in some quarters that the United States Government plans eventually to agree to the entrance of the Red Chinese Government into the United Nations.

The testimony presented thus far has not produced any clear understanding on this point.

I think you have testified, or stated quite categorically, that as far as the Defense Establishment was concerned, it is unalterably opposed to Red China's entrance into the United Nations.

I think you stated that previously.

Secretary MARSHALL. That part that applies to the Defense Department is correct; but you can question the State Department on the general procedure.

Senator SMITH. Will it continue to be the policy of the Department of Defense, or does the Department stand ready to consider the question of the entrance of the Red Chinese into the United Nations as a bargaining point in the Korean peace settlement?

Secretary MARSHALL. I don't think that I could be more categorical in my replies than I have already been on that subject.

Senator SMITH. That lays the foundation for the next question.

EXTERNAL POWER CONTROLS CHINA

Do you believe, General Marshall, that what has happened in China is a conquest of that country by Soviet Russia, and that there is consequently a control of China today by an external power, namely, Russia?

Secretary MARSHALL. I think that is generally a fact.

Senator SMITH. Does that imply that the admission of Communist China to the United Nations would mean the recognition by the United Nations of the conquest of China by an external power—Russia? Wouldn't that inevitably follow?

Secretary MARSHALL. I think that would be the natural assumption. It means an additional vote of the Communist group.

Senator SMITH. Would this be something quite different from the mere determination of a procedural question of credentials when the question of the veto comes up?

Secretary MARSHALL. It is undoubtedly a consideration, but as to the procedural part, I won't attempt to answer that.

Senator SMITH. The statement has been made that it is simply a procedural point for the credentials to be accepted. Here we have a conquest by an external power and control by an external power.

Secretary MARSHALL. Which they will deny.

Senator SMITH. They will deny it, of course, but they will ask that their puppet be admitted to the United Nations. Now, the next question is this: Would this control of China by an external power be a sound ground to use the veto against the admission to the United Nations and to the Security Council of this externally controlled Peiping Communist government?

Secretary MARSHALL. I have already involved myself in the legalistic, and I would rather not answer the question.

Senator SMITH. I want to get the question in the record as a suggestion. One more question and I am through.

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF RECOMMENDATIONS OF JANUARY 12

I just want to get this clear, because I am still confused in my own mind by the Joint Chiefs of Staff statement of January 12. You have testified several times, General Marshall, that the January 12 Joint Chiefs of Staff recommendations were modified later in January in light of the improved conditions in Korea.

General MacArthur stated before the Congress and before these committees that the Joint Chiefs of Staff shared his view on the four important courses of action he recommended.

I have gone through the record carefully to see if at any point General MacArthur had been notified that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had changed their views. I can't find any place that MacArthur was notified of the change in their views. I wonder if I am wrong about that. Were his views shared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on January 12 or did he share the Joint Chiefs of Staff views on January 12 and

was he incorrect in any respect when he said he had not learned that they had changed their views since that time?

Secretary MARSHALL. Senator, I have done my best here a number of times to explain the relationship between the paper of January 12 which was to the Security Council, and its reference to General MacArthur by General Collins in person as a matter of information, which would naturally be of great interest to him, and the directive of the Chiefs of Staff of the previous day, January 11, and its relationship to the President's message of January 13.

Now really I think you should go further for information from the Joint Chiefs of Staff themselves.

Senator SMITH. I thank you. I do not want to press that. I just want to make it clear I am not clear on that matter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

MOTHER OF SENATOR BYRD

Chairman RUSSELL. I have just received notification from Senator Byrd's office that he telephoned and asked that I be informed that he is detained in Virginia due to the illness of his mother. He asked that the message go in the record.

Most of us have had the privilege of meeting Mrs. Byrd, the mother of the Tom, Dick, and Harry team, three great Americans who have contributed to their country.

I am sure that I voice the sentiments of every member of this committee and the Members of the Senate who are visitors here, when I say that we all fervently hope that Mrs. Byrd's illness will not be serious and that she will soon be restored to complete health.

Senator Johnson?

AGREEMENT ON PRESENT POLICY

Senator JOHNSON. General Marshall, in the light of present world conditions and present conditions in the Far East, you are of the opinion that the programs and policies that we are now carrying out in Korea is the most prudent and wise policy that this Government could carry out under the circumstances?

Secretary MARSHALL. That is correct, sir.

Senator JOHNSON. General, do you know whether your viewpoint is shared by the civilian heads of the three services, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force?

Secretary MARSHALL. I wouldn't answer that. I don't know of any difference in viewpoint.

Senator JOHNSON. Do you know of any disagreements they may have as to the wisdom of the present policy?

Secretary MARSHALL. I don't know of any, sir.

Senator JOHNSON. Do you know of any disagreement that any individual member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff may have with the wisdom of the present policy?

Secretary MARSHALL. No, sir.

Senator JOHNSON. Do you believe that they are in harmony and agreement with the wisdom of that policy?

Secretary MARSHALL. That is the impression that I have.

Senator JOHNSON. Do you know of any responsible or respected high military man now in the Department of Defense that feels that our policy is unwise?

Secretary MARSHALL. None has been brought to my attention.

Senator JOHNSON. Is it your opinion that General Ridgway feels that our course of action and our program is a wise one?

Secretary MARSHALL. We have had no indications from him to the contrary.

Senator JOHNSON. Have you had any indications from General Van Fleet or General Stratemeyer or Admiral Joy that they would prefer to embrace or substitute any other program for the program we are now following?

Secretary MARSHALL. I recall, of course, in the case of General Stratemeyer that he made statements in an interview in relation to the U. S. Weekly magazine advocating I believe the bombing in Manchuria.

Senator JOHNSON. Have you seen any official recommendation of either General Van Fleet, General Stratemeyer, or Admiral Joy in that regard?

Secretary MARSHALL. I have seen none. There may have been communication as I think there frequently has been between General Stratemeyer and General Vandenberg. I don't know on this particular point, but General Vandenberg can answer that.

Senator JOHNSON. Do you know of any member of the National Security Council that feels it would be the better part of wisdom to embark upon the MacArthur program instead of the one now being carried out?

Secretary MARSHALL. Senator, I do not think that I should comment on the views of a group like that. It is a matter of the individual himself. I hesitate to answer this way because it sets up the implication that there have been such disagreements.

Senator JOHNSON. I know of none but I just assumed that the National Security Council was well aware of our policy and our program, and if there had been any vital disagreement with that policy, that program, we would have heard about it.

Secretary MARSHALL. Well, I am establishing a precedent when I begin to interpret the various members. I am quite sure that our action has been sufficiently harmonious.

Senator JOHNSON. Have you at any time received any recommendations from any of the foreign commanders to the effect that we should abandon our present program and embark upon the MacArthur recommendations?

Secretary MARSHALL. Such recommendations would normally go to the Supreme Commander in Tokyo, and I have no information on that subject. The Chiefs of Staff could give you a more detailed answer.

UNITED STATES PREPAREDNESS

Senator JOHNSON. You have indicated that in your opinion we are not as prepared as we might be or as we should be at this time. I wonder if you would give this committee the benefit of your recommendations as to what we can do, what the country can do, what the Congress can do, what your Department can and should do to speed the day when we will be prepared.

Secretary MARSHALL. The most important action that I can think of at the moment is the conclusion before the Congress of their consideration in relation to the manpower act, which contains the basis

for a continued improvement in our military posture with a decreased cost. That is not to my mind merely the question of the general discussions but the time factor is becoming very serious because our further actions, particularly in the way of legislation regarding the Reserves and all, are dependent on what the set-up is to be.

At the present moment then I feel that prompt action regarding that manpower bill, and I hope action that does not destroy the most important phase of the matter, should be brought to a conclusion.

As to the appropriations, I think I have already said that I thought the Congress had acted with commendable promptness despite the large sums involved in regard to the various supplementary appropriation items. I believe the Senate still has to act—I am not quite certain—on the third supplemental of some 6½ billions. But what comes in your actions relating to the new 1951-52 budget I can make no comment on. The hearings seem to be going along all right and with a very considered understanding of the problems involved.

The general procedure under Mr. Wilson, I would not attempt to analyze that because it is a very complicated matter, and I am principally concerned with the inflationary factors which cut down our Defense Department purchasing requirements.

The attitude of the people, of course, is a very impressive factor in the whole affair; and what I am always worried about, and reference has been made to something of the sort this morning, is that we have to wait for some catastrophe to bring the unified action that the country will always give you.

I am very hopeful that they can all realize that we must move together in reasonable unity and very solidly behind the whole program.

That is talking in generalizations, but my main consideration there is that we don't have to wait for a catastrophe to bring about that energy, that unity that is so essential.

UNIVERSAL MILITARY TRAINING

Senator JOHNSON. You mentioned the important basic phases of the manpower program. Would you care to elaborate on what you consider the more important ones?

Secretary MARSHALL. The most important factor in the manpower bill is, of course, the universal military training and service.

I have talked about that so often, I almost give offense by talking about it again. I was concerned in General MacArthur's statement in regard to it, but he prefaced his comments by the fact that he had not studied the bill, and he made a special reference to his concern as to its effect on labor.

Well, of course, he was not aware of the fact that labor has endorsed the bill, and it has been written in a way to cause the least unfortunate effect on the labor situation in our industries.

As to the part that gave me most concern, it was the implication, if not the direct statement, that it was a matter that must have very, very serious consideration. He had said almost the same words before the Seventy-second Congress, and I think ever since then we have been giving it very, very serious consideration; and I cannot think of much else that can be said on the subject.

Senator JOHNSON. Do you know of any proposal advanced by the Department of Defense in your experience that has had more adequate consideration than the universal military training program?

Secretary MARSHALL. Offhand, I cannot think of any, except, maybe—but in a quite different manner—the question of what an officer can and should talk about before a committee, and what he should not, if anything. [Laughter].

Senator JOHNSON. There is certainly no disagreement within the services or within the Department that you are aware of with regard to the bill passed by the Senate on manpower?

Secretary MARSHALL. It had the complete endorsement of all the various portions concerned.

DEFENSE PROGRAM

Senator JOHNSON. Are you satisfied with the deliveries that are being made to the various services of equipment that would be required to give training and equip them for combat?

Secretary MARSHALL. I have had no reports brought to my attention or to me of what were thought to be serious delays in the matter. But I cannot give you any details at the moment because they have not been brought to my attention, as they would most certainly have been if there were undue delays in the production deliveries.

Senator JOHNSON. In short, it is your opinion that the civilian heads of the services and the military heads of the services, namely, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the other responsible and respected officials in the Department believe as you do that the program we are now carrying out in Korea is the more prudent one, and the wisest one in the light of all the conditions?

Secretary MARSHALL. The Secretaries, the Chiefs of Staff, and my immediate associates that I work with give me that impression.

Senator JOHNSON. And if they felt otherwise, you think they would be frank enough to submit recommendations to you?

Secretary MARSHALL. I am quite certain they would. I get a great deal of frankness in the day's business.

EISENHOWER'S VIEWS

Senator JOHNSON. Is General Eisenhower familiar with the program we are carrying out in Korea?

Secretary MARSHALL. I think he is.

Senator JOHNSON. Have you received from him at any time in your discussions with him and his problems, have you received any indication that he feels that our program is an unwise one in Korea?

Secretary MARSHALL. I have had no detailed report from General Eisenhower since he has gone to Europe except in one matter which concerned his own local problem, in which he wished to be certain we all understood it and took his point of view.

Senator JOHNSON. I am not asking for detailed reports. Undoubtedly before he went there he was aware of what our policy was and what our program was and how it meshed in with his plans and his program, and what I want to ask you is: Has he at any time given you any indication that he thinks the course we are following out there is not a wise and prudent one?

Secretary MARSHALL. He has given me no such indication. I have been trying to think of what had happened in my few conversations with him before his departure, and I think his only concern was that

he was not left without any American acquisitions to his military force.

Senator JOHNSON. Do you think the adoption of the MacArthur recommendations would require adjustments of General Eisenhower's plans and would seriously affect those plans?

Secretary MARSHALL. We fear that it might.

Senator JOHNSON. Thank you, General.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Green.

Senator GREEN. Mr. Chairman, the questions I had in mind to ask are minor ones. They are matters of minor importance, and in view of the length of General Marshall's testimony, I will shorten it by not exercising my right to ask questions.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Morse.

SECRET JCS REPORT

Senator MORSE. General Marshall, I hold in my hand a document, a secret document, entitled "Joint Chiefs of Staff Report for Senate Committees on Korean Operations."

It is a report which purports to set forth the actions taken by the Joint Chiefs of Staff from the beginning of the Korean War starting June 25, 1950, to April 11, 1951.

It sets forth paraphrased statements of messages and communications which the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent to their superiors, the Secretary of Defense, President of the United States, along with communications which they sent to other officials of Government, such as the Secretary of State.

It also contains paraphrased statements of communications which the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent to General MacArthur, referred to constantly in the volume as CINCFE.

With that description of the exhibit, Mr. Secretary, I ask you first: Are you familiar with the exhibit?

Secretary MARSHALL. I have read it, sir.

Senator MORSE. Next I ask you if, in your opinion, the exhibit presents a great deal of evidence in support of the conclusion that the Joint Chiefs of Staff kept General MacArthur informed in great detail as to all steps which were being taken on the part of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in connection with their command obligations and responsibilities with the Korean War?

Secretary MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator MORSE. In your opinion, does the exhibit show that the Joint Chiefs of Staff sought at all times in connection with every major problem and many problems that might be classified as not major arising in connection with the Korean War to obtain General MacArthur's views and recommendations with respect to the same?

Secretary MARSHALL. I think it does, sir.

Senator MORSE. Now, General, I want to turn to the exhibit—I shall not dwell on it any longer than I feel necessary—in order to establish one thing that I think needs to be established in this record, because I look upon this exhibit as the best evidence that anyone has submitted in this hearing as to the relationship, the official relationship, that was maintained between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and General MacArthur, and also the best evidence of any information that has been supplied to the joint committee to date as to the lengths to which

the Government went in its relationship with General MacArthur as CINCPAC, in an endeavor to avoid the development of any misunderstandings between the general and the Government.

I think it rather important that the record relate rather definitely some of the major events in connection with the Korean War concerning which subsequent differences of opinion seem to have developed between General MacArthur and the Government.

On page 24 of this document, under item 32, I find that the Joint Chiefs of Staff are very much concerned about Formosa, and "on July 28, 1950, informed CINCPAC that the Chinese Communists had announced their intention of capturing Formosa and that the Communist capabilities therefore could probably be resisted effectively only if the Chinese Nationalists made timely efforts to defend that island. The Joint Chiefs of Staff also informed CINCPAC of their recommendation to the Secretary of Defense that the Nationalist Government be permitted to employ its military forces in defensive measures to prevent Communist amphibious concentrations directed against Formosa or the Pescadores even if such measures included attacks against concentrations on the mainland. CINCPAC was further informed that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had recommended that the United States inform the Nationalist Government, if the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were approved. Later, on August 2, 1950, the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed CINCPAC that no action had been taken on their recommendations and that pending such action the existing policy toward Formosa would remain unchanged.

In his reply to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, dated July 29, 1950, CINCPAC stated his complete concurrence with their recommendations regarding the island of Formosa and the Chinese Nationalists. He also informed them that he was proceeding to Formosa with a selected group of staff officers on or about July 31, 1950, to make a brief reconnaissance of the situation there.

JCS-MAC ARTHUR AGREEMENTS

Now, in view of this exchange between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and CINCPAC, is it not true, General, that on July 28, 1950, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and CINCPAC were in agreement as to the policies that should be followed with regard to Formosa?

Secretary MARSHALL. It appears so.

Senator MORSE. Do you know of any incident since July 28, 1950, when the Joint Chiefs of Staff and CINCPAC were not in agreement as to policies to be followed in regard to Formosa?

Secretary MARSHALL. The only one I can think of at the moment is the desire of General MacArthur in November to bring some 60,000 Formosan Nationalist China troops into Korea.

Senator MORSE. Into Korea. But with respect to Formosa itself—

Secretary MARSHALL. That has a relation to that as to what it would do to the garrison of Formosa.

Senator MORSE. That is correct. I think my question is certainly subject to the qualification you make in respect to it. But let me put my question this way: Save and except for General MacArthur's recommendation in November 1950 that some 60,000 Nationalist troops should be taken to Korea from Formosa, was there any difference between General MacArthur and the Joint Chiefs of Staff as to the defense of Formosa proper?

Secretary MARSHALL. I do not recall any, sir.

USE OF NATIONALIST TROOPS

Senator MORSE. In respect to—let us pause for a moment now that you have raised this and ask a question or two with regard to his recommendation concerning the use of Nationalist troops in Korea, some 60,000 or thereabouts.

[Deleted.]

Senator MORSE. Another question or two in regard to the Formosan issue and its relationship to the Nationalist troops, General. Am I correct in my understanding that the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended against General MacArthur's proposal of November 1950 for the use of some 60,000 Nationalist troops?

Secretary MARSHALL. I think that is correct, sir. Of course, they can give you a very specific answer, but I think the records show that.

[Deleted.]

Senator MORSE. At the time of the general's proposal in November 1950 to use some 60,000 Nationalist troops in Korea, had strong representations already been made to the Government by our allies through which representations they made clear that they were opposed to the use of Nationalist troops in Korea?

Secretary MARSHALL. That is my recollection, Senator, but I would prefer that you go to the State Department.

Senator MORSE. But it is your opinion that this whole question of the use of Nationalist troops in connection with the Korean War from the very beginning of that war has raised a complicated problem with our allies?

Secretary MARSHALL. That is correct, sir.

UNITED STATES MILITARY MISSION TO CHINA

Senator MORSE. Now, while we are still on this point of the Nationalist troops, General, it is my understanding that General MacArthur favors the sending of a mission to Formosa, American military mission, to give technical advice and technical training. It is my understanding that he also favors an increase in American military aid by way of equipment to the Generalissimo's troops; is that your understanding?

Secretary MARSHALL. That is my recollection.

[Deleted.]

Senator MORSE. I agree that they should be off the record. However, I just do not see how we can go through the record in the exhibit which the Defense Department has submitted to us without giving some attention to the chronological steps that occurred which I think outline the final disagreement that caused the removal of General MacArthur, and that is why I am—

Secretary MARSHALL. I am not making any suggestions as to the chronological steps. It is the reasons for the viewpoint of the Chiefs of Staff.

Senator MORSE. It is my understanding, General, that it is the position of General MacArthur that after we supply the Generalissimo's troops with military aid and technical advice, the question should then be left up to the Generalissimo to decide what he wants to do with his troops thereafter.

Secretary MARSHALL. So long as it does not involve us in a world war, or an enlargement, which we think is dangerous.

Senator MORSE. I am glad to have your answer. You have anticipated another question I was going to ask you.

Secretary MARSHALL. Of the Korean conflict, without giving adequate return.

UNITED STATES INVOLVMENT IN CHIANG'S PLANS

Senator MORSE. I simply say, that I happen to be one who has felt for some time that it was a mistake for us, by way of unilateral action, to prevent the Generalissimo from carrying on war on the mainland of China if he wanted to carry it on.

It seems to me that when we took that course of action we necessarily involved ourselves in a phase of the China war that was bound to result in some embarrassment. But, be that as it may, that is the situation in which we find ourselves, so I now ask you the question: Do you know of any offer on the part of the Generalissimo to fight on the mainland without—mainland of China—assistance from American troops, if we desist, if we desisted, from our naval policy of preventing him from conducting a raid on the mainland, and he wanted to do it?

Secretary MARSHALL. I don't recall such.

Senator MORSE. Do you think the Joint Chiefs of Staff will be in a better position to advise this committee if the generalissimo has ever made an offer since the outbreak of the Korean War to fight on the mainland of China on his own initiative, without support from American troops, if we release him from the naval restrictions which now prevent him from conducting an amphibious landing on the mainland, if he wants to?

Secretary MARSHALL. Well, the Chiefs will give you a better answer to that than I can, sir, a more precise answer.

Senator MORSE. Do you agree with me, General—strike that.

WILL CHIANG INVADE CHINA WITHOUT AID OF UNITED STATES TROOPS?

General, do you not think it would be a proper course for our Government to follow if we are to provide the generalissimo with the military mission and the military aid which he apparently seeks, find out before we make all those commitments whether or not he would be willing to conduct an operation on the mainland of China?

Secretary MARSHALL. Read the first part.

(The question was read as requested.)

Secretary MARSHALL. I become involved in a rather difficult answer because I would consider at the present moment it would not be advantageous to our interests to have him do so.

In a general way, we should know what he would propose doing with better equipment, but as to our implying that the equipment would only be produced for that specific purpose or that general purpose, I find myself in some doubt.

We want to make certain that he can manage the defense of Formosa without assistance by ground troops from us, and with the assistance that we could divert from Korea in the air, and by sea to the defense of Formosa.

Senator MORSE. Am I correct in my understanding that the military assistance we now propose to give to the generalissimo, including both technical training from a military mission and military equipment, would not be needed in the quantity that we propose to supply it if his function is to be primarily the defense of Formosa, and not an attack on the mainland of China?

CHIANG'S CAPABILITY OF DEFENDING FORMOSA

Secretary MARSHALL. I would think the present proposal as to equipment and such, all of the equipment involved, would be needed to make certain of his capability of defending Formosa.

[Deleted.]

Senator MORSE. I am very glad to have that answer, General, because I think, for the record, it is a very important answer because of this problem, namely, I assume that we will be confronted with a rather complicated situation in relation to our allies if they continue to hold what I think is a mistaken point of view, but they have held it to date, the point of view that the United Nations should not give support to the generalissimo in conducting a civil war in China. But I understand your answer to mean that whatever assistance we now are giving or propose to give to the generalissimo can be defended, as far as the United States is concerned, on the ground that it is assistance that can be used very effectively in the defense of Formosa, irrespective of whether he sends one soldier to the mainland of China.

Secretary MARSHALL. That is correct, sir.

JCS INFORMED MAC ARTHUR OF POLICY

Senator MORSE. Now, returning to the exhibit of secret information previously identified and referred to, I notice on page 26, item 38, it says that:

By the end of July it became apparent that it was necessary to expand the scope of air operations beyond that of close support of ground forces and air supremacy. Accordingly, on July 31, 1950, the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed CINCFE that they would make available to him two additional bomber groups for the destruction of certain military targets.

Item 37 points out:

[Deleted.]

Senator MORSE. Page 27 of the secret exhibit previously referred to indicates, and I find that:

On August 4, 1950, the Secretary of Defense, with the approval of the President and the Secretary of State, dispatched a message to CINCFE, after CINCFE's visit to Formosa, reaffirming the decision of the President of June 27 with respect to Formosa, and pointing out that only the President has authority to order or authorize military action against concentrations on the mainland. While keeping the Joint Chiefs of Staff fully informed as to intelligence matters, the message to CINCFE stated that it was in the most vital national interest that no United States action precipitate general war or give excuse to others to do so. He was also informed, however, that his recommendations as to action to be taken were desired whenever appropriate.

Does not this message makes clear to CINCFE the policy of our Government in respect to its position on any action that might lead to widening the war or conducting operations on the mainland of China?

Secretary MARSHALL. I think it does, sir.

Senator MORSE. Does it not, in part, provide an answer to the question that one reads so frequently in the press these days: Did the Government keep CINCFE fully advised as to its position on Asiatic policy?

Secretary MARSHALL. I think it does, sir.

Senator MORSE. Item 41, page 27, of this exhibit says:

MAC ARTHUR'S UNDERSTANDING OF THE JCS POLICY

CINCFE replied on August 5, 1950, to the effect that he was operating meticulously in accordance with the President's decision of June 27 which he fully understood. He further stated that he would under no circumstances extend the limitations of his authority as theater commander, and expressed the hope that neither the President nor the Secretary of Defense had been misled by false or speculative reports from any source.

I have two questions on that paragraph, at least, General. (1) Does not General MacArthur's reply to the communication of August 4, 1950, previously referred to, make clear that General MacArthur understood the import of the message of August 4, and apparently also understood that the message of August 4 might be subject to the interpretation that there was some concern on the part of the Government as to whether or not General MacArthur was in agreement with the policies that the Government had set forth in not only that message but previous messages?

Secretary MARSHALL. It seems so.

Senator MORSE. It is rather difficult, is it not, to interpret his assurance set forth in the latter part of this message, that he hoped that neither the President nor the Secretary of Defense had been misled by false or speculative reports from any source, in any other light; is that not right?

It would be rather difficult, I say, to interpret the language from the latter part of his report, which I just read, in any other light than that General MacArthur himself was apparently concerned as he read the message of August 4—

Secretary MARSHALL. I think so.

Senator MORSE. Concerning whether or not the Government was concerned about his attitude.

HINTS OF STRAINED RELATIONSHIP

In fact, may I ask this question, General, at this point. Is it not true that although General MacArthur did meticulously carry out to the letter the directives that were given to him in regard to military matters, nevertheless, this exhibit as well as other evidence in regard to which you have already testified in this hearing, shows that for many months preceding his recall the relationship between the commander in the field and the Government was such that a considerable amount of effort was gone to by the Government in exchanges with MacArthur to make clear in detail the Government's position on Asiatic policy?

Secretary MARSHALL. I think the record indicates that, sir.

Senator MORSE. General, would it be a fair interpretation in your opinion to draw from the exhibit, through which I am now going, logically as to what I consider to be some of its major points, that al-

though the relationship between General MacArthur and the Government did not show any failure on the part of the general to carry out meticulously his military directives, it did show a considerable degree of difference between the general and the officials of the Government in regard to the over-all Asiatic policy, both military and diplomatic?

Secretary MARSHALL. Read that, please.

(The pending question was read by the reporter.)

Secretary MARSHALL. That is correct sir, in my opinion.

Senator MORSE. It is only your opinion that I seek.

True, I am suggesting certain tentative conclusions that I think the record supports to date, and I am checking those conclusions against your opinion, because I want to be fair to all parties concerned.

CONDUCTING ASIATIC OPERATION

Do you think, General Marshall, in view of the contents of the exhibit which I am now examining in this questioning of you, that it would be fair to say that the Government on the one hand and General MacArthur on the other seemed to be dealing with each other at arm's length in connection with the conducting of the Asiatic operation?

Secretary MARSHALL. I do not think of any actions on the part of the Government that suggests that it was proceeding on the basis of being at arm's length. I do feel that beyond the decisions as to policy it was the view of the Government that we had to proceed in a very careful manner in our interchanges with General MacArthur because of his attitude, because of what he had stated publicly in regard to the matter, because of our allies and their reactions and the general complications and delicacy of the situation under those conditions.

Senator MORSE. Would it be fair to say that one of the problems which developed between General MacArthur and the Government was due to the fact that although General MacArthur carried out meticulously military directives that were sent to him, he nevertheless was inclined from time to time to make public statements or release such news releases that created both within the Government and within American public opinion the impression that there was not complete harmony and agreement between his administration of affairs in Asia, including those of his military command, and the announced policy of the Government with respect to the same?

Secretary MARSHALL. I think that was the case.

Senator MORSE. In your opinion did not the creation of that attitude concerning what appeared to be a difference between General MacArthur on the one hand and the Government on the other create a very serious situation in connection with our Government's relation to her allies in the United Nations?

Secretary MARSHALL. I think that is correct.

TWO VOICES ON UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

Senator MORSE. Do you think that the subject matter I am now discussing, which can be summarized by saying that irrespective of cause, the impression was abroad in this country and in the world that there were differences between MacArthur and his Government, is one of the reasons for our allies wanting to know whose voice spoke in Asia, our Government's or MacArthur's?

Secretary MARSHALL. That is correct, sir.

Senator MORSE. And is it fair, do you think, for me to say that the impression of a difference which was created over a period of many months can be pretty much summarized by a phrase that you have already used in this testimony, namely, it was a mistake to have two voices attempting to speak for American policy in Asia?

Secretary MARSHALL. That is correct, sir.

Senator MORSE. Now returning to the exhibit previously identified, Mr. Secretary, I find on page 27 the following:

The Joint Chiefs of Staff on August 5, 1950, authorized CINCFE to conduct aerial reconnaissance over all Korean territory including up to the Yalu River on the west coast but short of the Korean-Soviet boundary on the east coast in order to establish the fact of support to the North Koreans by the U. S. S. R. or the Chinese Communists; but that all such flights must respect the northern frontiers of Korea.

Now that was August 5, 1950, where apparently again he was authorized to do some aerial reconnaissance up to the Manchurian border in one case and apparently on the east coast of China; is that not true?

Secretary MARSHALL. I do not see an indication here of further reference at this time to the general coast of China. With that exception I think that is true.

Senator MORSE. I think you are right. It doesn't say the east coast of China but it does include all of North Korea.

Secretary MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

MILITARY DEFINITION OF "STABILIZE"

Senator MORSE. Now, General, page 29 of this exhibit, item 48, under the heading "The decisions to pass to the offensive in Korea," it reads:

The Department of Defense made a major effort to build up United States forces in Korea first for the purpose of halting the North Korean aggression, next for the purpose of stabilizing a military front, ultimately with the objective of passing to the offensive. Although there were some deficiencies, the requirements of CINCFE were met to the extent it was within the power of the Department of Defense to do so, but with due regard to United States military commitments and requirements elsewhere.

Now I raise this particular point, Mr. Secretary, because of the use in this paragraph of the phrase "For the purpose of stabilizing a military front," and I want to relate that to the so-called directive or plan of January 12 in which the word "stabilize" is used.

As I read this exhibit—and I have studied it with considerable care—I have formed the conclusion—and I want you to check me as to whether or not you think it is proper—that by "stabilize our military officials" meant a status of our troops in defense, they meant laying down a line of defense that we could hold without further retreat, they meant a defense position in contrast to an offensive position, and that the proposal of January 12 has to be read in light of what the military meant by "stabilize." Am I correct in that interpretation of stabilize as it is used in the directive of January 12?

Secretary MARSHALL. I think that is correct, sir. You might add to that that it was used in connection with the situation at that time where we had been involved in retirements.

Senator MORSE. This reference that I have just read on page 29 is in connection with instructions to General MacArthur concerning

changing his tactics from a position of stabilization to a position of offensive. Does that not show that the Defense Establishment here in this country and CINCFE in Asia understood what the Joint Chiefs of Staff meant by the use of the word "stabilize"?

Secretary MARSHALL. I would assume so, sir.

Senator MORSE. The January 12 proposal was not only a proposal in which the Joint Chiefs of Staff told General MacArthur of their tentative plans, set forth their tentative recommendations and proposals, but the very language of the order itself made clear, did it not, that they were talking in terms of falling back to the Pusan area or in a territory of proximity thereto, or evacuation?

Secretary MARSHALL. Yes, sir; except that it was not an order, nor was it a directive. It was not to General MacArthur; it was to the National Security Council.

Senator MORSE. I am sorry that I used the word "order" in my question. I think I also said or meant to say, tentative proposals for a program to be followed by CINCFE in case the retreat then being engaged in continued to the point of the beachhead of Pusan or the complete evacuation of Korea. But for the purposes of reiteration and clarification, I want to put the question this way: Am I correct in my interpretation of the tentative proposals which the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised MacArthur on January 12 they were giving favorable consideration, involved a military plan for continued retreat, possible evacuation, and that they were proposals that should be followed, carried out, when the American-United Nations forces position became stabilized?

Secretary MARSHALL. Yes; correct.

Senator MORSE. And by "stabilization" the Joint Chiefs of Staff meant, and the exhibit from which I am quoting shows, that the word "stabilize" is used in that connection in military exchanges, a defense line which they were to hold?

Secretary MARSHALL. Correct.

Senator MORSE. Against the offensive of the enemy?

Secretary MARSHALL. That is correct, sir.

Senator MORSE. Do you think that this exhibit from which I am taking excerpts shows that when the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent to General MacArthur either directives or recommendations in connection with an offensive, they did not use the term "stabilize"?

Secretary MARSHALL. That is correct, sir.

INFORMING MAC ARTHUR OF ASIAN POLICY

Senator MORSE. On page 35 of this exhibit, General, I read:

Item 20: On August 29, 1950, the President dispatched a personal message to General MacArthur giving him, for his information, the text of a letter which had been forwarded to Ambassador Austin on August 27, 1950. The President mentioned a letter which Ambassador Austin had, on August 25, addressed to Secretary-General Lie. This letter admirably summed up the position of the United States Government, as stated by the President in his address on June 27, 1950, and again in his message to the Congress on July 19, 1950.

And then it sets forth seven points, covering the United States Government's position as to policy in Asia.

Do you think, General Marshall, that this message on the part of the President of the United States, to General MacArthur, was a very

clear notice to General MacArthur as to his Government's policy as of that time?

Secretary MARSHALL. I think it was.

Senator MORSE. In Asia?

Secretary MARSHALL. I thought so, sir.

Senator MORSE. Do you think, then, General Marshall, that I make a correct conclusion from this exhibit, that it does supply an answer to the question: Did the Government keep General MacArthur advised as to its policy in Asia, both militarily and politically?

Secretary MARSHALL. I think it does.

Senator MORSE. May I say again, to you, sir, that the purpose of this particular examination, as far as the questioner is concerned, is that I think it is of vital importance that the record of this hearing produce an answer to the question: "Is it true that the Government failed to keep MacArthur advised as to its policy in Asia?" because I think the American people are entitled to know the answer to that question; and as I have completed my examination, or my study of this exhibit, I cannot understand the charge that the Government failed to keep General MacArthur advised as to both its military and political policy for Asia.

To the contrary, I think the Government was just as meticulous in keeping MacArthur advised as MacArthur was meticulous in carrying out, to the letter, the military directives that he received; but as I read this exhibit, I also come to the conclusion that the sad fact is that for months, although both the Government and General MacArthur were participating in very meticulous conduct in keeping each other informed as to their respective positions, that unfortunately they were dealing at arm's length—that apparently a lack of mutual confidence had developed.

As a juror, I ask you that; but I think you ought to know what is going through my mind, as I ask more questions.

As a juror I would say, after studying this exhibit, which I think to date is the most important exhibit in this whole record—and we have to deal with most of it in secret—but as I studied this exhibit page by page, I came to the conclusion as a juror that the parties to the controversy were dealing at arm's length, because apparently each side felt that was necessary; and I think that is unfortunate, but I think it explains—according to my lights, at least—why the final break became inevitable.

I just don't think you can have a situation where you have to go to all the detail that apparently the Government felt it had to go to in its communications with General MacArthur in order to keep the record perfectly clear.

Now, on page 37, item 21, we find that:

MAC ARTHUR'S MESSAGE TO THE VFW

Prior to the dispatch of the above message—

referring there to the President's message of August 25, 1950, covered by my preceding question—

Prior to the dispatch of the above message, General MacArthur had been invited to speak at the fifty-first national encampment of the Veterans of Foreign Wars in Chicago. Unable to appear in person, by a cover letter dated August 21, he sent a paper to be read at the meeting. In his paper General MacArthur

placed much emphasis on the strategic aspect of Formosa and on its importance to American security. President Truman came into possession of a copy of General MacArthur's Veterans of Foreign Wars statement early Saturday morning, August 26. The President instructed the Secretary of Defense to direct General MacArthur to withdraw his statement to the Veterans of Foreign Wars in order to avoid confusion as to the United States position with respect to Formosa. General MacArthur complied immediately with this directive.

I think the record shows he did comply with every directive that was placed in his hands, but the report goes on to say:

The statement by General MacArthur, however, was published in the United States News and World Report.

General, in your opinion, did the publication of the general's letter to the Veterans of Foreign Wars, referred to in this paragraph 21 on page 37 of the exhibit, accomplish practically the same amount of harm that would have been accomplished if the general had delivered his message in person and had not complied with the request to withdraw his letter?

Secretary MARSHALL. I was not in office at that time. I would assume from what I know of such matters that the fact of the withdrawal would increase the interest in the terms of the message.

Senator MORSE. Is it your opinion that the publication of the letter in United States News and World Report provided further evidence that there was not complete agreement between General MacArthur and the Government concerning Asiatic policy?

Secretary MARSHALL. I know nothing whatever, Senator, regarding the circumstances of that release.

WAS MAC ARTHUR ADEQUATELY INFORMED?

Senator MORSE. Page 41 of this exhibit, paragraph 33, or rather item 33, I find that—

On September 15, 1950, CINCFE was informed of the following conclusions which had been approved by the President concerning United States course of action with respect to Korea:

(a) Final decisions cannot be made at this time inasmuch as the course of action best advancing United States national interest must be determined in the light of—

- (1) Action by the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communists;
- (2) In consultation with friendly members of the United Nations; and
- (3) An appraisal of the risk of general war;

(b) The United Nations forces have a legal basis for conducting operations north of the thirty-eighth parallel to compel withdrawal of the North Korean forces behind the line or to defend against these forces.

And then the message to General MacArthur sets out further details, including item (c):

(c) The Joint Chiefs of Staff were authorized to direct General MacArthur to plan for the possible occupation of North Korea but to execute such plans only with the approval of the President.

(d) General MacArthur should undertake no ground operations north of the thirty-eighth parallel in event of occupation of North Korea by Soviet or Chinese Communist forces. In this event, air and naval operations north of the parallel should not be discontinued; and

(e) In the event of employment of major Chinese Communist units south of the thirty-eighth parallel, the United States would (1) not permit itself to become engaged in a general war with Communist China; (2) authorize General MacArthur to continue military action as long as it offered a reasonable chance of successful resistance [deleted].

Then the message sets forth other details.

In your opinion, General Marshall, does this message to CINCFE on September 15, 1950, constitute another piece of evidence in support of a conclusion that the Government kept MacArthur advised in detail as to its position and policies on the questions presented by our Asiatic struggle?

Secretary MARSHALL. I think it does, sir.

MAC ARTHUR CONCURRENCE ON GOVERNMENT PROPOSALS

Senator MORSE. On page 42 I read:

On September 27, the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised the Secretary of Defense that they had no objection to the Department of State proposals for action by CINCFE in the event the North Koreans sued for peace or for an armistice. Further, they had no objection to the Department of State program with respect to bringing Korean hostilities to an end. General MacArthur advised, from the standpoint of the field commander, that both proposals seemed entirely feasible and practicable.

General Marshall, does not this exchange of messages on September 27, 1950, show that the Government not only was keeping General MacArthur fully advised as to the plans it had under consideration for attempting to bring about an armistice in the Korean War, but as of that date, September 27, 1950, General MacArthur advised the Government that he was not in disagreement with those proposals for an armistice?

Secretary MARSHALL. Correct, sir.

Senator MORSE. Therefore, am I again correct in my conclusions that certainly up to September 27, 1950, there is no doubt about the fact that the Government was keeping General MacArthur fully advised as to its policies, both military and diplomatic?

Secretary MARSHALL. It seems so to me, sir.

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO MAC ARTHUR RECOMMENDATIONS

Senator MORSE. Page 43 of the exhibit, I find a paragraph, paragraph 36, which reads as follows:

General MacArthur then submitted his plan for operations north of the thirty-eighth parallel, the substance of which was an attack north along the western coastal corridor by the Eighth United States Army and an amphibious landing by the United States Tenth Corps at Wonsan on the east coast of North Korea. The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved MacArthur's plan on September 29, 1950.

Does not this item show, General Marshall, that as late as September 29, 1950, this Government and General MacArthur were in agreement as to the military policy that ought to be followed in the immediate future following September 29, 1950, in respect to operations north of the thirty-eighth parallel?

Secretary MARSHALL. It would appear so.

Senator MORSE. Does not the paragraph from the secret exhibit from which I just read, in your opinion, justify the conclusion that General MacArthur was certainly receiving prompt action from the Government in response to his requests for authorization in connection with his recommendations for the conduct of the war in Korea?

Secretary MARSHALL. I think that is a fact, sir.

MAC ARTHUR NOTIFIED OF UN RESOLUTION

Senator MORSE. On page 46 of this exhibit, I find the following paragraph:

On October 6, 1950, the Joint Chiefs of Staff transmitted to General MacArthur the text of the proposed United Nations General Assembly resolution on posthostilities in Korea. He was informed that the General Assembly would probably vote on the resolution on October 6, 1950, and that any textual changes would be immediately transmitted to him. The Joint Chiefs of Staff further stated that it was considered that the resolution provided for support of operations north of the thirty-eighth parallel. After approval of the resolution by the General Assembly, General MacArthur was requested to transmit immediately the text of the resolution to North Korean authorities and to call upon them to lay down their arms.

On October 7, 1950—

which, incidentally, was the very next day—

the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed CINCFE that the General Assembly had passed the resolution on posthostilities in Korea with certain minor textual changes, of which he was informed.

On October 9, 1950, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, recognizing that the Chinese Communists might intervene in North Korea, amplified CINCFE's current directive and included, among other things, the provision that, in the event of the employment in Korea of major Chinese Communist units without prior announcement, CINCFE should continue the action as long as, in his judgment, his forces had a reasonable chance of success. He was cautioned, however, that he would obtain authorization from Washington prior to taking any military action against objectives in Chinese territory.

Do not these three paragraphs in your opinion, General Marshall, taken from page 46 of the exhibit previously identified, show again that our Government was keeping General MacArthur informed step by step of minute details of negotiations that were taking place between our Government and the United Nations?

Secretary MARSHALL. I think it does, sir.

POSTHOSTILITIES OPERATIONS

Senator MORSE. On page 49 of the exhibit, item 24, I find that—on October 21, 1950, CINCFE replied to the Joint Chiefs of Staff message of October 20 regarding the redeployment of the Second and Third Divisions. CINCFE stated that this matter had been discussed with the President at Wake Island. He believed that, upon the close of hostilities, the Eighth Army should be withdrawn to Japan. He hoped this movement would start before Thanksgiving and be completed before Christmas. Upon the cessation of hostilities the Second Division would be made available for return to the zone of interior.

Does not this exchange in your opinion, General Marshall, between CINCFE and the Joint Chiefs of Staff show again that detailed information and careful consideration was being given mutually by CINCFE and the Joint Chiefs of Staff in connection with the post-hostilities problems that would develop in Korea once the North Koreans were defeated?

Secretary MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator MORSE. Does not the particular language that I have just cited from the exhibit show that as far as the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were concerned, there was at that time no serious disagreement between them and General MacArthur as to what should be done by way of posthostilities operations?

Secretary MARSHALL. I think that is the case, sir.

DISPOSITION OF TROOPS

Senator MORSE. I refer now, General Marshall, to page 51 of the exhibit, paragraph 29:

On October 25 CINCFE informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the instructions reported in his message regarding the lifting of restrictions with regard to the employment of United Nations forces in North Korea were a matter of military necessity. [Deleted.] More seasoned commanders were necessary. CINCFE further stated that he saw no conflict between the removal of these instructions and his directive dated September 27. This directive indicated that the instructions sent to CINCFE could not be considered final, since they might require modifications in accordance with developments. CINCFE felt that he had the necessary latitude for modifications in a message from the Secretary of Defense on September 30, which gave CINCFE tactical and strategic latitude to proceed north of the thirty-eighth parallel. He further stated that he understood the basic purpose and intent of his directive and would take all precautions. However, he felt that tactical hazards might result from any action other than that which he had directed. He pointed out that the entire subject had been covered in his conference at Wake Island.

[Deleted.]

Secretary MARSHALL. I think, Senator, that there is a confusion there in exactly what is being referred to. That question could be better answered by the Chiefs of Staff. But my recollection is the issue was whether or not he was pushing the United Nations forces, excluding the South Korean forces, too far to the front in connection with the desire to have the South Korean forces carry out the forward movement toward the Yalu River, and avoiding the necessity of having other United Nations forces approach close to the river, and his answer is made to that. But it could be answered more definitely for you by the Chiefs of Staff.

APPRECIATION OF MARSHALL'S TESTIMONY

Chairman RUSSELL. Gentlemen, I regret very much to interrupt this interrogation at this point, but on Friday last you will all recall that it was stated that General Marshall had had an engagement of long standing at the Virginia Military Institute for this afternoon and tomorrow.

I assured him that we would undertake to release him by 1 o'clock today. It is almost 1 o'clock now. That matter was discussed, and I am quite sure that all members of the committee are aware of the factors involved, and it is unnecessary for me to go into any more details.

It is my intention to have General Bradley here tomorrow morning.

Mr. Secretary, it would seem to be necessary for you to return at some later date, and I will communicate with you sometime later in the week.

Secretary MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. I will communicate with you to arrange a mutually convenient time for your reappearance before this committee.

Secretary MARSHALL. If you wish to do so, I can manage to 1:30 without undue inconvenience.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, I have told several members of the committee that I intended to recess about 1 o'clock and I think that, perhaps, we had best follow that course. So, we thank you very much.

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, may I say that if I find it possible in the meantime to cover through other witnesses further questions on the particular exhibit to which I have been referring this morning, without recalling, as far as I am concerned, General Marshall, I will so advise the chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Very well. Of course, so many of these questions are peculiarly within the jurisdiction of the Joint Chiefs that we may save time by interrupting General Marshall's testimony.

I ordinarily do not like to do that, but in this case I think that perhaps it will serve a useful purpose, and we will have General Bradley here tomorrow morning at 10 o'clock; and if it is possible to do so without too great interruption of the business of the Senate, gentlemen, I intend to have an afternoon session. I will notify you prior to the recessing tomorrow morning as to whether that is possible.

General, I wish to extend to you again our very best wishes for a pleasant day down at VMI. I know something about the feeling that all of us have about returning to the atmosphere of the campuses where we had our education.

I also wish to thank you for your assistance to this committee over a period of 7 days. It has been a remarkable exhibition of stamina, both physical and mental, to handle the very wide field of questioning to which you have been subjected, and I think it has covered nearly every point on the globe, and all of the history of the last 10 or 15 years; indeed, if I recall correctly, why, we went as far back as the Napoleonic Wars, and the strategy employed in some of those campaigns on one or two occasions.

It has been a very grueling experience, I know, and it is one that would have tested the fire of any man. Throughout it all, you have handled yourself as a soldier would—as the soldier we know you to be.

You have answered the questions fully and frankly, and I am convinced that you have not hesitated to state the facts as you see them to be. Of course, I did not anticipate any other course.

There are few men in the history of our country who have played as prominent a part in the outstanding events in the past several years as you have done.

I referred the other day to the very remarkable fact that you had within a relatively short period of time served as Chief of Staff during the greatest war in which this country has ever been engaged; as ambassador to China during a very critical period in our history, and as Secretary of State and as Secretary of Defense.

You have participated in thousands of important decisions and have helped to shape the course of our Nation during the years to follow the war. You have been generously sharing with this committee your vast information on a wide variety of subjects.

I also wish to thank you for the time you have given us. You occupy a very important position today, one of the highest in the Government, that of Secretary of Defense; and I know that you have innumerable problems to settle every day in addition to answering the questions that have been propounded here.

The hours that you spent here must have caused a great accumulation of work on your desk.

On behalf of our committee, I wish to express to you my sincere thanks for your testimony.

RECOGNITION OF MARSHALL'S CONTRIBUTION

Chairman CONNALLY. General Marshall, I want to join the chairman in congratulating you upon the vivid and dramatic events that have transpired at the Virginia Military Institute and these celebrations which will be held. I know what pride and interest the VMI has in your career.

I had occasion some years ago to make an address to the cadet of the Virginia Military Institute, and I know of the high position which you occupy in their admiration and affection. I thank you deeply, along with the chairman, for the labor and the toil through which you have gone in these examinations.

I want to say that as cochairman I have not asked many questions, practically no questions, very few. My reasons for that have been that as cochairman I wanted to give every member of this committee opportunity to fully investigate all the questions pending before us without my consuming a great deal of time which otherwise might be allocated to them.

Furthermore, as chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations over the years, I have been more or less familiar with many of these questions and have had contact with you as Chief of Staff and as Secretary of State and now as Secretary of Defense.

It is possible that when you return I may desire to ask a number of other questions, but I have endeavored to so conduct myself as to shorten as much as possible the time that we have consumed or are about to consume in the investigation of all these questions.

I think this is a most unusual procedure, but I do not regret it because in a democracy like ours we like to think that the people are fully advised as to all important decisions, whether the decision is to be made by them or by their constitutional authorities that they have set up. So, thank you, General, very, very much for the marvelous memory that you possess, for the great ability which you have shown in all of the high positions which you have occupied, for your frankness, and for your courage in answering the great variety of questions covering such a long period of years.

I marvel at your ability to remember and recall and to refer to all of the many and multitudinous questions which you have been called upon to decide or to participate in.

So, sir, I strike hands with you across the distance from here to the Virginia Military Institute, and wish for you a great occasion and much joy and success and happiness.

INTERROGATIONAL PROCEDURE

Secretary MARSHALL. Thank you, Senator; thank you, sir.

Senator BRIDGES. Mr. Chairman, are we going to decide before tomorrow, and the taking of a new witness, on Senator Morse's motion as to limiting the first round of questioning?

Chairman RUSSELL. I have heard no objection to the course suggested, of limiting each Senator to 30 minutes, in order to expedite the hearing, and get around the table.

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, in fairness to all of our colleagues, some of whom are not here at the moment, I would like to serve notice that I will renew my motion——

Chairman RUSSELL. I had understood that your motion was pending here, to be acted upon prior to another witness being introduced.

Senator MORSE. I meant to renew——

Chairman RUSSELL. The first thing in the morning, the first matter to be considered, will be a vote on Senator Morse's motion, which I am sure you all understand, to limit the questioning to 30 minutes for each Senator, on each round of questions, and that the questioning will be completely exhausted by the time we get through. That will be the pending business in the morning.

Gentlemen, there is one other matter I should bring to your attention. General Bradley has communicated with me and advised me that he and each of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have had some speaking engagements for some months for Armed Services Day, which, of course, is one of the notable days recognized in our country.

The importance of it, as a great day, is as great as it has ever been.

General Bradley will be available on tomorrow and, I think, through Friday noon.

Senator BRIDGES. I think, Mr. Chairman, of course, that the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on the one day of the year when it would be particularly appropriate, and when they would be most pleased at being shown the courtesy, should not be involved before our committee.

Chairman RUSSELL. Thank you, and we will arrange it so as not to interfere with their program on that day; but that does not mean that we won't have a hearing on Armed Forces Day.

Senator KNOWLAND. One question, Mr. Chairman, on the list of information which you indicated to Mr. Larkin, I think, either yesterday or the day before. There was one additional bit of information which I do not think we have yet received. On the day before these hearings commenced, when you first brought up the Wake Island report, you recall that we requested a list of those that had been entitled to receive a copy of the, I think, 40 copies that were distributed, and that information has not been supplied to the committee as yet.

Mr. LARKIN. No, sir; it has not, but now I will have a little time to check into that matter for you, sir.

Secretary MARSHALL. General Bradley controlled that, and he can give you that information.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Sparkman.

Senator SPARKMAN. Along that same line, I had intended to ask—and forgot when questioning General Marshall—if we might not have a listing of the members of the United Nations, showing not just the contributions that they have actually made, and which have actually been received in Korea as General Marshall gave that several days ago, but to offers that have been made at any time, and the disposition that has been made of them.

Mr. LARKIN. We will get that for you.

Chairman RUSSELL. The committee will stand recessed until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.

(Thereupon, at 1:09 p. m., the committee stood in recess.)

